Ruling by California Supreme Court not to review Court of Appeal decision in Robles-Wong v. State of California and Campaign for Quality Education v. State of California, Aug. 22, 2016 Dissenting statement by Justice Goodwin Liu: The question at the heart of this case is whether California's K-12 education system has fallen below a minimum level of quality guaranteed by our state Constitution. The plaintiffs include dozens of students of various races, ethnicities, and socioeconomic backgrounds, from first graders to twelfth graders, all of whom attend public schools throughout the state. Citing a wide range of studies and indicators, these schoolchildren allege that the state is failing to provide access to a meaningful education that prepares them to meet the state's academic standards, to achieve economic and social success, and to participate in the political and civic life of their communities. This failure, they contend, violates the education clauses of the California Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. IX, §§ 1 ["A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement."], 5 ["The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each district at least six months in every year, after the first year in which a school has been established."].) The Court of Appeal, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaints. (Campaign for Quality Education v. State of California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 896 (Campaign for Quality Education).) The panel produced three opinions. The majority, in an opinion by Justice Jenkins, held that "sections 1 and 5 of article IX do not provide for an education of 'some quality' that may be judicially enforced by appellants." (Id. at p. 906.) Those provisions, the majority explained, "do not allow the courts to dictate to the Legislature, a coequal branch of government, how to best exercise its constitutional powers to encourage education and provide for and support a system of common schools throughout the state." (Id. at pp. 915-916.) Justice Siggins, in a concurring opinion, took the view that "the academic standards articulated in our Education Code" essentially define "the constitutional right to a quality education" and that any claims of systemic inadequacy "should arise under the statutes . . . without resort to the general language of article IX." (Id. at p. 918 (conc. opn. of Siggins, J.).) Justice Pollak dissented, saying that "if [article IX] is to have meaning, it must imply that the system of common schools must provide some minimum qualitative level of education. Such a reading of article IX is fully consistent with, if not compelled by, the importance that our Supreme Court historically has placed on the role of education and the recognition that it is a fundamental right of all the state's children." (Id. at p. 922 (dis. opn. of Pollak, J.).) Because this case presents unsettled questions of the utmost importance to our state and its schoolchildren, the petition before us readily meets our criteria for review. We are clearly being asked "to settle an important question of law." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b) (1).) Plaintiffs have made serious allegations of chronic deficiencies in California's K-12 education system, and they have asserted constitutional claims that only this court can definitively resolve. The issues are ones that divided our colleagues in the Court of Appeal, whose three opinions illuminate the momentous and complex nature of the controversy. That court ultimately held that the constitutional adequacy of the largest function of our state government is not an issue within the judiciary's purview. A holding of this magnitude, whether correct or not, warrants a full and reasoned examination by the state's highest court. The high courts in more than two-thirds of the states have addressed these issues over the past three decades in cases arising under the education clauses of their state constitutions. A substantial majority of these courts have decided it is their duty to resolve the constitutional issues; the minority that have found the issue nonjusticiable have done so in published opinions. Many courts have articulated standards for educational adequacy, and such standards have led to progress in some states but not others. All of this experience is available to aid our resolution of this case. Yet this court today decides that the issues presented do not merit our review. It is not the judiciary's job to make educational policy or to run the public schools. Those functions are constitutionally committed to the political branches (Cal. Const., art. IX, §§ 1-3, 5, 7), and no system will ever be perfect. But plaintiffs do not complain of mere imperfections. They allege that systemic deficiencies have deprived large numbers of children of the most basic educational opportunities, have disproportionately harmed the least advantaged children, and have persisted not only for years but for decades - even as "there can be no doubt that the fundamental right to a public school education is firmly rooted in California law . . . ." (Campaign for Quality Education, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 906.) It is regrettable that this court, having recognized education as a fundamental right in a landmark decision 45 years ago (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584), should now decline to address the substantive meaning of that right. The schoolchildren of California deserve to know whether their fundamental right to education is a paper promise or a real guarantee. I would grant the petition for review. I. In order to understand the significance of this case, it is useful to have some historical context. Fifty years ago, California's public schools were the envy of the nation. As an eminent scholar of California history has written, "[i]n the so-called Golden Age following World War II, the schools of