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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

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JAMES ANDERSON,
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No. 14-2-51133-0
Plaintiff,

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DEFENDANTS’ TRIAL BRIEF

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vs.

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SCOTT HAYLES, LORI HAYLES, the
marital community of SCOTT HAYLES and
LORI HAYLES; and their minor children
MATTHEW HAYLES, NATHAN HAYLES,
and ANDREW HAYLES;

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Defendants.

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I. INTRODUCTION

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The plaintiff, JAMES ANDERSON, claims that one or more of the defendants
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shot and killed his dog on or about March 10, 2014. The defendants deny this allegation
and each of the plaintiff’s claims against them.

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Scott and Lori Hayles are the parents of minor boys Matthew Hayles, Nathan

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Hayles and Andrew Hayles. The court file will reflect that, on or about June 29, 2015,

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the plaintiff amended his complaint to specifically identify the minor boys as named

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defendants in this litigation.
The plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint asserts the following causes of action

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against the Hayles family:

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DEF. TRIAL BRIEF - 1

LAW OFFICES OF RAYMOND SCHUTTS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
24001 E. MISSION AVE., SUITE 101
LIBERTY LAKE, WA 99019
(509) 944-2171
FAX (866) 546-4981

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1. Conversion / trespass to chattels

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2. Gross negligence* / recklessness*

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3. Negligence (including misrepresentation*1)

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4. Fraud / Intentional concealment, and
5. Civil conspiracy.

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II. TRIAL ISSUES

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a. Plaintiff’s burdens of proof.

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Plaintiff’s fraud, negligent misrepresentation and civil conspiracy claims require

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him to prove each of the applicable elements of those claims by a “clear, cogent, and

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convincing”

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standard.

See

WPI

160.03

(fraud);

WPI

165.06

(negligent

misrepresentation); and Woody v. Stapp, 146 Wn. App. 16, 22 (Div. 3, 2008). “Mere
suspicion or commonality of interests is insufficient to prove a conspiracy.” All Star Gas,
Inc. v. Bechard, 100 Wn. App. 732, 740 (Div. 3, 2000). If not otherwise addressed
herein, the plaintiff’s remaining causes of action must be proven by a preponderance of
evidence.

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b. Damages

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General Damages: The plaintiff attempts to blur legal lines in his measure of

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damages instructions when he would have this court instruct the jury that they may
consider what are typically described as “general damages”. Specifically, in his
proposed instructions, the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for “loss of enjoyment of
life” and his “mental, physical, and emotional pain and suffering experienced and which

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with reasonable probability will be experienced in the future.” See non-pattern plaintiff’s

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proposed jury instruction P3. Note further that there is no specific claim for negligent

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infliction of emotional distress.

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In this case, it is clear that the plaintiff sustained no direct physical injury as a
result of the defendant’s alleged negligent conduct. However, even in those cases, our
courts have previously held that the plaintiff must prove “objective symptomatology”

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* Based on communications with plaintiff’s counsel, the undersigned was advised that these claims have
been withdrawn. The parties intend to make a record of those withdrawn claims on Day 1 of trial.

DEF. TRIAL BRIEF - 2

LAW OFFICES OF RAYMOND SCHUTTS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
24001 E. MISSION AVE., SUITE 101
LIBERTY LAKE, WA 99019
(509) 944-2171
FAX (866) 546-4981

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which is “susceptible to medical diagnosis and proved through medical evidence.” Hegel

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v. McMahon, 136 Wn.2d 122, 135 (1998).

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The plaintiff will present no medical evidence or testimony from a medical doctor
speaking to any diagnosis of his which can be related to his dog’s death. See plaintiff’s
list of witnesses and exhibits. As a result, the jury should not be instructed or be allowed

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to consider this as an element of plaintiff’s compensable damages.

