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UNITED NATIONS

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NA TJONS UNIES

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIIIL RECORDS
THIRTEENTH

819

11< MEETIN G: 2 JUNE 1958

erne SEANCE: 2 JUIN 1958
TREIZIEME

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YEAR

ANNEE

CONSElt DE SECURITE
DOCUMENTS
NEW

OFFICIEtS

YORK

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TABLE

OF

CONTENTS
Paa~

Provisional agenda (SjAgendaf819)
.
Expression of thanks to the retiring President
.
.
Adoption of the agenda
Letter dated 29 May 1958 from the relJrcsentative of Tunisia to the President
of the Security Council concerning " Complaint by Tunisia in respect of
acts of armed aggression committed against it since 19 May 1958 by the
French military forces sLationcd in its Lerritory and in Algeria" (SI'1013) ...
Letter dated 29 May 1958 fmm the representative of France to the President
of the Security Council concerning:
(a) "The complaint brought by France against Tunisia on 14 February 1958
(S/39,54) " (S/'1015);
(b) "The situation arising out of the disruption, by Tunisia, of the modus
vivendi which had been established since February 1958 with regard to
the stationing of French troops at certain points ill Tunisian territory
(S/4015) .' .. ',' ...... ", .. '" ...... '"""" .. "" .. '".", ......

TABLE DES

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2

MATIERES

Ordre du jour provisoiTe (S/Agenda/81g)
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Remerciemcnts au President sortant ,."
Adoption de l'ordre du jour
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Lettre, en date du 29 mai 1958, adressee au President du Conseil de seeurite
par le representant de la Tunisie, concernant la question snivante: (( Plainte
de la Tunisie au sujet d'actes d'agression armee commis contre eUe par
les forces militaires fran~.ai"es stationnces sur son terriloire et en Algcrie
depnis le 19 mni 1958 n (Sj1013)
Lettre, en date du 29 mai 1958, adressee au President du Conscil de securiH
par le representant de la France, concern ant :
a) (( La pJclinte formu]ee par la France contre la Tunisie le 14 fevrier 1958
(S/3954)" [5/'10151;
b) ( La situation creee par la rupture, du fait de la Tunisie, dn modus vivendi
qui s'elnit etabli depuis le mois de (evrier HI58 sur le stationnement de
troupes francaises en ccrtains points du tcrritolre tunisien » (S/4015)

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S/PV.819

 Relevant documents not reproduced in full in the records of the meetings
of the Security COl:ncil are published in quarterly sup:;Jlement<; to the Official

Jl.ecords.
Symbols of United Nations documenls are

compo~ed

of capital/tllers r:ombined

willl figurEs. 1Henliorl 01 such a symbol indicales a re/erena. lo a Unit(d Nations

document.

•••
Les docnmenb; pertinents qui ne ~ont pDS reproduits in e::tenso dalls les
comptes rendus des seances du Conseil de securite sout pub lies dans des sup~
plements trimestriels allX Documents offlciels,

Les cot~ des documenis de i'Organisation de.~ Nations lJnies se composent
de lettres mQius~ules et de cllifires, La simple men/ion d'une cote dans un lexte signifie qu'il s'agii ri'un riocwnent de ['Organisation.

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EIGIIT HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH MEETING
HeLd in New York on Monday, 2 June 1958, at 11 a.m.

HUIT CENT DIX-NEUVIEME SEANCE
TI'!DUe la New-York, le fundi 2 juin 1958. la 11 heureB.

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President: Mr, T. F, TSIANG (China).

President: M. 1', F. TSIANG (Chine).

Present: The representatives of the following
countries: Canada, China, Colombia, France, Iraq,
Japan, Panama. Sweden, Unt:m of Soviet Socialist
Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
N ortbern Ireland, United States of America.

Prese.nts : Les rcpresentants des pay:; suivants
Canada, Cbine, Colomhie., France, Irak, Japan, Panama,
Suede, Union des nepubliques socialistes sovietiques,
RGyaume~Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du
Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amcrique.

P..vi>ionalagenda (SjAgendaj819)

Ordre du jour prori8oirt (S/Agends./819)

1.

2.

Adoption of the

ag~nda.

Letter dated 29 May 1958 from the representative

1.

Adoption de l'ordre du jour.

2.

Lettre, en date du 29 mai 1958, adressee an President clu Conseil de securite par le representant
de la Tunisie, concernant la question suivanic :
'" Plainte de la Tunisie au sujet d'actes d'agression
anne~ commis contre elle par les forces militaires
fran~aiscs stationnees sur san territoire et en Alg~­
tie dcpuis le 19 mai 1958 a (S/4013).

3.

Lettre., en date clu 29 mai 1958, adressee au President du Conseil ne securite par le representant
de la France, concernant :

oL Tunisia to the President of the Security Council
concerning: "Complaint by Tunisia in respect of
acts of armed aggression committed against it
since 19 May 1958 by the French military forcC5
stationed in its territory and in Algeria" (5/4013).

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3.

Letter dated 29 May 1958 lrom the representative
of France to the President of the Security Council
concerning:
(a) "The complaint brought by France against
Tunisia on 14 February 1958 (8/3954)"

(S/4015);

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(b)

a)

La plainte formulee par la France contre la
Tunisie le 14 fevrier 1958 (S/3954)>> [S/4015] ;

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b) (' La situation creee par .la rupture, du fait de

.. The situation arising out of the disruption,
by Tlmisia, of the modus vive.ndi which had
been established since February 1958 with
regard to the stationing of French troops at
certain points in Tunisian territory (S;'4015).

la Tunisie, du modus vivendi qui s'etait etabli
depuis le mois de feyrier 1958 sur le stationnement de troupes franyaises en certains points
du lerritoire tuuisien)) (S/4015).

It

Expresllion of thanks to tht; retiring Presidellt

ReDlerciementl! nu President Imrtaut

1. The PRESIDENT: It is my pleasant duty to
express the thanks of tlu~ Security Council lor the:
services 'JI Ambassador Ritchie of Canada, who presided
over the Council during the month of May. If my
memory is correct, that was the first time he presided
over the COlinciI. However, he presided with a tact
Bull a sureu~::;.s of touch worthy of a veteran. We are
grateful to our distinguished colleague from Canada.

1. Le PREsIDENT (iraduit de l'ang/ais) ; J'ai
l'agreable devoir, au nom du Conseil de securite, de
remercier M. Ritchie, alhbassadeur du Canada, qui a
preside le Conseil pendant le mois de maL Si mes SO;)venirs sont exacts, c'est la premiere fois qu'it exercait
ces fonctions. Cependant, il a fait prcuve d'un tact et
d'<ll1e maitri~e rlignes (l'un ancien. NOLlS adressons a
notre eminent colt~gue du Canada l'expression de nolTe
gratitude.

2. Mr. RITCHIE (Canada): May I express my appreciation, on behalf of my country, of the much too generou~
and kind words which the President has addressed to

2. M. RITCHJE (Canada) [traduit dt. t'anglaisJ :
All nom de man pays, je remercie le President des
paroles trop aimablcs el e.Iogit:uses qll'il a prononcees
a mon egard.

me.

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 Adoption de I'ordre du jow

Adoption of the Agenda
L'ordr~

The agenda was adopted.

du jDur est adDpli.

Letter dtLted 2!) May 1958 from the representative of
Tunisia to the President of the Security Couneil
cOllceming U Complaint hy Tunisia in respect of
acts of armed aggression committed against it
since 19 May 1958 by the French military forces
stationed in its teL'ritory and in Algeria" (8/4013)

!&ttrc, cn date du 29 mai 1958, adressec an Pl"eeidcnt
du COlleeil de seeurite par le representant de la
Tnnisic 1 oonecrnant la question 8uivante : ({ Plainte
de la Tuni~ie au eDjet d'actes d'ugreBsion armce
eoumu.8 eontre eUe par les forces miltaires frllD~aise8
8tationnees sur flan territoire et en Algerie depuis
le 19 mai 1958» (5/4013)

Letter dated 29 May 19Sa from the representative of
I'rance to the President of the Security Council
eoncerning:
(a) .. The complaint brought by France against
Tunisia on U February 1958 (5/3954) ,.

Leure, en date dn 29 mu 1958, Ildressee an Prc8ident
du CoBseil de lIeeurit6 pIU' le repreflcntant de la
Frame, eoneernant :
a) ({ La plninte formuUe par la France eonlre la
Tunisie le 14 fevrier 1958 (8/3954) » [5/4015] ;

(S/4015);

b) (( Lu situation ercec par la rupture, du tait de

(b) The 8ituation arisillg out of the diBruption,
by Tunisia, of the modus vivendi which had

la TuniBie, du modus vivendi qui s'etait elnbli
depui!~ le ntois de fCVl'ier 1958 sur le stationne_
ment de troupes fran~aise8 en certain" poinu
du territoire tuWsicn)1 (5/4015)

been established since February 1958 with
regard to the stationing of French troops at
certain points in Tunisian territory" (5{4015)

At I.he irwUalion of the President, Mr. Mongi SUm,
represenfal.ive Of Tunisia, look a place at the COUJIcil

Sur l'invitalion du Presidenf, AT. Alangi Slim, representant de la Tunislc, prend place d la lable du Conscil.

table.

Mr. GEORGES-PICOT (France) (I.ranslated from
In voting for the adoption of the agenda,
I was not signifying approval of the wording of the
Tunisian complaint, which refers to acts of aggression.
In our view, there can be no question of acts of aggression
when discussions are being held and are continuing
in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of tIle
United Nations. Moreover, as I shall show in the course
of my statement, the incidents to which the represcnt<ltive of Tunisia refers do not Constitute aggression on
the part of France.

3. M. GEORGES-PICOT (Fraacc) : En votant lJOl!I'
l'adoption de I'ordre cia jam, j('. n'ai pas approuvc
pour 3utant la reduction de la plainte tanisicnne, OU
il est question d'net('s d'a.gre:;sion, car, a nnlre avis,
on ne sllurait puder ri'aete:; d'agrc~sion lorsquc des
conversations onl lieu d .,c pour,<;uivcut conformement
a l'Article 33 de In Charle des Nations Unies. D'aillems,
COll1l1lC nous J'indiquerolls au cams de llolre intervention, les incidents auxquds fait allusion le rcpresenront de la Tltnisie ne constituent. pas ane agression
de la part de la Fr&l1cc.

4. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now proceed
to the discussion of the items on the agenda. The
first name inscribed on my list of speakers is thllt of
the rC]lrcsentative of Tunisia.

4. Le PR1~SlDENT (Iraduil de l'anglais)
Ln dis~
ellssion des questions imcrite., a l'ordrc clu jour e.,l
ouvcrtes. Le premier orateur inscrit (',<;t le representant
de la Tunisie.

5. Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (translated from French): I
should like to begin by thanking the Council for allOWing
the Tunisian delegation to participate for the secund
tim~ in these di~cussions on a question 3fl'ecting the
ind£:pendence and very existence of Tunisia.

5. M, SLl}l (Tunisie) : Je lit~n~ tout d'abMd a. re!JlCl'cier le Consei] d'nvoir permis a ln delegation tunisienllc,
ponr la dCllxirme fois, dlJ pal'ticiper 1\ ces diSCUSSions
sur unc que~tion qui interesse In vic rnemc et I'indr'.pendanee de In TUllisie.

6. At the request of Tunisia, the Security Council is
today culled upon to express its views on a complaint
mIating to a series of acts of armed aggres~ion committed
against Tunisia since 19 Mny 1958 and to decide what
lllcnsures should be taken to restore int.ernational
peace ulld sccurity, with particlilar reference to tllC
measurt~ which 1 shaU have the honour iormally to
reqllest in the course of this discussion.

6. Le CQnseil de sccuritc est appele nujlmrd'hui, il ia
reqllefc de la TUllisie, Et. se pl'onollcer sur une plainte
temlant u constater une ,<;cl'ie d'agl'l'ssiol1s arTTlees dont
elle a etl~ l'oLjct depuis le 19 illai 1958 et it decider
t~nes mes,ares qn'il estimera Iltik de prcndre pOllr
l'etabIir la paix et la sccurite ilJtA.~rJl[ltionales, et notllmmellt relIes que j'aucni l'honncur dt: lui demander
formdlcmcnt all CaUl'S de ces debats.

7. Three months ago - on 18 February 1958 to be
precise --- the Council met [811 th meeting] at the request
of Tunisia to examine a complaint entitled" Complaint
by Tlmisia in respect of an act of aggression committed
against it by France on 8 February 1958 at Sakict-Sidi_
Yousscf '.' [S/J952]. The complaint was accompanied
by a memornndum the last paragraph of which was

7, Dcj~, il y a trois mnis --le 18 kVl'icr cxactementle Conseil s'ctait rCllni [Sl1 o sennce), n la dcmandc: de
la Tunisie, [lour cxamim']' IIlW ]JlainLe ({u'elle .wait
introduite sous la cote S{:1D;,2 d ainsi libeller: " Plainte
d~ la Tunisie all sujet dl: l'arte d'agression commis
par la Franc!; COJJtn: cUe
Snltiet-Sidi-Yousscf le
8 fCvriC'r 1958 \l. La [Ilnint~ dedt accompagnce d'Ull

3.

Frenc1I):

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 immediately - and befor,:,- the meeting of 18 Februaryamplified by a further explanatory memorandum
[S/395'l] in order to avoid any misur.derstanding
regarding the underlying problems, the urgency of
which had heen demonstrated by the aggression, These
problems were thus formally referred to the Council
by my Governrr,enL

mcmoire dont le dernter paragraphe a cLci promplemeat - et avant la reunion du 18 fevrier - precise par
un additif explicatif [SI,195'lJ afm d'cvitcr toute equivoque quant aux probltimes de fond dont l'agression
avait montre I'aolite et dont man gouvernement saisissait ainsi forntellement le ConsciJ.

J do not wish to recapitulate in detail the causes
of the complaint of 13 February 1958. I shall confwe

8. Je ne vais pas I'eprendre avec tOllS leurs details
les causes de la plainte dn 13 fevtler 1958. Je me
contenterai seulement d'en n.ppeler cel'tains elements,
qui marquent la continuite dans l'in:ention agressive
et la similitude dans les moyens,

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myself to recalling certain facts whieh point to a
persistent intention of aggression and to a similarity
in the methods employed.
9. In the morning of 8 February 1958, the peaceful
Tunisian village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, which was
holding its weekly murk:t, was heavHy bombed and
machine-gunned for more than an hour by twentyfive B-26 aircraft coming from Algeria. As a result
three-quarters 0: the village was destroyed or damaged.
International Red Cross lorries were reduced to a heap
of scrap-iron, and tlle provisions they were carrying for
Algerian refugees were completely destroyed. Casualties
amounted to 71 dead, including 11 women and 20
children, and 130 wounded, of whom 100 required hospital treatment; all the victims, incidentally, were
Tunisi,m civilians. The children irtdllded eight schoolboys, who were machine-gul1l1ed while trying to escape
from their school, which was hit during the bombing.
This happened on 8 February 1958.