California were considered among the best in the nation, and test scores proved it." (Starr, California: A History (2005) p. 335.) During that period, "[p]ublic schools were being built by the hour, and dedicated. And public school architecture was at its best. An entire generation of talented young men and women went into public school teaching and administration. There was a sense that a utopia was being formed in the classroom." (Learning Matters, First to Worst (2004) [video program; Kevin Starr interview].) So confident were the state's leaders in the educational future of California's schoolchildren that they devised and executed a "Master Plan" to build what many regard as the best public university system in the world. (Starr, Golden Dreams: California in an Age of Abundance (2009) pp. 217-244.) "But by the early 1990s, California had dropped to the lowest rankings in terms of scores and dollars spent on K-12 education. In 1993, for example, fourth-graders in California were vying with fourth-graders in Mississippi for the dubious distinction of being the worst readers in the nation." (Starr, California: A History, supra, at p. 335.) This decline of California's K-12 education system, as the student population has become more diverse, is well-documented. (See Carroll et al., Rand Corp., California's K-12 Public Schools: How Are They Doing? (2005).) For two decades now, California has trailed most states on student achievement and education funding. (See Quality Counts, Education Week (1997-2016) [as of Aug. 22, 2016].) The allegations in the complaints, which we must accept as true at this stage of the litigation (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081), paint a sobering picture. According to one of the complaints (there are two in this case), "[d]espite having one of the most diverse and challenging student population [sic] in the nation, California per pupil spending in 2008-09 was $2, 131 below the national average, ranking the State 44th in the country. California's per pupil spending was less than each of the largest 10 states in the nation, with New York spending almost $6, 000 more per pupil." The staffing of California's public schools reflects the state's low spending levels. In 2007-2008, plaintiffs allege, "California ranked at or near the bottom in the nation in staffing ratios: 49th in total school staff; 47th in principals and assistant principals; 49th in guidance counselors; 50th in librarians; and 49th in access to computers. California educates over 1.7 million students more than Texas, but does so with 16, 700 fewer teachers." The test scores of California students, on average and disaggregated by subgroups, are among the lowest in the nation, as measured by the federally administered National Assessment of Educational Progress. On the 2009 assessment, one complaint alleges, "California tied for 47th of fourth grade reading and tied for 46th in eighth grade math. [¶] Academic performance is low for all subgroups of students. Even for students who are not academically disadvantaged, California ranks tied for 43rd in fourth grade reading and tied for 41st in eighth grade math. For California students whose parents graduated from college, the rank is still 40th in fourth grade reading and 39th in eighth grade math. . . . [¶] . . . California's economically disadvantaged students rank 49th in fourth grade reading and 48th in eighth grade math when compared to economically disadvantaged students in other states." In addition, plaintiffs allege, large majorities of our African American, Latino, and low-income students as well as English learners do not achieve proficiency according to the state's own academic standards: "In 200809, only 50% of California's students were proficient in EnglishLanguage Arts; only 37% of African-American students, 37% of Hispanic students, 36% of economically disadvantaged students, and 20% of English Learners reached this level. Only 46% of California's students were proficient in Mathematics; this percentage dropped to 30% for African-American students, 36% for Hispanic students, 37% for economically disadvantaged students, and 32% for English Learners. By eleventh grade, students in these groups had fallen even farther - in English language Arts, only 25% of African-American students, 26% of Hispanic students and economically disadvantaged students, and 5% of English Learners reached proficiency." Moreover, according to one complaint, California sends a smaller percentage of its high school graduates to four-year colleges and universities than all but three states: "Of those California students who do graduate from high school, many fail to successfully complete the course requirements (known as 'A G requirements') needed to even apply for admission to California's four-year public universities. Of 550, 000 students who enrolled in California public schools as ninth graders in the fall of 2004, only about one quarter completed the A G requirements and graduated eligible for a four-year college or university. [Rogers et al., California Educational Opportunity Report (2010) p. 7]. . . . [¶] Among those graduates who do gain admission into California's university system, many are unprepared to succeed there. Sixty percent of freshmen in the California State University system are not proficient in either Math or English, or both, and beginning in 2012, will be required to take remedial courses in these subjects before they can begin college." Although the legislative process has produced a variety of education initiatives over the years, none has yet to substantially reverse these indicators. The passage of Proposition 98 in 1988 and Proposition 111 in 1990, which guarantee K-12 education a minimum share of the state's General Fund, was arguably the last time the policymaking process sought to establish a constitutional minimum for the state's commitment to public schools. (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 8.) In 1992, the Legislature passed the Charter Schools Act, which launched the growth of charter schools in California. (Ed. Code, § 47600 et seq.) In 1996, the Legislature enacted the Class Size Reduction program, which seeks to limit class sizes to 20 students per certificated teacher. (Ed. Code, former § 52120 et seq.) In 1999, the Legislature passed the Public School Accountability Act, which set the stage for California's compliance with the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 by introducing a comprehensive system of assessments and accountability mechanisms to track and facilitate student progress toward statewide academic standards. (Ed. Code, § 52050 et seq.) Also in 1999, the Legislature created the California High School Exit Exam (Stats. 