LYLES SCHOOL OF CIVIL ENGINEERING

US Chemical Safety &
Hazard Investigation Board
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 910
Washington, DC USA 20006
September 28, 2016
Dear Chairwoman Sutherland and Board Members:
I am submitting this letter to you because of the extent and severity of errors as well as factually
incorrect statements in your draft report entitled Chemical Spill Contaminates Public Water Supply
in Charleston, West Virginia, January 9, 2014. I am a faculty member at Purdue University and
have been involved in the scientific response and investigation at the community, State, and
Federal levels. I have no conflicts of interest in this response and my interests represent those of
science and public health.
I urge you to immediately retract your report and remove it from circulation until it is corrected. Your
report has and will continue, without a doubt, to mislead the public to conclusions that simply are
untrue and without evidence for several claims. I was flabbergasted that the board voted and
‘approved’ the draft report late September 28 because there were just so many serious errors. It is
bewildering and disturbing. My hope is that the Board voted without critically reading through the
entire report, and did not knowingly approve a document with so many incorrect statements. My
hope is that the CSB recognizes its mistake and corrects the serious errors. Within your 48 hour
window, I have spent more than 20 hours preparing this thorough response to you. I appreciate you
providing an opportunity for feedback. I expect as a citizen, taxpaying member of the community,
researcher, and someone directly exposed to the contaminated water in West Virginia, you will
retract and revise your report accordingly.
I have high expectations of the CSB because your organization is charged with an important
mission. However, I am particularly disturbed by an event that took place on September 29, 2016.
CSB Team leader Johnnie Banks spoke with WV Metro News reporter Hoppy Kercheval and
claimed “the findings of these two independent tests suggest that there is no threat to humans.” As
evidenced through Mr. Banks’s statement but most importantly mirrored in your report that you
approved, CSB does not understand the limitations of existing toxicological studies that the National
Toxicology Program understands, I understand, and many others do understand. Mr. Banks
statement and similar statements by the CSB in the report are simply untrue. By the issuance of
incorrect statements your organization has propagated false claims about the spill’s impact on
human health. For the sake of scientific integrity to prevent further damage of the CSB’s reputation
and spreading of false information, you need to immediately retract your report and revise it. I
recommend that you also do not comment on toxicological impacts caused by the spill until you
understand the limitations of existing studies which you clearly do not.
To assist you in understanding the major issues associated with your document, I have outlined and
proposed recommended fixes. The 48 hour response window for comments has resulted in me
being unable to completely identify all the deficiencies. I think I have identified the most egregious
ones, but cannot be certain. There may be some typos in my response as well because, in addition

1

 LYLES SCHOOL OF CIVIL ENGINEERING

to my duties as a faculty member and father, I have worked nonstop to provide this response to you
since your public meeting two days ago.
Removing implied bias from the report is necessary. Additional references are needed to
substantiate several statements and information that has never before been presented to the public.
I expect you will remove factually incorrect statements in the interested of science, your agency’s
credibility, and mission to serve the public. If the CSB believes some of their statements are
grounded in fact, I expect you will appropriately cite where you obtained the information from to
support such statement. The references shall be specific to the statement and not a baseless
citation. I have made note of several of such citations in my response.
As a scientist, engineer, father, and person who was affected by the chemically contaminated water
I expect the final report will be something we all can be proud of. When I met with some of your staff
I felt like they cared a lot about getting the facts right. I know Mr. Banks cares a lot, which is why I
was taken aback by his statement and the report. 300,000 West Virginians were affected by this
federally declared disaster. Thousands of others received the contaminated drinking water in
Huntington, West Virginia who were never issued a do not use order. Hundreds of thousands of
people downstream in Ohio, Kentucky, and Indiana took action to protect their communities from
this spill. Our nation expects your agency to produce an investigation that communities across the
U.S. can be confident in having their best interests in mind. Your report and recommendations can
help communities and government agencies prevent another disaster that has changed the lives of
many people. The document you have made public must be retracted and revised in the interest of
science and public health.
Sincerely,

Andrew J. Whelton, Ph.D.

Conflicts of Interest: I am not receiving any monies from lawyers, Eastman Chemical Company,
Freedom Industries, West Virginia American Water, American Water, or any other organization that
is involved in this incident. I did receive funding from the US National Science Foundation and the
West Virginia Governor asked me to help him, along with several of my colleagues, to investigate
the spill when it happened. I was a member of West Virginia Testing Assessment Project (WVTAP).
Both projects ended. In 2015, my students and I visited your office to discuss ongoing research with
some of your team. I cannot recall exactly but CSB may have paid our travel expenses to and from
Washington, D.C. for the meeting. I also provided you feedback about your investigation.
Enclosure:
Response to comments for the CSB Report: Chemical Spill Contaminates Public Water Supply in
Charleston, West Virginia, January 9, 2014, made public 10:30 AM September 28, 2016 in
Charleston, West Virginia.

2

 Response to comments for the CSB Report: Chemical Spill Contaminates Public Water
Supply in Charleston, West Virginia, January 9, 2014, made public 10:30 AM September 28,
2016 in Charleston, West Virginia
Submitted by Andrew J. Whelton, Ph.D.

Executive Summary
(Page 2, 2nd para) The CSB stated:
“The SDS for Crude MCHM was the only available information at the time incident, and
although compliant with the OSHA requirements, offered little information to establish the
threat to humans. At the request of the WVBPH, the CDC used the available toxicological
information on the SDS to recommend a screening level of MCHM at 1 part-per million
(ppm). Eastman Chemical Company, the Crude MCHM manufacturer, voluntarily conducted
toxicological testing on MCHM prior to the incident and made those studies available to
public health officials on the evening of January 10th. Though not required to do so,
Eastman’s tests did not include studies at low doses that would have assisted public health
professionals in promptly communicating the risk of exposure when residents began
reporting symptoms. Freedom continued to revise its estimate of the quantity released,
which increased from about 1,000 to 10,000 gallons over the course of 12 days.”
There are several problems with these assertions in the Executive Summary and throughout the
report.
CSB makes the claim that the SDS was compliant with OSHA requirements. This vague statement
is without foundation and frankly not believable without supporting evidence. It is inappropriate to
make such charges without foundation or references so that others may understand the foundation.
Moreover, why has CSB assumed the role of determining compliance about SDS’s? CSB has no
regulatory authority. Absence of references implies CSB has created this statement out of bias or
incompetence. How specifically was the SDS compliant? With what regulations? What specific
parts of the regulations? When was this SDS compliance made official? If OSHA made a ruling on
SDS compliance, there must be some evidence to cite. Did this ‘compliance’ happen before the
spill, during? That clearly would be important to know.
The SDS statement in the Executive Summary and throughout the report should be revised
with the following facts in mind:
Eastman acknowledged information on their MSDS was not correct. Their SDS No
Observed Effect Concentration (NOEC) reported for daphnia magna did not match the
NOEC they observed in their toxicology studies. Does the presence of incorrect toxicology
data on an SDS meet the standard of OSHA compliance? Why was this “safety” data sheet
fact not mentioned in the chemical “safety” board report?
Eastman Chemical Company. ChemWatch Inquiry on MCHM. Email from Maranda
Demuth to Martin Zook, ChemWatch. July 15, 2014. Kingsport, TN USA.
Emails sent to Dr. Andrew Whelton at the University of South Alabama
---------- Forwarded message ---------From: Demuth, Maranda <mdemuth@eastman.com>
Date: 15 July 2014 16:17

Page 1

 Subject: Eastman Response - ChemWatch Inquiry on MCHM
To: Martin Zook <martin@chemicalwatch.com>
Martin,
Of the 18 studies that Eastman has performed to evaluate the potential hazards of
MCHM, two of those studies were to assess the potential hazard to aquatic
organisms. One study was conducted with vertebrates (fish), and the other study
was conducted with invertebrates (daphnia). These studies are designed to
evaluate effects to aquatic organisms exposed at specific concentrations and for
specific exposure durations according to standard US and international testing
procedures. These studies on aquatic organisms do not in any way predict potential
effects to human health. The study reports are available to the public at
www.eastman.com.
The acute study conducted with fish resulted in a 96 hour LC50 (Lethal
Concentration to 50% of the organisms) of 57.4 mg/L, and a NOEC (No Observed
Effect Concentration) of 25 mg/L. The acute study, conducted in 1998, with daphnia
resulted in a 48 hour EC50 (Effective Concentration to immobilize 50% of the
organisms) of 98.1 mg/L, and a NOEC of 50 mg/L. The daphnia NOEC value of 40
mg/L reported on the 2005 and 2011 versions of the substance’s Safety Data Sheet
(SDS) is a typographical error that occurred as the test results were input into the
database used to generate the SDS. While the error is small, the lower value of 40
indicates greater toxicity than was actually observed in the study.
Under the United Nations Globally Harmonized System (GHS) of hazard
classification, which has been adopted by many countries, the aquatic ecosystem
hazard classification is based upon the most sensitive or severe results from aquatic
toxicity studies, such as the acute aquatic toxicity studies that were conducted. Note
that while a NOEC endpoint can be determined for these studies, under current
hazard classification systems the LC/EC50 values are the preferred endpoints
utilized for these types of studies. Under the GHS classification system, acute
toxicity results (LC/EC50 values) in the range of 10-100 mg/L would receive the
same hazard classification. The results from the Eastman fish and daphnia studies,
as well as the daphnia studies conducted at the University of South Alabama,
provided acute LC/EC50 values in this range which indicates that all of these results
would provide a similar GHS hazard classification. Therefore, these new results
from the University of South Alabama only confirm the potential hazards previously
determined by Eastman.
Based upon Eastman’s understanding of the spill that occurred in West Virginia, the
duration of the spill was short, the amount of material that was spilled into the river
was rapidly diluted to very low concentrations, and adverse effects on aquatic
organisms were not reported. In addition to the effect of dilution, Eastman performed
a biodegradation study of the material which indicated that the substance would
undergo natural biodegradation as it was transported downstream.
Regards,
Maranda
From: Martin Zook [mailto:martin@chemicalwatch.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2014 10:24 AM
To: Demuth, Maranda
Subject: Re: [I] Question
Maranda,