9. Le 8 fevrier 1958, au matin, le paisiblc village
tunisien de Sakict·Sidi-Youssef, qui tenuit son marcbe
llebdomadaire, etait soumis pendant plttS d'une heure,
de la part de 25 avions B-26 venant d'Algerie, a tlU
bombardement et a un mitraiHage intenses. Le resultat
fut que le village a He aux trois quarts detruit ou endommElge. Des canlions de la Croix-Rouge intcrnationalc ant eM transf(lrmes en ~mas de fermille, et les
vivre~ qu'ili trat!sportaient a l'intention des refugie.s
algeriens completement perdus. Le bilan en pertes
humaines fut de 71 marts (pnrmi Iesquels 11 femmes
et 20 enfants) et de 130 blesses, dont 100 ant dfi ctre
hospitalises - tons etaient d'llilleurs des civils tunisiens,
Panni les enfants llguraient notamment huit petits
ccolicrs mitrailles alors qu'ils essayaient de fuir leur
ccolc atteinte par le bombardement. C'Hait le 8 fevrier
1958,

10. On the following day, 9 February 1958, the
pennanent representative of Tunisia to the United
Nations infonned the Secretary-General that the
Govcrr.mcnt Q{ the Republic of Tuni!';i~, exerdsing
its right of self-defence and its prerogatives as Cl severeign State, had inforned the French Government
that Ei'reneh troops stationed in Tunisia we;,e prohibited
from leaving their barracks.

10. Le lcndemain, 9 fevrier 1958, le representant
permanent de la Tunisie aupres de l'Organisation des
Nations Unies informait le Secretaire general que le
Gouvernement
la Republique tunisienne, usant de
son droit de Iegitin:e defense ct de son droit legitime
d'Etat souverain, avait llotifiC au Gouvcrnement
frangais l'interdictiO:l aux troupes frangaises stationnees
en Tunisie de sortir de leurs casernements.

11. Iu a letter of 13 February 1958 [5/3951J, the
Government of Tunisia explained to the President
of the Security Council that these mea~ll~es had been
taken in the exercise of its right of self-defence under
Article 51 of tlle Charter, The measures comprised in
particlllar the prohibition of any French troop movemerits it! Tunisia, the sending of French t!avaI u:Jits
into Tunisian ports, the landing or parachuting of
reinforcements and any flights by French military
aircraft over Tunisian territory.

11. Par une lettrc du 13 feYrier 1958 [5{3951], le
Gouyerncrnent LUIli5kn precisait E. l'inleution au
President du Consoil de seeurite que ees mesures
etaient prises en vertu du droit de legitime defense
prevu i:t l'Article 51 de la Charte. EIles eomportaient
notamment l'intcrdiction de tout mouvement de troupes
irf1n~ai5es en Ttmisie, de tout acces d'unites de la marine
de guerre frangaise £lUX ports tunisiens, de tont debarquement ou parachutage de renforts ainsi que de tout
survol du territoire par l'aviation militaire fran~ise.

12. On 15 February, at the instance of the Secretary.
General of the United Nations, the Tunisian Government authorized local deliveries of the necessary food
supplies for the immobilized French troops, having
previo1\sly received an assurance that these facilities
would not be abused and t}Ul:t their sole purpose was to
permit "dispatch of the foodstuffs and suppLit:s
necessary for the mainte:lance of the troops". I should
like to make these points cleur from the outset, since
I may have to revert to them later.

12. Le 15 fevrier, a la suite d'une intervention (lu
Secretaire general des Nations Unies, le Gouvcrnement
tunisien autorisait les livrai.'>ons locales de vivres
necessaires aux truupes frangaises consignees, s'etant
assure au prealable c;ue les facilites envisagees ne seraicnt
PflS utilisees d'une faC;.on abusive et qu'elles avaient
peur objet uniqucment ( l'envoi des produits alimentaires et d'l ravitaillement neeessair€-3 it la subsistance
des troupes n. Je tiens it preciseI' ces points des maintenant POlll' la suite du debat. J'aurai it y revenir peut~~tre
per l:k 9uite,

13. On 18 February HoS, the Security Council, after
adoptbg its agenda, adjourned the debate on learning
that the United Kingdom and the United States of
America had offered their good offices to settle the

13. Le 18 £evrier 1958, le Conseil de securite, apres
avoir adopte son ordre du jour, ajournait le debat,
ayant appris que le Royaume.Uni et les Etats-Unis
d'Amerique avaient oITert leurs bans offiees pOllr regIer

de

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 problems W11ich were outstanding between the two
parties and which were the subject of the complaints
before the Cl)tHl.cil. Let me rc~all that, so far as Tunisia
is concerned, its request to the Council, as set forth in
documents 3/3952 and S/3957, tOncerned the fo]]oVrlng
tWQ points: first, that French troops should be witildrawn from Tunisia because their presenee, against
Tunisia's wjshes, constitutes a threat to its sccurity;
secondly, that means should be sought of putting an
early end to the war in Algeria, which has encroached
upon Tunisian territory and the GOlltilluancc of which
is a threat to internntional peace and security in that
part of the world.

les problemes en suspens entJ:e les deux. parties et qui"
Qnt fait l'abjet jes plaintes pcndantes devant le Conseil.
Je tiens a rappeler que, en ce qui concerne l<l Tunisie"
la requete, telle qu'elle etait prccisce :llors par les
documents S{3952 et 5/3957, portait sur les deux points
suivallts : premieremellt, l'evacuation des troupes
Irancaises de Tunisie, dont la presence, contra la
volontG de celle-ci, consttue une menace a sa securitc;
deuxiemement, In recherche d'une solution mettant
rapid~ment fin a la gucrre d'Algeric, dont 10s debor·
demellts S'.lr le sol rie la Tunisie et dont la prolongation
constituent une menac!', a la paix et a la securite init·r·
nationales dans ceUe region du monde.

14. The Security Council adjourned, and the Rood
oiHces mission, consisting ol Mt. Robert lHllrphy and
Mr. I-Iarold Beelcy, immedi<l.tely undertook its mediation
between France and Tunisia. After s~vern.l jcurneys
hetween the capitals of the two countrjes and contacLs
heh'icen the two Governments, the mission was ab:e,
on 15 March, to p:opose to th€ Tunisian Government
Q draft compromise agrr.emp.nt on the procedure for
the evacuuUon of the French troops in Tunisia.

14. Le Conseil de secuite s'etant a:ors ajoume, In
mission des bons offtces, comp0see de :MM. Hobert :him.
phy et Harold Beeley, a entrepris aussitM son action
entre la Franoe et la Tunisie. Aprcs p:usicurs voyages
entre les capitale~ des deux pays e-t des cont,acts pntrE.'.
les deux gouv~rncmcnb, MM. Murphy ct Beeley ant
[:Iu, le 15 :llarS, propos~r au Gouvernement tunisien un
projet de compromis portant sur les modalites d'evn.
cuatioll des trQupes frnnyaises de Tunisic.

15. This agreement provided for a first stage, during 15. Scion Ce compromis, pCl:dant line premiere phase,
which all French military personnel olltside the Bizcrtc J'ensemble du personnet militaire frano;ais se trouvant
perimeter were to be withdrawn from Tunisia as SOOI1 hors du perimetrc de Bizerte sera retire de la Tunis:c
as possible. TIle General OfUcer commanding the French dans les meilleurs delais. Le command,mt supcrieur
forces was to draw up a timetable for the movement des forces frano;aises etablira pour le mouvement des
of the trQops and their equilJll1t:nt, which was to be the troupes et de lenr matcrip.l Ln horairc qui fera l'objet
subjcct of agreement between the Tunisian and the cl'un accord entre les auto rite.; tunisiennes et franr;;:aises.
French authorities. The Tunisian authorities were to Les alttorites tunisiennes prendront des mesurcs aptes
take the necessary stens to enS:.Ire the dignifted and
garantir aux troupes francaises la possibilitC de quitter
unimpeded departure from Tunisia ol the French la Tunisle cl 'une far;ou digne et sans c.ntraves. A partir
troops. On the date on which this r:lOvement began, de la date ou commencera cc Illouvement, le Gouverthe Tunisian Government W:lS to revoke t1:e restrictive nemEnt tunisien rapportera, en cc qui le eoncerne et
measures taken on 8 Febrll.'lry with regard to French en cc qui touche les forces fran<;aises hors du perimetre
forces outside the Bizerte perimeter. In a second stage, de B:zerte. les mesures de restrictions prises le 8 fevrier.
during which the good offices oi tl1e Governments of Dans une dellxieme p~1ase, au COUts de laquelle les
the United Kingdom and the United States would bons offices des Gouwrnements du Royaume-Uni et
remain available to Tunisia and Prance, " provisional des Etats-Ullis Cf':stcrant A. J~ disposition de la Tunisie
regime for the Bizerte base was to be worked out by ct de la France, un regime provisoire de la base de
the Prer.ch and Tunisian Govenments. This compro- Bizerte sera defini entre le Gouvernement frnncais et le
mise agmement was accepted by the Tunisian Govc.tn- Gouverncment tunisien. Cc compromis, accepte par le
meat on 15 1~arch 1958 and was to be approved by the Gouverncmenl tunisien le 15 mars 1058, dcvait etre
government of Prime Minister Gaillard on 14 April agree par le gouvernernent de M. GailIard le 14 avril

a

1958.

..

1958.

16. I wish to cmph:l.size that under -::his agreement of
15 March no [reedom of movement for thc French
troops stationed in Bizerte could be contemplated until
the cvoeuutjt>n of all forces otltsic:~. tl:e rerim~t{'.r
had been completed. Then, and then only, would such
freedom be accorded to the forces at Bizf;rle, penlling
the outcome of the conversations wUch were to tqke
place concerning that base. In order La preclude allY
misunderstanding on this point in tlle subsequcnt
discussion, I also wish to stress that th~ san;e agreement,
in providing for the return to Tunisia of military airfields, if. particular, those at El-Aouilla, Sfax, Gabes,
~fsa, and Remada (I repeat: Gafs<l and Hemada)
indicated that arrnngc:nent5 would he made to enable
the ambassadors of tile United St.ai'.E'l'l find the United
Kingdom to satisfy themselves that tl:ese airfields
would be used for peaceful purposes only. It was even
stipulated that ..... to facilitate the task of the observers, thc nir:lelds at Remada and at Galsa would be

~.- - - - - - - - - -

10. Je bens a signaler que, sdou cet accord du 15 mars,
la libette de mouvement des forces fran<;aises basees
Bizerte ne pouvait et:-e envisagee qu'ur.e fois que
l'p.nscmble de l'evacuation des troupes existant hors
de Cl: perimetre auraH pl"is fir.• Alars, et alars seulemer.t.
cette UberM serait accGrd6e nux forces de Bizerte, en
attendant le resultat ries conversations qui devaient
avoir lieu au sujet de cctte base. Je tif'n.~ ~ Mllligncr
par aillcurs, pour mieux cclairer la suite des debats, que
le mcme accord prcvoyant la remi1\c a la Tunisie des
terrsins d'avtation militaire, notamment de El-Aouina,
Sfax, Gabes, Gufsa et Rcmada Ge r6pCtc ; Gafsa et
Remada), impliquait que des mesures seraient prises
pour permettre nux ambassadcurs des :t:tats-Unis et
du Royaume-Uni de s'ussurer que lesdits terrains ne
scrv:r.aient qll'a des fms pacifiqucs. n y est memc
stipule, et je cite; « ... en vue de faciliter la tAche des
observateurs, le8 terrains d'aviation de Remada €t
dc Gafsa seront mis, a titre provisoire, hors d'etat

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'rendered temporarily unserviceable." The course of
events showed that at least one of these airfields was
I\sed against the eivilian population of Tllllisia,

d'~tre utJises r>. La suite des evenements montrera
qu'au mains un a ete utilise contre la population civile
de la Tunisie.

17. Such were the main provisions of the agreement
'01 15 Man:h 1958, proposed to Tunisia. and France by
two friendly Governments whose offer of good ofllces
was notified to the Security Council on 18 February
1958. This agreement was formally accepted by Mr.
Gaillard's governmellt on 14 April H158. Unfortunately,
. (1 few hours after this acceptance a governlIlental crisis
broke out in France, delaying the implementation of
the agreement. For this reason, too, the gond offices
mission of the United Kingdom and the United States
was suspended.

17. Telle." etaieni les clauses essentielleJ> d~ cet accord
du 15 mars 1958, propose a la Tunisie et Et la France
par deux gouvernements amis dont l'ofire des bons
offices avait lite notifiee au Conseil de securite le 18 £evrier 1958. Get accord avait de formellement accepte
par le gO'<1vcrnement de M. Gaillard le 14 avril 1958.
Malheureusement, quclques heures apres ceUe acceptation cut lieu la crise ministericlle e:t France, qui en
retarda l'execution. De ce fait aussi, l'action des bODS
offtces anglo-americains se tronvait etre suspendue.

18. I should like to pay a sincere tribute to the repre~
5cntative.". of thp. Hoited States and the United Kingdom
Governments for the unwearying devotion they displuyed in carrying out their mission. With remarkable
persistence and objectivity, :hey moved between
'funis and Paris in their untiring efforts to find a partial
compromise which might pave the way for a more
complete settlement of the dispute. It will be for others
to appraise the readiness of the Government of the
Republic of Tunisia to compromise and come to terms,
as reflected in its provisional agreement not to press
its entirely legitimate claims, which arc completely
in accordance with justice and with the prir..ciples of
the Charter of the United Nations. The praise and the
blame will be apportioned by posterity.

18. Je tiens ici a rendre un hommage sin<:ere aux
representants des GOuvernements des Etats~Unis et dll
Royaume-Uni pour le devouement inlassable qll'ils onl
montre au cours de leur mission. Avec une tenacite 121
une objectivite remarquables, i1s se sont depenses entre
Tunis et Paris pour tronver un com?romis partiel qui
put ouvrir la voie a . m e solution plus complete du
con flit. O'autres que moi diront jnsqu'a quel point le
Gouvernement de la Republique tunisiellne a ele vel'S
la conciliation et l'arrangement, consentant a mettre
provisoirement en sDurdine ses revendications Les plus
legitimes et les plus conformr.s a la justice et aux principes de la Charte des, Nations Unies. L'histoire situera
les responsabilites.

19, My Governrr,ent tht:u awaited the formation of
a French government so that the situation could be
restored to normal. It was under:;tood that in the meantime all the security measures taken by the Tunisian
GOvernment after the bombing of 8 February 1958
would remain in force. Although there were sume
frontier incidents caused by the invasion of Tunisian
territory by French forces from Algeria and by violations of Tllnisian air space, my Government, while
protesting to the French Embassy against snch violations, did not wish to bring them to the attention of
the Security Council. With regard to the provisioning
of the French troops in Tunisia, my Government took
a very generous attitude, confining itself to observing
tht:l approaches to the barracks, in onier to avoid any
possible sortie by the troops.

19. Depuis, IT.on gOllvr.rnement ~vait attelldu la
constitution d'un gouverncment en France pour voir
se normaliser la situation. Il etait cntendu qn'entretemps tontes les mesures de securite prises par le Gouvernement tunisien a la suite du bombardcment dll
8 revrier 1958 scraicnt maintenues. iJ y cut bien quelques incidents Qe frontieres provoquees par l'irruption
sur le gal tunisien de forces franc;aises venad d'Algerie,
ou des survols de l'espace aerien tmisien, mais mon
gouvcrnement, tout en protestant aupres de l'ambassade
de France contre de lelles violations, n'avait pas voulu
cependant les porter it la connaissance dn Conseil de
seeurite. Quant au ravitaillement en vivrt.:s alimentaires
des trou?es franc;aises de Tunisie, man gouvernement
avait temoigne de la plus grande mansuetude, s'atta~
chant seulement a sUiVeiller Ies abords des easct'Uements
pOUf eviter toute sortie possible de ces troupes.

