

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (S//NF) HUMINT initiative at Logan Airport.

Date: 08/13/2012

From: BOSTON

BS-I2

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: SSA [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: 800A-BS-98732

(U//FOUO) INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
MANAGEMENT - I-1 OO:BS

Synopsis: (S//NF) To outline HUMINT initiative at Logan Airport.

Reason: 1.4(b), (c), (d)

Derived From: FBI

NSISC-20090615

Declassify On: 20370712

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. (U//FOUO) Memorandum of Understanding Between the Intelligence Community, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security Concerning Information Sharing

Details:

(U//FOUO) With the recent creation of the Logan Airport JTTF Annex, the Intelligence Branch and squad I-2 (HUMINT squad) are collaborating with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to identify mutually beneficial opportunities to increase HUMINT reporting against national and local intelligence requirements. This EC serves to outline a broad framework, developed by FBI Boston and CBP Boston, to identify international travelers who may be in a position to provide reporting which addresses intelligence requirements.

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(U) According to the Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) the FBI is an intelligence agency as well as a law enforcement agency. Its basic functions accordingly extend beyond limited investigations of discrete matters, and include broader analytic and planning functions.

(U) Part IV of the AGG-Dom authorizes the FBI to engage in intelligence analysis and planning, drawing on all lawful sources of information.

The functions authorized under that Part include:

- (i) development of overviews and analyses concerning threats to and vulnerabilities of the United States and its interests;
- (ii) research, analyze information, and prepare reports and assessments concerning matters relevant to authorized FBI activities; and (iii) the operation of intelligence, identification, tracking and information systems in support of authorized investigative activities, or for such other or additional purposes as may be legally authorized, such as intelligence and tracking systems relating to terrorists, gangs, or organized crime groups.

(U//FOUO) According to the DIOG the following are authorized activities under an Assessment:

- (U) Access and examine FBI and other Department of Justice (DOJ) records, and obtain information from any FBI or other DOJ personnel. (DIOG 5.9.1.B)
- (U) Access and examine records maintained by, and request information from, other federal, state, local, or tribal, or foreign governmental entities or agencies. (DIOG 5.9.1.C)
- (U) Interview or request information from members of the public and private entities. (DIOG 5.9.1.F)
- (U) Accept information voluntarily provided by governmental or private entities. (DIOG 5.9.1.G)

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(U//FOUO) Additionally, according to Section 5.2 the FBI cannot be content to wait for leads to come in through the actions of others; rather, we must be vigilant in detecting criminal or national security threats to the full extent permitted by law, with an eye towards early intervention and prevention of criminal or national security incidents before they occur. For example, to carry out its central mission of protecting the national security, the FBI must proactively collect information from available sources in order to identify threats and activities and to inform appropriate intelligence analysis.

(U//FOUO) Based on the authorities granted in previously approved Type 3 assessments, FBI Boston will routinely provide CBP with an updated list of countries from which various threats are known to emanate.

CBP, in turn, will create a threshold targeting query to identify individuals who will arrive at Logan Airport in the subsequent 72 hours, and who have transited one or more airport(s) located in the countries of interest. It should be noted that an existing memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the FBI and CBP authorizes the sharing of this information, and the FBI has independent access to travel records through the TECS database. The use of CBP's threshold targeting query serves merely to consolidate and organize the data in a manner which allows for bulk exploitation (described below).

(U//FOUO) Once individuals who will be arriving at Logan Airport from countries of interest are identified, their names and dates of birth will be uploaded as a batch query in the FBI's Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW) database. FBI Boston Intelligence Branch and HUMINT squad personnel who are co-located with CBP at the Logan Airport JTTF Annex will analyze the results to identify which individuals may have placement and/or access to respond to intelligence requirements based on their biographic information being referenced in one or more of the databases contained in IDW.

(U//FOUO) Once an individual of interest is identified, the information will be provided to CBP for their awareness and to determine what course of action to pursue. It is the discretion of CBP to determine

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whether or not CBP will create a TECS record (commonly referred to as a "lookout") to flag that individual when they cross the border. It should be underscored that the FBI does not direct CBP to create TECS records on individuals. The FBI merely provides all available intelligence related to the traveler to cleared CBP personnel on the JTTF. It remains the responsibility of CBP to determine what action the intelligence may warrant, to include the creation of a TECS record which may result in an enhanced secondary inspection of the individual.

(U//FOUO) If CBP chooses to conduct a secondary inspection of the traveler, FBI personnel will coordinate with the CBP officer who will conduct the inspection to share and provide context to the available intelligence. This pre-arrival coordination also provides an opportunity for the FBI to sensitize CBP personnel to intelligence requirements which may be of interest related to the traveler.

(U//FOUO) At the discretion of CBP, and in a manner which does not interfere with CBP operations, FBI personnel may be present to observe the inspection of the passenger. CBP personnel will conduct the inspection of the traveler and evaluate the passenger's placement and access to intelligence of interest, as well as their willingness to cooperate with the United States Government (USG) in the future. When appropriate, CBP personnel will obtain contact information for the traveler and determine if the traveler is amenable to being contacted in the future to provide assistance to the USG.

(U//FOUO) Based on the results of each secondary inspection, FBI personnel will determine how best to proceed with each individual on a case-by-case basis. Those individuals who are assessed to have appropriate placement and access, as well as the willingness to work with the USG will be assigned to an agent on the HUMINT squad for further contact in accordance with the Domestic Intelligence Operations Guide 2.0 (DIOG). Those individuals who may warrant investigative action will be assigned to the appropriate investigative squad for whatever action deemed appropriate. In situations where intelligence gleaned from secondary inspections meets the threshold to disseminate

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Logan Airport HUMINT Initiative

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raw intelligence, an Intelligence Information Report (IIR) will be drafted and disseminated as a joint FBI/CBP product to the United States Intelligence Community (USIC).

(U//FOUO) In order to further sensitize CBP personnel to emerging threats and corresponding intelligence requirements, the FBI will routinely provide CBP with intelligence threat briefings. To the extent possible, these briefings will be tailored to provide actionable intelligence for use by CBP in both their existing targeting efforts, as well as to incorporate such intelligence into their secondary inspections of travelers.

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	<u>December 2011</u>	<u>January 2012</u>	<u>% Change</u>
<u>Passenger Screening Metrics</u>			
Individuals Scrubbed in FBI Databases:	3,822	5,944	+56%
Individuals of Interest Identified:	34	51	+50%
<u>Intelligence Collection Metrics</u>			
CBP Lookouts Created*:	24	44	+83%
CBP Inspections Conducted (FBI Not Present):	19	40	+110%
CBP Inspections Conducted (FBI Present)*:	5	7	+40%
<u>Intelligence Sharing Metrics</u>			
Individuals Referred to Investigative Squads:	8	32	+400%
Individuals Referred to I-2:	4	3	-25%
Individuals Referred to Other Divisions:	2	2	0
Individuals Referred to Other Agencies:	1	2	+100%
<u>Intelligence Production Metrics</u>			
Interviews of IIR Value:	2	2	0

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