1999, 1st Ex. Sess. 1999-2000, ch. 1, § 5, p. 8075), but in 2015, the Legislature suspended it, and it is no longer a condition of receiving a diploma (Stats. 2015, ch. 572, § 1). More recently, the voters in 2012 passed Proposition 30, which imposed temporary tax increases to support K-12 education and community colleges. (Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 36, subd. (e).) And in 2013, the Legislature restructured the school finance system by creating the Local Control Funding Formula, which is designed to improve the ability of school districts to flexibly use state education dollars to address the most pressing areas of need. (Ed. Code, § 42238.02.) Each district now receives a base funding allocation per student, plus supplemental funding depending on the district's population of English learners and low-income students as well as the concentration of those students in the district. (Ibid.) As these efforts suggest, educational policymaking in California has not been a tale of intransigence. At the state and local levels, many educational leaders have labored mightily to provide all children with access to a decent education, and we should not ignore their successes. (See Cal. Dept. of Education Success Stories [as of Aug. 22, 2016].) However, as the complaints allege, the past two decades have not produced a tale of overall efficacy either. It is of course unrealistic to expect a major turnaround of any large school system to occur overnight; such "miracles" are properly met with skepticism. But some states have made significant gains in education over the past 20 years (see Hanushek et al., Achievement Growth: International and U.S. State Trends in Student Performance (2012) pp. 5-16), even as student achievement in California, despite some progress, has remained generally low. It is against this backdrop that plaintiffs have turned to the courts for an elaboration of the Legislature's duty to provide for a system of common schools. The schoolchildren who brought these actions do not claim they are entitled to a world-class education. They ask only whether the California Constitution protects them from being deprived of a minimally adequate education. They are asking the judiciary, as the ultimate guarantor of constitutional rights, to define and safeguard their fundamental right to education. II. Despite recognizing that education is a fundamental right under the California Constitution, the Court of Appeal found "no explicit textual basis [in section 1 or section 5 of article IX] from which a constitutional right to a public school education of a particular quality may be discerned." (Campaign for Quality Education, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 909.) The court said that section 1 is " 'general and aspirational' " and that section 5 does not " 'delineate or identify any specific outcome standards.' " (Id. at pp. 908-909.) The court also refused to read sections 1 and 5 together to find a right to an education of some quality. (Id.at p. 909.) Further, the Court of Appeal invoked separation of powers principles in finding the controversy nonjusticiable, concluding that " '[t]he quandary described in the complaint[s] is lamentable, but the remedy lies squarely with the Legislature, not the judiciary.' " (Id. at p. 916.) As Justice Pollak argued in dissent, there is significant reason to question the Court of Appeal's holdings that article IX's education clauses do not imply any minimum standard of quality and do not impose any duties on the Legislature that are judicially discernible or enforceable. These holdings reflect the minority view among the more than 30 state high court opinions addressing similar issues under their state constitutions. (See Campaign for Quality Education, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 920 (dis. opn. of Pollak, J.) ["The different outcomes [among state high courts] result less from differences in the wording of the respective constitutions than from different perceptions of the role properly played by the courts in overseeing compliance with the state's basic charter."].) A significant number of these courts have recognized a judicially enforceable right to an adequate education. The adequacy standards articulated by the high courts of Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming are reviewed in Justice Pollak's dissent. (Id. at pp. 925-929, citing Conn. Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell (Conn. 2010) 990 A.2d 206; Gannon v. State (Kan. 2014) 319 P.3d 1196; Rose v. Council for Better Education (Ky. 1989) 790 S.W.2d 186; McDuffy v. Secretary of Education (Mass. 1993) 615 N.E.2d 516; Robinson v. Cahill (N.J. 1973) 303 A.2d 273; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York (N.Y. 2003) 801 N.E.2d 326; Abbeville County School Dist. v. State (S.C. 2014) 767 S.E.2d 157; Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School Dist. (Tex. 2005) 176 S.W.3d 746; McCleary v. State (Wn. 2012) 269 P.3d 227; Pauley v. Kelly (W.Va. 1979) 255 S.E.2d 859; Campbell County School Dist. v. State (Wyo. 1995) 907 P.2d 1238; see also Lake View School Dist. No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee (Ark. 2002) 91 S.W.3d 472; Claremont School Dist. v. Governor (N.H. 1993) 635 A.2d 1375.) These decisions "demonstrate that courts are capable of articulating such a standard, albeit a standard that is general and requires intensive factual analysis to apply." (Campaign for Quality Education, at p. 925 (dis. opn. of Pollak, J.).) Justice Pollak concluded "that the provisions of our state Constitution requiring the state to support a system of common schools is not without substance, and that the Constitution requires a system that provides students with a meaningful basic education in reality as well as on paper. . . . [A] standard such as those articulated in the opinions quoted above, though general, permits meaningful evaluation of a school system by educational professionals and experts." (Campaign for Quality Education, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 929 (dis. opn. of Pollak, J.).) Judicial formulation of broad and general standards "reflects not only the 'recognition of the political branches' constitutional responsibilities, and indeed, greater expertise, with respect to the implementation of specific educational policies' and that 'the specific educational inputs or instrumentalities suitable to achieve this minimum level of education may well change over time, ' but that 'like any other principle of constitutional law, this broad standard likely will be refined and developed further as it is applied to the facts eventually to be found at trial in this case.' " (Id. at pp. 929-930.) Apart from its concerns about formulating an adequacy standard, the Court of Appeal worried that adjudication of plaintiffs' claims would potentially put the judiciary on a collision course with the Legislature in violation of the separation of powers. Two points from Justice Pollak's dissent are pertinent here. First, "[t]o a large extent, " this worry "rest[s] on the premise that plaintiffs are seeking to compel the California Legislature to appropriate additional funds for K-12 education, which is beyond the constitutional province of the judiciary." (Campaign for Quality Education, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 931 (dis. opn. of Pollak, J.).) However, "[p]laintiffs do not allege simply that the amount of funds appropriated to the schools is insufficient, but that the system by which funds are allocated among schools and school districts is significantly responsible for the inadequacies in the educational system." (Ibid.) Further, "[p]laintiffs allege that the present system incorporates inadequate teacher training, and some plaintiffs also attribute deficiencies to the methods of teacher evaluation, promotion and discipline." (Id. at p. 932.) At this point, it is far from clear that any remedy for a proven violation would require the courts to order increased spending on education. "[A]s the experience in other states confirms, various forms of relief are available short of ordering the legislature to appropriate funds. Courts have required plans to be developed to address and correct adjudicated deficiencies. The intensive examination of the system that trial of plaintiffs' allegations would necessarily entail may be expected to yield other specific forms of relief." (Id. at pp. 932-933.) Indeed, it may be that reforms designed to make more efficient use of existing funds would provide an important measure of relief if plaintiffs were to prove a violation. (See id. at pp. 918-919 (conc. opn. of Siggins, J.) ["the balance between more resources and operational and organizational change in the schools may need to be differently struck"]; Vergara v. State of California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 619, 640-641 [trial court found that hiring and retention of grossly ineffective teachers severely hamper students' educational progress].) Second, and more fundamentally, whatever limitations on judicial authority may constrain a court's ability to order remedies for proven violations, "[w]e need not presume that the Legislature will fail to respond appropriately if the court should ultimately determine that the Constitution is being violated by the lack of sufficient funding." (Campaign for Quality Education, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 932 (dis. opn. of Pollak, J.).) Although courts in some states have clashed with their legislatures over educational adequacy remedies (e.g., Kansas and Washington), there are also examples of such litigation resulting in interbranch collaboration and important reform (e.g., Kentucky and Massachusetts). Like Justice Pollak, "I would not presume to predict the long-term consequences of permitting plaintiffs' disturbing allegations to be examined at trial and the appropriateness of any remedy for confirmed inadequacies evaluated on appeal. . . . It may well be that the extent to which proven deficiencies in California's educational system ultimately are corrected will depend on the good faith of legislators and other public officials and the play of political forces. Nonetheless, I would not assume that a judicial edict, entered and upheld after the searching inquiry demanded by our court system, would be for naught." (Id. at p. 935.) This last point bears emphasis. The potential for conflict between courts and the political branches is inherent in the power of judicial review. Even so, "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." (Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. 