20. As a result of the establishment of the so-called
Committee of Public Safety in Algeria on 13 May 1958,
the situation became extremely disturbing. The members of the CQuncil will readily Lllldcrstand why, under
a just and proper interpretation of Article 2, paragraph
7, of the United Nations Charter, I must refrain from
commenting on the ch2racter of this Committee of
Public Safety, The fact remains that this event - I
might almost say" advent " ~ could rightly be considered to be threatening and dangerous for the North
African conntries. The positiorl~ previously taken with
regard to Tunisia, among other mattera, by the person~
constituting the Committee were not likely to set at
rest the legitimate apprehensions of these countries.

20. Le 13 mai 1958, la situation a:Iait devenir e:dre~
mement inquietante, par suile de la cOl13titulion en
Algetie de ce qu'on a cOllvenu d'appeler le Comit6 de
saIut public. Les membres du Conseil comprelldront
aisement que, faisant une juste et saine interpretation
de l'Article2, paragraplle 7, de la Charte des Nations
Unies, je m'ab5tienne de toute remarque sur le caractere de ce Cornite de saiut public, It n'en demeure pas
mains vrai que cet evenement - j'a]ais dire cet avenement - pouvait a jl(~te titre etre considere comme
lourd de menaces et de dangers pour Ies pays nordafricains. Les prises de position anterieures des personnalites qui composent ce comite, notamment it l'egard
de la Tunisie, n'etaient nullcment de nature a calmer
les apprehensio:lS Icgitlmes.

21. Yet, although serious incidents had alre~dy occurred, Mr. HabibBourguiba, President of t~ RepubliC

21. Pourtant, alors que des incidents graves avaient
deja surgi, M, Habib Bourgniba, president de I.a Repu-

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5

 of Tunisia, said in his speech to the Tunisian peoI:le
on 22 May 1958:
" In view of the events in Algeria and the continUlltion of the cabinet cri;js in France, wllicll revealed
cCltain changes in the trend of French policy, we
have thought it best to remain on thealcrt while
awaiting the turn of events. In this way we hoped
to fac.ilitate the taslt of the Government, which might
be able to overcome its difficulties, and to avoid
furnishing wcapollS to our adversaries."

blique tunisiennc, s'adressant au peuple tunisien dans.
Bon discours du 22 mai 1958, declarait :
«Dl'vant les evenements d'Algerie et les prolon~
gemcnts de la crise ministericlle en France qui
revelaient certains changemen'.:s dans l'orientation
politique fra1ll':llise, nous nvons prms6 qu·il 6tait
preferable de rester dans l'expectativc en attendant
dc vo:r que: tour allaient prendre les evenements.
Nous pensions ainsi, d'une part, faciliter la tache
d!! gouvcrnement, qui pourraiL pellt~etre dominer
ses difficultlis, d'autre part, eviter de donner des
armes aux adversaires. »

22. 'The Tunisian Government did eveI)'thing in its
power to avoid aggt<Jvating the situation. Thus, nine
French colonists who had been arrested for possessing
arms in February follow;ng the Snkiet-Sidi-You:mf
iJ.cident were released on 13 May.

22.

23.

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Although the French representative at Tlli1is
informed my Government on the morning of 14 May
that the French troops stationed in Tunisia under the
command of General Gambicz remained l()yal to the
Paris Government, the course of events soon proved
that those troops took action parallel to that 01 tlie
troops in Algeria. and soon after collaborated with
them. Since 14- May Tunisian territory has daily been
the sCene of French militar:y operations of an increasingly
aggressive and serious char:w.tl'.r.

Le Gouvernement tunisien fit tout son possible
pour eviter une aggravation de la situation. C'est ainsi
que neuf colom franc;ais, arretes durant le mois de fevrier
it la suite des evenements de Sa kiet~Sidi- Youssef pour
detention d'armes de guerre, furent rel~cMs le 13 maL

23.

Le matin du 14 mai, le representant de lE. France

a Tunis a fait savoir a mon gouverr.ement que les troupes
fran~,aises stationnees

en Tcnisie sous le commandement
du general Gambiez restaient fideIes au gouvernement
de Paris, Mais les faits n'allaient pas tarder a demontrer
que Cel> troupes agissaicnt parnllelement, et bientM
e:I collaboration, avec celles d'Algerie. En eITet, it
p3rtir du 14 mai, le territoire tunisien a ere quotidie:lnement le theAtre, de la p8.rt des troupes franc;aiscs,
d'une serie d'operations militaires a caraetcre de pbs
e:l plus agressif et dont le gra.vite a1l8it en s'arnplifiar.t.

24. 0[1 15 May, French reconnaissance and bombing
planes violated Tunisian air space.

24. Le 15 mai, l'espacc aerien lunisien est viole par
des avions de reconnaiss~nce ft de hombardcme:lt
fram,aig,

25. On 16 May, tanks of the French garrison at Gabes
tried to leave their barracks.

25, Le 16 mai, des tanks de la garnison frangaise de
Gabes tentent de sortir de Ieur casernement.

26, On 18 May, thirty armoured vehicle.s left the
Remada camp and travelled forty kilometres towards
Bir Amir and Ain Delwuk. French forces took by s-.trprise and captured six Tunisian soldiers guarding the
Bir Amir post, but lhey soon had to release them.
They Eet up a barrier at Bir Dek011k I'llla kept 5nbstantial French forces there alter the troops occupy.ng
Bir AmiI.' had withdrawn to Remada,

25. Le 18 mai. 30 vehicules blindes quittent le camp
de ReIllalla et se diligent, 40 kilometres plus loin, vers
un point qui s'appel1e Rr Amir et un autre point
nomme Ain Dekouk Les elements franc;ais s'emparent
par surprise de six soldats tnnisicns qui tenaient le
poste de Bir Ami;. et qu'il£ ant df! rcMcher par la suite.
fls Ctablisscn t un barrage a Bir Oekouk, all d'importantes forces fraOl;aises sont mainte:Jues, apr~s le
retrait it Remada des forces qui avaient occupe l'autre
point, Bir Amir.

27. This Remada incident, about which I kept the
Secretary-General fully informed, began to turn into
a larger-scale action with the support 01 French aircraft from Algeria. On 21 May, more French units
(rom Hemada moved fi::ty kilometres to Fatnussa,
where a Tunisian army unit was stationed, flnd occupied
the pcsition, They then occupied the crossroads and
heights on the paths from Rcmada to Bordj-le~Bceuf
nnd Tnbouine. Another military column marched
toward Oued Dckouk. Four Prench jet aircraft landed
at Gafsa and on the following day, 22 May, flew over
the city firing their machine-guns.

27. Cctte aftaire de Remada, dont j'ai tenu le Secrl~­
taire general rcgulieremellt in forme, dcvait e.vo!l:er
d'aillClI1's verB une action de plu.'J grandc envergure,
avec l'appui de l'aviation frant;:aise venant d'AIgerie.
Ell efIet, le 21 m!li, de nouveoux elements francais
partnnt de Remada se portent, 50 ldlometres plus loin,
sm un point qui s'appelle Fatnassa., OU se trouve line
unite. de l'armee tUl1isienne, et occupent la position.
11s pOllrsuivcnt le·.!r mCl\vement d'occupation de5
carrefours eL des hauteul's sur les pistcs reliant Hemada
a Bord~-lc-Bceuf d'un cote et tl Tataonine de l'autre.
Dne IlQuvelle colonne militaire £'acherr.ine vers l'olled
Dekouk. Quatre avions a reaction franc;ais atterrissent a
Gafsa. Lc lcndemain 22 mai, ils en dccollen-l et evolllfnt
au·dessus de la villI' en elTectuant des mitraiIlages.

28. French aircraft from Algeria continued to operate
during the following days. On 23 May, flights of twinengine bombers and reCOllllaisSlIJ1Ce aircraft from Alg~ria
were seen over many points in Tunisian territory:

28. Les operations de l'aviation franyaise d'AIgerie
devaient se poursuivre les jours s\\ivants. Le 23 mai,
des .'IurvoJs de hombardic:s bi-moteurs et d'avions. df':
recollnaissance venant d'AIgerie sont reperes sur de

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Ouehtata. Ghardimaou, Saldet-Sidi-Youssef once again,
Bir Drassen. Fcdj El Kahla and Kataat-es-Scnam.
Leaflets in Arabic and French we:e dropped over
Kalaat-es~Senam; I have copies of them.

nombrCllX points du territoire tUllisien : Ollehtata,
Ghardimaou, Sakict-Sidi-YoLlssef encore, Bir Drassen,
Fedj El Kahla et Kalaat-Es-Senam. Des tracts en arabe
et en fr3:1 vsis sont lances SLr ceUe derniere ville - je
signale aux mcmbres du Conseil que j'en ai des copies.

29. On Saturday, 24 May, in the evening, Tunisian
and Frencl1 forces clashed at Ain Kambou-: when
French raiding parties £1'00 nemada opened fire on
El. barrier and tried to force it. Ain Kumbout is about
ten Jdlomctrcs south of the Remada barracks. There
were a number of ldlled and wounded.

29, Le samedi 24 mai au soil', un accrochage a lieu a
Arn Kambout entre les forces tunisiennes et les troupes
frnnc;:rrisc5, ql\i, sorties de He:nad<l, Olwr('[J!: le fen !>lIr un
barrage en vue de le forcer. AIO Kambout est un point
qui se trouve a U3e dizainc de kilometres au sud rlu
casernement de Remada. On a eu a deplorer dc,~ morts
et des blesses.

30. On Sunday, 25 May, waves of four B-26 bombers
from Algeria bomLe,d and machine-gunned the Hcmada
and Oued Dekouk area for four hours. A working area
was attacked and two Red Crescer.t cars w~re hit,
even civilians not ieing spared. There were six wounded
and elev'~n missing,

30. Le dimanche 25 maL des vagues de quatre bom-

31. On 26 May, Frencll troops committed acts of
vandalism at Remada. (You realize, gentlemen, that
I am weighing my words carefully.) These troops
burned warehouses containing wheat set aside to combat
unemployment. They broke open the doors of private
homes and shops, which they sacked and pillaged,
together with the head offices of the gover:ll1lelltal
delegation :md the National Guard. They searched and
robbed pussers-by. A scJlOo1master on un impection
trip was savagely mishandled, The headmaster of the
Remada school, l:is wife and his three chi.ldren died
as a result of maltrentment by the French Army. All
Lhis HIm: aeroplanes continued to violate the RiI' spuce
of Tunisi3.

31. Le 2G mai, les troupes franc;:aises se I:vrent it
Remada El des actes de vandalisme (V011S savcz, Messieurs, qlle je meMll'C mcs mots). Elks brulcnt le depot
ou etait entrcpose lc ble destinc i1 la lutte contre le
cll6mage. Elles deloncent les partes des maisom privees
et des magasins, qu'elles saccogent el pillent, ainsi que
les sieges de la delegation gOllvcrnmTJentale et de la
garcle na tionalc. Elks fouillent les passants, ks deva~
lisenc. Un institutenr en rr:ission d'cxamen est sanvagement maJmene. Le directeur de l'ecole de Remada,
sa femme et ses trois enfants sont morls des suites des
sevices que l'armcc Iranr,:aisc leur a fait subir. Pendant
cc temps, les avions continnaient a sllrvnler la region.

32. ]n fact, violations of the Tunisian air space have
persisted up to the present time.

32. Les violations de l'espace aerien tunisi~n n'ont
d'ailleurs pas cesse, eL les survols de oohe tcrritoire se
sont poursliivis jusqu'a cc jour.

33. These are the painful facts. It will be claimed
that they were provoked by alleged actions on the
part 01 the Tunisia!l Government. I will not reply to
this 8ssertion nOW, but reserve my delegation's right
to do so with all the earnestness at its command after
we have heard all the arguments which the Freudl
representative may see flL to submit in support of
his complaint.

33. Tels sont les faits dans leur cmdite doulollreuse.
On sQutiendra qll'ils avaienl elc provoques p8r de preLenrlues mesUl'CS ~rises par le Gouvcrnement tunisien.
Je m'abstiens ponr le moment de rcpondrc il. cette
assertior., reservafll it llla delegation le .~oin de le fuire
ilvec Lout le scrielL'C: dont ellc est capable. Elle y rcpondra
des que nous auroIls de la part du representant de la
France tons les arguments qu'il lui scmblera bon
d'apporter a l'appui de sa requ~.te.

34. But there a.re certain irrefutabk conclusions that
I will v'~nture to state now.

34. Moos un cerLain non:bre de conclusions, irrecusables celles-la, dellleurenL, et je me permets de les
souligner mainter.ant.

.:\5.

First, no ,Q'flrrison of French treaDS was disturbed
in any way by Tunbian civil or military authorities.

35. Prcmierement, ,lUCllll cascrnement de troupes
franl(aises n'a 6te inquiete en qlloi que cc soit par les
8utoritcs tunisiennes, tant civiles que militaires.

36. Secondly, since 13 May the Tunisian people has
maintained the remarkable calm and lI1e dignity required by the circumstances despite its first jastillable
apprehensions and the repeated aggressions it has
sufl'ered since. The Tunisian people has respected, and
will continue to respecL, all Prench or 10reign nationals
living in Tunisia, who will be assured of tranquillity
and the free enjoyment of their pl'oIJt:rLy.

36. DeuxicmemeIlt, dcpuis le 13 mai jllsqu'a e~ jour,
le peuple tunisien, malgre les legitimes sl1jets d'apprehCllsion, uu debul, et U1dg:l'I~ le5 agrc'ssions repctees
dont n a ete victime pOll' la suite, n'3, cesse de garder
un sang-froid rernarquable et la dignitc qu'exigent les
circonstanccs. 11 a respectc, et continuera a le faire,
tans les habital1ts de uationalitc frartl;aise ou etrangere
viv[Jnt en Tllnisic, !cur assnr:>nt hi quietude et la fibre
jouissance de leurs biens.

bardiers B~26, vcnant d'Algeric. bombardent et mitrailll'nt, quatre heures (Jurant, la region de Remada eL de
roued Dekouk. Un chanticr de travailleurs est :tttaque,
deux voitures du Croissant-Rouge sOllt touchees, les
civils eux-memes ne sont pas epargn6s. On compte
6 blesses et 11 disparus.

7

 37.

In hls speech of 26 May, Pres:dcnt Bourguiba
took ~are to tell the Tunisian people: ., Foreigners and
FreIlChme:1 illllst be treated with consideration and
respect; their security and well-being are your personul
responsibility." The President added: "They are
attempting to provo;"e us by saying that the people
are renwilling calm. But this calm is the m[)st obvious
sign of its strength and in1tuence."

37, Dans son discours du 26 mai, lc president Buurguiba ne manq:J.ait d'ailleurs pas de s'adresser au peuplE
tunisien en ces termes : (( Vous savez que les etrangers.
c~ les Frant;.ab doivent Cire ent(mre,~ d'egards ct de
respect el que leur s6curite et leur bien-etre relevent
de votl'C responsabiHe a tons. )) Le President ajoutait :
«( Oll essaie de nOlls provoquer ~n disant que le pel1ple
reste calme. Mais cc calme est Le signc le plus evident
de sa force et de son poids. Il

38,

My third conclusion is that all the attacks, skirmishes and other aggressivt'. acts which have occurred
in. Tunisia during this critical period which began 011
14 May have taken placf drw;r,ns of kilometres away
from FrcDch military instnllations. This is indisputable prod of the aggressive attitude of tllC French
troops in Tunisia, supported, 0: perhups spurred on,
by the French [orccs in Alger:a.

