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Case No. 16-15469
IN THE

United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
NARUTO, A CRESTED MACAQUE, BY AND THROUGH HIS NEXT FRIENDS,
PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS, INC.,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
––v.––
DAVID JOHN SLATER, WILDLIFE PERSONALITIES, LTD.,
AND BLURB, INC.,
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES,

––––––––
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA IN CASE NO. 3:15-CV-04324,
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE WILLIAM H. ORRICK III
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES DAVID JOHN SLATER
AND WILDLIFE PERSONALITIES, LTD.
ANDREW J. DHUEY
456 Boynton Avenue
Berkeley, California 94707
(510) 528-8200
Attorney for Defendants-Appellees,
David John Slater and
Wildlife Personalities, Ltd.
25 August 2016

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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 26.2 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Defendant-Appellee Wildlife Personalities, Ltd., certifies that it is a private
corporation that has no affiliation with any other corporation. It has no
parent corporation, and no publicly-held corporation owns 10% or more of
its stock.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ............................................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................... iv
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .............................................................. 2
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ................................................ 3
STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACT ................................................ 3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................................................... 4
ARGUMENT:
I.

II.

The Court Should Affirm the District Court’s Judgment of
Dismissal for Lack of Standing .. ............................................... 5
A.

Non-human Animals Lack Standing to Sue for
Copyright Infringement... ................................................ 5

B.

PETA Is Ineligible to Serve as Naruto’s “Next
Friend”... .......................................................................... 8

The Court Should Order PETA to Pay Slater’s Attorney
Fees on Appeal.. ....................................................................... 11
A.

The Court Should Address Slater’s Request for Fees
on Appeal in Its Merits Decision... ................................ 11

B.

Slater Is a “Prevailing Party” under Section 505........... 12

C.

All of the Applicable Factors Favor Awarding Slater
Recovery of His Attorney Fees on Appeal... ................. 14

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D.

1.

Dismissal for Lack of Standing Gives Slater the
Greatest Degree of Success Possible ..................... 14

2.

PETA’s Legal Positions Are Objectively
Unreasonable and Its Appeal Is Frivolous ............. 15

3.

PETA’s Motives in Filing, Prosecuting and
Appealing This Action Were Improper. ................ 17

4.

The Need for Deterrence and Compensation Favors
Awarding Slater His Attorney Fees on Appeal. .... 20

5.

PETA Is Not an Impecunious Litigant................... 23

Attorney Fees under Section 505 May Be Awarded
Against “Next Friend” Litigants... ................................. 24

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 26
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES ........................................................ 26
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH WORD LIMIT ....................... 27
PROOF OF SERVICE .................................................................................. 28

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ........................................................... 3
Beer v. United States, 361 Fed. Appx. 150 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ........................ 22
Beer v. United States, 696 F.3d 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................ 22
Berry v. Hawaiian Express Serv.,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78281 (D. Haw. 2006) ............................................ 18
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. WB Music Corp.,
520 F.3d 588 (6th Cir. 2008) ........................................................................ 21
Brittain v. Superior Court of Napa County,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8861 (N.D. Cal. 1993) ............................................ 25
Cetacean Community v. Bush,
386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004) ........................................ 5-8, 13, 15-19, 21-22
Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v.
New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1993) ........................... 5
Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) .............. 9, 11, 17
Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F.,
118 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 1997) ........................................................................ 24
Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2003) ................ 14, 23
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) .................................. 15, 17-20
Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826 (2011) ................................................................. 25
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)........................................ 9-10
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979 (2016) .............. 12, 14
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L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters TV Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998)...... 12
Lanard Toys, Ltd. v. Novelty, Inc., 375 Fed. Appx. 705 (9th Cir. 2010) ..... 12
Maljack Prods. v. Goodtimes Home Video Corp.,
81 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 1996) .................................................................... 12, 19
Massie ex rel. Kroll v. Woodford, 244 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. 9
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods.,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12469 (C.D. Cal. 2004) .......................................... 18
Minden Pictures, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60901 (N.D. Cal. 2014),
rev’d, 795 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2015) ................................................... 12-13, 15
Moody v. Smith (In re Moody), 105 B.R. 368 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989) ...... 25
O’Toole v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 499 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) ..... 24
Petri v. Kestrel Oil & Gas Props., L.P.,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8695 (S.D. Tex. 2013) ............................................ 24
Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn, 716 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2013) .......................... 13
Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1984).............. 12
T.W. by Enk v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 1997) .................................. 10
Tilikum v. Sea World Parks & Entm’t, Inc.,
842 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (S.D. Cal. 2012) .................................................. 17-20
Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1980) ......................................... 12
PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
Article III .......................................................................................... 10, 13, 22
Thirteenth Amendment ........................................................................... 17, 20