137, 177; see Marin Water & Power Co. v. Railroad Com. (1916) 171 Cal. 706, 711-712 ["The judicial function is to 'declare the law and define the rights of the parties under it.' "].) I do not underestimate the uncertainties that might attend a judicial declaration of the law in this context. But it has always been the case that "[t]he judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the purse . . . . It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments." (The Federalist No. 78 (Cooke ed., 1961) p. 523 (Hamilton).) We ought to proceed in this case, as we do in all constitutional cases, with a strong presumption that public officials - having taken the same oath we have taken to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California" (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 3) will work in good faith to effectuate any judgment duly entered by the courts. This understanding is not only a matter of the respect we owe the coordinate branches of government, but also an essential underpinning of the rule of law as practiced in our constitutional tradition. III. The challenges facing California's K-12 education system remain within the purview of the Governor, the Legislature, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and other state and local officials. This court's passivity in the face of plaintiffs' claims should not be understood as an implied judgment that those claims are unmeritorious or unfit for judicial resolution. Our denial of review suspends, for now, the prospect of judicial elaboration of what the fundamental right to education entails. But it is possible that the complexion of the issue and, in turn, this court's posture may change if our education system further stagnates or worsens. At the same time, my vote to grant review should not be construed as a judgment that plaintiffs have established a constitutional violation. Apart from the unsettled questions of justiciability and interpretation of article IX, plaintiffs' allegations have not been tested at trial, and it appears that some of the conditions alleged in the complaints have changed. Since 2010, the year plaintiffs filed their complaints, state funding of K-12 education has risen significantly. Proposition 98 funding per pupil is projected to exceed $10, 000 in 2015-2016, a 28 percent real increase since 2010-2011. (Legis. Analyst, The 2016-17 Budget, EdBudget Tables, K-12 Education, K-12 Proposition 98 Funding Per Pupil [as of Aug. 22, 2016].) The current budget returns our K-12 system to the funding level that existed in 2007-2008, before the economic downturn. (Ibid.) Whether education funding will continue its current upward trajectory remains to be seen. (See Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 36, subd. (f) [Proposition 30's tax increases to fund education will expire in 2016 (sales tax) and 2018 (personal income tax)].) As a result of the Local Control Funding Formula, enacted in 2013, a significant portion of education dollars are now allocated to districts according to their numbers of low-income students and English learners as well as the concentration of those students in the district. (Ed. Code, § 42238.02.) The formula replaced what many believed to be an outdated and arbitrary funding scheme with a more rational and equitable distribution. School districts now have more discretion in spending their funds, and each district is responsible for adopting a three-year local control and accountability plan. (Id., § 52060 et seq.) This devolution of control and accountability marks a pronounced shift from the decades of centralized education governance catalyzed by Proposition 13 and reinforced by the federal No Child Left Behind Act. Time will tell whether these reforms prove effective. Meanwhile, student achievement remains low. On the 2015 National Assessment of Educational Progress, California ranked 48th in fourthgrade math, 49th in fourth-grade reading, 41st in eighth-grade math, and 44th in eighth-grade reading. (U.S. Dept. of Education, Nat. Center for Education Statistics, NAEP State Comparisons [as of Aug. 22, 2016].) These low rankings persist when test scores are disaggregated by subgroups. In fourth-grade reading, for example, California students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch ranked 48th compared to their counterparts in other states; students who were not eligible ranked 40th. (Ibid.) Although the initiatives above are significant, none of them directly addresses the fundamental question of adequacy at the heart of plaintiffs' complaints. Proposition 98 funding is designed to increase with growth in the economy and K-12 attendance, but the funding level is not based on what resources are needed to provide a minimally adequate education to all students. The Local Control Funding Formula aims to distribute funds more equitably according to student needs, but it does not purport to prescribe adequate funding levels. In order to identify a concerted effort to examine the adequacy of California's K-12 education system, one has to go back a full decade. In 2005, a bipartisan group of state leaders - the President Pro Tem of the Senate, the Speaker of the Assembly, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Governor's Committee on Education Excellence, and the Secretary of Education - commissioned a comprehensive review of California's school finance and governance systems. Funded by four major foundations, this initiative enlisted dozens of scholars throughout California and the nation, and resulted in over 20 research papers not only on resource adequacy and equity, but also on state and local governance, teacher policies, and data and information systems. (Stanford Center for Education Policy Analysis, Getting Down to Facts [as of Aug. 22, 2016].) This unprecedented body of research was completed in 2007, but its potential impact in the policymaking arena was largely eclipsed by a severe recession. Now that economic conditions have improved, there have been calls to renew the wideranging inquiry that began a decade ago. (Cal. School Boards Assn., California's Challenge: Adequately Funding Education in the 21st Century (2015).) Today this court declines to decide whether our state Constitution lends urgency or guidance to such inquiry. This is unfortunate given what is at stake. In Serrano v. Priest, supra, 5 Cal.3d 