DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES I t55 DEFENSE FENTAGON WASHINGTON. Dc zoact-l Jefli'e Kn Subject: OSD MDR Case I4-M-3329-AI Dear Mr. Kaye: We have reviewed tlle infomu-ltion under appeal in the above referenced case in consultation with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and Joint Staff (IS) CIA dam-mined their previously protected portions required continued protection and denied the documents in full. OSD. DIA, and JS have declassified the documents in part OSD excised infon-nation is still properly classified under Executive Order 13526, section and DIA excised information is still properly classified under lake) and .IS excised information is still properly classified under section 1,403) and and is also protected under the Freedom of Information Act (F 01A), 5 552(b)(5). CIA excised information is still properly classified under section 0 Section 1,4(a) protects information that could be expected to reveal military plans, weapons systems, or operations. 0 Section 1,4(c) protects information that could be expected to reveal intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or . Section 1.4(g) protects intonation that could be expected to reveal vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, plans. or protection services relating to the national security. I FOIA, 5 USE. 552(b)(5) protects inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or Ietlels which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency. The Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel stands as the appellate authority. A written appeal must be filed within 60 days explaining the rationale for reversal of the decisions Reference should be made to OSD MDR Case Lettels of appeal should be sent to the following address: Executive Secretary, ISCAP Information Security Oversight Office The National Archives Building 700 Ave, NW. Room 500 Washington, DC 20408 If you have any questions please contact Mr. John D. Smith by email at Sincerely, George R. Sturgis Deputy Chief, WHS, Records, Privacy and Declassi?cation Division, ESD Enclosures: 1. Appeal request 2. Documents 1 and 2 WI 05D 1.4 (1 FINAL serum .. CJCB Estonia! Review of Guantsnam aperitif ay Intelligence 0 I): M011 17 JUN 2002 Acting Commander, US Southern Command requested CJCS provide SOUTHCOM assistance with an external review of ongoing Guantanamo Under guidance provided by matter O?ioeofthe andtheUS om a team of ect Secretary of Defense, the Joint Ste??, FortHuachucaAZ, was tasked to perform the external review. The external review team received the following mission statement: following speci?c evaluation tasks: - The relationship between the Don and Interagenoy elements involved in the interrogation process - The existing mechanism that binds Del) itation eRorts and Intersgeney a euro We) Investigation Taskl'oree - Taskings in support of detainee legal defense issues - Determine ifinterrogationlenploitetion e?'orts would he better served by having personnel assigned in a PCS status. The team conducted its external review during the period 14 August through 04 September 2002 with visits and interviews of all involved agencies. The team traveled to SOUTHCOM Headquarters, Miami, assetan luvs NI memo 91M 06 9W :3 DIA Equities Release. We Defer the Release of the remainder ofthe DIA Reviewed and Deten'nined Some Slpeci?c are Exempt from Pu i Florida, and US Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from 21-28 August, 200 . M14 Of?ce of the Secretary of Defense Chief, RDD, ESD. WIIS Date: Authority: E0 13526 Declassify: Deny in Full: Decnassify in Part: 1 Reason: 0 MDR: - - mAl summwus Mn Chlal. Records Date: M501 Meal 050 1.4 (a mm} 5? II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS: If the United States is to truly cond ct a Global War on Terrorism we musfa?dopt a long-term view of that operations at GTMO must viewed as ?Amenca?s Battle Lab? in the Global War On Terrorism (GW is". j: nation faces an en new threat ?amework and if we plan to win this struggle we must invest both human capi infrastructure in this 4 ?Battle Lab.? The detainees at GTMO hav goal and intention is the destruction of the United States and we ignore such a resource at our own peril. )(Sr Task Force 170 has seen umerous succe and should be congratulated for their WMHO guide current and future operations in the glo war on terrorism, orchestrate interagency decision-making and analysis and disrupting planned and ongoing terrorist activities. Positive teamwork among the dedicated working-level interrogators, special agents, linguists and other personnel assigned has succeeded in meeting the nation?s requirements. each operations, and reinforcement from parallel commands all have contributed to success. These experiences, as well as the enabling tactics, techniques, and procedures must be Captured in existing lessons learned systems and reinforced with the subsequent assignment of TF-170 personnel to trainini, doctrine, or During its evaluations, the Extemal Review Team discovered a si can umber of problems with Joint Task Forc- Guantanamo. Those problems and recommended solutions nted upon brie?y in thi Executive Summary and examined in more detail in the Final Report. The lack of any