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STATUTES
United States Code,
Title 5, Section 702............................................................................... 6
Title 16, Section 1532(13). ................................................................... 6
Title 16, Section 1540(g)(1)(A)............................................................ 8
Title 17, Section 101............................................................................. 7
Title 17, Section 201............................................................................. 7
Title 17, Section 203 ............................................................................ 7
Title 17, Section 203(a)(2)(A). ............................................................. 7
Title 17, Section 304............................................................................. 7
Title 17, Section 505....................................................... 3, 11-14, 25-26
ACTS OF CONGRESS
Administrative Procedures Act .............................................................. 5-7, 16
Copyright Act......................................................................... 1, 6-8, 13, 20, 25
Endangered Species Act .............................................................................. 5-8
Marine Mammal Protection Act ............................................................ 5-7, 16
National Environmental Protection Act................................................. 5-7, 16
RULES
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(c) ................................................. 21
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(e) .................................................. 22
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38....................................................... 17
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 .............................................................. 25
Ninth Circuit Rule 39.1-1.6 .......................................................................... 11
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Andrew Dhuey, The Great Haste and Less Milling of Beer v. United States,
Patently-O (Aug. 12, 2010), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/08/guest-postthe-great-haste-and-less-milling-of-beer-v-united-states.html
(last visited Aug. 25, 2016)........................................................................... 22
Irell & Manella LLP, Irell Named to IP Hot List by National Law
Journal, June 2016, http://www.irell.com/news-item-470.html (last
visited Aug. 25, 2016)................................................................................... 19
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PETA, Financial Reports, 2015 Financial Statement,
http://www.peta.org/about-peta/learn-about-peta/financial-report/ (last
visited Aug. 25, 2016).............................................................................. 23-24
PETA, UPDATE: ‘Monkey Selfie’ Case Brings Animal Rights Into Focus,
http://www.peta.org/blog/monkey-selfie-case-animal-rights-focus/, Jan. 6,
2016 (last visited Aug. 25, 2016).................................................................. 20
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform, Lawsuit on
Behalf of Monkey Tops Poll of Year’s Most Ridiculous Lawsuits,
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/lawsuit-on-behalf-ofmonkey-tops-poll-of-years-most-ridiculous-lawsuits (last visited Aug.
25, 2016) ......................................................................................................... 1
Wall Street Journal Law Blog, Leading Questions: A Chat with PETA
Lawyer Jeff Kerr, June 6, 2016,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/06/06/leading-questions-a-chat-with-petalawyer-jeff-kerr/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2016) ............................................... 20

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INTRODUCTION
This case – winner of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Most
Ridiculous Lawsuit of 2015 award1 – is poised to retain its title in 2016. Last
year, an animal rights organization, People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals, Inc. (“PETA”), and a primatologist, Antje Engelhardt, Ph.D.,
walked into federal court, claimed to be a monkey’s “next friends” and sued
for infringement of the monkey’s claimed copyright. To no one’s surprise,
the district court dismissed the case for lack of statutory standing.
On appeal, the crazy got crazier. Dr. Engelhardt withdrew from the
case. That leaves PETA, which does not allege any relationship with the
monkey, as the monkey’s sole next friend.
Under controlling Ninth Circuit precedent, monkey see, monkey sue
is not good law under any Act of Congress unless the legislative text plainly
grants non-human animals standing to sue. It is undisputed that Congress
never plainly said that non-human animals could have standing under the
Copyright Act. And even if Congress had taken that extraordinary step of
granting statutory standing to animals, separate Ninth Circuit precedent

1

U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform, Lawsuit on Behalf
of Monkey Tops Poll of Year’s Most Ridiculous Lawsuits,
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/lawsuit-on-behalf-ofmonkey-tops-poll-of-years-most-ridiculous-lawsuits (last visited Aug. 25,
2016).
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requires that a next friend of a litigant have a significant relationship with
the party it purports to represent.
There can be little serious debate that affirmance of the dismissal in
this case is required under two separate lines of controlling authority. The
only serious question on appeal is whether the Court should order PETA to
pay the attorney fees on appeal of Defendants-Appellees. It should. PETA
has unfairly and needlessly forced Defendants-Appellees to address legal
positions that are wholly unreasonable under current law.
If PETA had wanted to assert a good faith challenge to existing law, it
should have conceded that controlling authority required affirmance of the
district court’s dismissal. Then PETA, with little expenditure of party or
judicial resources, could have filed a petition for en banc hearing, and
possibly a petition for certiorari at the Supreme Court. That candid and
forthright appellate approach would have been minimally burdensome to all
involved.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendants-Appellees David John Slater and Wildlife Personalities,
Ltd. (henceforth, “Slater”) agree with Plaintiff-Appellant’s jurisdictional
statement.