584, we described "the indispensable role which education plays in the modern industrial state. . . . [F]irst, education is a major determinant of an individual's chances for economic and social success in our competitive society; second, education is a unique influence on a child's development as a citizen and his participation in political and community life. . . . Thus, education is the lifeline of both the individual and society." (Id. at p. 605.) We quoted Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 347 U.S. 483, 493: " 'Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. . . . It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.' " (Serrano v. Priest, at p. 606.) We should not leave the schoolchildren of California to wonder whether their fundamental right to education under our state Constitution has real content or is simply hortatory. The policymaking process may eventually address plaintiffs' claims, or it may not. Plaintiffs urge this court to clarify the state's obligation. They seek an education system that is truly capable of fulfilling its vital role for all children of the Golden State. These issues, however we might resolve them, deserve this court's full consideration. I respectfully dissent from the denial of review. Dissenting statement by Justice Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar: Time and again we have emphasized how fundamental the right to education is for California. (See Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 686 ["education is . . . a fundamental interest for purposes of equal protection analysis under the California Constitution"]; Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 608-609 ["the distinctive and priceless function of education in our society warrants, indeed compels, our treating it as a 'fundamental interest' "].) And rightly so: Meaningful access to public education is foundational not only to economic opportunity for millions of students, but to our shared civic life. But what good are such judicial exhortations if that right has no meaningful content? Arguing that such content must exist to render meaningful the fundamental right to education, plaintiffs allege that the California public schools fail to provide large numbers of students with a level of minimally acceptable education in violation of article IX of the California Constitution. According to plaintiffs, California does too little to define a minimally adequate education for its students. It ranks at or near the bottom relative to other states in terms of educational outcomes and staffing ratios. It provides inadequate teacher training, and fails to provide the resources students need to succeed. As a result of these deficiencies, plaintiffs allege, California students are directly harmed: nearly twothirds of low-income and minority students fail to meet the state's own standard of proficiency in mathematics or language arts; and fewer than 60 percent of African-American and Latino students even graduate from high school. (See Campaign for Quality Education v. State of California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 896, 924-925 (dis. opn. of Pollak, J.).) Whether plaintiffs could have proven as much at trial - this case having been squelched at the pleading stage - remains unanswered. So do the important questions of state constitutional law presented by this case that our court is best suited to resolve. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b)(1).) Indeed, the question whether our state Constitution demands some minimum level of educational quality, as opposed to resolving precisely how schools should be administered, lies at the core of what this institution is empowered to adjudicate. And because plaintiffs' claims here concern a range of state activities affecting education, the key question in this case implicates more than simply an exercise in defining the appropriate level of funding or of any other single input to support an adequate education. We consider that question against the backdrop of separation of powers principles that are vital to our government. Yet never have these principles meant that we should strain to avoid our responsibility to interpret the state Constitution simply because the right at issue touches on concerns the Legislature might ultimately address, or because the task of resolving a case implicating the right to education demands careful attention to the proper role of courts as well as our sister branches. We routinely treat as justiciable those challenges based on other fundamental rights, such as the right to marry, vote, or engage in free speech. (See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th 757, 809 [right to marry]; Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850, 865 [right to free speech]; Gould v. Grubb (1975) 14 Cal.3d 661, 670 [right to vote].) The right to education is no less fundamental, nor is it any less worthy of protection. Courts of other states, when faced with similar challenges based on this right, overwhelmingly agree. (See, e.g., Gannon v. State (Kan. 2014) 319 P.3d 1196, 1226 ["Most state supreme courts have rejected the nonjusticiability argument . . ."].) It is especially important for California's highest court to speak on this issue. Our state educates one-eighth of all public school students in the country. (See Nat. Ed. Assn., Rankings of the States 2015 and Estimates of School Statistics 2016 (May 2016) p. 11.) Many of those kids who come from low-income families find themselves concentrated in particular schools or districts that, despite the best intentions, fail to deliver an education remotely worthy of the students they are serving. These realities make it all the more critical that the representative branches play the crucial role that belongs to them, but with greater clarity about the scope of the right to education -- clarity only this court can provide. Respectfully, I would grant review.