Page 2

 Thanks. Can we get an answer before the end of today?
Martin Zook
Chemical Watch
540.822.4840 (land)
540.840.3410 (mobile)
On 15 July 2014 10:19, Demuth, Maranda <mdemuth@eastman.com> wrote:
Martin,
I am working to find the answer to your question. Can you advise of your deadline?
Maranda
From: Martin Zook [mailto:martin@chemicalwatch.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2014 9:28 AM
To: Demuth, Maranda
Subject: [I] Question
Maranda,
It is my understanding that the toxicity threshold on the MSDS for MCHM went from
50 parts per million in 1998 to 40 ppm in 2005 and 2011.
Do I understand correctly?
Is there an explanation for the change?
Martin Zook
Chemical Watch
540.822.4840 (land)
540.840.3410 (mobile)
From: Demuth, Maranda [mailto:mdemuth@eastman.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 3:11 PM
To: Mattise, Jonathan
Subject: RE: [I] Crude MCHM study
Another email
Jonathan,
Thank you for contacting Eastman.
As reflected in our Q&A and toxicity testing disclosures at www.eastman.com,
Eastman voluntarily sponsored 18 toxicity tests on the product Crude MCHM and its
major component MCHM to evaluate the potential hazards to workers in an industrial
environment and to the environment. The laboratories that conducted the studies
followed Good Laboratory Practice and used Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines. Eastman has no reason to question
the conclusions of the authors of the studies. Further, Eastman is unaware of any
reason to repeat the studies.
Eastman has not been provided with copies of the studies conducted by Dr. Whelton,
and therefore, we are unable to comment specifically on why he performed a study
three times that is traditionally only performed once when appropriate standards and
protocols are used. Eastman’s daphnia toxicity test referred to by Dr. Whelton was
performed on Crude MCHM. It is also unclear to Eastman which substance Dr.
Whelton tested. As has been reported widely, the material spilled by Freedom
Industries was a mixture of Crude MCHM and certain other products that are not
produced by Eastman.
Based on our understanding of the spill, the concentration of the material spilled by
Freedom Industries in the Elk River never reached a level that caused an impact on

Page 3

 aquatic life under either Eastman’s study or Dr. Whelton’s reported findings.
Additionally, we are not aware of any reports of impacted aquatic life as a result of
the spill.
Maranda Demuth
Corporate Communications
Eastman Chemical Company
Office: 423.229.6135
Cell: 423.963.1683
mdemuth@eastman.com

Another problem is that in July 2016 the US National Toxicology Program released the
results of their West Virginia toxicology study. Their testing of crude MCHM provided to them
by Eastman Chemical Company revealed 7% 1,4-cyclohexanedimethanol (CHDM) was
present in their product, not 1-2% as claimed on the crude MCHM SDS. CHDM is one of six
ingredients listed on the SDS. Does the presence of incorrect product composition data on
an SDS meet the standard of OSHA compliance? Why was this “safety” data sheet fact not
mentioned in the chemical “safety” board report? Was the NTP chemical testing data not
defensible? I have spoken with NTP and they believe their data is defensible. How does
CSB think otherwise?
US National Toxicology Program (NTP). Chemical Methods - WV Chemical Spill
NTP Studies: West Virginia
Chemical Spill: NTP Chemical Procurement,
Analysis,
and Formulation. Publicly Released July 8, 2016. Research Triangle
Park, NC USA. 9 pp.
http://tools.niehs.nih.gov/cebs3/wvspill/index.cfm?action=main.dataReview&bin_id=7
27
In 2014, tank liquid testing results were submitted to the West Virginia Public Service
Commission by Dr. Joseph Cortuvo. These results showed 5.3% CHDM was present in the
tank liquid not 1-2% as listed on the crude MCHM SDS. CHDM is not a component of
Stripped PPH, but is a component of crude MCHM. Thus, this CHDM originated from crude
MCHM and was likely diluted from some higher concentration to 5.3% by mixing crude
MCHM with Stripped PPH. This work was conducted by REIC Laboratories. Does the
presence of incorrect product composition data on an SDS meet the standard of OSHA
compliance? Why was this “safety” data sheet fact not mentioned in the chemical “safety”
board report?
J.A. Cortruvo. 2014. Direct testimony of Joseph A. Cortruvo, PhD, BCES. Testimony
Manuscript. Charleston, WV USA.
Another issue is that according to record disclosure by Eastman Chemical Company, the
vapor pressure reported on the SDS was not representative of 4-MCHM isomers. 4-MCHM
has two isomers, it is not just a single compound. The Company reported a single vapor
pressure value for 4-MCHM on their SDS that was not representative of either isomer. The
corporation knew the trans- and cis-isomers of 4-MCHM had different volatility according to
their internal Special Material Business Unit product profile document. CSB is urged to
review this document and consider its implications to the reliability of the SDS the
responders used to make public health decisions.

Page 4

 Eastman Chemical Company. SMBU Product Profile. November 30, 2012. Kingsport,
TN USA.
The US National Science Foundation provided RAPID research funds to Virginia Tech to
ultimately examine 4-MCHM isomer volatility.
The CSB has failed to make clear information contained on the Crude MCHM SDS was not
correct and this is unacceptable in a chemical “Safety” investigation. The report should be
immediately revised to account for this oversight.
(Page 3, para 1, line 3) The CSB stated that the chemical manufacturer conducted “voluntary”
toxicological testing. Whether it was or was not voluntary has no relevance to the CSB
investigation. State of West Virginia and WVAW “voluntarily” issued do not use orders. CDC
“voluntarily” issued drinking water safety guidance to pregnant women. The word “voluntary” has no
scientific basis. This should be removed.
(Page 3, para 3, line 5) The CSB stated that: “[Eastman Chemical Company] made those studies
available to public officials on the evening of January 10th”
First, CSB did not mention that all toxicological studies were not provided to public officials
on the evening of January 10th and that public health officials had to make public health
decisions without all the available toxicology data Eastman had in its possession.
Eastman Chemical Company had in its possession a 1970s crude MCHM inhalation toxicity
study that was conducted on rats. This crude MCHM inhalation toxicity study was not made
available to health officials with the rest of the toxicology data before the established
drinking water screening levels were proposed. The reference is below and the corporation
posted it on their website more than seven months after the spill.
Terhaar CJ. Basic toxicity of Crude 4‐Methylcyclohexanemethanol. Acc. No. 223270,
HS&HFL No. 75‐195. TL‐77‐12. Rochester, NY: Eastman Kodak Company; 1977.
February 10, 1977.
http://www.eastman.com/Literature_Center/Misc/MCHM_acute_tox_1977.pdf
To be clear, the CSB is urged to review the following documents. This inhalation study was
not cited in any health risk assessments. Below are the health risk assessments showing no
organization reviewed this inhalation study.
CDC. Summary Report of Short‐term Screening Level Calculation and Analysis of
Available Animal Studies for MCHM. Dated January 220, 2014. Atlanta, GA USA.
[Note this file was posted well after the screening level was issued to West Virginia
on January 9, 2014]. http://emer gency.cdc.gov/chemical/MC
HM/westvirginia2014/pdf/MCHM‐ SummaryReport.pdf
CDC. Summary Report of Short term Screening Level Calculation and Analysis of
Available Animal Studies for Dipropylene Glycol Phenyl Ether (DiPPH) and
Propylene Glycol Phenyl Ether (PPH). Undated. Atlanta, GA USA. http://emer
gency.cdc.gov/chemical/ MC HM/westvirginia2014/pdf/DiPPH‐PPH‐ calculation.pdf
TERA. Report of Expert Panel Review of Screening Levels for Exposure to
Chemicals from the January 2014 Elk River Spill. May 12, 2014. West Virginia
Page 5

 Testing Assessment Project (WVTAP). Charleston, WV USA. http://ww w
.tera.org/Peer/WV/WV%20Expert% 20Report%2012%20 May%202014.pdf
In a letter dated May 20, 2014 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
Director
Dr. Friedman, who was also Administrator of the for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(ATSDR), address a letter to West Virginia Representative Shelly Moore Capito. In the letter
Dr. Friedman
acknowledged there was a lack of toxicological information available for inhalation
“We evaluated the potential for developing an air screening level early on, but concluded thi
s would be difficult due to the lack of toxicological information on inhalation…”
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2014, May 20). Letter from CDC Director
Dr. Thomas Frieden to Senator Shelley Moore Capito. Topic was to clarify CDC screening l
evel development. Washington, DC USA.
CSB is either unaware of this information which means their investigation is compromised or
did not fully describe what they found and its significance. The fact that toxicological
information for crude MCHM was not provided to health professionals when it was critically
needed is a significant finding. Water utilities, States, Federal Agencies, and other
organizations need to know this. Many assume they are provided all the information
available.
This is a critical oversight and must be corrected in a revised CSB report.
(Page 4, para 4) CSB specifically mentioned the crude MCHM SDS as a key finding but failed to
mention all of the incorrect information it contained. The CSB also mentioned Eastman provided
toxicological studies to public health officials, but failed to mention that Eastman did not fully
disclose all of their toxicology data, specifically the only inhalation study that existed for crude
MCHM.
The CSB should revise this statement to make clear even though an SDS was present, it
contained incorrect information and Eastman Chemical Company did not fully disclose all of
the crude MCHM toxicology studies they had in their possession to local, state, and federal
public health officials during the response.
(Page 4, Lessons Learned and Recommendation Sections). The CSB should add additional
recommendations based on my disclosures in the “recommendations” section at the end of this
response.
(Page 7, Section 2.2.1 Leak Discovery, para 2, line 5) The CSB cited a West Virginia private
consulting company as the most credible source documenting the distance the WVAW intake was
downstream from the spill site. Scientific reports cite original data or organizations with most
authority for the information. The Testimony of Jeffrey McIntyre of WVAW to the Public Service
Commission or WVDEP, or other State of West Virginia agency would be more representative of an
authoritative source for the distance downstream than a consulting company. This reference should
be changed and is inappropriate here.
J.L. McIntyre. Direct Testimony of Jeffrey L. McIntyre. Public Service Commission of West
Virginia, Charleston; CASE NO. 14–0872-W-GI; General Investigation Pursuant to W.Va.

Page 6

 CODE 24–2-7 into the Actions of WVAWC in Reacting to the January 9, 2014 Chemical
Spill. Submitted by Jackson Kelly, PLLC, 46 pp. July 2, 2014.
(Page 8, para 4) The CSB claimed “Shortly after 6:00 PM, WVAW, after consultation with the
Governor’s office ….. issued the DNU order.” This statement is not true based on the actions taken
by the state themselves and their postings on twitter and meeting announcements. The CSB should
correct their timeline and other statements about the timeline as well as replace Figure 1 which is
wrong.
5:23 pm –West Virginia Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety notifies the public of
an upcoming “Do Not Use” water order for WVAM customers via Twitter
5:36 pm – West Virginia Governor Earl Ray Tomblin issues a warning to
citizens: “EMERGENCY: Do NOT use tap water for drinking, cooking, washing or
bathing in Boone, Lincoln, Kanawha, Jackson, Putnam counties.”
5:45 pm – WVAW issues the Do Not Use tap water order, permitting only toilet flushing and
firefighting.
5:54 pm – The Governor declares a State of Emergency for “Boone, Cabell, Clay, Jackson,
Kanawha, Lincoln, Logan, Putnam, and Roane counties. Residents served by
Lincoln Public Service District (PSD), Queen Shoals PSD, Reamer PSD, City of
Culloden PSD, and City of Hurricane PSD are also affected. West Virginians in the
affected service areas are urged NOT to use tap water for drinking, cooking, washing
or bathing. Right now, our priorities are our hospitals, nursing homes, and schools. ”
(Page 7, Section Factual information, para 2) The CSB does not seem to understand what liquid
was spilled and interchangeably refers to the liquid and it’s components as “MCHM”. The arbitrary
approach to describing the chemicals confounds the reader’s ability to clearly understand what is
being discussed. (It is also clear later in the document CSB itself does not understand what
chemicals are being discussed.) CSB later in the report makes clear the tank liquid was a mixture of
crude MCHM, stripped PPH. The CSB however does not make clear in this introductory section that
additional chemicals were in the tank other than “MCHM.” Use of the acronym “MCHM” to describe
the liquid and spill is misleading and should be corrected. MCHM represents the acronym for two 4MCHM isomers, not the complex liquid and not Crude MCHM. Crude MCHM is one of the liquids
that was present in the tank.
On para 2, the CSB stated “MCHM tank”. This is likely CSB describing the physical steel
tank with the visible markings “MCHM” on the side that contained the liquid at the Freedom
Industries site. More than “MCHM” was stored in that tank when the spill occurred. CSB
should make clear they are describing the marking on the tank.
On para 2, the CSB stated “flowing MCHM”. Despite the tank liquid being a poorly
understood mixture of stripped PPH and Crude MCHM compounds that also had been
chemically altered by Freedom Industries, the CSB refers to this liquid as “MCHM.” The
spilled liquid was not “flowing MCHM”. It was liquid from the tank that turned out to contain
MCHM as one part of the Crude MCHM, Stripped PPH as well. CSB should revise this
sentence to state “flowing material”.
On para 2, the CSB referred to the spill as the “MCHM leak” despite the tank liquid being
comprised of a number of different chemicals, including Crude MCHM, Stripped PPH, and
their individual components. CSB might have done this based on interviews with WVAW
personnel who did not understand what chemicals were in the tank. This sentence should
be state “chemical leak”.