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COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether a non-human animal can have statutory standing to sue for
copyright infringement.

2.

Whether under 17 U.S.C. § 505, this Court should award DefendantsAppellees their reasonable attorney fees on appeal against Next Friend
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc.

STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACT
The only pertinent fact in this case is that Naruto is a monkey suing
for copyright infringement.
PETA’s factual allegations reveal its misunderstanding of how the
Monkey Selfie photograph came to be, but those mistaken and immaterial
allegations must be accepted as true in PETA’s appeal of the pleading-stage
dismissal. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If the Court is
curious to know the true story of the world-famous Monkey Selfie, it is
available at Slater’s website.2
Slater, an award-winning nature photographer, set up what became the
Monkey Selfie in the course of several grueling days in an Indonesian
jungle. Developing a keen understanding of their subjects is a critical skill

2

http://www.djsphotography.co.uk/original_story.html
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for any professional photographer, and that was vital here for Slater as he
slowly built a trustful, friendly relationship with a group of crested macaque
monkeys. Only a talented human photographer could have made the artistic
choices involving camera lens width, positions and settings (e.g., predictive
autofocus, motorwind, and flashgun). PETA insults all professional
photographers with the suggestion that seeing your reflection in a lens and
pressing a shutter button – by itself – entitles one to a copyright for the
photograph, even when someone else made the critical artistic decisions that
resulted in a photographic work adored by millions worldwide.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court should affirm the dismissal for lack of standing because
Congress did not plainly say that non-human animals can have standing to
sue for copyright infringement. Additionally, the Court should affirm the
dismissal because PETA, the only remaining purported “next friend” of
Naruto, has alleged no relationship with him, as is required for “next friend”
eligibility.
Also, the Court should order PETA to pay Slater’s appellate-stage
attorney fees, the amount thereof for the district to determine on remand.
PETA’s positions are objectively unreasonable and its motivation in
prosecuting this action is improper. PETA should be deterred from bringing
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such a frivolous action again, and Slater should be compensated for enduring
this case.

ARGUMENT
I.

The Court Should Affirm the District Court’s Judgment of
Dismissal for Lack of Standing.
A.

Non-human Animals Lack Standing to Sue for Copyright
Infringement.

“[I]f Congress and the President intended to take the extraordinary
step of authorizing animals as well as people and legal entities to sue, they
could, and should, have said so plainly.” Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386
F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Citizens to End Animal Suffering
& Exploitation, Inc. v. New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D.
Mass. 1993)). In Cetacean Community, this Court rejected the notion that
non-human animals could have standing under four Acts of Congress: the
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”), Marine Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”), and the National
Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”). 386 F.3d at 1176-79. None of the
four Acts expressly excluded non-human animals from having statutory
standing, but all four lacked the requisite plain statement indicating
legislative intent to take that “extraordinary step” in federal jurisprudence.
Id. at 1179.
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The four statutes at issue in Cetacean Community differ on the
question of standing. The APA provides judicial relief for a “person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action”. Id. at 1176 (quoting 5
U.S.C. § 702). The ESA grants standing to a “person”, which is defined to
include an “individual”. Id. at 1177 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13)). The
MMPA and NEPA contain no explicit grant of standing. Id. at 1178-79.
What they all have in common, though, is no explicit standing grant for nonhuman animals, and thus the plaintiff cetaceans failed to satisfy the plain
statement standing requirement:
But, as with the ESA, these cases do not instruct us to expand
the basic definition of “person” beyond the definition provided
in the APA. . . . Absent a clear direction from Congress in
either the MMPA or the APA, we hold that animals do not have
standing to enforce the permit requirement of the MMPA. . . .
[W]e see nothing in either NEPA or the APA that would permit
us to hold that animals who are part of the environment have
standing to bring suit on their own behalf.
Id. at 1178-79 (emphasis added).
It is undisputed that Congress did not say “plainly” or give a “clear
direction” that non-human animals have standing to sue under the Copyright
Act. Indeed, much like with the ESA (see Cetacean Community, 386 F.3d at
1178-79), several provisions of the Copyright Act strongly indicate that an
individual “author” must be a human. The “children” of an “author” can
inherit certain rights, “whether legitimate or not” and that includes “children
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legally adopted” by the author. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201, 203 and 304. An
author’s “widow or widower owns the author’s entire termination interest
unless there are any surviving children or grandchildren of the author, in
which case the widow or widower owns one-half of the author’s interest.”
§ 203(a)(2)(A).
In sum, Cetacean Community set forth a straightforward test for nonhuman animal statutory standing, and the Copyright Act fails that test. If
only all standing analyses were so easy.
At the district court, PETA argued that Cetacean Community involved
a different statute than the Copyright Act, and as such is distinguishable.
According to PETA, there is a critical difference between the ESA, which
defines “person” to include an “individual”, and the Copyright Act, which
does not define “author”. PETA Br. 11-12. PETA thus ignores how the APA
does not define “person”, and how the MMPA and NEPA do not even have
explicit grants of statutory standing. The terms “person”, “individual” and
“author” could possibly include non-human animals. But the standing
inquiry under Cetacean Community is not about possibilities; it is rather a
simple question of whether the applicable Act of Congress plainly and
clearly directs that non-human animals have standing to sue. Id. at 1179.

