Bulk Powers In The Investigatory Powers Bill: The Question Of Trust Remains Unanswered

BULK POWERS IN THE
INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL:
The Question Of Trust Remains
Unanswered

September 2016

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 Bulk Powers In The Investigatory Powers Bill: The Question Of Trust Remains Unanswered

Introduction

We are on the brink of introducing the most pervasive and intrusive surveillance
legislation of any democratic country in the world. The Investigatory Powers Bill sought
to answer important questions about the place that modern and highly intrusive
surveillance capabilities have in a democratic society, questions that were raised by
the Edward Snowden disclosures in 2013 and subsequent reports produced by David
Anderson QC, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the Intelligence and
Security Committee (ISC) in 2015. But just a matter of weeks before the new law is
enacted, significant questions of trust remain unanswered.
This paper highlights some of the key flaws Privacy International sees in the current
incarnation of the Investigatory Powers Bill, and urges the House of Lords to put the
brakes on the bulk powers, about which many important questions remain unanswered.
In this paper we set out how:
•  the Bill fails to provide sufficient clarity, which was promised at the outset of the
legislative process, to alleviate confusion around the UK’s surveillance laws;
•  the Bill has not advanced transparency to the degree needed, still leaving most of
the public in the dark about the extent of the surveillance powers;
•  significant questions remain about the Bill’s safeguards and oversight regime; and
•  major questions also remain regarding the bulk powers, even in light of David
Anderson QC’s recent report.
The points we raise lead to a single recommendation for consideration by the House
of Lords. Because of the significant questions that remain unanswered, we urge the
House of Lords to introduce a series of amendments that will remove the bulk powers
contained in the Bill.

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1. The proposed Bill adds to our already confusing and impenetrable surveillance
laws
In an oft-quoted section of his 2015 report on the investigatory powers regime, David
Anderson QC declared: “Obscure laws – and there are few more impenetrable than
RIPA and its satellites – corrode democracy itself, because neither the public to whom
they apply, nor even the legislators who debate and amend them, fully understand what
they mean.”1 Anderson went on to say that many of the current surveillance laws are
“so baldly stated as to tell the citizen little about how they are liable to be used.”2
The Investigatory Powers Bill was thus introduced with a goal of improving transparency
and enhancing the safeguards that apply to modern surveillance.3 Unfortunately, it has
fallen far short of those goals.
The Bill is over two hundred pages long, and filled with vague language, confusing
definitions and catch-all powers, like national security notices, that leave even experts
confused as to what activities the Bill may permit in the future.4
The Bill also leaves in place most of the “obscure laws” criticised by Anderson,
including significant portions of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
(RIPA), and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (ISA). Indeed, the Intelligence and
Security Committee (ISC) has criticised the Bill for encompassing only certain types of
equipment interference (EI), while allowing “different forms of EI . . . [to] continue to sit
under the broad authorisations provided to the Agencies under the [ISA].”5
In the past, the intelligence services have demonstrated their predilection for using
the law that is most convenient, not necessarily the one that is most transparent.6 In
this context, leaving RIPA, the ISA and other related acts in place while adding the
Investigatory Powers Bill into the mix will only increase confusion.
2. The Government has failed to be transparent with the public about how it will
intrude on their privacy
•  The public does not understand or give consent to the Bill
It is important to recognise that the Investigatory Powers Bill is a materially different
piece of legislation to the one that the Conservative Party’s 2015 election manifesto
indicated would be put forward.7
The manifesto states “we continue to reject any suggestions of sweeping, authoritarian
measures that would threaten our hard-won freedoms”.8 Despite this assertion, the
bulk powers that are the foundation of this Bill amount to nothing short of a mass
surveillance apparatus, and suspicionless collection and retention of the personal data
of an entire population is a profound and dangerous antithesis to democratic principles
and values.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers Review, June 2015 ¶13.31
A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers Review, June 2015 ¶13.31(a)
Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, November 2015, Forward from the Home Secretary
See, for example, Graham Smith, “The content v metadata contest at the heart of the Investigatory Powers Bill” 26 May
2016, available at http://cyberleagle.blogspot.co.uk/2016/05/the-content-v-metadata-contest-at-heart.html
Intelligence and Services Committee, Report on the draft Investigatory Powers Bill, 9 February 2016, ¶11-13.
Privacy International, “New documents reveals that GCHQ and MI5 stretched law to breaking point” 6 June 2016,
available at https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/872
The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015, available at https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto
The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015, p. 61