overarching national policy or plan unifying all levels of command from OSD through SOUTHCOM to the Joint Task Forces is of paramount concern. There is no orchestrated ubliciafi?airs or media energy; ?ne master facilities plan, and most po tly no long term perspecu of any kind. Other problems include a bifurcated command structure with multiple, parallel, non?supportive chains of command. The Criminal investigation Division (CID) Command?s pursuit of prosecutcrial criminal evidence is juxtaposed against the JTF-170 2 DEGLASSIFIED IN PART 033mb. (33 Chief. Records 8: Denise: Div. WPS Date: A1163 2015 :3 40pm] entire mission is woefully undermanned and until a new Joint Manning Document is approved, shortages will continue to negatively impact the mission. The current facilities at Guantanamo, to include detention, housing and?are totally inadequate for a mission of such national importance. Mos interrogators and arrive with little or no backgron or experience in terrorism, Islam, counter- terrorism databases, collaborative tools, or techniques for working with requirement for a course translators and there is an immediate addressing such shortfalls. the lack of any US Government Public Policy or Pu Strategr has damaged the operation. A constant stream of visitors, unfettered media access, and almost total lack of 1?11anan have??.93.st MM An immemate plan nesting SOUTHCO an - must be constructed and approved. CINCSOUTH, although responsible for the JTF operation, doesn?t own the Guantanamo installation or facilities, while multiple non-DOD agencies operate on di??ering agendas and goals with ormal ements of any kind. Detention facilities are inadequate cred mission success and the lack of long-term perspective is evident. external evaluation team spent a great 0f ort examining six speci?c mission tasks )included in the SOUTHCOM request. 1. The relationship between the Don and Interagency elements involved in the interrogation process. Dis 3 Mic)- MED 13526 DECLASSIFIED IN PART cu? 95*) osd?ia mug) . Fla-Vi exllent cooperation Iv. WHS RECOMMENDATION: Formalize the e??orts of all players and no-DoD) th Such an men on war ng in the ?eld now, may no survive the long-term nature of this mission absent the stability a IATF command and control arrangement. 2015 aver. Records a Dodson Date: 2. The existing mechanism that binds DOD and Interagency exploitation e?orts. formal coordination agreement currently exists between DOD and non-DOD agencies. Coordination isl e1 informal, tentative and primarily the result of individual diam success is largely attributable to all invo ve parties aving a "r focus, namely national security and the discovery 0 Several facts serve to ?bind? all participating agencies. 0 The detainees belon to DOD, therefore coordination with Formalize the efforts of non-DOD la DEWED EN PART $01.44 0. Wm Such agreement and organization would codify responsibilities for a greater unity of effort. 481? 4. The relationship between the GTMO and the Criminal Investigation Task Force. Where is currently no formal relationship between JTF-160, JTF- 170 and the Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF). The Joint Task Forces are subordinate to SOUTHCOM and report through Commander US Southern Command to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Sta??, to the Secretary of Defense. The CITF is subordinate to the US Army?s Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and reports directly to the Secretary of the Army who reports to the Secretary of Defense. The CITF and JTF are not complementary W, 5 191(0) OSD 1.4 (CL Damage?ng seeker-serous we a a 2m and no authoritative statement prioritizing or unifying the two missions has been issued by the Secretary of Defense. 181/ The Joint Task Forces and Criminal Investigation Task Force lack a controlling authority and integrating commander. Each exists under independent non~intersecting chains of command and their organizational structures are similarly unhelpful. JET-170 is located entirely at GTMO (interrogators, sta?? and leadership) while the CITF has only its interrogators located at GTMO. All CITF databases, and leadership reside at Ft Belvoir and interrogators at GTMO must refer all decisions to Ft. Belvoir. The result is di?'iculty in reconciling divergent views and an inabili to coordinate decisions between respective Task Force leadership. result is virtually no interface between the two Task Forces above the lowest individual interrogator level. ,?/The CITF is gathering evidence for Military Commissions. However, at present any such commission lacks an overall stated strategy within DOD with DOJ. This has had a negative imiact on the overall 0 The delay in the transfer] release assessments by law enforcement is directly related to law enforcement?s inability to adequately assess the prosecutorial value of individuals. OSD 1.4 (C), Develop and promulgate a DOD prosecutorial strategy, which speaks speci?cally to coordination with DOJ. An overall strategy regarding which cases will be removed to US Federal court would allow all prosecutors, both at DOD and DOJ, to focus on the cases they will handle in the forum for which they are responsible. Designate a lead prosecutor to implement the overall strategy, to facilitate prioritization of existing criminal cases, and to direct the transfer assessment determinin which cases have no prosecutorial value. amounts us an at WIEDINPART prosecutors could enable ea Walker-Linth- 0 De?ne the Military Commission concept of operations. Closely integrate a prosecutorial team with operations at GTMO. 18)? 