Sarasota C?ozritti'
Criminal Justice Building
207l Ringling Boulevard
Suite 400

Sarasota. l. 3423 7-7000
94 861-4400

Sarasota
Please rep/t Iu.?

ED BRODSKY

gatate attorney

Twelfth Judicial (?ireuit

.S?w'l?ilt?f .S?m'asula, .llunult'v De?cit) (fowl/i 

li?mt'i' Of?ce?

R.L. .?xnderson Building
4000 South Tamiami Trail
Room 135

Venice. FL 34293-5028
(94? Sol-3200

.llunalu' (?Ulml?l?

County Admin. Bi ilding

I: Manatee Ave iuc W.
PO. Box l000

Bradenton. FL 342 
747-30?"

September 27, 2016

01?5an ?Uuntt?

l')eSmo ('ounty Courthouse
East Oak Street

Third Floor

Arcadia. FL 33466-4446
(863) 9934381

 

Sheriff Tom Knight

 

Sarasota Sherist Office
2071 Ringling Blvd, 1"1 Floor

Sarasota, FL 34237

Dear Sheriff Knight,

This of?ce has completed its review of your agency?s investigative conclusions that probable
cause does not exist for perjury regarding false statements given by deputies during depositions.

the false statements were given in an effort to protect the safety

and identity ofa confidential informant involved in a three kilogram cocaine trafficking case.
This office?s conclusion was based upon a determination and application ofthe law and case law
to the facts, which included what the statements were and whether they were material. To fully
understand what perjury is, it is necessary to review the perjury statute Vi hich is as follows:

837.02 Perjury in of?cial Except as provided in subsection (2).
whoever makes a false statement, which he or she does not believe to be true, under oath
in an official proceeding in regard to any material matter, commus a felony of the third

degree. punishable as provided in s. 775.082, 5. 775.083, or s. 77 5.084.

The jury instruction for this statute is also instru

ctive regarding what is necessary to establish

perjury. When applying the instruction to the facts in this situation and aller a careful review of
the submitted materials, the following can be established. First, the relevant statements were

deputies under

cial proceeding. Second, the relevant statements were false. And, third, the
stood those statements not to be true (three
statements in some form within minutes to
ng that false statements were given, it is also necessary to determine whether the

of the officers modified or added to
days after the dc position).

statements were in regard to any material matter. For that reason, it is essmtial to look to the
definition regarding materiality found in Florida Statute 837.01 I which states:

837.01 1(3)
admissibility under the rules of evidence, which could affect the course or
outcome of the proceeding. Whether a

?Material matter" means any subject. regardless ofits

situation is a question of law.

matter is material in a given factual

What this means is that even though false statements were provided by the deputies it is still
essential to determine if those statements could have had any bearing on a judicial determination
of guilt or as the statute plainly says ?which could affect the course or outcome of the
proceeding.? Regarding the materiality prong of the statute the Florida Supreme Court has
explained:

Unless the alleged testimony given under oath is germane or material to the
inquiry or charge, then its truthfulness is not the vital issue because the
purpose to be guarded against and the reasons to be punished for perjury are to
deter persons from testifying under oath to false statements in order to mislead
the trier of the facts such as the court or the jury or both and thereby to thwart
and pervert justice.

Wolfe vs. State, 271 So.2d 132, 134 (Fla. 1792).

The withholding by the deputies of the name of or even the existence of the con?dential
informant did not affect the ?course or outcome of the proceeding.? Those answers were not
material as that term is de?ned by the statute and by case law. Moreover there were two
independent legal reasons for the traf?c stop that led to the discovery of the three kilos of
cocaine. First the stop would be considered a legal traf?c stop for a traf?c infraction (no seatbelt)
which provides an independent reason for the stop. See, Whren v. United States, 517 US. 806,
116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996), HN14 where the United States Supreme Court held that
the reasonableness of a traf?c stop depends solely on the validity of the basis asserted by the
of?cer involved in the stop, and the of?cer's subjective intentions are not involved in the
determination of reasonableness. Second, the tip regarding the cocaine came directly from a DEA
task force agent that was following the defendant?s vehicle containing the con?dential informant
as a passenger. That fact provides transferred probable cause pursuant to the fellow of?cer rule.
Finally, the defendant?s ?ngerprints were subsequently located on the garbage bag containing the
cocaine and packaging material. Therefore, in conclusion, the statements were not material and
would have had no effect on the outcome of the case.

Signi?cantly, there are procedural safeguards that exist to protect the identity and disclosure of
information regarding con?dential informants. Regrettably, those safeguards were not utilized in
this case. Accordingly, while no criminal charges will be ?led by this off 106, we defer to your
agency for any administrative actions.  deemed appropriate.

  

Division Chief

Of?ce of the State Attorney

Twelfth Judicial Circuit

2071 Ringling Boulevard, Fourth Floor
Sarasota, FL 34237

Office: 941.861.4323

Fax No: 941.861.4019