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Indeed, the manifesto recognises that the power that should be maintained is “the
ability of the authorities to intercept the content of suspects’ communications, while
continuing to strengthen oversight of the use of these powers”.9 Yet, Part 6, Chapter 1
of the Bill is devoted to bulk interception, which inherently involves the interception of
communications of people both abroad and in the UK who are not suspected of any
crime.
The far-reaching bulk powers contained within the Bill affect literally everyone in the UK
but public knowledge of the Bill - and even a rudimentary understanding of its impact on
the privacy of everyone’s personal data - is extremely low. According to a ComRes poll
commissioned by Liberty in June 2016, 72% of people polled have either never heard of
the Investigatory Powers Bill or know nothing about it.10
In the same poll, ninety percent of the public either said it is only acceptable for the
Government to access and monitor records of their emails, text messages, phone calls
and online browsing history if they are suspected of or have committed a crime – or say
this practice is never acceptable.
Most fundamentally, nine out of 10 British adults polled believe state surveillance
powers proposed by the Investigatory Powers Bill are not acceptable.
A manifesto commitment that has been greatly exceeded and a lack of public
understanding and support for the Bill demonstrate the Government’s failure to secure a
proper democratic mandate for a law that rewrites the contract between the state and
the citizen.
•  Powers vs programmes
The conversation around the Bill has also suffered from a failure to address some of the
ways in which the bulk powers may operate in practice. While the police and intelligence
agencies’ capabilities were revealed in broad strokes with the introduction of the Bill,
many questions about how those powers actually operate remain unanswered.
Despite the publication of hundreds of pages of draft legislation, explanatory notes and
codes of practice, the Government has explained very little to Parliament or the public
about the nature of the bulk operations. As such, the legislation remains abstract, and
lacks clarity and transparency about the specific capabilities Parliament is on the verge
of sanctioning. Indeed, it may only be through examining known operational capabilities
that a full understanding of the bulk powers can be ascertained.
For instance, the Snowden disclosures reveal that through a programme codenamed
‘Optic Nerve’, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) had collected
screen captures of 1.8m Yahoo webcam users.11 Such widespread collection was
disturbing both because of its scale and the extremely private and intimate nature
of some of the images obtained, which were described as containing “substantial
quantities of sexually explicit communications.”12

9
10

11
12

The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015, p. 65
Liberty, “Ninety per cent of Brits believe Government surveillance powers contained in new Snoopers’ Charter are not
acceptable, new poll finds” 5 June 2016, available at
https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/news/press-releases-and-statements/ninety-cent-brits-believe-governmentsurveillance-powers
Ackerman and Ball, “Optic Nerve- millions of Yahoo webcam images intercepted by GCHQ,” The Guardian 27 February 2014
Ackerman and Ball, “Optic Nerve- millions of Yahoo webcam images intercepted by GCHQ,” The Guardian 27 February 2014