Page 7

 On para 2, the CSB described that a vacuum truck arrived at Freedom to collect “pooled
MCHM”. Here, the CSB is referring to the tank liquid, not the single 4-MCHM compound
itself. CSB should revise this sentence to state “the spilled material”.
At the bottom of the page, CSB referred to the “MCHM material” as a flocculent. The liquid
spilled was not MCHM, it was a complex mixture of Crude MCHM, Stripped PPH, had been
chemically modified by Freedom Industries, and MCHM was only two of many compounds
present in that mixture. The CSB should revise this sentence to state the “liquid was a
flocculent”.
(Page 8, para 2) Here, CSB correctly referred to the SDS as a “Crude MCHM SDS”. Unfortunately,
CSB then goes on to misstate that “MCHM constituents were not consistent with what he would
expect” and that “MCHM was a frothing agent, not a flocculent.” First, this sounds like testimony
from someone who does not understand that multiple chemicals were present and the complexity of
the liquid spilled. Notwithstanding the source of this information, it is extremely important CSB
correctly refer to the spilled liquid as such and not arbitrary nonscientific nomenclature. Especially
when trying to prevent biases of others through interviews. If CSB is quoting depositions then this
information should be in quotes and cited accordingly. Moreover, CSB should correct the person’s
explanation to accurately reflect what was spilled.
To be clear, the acronym MCHM describes two isomers present in crude MCHM. These are cis-4MCHM and trans-4-MCHM. There are no “MCHM constituents” in isomers as CSB has alleged.
CSB’s statement is simply untrue. Second, the tank liquid was being used as a frothing agent,
“MCHM” was not being used as a frothing agent as CSB has incorrectly stated.
The sentences should be revised to the following.
“….constituents listed on the crude MCHM SDS were not consistent with what he would
expect…”
And
“…that the tank liquid was a frothing agent, not a flocculent.”
(Page 8, para 3) CSB may have incorrectly alleged WVAW made decisions based on 4-MCHM
isomers only, but WVAW had the Crude MCHM SDS in their possession. If the sentence is not
revised the reader will conclude that WVAW naïvely thought a single chemical, 4-MCHM, was
present in the river and drinking water treatment plant not any of the other chemicals also present in
the tank liquid. The sentence must be revised to correctly describe what happened if revision is
necessary.
“….Available information about crude MCHM and the status of water storage within the
water distribution system….”
(Page 8, para 3) CSB stated “WVAW advised WVBPH and …. the Governor’s Office that MCHM
was detected in the water beyond the filters and that the water distribution system might be
contaminated.”
CSB has alleged that responders, at 6pm on January 9, had the ability to detect 4-MCHM isomers
in the drinking water. CSB has presented NO evidence that chemical identification methods were

Page 8

 available at this time. It is my understanding based on WVAW’s admissions that they did not know
4-MCHM was detected in the water beyond the filters… They knew a licorice odor was present in
the drinking water, but had absolutely no chemical identification at this time. It is incorrect to state
otherwise. Did they know other chemicals were present in their finished water? CSB should revise
this sentence to state
“…that contaminated water was detected beyond the filters and that the water system might
be contaminated.”
(Page 8, para 4) See comment above about CSB’s incorrect timeline.
(Page 8, para 4) CSB stated that the “WVDEP found that the MCHM spill caused …..”
The CSB should revise this sentence to be correct and state:
“WVDEP found that the chemical spill caused….”
(Page 9, para 2) CSB alleges by their text that CDC developed a 1 ppm screening level for “MCHM”
in drinking water. Here it cannot be clearer how CSB’s liberal use of the acronym “MCHM” is
incorrect. CDC did not issue a screening level for the tank liquid. CDC issued a screening level for
the total concentration of 4-MCHM isomers, cis and trans isomers. CDC issued a screening level for
a single component of Crude MCHM. CSB should revise this sentence to state
“short-term screening level concentration for 4-MCHM in drinking water. This represented
the total concentration of cis- and trans-4-MCHM isomers and considered ingestion only exposure.”
(Page 9, para 2) CSB again refers to what WVAW, WVARNG, and private labs tested for in water
as “MCHM”. That’s not correct. The laboratories tested for 4-MCHM isomers only. (CSB has
previously alleged the liquid spilled from the Freedom Industries tank was “MCHM”. CSB seems
confused about what these chemicals were and this undermines the credibility of the report and the
Board). CSB should revise this sentence to state:
“a method to test for 4-MCHM in drinking water.”
(Page 9, para 2) CSB incorrectly stated that “…which began producing samples later that day.”
Laboratories do not produce water samples. They analyze water samples. CSB should revise this
sentence to state
“…which began analyzing samples later that day.”
(Page 10, Figure 1) CSB has an incorrect timeline. See prior timeline comments and correct/revise
Figure 1.
(Page 10, para 1) CSB describes the incident as the “MCHM leak.” This indicates CSB does not
understand more chemicals were present in the tank liquid other than MCHM.
CSB should revise this sentence to state
“As a result of the chemical spill, residents and visitors…”
(Page 10, para 1) Here, CSB first reports the existence of pure MCHM. This is important to note,
because later on CSB claims pure MCHM was present in the drinking water. Pure MCHM was not,
never was present in crude MCHM or the drinking water. It is factually incorrect to claim it was.
CSB’s credibility is seriously undermined here.

Page 9

 (Page 10, para 1) CSB cited the WVTAP toxicology report when discussing the West Virginia
Poison Control Center data. This is inappropriate. Scientific documents should cite the source data
when available. The West Virginia Poison Control Center is a public agency. CSB should cite the
actual data. If CSB cannot obtain/review source data, a copy of the data was pasted in the SI
section of Whelton et al. 2014. The WVTAP report does not contain the actual Poison Center data.
It is also important to point out the following:
Since the Poison Center data was collected the Poison Center admitted some persons
receiving calls were untrained, so their reported data may not be reliable.
E.J. Scharman. WV Poison Center Response Roles and Responsibilities.
Presentation to the National Association of City and County Health Officials Webinar,
Response and Recovery During an Environmental Disaster: Learning from the Elk
River Chemical Spill; West Virginia Bureau of Public Health: Charleston, WV, April
22, 2014.
Also, only 36% of the total number of calls to the Poison Control Center could be answered
due to call volume challenges. As a result, there was a lot of data that simply was not
collected about reported symptoms and questions. It is in appropriate to imply the Poison
Center data is comprehensive. The limitations of this information must be made explicit.
E.J. Scharman. 2014. Poison center surge capacity. Proc. Annual Meeting of the
North American Congress of Clinical Toxicology (NACCT). Clinical Toxicology. 52,
682-818
The Poison Control Center data, while informative, may not be representative of the 300,000
population affected.
(Page 10, para 1) CSB has claimed that the symptoms were reported to be caused by MCHM. This
statement is untrue. The symptoms could have been caused by –contaminated drinking water
exposure-, not just 4-MCHM, or crude MCHM. In this statement, CSB ignored the fact that Stripped
PPH components, at least PPH and DiPPH, were also present in the drinking water. CSB ignored
the fact that MMCHC was also present in the drinking water along with 4-MCHM isomers. CSB puts
forward no awareness that multiple chemicals were present in the drinking water in addition to 4MCHM. The reasons for their omission is concerning and undermined the credibility of CSB.
While it is correct that ATSDR and WVBPH indicated symptoms could be due to contaminated
drinking water exposure or other clinical illnesses in the population, it is also important to declare
symptoms could also be due to contaminated water exposure. Also needed is a sentence making
clear why this difference cannot be confirmed. That is an opportunity for CSB to identify how the
public health response can be improved in the future.
(Para 10, para 1) CSB inappropriately refers to “MCHM-contaminated water”. There were more
chemicals than just 4-MCHM isomers present in the contaminated drinking water. CSB
demonstrates that they do not understand the chemicals present in the contaminated water. CSB
should revise the sentence to state
“contaminated drinking water”.
(Page 11, para 2) CSB has alleged on “….January 25, MCHM levels were 50 ppb, consistently
lower than the safe concentration established by CDC at 1ppm.” The CSB has chosen to cherry

Page 10

 pick data or simply ignore higher levels of 4-MCHM in the distribution system that occurred PAST
January 25.
On January 25, maximum of 43 ppb of 4-MCHM was detected in the distribution system.
On January 26, maximum of 268 ppb 4-MCHM detected in the water distribution system.
CSB’s statement is wrong and must be revised. It is untrue as written.
Second, CSB has chosen to deliberately avoid any mention of chemical levels inside resident
homes, private businesses, and other commercial buildings obtained by Universities or other parties
to the spill response. The CSB even avoided discussion of USGS’s office building tap water study
where they discovered MMCHC in their drinking water, a known Crude MCHM ingredient. This
omission is completely shocking.
As CSB knows, 4-MCHM levels inside residences were greater than the highest 4-MCHM level
detected in the water distribution system on some days. This is likely due to residents being told to
use their plumbing (toilet uses) without any organized rapid testing by the responders to determine
what chemical levels were present – at their taps – where people were coming into contact with the
water. This deliberate omission of data by CSB is unjustifiable and biased CSB’s report. To a
reader it also indicates no one conducted in-home testing. Much was learned by testing drinking
water inside residences and CSB should revise their discussion to make clear the lessons from
those investigations. If CSB chooses to avoid discussion of residential tap water sampling data they
should provide justification. However, the CSB’s report discusses public health recommendations
(how to prevent harm to residents), water distribution monitoring results, but explicitly avoids
discussion of the in-between….the plumbing, large amount of in-home testing data, and associated
studies.
(Page 11, para 2) The use of the word “low” to describe 4-MCHM concentration is inappropriate. 4MCHM odor can be detected at 0.15 ppb in drinking water. A concentration of 50 ppb would not be
low.
The word “low” should be removed from the report. It demonstrates bias and is not
scientifically accurate.
(Page 11, page 2) CSB refers to “….citizens continued to detect MCHM odors.” First, no study was
conducted that pinpointed exactly what the odors originated from. Yes, 4-MCHM isomers
contributed, but other chemicals contributed too according to WVTAP support research. CSB’s
depiction that citizens detected only “MCHM-odors” is not supported by evidence and it surprising
that CSB is uninformed. To be clear:
Approximately one month after the spill, WVTAP conducted a drinking water odor and
chemical oxidation study (McGuire studies). Using the tank liquid, researchers found that the
aqueous 4-MCHM OTC was less than 0.15 ppb, odor recognition concentration was 2.2
ppb, and odor objection concentration was 4.0 ppb. These researchers also suggested that
other chemicals in addition to 4-MCHM contributed to odor, and odor characteristics of
drinking water contaminated with tank liquid and pure 4-MCHM differed.
M.J. McGuire. 2014. Oxidation Studies with Crude 4-methylcyclohexanemethanol in Water;
West Virginia Testing and Assessment Project: Santa Monica, CA USA.
M.J. McGuire. 2014. Odor Study Technical Memorandum. WVTAP. Santa Monica, CA USA.