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On appeal, PETA raises a new argument about Cetacean Community:
“[T]he statutes at issue in Cetacean represented a waiver of the United
States’ sovereign immunity, and such waivers, unlike the Copyright Act, are
narrowly construed.” PETA Br. 11. But the holding in Cetacean Community
is not at all based on or related to sovereign immunity or its waiver. Indeed,
nowhere in Cetacean Community did this Court ever mention sovereign
immunity or the canon of narrow construction for waivers of sovereign
immunity. Moreover, the citizen-suit provision of the ESA provides that a
“person may commence a civil suit . . . to enjoin any person, including the
United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency.” 16
U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A). It would be a strange interpretive result if the
definition of the “person” entitled to sue under the ESA were construed
broadly or narrowly, depending on whether the defendant is a public entity.
Indeed, if PETA is right about this Court’s sub silentio holding in Cetacean
Community, a plaintiff could be a “person” and not a “person” in the same
ESA case with both public and private defendants.

B.

PETA Is Ineligible to Serve as Naruto’s “Next Friend”.

“In order to establish next-friend standing, the putative next friend
must show: (1) that the petitioner is unable to litigate his own cause due to
mental incapacity, lack of access to court, or other similar disability; and (2)
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the next friend has some significant relationship with, and is truly dedicated
to the best interests of, the petitioner.” Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d
1153, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Massie ex rel. Kroll v. Woodford,
244 F.3d 1192, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001)) (emphasis added).
Two putative next friends filed this action: PETA and Dr. Engelhardt,
a primatologist who alleged that she has “known, monitored, and studied
Naruto since his birth.” ER 23. It may well be that the relationship with
Naruto Dr. Engelhardt alleged is “significant” under Coalition of Clergy v.
Bush. However, Dr. Engelhardt moved to withdraw from the case, informing
the Court that she “will not continue as a next friend to Appellant in this
proceeding.”3 This Court granted Dr. Engelhardt’s motion, thus leaving
PETA as Naruto’s lone putative next friend.4
Unlike Dr. Engelhardt, PETA did not allege any relationship with
Naruto, much less a significant one. That is a problem on appeal. PETA is
now in a position very much like the ballot initiative defenders in
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013): a party necessary for
standing at the district court is not participating in the appeal. “[S]tanding
must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by

3

Docket entry no. 10, May 4, 2016.

4

Docket entry no. 14, May 18, 2016.
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persons appearing in courts of first instance.” Id. at 2661 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
All of the Naruto relationship allegations in the Complaint concern
Dr. Engelhardt; none involve PETA. See ER 21-23. PETA alleges,
essentially, that it is an animal rights advocacy organization: “PETA is the
largest animal rights organization in the world and operates, in part, under
the principle that, as sentient beings, animals have rights that are or should
be recognized in law and protected by courts.” ER 23. PETA alleges no
connection to Naruto, an Indonesian monkey who lives roughly 10,000
miles from PETA’s headquarters in Virginia.
[A]llowing a complete stranger to bring suit in their name as
their next friend because they cannot sue on their own behalf
would not violate Article III. But it might well offend the policy
behind the requirement of standing, which is to confine the
right to initiate and control federal court litigation to persons
who have a concrete stake, rather than merely an ideological
interest – passionate and motivating as such interests can be –
in the litigation. Without such a limitation, not only would the
federal courts be flooded by “cause” suits (really flooded), but
people who did have concrete stakes in a litigation would often
be thrust aside by the ideologues.
T.W. by Enk v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations
omitted).
However passionate PETA may be about establishing monkey
standing for copyright infringement suits, that passion is not a “significant
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relationship” with Naruto under Coalition of Clergy v. Bush. If it were, then
hundreds and perhaps thousands of animal charities would be eligible next
friends of Naruto, qualified to bring suit on his behalf.

II.

The Court Should Order PETA to Pay Slater’s Attorney Fees on
Appeal.
Slater requests that should the Court affirm the judgment of dismissal,

the Court also award him his attorney fees on appeal under 17 U.S.C. § 505.
Slater’s attorney fees on appeal should be awarded against PETA, the party
responsible for this appeal.