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Under the Investigatory Powers Bill, it is very possible that a programme like Optic
Nerve might continue pursuant to a bulk interception warrant. The debate around the
Bill has provided no assurances this won’t happen, in part because of the Government’s
continuing policy of neither confirming nor denying most of the Snowden disclosures.
The Government has not declared to the public that it wants the ability to scoop up
their webcam footage, even if they’re not suspected of any crime. Does the public
accept that the state should have such a deep reach into their personal lives? Is this the
type of power that we are comfortable sanctioning in our democratic society?
Similar questions should be asked with regard to many other revealed programmes,
including two examples code-named ‘Muscular’ and ‘Karma Police.’
Under Muscular, GCHQ, in cooperation with the US National Security Agency (NSA)
infiltrated the private fibre optic cables linking the data centers of Yahoo and Google in
order to obtain their users’ private data and communications.13 Such activity, directed
at overseas companies, might now be authorised under a bulk equipment interference
warrant.
Under Karma Police, GCHQ sought to map the web-browsing habits, online interactions
(including messenger service chats and emails) and locations of almost anyone who
uses the internet.14 GCHQ did this by collecting and storing billions of communications
data records. Bulk acquisition and bulk personal datasets warrants could allow GCHQ
to continue this work. The question is, should they? Does the public understand this
and accept this? These questions have not been answered.
3. Safeguards remain weak
The kind of pervasive and deeply intrusive surveillance capabilities in the Investigatory
Powers Bill must have the most rigorous and independent authorisation and oversight
possible. But the standards that have been proposed fall far short of this. We provide
two of the most pressing examples here.
•  Judicial authorisation
The proposed judicial authorisation scheme is far from world leading. While posited
as a ‘double lock’ authorisation, it is in truth a single broken lock. The Secretary of
State retains the power to issue warrants. While Judicial Commissioners “approve”
this decision, there remains a lack of clarity regarding the scope of their review.15 The
passage of the Investigatory Powers Bill would continue to make the UK an outlier
among other democratic countries and the only state in the Five Eyes Alliance (which
also includes the US, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) that does not vest the
full power to approve surveillance activities in the judiciary. It flies in the face of

13
14
15

Gellman and Soltani, “NSA infiltrates links to Yahoo, Google data centers worldwide, Snowden documents say,” The
Washington Post 30 October 2013
Ryan Gallagher, “From Radio to Porn, British Spies Track Web Users’ Online Identities,” The Intercept 25 September
2015
See Justice, Investigatory Powers Bill 2016 Briefing for House of Commons Second Reading, March 2016, p. 3, available
at https://2bquk8cdew6192tsu41lay8t-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/JUSTICE-Investigatory-PowersBill-2R-Briefing-11-March-2016-FINAL.pdf

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Anderson’s explicit recommendation in “A Question of Trust” that “the warrant-issuing
powers currently vested in the Secretary of State . . . be exercised only by Judicial
Commissioners” [emphasis added].16
•  Thematic warrants are problematic - and Anderson agrees
Anderson’s review repeatedly raises concerns about the use of thematic warrants
for the supposed targeted interception and equipment interference powers, which
respectively authorise interception or hacking within the United Kingdom. Under a
thematic warrant, the Secretary of State and Judicial Commissioner will not approve
each individual target of surveillance. Instead law enforcement and the security and
intelligence agencies may choose their targets without additional sign-off. Anderson
therefore notes that thematic warrants “have some of the potential range of bulk
warrants but without the same safeguards.”17 Anderson similarly criticises thematic EI
warrants, which he notes “effectively import[ ] an alternative means of performing bulk
EI, with fewer safeguards.”18 To be clear, thematic warrants, like bulk warrants, can
never have effective safeguards. They lack any element of individualised suspicion,
preventing effective judicial authorisation and increasing the risk of arbitrary action.19
4. The case for the Bulk Powers still has not been made
•  Are the bulk powers necessary and proportionate?
Much stock has been placed in David Anderson’s review of the bulk powers, which
was released in August 2016. Anderson’s review sought to address whether there
is an operational case for the bulk powers in the Investigatory Powers Bill. However,
his analysis does not answer the critical question of whether an operational case
justifies the significant privacy intrusions that the powers entail. As the European
Court of Human Rights has eloquently stated, there exists “the risk that a system of
secret surveillance set up to protect national security may undermine or even destroy
democracy under the cloak of defending it”. Accordingly, the state must always
balance its interest “in protecting its national security through secret surveillance
measures against the seriousness of the interference with [the] right to respect for . . .
private life”.20
International legal authorities are clear on why bulk powers fail the tests of necessity
and proportionality. By their very nature, the bulk powers place very large groups
of innocent people under surveillance without any suspicion whatsoever. Under
the proposed Bill, the UK Government will not be required to specify or target their
surveillance toward the communications, data or equipment of a particular person,
premises or even an organisation.