La troi!'>it'-,me conclusion que je tire est la suivante :
tOlltes les attaques, E.ccrochages ou 3utres aetes agrcsliifs.
qui ont eu lieu en Tunisie uu cours de cette periode
critique eommen9unt le 14 mai,l'ont etc it des dizaines
de kilometres des installatioE::i militaires fran9aiscs
- re qui est une preuve irrefragable de l'agressivite des
troupes lralll;.aises en Tunisie, 3ppUyees, OU, peut~etre,
poussces, par les forr.es franc.aises d'Algerie.

39. In this connexion I should like to mention the

39. Je voudrais a ce sujet faire meJ1tiol1 des prises de
position du commandemcnt militaire franvais d'Alger
au sujet de la Tun:sic. Un communique public par l~
commandemellt le 21 mal marque r-ettcrrent la prise
en charge, par la X e rcgioll militaire (Alger), des troupes
fr:tn(;'.abes stationnees en TUllisie, et la volonte d'appuyerlcs operations agresEivcs de ces cernieres.

po.~iti(Jn

taken by the French High Conmand in Algiers
witll regard to Tunisia. A communique published by
the High Command 00 21 May provides clear eviclence
of lhe assumption of respoosibJity for French troops
stationed in Tl1nisia by the Tenth Military District
(Algiers), and oJ ao intention Lo supp)rt tlie aggressive
operatiolls of these troops.

38.

40. On the same d<ly, 21 IY:ay, Colone[ Lacheruy,
spokesman fol' General Salan, Comrnander-in~Chief of
the French forces in Algeria, stated the position even
more clearly at {l prcss eonfere::t('.f. When f1sk~d about
the possibility of military action against Tunisia,
Colonel Lacheroy s£lid thai, should tllC necessity arise,
General Salan would act" without consulting Paris"
and" without authorization from Paris ", This plainly
demonstrates that the situation ill Tunisia was and
still is dangerous.

40, Le mem~ jou:, le 21 md. le colonel Lnl'.hr.rny,
po:te-parole du general Sal an, commandant en chef des
forces fmnl;:sises en Algerie, dait encore plus expressif
au cours d'unc conference de prcsse. Intrrroge sur la
possibilite d't:ne action militaire contre la Tunisie, le
colonel Lacheroy a declare que, dans cctte cventualite,
le general Salan agirait «sans cO:lsulter Paris» et
l( :lUllS ayoir la permission de Paris ". CeJa VOll~ mont.rf.
bien que la ::iituation, en Tunisie, Hait et demeure
dangereuse.

41. I 'would like to add that, according to one pres~
agency, a communique published in Algiers announced
thllt the spol,csman of the Committee of Public Safety
had said that tile government of Prime Minister Pt1imlin
was seeking to exploit the situation aCid to ohtnin inter~
national sanclions against tlle authorities in Algiers;
the spokesman nddfld that" the 22,mO Rn~nch ~oldi('.r~
in Tunisia under the ccmmand of GCllend Gambiez
orc working in very dose contact with us for opera~
tional reasons".

41. Je voudrais ajoutcr que, selon line agence de
presse, un communique pllbliC a Alger all nonce que le
porte-parole du Comite dc salut public a u6clare que le
gouvernement pflimlin s'efIol'l;ait d'cxploiter la !'>ituation
et d'obtenir des sancticllS internationales cadre les
autorites d'AIger j ce porte~Jlarole ajoute que (( les
22.000 soldats francais de Tur.isie, sous le commandell1cnt dll goneful Gambiez, travaille:lt en contact trts
etroit avec no us pour des l'aisons opcrationnelles 11.

42. I apologize for this digression and ~hall proceed
with my statement I do not wish to expatiate on the
various statements made before 13 May by the me~l
who are at present - or were yesterday - the leaders
of tlle Algiers Committee of Public Safety.

42. Je m'excuse de cette pareilthese et je reprencs.
mon expose; je ne youdrais pas m'ctendre outrc meSllLC
sur les differentes declarations faites aV3::tt le 13 mai
par des hommes c:ui dilig~nt actuellement le cUlllil(·.
d'Alger DU le dirigeaient hier.

43. At various times - particillarly during the debates
in tIle French Parliament - v[~ws which were patently
hostile, if not actually aggressive, have been expressed
with regard t~ Tunisia. POl· mor" th::m fl yl'llr now,
arguments which havc no connexion with the we[estnblis·hed pl'inciples of international law havc been
put forwnrd with refercnce to my c:mntry in order to
justify acts of aggression or invasions ol' its t~lTitory
or air space, either planned or executed. There has
been talk of tile right of pursuit, the right of retaliatiot\
and the right of reprisal.

43. A l1iffenollLc::; rcpriS(:s - et notmllrncnt Jors d<:s
debuts elu Parlcment fl'fm~ais - des intentions ncttc~
ment hostiles, sinon agrl'ssives, se sont fait jour a
l'rflard de la Tunisie, Des formulcs qui 11'ont aucun
rapport avec les rdncipes bie:l eLablis du droit internRtional ont apparu, clcpuis plus d'un an dejii, a l'encontre de mon pays, pom cmnouf1er des agressions Oil
des violations t[;}'ritoriales Oil aerieJ:ncs, envisngecs eu
consommees. On a parlc dc droit de poursuite, de droit
de riposte, de droit de l'eprcsaUes.

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44. Moreover, the moving spirits of the Algiers
Committee of Ptw]ic Safety, set up on 13 May 1958,
are the same men who, during the debate in the French
Parliament on 16 April 1958, which brought about the
fall of the govcrn;ncnt of Mr. F6lix Gaillard, expre~sed
the most violent opposition to a compre,mise with
Tunisia on the basis of the agreement of 15 March
resulting from the proposals of the good offices mission
of the United Kingdom and the l:nited States. Tlll~S,
Mr. Jacques Soustelle, who asked for" limibd aetion,."
was supported b} AIr. Pierre Andre, who stated that
"it is essential for us to remnin not only at the airfH~IGs,
but also in the scuth of Tunisia" and inquired" why
the Government had not organized limited lightning
raids against Tunisia." These clearly and evidently
aggressive intentions with regard to Tunisia were
endorsed by the statement or General Salan's
spokesman, to which I have already referred. Since
14 May 1958, tl1ey have been translated into adion
with the result that we have sufTel'cd casualties in
dead and wounded, in addition to st'.rinul m<lterial
losses.

44. Par ailleurs, les animateurs du comite d'Alger,
comtitue depllis le 13 mai 1958, sont ceux.-Ia rnemes
qui, lors du debat qui a provoque au Parlement fnmcais,
le 16 avril 1958, la chute de l\t Felix Gaillard, s'etllient
le plus violemment {1Ppos~.s :i \l 11 c.ompromis avec la
Tunisic sur la base de l'a.c.cord du 15 mars, re:'llise sur
la proposition des bons offices anglo-amerieains. Ainsi,
M. Jacques Soustelle, qui demandait «d'operer des
actions limitees n, e'tait souteLu par ]\1, Pierre Andre,
qui dec1arait que (~notre maintien s'impose, non sculcM
sur les aerodromes, mais aussi dans le sud turrisien l"
et cemandait (( pourquoi le gouvernement n'a,Dit pas
montp. rlP.s actions eclair limitees contre la TJoisie ».
Ces intentions claires et nettement agressives a I'egard
de ta Tunisie se trouvent etre corroborees par la d6claM
ration dll porte-parole du ger,eral Sal:'ln que j'ai citee
plus haut ; depllis le 14 mai 1958, elles ont ete sllivies des
faits, et nom nvons it deplorer des morLs, des blcsses,
saIlS compter de graves depredations mawriellcs.

45. A series of acts of armed aggression have thus
been wmmitted Oil Tunisian soil by tile French troops
atatioltcd in Tunisia in co-o[Jeration wilh troops from
Algeria. These acts moreover are parts of a very long
series of similar acts committed in Tunisia either by
the Fl"C'lleh troop.~ stationed there, who adopt the
attitude of occupying forces, or by French troops
from Algeria, the most serious incident being the onc
at Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef on 8 February, which was HIe
cause oJ Tunisia's first complaint to the Security
Council .

45. II Y a done la une scrie d'agressiorrs armees eommises sur le sol tunisien par les troupes frangaises
stationnees en Tunisie, en cooperation avec eelles
d'A:gerie. Ces ngressions se plaeent d'ailleurs uans le
eadtc d'une serie tres longu€ d'ades d\;,. meme nature
commis en Tunisie, soit pal' lea troupes frangaises qui y
stationnent avee la mentalitc dc I'Qccupant, soit par les
forces fran~aises venant cl'Algerie, et dont le plus
important a ete l'attaque de Sakiet-Sidi-Yollssef, le
8 fevrie)', qlli a provoql1€ la prcmiere plainte de la
Tunisie au c.Jnseil de secUTitc.

46. The presence of French troops in Tunisia, however,
hUB been n constant cause of concern sinr.e my country
became independ~nt. In the course of a ~ingle yeaT,
from April 1956 to May 1957, almost 200 incidents of
all kinds have been provoked by the French Army
stationed in Tunisia, incidents involving searches,
entry into private homes, raids, 9.bductions, lootir.g,
skirmishes with the Tunisian Army, machine-gunning
and mortar-fire. [ shall recall the fairly large-scale
skirmish 0031 May 1957, in whieh Mr, Khamais I-Iaject.
Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreig:>. Affairs of
Tunisia, was severely wounded while inspec:tiug a camp
for Algerian refugees, By 7 February 1958, i.e., just
before the bombing of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, the number
of civilians abducted had risen to 141, of W:10m 37 are
still missing.

46, La presence des troupes frangaises en Tunisic n'a
d'ailleurs cesse d'etre unc cause de proioccllpatio:l depuis
l'independar.ce de mon pays, 3:n un an, du mois d'avril
1955 nu mois de mais 1957, on a eu it compLer pres de
200 incidents de tonIes natures, provoques par l'armee
fran~aise station nee en Tunisie, et consistant en des
perquisitions, de!! violations de domicile, des ratissages,
des enlevements, des pillages, des accrochagefl avee
l'armee tunisienne, des miLraillages et des tirs de morHer.
Je rappellerai l'accroehage assez important qui a Cll liell
le 31 ll1ai 1957, au COUl'S dutll1el fut grievement blesse
1VL Khamais I-lajeri, sccrelaire general du j\[illislcrc
des aiIaires etrangeres de Tutisie, alors qu'il in.c;pectait
un centre d'hebcrgement de refugies algeriens. Le
bilan des enlevements de ci,ils s'ele'l,'ait, au 7 fewier
1958 _. c'est-a-dire la veille du bombul'dement de
Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef - a HI, dont 37 sont jusqu'a cc
jour demeures dispams.

47. I should like to stress that several of these incidents
took place with the help of thc French Army in Algeria,
which made sorties into Tunisian territory for the
purpose of carrying out raids, destroying properLy
and abducting individuals, Its aircraft flew over
Tunisian air space, carrying out machine-g~nning and
bombing operations on numerous occasions; the mo:;;t
importar.t and sy:;;tematic oj these operations took
place at Sali:iet-Sidi-Yollsscf and rightly incurred the
censure of world public opinion, Apart from the bombing
of Sakiet-Sidi·Yousscf, by 8 February 1958, operations
in Tunisia by French troops and French aircraft from

47. Je liens a souligner que plllsieurs de ces incident.s
ont eu lieu avec la p<lrliciplltion de l'arrnee fran~<'lise
cl'Algeric. qui, de son cOte, faisait des incursions dans
le territoire tunisier. pour s 'y livrcr it des raLissages,
des destructions de biens et des enlevcments de perSOlmes, cL dont l'aviation SUl"volail l'espaee uerien
tunisien, ou elle cffectuail, A de notllbreuses repri~es,
des Illitraillages et dc bomhal'dcmeds, dont le plus
important et le plus systematique dcvaiL ctre celui de
Sakid-Sidi-YousseI, qui a legitimement soulev6 la
reprobation de l'opinion mondiale. Cependnnt, en dehors
de ee bomhardcme.nL de Sakiet-Sidi-Yollssef, les o[Jc-

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Algeria had resulted in 22 dead, 42 wcunded and

50 persons reported missing,

rations en Tunisie de l'armee cl. de l'aviation fran~aises
I venant
d'Algerie avaient faiL, au 8fevrier 1958. 22 morts,
42 blesses et 50 disfnrus,

All these incident'; were the subject of protests

48. Tous ces incidents ont d'ail:eurs fait l'objet, de la

by my Government to the French Embassy at Tunis.

part de mon gOllverncmcnL, de protestatioos aupres
de l'ambassadc de France a Tunis. Les evenements
revctant un certain earaetere lie gravitC ont ctG porLes
a la connaissllllce du Sccretnire general des Nations
Unies paries soins du represelltanL permanent de la
Rbublique tUllisienJle, qui n'a pas man que de reserVer.
le cas echcant, le droit de legitime ddcnse, prcvu pur
I'Article 51 de la Oart(', en cas d'aggravution de 1:1
situation a la ,~uite des actions ugressives repetees des
for,~es fmn(faises stationnces en Tunisie ou Vt:llant
d'Algefic.

48.

The more serious of the-m were bTOtltl1t to the notice
of the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the
pcrmaner.t representative of Tunisia, who specifically
reserved Tllnil:iia's right of self-defence under Article 51
of the Charter. should its exercise be necc::;sitalcLl by

a detedomtion of the situation due to repe:lted acts
of aggressioll by French force, stationed in Tunisia
or by forces from Algeria.

49. Thus, all these ncts, of which tlte Sakiet-SidiYoussef incident of 8 February 1958 W8S the most
na~rant, inevitably lead us to the conclusion that
the numerous and bIooey attacks, with which the
present appeal is concerned, constitute unqualified and
prcmerlitated ermed aggr€ssion. J say armed aggrcSSiOJl
and add that it is t10t possible in all honesty to nvoic
desclibing it as such. 'We liave before us a typic::!l
t:ase of nggression, on which tllere is no possible room
for doubt. All the qnalifications arc rr.ct: armed attacks
on a sovereign and independent State, Tunisio, by the
regulnr armed forces of unothe!' Stare. France, earned
out on the territory of the State which is the victim
of the attacks. There caOl be no possible doubt that
these qualifications arc met in this particular case.
I should B.lso like to point out that one qualification
is met which is not esselltit.l. In the Case of the aggression
ion Korea in 1950, there was 11') need for the Security
CO"jllcil to determine wIlether or not the 3ttacking
forces were regular forces under the control of a State.
The C<luncil decided that aggression had taken place
anJ luuk all the appropr:ntc sleps to repel it,

19. Aiusi done, tous ees actes, dont le plus saillant
fut cclui de Sakiet-Sidi~Yoll:'lsel (~ fcvrier 1958), !le
pcuvmt que nous mener a la conclusion que les mul~
liples ct sanglantcs attaques qui font l'objet de la
prcscntc requCle constituent un~ ngrr.ssion ::!rmce
camcterisce et premeditc.,~. Jc dis bien : agression
armee j et j'ajoute que cette qJulific'ttion ne st.urait
~trc hor.llctement livitce. Now:, ~ommes en presence
du cas typiquc de l'agression, alL sujet duquel aucune
conLroverse n'est possible. Touhs les conditions neccs~
saircs sont n~\lnics ; attui]ues arm~es d'un Etut indlj~
pcndant et suuvcrain - la Tunisic
p"r lm; forces
armees regulir.res d'un atl~re Etat - la Fmnee
lJortees sur le: sol de l'Eto.l. attaque. Ces cond:tiuns
!';ont. sans contestation possible, r0unie~. Je me pe,mets
de souligncr d'ailleurs qu'il y ell n memc une de trop.
Dnns le cus de l'agression en Conic, en 1950, le Conseil
chel'cher si les forces
de secllritd n'~ mcme pas ell
ll.uaquontes ucpembicllt rcguJitrc!lwnt ou non d'un
Ebt. 11 avail estime qu'il y nVDil agression et il avait
pris toutcs les mesur,~s utiles Cll vue de la repousser.