A.

The Court Should Address Slater’s Request for Fees on
Appeal in Its Merits Decision.

By stipulation, the parties have deferred the question of trial courtstage attorney fees until the resolution of this appeal. ER 8. It would thus be
judicially efficient to award Slater his fees on appeal, but remand for the
district court the determination of the amount of those fees. The district court
can then determine the amount at the same time that it considers Slater’s
motion for fees incurred in district court proceedings.
The Court has discretion to defer the question of fees on appeal to the
post-decision procedure set forth in Ninth Circuit Rule 39.1-1.6, but Slater
respectfully submits that addressing his request in the merits opinion would
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be more judicially efficient. Unlike cases where statutes or contractual
provisions automatically entitle a prevailing party to attorney fees, Section
505 fee determinations are discretionary. An “important factor” in the
Court’s exercise of that discretion is the “objective reasonableness” of the
losing party’s legal positions. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S.
Ct. 1979, 1988 (2016). Given the obvious unreasonableness of PETA’s
positions, this case is well-suited for consideration of an appellate-level fee
award in a consolidated single opinion. Often the Court has taken this
approach and awarded fees on appeal in merits opinions of cases, leaving the
amount of the fee award to the district court’s determination on remand.5

B.

Slater Is a “Prevailing Party” under Section 505.

The Copyright Act permits courts to “award a reasonable attorney’s
fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. In Minden
Pictures, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60901
(N.D. Cal. 2014), the district court considered whether a defendant who wins
5

See, e.g., Lanard Toys, Ltd. v. Novelty, Inc., 375 Fed. Appx. 705, 714 (9th
Cir. 2010) (fees on appeal awarded to prevailing copyright case litigant
under § 505; determination of amount for the district court on remand); L.A.
News Serv. v. Reuters TV Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 1998)
(same); Maljack Prods. v. Goodtimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 89091 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d
587, 588-91 (9th Cir. 1984) (same in ERISA case); Williams v. Alioto, 625
F.2d 845, 850 (9th Cir. 1980) (same in civil rights action).
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a dismissal for lack of standing is a “prevailing party” eligible for a fee
award under Section 505. After a thorough review of applicable Ninth
Circuit and Supreme Court authorities, including Cetacean Community, the
district court concluded that because a dismissal for lack of statutory
standing does not implicate a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it has the
power to award attorney fees to the prevailing party under Section 505. Id. at
*7-20. This Court reversed the district court on the merits in Minden
Pictures, but without comment on the fees issue, which became moot after
the reversal. 795 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2015).
This case presents the Court with an opportunity to clarify that a
defendant who obtains a dismissal for lack of statutory standing is a
“prevailing party” for purposes of a fee-shifting statute. Righthaven LLC v.
Hoehn, 716 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2013) is not to the contrary, and even
if it were, it would conflict with earlier Ninth Circuit precedents and a later
Supreme Court decision. See Minden Pictures, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
60901 at *10-12, *17-18. Under Cetacean Community, Article III does not
preclude constitutional standing for a monkey or any other non-human
animal in federal court. 386 F.3d at 1175. Naturo lacks only statutory
standing under the Copyright Act, and thus this Court has subject matter

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jurisdiction over his claim of infringement, and it has discretion to award
Slater his attorney fees under Section 505.

C.

All of the Applicable Factors Favor Awarding Slater
Recovery of His Attorney Fees on Appeal.

In deciding whether to award fees, the Court should consider, among
other things: the degree of success obtained on the claim; frivolousness and
the objective reasonableness of the losing party’s positions; the losing
party’s motivation and the need for compensation and deterrence. Kirtsaeng,
136 S. Ct. at 1985. Courts in the Ninth Circuit also consider “whether the
chilling effect of attorney’s fees may be too great or impose an inequitable
burden on an impecunious plaintiff.” Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323
F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003). All of these factors favor granting Slater his
attorney fees on appeal.

1.

Dismissal for Lack of Standing Gives Slater the Greatest
Degree of Success Possible.

Should the Court affirm the district court’s dismissal on the ground
that non-human animals lack statutory standing to sue for copyright
infringement, Slater will have achieved the greatest degree of success
possible in this litigation. Unlike cases where a lack of standing dismissal
left open the possibility that the defendant would face an infringement suit
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by another party,6 affirmance here would mean that no monkey and no
purported “next friend” of a monkey could ever have standing to sue Slater
for copyright infringement of the Monkey Selfie, or any of Slater’s other
photographs.

2.

PETA’s Legal Positions Are Objectively Unreasonable and
Its Appeal Is Frivolous.