16

17
18
19
20

David Anderson Q.C. Report of the Bulk Powers Review, ¶14.95(b); see also id. at Recommendation 22 (“Specific
interception warrants, combined warrants, bulk interception warrants and bulk communications data warrants should
be issued and renewed only on the authority of a Judicial Commissioner.”); ‘Liberty’s briefing on the Investigatory
Powers Bill for Report Stage in the House of Commons’ 2016, Liberty, available at
https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/sites/default/files/campaigns/resources/Liberty’s%20Briefing%20on%20the%20
Investigatory%20Powers%20Bill%20for%20Report%20Stage%20in%20the%20House%20of%20Commons.pdf
David Anderson Q.C. Report of the Bulk Powers Review, August 2016, ¶2.10, 2.12, available at https://
terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Bulk-Powers-Review-final-report.pdf
David Anderson Q.C. Report of the Bulk Powers Review, August 2016, para. 2.56, available at, https://
terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Bulk-Powers-Review-final-report.pdf
See Statement of Facts and Grounds, The Queen on the application of Privacy International v. Investigatory Powers
Tribunal, 9 May 2016, available at https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/Grounds_1.pdf
Szabo and Vissy v. Hungary 12 January 2016 ¶57, available at http://statewatch.org/news/2016/jan/echr-case-SZAB-%20
AND-VISSY-v-%20HUNGARY.pdf

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In 2014, the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights stated that “[m]ass or ‘bulk’
surveillance programmes may . . . be deemed to be arbitrary, even if they serve a
legitimate aim and have been adopted on the basis of an accessible legal regime”
and that “it will not be enough that the measures are targeted to find certain needles
in a haystack”.21 That same year, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben
Emmerson QC, stated “it is incompatible with existing concepts of privacy for States
to collect all communications or metadata all the time indiscriminately” and that “[t]
he very essence of the right to the privacy of communication is that infringements must
be exceptional, and justified on a case-by-case basis.”22 Recently, in 2016, the UN
High Commissioner on Human Rights reiterated that “[m]ass secret surveillance is not
permissible under international human rights law, as an individualised necessity and
proportionality analysis would not be possible in the context of such measures.”23
The European Court of Human Rights has similarly found that a government, in
authorising surveillance, “must be capable of verifying the existence of a reasonable
suspicion against the person concerned, in particular, whether there are factual
indications for suspecting that person of planning, committing or having committed
criminal acts or other acts that may give rise to secret surveillance measures, such as,
for example, acts endangering national security.”24 It must also “ascertain whether the
requested interception meets the requirement of ‘necessity in a democratic society’, as
provided by Article 8 and 2 of the [ECHR], including whether it is proportionate to the
legitimate aims pursued, by verifying, for example whether it is possible to achieve the
aims by less restrictive means.”25 The European Court concluded that an authorisation
for surveillance must identify “a specific person” or “a single set of premises” in order
to facilitate the necessity and proportionality analysis.26
•  No case for bulk hacking
The Government’s operational case for bulk equipment interference, more commonly
known as bulk hacking, is a purely hypothetical one. As Anderson himself notes in his
review “[t]he entire debate about [bulk hacking’s] utility is... focused on the [security
and intelligence agencies’] assessments of future developments in technology, on
extrapolation from the use made of other powers, and on hypothetical case studies.”27
What is not hypothetical is the serious security implications of bulk hacking. Hacking,
by its very nature, exploits weaknesses in software and hardware used by millions
of people. It therefore incentivises the state to maintain security vulnerabilities that
allow any attacker - whether GCHQ, another country’s intelligence agency or a cyber
criminal - potential access to the devices of large swathes of people as well as access
to network infrastructure upon which we depend for financial and other everyday
transactions.