50. During the course of this discussion my delegation
has tried to be as brief ns possible. J shall now proceed
to Ollr conclusions.

Ma delegfltion s'est utt.achee au caurs de ce debat
qu~ possible. J'en UlTivc flUX conclusions.

51.

add furLher argualents drawn from the facts,
should subsequent interventions make this lleCess<llY)
leads the delegation of tIle Republic of Tunisia to
request the Security COLncil, under Article 39 of the
Chflr-ter of the United NH tions. to determine the
existence of the act of aggression I have just defined.
Tbat is my first request.

51. L'exposc que ~e vicns de fain: - et que je me
permettrni de reprendre aVCG plus d'argurnellts, tires
des faiLs, si lc~ inlerventiOlls ultcl'icnres en fonl nppitrnltre la necessite - amene la uo!ltigation de la Repll~
blique tnnisienne
dcmander au COBseil de sccurite
la conslntaticn, con[onnclllclll h. I'Article 39 de la
Charte des Nations Unies, de l'agl'es~ion que JC viens
de definir. C'est il\ ma prcmiere demandc.

52 My second nrise.q logical:y from t.Jl~ first: it is
that t1le aggression should be ended by removing its
c:.nses and that its victirr:, Tunisiu, s:lOttld be protectcd
against its continu:\tion 01' resumption.

52. La deuxicme ell est In consequence logiqlle :
rC:Jollsscr l'llgression, en s\\pprimcl' les causes, et assurer
le pays agrcJoisc, la Tunisie, contre 5[\ PO~ll'suiLe ou sa
reprise.

53. The statement of the facts which T have submitted
slwws that for almost two years Tunisa has bCt::l
subjected to sporadic but persistent acts of aggressio;)
by French troops sbtio:led in Tunisin 0:- eng~ged i:l
lwstiJiLies in Algeria who have viollltcd the tcrd.Lorir.J
integrity or the air space of Tunisia to commit £lcb
of aggression there.

53. L'exposc des faits qlie j'ni presentc'. dcmontre que
lfl Tnnisie fl eu pendant pres de deux ans a faire face
D. une agl'c!';siOll int.ermiu'mlLl', lllfds continuclle, de la
p:-:rt des troupes fl'an~ni~~s Rllllion\le~s CII Tunisic au
faisflnL la guerre Cll Algl'rie, et vio18ut l'intligrile
territoriale ou l'espce a~l'jen dl' la Ttlni~jc, pour y
commettre des actes tlgrcssifs.

54. The Secnrity Cour.cil is accordingly hound to
help Tunisia, a Member State, to locpcI aggres~ion by
providiug assistance in accordance with Article 30 of

5<1. Le Consdl de sccuritc ne pellt dOlle aider la Tunisie,
Etat r-,'I\~mbre, a TCpousscr l'flgrcssioll qu'en l'assitant,
conform~-mellt Dl'Articlc 30 de h Ch,de, et en mettllnt

The statement which I lUive jmt made (Lo Wllich

r shall

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the Charter and by placing at its disposal all the appropriate means for removing the causes of aggression
provided for in Articles 40 and 41 and subsequent
Articles of the Charter.

a sa disposition taus moyens, prevus par Ies Articles 40,
41 et suivants de la Charte, propres a en supprimer les
causes.

55. The statement which I have just made shows that

55. L'expose que je viens de faire demontre que
l'agression dont la Tunisie est victime a deux causes
essentie11es : premiercment, la presence des forces
frani;aises en Tunisie, contre sa volonte ; deuxiemement.
la guerre en Algerie, qui s'est dcversee en Tunisie, du
fait des agressions multiples de l'armee fran<;aise contre
le territoire tunisien, et dont les illustrations les plus
sanglantes ont ete Sakiet-Sidi-Yollssef, le 8 fevrier
1958, et les bombardements massifs de la region de
Remada, les 23, 24 et 25 mai 1958.

the aggression of which Tunisia is a victim has two
main causes: the first of these is the presence of French
forces in Tunisia against Tunisia's wishes and the
second is the spreading of the Algerian war into Tunisia
because of the many acts of aggression committed by
the French Army against Tunisian territory, of which
the most bloody examples have been the attack on
Sakiet - Sidi - Youssef on 8 February 1958 and the
heavy bombing of the Remada region on 23, 24 and
25 May 1958.
56. I intend, at the present stage of the discussion,
to confine myself to the first of these two causes: that
is the presence of French troops in Tunisia.

56. Je vais me limiter, au stade actuel dn debet, :'I la
premiere de ces deux causes: la presence des troupes
fran<;aises en Tunisie.

57. On 20 March 1956 France signed a Protocol with
Tunisia recoguizing its independence and the full
exercise of its sovereignty in all spheres. This nullified
all previous agreements between Prance and Tunisia
which were incompatible with Tunisia's position as
an independent and sovereign State and in particular
those of which the main purpose, explicitly stated in
the preamble, was the grant to Tunisia of a status
falling short of complete sovereignty. The Protocol
of 20 March 1956 provides for the revision of these
previous agreements, as is required by both logic and
justice.

57. Le 20 mars 1956, la France a signe avec la TUllisie
un protocole reconnais!>ant son independance lOt la
plenitude de l'exercice de sa souverainetC dnns tous les
domaines. De ce fait sont devenus caducs tous les
accords anterienrs entre In France et la Tunisie, non
compatibles avec la situation de la Tunisie, Elat independant et sonveraiu, et nolamment ceux qui avaicnt
pour but essentiel, explicite dans leur preambule.
l'etablissement pour la Tuni!>ie d'une situation d'Etat
ne jouissant pas de la plenitude de sa souverninete.
Cela est tellement conforme a la logique et an droit que
le protoeole du 20 mars 1956 stipule qu~ de tels accords
doivent etre revises.

58. Since April 1056, the Tunisian Government has
repeatedly requested the French Government to settle
the thorny problem of the presence of its troops in
Tunisin. It has always met with evasions or with an
attitude of increasing ill-will. Some months after it
beGame independent, it clearly informed the French
Government of its desire that the French forces evacuate
Tunisia.

58. Or, depuis le mois d'avril 1956, le Gouvernement
tunisien a demande <l maintes reprises au Gouvernemcnt
franlf<lis de regler ce probleme epineux de la presence
de ses trO'llpeS en Tunisie, Il s'est toujours heurte a des
derobades ou a une mauvaise volonM de plus en plus
manifeste. An bout de quclques mois apres l'independance, il a nettement manifeste au Gouvernement
fran((ais son dCsir de voir les forces franQaises evacneI:
la Tunisie.

59. There has admittedly been a reduction in the
strength of these troops from the figure of 45,000 before
March Hl56 to the present figure of 22,000. We consider,
however, thnt this !"eduction was duc to the operational
requirements of the war in Algeria rather th3n to any
real desire to withdraw troops stationed in Tunisia.

59. Il Y a bien en un allegement des effectifs de ces
troupes, qui ont ete ramenes de 45.000 hommes, qu'ils
comptaient avant mars 1956, a 22.000, qu'ils comptent
maintcnant. Mais eet allegement nous semble ~tre
beaucoup plus dicte par les necessites operationnelles
de la gucrre en AIgerie que par le desir reel de retrait des
troupes stationnces en Tunisie.

60. Finally, as a result of tIte bombing of SaldetSidi-Yollssef on 8 February 1958, the Government of
the Hepublic of Tunisia asked for the complete, totEd
and immediate withdrnwal of all Prench forces from
Tunisia.

60. A la suite du bombardement de Sakiet-SidiYoussef, le 8 fevrie!" 1958, le Gouvernement de la
Republique tunisienne a fini par reclamer l'evacuation
complete, totale et immediate de l'cnsemble dcs fOl'ces
franQaises de Tunisie.

61. This legitimate unwillingness of an independent
State to tolerate the continued presence in its territory
of foreign troops who show little respect for its
sovereignty and integrity was officially communicaled
to the Security Council in document S/3957 dated
17 February 1958.

61. Cette volonte legitime d'un Etat independant
de ne plus tol6rer SUI' son territoire la presence de
troupes etrangcl'es qui font si peu de cas de sa souverainete et du respect da a son integrite a eM manifestee officiellement au Conseil de securiLe par le document 8/3957, en date du 17 fevrier 1958.

62. It was also communicated to the good offices
mission of the United Kingdom and the United States.
As I pointed out at the beginning of my statement,

62. Elle a ete manifestee aussi a la mission des bons
offIces anglo-americains. En dIet, ['accord du 15 mars
1958 realise par cette mission prevoit, comme je l'ai

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 tile agreement of 15 March 1958 achieved by this
good olfLces mission provides for a first stage during
which all Frendl forces outside the Bizerte perimeter
will he withdr2wn from Tunisia and for a second stage
during which the Tunisian and French Governments
will agree jointly on a pro:.Jisional regime for Bizerta.

indique au debut de mon expose, une premiere phase
au cours de laquelle toutes les forces iff.ln~aise.9 se
trouvant hors du perimetre de Bizerte seront. evaeuc~s
hors de Tunisie, et une deuxieme phase au cours de
Iflql1elie le Gouvernement tnnisien et le Gouvernemcnt
frall~ais definirorrt it'un COlllllLlJn accord un regime
provisoire pour Bizel'te.

(;3. It was tllerefore reasonable to assume that the
French forces in Tunisia would continue to resped
tlle security regulations which Twlisia made in respect
of them 011 8 February 1958, and that they would
not provoke incident;;, muc:lless Ctlrry out sorties from
their headqua~tcrs to tiUa,:k the Tunisian Army and
occupy IIew 3i"CaS in Tunisia. Unfortunately that was
not the case.

11 etait alors permis d~ croire que les forces frando:: l\lllLsie alhiiellt contLnuer a respecter les iHs~
tructions de securite les wllcernant, prises par la
Tunisie le 8 fevner 1~58, et cviter de provoquer des incL~
dwts, encore moins de se Jivrer a des 50rties de Ieurs
casernements pour occuper de nouveaux pOints du
territoire tunisien en attaquant l'armee tunisieulIl'.
Malheurellsement, CElfl ne fu! pllS.

I}.I. Tunisia tas been the victim of armed aggression
by the French troops stationed on its territory against
its \vishe~. In the circumstanccs, thc presence of these
troops in Tllni.~ia clearly i::onsututes a tllreat Lo the
peace within the meaning lIf Article 39 of the Charter
and a threat to the security of Tunisia itself.

64. La Tunisie a etC agrcsse,e violemment par ks
troupes fl'alll~llises stationnees, contre sa volonte, SLr
son tt'ITit.oire. D:ms ces conditions, Icur presence en
Tunisie constilue bien une menace a la paix et a la
sccurite propre de la TlInis'e, menace pn~vue pflr l'A~~
tide 39 de la ChartC';.

CS. T]le Govcrnmcllt of the Republic of Tunisia has
Lried every method of reac:ling an amicable agreement
01 the liberatlon of its tenitory from the illegal presence of the French troo[Js, which are contiilually
attacking it. It has tried direct negotiation, but without
success. It has accepted the good oJIices mission and has
shown HseIf H patient and as conciliatory 8.S can
hLlmanly be expected. It has now no alternative but
to appeal to the Security CcuncH as the body responsible
for the maintenullce of internatiolll'll peHce rlml security.

65. Lt' Gnl1vernp.nlent de la Republique tunisiennc a
cpuise tous les moyens amiables pour arriver a liMrer
son territoire de la f,resence ilMgittme de troupes franyaises c;ui l'agrcsser.t continuellement. 11 a tente la
negociation direete : il n'a pas rCLlssi. Il a accepte les
b:ms offices, eL 1l cite plus loin dans la voic de]o. patience
e: de la concession qu'it e~t humainemcnt pOSSible de
le faire, II ne lui reste plus que le recours au Conscil
de securite, responsable du maintien de la paix eL de
IB sikunt.c intcrnationales.

66, Tl:e Tunisian delegation therefore requests bc
Security Council to take, ill accordance with Alticle 39
of the Chnrte" aU tippl·opriate measures provided [or
In ArUcles 40 awl ,11 and subscquent Al:"ticlcs to 3.sslst
i: to obtain the withdrawal of the }-;'rench troops which
arc stationed in Tunisia against iLs wishes siTltc their
presence c.ons-jtutes one oi the fundamental causes of
the genuine aggres.sioll Tunisia has suITcred.

En conseqllence, la delegation tunisienne demande
Conseil de securite de prendre, clll1formement a
l'Article 39 de la Charle, tout.es mesures prevues par
les Artides 40. 4-1 et .<mivallt.s propres a l'assis';er dans
l'evacuaLion des troupes franyaises statiollnecs en Tunisic contre sa volonte - ce fait constiluant l'une des
C,lUses cssent:elles de l'agression efl'ective dont la
Tnnisie est l'objet.

€7. Pending such withdrawal. my delegation calh for
provisional security measurcs and requests the Council,
acting under Article 40 of the Charter, formally to
request Fr:mc" : ilrst. 1:0 ensure tllat its troops stalioned
i.1 Tunisia observe the preventive security mcasures
taken in respect of them by the Governmetlt of thc
Republic of Tunisia on 8 February 1958 and cornrnuJicated to the Prcsident of the Security Councj] on 13 February 1958, measures wl1ich included a prohibition
of all French troop movements in Tunisia; and secondly.
to ensure that 3Jl other French forces observe the
dec.ision taken on 8 Februnry 1958 to prohibit naval
unih from entering Tunisian ports, and to prohbit
2ny landing or parachuting of rcinj'orcements and all
fl.ights over Tunisian terril:ory. In this connexiOll I
should like to Tecall once again that these p1'Ovisional
mcasures were the mbjecl of a communication to the
Presi<1<::C1t of Lhe Security Council dated 13 Februory
1958 [5/39511.