Each of PETA’s positions on appeal is objectively unreasonable under
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534, n. 19 (1994). Taken together,
PETA’s arguments and omissions render its appeal frivolous.
Non-human animal statutory standing under Cetacean Community
could not be simpler: if an Act of Congress plainly states that non-humans
can have standing, they can; if not, they cannot have standing. 386 F.3d at
1179. That is exactly how the district court understood this Court’s holding
in Cetacean Community. ER 15-16. Nonetheless, PETA omits in its appeal
any discussion of the plain statement standing requirement of Cetacean
Community.

6

See, e.g., Minden Pictures, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60901 at *20-21 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (degree of success for publisher
that won dismissal for lack of standing mitigated by fact that it remained
subject to suit by individual photographers), rev’d on other grounds, 795
F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2015).
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Instead of addressing the express holding in Cetacean Community,
PETA attempts to limit its reach to cases where sovereign immunity is at
issue. PETA Br. 11. But this Court never even mentioned sovereign
immunity in Cetacean Community; nor did it say or imply that it was
construing statutory language narrowly. It is unreasonable to argue that
binding precedent can be disregarded based on a doctrine and on a canon of
construction never discussed in the applicable decision.
Moreover, PETA’s claim that “the statutes at issue in Cetacean
actually define who has standing” is patently false with regard to two of the
Acts of Congress at issue: the MMPA and the NEPA. “As is true of the
MMPA, no provision of NEPA explicitly grants any person or entity
standing to enforce the statute, but judicial enforcement of NEPA rights is
available through the APA.” 386 F.3d at 1179 (citation omitted). PETA
asserts a “contrast” in that “the Copyright Act makes no attempt to define
those who have standing.” PETA Br. 12. But there is no contrast whatsoever
on that point between the Copyright Act on the one hand, and the MMPA
and NEPA on the other.
PETA compounds the frivolity of this appeal by maintaining it even
after Dr. Engelhardt has withdrawn from the case. In its principal brief,
PETA makes no mention of Dr. Engelhardt’s withdrawal, nor does it address
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the resulting “next friend” standing problem. PETA has not alleged a
“significant relationship” with Naruto as is required under Coalition of
Clergy v. Bush. In fact, PETA alleges no relationship with Naruto at all.
Given PETA’s inability to make any reasonable arguments for why
two separate lines of controlling Ninth Circuit authority do not require
affirmance, PETA’s appeal does not satisfy the requirement of Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 38 (frivolous appeal). PETA’s positions fall well
below the more demanding standard of objective reasonableness under
Fogerty.

3.

PETA’s Motives in Filing, Prosecuting and Appealing This
Action Were Improper.

Indications of PETA’s improper motive in filing, prosecuting and
appealing this case include: i) PETA’s pre-filing familiarity with Cetacean
Community, ii) PETA’s access to sophisticated counsel and iii) PETA’s
celebratory press release on its website accompanied by a request for
donations.
In 2011, PETA filed suit as “next friends” of five orcas “held by
[SeaWorld] in violation of Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, which prohibits slavery and involuntary
servitude.” Tilikum v. Sea World Parks & Entm’t, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d
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1259, 1260 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting complaint). PETA resisted SeaWorld’s
motion to dismiss by citing, among other cases, Cetacean Community.7
The Tilikum court agreed with PETA that Cetacean Community was a
relevant precedent, but one that supported SeaWorld’s arguments for
dismissal:
The court notes that while “[a]nimals have many legal rights,
protected under both federal and state laws” which provide for
the humane treatment and criminalizing cruelty to animals, only
human beings have standing to bring such actions. . . . “It is
obvious that an animal cannot function as a plaintiff in the same
manner as a juridically competent human being.”
842 F. Supp. 2d at 1262, n. 1 (quoting Cetacean Community, 386 F.3d at
1175-76).
Courts in this circuit analyzing the motivation factor of Fogerty have
considered whether a losing party had access to counsel who could warn
them that they were asserting an objectively unreasonable position.8 Here,

7

ECF 3:11-cv-02476, Dkt. no. 14, p. 21 (S.D. Cal. filed Jan. 13, 2012).

8

See, e.g., Berry v. Hawaiian Express Serv., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78281
at *28 (D. Haw. 2006) (“This Court also finds that Plaintiff’s pursuit of
claims against Guidance, in spite of notice that its copying constituted fair
use, is a strong indication that he had an improper motivation. Plaintiff had
access to counsel who could have easily determined that such claims were
without legal and factual basis.”); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12469 at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“Plaintiff’s conduct also
does not appear to be motivated by the protection of a valid interest. Plaintiff
had access to sophisticated counsel who could have determined that such a
suit was objectively unreasonable and frivolous.”).
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the same PETA in-house counsel who appeared in Tilikum are also counsel
in this case.9 PETA’s outside counsel in this action are indisputably
sophisticated in the field of intellectual property.10 PETA’s counsel could
and should have determined that it was objectively unreasonable to assert
that Cetacean Community left open the possibility of non-human animal
standing under an Act of Congress that does not plainly say that non-human
animals have standing.
After the district court hearing where Judge Orrick indicated his
intention to dismiss this action for lack of standing, PETA explained how,
from its perspective, it wins even while it loses.11 “Despite this setback, we
are celebrating that legal history was made in our unprecedented argument to
a federal court that Naruto, a crested macaque monkey, should be the owner