21
22
23
24
25
26
27

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, The right to privacy in the digital age, A/HRC/27/37, 30 June 2014 ¶25,
available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf
Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while
countering terrorism, A/69/397, 23 September 2014, available at https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N14/545/19/PDF/N1454519.pdf?OpenElement
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on best practices and lessons learned on how protecting and promoting
human rights contribute to preventing and countering violent extremism, A/HRC/33/29, 21 July 2016, available at
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G16/162/55/PDF/G1616255.pdf?OpenElement
Zakharov v Russian Federation, [GC], No. 47142/06, 4 December 2015, ¶260
Zakharov v Russian Federation, [GC], No. 47142/06, 4 December 2015, ¶261
Zakharov v Russia 47143/06 (4 December 2015) at ¶259-267
David Anderson Q.C. Report of the Bulk Powers Review, August 2016, at ¶7.1, available at https://
terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Bulk-Powers-Review-final-report.pdf

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While Anderson was perfectly willing to accept hypothetical cases about the utility of
bulk hacking, he refused to engage in what he described as “allegations . . . about
the potential of [hacking] to create security vulnerabilities or leave users vulnerable
to damage”.28 These security implications are well-documented by the technology
and security community,29 and are fundamental to an assessment of the utility of bulk
hacking. If bulk hacking produces weaknesses in devices, systems, and networks,
which the intelligence and security agencies are also tasked with protecting, are these
powers really operationally effective?

•  Questioning the case for domestic bulk acquisition
As Anderson himself points out, in the US, the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (PCLOB), an independent bipartisan agency, concluded that
there is no operational case for the bulk telephone records program operated
by the National Security Agency (NSA) under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT
Act. Anderson admits that this program “has obvious similarities with the bulk
acquisition power” in the IP Bill.30 In particular, both programmes authorise the
bulk collection of domestic communications data. And in PCLOB’s own words:
“[W]e have not identified a single instance involving a threat to the United
States in which the program made a concrete difference in the outcome of a
counterterrorism investigation. Moreover, we are aware of no instance in which
the program directly contributed to the discovery of a previously unknown
terrorist plot or the disruption of a terrorist attack.”31
Astonishingly however, Anderson dismisses PCLOB’s findings on the basis that
“[t]he nature of the communications . . ., the types of provider from whom it is
collected and the categories of records collected” are more limited in the US
context.32 According to PCLOB, the NSA was acquiring “a massive number of
calling records from telephone companies each day, potentially including the
records of every call made across the nation”.33 And PCLOB’s findings point
to no fundamental limitations to bulk acquisition powers; at no point does it
suggest that the bulk telephone records program would be effective if only it
were expanded further. We believe that the same conclusion is warranted for the
domestic bulk acquisition powers in the Investigatory Powers Bill.
•  Other flaws in Anderson’s review
Anderson’s review had other methodological weaknesses that have led us to
question his conclusions. Whereas Anderson relied on three team members
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

David Anderson Q.C. Report of the Bulk Powers Review, August 2016, at ¶7.26, available at https://
terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Bulk-Powers-Review-final-report.pdf
For example, see Expert report of Professor Ross Anderson, Privacy International et al. v. Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs et al, IPT/14/85/CH, 14/120-126/CH, available at https://www.privacyinternational.
org/sites/default/files/Anderson_IPT_Expert_Report_2015_Final.pdf
David Anderson Q.C. Report of the Bulk Powers Review, August 2016, ¶3.50, available at https://
terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Bulk-Powers-Review-final-report.pdf
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of
the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 23 January 2014, p. 11,
available at https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf
David Anderson Q.C. Report of the Bulk Powers Review, August 2016, at ¶¶3.51-3.54, available at https://
terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Bulk-Powers-Review-final-report.pdf
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of
the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 23 January 2014, p. 87,
available at https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf
Committee on Responding to Section 5(d) of Presidential Policy Directive 28: The Feasibility of Software to Provide
Alternatives to Bulk Signals Intelligence Collection, p. vii, 2015, available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/19414/
bulk-collection-of-signals-intelligence-technical-options