07. Par ailleurs et en attendant cette evacuation, ma
delegation demrmde des rr,esures provi~oires de securite. ct elle demande au Conseil. agissallt en application de I'Article 4D de la Charte, d'illvitcr solennellement la France: premierement, a laire obse:-ver par
ses troupes stationnees en Tunisic les mesures prevenLves de sccul'ilc prises a lell: egal'd par le Gouvernement
de la Republiquc tunisienne le 8 fevrier 1958 et notiMC's /lll President du Conscil de securite d!>.s le 13 revrkr
1958, comporlRllt not.<'l.mment l'int.erdiction de tout
mouvcment d,~ troupes fral1<;aises en Tunisie ; deux.i~­
rnemenl, a fairc observer par toutes autres forces fran~aiscs l'interdietion qui !eur a ete faite le 8 fevrier 1958
de toul ncccs d'uniLes de la marine de gucrre aux porl8
t'.lnisiens, de tout debarqncmenl ou pflrachutagc de
renIorts, ainsi que de tout slIrvol rlu tcrritoire tunisien,
Je rappellc it cc sujet, encore une fois, que ces mesures
provisoires ont fait l'ohjet cl'unr. r.ommunication au
Presiden.t du Conseil de securite a la date du 13 fevrier
1958 [5/3951].

68. These are the requests which my delegation feels
compelled to submit Lo Lhe Security Council at the
present stage of the discussioll. Is this too much to llsk

68, 'Ielles sont les demandes que ma delcgaLion croit
devuir }rescnter au Conscil dc sccuritc im J'etat ncttlel
du dcb(l.L Serait-ce trop d~mandcr au Conseil ? Je ;le

12

63.

~aises

66.
tl'J

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of the Council? InaU seriousness. I do not think so.
The case is simple and clear~cut. A State Member of
the United Nations, Tunisia is the victim of aggression
wrnmitted by French forces stationed on its soil against
its wishes. After having unsuccessfully tried every
method of reaching an amicable agreement on the withdrawal of these force.s from its territory, it today requests
the Security Council to decide {JO the appropriate
measures to repel the aggression and remove its causes.

le pense serie'.lscment pos. Le cas est simple, clair, Un
Etat membre des Nationfi Unies, la Tunisie, est I'objet
d'une agression effective de la part des forces franQaises
stationnees stir son sol contre sa volonte. Apre3 avoir
epuise toutes les voies de recours amiables en vue de
voir ces forces cvacuer son territoire, il s'udresse ll.lljourd'hlli au Con~eil de se-curite pour voir decider toutes
mesures utHes propres a repousser l'agression et a en
supprimcr les causes.

69. The Tunisian people is aware that its security is
now in the hands of the Security Council, which h",s
taken efTective action on previous occasions of this
kind. I <llll confident that iL will not be disappointed.

69. Le pellple tunisien a conscience qu'a partir de Cl'
jour sa securite est entre les trains du Conseil de securite, qui a eJricaccment agi en pareille3 circonstances.
J'ai confiunce qu'it ne sera p<'.s de';-.I1.

70. Mr. GEORGES-PICOT (France) (translated from
French): By giving an incomplete account of the facts,
the Tunisian repre:;entative has represented the SaldetSidi-Youssef incident as an act of aggression by France
against an innocent civilian population. Since this
incident has been raised again, I consider it my dllty, in
order to moble tilt Council to fOfm an objectiveappraisal
of the situation, to fill in the gaps in the Tunisian statement and 1;0 correct certain points which will make it
clear to the Presidcnt and the merrbers of Lie Council
that Snkiet-Sidi-Youssef was not an open town, but a
military centre of the Algc:oian rebels, supported by the
Tunisian Army anti administration,. a centre from
which attacks w~.re continually launched against the
French forces.

70. M. GEOHGES-PICOT (France) : Le representant
de la Tunisie a pnisente j'incident de Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef
cOlllme une agression de la France contre une population civile innocente, en decrivant les faits d'une
maniere incomplete. le crois de mon devoir, pour permettre au Conseil d'ap[1l'ccier objectivement la situation,
puisqu'il y a ete fait de nOllveau rCIcrem;e, de completeI'
les lacunes de l'exposc tunisien et de redresser certains
fait.~ qui permettront au President et aux membres
dll Conseil d~ constater que Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef n'etait
pas une ville ouverte, mais une place d'anues des
rebdles Illgeriens, appuyes par l'armee et l'administration tunisieunes, place d'oD. ne cessaient de partir
des agressiolls conLre les forces fran~aises.

71. Lor.g before the incident of 8 February 1958,
Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef and its mine were used as a training
centre for the rebels and as a transit point forthe supply
of 81ms to the AIgerinn rebellion. What amounted to a
rebel gllrrison - averaging 500 to 700 men - was
permatlcntly established at the mine, while the families
lived in the village. Units of recruits were stationed
there, urew arms and for six weeks carried out intensive
military training consisting of teclmicaJ insuucllon
on the spot, combat exercises in the hills to the north
of the mine buildings, firing practice in the hills to the
south-east and parades at which the flag of the FLN
[National Liberation Front] WClS carried. When this
tmining was completed, the recruits Idt in army
convoys. A detachment of the Tunisian Natior:al
Guard - thirty men under the command of a lip.ll I:enant - was stationed at the approaches to the mine.
Food sllpplies for the camp were brought in by 10lTy
from Tadjerouine or were obtained from local traders.
We have receipts for goods supplied to the PLN command bearing the stamp of the unit which was stationed
at Saldet-Sidi-Yollsbef. This rebel centre was protected
not only agninst land attack, but also against observation from Lhe air. Anti-aircraft guns wp.re set IIp in tile
centre of the village and on the l'oofs of public buildings.
The National Guarrl, and even the Tunisian Army,
helped tD provide this protection against l<:nd and ~\iL'
attack.

Bien avant l'incident du 8 fevrier 1958, Saldetsa mine constituaiellt un centre d'entrainement pour les reLelles et Ull centre de transit
d'arrncs an pront de la rcbelllon algcrienne. Dne veritable garnison rebelle - de 500 a 700 hommes en
moyenne - etait instaIlce en permanence a la mine,
les fftmilles residant duns le village. Les unites de
recrues y tennient ga.rnison. y rccevaient leurs annements, et y suivaieut pendant un mob et demi un
entratnement militaire intensif : instruction technique
sur place, exercices de combat dans le djebel au nord
des bfltiment::> de la mine, tirs dans les djebels du sudest, dtdiles avec drapeau FLN [Front de liLcration
natlOnale] en tete. ClOt entrronement termine, les l'ecrues
repul'taient en detachements de transports d'annes. Un
rlr.t.af'.hement. rlp la garde nationale tunisienne - 30
lIoIDmes commandcs par un iieutenmlL - stalionnait
aLlX abords de la mine. Le ravitaillement d'.! camp
etait assure par camions vcnrmt dc Tadjercuine et
par le commerce local. Nous avollS des re!tus de marchandises delivrees au commandement I7LN. avec les
cflcllels de J'unite qui etait a Sakiet-Sidi-You3~ef. La
proLection de ce centre rebelle etait assurce non seulement contre les incursions terrestres, mais egalement
contre l'observation aerienne. Des mitl'ail1ellSes antiaCl'ienllcs 6taient ins-~alllies all centre dll village et sur
les toits des btltiments pltlJlics. La garde nationale et
meme l'armee tunisiennc pretaient lenrs concours a
cctte protection terrestl'e et antiaerienne.
72. Vne armre qui instalie ses mitrailleuses n'.! milieu
de la population civJe }lrend une responsabilitc grave
a 1'6garc1 de ccHe populntion. Dne vilk d'oll des pieces
tircnt sur d'autres troupes ne peut pnHendre elre une
ville ouvene, a l'ubri des bom':.Jardements. Pour me5urer
la l'Csponsabilite dc 12. Tunisie dans l'incident du 8 fcvrier.
il faut se souvenir du grave incident du 11 janvier,

72. An army which ~ets up machine-guns in the cen:re
of an arca occupied by civilians aSCiumcs a 11eavy
responsibWty with n:ganl to this civili<:ln population.
A town :rom which guns are fired on troops elsewhere
Cannot claim to be an open town, immune from bombing. In appraising Tunis:a's responsibility in regard
to the incident of 8 February, it is nece9sUI)' to bear

13

71.

Sidi~Youssef et

 I"

TUl1isjal~s in partif'lllarly revolting circumstances. We can make available to the Council
photographs which will bear out this assertion. It
should be remembered that Sakict-Sidi-Youssef was a
fortified camp for Algerian rebels: machine-guns had
been set up right h the centre of Lhe village and on the
roofs of official Tunisian buildings and these guns
continunlly nttacked French aircra[L

qui a eoute la vie a 14 soldats Iranltais, massacres avec
la complicite tunisienne dam; des conditions p~rticu~
liel'cmeni odieuses, Nous te:lons d'ailleurs a la dispos:tion du Conscil des Jlhotographic:> pour ilh:stl'er ce
que no us avan~oCls, 1I taut avail' present a l'esprit le
fait que Sakiet-Sidi-YousseI elait un camp retranche
des rcuellcs algericns, avcc des rnitrailleuscs en plein
centre du village, S'-ll' le toit d'irr.meubles officie]s lunisi ens, ct qui attaquaicnt constalOment des avions
fmn<;gis.

73. Before concluding my remarks on this subject,
I slwuld Wee to point out that, on Lem'ning of the
Sakiet-Sidi-Yollssef incident, hoth the Prime Minister
of France and the Natiouu] Assembly deplored tlIe fact
that casllolties bad been inflicted on the civilian population. Mr. GaiUa:-d added that France was ready to
make good the damage caused and to pay com;Jensation.

73. :e tiens, avant de clare ce chapitre, u rnppeler
qal". le President dll Conseil fl'anl/ais et l'Assemblee
natiollalo, des qu'ils ont cte snisis de l'inci(]pnt' elf:
SakiehSirli~Youssef,
ont deplore qu'it y ait ell des
viclirr.es dans la popnlation eivi1e_ M. Gaillard a Hjoute
que lJ Fr.<mce etait pretc a envtsagcr :a reparation
des dommages camcs et le vcrsement d'indemniLes.

71. There cen be no doubt that He support given to
the FLN by Tunisia constitutes aggression. We need
only rcfer to the definition of aggn'lssion contnined in
the ?roposaLs submitted te the United Nations by the
majority of the African and Asian States and by
certain Latin·Americall States. The delinition contllins
the following statement: "In an international conflict
that StClte shall b~ decllll'ed illP. Iltb,cker w1Jicll supports
armed bands organized in its territory which invade
the territory of another Stllte-, or refllses, on being
requested by the invaded State, to take ill its own terri~
tory any action within its power to deny s;lCh bands
any aid vr protection."

74. Que J'appui donne pal' la Tunisie ail FLN constitue unc agrcssion, cola ne fait. p:::tS Jp. ol"lute. Il sumt
de nous en rapporter a la. tWinitiOll dormee de l'agression duns des propositions qui ont elc presentees a
]'OrgEnisation des Nlltions Units par la pluparL des
Etats africains ct a"iatiqu<:o, et CGrlains Etnts I~tino­
americains. II cst dit dans cette definition : lr Sera
reC()n:lll pour agressell~ dans UIl conJlit inte~national
J'Etat qui aura rlonne son appui it Le;; uundes arOlees
('U[, !ormees sur son territoire, lHJI"Cnt envnhi le 1errhoirc d'un alltrc Et<'lt, ou qui aur<'l rcfuse., malgre la
delIlande de I'Etat cll\'ohi, de prendl'e sur ,>on prOprie
territaire les mesures en san pouvoir pour priver les·
dites bandcs de toutc aide et protection Cl.

75. Arlic1c { of the l;ollvention concerning the Duties
and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, adopted
nt HaVfllHl. on 20 FcbJ'llary t928 by the VIth International Conference of American States, reads as follows:
"The contmcting States bind thcmsctvcs to
observe the following rules with regard to civil
strife in another one of them:
"First: To use all menns at thcir disposal to
prevent the inhabitants of their territory, nationllls
(I':' aliens, from par~icipaling in, gathering clemcn15
crossing the boundary or sailing from their territory
for the purpose of starting or promoting civil strife.

75. L'article premier de la Conventiun conccmant lcs
devou-s et droits des Etat, en cas de Illttes civiles,
adoptee it La Havane, le 20 fevrier 1928, par la VIe
Conference internntionulc arrH~ric8ine, est ainsi ref!iee :
"Les Etats contractan:s s'obtigent a observer les
regles sllivantes eOIlcernant la luLte civile dans l'un
cl'cntre eux :
f. Premicrement : Employer les moyens en leur
pOllvoil' pour hitcr que les /labitanls de leur territoire, nfll:ionflllx ou etrangcrs. ne prennent par:, ne
ras:;;cmblent les elements OU DC p;:ssellt la frontiere,
ou ne s'cmbarqucnt sur leur telTitoil'e pour commencer 011 soutcnir une lntte civile.
(Secondement : Dcsar'l1er ou interner toute force
rebellc qui traverse leuTS fronti~rcs, les cJepenses de
],intCl'l1Cmcllt etant au compte de l'Elat all l'ordre
a ete bOllleversll. Lcs arme.~ trouv~e:; uu pouvoir des
rebeJ]es pourror.t etr£! .~aisies et gardees par le gou~
ve~nement du pays de reIugc pour Nre rendues a
J'Etat en llltte civile, une fois que ID lutle sera terminee.
il Tl'oisiemement : l)efendre le 1rafic des urmes et
clll maLericl de gucrl'e, sauf !orsqu'i!s s('l".<1ient. rlestines
all gouvcrnemcni. et uussi longtemps que la condi~
tion de bclllgel't'.l1ts ne sera pas reCDnnuc aUK rebclles,
r.flS clans lequel seront appltquccs les regles de la
neutraJitc.

in mind the serious incident of 11 January, which cost
the lives of fourteen French soldiers, murdered with the
(;omrlicity of

"Second: To disarm and intern every rebel forC(l
c:-ossing tlleir boundaries, the expBnses of internment
to be borne by tllfo St,rte where public order mi'ly
have been disturbed. The arms found in the hands
of the rebels may be seized and wilhdrawn by the
Government of the country granting asylum, to
be returned, once the struggle has ended, to the
State in civil strife.
"Third: To forbid the traffle in arms and war
material, except when intended tUI' the GovenUllent,
while the belligerency of the rebels has not been
recognised, in which latter C<'lse the rules of neutrulity sllUJI be applied,

".
l

p.

League Ql Nnt'ons,
~t.

TrealiJ SerIes,

vol. CXXXIV,

1932-HJ33,

I Socield nC5 N!llhms, R,Ullflil des Tral'Us, VQi. cxxxrv,
1932-1933, p. 53 et 59.

 L

I
[
~

I
r'"

76. Purthermore, President Bourguiba has himself
stated that support of the rebels is contrary to the
principle of respect for the sovereignty of another
State. In a speech made at ThaJa on 13 August 1957,
President Bourguiba said:
" I do not want the Algerians themselves to supply
the French with a pretext; I should like them to
display an attitnde of wisdom, maturity and selfdenial. . , . The Algerians must not furnish the French
with nny grounds for demonstrating to the world
that Tunisia is incapable of dischnrging its responsibilities as an independent and sDvereign State."

78. D'ailleurs, Le president Bourguiba lui·meme a
declare que donner un appui aux rebelles etait contraire
au principe du respect de la souverainete d'un autre
Etat. Dans son discours de Thala du 13 aoUt 1957, le
president Bourguiba El. Mclan~ :
«Je voudrais que les AIgericns eux-memes ne
fournissent pas un pretexte aux Frall(;ais; ie voudrais qu'ils aient une attitude de sagesse, de maturite,
d'obnegation. [... ] Les Algeriens ne doh'ent pas fournir aux Franr;ais un pretexte de nature a demontrer
devant le monde l'incapacite de la Tunisie dans
l'cxercice de ses responsabilites en tant qu'Elat independant et souverain.
1)

77. An independent and sovereign country must
not allow people to take cover behind its frontiers
and attack others, even if these others are their enemies.
Moreover, in different circumstances President Bourguiba upheld the same principle in regard to Tunisia.
Did he not reccntly recaU his ambassador from Syriu
rnerdy because one of his political opponents, Salah
ben Youssef, had been admitted to and given asylum
in tbnt country?