9

Compare 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1259 (counsel list) with ER 19 (complaint
cover).
10

See Irell & Manella LLP, Irell Named to IP Hot List by National Law
Journal, June 2016, http://www.irell.com/news-item-470.html (last visited
Aug. 25, 2016).
11

With regard to the Fogerty motivation factor, the Court may consider
statements of PETA’s general counsel made outside of the evidentiary
record where the authenticity of the statements is not in doubt. See Maljack
Prods. v. Goodtimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 889, n. 12 (9th Cir.
1996) (“The district court did not err in considering [unauthenticated internal
corporate] documents as indicators of MPI’s motivation, however; MPI
produced the documents to GoodTimes, many of the documents were on
MPI letterhead and MPI does not contest their authenticity.”).
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of property . . . rather than a mere piece of property himself,” said PETA’s
general counsel.12 At the bottom of this quoted press release on PETA’s
website, readers were invited to click the “Donate Now” button. Id.
Similarly, PETA’s general counsel recently explained how PETA
“won” while losing in Tilikum: “[W]e were trying to break barriers when we
sued SeaWorld, claiming under the 13th Amendment that five orcas were
enslaved. The judge wasn’t willing to make that step, but just being in the
courtroom arguing that case was a victory.”13
Asserting objectively unreasonable legal positions for the purpose of
making “legal history” indicates an improper motive under Fogerty. Such
litigation conduct suggests that PETA saw pursuing this surefire loser of a
case for copyright infringement as a means to gain publicity and donations.
That is inconsistent with the purposes of the Copyright Act.

4.

The Need for Deterrence and Compensation Favors
Awarding Slater His Attorney Fees on Appeal.

12

PETA, UPDATE: ‘Monkey Selfie’ Case Brings Animal Rights Into
Focus, http://www.peta.org/blog/monkey-selfie-case-animal-rights-focus/,
Jan. 6, 2016 (last visited Aug. 25, 2016).
13

Wall Street Journal Law Blog, Leading Questions: A Chat with PETA
Lawyer Jeff Kerr, June 6, 2016,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/06/06/leading-questions-a-chat-with-petalawyer-jeff-kerr/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2016).
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Courts should deter copyright plaintiffs from irresponsibly pressing
legal positions that clearly conflict with controlling precedent. Doing so is
wasteful of the courts’ and the parties’ resources. See Bridgeport Music, Inc.
v. WB Music Corp., 520 F.3d 588, 595 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t was not an
abuse of discretion for the district court to award fees and costs against the
company in the hope of motivating it to litigate in a more responsible,
realistic manner and to deter it from continuing to engage in questionable
litigation tactics.”).
Here, it was irresponsible of PETA to contend that Cetacean
Community does not require dismissal for lack of standing, and to maintain
its appeal even after Dr. Engelhardt withdrew from the case. A realistic,
responsible approach for PETA would have been to concede from the start
that Cetacean Community requires dismissal of this case for lack of
standing. After a stipulated judgment at the district court, PETA could then
have presented its non-human animal standing argument to the active
members of this Court in a petition for initial hearing en banc (a proceeding
where Cetacean Community does not bind the judges). Fed. R. App. P.
35(c). That would have imposed little burden on the district court, this Court
or the defendants. No defendant would have even been permitted to file a

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response to PETA’s petition unless the Court had requested one. Fed. R.
App. P. 35(e).
A group of then-current and retired Article III judges modeled the
responsible way to challenge controlling precedent when they sued for
recovery of back pay. Beer v. United States, 361 Fed. Appx. 150 (Fed. Cir.
2010).14 At the Court of Federal Claims, the judges conceded that binding
Federal Circuit precedent required dismissal of their action. Id. at 151. At the
Federal Circuit, the judges filed a petition for initial hearing en banc, directly
challenging the binding precedent. Id. Should that petition be denied, the
judges acknowledged, affirmance of the dismissal would be required. Id. at
151-52. After an appellate journey that included a trip to the Supreme Court,
the judges prevailed. 696 F.3d 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Throughout the
litigation, the judges were careful never to waste judicial or governmental
resources by pressing a legal position that was clearly untenable under the
controlling precedent they were challenging.
Giving PETA’s appeal a most generous interpretation, it is at best an
attempt to overturn or at least limit the reach of the categorical holding in
Cetacean Community. Fair enough – that is something for the Court to
14