Page 11

 CSB should revise the statement to state:
“citizens continued to report detecting drinking water odors….”
(Page 11, page 2) Seeing that CSB focused on WVAW’s actions, health effects, and public
confidence, CSB has omitted any mention of the fact that some of the emergency bulk water
distributed to the population was actually contaminated. The same water residents were being told
not to use.

Bulk water containers pulled. Charleston Daily Mail. January 17, 2014. Charleston, WV.
The distribution of licorice smelling contaminated water to the population through emergency
water distribution stations caused problems. Clearly some sort of CSB recommendation
should be issued to prevent such actions from ever occurring again. Acknowledging that it
occurred is also necessary. Lack of discussion of this incident implies CSB finds that
distribution of contaminated water to the population was acceptable.
(Page 11, para 4) Two sentences does not equal a paragraph in a scientific report. Topic sentence
and supporting points are needed. CSB should review their report to correct other places where two
sentences are purposed to represent a paragraph.
(Page 11, Section 2.2) CSB claims Freedom “stored and sold MCHM”. They did not. They stored
crude MCHM and then a modified version of it. CSB should correct this description to accurately
describe the liquids that Freedom stored and sold.
(Page 13, last para) CSB claims Freedom “stored MCHM for sale”. They did not. They stored crude
MCHM and then a modified version of it. CSB should correct this description to accurately describe
the liquids that Freedom stored and sold.
(Page 15, Section 2.2.2.1 MCHM Tanks) CSB refers to the physical tanks on the Freedom Site as
“MCHM tanks.” CSB should make clear that they are referring to the label on the tanks, not the
Page 12

 contents. The tanks did not just contain “MCHM”. This is another example of how liberally using the
acronym "MCHM” is inappropriate. It is recommended CSB change the title to be
“Tanks Used to Store Liquids at Freedom Industries Site”
(Page 15, footnote) CSB claimed MCHM is used in the froth flotation process. It was not. Crude
MCHM and the further processed liquid (with Stripped PPH, pH adjusted, etc.) was used in the froth
flotation process. CSB should correct the statement to be:
Crude MCHM and the further processed liquid (with Stripped PPH, etc.) was used in the
froth flotation process.
(Page 15, Section 2.2.2.1 MCHM Tanks) CSB cites a decommissioning plan developed by
contractors claiming tank 396 held 88.5% crude MCHM 7.3 % PPH, and 4.2% water by weight. This
is not the source document. CSB should be citing the source document which was submitted by
Gary Southern to WVDEP:
Freedom Industries, Inc. Letter to West Virginia DEP describing the composition of the
materials in Tank 396. January 22, 2014. Charleston, WV USA.
http://www.dep.wv.gov/pio/Documents/Freedom%20Response%20to%20WVDEP%20Order
.pdf.
(Page 16, para 1) CSB refers to tanks being use to mix “MCHM”. This is not true. Tanks were used
to mix Crude MCHM. CSB should correct this mistake.
(Page 17, para 1) CSB refers to the tank liquid as a blend of crude MCHM and stripped PPH. But,
later in the same paragraph CSB refers to “MCHM exposure”. CSB must correct this inconsistency.
The statement should be revised as:
“Freedom Industries’ SDS for Shurflot 944 is similar to that of crude MCHM’s SDS and
stated …..”
(Page 17, Section 2.2.2.1.2 crude MCHM) CSB claimed that “Crude MCHM, manufactured by
Eastman Chemical Company (Eastman) contains a mixture of six different chemical compounds,
including pure MCHM and water.” This statement is untrue. The SDS listed six compounds, but
there were more chemicals present in crude MCHM.
What’s more surprising is that CSB even cited their OSHA tank liquid testing results that 2methylcyclohexanemethanol (2-MCHM) was present. This compound was not listed on the crude
MCHM SDS. This compound can only be from crude MCHM because Striped PPH has much
different ingredients. Because 2-MCHM was present, this indicates more than six compounds were
present in crude MCHM. CSB’s own data show their statement about how many compounds are
present in crude MCHM is untrue.
Without explanation, CSB chose not to cite the National Toxicology Program’s chemical analysis of
crude MCHM. Specifically, NTP found several chemicals that were NOT listed on the crude MCHM
SDS:
2-Ethyl-1-hexanol
cis-Octahydroisobenzofuran

Page 13

 Without explanation, CSB chose to cite some WVTAP data, but none of the WVTAP tank liquid
analysis. WVTAP found a variety of chemicals that were NOT listed on the SDS:
2-Methoxyethoxybenzene (MEB)
Cyclohexanemethanol (CHM)
Dimethylester 1,4-cyclohexanedicarboxylic acid
4-Methyl, methyl ester cyclohexanecarboxylic acid (MMCHCA)
Without explanation, CSB chose to ignore tank liquid chemical characterization data submitted as
part of the West Virginia Public Service Commission. Testimony by Joseph Curtuvo reported the
following chemicals present in the liquid that were not listed on the SDS:
Cyclohexanemethanol (CHM)
1-Hydroxymethyl-2-methyl-1-cyclohexane (HMC)
Other unidentified compounds
CSB’s statement that only six compounds were present in the crude MCHM is wrong and must be
corrected. This statement occurs throughout the CSB report and should be corrected at every
place. The fact is that the exact composition of the spilled liquid, and crude MCHM, and stripped
PPH remains unknown because appropriate chemical analysis methods were not applied to fully
characterize the material.
A correction could be that Crude MCHM’s SDS listed six compounds and a number of other
compounds were also present in the liquid.
(Page 18, para 1) CSB has claimed “pure MCHM” was 4-MCHM and present in the water supply.
This is false. 4-MCHM isomers were present, but there is a distinct difference between pure MCHM
and the isomers that entered the water supply by way of crude MCHM.
The CSB is asked to make clear they understand (and convey this understanding to the reader) that
there are two different compounds that makeup total 4-MCHM. One is called cis-4-MCHM and the
other is called trans-4-MCHM. Emergency responders, WVAW, Universities, and other
organizations reported the concentration of 4-MCHM. This was total 4-MCHM, a summation of the
concentration of cis- and trans-4-MCHM isomers. Each isomer has a different volatility, water
solubility, and odor characteristic. You can read more about how different these two 4-MCHM
isomers are here: http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/acs.estlett.5b00061
The reason CSB’s statement is wrong is because pure MCHM contains trans/cis isomers at
different abundance than crude MCHM. Pure MCHM had one trans-4-MCHM isomer for every two
cis-4-MCHM isomers present. While, crude MCHM had two trans-4-MCHM isomer for every one
cis-4-MCHM isomer present. Pure MCHM was never present in the drinking water in West Virginia
and it is wrong to state otherwise. Below are references for you to see why your statement is
wrong.

Page 14

 http://www.awwa.org/publications/journal-awwa/abstract/articleid/46969730.aspx
The USGS and West Virginia University determined the isomer ratios too:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0045653514012648
(Page 18) CSB chosen not to mention US National Toxicology Program’s thorough chemical
analysis of crude MCHM and Stripped PPH. This omission is scientifically unjustified and I assume
CSB was unare of it. For that reason, CSB should revise it’s report to include discussion of the NTP
compositional analysis data.
USGS and the US National Toxicology Program were the only organizations to detect
MMCHC in crude MCHM and confirm its presence with an analytical standard. Testing data
indicate that CHDM was present in the tank liquid (5.6%) and crude MCHM (7.15%) at levels
much greater than the 1-2% reported on the crude MCHM product SDS.
NTP analysed DOWLANOL™ PPH glycol ether, which was the product Freedom Industries
processed into Stripped PPH. NTP is the only organization to have reported the composition
of DOWLANOL™ PPH glycol ether. Four isomers of dipropylene glycol phenyl ether,
91.7% of total composition were found. Nineteen impurities
at levels greater than
0.05% were found and the compounds detected in greatest abundance were phenol
(0.11%), 1-phenoxypropan-2-ol (1.92%), and
2-phenoxypropan-1-ol(0.86%).
While a variety of studies conducted do provide insight into the composition of the tank
liquid, it’s components, and even compared two batches of crude MCHM, the tank liquid’s
composition (1) remains poorly understood, (2) no SDS existed that described its
composition, (3) crude MCHM provided to laboratories sometimes contained chemicals that
were not listed on the product SDS or within the range reported on the SDS, and (4) the
presence of the multitude of DOWLANOL™ PPH glycol ether and crude MCHM compounds
in the tank liquid is unknown.
US National Toxicology Program (NTP). Chemical Methods - WV Chemical Spill NTP
Studies: West Virginia
Chemical Spill: NTP Chemical
Procurement, Analysis,
and Formulation. Publicly Released July 8, 2016. Research Triangle Park, NC USA.
9 pp.
http://tools.niehs.nih.gov/cebs3/wvspill/index.cfm?action=main.dataReview&bin_id=727
Page 15

 (Page 18, para 1) CSB reported the existence of OSHA testing results for tank liquid, but incorrectly
claimed “pure MCHM” was present. Crude MCHM never had “pure MCHM” inside it. See the
explanation for why this is wrong above. This text must be corrected.
(Page 18, para 2) Crude MCHM is not an alcohol. 4-MCHM has an alcohol functional groupCrude
MCHM is a complex mixture of compounds, some of which are alcohols, carboxylic acids, and other
organic compounds. CSB needs to strike the misrepresentation of crude MCHM being an alcohol.
(Page 18, para 2) CSB has no business citing C&E News magazine as an authoritative source for
how crude MCHM was used. There are other documents from Eastman Chemical Company,
Freedom Industries, and other organizations that create, purchase, and test the material worthy of
justifying the statement.
(Page 18, para 2 and 3) CSB uses the acronym “MCHM” multiple times to refer to Crude MCHM but
then oscillates back to stating crude MCHM. CSB should rewrite their description to be consistent
so as not to confuse the reader.
(Page 18, footnote 50) CSB declared to the reader how “MCHM” will be described. This is way too
late. Despite this declaration, CSB has been using confusing terminology throughout the report.
Even with this declaration earlier in the report, CSB’s descriptions would still be too confusing. The
text must be rewritten anywhere MCHM is mentioned.
(Page 18, para 3) CSB stated that methanol “makes up 1% of the mixture”. CSB should add a
qualifying statement to be clear. As written, CSB is declaring methanol is only present in crude
MCHM at 1%. CSB has no data to support such a statement. The sentence should be revised:
“The Eastman SDS lists exposure limit information only for methanol, which the SDS
reported to be 1% of the mixture.”
(Page 19, para 3) CSB should remove the word “only” from the last sentence. Only implies the
chemicals have been tested for every population imaginable, and only was it found toxic to on
population. No evidence was cited by CSB supporting such a statement.
(Page 23, para 2) CSB stated 1.69 miles to the KVWTP intake. This distance conflicts with CSB’s
earlier claim on page 1 that the distance was 1.5 miles. It is important that CSB does not contradict
itself in the report because that undermines credibility.
(Page 24, para 1) CSB should revise its approach to referring to Crude MCHM as “MCHM” for the
reasons discussed above as this causes reader confusion. CSB should revise the topic sentence to
state:
The single water intake on the Elk River provided the medium through which contaminated
river water was distributed through the Kanawha Valley water system.
(Page 24, para 2) The City of Huntington, WV was distributed licorice smelling contaminated water
through the Huntington Water Treatment Plant owned and operated by WVAW. Why was this not
mentioned since CSB believes WVAW’s involvement and the nine counties are important to
describe? Huntington is located in Cabell County? The Kanawha Valley Water Treatment Plant also
provided contaminated water to residents in Cabell County, but separate from the Huntington
drinking water treatment plant which was further downriver.