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Loss of use: In discovery responses, the plaintiff has denied any economic loss

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claim and, accordingly, has declined to produce income tax returns. Notwithstanding, he

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cites the Straka Trucking case in his trial brief at page 5 for the proposition that he is

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entitled to loss of use “until payment is made by the defendant”. That case involved the

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total destruction of the plaintiff company’s logging truck. The plaintiff claimed damages
for loss of use beginning with the date of the accident to the date when the tortfeasor
paid for the truck (April 1, 1996 to June 12, 1996).
The clear language of the opinion does not support the plaintiff’s claim for
damages. Relevant quotes from the case provide as follows:
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“In general, the plaintiff can almost always recover some measure of

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damages for a reasonable period of lost use.” Straka Trucking, Inc. v. Estate

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of Peterson, 98 Wn. App. 209, 211 (Div. 2, 1999) (emphasis added).

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“Any such claim is subject to normal requirements on special damages,
duplication of damages, and mitigation of damages.” Id. at 212 (emphasis

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added).
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“On remand, Straka has the burden of proving the reasonableness of the
period of time for which it claims loss of use.” Id. at 214.

Based on the foregoing, and despite the plaintiff’s contention to the contrary, his
“loss of use” damages, if any, are not open ended.
Intrinsic value: The plaintiff devotes the vast majority of his trial brief (pages 5 to
13) as an attempt to conflate “intrinsic value” with “emotional distress” or “loss of
companionship”. To date, Washington courts have provided little guidance as to what a

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DEF. TRIAL BRIEF - 3

LAW OFFICES OF RAYMOND SCHUTTS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
24001 E. MISSION AVE., SUITE 101
LIBERTY LAKE, WA 99019
(509) 944-2171
FAX (866) 546-4981

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jury may consider for purposes of “intrinsic value” in a deceased pet case. Instead, our

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courts have generally advised what intrinsic value is not as follows:

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suffered because of injury or threatened injury to a pet.” Pickford v.

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“No Washington court has extended the Hunsley rule to emotional distress

Masion, 124 Wn. App. 257, 260 (Div. 2, 2004).
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“[W]e decline to extend to loss of companionship for death or injury to a
pet.” Id. at 263.

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The plaintiff also relies on the Womack case in support of his damages claim. In

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that case, the plaintiff received an award from the court by way of default judgment.

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Womack is distinguishable from our case because there Division 3 held “a new action

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and remedy for malicious injury to a pet exists in Washington State.” Womack v. Von

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Rardon, 133 Wn. App. 254, 257 (Div. 3, 2006). The plaintiff in our case has not pled
malicious injury to his pet. Womack and the appellate court’s discussion of damages in

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a malicious pet injury case are inapplicable to the plaintiff’s damages in the case at bar.

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III. CONCLUSION

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Based on the foregoing argument and authority, the defendant respectfully

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requests that the jury be instructed as to the laws of Washington as they currently exist

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and not how the plaintiff perceives them to be.

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DATED this _____ day of July, 2016.

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LAW OFFICES OF RAYMOND SCHUTTS

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_______________________________
Daniel E. Stowe, WSBA#27281
Attorney for Defendant

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DEF. TRIAL BRIEF - 4

LAW OFFICES OF RAYMOND SCHUTTS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
24001 E. MISSION AVE., SUITE 101
LIBERTY LAKE, WA 99019
(509) 944-2171
FAX (866) 546-4981

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _____day of July, 2016, I sent for delivery a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Defendants’ Trial Brief by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
Adam P. Karp
Animal Law Offices of Adam P. Karp
114 W. Magnolia St., Ste. 425
Bellingham, WA 98225

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U.S. MAIL
LEGAL MESSENGER
EMAIL
HAND DELIVERED
EXPRESS DELIVERY
FACSIMILE

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_________________________________
Debi Vocca

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DEF. TRIAL BRIEF - 5

LAW OFFICES OF RAYMOND SCHUTTS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
24001 E. MISSION AVE., SUITE 101
LIBERTY LAKE, WA 99019
(509) 944-2171
FAX (866) 546-4981