See Andrew Dhuey, The Great Haste and Less Milling of Beer v. United
States, Patently-O (Aug. 12, 2010),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/08/guest-post-the-great-haste-and-lessmilling-of-beer-v-united-states.html
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consider upon the filing of an en banc petition. But even with this generous
interpretation, it was and is unfair for PETA to force the district court, a
three-judge panel of this Court and the defendants to address legal positions
that are unreasonable under controlling Ninth Circuit authority. Awarding
Slater his fees on appeal would fairly compensate him for the enduring what
PETA unnecessarily forced him to endure. It would also deter PETA and
similarly-situated parties from engaging in irresponsible litigation conduct in
other cases.

5.

PETA Is Not an Impecunious Litigant.

An attorney fees award against PETA would not have a “chilling
effect . . . or impose an inequitable burden on an impecunious plaintiff.” EtsHokin, 323 F.3d at 766 (citation omitted). PETA alleged in the complaint
that it “has the financial and operational resources and the professional
expertise to administer and protect Naruto’s copyright in the Monkey
Selfies.” ER 23. Indeed, PETA reports its considerable financial resources
on its website: “Total [2015] Revenues $44,923,150. . . . Net Assets End of

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[2015] $16,482,262”.15 PETA could easily afford to satisfy an attorney fees
award in this case.

D.

Attorney Fees under Section 505 May Be Awarded Against
“Next Friend” Litigants.

PETA’s status as a purported “next friend” of Naturo, rather than as a
named plaintiff, has no bearing on whether it should bear liability for
Slater’s attorney fees. Courts have taxed costs against “next friends” of
losing party plaintiffs, despite contentions that their representational status
should insulate them from liability.16 Likewise, courts have imposed and

15

PETA,
Financial
Reports,
2015
Financial
Statement,
http://www.peta.org/about-peta/learn-about-peta/financial-report/
(last
visited Aug. 25, 2016); see O’Toole v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 499 F.3d
1218, 1224-25 (10th Cir. 2007) (abuse of discretion for district court not to
take judicial notice of financial data on defendant’s website, the accuracy of
which defendant did not dispute).
16

Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 256 (5th
Cir. 1997); Petri v. Kestrel Oil & Gas Props., L.P., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8695 at *18-22 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (“Here Petri has not cited any authority for
not following the law regarding taxing costs against the losing party because
it was a ‘next friend’ nor precedent within this Circuit for equitable
exceptions.”).
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threatened attorney fees sanctions against “next friends” under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11.17
Slater is unaware of any case where a court considered whether to
award attorney fees against a “next friend” pursuant to a fee-shifting statute.
Perhaps this is because the typical case in which a “next friend” appears is
on behalf of a relative who is the named plaintiff in a civil rights action. The
fee-shifting statute in federal civil rights cases “allows a defendant to
recover reasonable attorney’s fees incurred because of, but only because of,
a frivolous claim.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 836 (2011). Given that other
rules provide attorney fee sanctions against litigants who prosecute frivolous
claims, there will seldom be reason for federal courts to consider awarding
fees under a fee-shifting statute against a “next friend” litigant.
Still, this is the exceptional case (in so many ways). It would greatly
frustrate the purposes of the Copyright Act if putative “next friends” could
shield themselves from liability under Section 505 simply because they are
not the named plaintiff. There could be cases such as this one where all of
the applicable factors favor awarding fees to the prevailing party. What cold

17

Moody v. Smith (In re Moody), 105 B.R. 368, 372 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989)
(“The violations by Ms. Youngs discussed above are not overcome by her
argument that she is the ‘next friend’ of the Debtor.”); Brittain v. Superior
Court of Napa County, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8861 at *18-19 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
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comfort it would be for a prevailing defendant to win a fee award that is
enforceable against a judgment-proof named plaintiff, but not the party
solely responsible for filing and prosecuting the action. Nothing in Section
505 suggests that Congress meant to permit that unjust result.

CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the judgment of dismissal for lack of
statutory standing. The Court should also award Slater his attorney fees on
appeal against PETA, the amount thereof to be determined by the district
court on remand.

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ ANDREW J. DHUEY
Attorney for Defendants-Appellees,
DAVID JOHN SLATER and
WILDLIFE PERSONALITIES, LTD.

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
Slater is unaware of any related cases.

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X

5,541

X
Microsoft Word 2010
14-point Times New Roman

/s/ Andrew J. Dhuey
Defendants-Appellees David John Slater and WLP, Ltd.

25 August 2016

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16-15469

25 August 2016

/s/ Andrew J. Dhuey

~ 28 ~