Page 16

 (Page 28, para 1) CSB refers to the chemical spill as the “….of the MCHM spill….”. More than just
crude MCHM was spilled. CSB should revise the sentence to state
“….of the chemical spill….”
(Page 28, point 1) CSB refers to “MCHM leaked from tank 396….” More than just MCHM leaked.
CSB should revise the sentence to state
“Chemicals released from tank 396…
(Page 28, point 2) CSB refers to “Once MCHM escaped the tank….” More than just MCHM leaked.
CSB should revise the sentence to state
“Once the liquid escaped the tank…”
(Page 28, point 6) CSB refers to the chemical spill as the “….MCHM spill….”. More than just crude
MCHM was spilled. CSB should revise the sentence to state
“….chemical spill….”
(Page 28, para 3) CSB refers to “….which MCHM leaked from the tank…” More than just MCHM
leaked. CSB should revise the sentence to state
“….which the liquid leaked from the tank….”
(Page 30, para 1) CSB stated “MCHM-containing tanks”. Because the information was not available
I cannot be sure if just Crude MCHM was present in those tanks or if shurflott was present (mixture
of crude MCHM + Stripped PPH). CSB should review their records and change how they describe
what’s present in these tanks.
(Page 36, para 2) CSB refers to “…internal inspection of the MCHM tanks.” What is CSB referring
to? The tanks with markings of “MCHM” on them or tanks that stored crude MCHM, or tanks that
Stored Shurflott? CSB needs to revise how they describe what the chemicals were, where they
were stored, and what vessels they were stored in.
(Page 40, para 1) CSB claims only MCHM was released from the bottom of tank 396. That’s
incorrect. A variety of chemicals were released from tank 396 as evidenced by water testing
records.
CSB should revise their statement to state “….sudden release of chemicals from the bottom
of tank 396.”
(Page 40, para 2) CSB’s calculation about how many gallons of liquid was released is unsupported.
CSB, for thoroughness should explain how they calculated 10,000 gallons. Was this including the
11.5 GPM discharge for 24 hours before the spill was discovered? Didn’t liquid escape the tank
even after the spill was detected? This is a scientific report and requires thoroughness and
transparency.
(Page 40, para 2 and 3) CSB refers to the complex liquid as “MCHM leak, MCHM tank, and MCHM
had leaked.” More than just MCHM leaked. CSB should revise these statements to accurately

Page 17

 declare the tank liquid was released. It is inappropriate to declare this is the MCHM spill. More than
MCHM was spilled.
(Page 41, para 1) CSB referred to the “….MCHM tanks….”, “…characterize the flow of MCHM
through…”, ”…”MCHM quickly traveled…”. More than just MCHM leaked. CSB should revise these
statements to accurately declare the tank liquid was released. It is inappropriate to declare this is
the MCHM spill. More than MCHM was spilled.

(Page 42, para 2) CSB already stated that the leak flowrate was estimated to be 11.5 GPM (Page
40). Why is this repeated?
(Page 42, para 2) CSB has alleged none of the Freedom employees reported seeing any MCHM
leak prior to the day of the incident. I can guarantee they didn’t. People cannot see 4-MCHM. The
correct description is tank liquid or liquid from the tanks. CSB should revise these statements to
accurately declare the tank liquid was released. It is inappropriate to declare this is the MCHM spill.
More than MCHM was spilled.
(Page 44, para 1) CSB has supposedly quoted WVDEP, but no reference exists to support this
assertion. Provide the reference or delete the statement.
(Page 44, para 2) CSB is alleging tanks only contained 4-MCHM or Crude MCHM (it’s still unclear
because of the naming approach CSB has applied). Second, CSB alleges “MCHM and stripped
PPH continued to flow from the bottom of tank 396…” There is no evidence that all of the Crude
MCHM and all of the stripped PPH present in the tank flowed into the environment. With existing
uncertainty, CSB should revised the statement to be
“Liquid continued to flow from the bottom of tank 396…”
(Page 44) Why did CSB not mention the multiple chemical spills at the Freedom Industries site that
occurred after January 9? Several of these prompted WVAW to shutdown its intake? This is
relevant to the investigation as the continued release of contaminants into the environment
occurred. The CSB should revise their report to fully document the spills from the Freedom
Industries site.
(Page 47, para 1) CSB referred to the “….MCHM release…” . More than just MCHM leaked. CSB
should revise this statements to accurately declare the tank liquid was released. It is inappropriate
to declare this is the MCHM spill. More than MCHM was spilled.
(Page 49, para 1) CSB reported some but not all testing results from WVDEP. Why? Also, why
were EPA testing results not reported? Why were ARCADIS testing results not mentioned? This
omission has no scientific basis.
(Para 49, para 1) CSB has claimed WVDEP tested water samples for MCHM. They likely mean 4MCHM isomers, not crude MCHM as they have been using the acronym “MCHM” to describe. CSB
should revisit the raw data and make certain they are clear in what exactly the data say and convey
that information clearly. As presented, CSB has implied WVDEP tested the water for crude MCHM
and that’s simply not true.
(Page 50, para 2) CSB makes a point to discuss MCHM and the lack of regulations and health
screening levels. First, this needs to be described as tank liquid not “MCHM”. Of course there were
no screening levels for crude MCHM. EPA and CDC do not set such screening levels for complex

Page 18

 mixtures. Why would CSB even think this? The statements written are not correct and must be
revised.
(Page 50, para 1) CSB has alleged WVAW only assumed “MCHM” was present in the Elk River and
that they could treat it. First does CSB mean 4-MCHM or crude MCHM or the tank liquid? Second,
did WVAW know that crude MCHM contained a variety of other impurities? Organic chemical
based/Polymer based flocculant liquids used for water treatment are known to contain impurities.
Why was this not mentioned by the CSB? Flocculants used for water treatment are not 100% pure.
(Page 51, para 2,3,4,5) CSB refers to “MCHM” multiple different ways and does not seem to
understand what exactly happened. For example, is CSB Asserting WVAW only thought 4-MCHM
was present going through the filters? Or Crude MCHM and a variety of compounds that went with
it? CSB does not seem to know the difference according to their description. As such, this must be
revised.
(Page 51 para 3) MCHM is not a frothing agent, the tank liquid was the frothing agent.
(Page 51, para 3) It is irrelevant that WVAW did not know a “frothing agent” was stored upstream of
the intake. CSB should remove the words “frothing agent”.
Second, CSB refers to MCHM as “its concentration”. Here is CSB referring to MCHM in singular
form, but Crude MCHM, Stripped PPH have a number of constituents, not just 4-MCHM. CSB
needs to make clear multiple chemicals were spilled and that WVAW did not know what these were
and both WVAW and WVBPH were unprepared to establish water sampling and analysis methods.
(Page 51, para 3) The water was not just contaminated with MCHM. It was contaminated with the
spilled liquid. CSB should make this clear. As currently written, it is misleading.
(Page 51, para 3) The last sentence is simply not true. It should state “WVAW also coordinated with
a research group within the DuPont Corporation and National Guard to isolate the 4-MCHM and
develop a test method.” No test method was developed for any other ingredients in the crude
MCHM except 4-MCHM. According to discussions with General Hoyer, the National Guardsman
who worked at DuPont only looked for and found 4-MCHM. It is untrue to claim an analytical
method was developed for crude MCHM. If that were the case multiple compounds would have
been identified and reported.
(Page 51, para 4) If what the CSB has alleged is true, this is a major finding. As written, the CSB
stated that “WVBPD requested that CDC determine the safe drinking water level for 4-MCHM (or
pure MCHM).” The CSB should doublecheck their notes. My understanding is that CDC was asked
to determine a safe drinking water limit for 4-MCHM, not pure MCHM. As mentioned above pure
MCHM has a different abundance of trans/cis isomers compared to crude MCHM. Crude MCHM
was spilled. Thus, the composition of trans/cis isomers between the two chemicals would be
different. CSB’s statement implies WVBPH requested assistance from CDC for the wrong chemical.
If this is true, this is a key CSB finding that warrants more discussion and recommendations in this
report. More explanation is needed here to clarify the request by WVBPH to CDC.
(Page 52, para 4) CSB directs readers to the MSDS table for crude MCHM, but that table is
incomplete. CSB reported that their OSHA test results found other chemcials present. A number of
other organizations tested crude MCHM and tank liquid. This information needs to be cited.