5. Takings in support of detainee legal defense issues. Emivilian litigation requests impact JTF- 170. Short-fused, unvetted taskings in support of DOJ federal litigation are onerous and time consuming and create a signi?cant drain on JTF-170 manliower. 0 During May 2002 and the months prior, JTF-17O received numerous short-fused requests for litigation support from DOJ to DOD. The requssts were for such items as af?davits, witness interviews, and documents related to particular cases. These were important in supporting ongoing federal litigation efforts. 0 In May 2002, JTF-170 received approximately a dozen such requests. One request alone required sending ?ve hundred and eighty nine electronic memorandums for record through the chain of command. One request alone required passing up through the chain of command appraidmately ?ve hundred and eighty nine electronic memorandums for record. These short-fused requests require an enormous amount of time and coordination within JTF- 170 before a response can be provided. 0 In recent months, the requests for litigation support appear to have reduced in number commensurate with litigation. With the 7 1? newsman IN PART . 3518 OSD 1 4 (c mom Date: AUG 3 2015 prosecutorial efforts in their infancy, the need for litigation support Will only expand. Only legitimate requests for support should be forwarded to JTF-170. Finally, the proper responding entity must be identi?ed and it is not always JTF-170. RECOMMATION: Use established military chain of command and communications for processing litigation support requests as a means of ensuring a through review of the requirements and to ensure the appropriate directorate is tasked with responding. DOD and DOJ or other relevant interagency element should do so via a Memorandum of Agreement 6. Determine if interrogation/exploitation e?orts would be We current Joint Manning Document JMD rovides insuf?cient manpoweijoimccessfullyperfo ?l'he new JMD addresses ese 3 rtfalls and com ma of the two task force missions reduces a signi?cant number of sta?? and support billets. . Mommanom The new JMD specify leadership and key] essential personnel should be assigned for two year accompanied tours. These ?key? pers e1 (2 year PCS accom ?ed tours should include an leadeth JMD should also inclu ?essential? iersonnel (1 year PCS unaccompanied tours) for interrogators and mobilized Reservists, and ?temporary? (179 day TDY urs or Junior support (J1, J4, J6) sts?? personnel. Thi assignment policy in concert with 100% JMD ?ll will optimize continuity of leadership, and consistency in reporting. Current Naval Base infrastructure will support two-year accompanied tours for at least ?fty JTF families. JMD Assigiment policies should be consistent for all Services. m. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS: m. POLICY A. Long Term GWOT Commitment Observation: There is no overarc coherent plan for the 0 blic policy -r command and control tructures, media gagement, ties an manning have been haphazard. The ?immediate? startup of Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) operations, short term funding focus, and use of ?as is? facilities have proven detrimental to the long term GWOT mission. 8 ED Ill PART 0 13526 DEGLASSIFI 041W 050 1.4- 0~ SEW Authority: 3% provide us with insig a the destruction of the United States and if we ignore such a valuable .3 resource, we do so at our own peril. Subsequent observations address 3 a the building of coherent nested ans for the iinprovement of facilities. as public diplomacy, policy, llec?on, training, organizational a frameworks and personn sense. a tar B. Inadequate Detention Facilities '5 3 3 (8r Observation: SOUTI-ICOM, JTF-170, JTF-160, CIA, FBI, CITF, and reports from Congress have expressed serious concerns that the current detention facilities at GTMO degrade th by failing to provide adequate security variation, incentives to encourage detainee cooperation, and suf?cient capacity. 48) Discussion: ee management, Onl one section of 204 wi qu Rotations to this section rovide obvious bene?ts. hi Facilities ?exibility ens. es the comman or to 9 -. 