77. Un pays illdependant et souverain ne doit pas
permettre a des gem de se proteger derriere ses frontieres et de frapper d'autres gens, meme si ces derniers
sont leurs ennemis. D'ailleurs, en d'autres cirtonstances, le president Bourguiba a su dCfendre Le meme
principe quand il interessait la Tunisie. N'a-t-il pas
recemrnent rappele de Syrie son ambassadeur simplement parce qll'un de ses adversaires politiques, Salah
ben Youssef, avait etc admis et re~,u dans ce pays?

78. More recently, President Eourguiba expressed
the following views On Tunisia's participation in the
African-AsLan Peoples' Conference, held at Cairo in
December 1957:
"As regards onr participation and tlle sending
to the Afric:an~Asian Congress of a Tunisian people's
deLegation which does not represent the Government,
we have said that it was impossible for I1S to participate as long as Salah ben Youssef and Youssef
TIouissi were regarded as the representatives of
Tunisia. I hnve received a promise that these individuals will be excluded, On this basis, that is to say,
on the basis of respect for Tunisian sovereignty,
the exclusion of these agitators who are fishing in
troubled waters, ancI respect for diplomatic usage,
which precludes countries maintaining diplomatic
relations from encouraging or assisting the activities
of an enemy, we will take p art in the Congress."

78. Plus reccmment, au sujet de la participation
de la Tunisie a la Conference des pcuples d'Asie et
d'Alrique, tenue an Caire en decembre 1957, le president Bourguiba s'est exprime en ccs termes :
«En ce qui concerne notre participation, I'envoi
d'unc delegation populaire tunisienne, ne representant pas le gouvernement, au Congres arro-asiatique,
nous avons dit qu'U nous eta it impossible d'y partlciper tant que Salall ben Youssef et Youssef RouIssi
seraient cOllsideres comme representants de la Tunisie. J'ai obtenu la parole que ees gens seraient ccurtes.
Sur ces bases - c'est-a-dire le respect de la souverainete tunisienne, l'eloignement de ccs agitateurs
qui pechent en eau trouble et le respect des usages
diplomatiques qui interdisent aux pay" qui sont en
relations dipJomatiques d'encourager ou d'alimenter
l'activite d'un ennemi - . nous participerons au
Congres. I1

79. I think that this position demonstrates clearly
the situation which ltaS resulted from Tunisia's support
of the Algerian rebels. Mr, Slim has told us that the
Algerian affair lias encroaclled upon Tunisia. ]n actual
fact, it is the stand taken by Tunisia which is causing
Tunisian policy to encroach upon Algeria. For what
Tunisia is doing is to support a group of Algerian rebels.

79. Il me semble que cette position indique claircmcnt
queUe est la situation resultant de l'appui donne par
la Tunisie aux rebelles nlgcriens. M, Slim nous a dit
que l'afIairc algerienne debordait :linsi sur la Tunisie.
En realite, c'est la position pri~e par la Tunisie qui
fait deborder la politique tunisiennc en Algerie. Car
que fait la Tunisie ? Elle donnc son appui a un groupc
de rebeHes algeriens,

80. Solutions can be enVisaged in Algeria which
would not give the prepondenlllt influence ond power
to the PLN. In that event, given Tunisia'~ attitude,
it is obvious that that country will continue to support
the FLN and to interfere in the internal political
affairs of Algeria, It is not the events in Algeria which
are the underlying cause of the present situation;
but Tunisia's infringement of the principle of non··
intervention. This sit"Gation should bc borne in mind,
as it is, so to spellk, the background to all the events
I am about to describe,

80. On pent imaginer des solutions en Algeric qui ne
donneraient pas I'Mgcmonie et le ponvoir au groupe
FLN. Si eela se produisait, il e~t manifeste, elant donne
la position de la Tunisie, qu'ellc continuerait a sout~nir
le FLN et a s'ingercr dans la politique interiellre de
l'A/gene. Ce ne sont done pas les evenemcnh d'Algeric
qui sont a la base et il l'origine de la situationactnelle,
mais bien l'atteinte [lortee par la Tunisie all prindpc
de la non-intervention. CeUe situation doH ctre rnppeICe, car cUe constitue en quelque sortc la toile de
fond sur laquelle se sont derou]Cs taus Ics 6venements
dont je vais vallS parler maintenant.
81. Toutefois, avant de comlllencer eet expose, je
voudrais attirer l'attention du Canseil sur une sitnation
qui nous a 6t6 signalee hiel' soir.

81. Before beginning my account, however, I would
like to draw the Council's attention to a situation
which was brought to our notice yesterday evening.

15

 82.

82. D'apres les renseignements que nous avons rC9us
de Paris, l'armee tunisienne a opere, dans la nuit du
31 mai au 1er juin, des mOl.lvements dans la region de
Remada. Des unites tunisiclUlCS progresscnt en direction
de Bordj-Ie-Bceuf et de Remada. Leur but serait, d'une
part de mantel' des embuscadcs sur les routes menant
de Remada a Bordj-le-Bccuf et a El Hachem, d'autrc
part de reoccuper 1e5 po~itions qu'elles tenaient le
24 mai au soir autour du poste et du terrain d'aviation.
Le general Gambiez, commandant sllperieur des forr-t~s
frall~aises en Tunisie, crainL, Jans ccs conditions, qu'une
nouveHe attaque ne soit declenchee contre nos forces
U Remada et, peut-~tre, en d'autres points.

According to jTJform8tion received from Paris. on

the night 31 Mayjl June the Tunisian Army carried
out movements in thE'_ area of Remada. Tunisian units
are advancing lowards Borj-le-Bceuf and Remada.

Their object would appear to be, on the ooc hand, to
lRy ambushes along the roads from RemacJa to Bordjle-Bamf and to £1 Hachem. and on the other, ton:occupy
the positions they held on the evening of 24 May
surrounding tIle base and the airfield. In the circllrnsLances, General Gambiez, GerH~ral Officer commanding
the FreJJch forces in Tunisia, fears that a new attack
may be launched against our forces at Remada and

possibly at other points.
83.

--

83, Le wmmandement frall(;ais a tloun6 instructioJl
aux unites fnw«aises de s'efforcer de refusl:r le contact.
Mais il est evident que, si l'action tunisienne s'engagG,
les forces frnngaises sex-ant ohligees de ripostt:r, pour
se deIendre, par tous les moycns dont eUes disposent.
On ne pent demander a des troupes de se laisser isolcr,
entotlrer, desarmer et anr.iltiler. TJUS ceux d'entrl~
vous qui connaissent I'annee Oil qui oul appartenu a
l'armce savent que c'est le premier devoir d'une troupt:,
un devoir sacre auquel elle ne pe ut renoncer, quand
elle est nLtaquee. 11 appartient done aux autoritL'-S
tunisicnnes de retablir le statu quo anterieur et d'eviLcr
le mouvement de ses forces vel'S le sud.

The French Command has instructed French

units to do their utmost to avoid any contact. However,
if the Tunisian begin an engagement, the French
units will obviously be compelled to tn.ke l"_ounter_
action in .~d[-dcfencc with nil the men.ns at their
disposaL Troops cannot he asked to allow themselves
to be cut~o['f, encircled, disarmed afld :wnihilated.
All those of you who are acquainted w:.th milita.ry
matters or who have !'lerved in the army are aware
that this is the first duty of a force, U sacred duty which
it cannot repudiate. when attacked. It is therefore
for the Tunisian authorities to re-establish the status
quo ante and lo refrain from Tlloving their forces towards
tlU:l suuLh.
8,1. I now come to the statement of our complaint
and to an initial reply to the arguments pot forward
lly the Tunisian representative. After making this
statement and studying his intervention, I reserve
the right to add to what I have said.

84, J'en viens maintenant a l'expose de notre plainte.
et a une premiere reponse aux arguments utilises par
le representant de la Tunisie. Je me reserve, apre:i
avoir fait mon expose et apres avoir etllc!ie ses decln~
rations, de completer cc qlle jc vais dire.

85. I should flrst lIke Lo draw Lhe attentior. of members
of the Council to certain points in the explanatory
memorandum submitted by the TLlrllsian representative
in support of hi!> complaint ISj40J.'J!.

8S. .re vOlldrais, au debut de mon expose, attirer
I'attention des membres du Conseil ~ur certains points
du memoirc explicatif remis, a l'ap;mi de sa plainte,
par le repre!)Cntant de la Turusic (S{40131,

86. Mr, Slim first recalls the measures taken by the
Tunisian Government in February 1958 to limit the
movement of French troops and to reglll:lte food
supplies for those troops. He asserts that in taking
these measures, his Government was merely exercising
its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations.

8G. M. Slim rappelle, tout d!abord, les mesures p:-ises
par le Gouvernement tunisien, en Jcvrier 1958, pour
limiter les mouverncnts et reglementer le ravitaillement
des troupes fraw;aise.s. IJ atnrme que son gouvernement
ne faisa;t en cela qu'exercer son droit de legitime
dcfense, cOflformem.ent l'Article 51 de la Charte des
Nations Unics.

87.

87. Il Y avait hI. - et certail:s membres dll ConseiJ
ant dti le remarquer B ce momcnt comme nous - une
reference abusivc ll. I'arlicle CJl question, destinec G
justifier toute une serie de dec:sions arbitraires prises
a cc moment, non seulement eontre les troupes fran·
l;aises en Tunisie. mais aussl codre la population civile
Iram;aise et certains consulats de la zone fronti~re.
Juridiqucment meme, une telle attitude est insoutc·
nable. L'articJe 51, en eITet, n'autorise l'exercice du
droit de legitime defense que (( uallS le l,;a:s oil un Membr(:
des Nations Unies est l'ohjet j'une agression annee,
jusqu'i\ ce que le Conseil de secIlrite ait pris des mesures
nece.ssaires pour rnairotenir la pnix '. Cl'. texte pr&voit
done une evcntuaUte, ceUe de l'agression armee, qui
n'existait PflS au roomen: oil la Tunisie a invoque
]'article 51, dont les termes ant, ju:;qu'it present, ete
illterpretes d'une [a~on trios stricte. On pourrait, de
plus, faire rcmarquer que le Conseil n'avait pas encore
ete saisi du probleme lorsque les mesures en question
ant eta prisos.

Certn.in members of the Council must have
::IS we did ourselves, Utat this
was an unwarranted use of that Article, interrded to
justify a series of arbitrary dedsions tal{en at that
time with regard not only to French troops in Tunisia,
but also to the French civilian pupulation and certain
consulates in the frontier area. Such an argument is
in fact legally untenable. Article 51 a~thorizes the
exercise of the right of sp.lf-Jefence only" if an armed
attack OCWTS against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has takefl measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security." The
text, therefore, provides for an eventlHJlity, namely
armed attack, that had not occurred at the time W:len
Tunisia invoked Article 51, the terms of which have
hitherto bC!en vel)' strictly int~rpreted, It might be
pointed out, furthermore, that the problem had not
yet been referred to the Council when the measure"
in question were taken.
observed at the time,

a

16

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88. I shall show later how the Sehara Group of
South Tunisia was excluded from the application of
these measures. In the circumstances we are justified
in contending that the regrettuble incidents about which
the Tunisian representative has lodged a complaint
were solely due to the infringement of the modus vivmdi
governing the activities of this grOllp. If the Tunisian
case had been well-founded, then in the present instance
it would be France which could have invoked Article 51
and complained of armed attack, namely, tlle sudden
find llllwarranted violation by the Tunisian authorities
of the mod!l.~ vivendi to which I have just referred.
FrancE' did not wish to take this course of actiOn and
c()n~idered tit" t the problem" involved could be settled
only hy negotiation and co-operation between France
find Tunisia. However, wc are not preparcd to remain
silent and thercby giVf'. the imprcssion tllat wc approve
the case put forward by the representative of Tunisia.

88. J'indiqllerai plus loin comment le Groupe saharien du sud tunisien avait eU d'ailleurs exclu du champ
d'application desdites mesures. Daus ces conditions,
nollS pouvons, it bon droit, pnltendre que, seule 1'3tteinte ponee au modus vivendi qui regissait l'activite
de cette unite a etlS la cause des incidents regrettablcs
dont se plaint le representant tunisien. Si la these
tunisienne etait fondee, c'est, dans l'afTaire que nous
examinons actuellement, la France qui aurnit pu invoquer l'Article 51 et l'agrcssion que cOllstitue, en fait,
la violation subile et sans raison, par les 311tOrites
tunisiennes, du modus vivendi auquel je viens de faire
allusion. La France n'a pas voulu s'engager dans cette
voie, estimant au surplus que la solution d~s problemes
poses ne pOLlvait rcsulter que d'une negociation et
d'une cooperation entrc la France et la Tunisie, Muis
nous ne sommes pas disposes pour cela a paraitre
approuvC! par notre silence l'argumentation du representant tunisien.

gg. Mr. Slim also states tilnt, at the instance of the
Secretary-General of the United N;\tions, the Tunisian
Government uccorded very liberal facilities to ensure
food supplies for the immobilized troops. He fails to
add, however, that in recent days, at least at certain
points, it hus been possible to provision our posts
by air only -- a fact Wllich has given rise to several
incidents.

89. M, Slim declare, en outre, qu'a la suite de l'intcrventil1n du Sc,crctairc general des Nations Vnies, les
plus larges facilites ont ete consenties par le Gouvernement tunisien pour assurer le ravitaillement des
troupes immobilisees. Il n'ajoute cependant pas que,
en certains points tout au mains, au cours de ces derlliers jours, le ravitaillement en vivres de nos posttS
n'a pu etre ass lIre que par la voie des airs, fait qui a
ete cause de pll1sieurs incidents.

90. [n speaking of the French troops, I feel I should
point out that nil impartial observers of the situaLion,
including the persons entrusted witll the good oIHces
mission, have paid tribute to the patience, discipline
and spirit of self-denial of these troops and that tbe
compromise agreement to which Mr. Slim has
referred recognizes that no action can be taken which
(lnes not respect the dignity of these troops.

90. Je crois devoir rappeler, au moment OU je parie
des troupes fran~aises, que tous les observnteurs impartiaux de la situation, notamment les personnalitcs qni
ont ete chargees des bans offices, ont rendu hommagc
a la patience, a l'esprit de discipline et a l'abneglltion
de ces troupes, et que, dans le compromis m~me auquel
a fait allusion M. Slim. il est reconnu qu'aucune mesnre
ne pourrait etre prise qui ne rcspecte la dignit~ de ces
troupes.

91. Finally, it would appear from the explanatory
memorandum submitted by Mr, Slim that the comproll\is~ agreement of 15 March 1958 "laying down,
infer alia, the procedure for the evacuation of the
French troops from Tunisia" is now a dead letter
because of the failure of the French GOvernment to
ratify it.

91. Il semble, enfin, ressortir du memoire expHcatif
presente par M. Slim qu'un compromis du 15 mars
1958. !( etablissant llotamment lcs modalites de l'evacuatioll des troupes franC;aises de Tunisie". est actuellement lettre morte du fait de sa non-rahfication par
le Gouvernement franc;ais.