Page 19

 (Page 53, para 1). The statement “To fully understand the impact of the chemical spill on the
public…” is biased and sounds like someone else wrote it, not CSB. WVBPH never fully understood
the impact. An unbiased revised sentence would be
“To better understand the impact of the chemical spill on the public…”
(page 53) Why didn’t CSB report any analysis of drinking water customer complaint records from
WVAW? Customer complaints are critical to understanding the extent of water distribution system
contamination.
It is common practice for small and large water utilities to record drinking water customer
complaints they receive. They are numerous examples of how customer complaints helped
water utilities and public health investigators identify when customers received contaminated
water and where it went. For example, customer complaint records were instrumental in
understanding the Milwaukee Cryptosporidium outbreak. As MacKenzie et al. showed,
customer complaints indicated that 7-10 days before the outbreak customer’s called the
water utility in mass about “cloudy” water [it was contaminated]. Here is the study:
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJM199407213310304. Dr. Whelton lead a study
years ago to help US utilities design drinking water surveillance systems for customer
complaint monitoring because of their value. Here is that study:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254156899_Using_customer_feedback_for_impro
ved_water_quality_and_infrastructure_monitoring
Dr. Whelton requested that WVAW provide customer complaint records for analysis and they
declined citing litigation. CSB seems to have had access to those records but does not seem to
have been able to adequately analyze and interpret them.
Here is the information request denial issued to Dr. Whelton by WVAW:
From: Jeffrey.McIntyre@amwater.com [mailto:Jeffrey.McIntyre@amwater.com]
Sent: Thursday, January 21, 2016 11:35 AM
To: Whelton, Andrew J <awhelton@purdue.edu>
Subject: Re: Data Request
Thank you for your email. We are unable to provide the information you request due to
pending litigation against the company over the Freedom Industries chemical spill.
Regards,
Jeff
Jeffrey L. McIntyre
President
West Virginia American Water
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Charleston, WV 25302
P: (304) 340-2000
C: (304) 533-5756
F: (304) 340-2076
jeffrey.mcintyre@amwater.com
www.amwater.com
"Whelton, Andrew J" ---01/18/2016 04:09:04 PM--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~
From: "Whelton, Andrew J" <awhelton@purdue.edu>
To: "Jeffrey.McIntyre@amwater.com" <Jeffrey.McIntyre@amwater.com>,
Date: 01/18/2016 04:09 PM

Page 20

 Subject: Data Request
________________________________________
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~
THIS EMAIL WAS SENT FROM OUTSIDE THE COMPANY. PLEASE USE CAUTION AND
VERIFY THE SENDER BEFORE OPENING ATTACHMENTS OR CLICKING LINKS.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~
Hi Jeff,
Would WVAW provide me the customer complaint data pertaining starting January 1, 2014
to August 1, 2014?
I am seeking information pertaining to the daily log that describes number and duration of
calls, call classification categories and sub categories available, description of each issue
provided by the caller, location of the caller in the service area/whether the caller was a
WVAW customer, and any other notes made by the person receiving the contact. I am also
interested in any identifiers WVAW used to mark a call as possibly related to the Freedom
Industries chemical spill incident, if any. The data as collected would be ideal (1 record for
each call), and any summaries made/drafted would be helpful too. Many people report this
as "customer complaint" data, but I consider it "customer feedback" because customers who
contact a utility are not always complaining.
I assume this information has been compiled and centralized due to WVAWs efforts to
better understand the incident. My plan is to review it and publicly report the data if it
indicates any trends. I have yet to see any report describing the results. My interest in this
type of data goes back to my US Army days when we proposed such an effort for deployed
and garrison water system monitoring.
Thank you. Let me know if you have any questions.
Andy
Andrew J. Whelton, Ph.D.
(page 52, para 1) Of course “WVBPH and ATSDR could not confirm if MCHM caused the
symptoms.” There were multiple chemicals present not just 4-MCHM. To be accurate, CSB needs
to revise the sentence to state “WVBPH and ATSDR could not confirm if contaminated drinking
water exposure caused the symptoms….” WVBPH and ATSDR themselves did not understand
MMCHC was present in the drinking water when their report was published. USGS didn’t report that
information until 11 months after the spill.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0045653514012648
(Page 53, para 2) Is the CSB claiming that KCHD only asked residents to report if they were
exposed to MCHM? 4-MCHM? Crude MCHM? Or was it the contaminated drinking water that
contained 4-MCHM, MMCHC, PPH, and DiPPH? CSB needs to clarify this statement. CSB does
not seem to know what they are reporting on.
Why has CSB deliberately omitted any mention of PPH and DiPPH water testing data? These were
present in the drinking water. WVAW and WVDHSEM reported the water testing data. There is no
scientific justification for excluding these data from the investigation.
(Page 53, reference 151). Why is CSB citing a presentation when the results of a research study
were published in a peer-review journal? CSB should read that study and check to be sure any data
presented in the PPT file is also present in the peer-reviewed study.

Page 21

 (Page 53, para 3) CSB is claiming that “WVBPH asked CDC to establish a recommended screening
level for the MCHM…” This statement is in direct conflict with an earlier statement that WVBPH
asked for assistance about 4-MCHM (but then pure MCHM too). CSB does not seem to understand
what WVBPH asked of the CDC and the difference between these terms. There are significant
differences and go to the heart of any critical investigation of the incident and impacts. These
sentences must be revised.
(Page 54) At no point did CSB acknowledge that the CDC screening level did not consider
inhalation exposure. This is highly disturbing and perpetuates a falsehood lacking scientific basis.
The CDC acknowledged that there was a lack of toxicological information available for inhalation in
a letter dated May 20, 2014 from Dr. Frieden, Director of the CDC and Administrator of the ATSDR
to West Virginia Representative Shelly Moore Capito:
“We evaluated the potential for developing an air screening level early on, but concluded this would
be difficult due to the lack of toxicological information on inhalation….”
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2014, May 20). Letter from CDC Director
Dr. Thomas Frieden to Senator Shelley Moore Capito. Topic was to clarify CDC screening le
vel development. Washington, DC USA.
Second, the West Virginia Testing and Assessment Project (WVTAP) also conducted their own
thorough review of toxicological studies from February 2014 through March 2014 pertaining to the c
ompounds in the spilled tank liquid. I was part of the WVTAP investigation.
As part of the WVTAP investigation, a tank liquid toxicology review was led by Professor Craig Ada
ms at Utah State University (Adams et al. 2014). All of the publicly available toxicology studies perta
ining to crude MCHM and the other tank liquid products were reviewed by Dr. Craig Adams, Dr. An
drew Whelton, and Jeff Rosen of Corona Environmental Consulting and waspublished in 2014. WV
TAP communicated directly with the CDC to determine which documents Eastman Chemical Comp
any had provided them and were used for the CDC’s drinking water
‘appropriate for use’ drinking water screening level determinations. WVTAP’s investigation revealed
that no inhalation studies had been conducted by any organization as of Mid‐
2014. This conclusion was based on the lack of any inhalation studies that were provided to the he
alth officials involved when WVTAP conducted their study.
C. Adams; A. Whelton; J. Rosen. Literature Review: Health Effects for Chemicals in 2014 W
est Virginia Chemical Release: Crude MCHM Compounds, PPH and DiPPH, v1.4. March 1
5, 2014. West Virginia Testing Assessment Project (WVTAP). Charleston, WV USA. https://
s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1088254/health‐effectslit‐review‐
wvtap‐15mar14‐v1‐4.pdf
The CSB statement that the screening level was adequate, and implied for all exposure routes, is
simply untrue. This requires immediate revision. The 4-MCHM screening level did not cover all
exposure routes. Screening levels developed by CDC considered ingestion. CSB does not
understand the purpose of the National Toxicology Program studies and is urged to contact the
National Toxicology Program to better understand what their studies were and were not intended to
do. The National Toxicology Program did not evaluate health impacts caused by inhalation
exposure. They even publicly declared this.
“Bucher [NTP] conceded that the federal findings still suffer from a lack of data about
inhalation exposures residents experienced, especially when following the state-promoted

Page 22

 guidance for running hot and cold water to flush home plumbing systems of any
contamination. Federal officials abandoned a plan in the immediate aftermath of the spill to
come up with a limit for how much MCHM was safe in the air, no air sampling was done in
homes or public buildings, and follow-up research has warned residents could have been
exposed to dangerous levels of chemicals during flushing procedures.“Clearly [inhalation]
hasn’t been addressed,” Bucher said. “We really had no clue about what kinds of levels of
exposures were happening during the flushing.”
http://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/20160708/final-federal-mchm-study-leaves-samequestions-unanswered
CSB’s statement in the report is simply wrong and unsupported by evidence. CSB should should
revise any discussion of the screening levels to explain inhalation exposure was not considered nor
evaluated in National Toxicology Program studies. Period. Failure to do this will make CSB an
accessory to perpetuating falsehoods. CSB has gave the public the impression inhalation toxicity is
understood. It was not, still is not, and no one is looking into it. Any decision otherwise by CSB
would amount to scientific misconduct.
Additionally, there was no mention about the lack of toxicity data for sensitive subpopulations who
were exposed to the contaminated water. Persons with COPD, chemical sensitivity, etc. The
studies conducted by the National Toxicology Program did not examine these types of
subpopulations who were exposed to the contaminated water. CSB examined the impacts on
healthy subjects.
(Page 54, para 4) CSB is referring to the presence of “MCHM” above a threshold. CSB previously
referred to “MCHM” as crude MCHM and Pure MCHM (which are completely different products).
CSB needs to change this acronym here to be 4-MCHM. CDC also developed a 4-MCHM
screening level, not MCHM screening level.
(Page 55, para 1) CSB has claimed the 4-MCHM level entering the water treatment plant at 5pm on
January 9 was 13.7 ppm. CSB provides absolutely no source for this information and this level was
never made public by the State of West Virginia or WVAW. In fact, when I was part of WVTAP the
state of West Virginia told us the data they jointly collected with WVAW was all that was available
for 4-MCHM levels. The information CSB has disclosed indicates the state either was dishonest to
WVTAP and myself, this information was fabricated by CSB and does not exist, or some other
organization chose to withhold this information from the public. CSB should explain exactly the
source of the data and identify the reasons why this information was not disclosed to the public,
especially the 300,000 people who were distributed water of unknown toxicity.
Second, how is the fact that 13.7 ppm 4-MCHM having been detected by WVAW and not disclosed
to the public OR State of West Virginia OR CDC or National Toxicology Program not a major
finding?
Also, when was the 13.7 ppm information known? Was it known the night of the spill, before CDC
issued their water safety guidance? Before WVAW, WVDHHR issued their plumbing system
flushing guidance? When the decision was made not to test water in people’s homes, did the
parties involved know these higher 4-MCHM levels could be present? The CSB report demands an
explanation for this disclosure and events surrounding it.
(Page 55, para 1) CSB has drawn a graph that makes little sense and must be revised. First, no
one tested the water for “crude MCHM”. That’s untrue. Any test would have involved 4-MCHM only

Page 23

 because that’s the only chemical people knew to test for. Second, there is no evidence that 13.7
ppm or any of the data CSB has attempted to graph exist in the State of West Virginia or WVAW
records made public. CSB is proposing through this report that 4-MCHM data exist that were
NEVER made public. CSB also has provided no reference for this data. Third, we have no idea
what the data points represent. Are these maximum 4-MCHM levels for the time period collected?
Are these averages of multiple replicates collected? How many samples were collected per
sampling event? Fourth, what was the minimum detection limit (MDL) for the test? The absence of
data 1/11/2014 1:10pm is unexplained and seems to imply CSB omitted the data. CSB must revise
and explain exactly what is happening with this graph.
(Page 55, para 2) It is untrue that 4-MCHM levels were consistently below 50 ppb on January 18.
On January 26, 4-MCHM was 268 ppb in the water distribution system. See previous comment. I’m
not certain why CSB cited WVTAP in this sentence. This should be corrected. The 4-MCHM data
from the water distribution system were posted online by WVDHSEM.
(Page 55, para 3) Delete “MCHM” from the sentence. Odor was caused by multiple compounds not
just 4-MCHM isomers per WVTAP’s research.
(Page 56, para 3) CSB claims “…highly recognizable licorice odor of MCHM can be detected at
very low concentrations…” What is CSB referring to? Drinking water contaminated with 4-MCHM
isomers? Crude MCHM? Tank liquid? CSB has a duty to explain what they are referring to in this
report.
(Page 56, para 1) CSB claims “As a result, residents could smell MCHM in their water at
concentrations lower than CDC determined it was safe to drink..” First, residents were smelling the
contaminated water, not necessarily just 4-MCHM isomers or Crude MCHM. PPH, DiPPH, and
MMCHC were also present. CSB must take care not to use such grandiose open-ended
statements. CSB should revise the statement to state “…smell 4-MCHM in their water…”
(Page 56, para 2) CSB fails to state that some of the information provided about the chemicals (i.e.,
incorrect information on SDS) also affected the ability of public health agencies to credibly
communication the risk of contaminated drinking water exposure.” Revise this sentence as stated
above. As currently written, the CSB description fails to demonstrate CSB reviewed all important
chemical “safety” information available from this spill. This is a key finding of the incident CSB has
chosen to be unaware of indicating that their investigation is deficient.
(Page 56) CSB has failed to acknowledge no level of MMCHC exposure was determined to be safe
by CDC or State of West Virginia health officials. The USGS detected and confirmed the presence
of MMCHC in the Charleston drinking water. The report should be revised.
(Page 59, Figure 33) How is the discovery by WVTAP that 4-MCHM was still present in resident
homes one month after the spill not a major event on the timeline? This should be added.
Second, CSB must insert an asterix or note that CDC’s announcement on March 3 does not pertain
to inhalation exposure. It did not and it is misleading to generally apply no adverse health effects for
anything.
Third, CSB must insert the advisory issued by WVBPH to schools about how to flush buildings.