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with no additional staff, PCLOB - which consists of five members - depends
on a permanent staff of approximately 20 employees, including staff attorneys
and security and technology specialists. Anderson also speaks highly of the
US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) committee, which was tasked with
considering alternatives to bulk collection by President Barack Obama in
January 2014. The NAS Committee consisted of “individuals with expertise in
national security law; counterterrorism operations; privacy and civil liberties
as they relate to electronic communications; data mining; large-scale systems
development; software development; Intelligence Community (IC) needs as
they relate to research and development; and networking and social media”.34
They were assisted by a staff drawn primarily from the Computer Science and
Telecommunications Board, which provides independent advice to the federal
government on technical and public policy issues related to computing and
communications. By contrast, Anderson’s team was small and under resourced.
Serious questions have also been raised about their independence, as the team
consisted of a former Director of Technology and Engineering at GCHQ, a
former Director of intelligence at the NCA, and a barrister regularly instructed by
the Treasury.
Anderson and his small team relied heavily on secret briefings by the
government, particularly the security and intelligence agencies, with only
limited input from other stakeholders, and held no public hearings. His review
considered a number of case studies selected by MI5, MI6 and GCHQ and as
Anderson himself states he has seen only ‘a small sample of the SIAs’ work’.35
In comparison, PCLOB received extensive briefings from experts across diverse
fields, including government officials, academics, civil liberties advocates,
technology and communications companies, and trade associations. In addition,
PCLOB held multiple public hearings, at which such experts testified. Like
PCLOB, the NAS Committee held extensive briefings and public hearings,
consulting with a diverse range of experts. And their report underwent a rigorous
review process from a similarly diverse panel of experts.
Finally, it is worth noting the short space of time allocated to Anderson’s review.
PCLOB began its review of the bulk telephone records program in June 2013
and published its report seven months later. The NAS Committee was mandated
to complete its study in five months but noted that it was “not blessed with a
luxury of time.” Anderson, on the other hand, began his review in June 2016 and
submitted his report just over two months later, relying on a bare bones team.

35

David Anderson Q.C. Report of the Bulk Powers Review, August 2016, ¶5.41, available at https://
terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Bulk-Powers-Review-final-report.pdf

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5. Conclusion
The investigatory powers that Parliament is on the brink of authorising represent
a fundamental shift in power from the individual to the state.
We seriously question whether the Bill as a whole is sufficiently clear and its
consideration has been fully transparent. At the least, it still falls considerably
short of providing sufficient safeguards for the intrusive powers it will authorise.
With regard to bulk powers, David Anderson’s recent report does not make a
robust case. Instead, it asks the security and intelligence agencies to explain
how these powers are effective, and accepts their justifications, even where they
are merely hypothetical.
Even more fundamentally, at no point during the debate of the Bill has the
question of proportionality been answered - that is, even if we assume bulk
powers are uniquely useful (which we do not accept), does that usefulness
justify the intrusion into all of our privacy? We assert that bulk, indiscriminate
collection of personal data can never be necessary or proportionate.
We therefore put forward a single, overarching recommendation, which we urge
the House of Lords to consider seriously:
Remove all bulk powers from the Investigatory Powers Bill. The case
for their effectiveness remains questionable, and whether such powers are
proportionate has not been answered. Privacy International believes that
bulk powers, by definition, can never be proportionate, and would create an
apparatus for perpetual mass surveillance.

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