92. I must make it clear that we cannot accept this
point of view, which is at variance with the very definition of good offices and also with the facts. The
basic purpose of this. procedure is not to fllld a direct
solution o[ the dispute in which it is being employed:
that is precisely what distinguishes it from mediation
or arbitration, in which a settlement is either proposed
to, or imposed upon, the parties to the dispute. The
function of those who nccept a good offices mission is
no less important. hut its SCope is more restricted:
it Consists in finding an area of agreement as a basis
for th<.: resumption of direct negotiations between the
coulltries concerned. That appears to me to be the
manner in which the United States and the United
Kingdom have always interpreted the good o1TIces
procedure; I trust that their representatives in the
Security Council will correct me if I am mistaken.

92. Je tiens a bien declarer que nous ne saurions
accepter ce point de vue, qui est eontraire tant a la
definition me-me des bOilS otnces qu'a la realite des
faits, Le but essentiel de la procedure qui nons occupe
n'est pas, en cITet, d'obtenir directemcnt une solution
du differend apropos duquel elle s'exerce ; c'est la
justement ce qui la disullgue de la mediation all de
l'arbitrage, dans lesquels un rl:glcment est. soit propose, soit impose, aux parties en cause. Le rOle de cellX
ql.!l acceptent une mission de bans offices est non mains
important, mais il a un champ cl'application plus
restreint : il consiste <\. trouver un terrain d'entente
permettant la reprise de negociations directes entre les
pays interesses, Telle me parait ~tre l'interpretation
qu'ont toujours donnee les Etats-Unis d'Amcrique et
le Royaume-Uni de la procedure des bons offices;
leurs representants au Conseil de sccurite voudront
bien me corriger si je me trompe.

17

i

 93. For my part, 1 feel that Mr. Robert Murphy
and Mr. Harold Beeley have performed their task
excellently and I am grateful for this opportunity of
stnting publicly that my Government has greatly
appreciated the results which they have achieved.
What has happened in the last few day~'t It llas been
possible to resume direct negotiations between Paris
and Tllni~; they tHe still under way despite the tension
created in southern Tunisia by the untimely and dan~
gcrous actions of the Tunisian authorities. Thus, far
from having to enter a finding of failure, the Council
is today in a position to take note of the salutary
results of the mission undertaken by Mr. Murphy and
Mr. Beeley and to express the hope that the parties
cOilccmed will refmin from any act which might once
more disrupt the conversations which have been so
opportunely resumed.

93. J'estime, pour ma part, que MM. Robert Murphy
et Hal'old Beeley ont parfaitemeni rempli leur tache,
et mUll gouvernement --- jc suts hellrellx de I'<wasion
qui m'est donnee de le dire publiqucment - a apprecie
pleinement le result£lt qu'ils ont obtenu. Que s'cst-H
passe, en efIet, all cours de ces derlli~r~ jOlll'S? J.,e,q
negociations directes ont pu reprendre entre Paris
et Tunis; eUes se poursuivent encore actueIlement,
en dcpH dc la tension cr~~e duns lE sud tunisien p:u
les initintivcs intempe.<;,tivcs et dangereuses de~ auto~
rites tunisiennes. Loin done d'uvoir a dresser un proces~
verbal de enTence, le Comeil e.st aujollrd'hlli en mCSllre
de constater l'heureux efl:et de la mission de MM.
Murphy et Beeley et d'exprimer le vreu que les parties
s'ubstiennent de tout acte sllsceptible de venir troubler
a nOl1veallle deroulement du dialogue si opportunement
repris.

94, I consid~ it necessary at this point, before placing
in theit· true perspective the Tunisian representative's
<l.:;sertions regarding the r~cent incidents whieh h::\vp.
unfortuna tely once again pitted Frenchmen against
Tunisians, to retrace briefly the events which lie at
the rool of the present situalion.

94. Il m'appuralt maintenant indispensable, avunt
de r~tablir sous leur vrai jour les assertions du repre~
sentant de la Tunisic quant allX recents incidents qui
ant malhcllrellsement, llne fois de pLus, oppose Fr::mt;ais
et Tunisiens, de retracer brievement I'historique des
faits Cjui sont a l'origine de la presente situation.

95. Under the conventions between Franeeand Tunisia,
signed ~t Parts on .3 June 1955, France recognized lhe
internal aulollOmy of Tunisia, retaining special prero·
gatives only in regard to defence and toreigtl atrairs.
Certain responsibilities relatina to public order were
also temporarily entrusted to France. These couventiol,s,
which - and I stress the fact - were freely negotiated
<md freely concluded, afforded France the certaintyor so at least it believed - that its interests would not
be threatened from Tunisian territory; at the sa.me
time,. they allayed Tunis!.'ln anxieties, as shown by
speeches made at that time by the present head of the
Tunisian Government,

95. Par les conventions entre la France et la Tunisie,
signces it Paris le 3 juin 1955, la France reconnaissait
l'antonomie interne Ul:l la Tunisic en ne con servant dCl
prerogatives particuliercs qu'en matiere de defense
et d'affaires exterieures. Certaines responsabilites COIlcemant !'onJrl:l public lui eroicnt temporairement
reconnlles. ecs textes, librement negocies, librement
conclus - je le souligne - assuraient a la France la
certitutJe ~ uu mains le croyait-olle ~ qu'aueune
menace ne s'exercerait eOntre ses int~rets
partir du
territoire tunisien, et repondaicnt err meme temps
aux preocl,;upations tunisicnnes, COIDlUe en font foi les
rliSCOU1'5 prononces :i. l'epoque par l'actuel chef du
Gouvernement tunisien.

9B. On 8 find 10 October 1955, the conventions of
3 June 1955 were described by Mr. Bourguiba - oud
J quote his own words - as "a triumph of reason"
and, on the occasion of their ratiHcation by France,
he went so far as to say: " I am profoundly convinced
that France will Ilt,ver regret having placed so high
a tmst in the Tunisian people."

96. Le:> 8 et 10 octabre 1955, les textes des conventions
du 3 juin 1955 etaicllt qualifies par M. Bourguiba jc cile lies pl'opres C'xpressions - de «triomphe de la
raison )), et, a l'occasion de lellr ratification par la
Frflnce, il declarnit meroe : (( Je suis pro£ondement
convnincll que II'! France ne regrettera jamais d'avoir
place une telle confiance dans les Tunisii'IH.»

~7.

It wus jn the same spiril: t.hat Franee, in another
act of good will, met the new demands of the Tl1nisi.m
authorities by recognizing the independence of Tunisia
on 20 March 1956 [Protoeol of Agreement between
France and TunisLaJ. The othilr party, in turn, formally
undertook to negotiate agreements with France est!lb~
lishing interdependfmce in the neld of defence. This
commitment in principle was not embodied in any
specific legal provisions, because the Tunisian l'tJJnistcrs
had expresser! the wish that their country's tuil sovereignty should first he recognized. France met this
wLsh.

97. C'cst dans le me.me esprit que la France, le 20
nlars 19S1:i, par un autre actc de banne volonte, rcpoudaH encore unc fois aux nouvelles delhandes des autorites de la Regence en reconnaissant J'independance
de la Tllnisie [Protocole d'accord entre la France et la
Tunisie]. Nos interlocuteurs p.renaient, en contrepartie,
l'engagemcnt formel de oegocicr avec la France des
accords d'interdependance en matl1'1re de deftJllse.
Si cct engagement de principe u'etait pas assorti de
clauses jnridiques detailIees, c'etait en raison du souhait
exprime pnr Jes rninistres tunisicns de voir ta sou verainete totalc de leur pays reconnue au prealable. La
Prance a repondu
ce souhait.

98. Since June 1956, in conformity with the Protocol
of 20 March, :France has helped to build up a Tunisio.n
Army by providing material and equipment and by
~raining its officer corps.

98. Des le mois de j uin 1956, et conformement au
protocole du 20 mars, la France apportait son concoun
a la constitution de I'armee tunisieull(J par l'apport de
ma.tcriel et d'equipemeat et par !'instruction des
cadres.

IS

.I

I

a

I

r

(
I

,r

,r
,

a

,

 s
99,

The Tunisian Government, on the other hand,

which were expressly provided for in the Protocol
of 20 March 1956. A partiul agreement was nevertheless
wncluded on 5 October 1956, under which responsibility
lor the .mpervision of Tunisian territory was transferred to the TUllisinu authorities but did not extend
"to the control of coastrrl waters and air space, or to
that of radio trall~mittcrs and clandestine uroadcasts ".
A prOCCHJCrual annex.ed to this agrccmelll contained
an undertaking by the Government of Tunisia to examine "with parLicnlar care requests submitted to it
by the French Amollssador with respect to supervision
of thl~ territory ami frontiers, particularly as regards
the {'l)l\ trol of French citizens and tllc illicit arm~ trafHc".
We know ,vhaL has come of this.

99. Le Gouvernemcnt tunisien, en revanche, s'est
desobe it la discussion de. l'ensembl~ des accords en
matiere de defense, que le protocole elu 20 mars 1956
avait pourtant expressement prevus. Un accord
partiel fut neanmoins conclu le 5 octobre 1956, nux
termes duquel les competences concernant la surveillance du territoire tunisien etaieat transferees nux
autorites tUl1isi<'.nnes, m::lis ne s'etendaient pas ~ au
contrille des caux cDticrcs et de I'espace aerien, non
plus qu'i:\ cdui des pORtes emetteurs radio-electriqucs
et des emissions clandestines 11. Un proces~verhal joint
a cet accord comportait l'engagement du Gouvernement
tuuisicn d'examiner ,( avec un soin particulier les
demandes que i'ambassadeur de France lui pr6s~nterait
en matiere de surveillance du territoire et des frontieres, notamrncnt en ce qui concerne le contrOle des
Franpis et le trafic Illicite des armes". Nous saVODS
ce qu'il en est advenu.

100. Not ouly is Tunisia failing to futtil the commitments tllus entered into, but it has USl\(] arms supplied
to it by Francc to take action against the French Army,
to pn;Lect the establishment of H re.bel organization
on its territory, and to facilit[lte, either directly or by
obviolls collusion, thc arms lraHic and the passage
ot' armcd groups ucro~s its frontiers. These facts are well
known; I call make further details [Ivnilable to the
members of the Council, but I (1.0 not wish to impose
ullon their pntiencc, I1'1orcover, the question was before
Lhe United Nations General Assembly at its twelfth
session.

100. Non seukment la Tunisic ne respecte pas les
engagements ains~ souscrits, mais eIle s'est servi~ des
annes cedees par la Francc pour s'opposer li. l'aTmec
fralll;aise, pour proteger sur son t!'ITitoire l'implan tation
d'unc orgallJ:'!ation rchelle et favoriser, soit dircctement,
soit par unc collusion evidente, le trafic des anncs et
le passage de groupes nrm~_s a travers ses frontii-.res.
ees faits sont bien connus, et j'cn t.i~ns au surplns les
details a la disposition des membrcs du Conscil, mais
je ne veux pas abuscr de Icur patience. L'Assemblee
gencrale de l'Organisation des Naticns Unies en a cu
d'ililleurs connflissance a sa douzieme session.

101.

France is justified in contending that the Tunisian
Government bas taken advantage of all the facilities
uecorded to it by France in order to give open and
constantly increasing encouragcment to s~ppor~ers of
U rebellion 011 Frcnch ten-itory and that, 1Il domg so,
Tunisia has committed a defmite breach of faith. The
Tunisian Government has also failed to fulfil its obli~ations under the United Nations Charter, which
requires it to live in peace and as a good neighbour
with the other Mcmbers of the United Natium. Its
attitud(' is directly contrnry to the spirit of decisions
taken by the Geneml Al\sembly, which, in its resolution
288A (IV) conccrnillg the situation in Greece, called
upon" Albania, Bulgaria and the other Statcl\ concerned
to cease forthwilh rcndering any ul\sistance or support
to Lhe guerillns in fighting Hgainst Greece, includ~ng
the USl~ of their territories as tl. base for the preparahon
or launching of arml'd actions ". Are we not facing a
similnr situation?

101. La France est ell droit de pretendrl: que le Gouvernement tunisien a cxploite toutes les facilites qu 'elk
lui avait donnees pOUf apporter. d'une mal1ien~ san,;
ccsse croissante, un applli otlvert :'lUX lJartisanil d'une
rebellion sur un territoire lram;ais, et que, ce faisant,
la Tunisie s'est livr~e a un veritable abus de confiance.
Le Gouvernemcnt tunisien a egalement failli aux obligations de la Cbarte des Nations Unies. qui lui commande de "ivre en paix, dans un esprit de bon voisinage,
avec les autres Etats Membrcs des Nations Unies.
Son attitude est directemer.t contrnire a I'esprit des
decisions de l'Assemblee generule, qui, dans sa resolution 288 A (IV) notamment, a propos de la situation
en Grece, a invite Il1'Albanie, la Bulgarie et It's nutres
Etats intcresse~ a cesser immcdialemenl d'apporter
toute aide ou tout appui aux partisans dans leur lutte
contre ICl Grece, et notamme-nt de leur accorder I'usage
de leur tcrritoirc COlnme base pour la preparation Oll le.
dl:klem;hem~nt d'une action armee ll. Ne nOLlS trouvonsnous pas exactement dans nn cas analogue ':

102. Tltese preliminary obs('.rvaliom secm to me to
be necessary for an undcrst<:lnding of the two aspeets
of the matter which the Council is today considering
at the requcst of the Tunisian delegation~ onr. concerns
thlO remaining French military foret1~ in Tuni~b; the
uther relates to the inciuents at Remada.

102. Ces obs<'.rvations prcliminaires me parai!;sent
necc.ssaires pour la cOlllprej}'wsion des deux aspects
de l'afiaire dont le Conseil est aujourd'Jlui saisi par la
delegation tunisienne : l'un conc.erne ce qui subsiste
de la pn~sc.ncc militairc. rranr;:aise erL Tunisic, I'autre
Cl trait aux incidents de Rcmada.

103. It- will Lake me abouL another half-hour to complete my statemenL. 1 SliOUld lil!c to know, Mr. President,
whether you wish me to proceed or to interrupt my
statement at this point and reSUIlle after lunch.

103. J'en aurais encore a pell pres pour une dell'iheure. Je voulais vou.s demander, monsieur le President,
si vous de."irez que je termine, ou que j'interrompe ici
mon expose pour le reprenJrc apres le dejeuner.

104. Tile PHESmENT~ It seems to me that since
tile representative of l'rance requires [lIloLher half~
hour to complete his speech, and since the interpre~

104. Le PRESiDENT (fraduil de l'anglais) : Etant
(ju'il faut encore ltne demi~ru::llre an representant
de la Frnllce pour terminer SOIl expose et que l'inter-

lJtl~ avoided discussion of any of the defence agreements

donn~

19

 bttion will also take up a considerable time, it might
be as well if we adjourned now and met again at 3 p.m.

Unless I hear any objection I shall assume that the
Council agre~s to my suggf'!stillIL
It was

80

pretation prendra egalement assez longtemps, nOllS
pourrions lever maintenant la seance et nOllS re.lInir
de nouveau a 15 heures, En I'ahsence d'objection, je
considcrerai que le Conscil aceepte ma suggestion.

Il en est ainsi decide.

decided.

La seance

TIle meeting rose at 12.60 p.m,

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