Page 24

 Fourth, CSB must insert the advisory/recommendations by WVDHHR about how to flush buildings
with septic tanks. [Different flushing directions were provided] You can find the direct comparison
here: http://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/articlelanding/2015/ew/c5ew00118h#!divAbstract
(Page 60, para 2) CSB should change “MCHM” to 4-MCHM. Also, CDC’s data does not pertain to
inhalation exposure. CSB must make that explicit or the CSB is contributing to confusion about
what CDC’s evaluation did and did not pertain to.
(Page 62, para3) CSB has deliberately mislead the public with the following statement and this is
shocking: “The yearlong study, completed in June 2016, evaluated the toxicity of MCHM and
concluded that exposure at or below the MCHM Screening level of 1 ppm is not considered not
likely to be associated with any adverse health effects.” While the CSB cites the National
Toxicology Program final update posted online, CSB fails to point out that the NTP studies did not
evaluate inhalation exposures. There is NO data for the long-term health impacts caused by
inhalation exposures. National Toxicology Program admitted publicly their data do not apply to
inhalation exposures. The omission of this information by CSB is disturbing and must be addressed
in the revised CSB report.
(Page 64, para 1) I am particularly confused about this statement because it is not supported by
any data or references. Thus, I am concerned that CSB did not fully write these sentences. These
are declarative statements and thus should be supported by evidence or removed from the CSB’s
report altogether. I am referring to the following sentences which have no basis:
“the differences between them would not have changed the way in which WVAW responded
to the incident, nor would they have prevented MCHM and PPH, stripped from entering the
water distribution system.”
(Page 65, para 1) Did PSC initiate a MCHM investigation or chemical spill investigation? Here, CSB
is referring to the spill as a single chemical, 4-MCHM.
(Page 65, para 1) CSB claims that the PSC investigation only pertains to MCHM. That’s not true.
The investigation pertains to more than just 4-MCHM or crude MCHM. CSB must revise this
discussion to accurately represent what the PSC investigation is so as not to mislead the public
which they have done.
(Page 65, para 2) CSB claims WVAW issued a DNU notice at 5:51 pm, but Figure 1 says 6:00pm.
Please review the previous comments I have about the actual timeline as CSB’s report is incorrect
and contradicts itself. If CSB does not know when events occurred the CSB should not report them
and declare that it is unknown or unclear.
(Page 65, para 2) CSB does not indicate they reviewed drinking water customer complaint records
from WVAW, yet makes the claim that “WVAW did not receive any complaints of licorice-smelling
water from customers prior to becoming aware of the release…” CSB should have the records.
CSB should also query other terms. Many times people report other odor descriptors. This was
made clear in the WVTAP study by McGuire and crude MCHM study by Dietrich. Why has CSB
chosen not to graph the total number of drinking water related complaints received by KVWTP with
time? Why specifically mention “licorice-smelling water”? This is arbitrary. CSB should do and
report a more thorough analysis or simply state WVAW did not provide records to the CSB for
analysis. Other descriptors were used to describe the contaminated water by the affected
population. CSB’s statements lack scientific basis.

Page 25

 In full disclosure, I requested WVAW provide me their records and they declined citing that they are
under ongoing litigation. The email response from WVAW was pasted at the beginning of this
response document.
(Page 66, para 2) Why didn’t CSB mention that one zone was mistakenly given the okay to flush
before it was supposed to? This resulted I believe in depressurization, something WVAW wanted to
avoid. This is important to point out as no one can learn from that mistake if it’s simply never
mentioned. The CSB should follow-up and investigate this, and incorporate it into their report.
(Page 67, para 2) CSB reports that WVAW requires that plant shutdown not exceed 12 hours, but
what is the required amount of water that should be available for water supply in accordance with
regulations? Is there a limit and how does this 12 hour shutdown time relate to the time it would
take to deplete the stored water in tanks and clearwell at the water treatment plant?
(Page 68, para 1) CSB claims again and falsely that six compounds were present in the “MCHM
mixture.” Please seem previous comments from me about why this simply is not true. Revise this
sentence.
Secondly, CSB should then reevaluate how these additional compounds are listed as hazardous in
the WVAW plan.
(Page 68, para 1) CSB claims that “Crude MCHM and PPH, stripped ….. nor are they identified as
materials that would generally be hazardous to a water supply.” This statement has no basis and
cites WVAW’s own emergency contingency plan. Clearly these chemical mixtures posed public
health risks. This statement should be removed from the CSB report.
(Page 68, para 1) CSB claims WVAW only suspected a single chemical was present in their source
water, 4-MCHM. If this is not true, the CSB report should be revised to correctly explain what
WVAW did suspect. CSB bas nebulousl referred to “MCHM” throughout this document and it is
imperative CSB makes clear they understand what chemicals and liquids were involved in this
incident. If CSB does not, I recommend the CSB remove this report indefinitely as it will deliberately
confuse people about what occurred and the limitations.
(Page 68, para 1) CSB claims that PAC and GAC were not sufficient and goes on to state “partly
due to the volume of chemicals spilled”. CSB failed to mention that removal is also affected by the
amount of PAC and GAC present. The more PAC added to the water the more chemicals would be
removed. Louisville Water Company found this out by conducting quick bench-scale tests when the
spill occurred. They released their PAC data for crude MCHM. Several Universities also conducted
their own studies. The higher the PAC dose the more 4-MCHM would have been removed. The
CSB should explain how the PAC doses WVAW used were determined and why higher PAC doses
were not applied to remove more organic chemical from the water as it passed through their facility.
(Page 68) Not mentioned at all in the CSB report is the possible consequences of increasing the
oxidant dose at the water plant on chemicals present. Is the action by WVAW something all water
utilities should follow? CSB did not mention this so, by default, CSB supports that when water
utilities do not know what chemicals are present to increase oxidant doses in their water treatment
system – without regard for what transformation products could be formed or their resulting toxicity.
CSB should revise its report to address this action.
(Page 68, reference 220) The reference is spelled incorrectly. It is the Water Research Foundation,
not Foundations. Second, that reference is a restricted access document and is not publicly

Page 26

 available. Third, it was cited by EPA Region 3 publicly who claimed chemicals involved in the spill
didn’t stick to plumbing pipes. Testing by my group and Dietrich at Virginia Tech showed chemicals
actually did stick to pipes at room temperature. So, the Water Research Foundation document is
either deficient or the persons who publicly declared what the document said didn’t know what they
were talking about. Why this event was never mentioned in the CSB report? It is important to point
out CSB has deliberately chosen not to make any recommendations to the EPA. What are the
scientific reasons for this decision? This is wicked surprising.
(Page 71, para 2) MCHM was NOT detected by odor as CSB has asserted. Contaminated drinking
water was detected by odor. 4-MCHM may have been present but other chemicals influenced odor
per WVTAP, not just 4-MCHM.
(Page 72, end of page and Page 73 para 1) CSB has cited that American Water used WHEAT
(EPA’s Water Health Economic Assessment Tool) to analyze the likelihood and consequences of
the failure of water systems. This disclosure is out of context because CSB does not seem to
understand the severe limitations and assumptions of WHEAT. In fact an American Water Works
Association analysis of WHEAT pointed these out (see reference below). It is perplexing why CSB
has chosen not to even mention that AWWA has conducted this analysis in light of the fact CSB
directed recommendations at the AWWA. In particular, WHEAT does not include impacts to
residential customers and similar to FEMA the estimates of regional losses are based on an
earthquake study, unrelated to drinking water. CSB should be discussing WHEAT in an unbiased
manner and point out its limitations. The current discussion is biased. A full discussion of WHEAT
can be found in the peer-reviewed paper here:
Craig P. Aubuchon and Kevin M. Morley. The Economic Value of Water: Providing
Confidence and Context to FEMA’s Methodology. DOI 10.1515/jhsem-2012-0081
Homeland Security & Emergency Management 2013; 10(1): 1–21.
(Pages 75 to 86) CSB frequently refers to the chemical spill as the “MCHM spill”. This is
inappropriate because previously in the report CSB has referred to MCHM tanks, MCHM being
tested by the responders (they only tested for 4-MCHM not all chemicals), and declared MCHM
represents crude MCHM on other occasions. CSB should revise all of their descriptions of “MCHM”
to be more specific about what exactly they are referring to.
(Page 82, para 1) CSB reported that the WVAW intake was 5 hrs travel time to Freedom Industries
tanks but cites no reference. This number has no basis and should be removed unless CSB
provides evidence that it is based on science. What computer modeling did they use? What studies
are they citing? How reliable is this number. 5 hours sounds awfully specific without any Elk River
flowrate data or other disclosures used to calculate this travel time.
(Page 82, para 1). CSB has claimed the WVAW intake was 1.5 miles upstream of Freedom
Industries tanks. This is in direct conflict with CSB’s earlier assertion that the distance was 1.6
miles. CSB should fix this mistake.
(Page 87, para 1) Was an NPDES permit obtained by the State, WVAW, or municipalities before
discharging contaminated water into the sewer systems during flushing? This water ended up
traveling to the wastewater treatment plants such as Elk Valley, Charleston Sanitary Board and
others. The US EPA has stated that NPDES permits are needed before discharging contaminated
water to a sewer or the environment. Why didn’t CSB report the results of this investigation?
Clearly, there are regulatory implications. CSB’s investigation of the regulatory aspects of this
incident are deficient without this analysis.

Page 27

 (Page 109, para 2) CSB has reported that spilled liquid was chemically analyzed by OSHA and
cites a number of different methods. But, the pH and material content results were not described.
Some people claim the liquid was corrosive. What was the pH? That is one way to understand if a
substance is corrosive (not the only way). CSB should describe this information as this is critical to
understanding the spilled liquid. There is no scientific basis for withholding such information.
(Page 109, para 2) Second, the CSB claimed “percentages were equivalent to the SDS’s and
employer calculations.” This statement should be removed as it is not supported by any facts or
data. CSB has demonstrated through 100 pages of this report that it has difficulty understanding
chemicals present in the spilled liquid, crude MCHM, and describing what chemicals were in the
drinking water. The statement CSB has put forward, in light of all that evidence, has no credibility.
After reporting the OSHA testing results, CSB should revise this sentence accordingly.
(Page 109, para 2) Why has CSB chosen not to comment on the fact that the National Toxicology
Program’s crude MCHM composition (used for toxicology studies for the West Virginia chemical
spill) did not match that of the Crude MCHM MSDS? This seems like exactly the topic CSB should
be addressing because it is related to a “safety” data sheet.
KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Page 110, item 6) CSB now is uncertain about the distance from the spill site to the intake. “about
1.5 miles”. This directly contradicts other statements in the CSB report and must be fixed.
(Page 110, item 6) The water treatment process did not “allow” MCHM to contaminate the drinking
water. Actions taken by WVAW allowed the spilled liquid to contaminate the drinking water. Actions
taken by Freedom Industris permitted the Elk River, the drinking water source, to become
contaminated. Also, more than just 4-MCHM was in the drinking water and CSB must make that
clear and stop misleading the reader.
(Page 110, item 7) CSB claims WVAW and WVBPH decided the drinking water could be
contaminated and distributed to the population. If WVBPH did really make this determination, CSB
should cite specific evidence with references. I don’t doubt this occurred, but CSB has provided no
evidence that it actually did.
(Page 110, Item7) WVAW did not notice “MCHM” in the finished water. WVAW detected the
existence of contaminated water by odor. WVAW had no knowledge 4-MCHM was present nor
were there any analytical results CSB has proposed that supports CSB’s claim. This statement is
untrue. CSB should revise the statement accordingly.
(Page 110, Item 8) CSB failed to mention that flpocculants contain impurities. Second, there were
multiple chemicals in the water not one as CSB has alleged with the singular form of “chemical” in
their sentence. This must be corrected.
(Page 110, Item 10) CSB’s statement is incorrect. First, information listed on the crude MCHM data
sheet was incorrect. CSB made no mention of this. This must be mentioned.
Second, not all toxicological studies were provided by Eastman Chemical Company to health
officials. This must be mentioned.

Page 28

 CSB should also mention the surprise 12 day later disclosure of Stripped PPH and that residents
were exposed to its ingredients unbeknownst to WVAW, CDC, State of West Virginia, ATSDR, and
other agencies who had already issued public health guidance based on incomplete information.
Finally, information was “not changing”. Organizations that issued guidance did so without
understanding the chemicals and their concentration that were present in the tank, river, water
treatment plant and how they would be affected by oxidants, their toxicity, chemical properties, all
exposure pathways, among other issues. It was people who made these decisions from agencies.
CSB does not make this clear.
(Page 112, item 6) CSB has placed a disproportionate burden on water utilities and this recommend
must be revised. CSB has alleged water utilities should be responsible for testing for all chemicals
at all times. This recommend is inappropriately directly at water utilities and should be directed to
the US EPA. The logistics involved with water utilities testing for all chemicals at all times is simply
unreasonable. Small water utilities do not have the ability to do this. EPA should modify their
organization to setup a rapid response process for examining environmental media with unknown
contaminants. At present, EPA does not have this capability. If they claim they do, they have not
applied it - ever - to my knowledge. You can review the Washington DC petroleum contaminated
water incident, Glendive Montana and Nibley City Utah Chemical spill responses to confirm this
statement. The analytical methods applied are haphazard and generally without basis to fully
understand chemical threats in contaminated drinking water.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS TO THE CSB INCLUDING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There are several glaring omissions from the CSB report that require justification from CSB
because of the critical role in the chemical accident response and recovery.
1. Because of time limitations, I did not read any of the appendices. Thus, my assumption is
that incorrect information is contained in these files too. CSB should review comments
above and correct any statements that are untrue including the timeline.
2. There are several other key findings CSB has not addressed in the report that I have
described in this response. These should be included in the revised report.
3. CSB shall more clearly define what liquids were spilled, what they fully consisted of, what
chemicals entered the water supply, were distributed to residents, and what research was
conducted to identify and evaluate the fate and toxicity of these chemicals. CSB’s
inconsistent approach in their report implies they do not understand what chemicals were
spilled, where they went, what residents were exposed to, and what different agencies did
based on requests from other agencies, among other deficiencies.
4. Why wasn’t any of the plumbing system flushing guidance discussed? How is this not a
critical aspect of the chemical exposures residents experienced? There was no scientific
justification provided for this deliberate omission. In light of the disclosure by CSB that the
highest MCHM level experienced was over 4 ppm, this makes the inhalation exposure a lot
more significant.
http://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/articlelanding/2015/ew/c5ew00118h#!divAbstract
5. The CSB did not make clear how poorly understood the chemical composition of the
drinking water was, the spilled liquid, liquid in the tank, and chemicals that residents were
exposed to when they contacted the contaminated water. The CSB report shows that the

Page 29

 Board does not understands the chemical composition of the tank liquid. The uncertainty
about the chemicals and chemical fate was not mentioned by the Board. This report must be
revised to be scientifically accurate.
6. Why did CSB deliberately omit discussion about EPA’s 4-MCHM air screening level? There
was no scientific justification provided for this omission. EPA seemed to think there was a
health risk associated with inhalation exposure to establish a screening level.
A variety of studies have been conducted that indicate the EPA’s 4-MCHM screening level
was exceeded at faucets, kitchen sinks, showers. That would imply unsafe conditions
existed.
www.isec-society.org/ISEC_PRESS/EURO_MED_SEC_01/pdf/AW-11_v2_297.pdf
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969715305532

Why did CSB not recommend that technologies for predicting chemical exposures at the tap
are needed when this technology clearly was lacking?
Why did CSB not address the inability of the chemicals to be flushed out of the water
distribution system and plumbing rapidly? This extended the ability of the community to
recover from the incident?
7. Was there a specific formal or informal request from the EPA or some other reason why
CSB chose not to make any recommendations to EPA or discuss EPA activities took during
the spill response especially the guidance provided to the State of West Virginia, WVAW,
and the public?
8. What is the scientific justification for not mentioning MMCHC, PPH, and DiPPH were also
present in the drinking water? The CSB knows this information because I mentioned it to
them before they finalized their report. The CSB also read the WVTAP report. The CSB also
knows no screening level was established for MMCHC despite the exposures residents
experienced. CSB’s report is deficient, indicates bias and should be revised.
9. Impact of the Spill
The report does not mention that communities located in three other states were affected by
the chemical leak: Ohio, Kentucky, and Indiana. Water suppliers in these states (and their
customers) had their sources affected or took action to protect themselves. The incident
affected nearly 1 million people up to 700 miles downstream, not just 300,000 people near
Charleston.
The CSB also did not mention that Huntington, WV residents were distributed chemical spill
contaminated drinking water. They received drinking water from the WVAW drinking water
treatment plant in Huntington with a licorice odor.
The scope of the CSB investigation seems only to consider the KVWTP service area and
West Virginia American Water’s Kanawha Valley Water Treatment Plant, but the spill
impacted hundreds of thousands of more people and multiple drinking water systems.
Reasons for omitting that more West Virginians were exposed to chemical spill
contaminated drinking water were not made clear.

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 10. The CSB cited spilled liquid testing results conducted by the OSHA Salt Lake Technical
Center (SLTC). According to Chairwoman Sutherland, I have only 48 hours to respond to
the report. At noon on September 28 (before the 48 hr deadline was issued), I contacted
OSHA SLTC and they forwarded me to OSHA West Virginia because they said OSHA West
Virginia should provide me the results I am looking for. I contacted OSHA West Virginia and
they directed me to submit a FOIA request. I submitted the FOIA request on the afternoon of
September 28. OSHA told me they have 20 days to respond to my FOIA request and
provide that data. On the evening of September 28, asked CSB to make the OSHA results
that they have public immediately so that I may review them. CSB never made the results
available. I have serious concerns that the testing conducted by OSHA is not credible based
on how CSB has explained their results or that CSB is incapable of adequately explaining
their results. This is a major reason why CSB should immediately retract their report and
remove it from circulation until the data can be accurately interpreted and presented.
11. CSB did not cite University contributions to the chemical spill response or recovery. No
recommendations about the value of university contributions. This is shocking and implies
CSB is not aware of the value of University researchers in exposing the science behind this
spill and recovery. Not citing any studies conducted by the multitude of Universities that
participated in the response and recovery was deliberate by CSB. CSB did cite a consulting
company based in West Virginia whose employee is now running for political office and
participated in the drafting and passage of the West Virginia Above Ground Storage Tank
Bill. The appropriateness of this citation was discussed earlier in this response. Several
Universities conducted testing to better understand the chemical properties and exposures.
Others examined water treatment plant processes and fate of chemicals in the environment
and wastewater systems. Several universities analyzed risk communication events from the
spill. There have been extremely significant discoveries made my University research teams
– some of which prompted federal and state agencies to adjust how they responded to the
incident. The omission of this information is frankly disturbing and a deliberate attempt by
CSB to not mention all scientific contributions for this incident. The CSB report makes clear
work conducted by academic institutions during chemical spill response does not rise to the
level of citation in such an important investigation. The CSB report should be revised to
account for this glaring omission.
12. CSB should add a recommendation that the EPA should be responsible for the
establishment of a rapid response analytical testing laboratory that all water utilities can use
when faced with chemical spills to characterize (1) liquids that are spilled to identify the
chemicals that are present, and (2) contaminated waters, soil, and air. It is unreasonable to
expect water utilities and states to be able to test for every single contaminant. As we
witnessed in West Virginia by local, state, federal agencies and WVAW who did not
understand the chemicals present in drinking water, consequences of these decisions based
on incomplete understanding of the water toxicity can be severe.
13. CSB should recommend to the EPA that they reduce their research on incident detection
and instead move resources to contaminated drinking water response and recovery
activities. EPA has spent millions of dollars in “detection” research, yet none of it helped
West Virginians. Clearly, EPA’s research outputs are not helping all Americans and
communities. Since the 2014 chemical spill was detected numerous other water
contamination incidents have occurred and EPA, and associated agencies continue to
demonstrate a lack of ability (or resources) to issue science-based guidance to the
population.

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 14. Many of the problems that occurred once the spill was detected were not due to poor
planning. They were due to people making decisions without understanding science,
engineering, or public health principles. None of this is mentioned or cited in their report.
Failure by many people at the local, state, and federal level not understanding the
consequences of their decisions is a root-cause of the incident. CSB assumes if people are
provided access to information, public health protective decisions will be made. That simply
is not true. Those persons must be educated to understand the assumptions underlying the
data they are using to make the decisions. Time and time again we have found persons
involved in the chemical spill response and recovery did not understand the data and
assumptions.
15. Several of their references listed in the text link to references that have no obvious
relationship to the word or statement cited.

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