03". WHS IN PART AMEO 13526 4-- Mel. Records a Deccan ?lata: 05D 1'4 mm 53W 461):an contro 181? Recommendations: Direct SOUTHCOM to create a Master Facilities Plan. Such a plan should include the following requirements: Current military operations necessitate greater capacity overall; a medium security facility might be built for considerably less cost. Building a medium se ca would facilitate more communal living Ausanzms operations oomman er in punishing those detainees who commit misconduct. - An expanded capacity to allow for routine maintenance plan units completed a few months ago are already mated near the toilets 85 sinks. The exterior of all the general population facilities is also degraded. The overcrowding restricts the ability for easy maintenance. MC. Transfer/Releases have not occurred despite an approved process Jab/Observation! GTMO leaders?esire to begin transferring appro riate Immediately. Le unanimously agree tba Leaders at GTMO desire transfer of appropriate persons immediately for several reasons: - Onward movement of some detainees woul OSD 1.4 a m: cream - ~e These are many other examples of how commanders could utilize a transfer rel of some ted - Transfers releases from GTMO could return the cam to i I - Leaders at GTMO also believe that the huge? detainees remain at GTMO, the greater the chance tthey - ecome hardened jihadists, thus increasing the risk posed by these individuals to the United States. us far onl two detainees have been transferred out from GTMO - - The transfer process is designed to provide the decision-makers in Washington with two recommendations - one ?-om 170 via SOUTHCOM and one from CITF via SECARMY. Once these two recommendations arrive a 170 a decision can be m?de, per the GM as provided approximately 20 has rovided three. - There appears to 059 1.4 a MS) sums-Assess? ?scour-menu- cw.RW&DedasoDlv.m 0m AUG 3 0 1016 Jar Recommendations: EXpedite Transfer] Release Processes: This co (1 hasten the simultaneous forwarding (or nearly simultaneous forwarding) of recommendations to OSD from both entities. - Appropriate DOD o?cials should provide the law enforcement and risk assessment guidance needed by CITF to facilitate investigations. - Appropriate DOD oi?cials should determine the appropriate standard of investigation for CITF and provide guidance. Mn. Public Policy Plan bsemtion: Currently no USG Public Policy Strategy eidsts. OSD- PA, OJCS, and We all operate independently with no overarching strategy. Numerous and uncoordinated media visits cou led mm minimum guidance in MN 131? Recommendations: lead e?'ort in coordination wi SOUTHCOM Staff JTF GTMO to construct Public Diplomacy Strategy.? INTELLIGENCE g] A. ANALYSIS AND DATM Mbaemtion: 12 OHM OSD 1.4 (Q 0 WW Cruel. Records ammonia. Date- AUB 3 H?n. m2; .5 3E 5% .320 83. cm .693. gm 2. OWE?ant ~03 05D 1'4 namssmeommat . 13528 mm. nus a 0 ms 191 PSYOPSHO What-1731:1011: environment at GTMO and the circumstances under which the detainees are bein hel "me?'ec?ve in man cases. 497 Recommendations: . CIA [41(0) D??m OSD 1.4 Ma) OSD 1.4 (Q Mg) Nu) . monu? nus a ma 2% 4. 1.. 0 OSD 1.4 (a PART 3526 DadasaDiv.WHs AUG 3 1015 DECLASSIFIED IN AM E0 1 cm Date: ?lnowl Ires?en! an opportunity to orgamzel th- Ma more e?cient manner. The 20 August 2002 JCS can on er provides for a Joint Task Force Guantanamo Commander (two star), a subordinate Joint Detention Operations Group (JDOG), and a Joint Interrogation Group (JIG) each commanded at the 06 level. W.Rma0edaosolv,wus DECLASSIFIED IN PART Data: M50153 0er 1.4 DIAap/nea? Cc) Recommendation: 's e??ective and should be conhnue . wise, accommodating er of interest to another element was information on individual detainees is developed, is logical and should be continued. The future could allow for participation 0 anizations not already at GTMO i.e. Treasury, Customs, ATF, an AUG 3 2015 speaking the extremely high volume of work demands it and each other?s rmation re arts are of value to all in the JTF. orking together is not new. The Director for Central Intelligence?s Counternarcotics (now Crime and Narcotics Center brought such agencies together in 1989 to ?ght the war on drugs. However, whereas the CNC was an interagency coordinating body, JTF- 170 is a defense operating element with a distinct interagency population of varying experience. Therefore JTF-ITO operations require coordinating venuaor methodples: 1913199?th enforcement Operators to provide nu one or operational des or interactions with detainees. Because of the sophistication required in approach and personnel, the numerous legal and procedural issues, cultural familiarization required and skill sets needed by operations personnel across-the-federal board, this venue should be a comes of instruction rovided to operati no] and other key personnel prior to deploymethich is addressed elsewhere in this report. ,[Bf Lastly, although the operations commentary centered on process, as stated elsewhere in this report, not until changesare made to the physical facility will application of proper interrogation techniques be morons- 20 05D 1.4 (C. DEGASSIFIEDINPART $013528 amm- ?mamwmm-WHS Data: . AUG 3 2816 possible. A dormitory atmosphere pervades the general population lockup, which, no matter how austere looking and e?ciently managed, provided a su rt structure to the detainees. This is because USSOUTHCOM JTF-170 did an outstanding job across the board of executing its strategic interrogation mission. Current processes are working but can be improved; Process improvement recommendations related to detainee interrogations are on balance incremental in nature and should be able to be accomplished with minimum disruption. 481' E. INTELLIGENCE CONTINGENCY FUNDS Mansion. Recommendation in use is a former av "ecurity Group building that is to small. for 21 IN PART 0 13526 Authority: 03D Mfg) Recommendation: Work with for an intelligence appropriation 'on erha modeled The facility should support the long-term view of the war on terror an the vision of Guantanamo Bay as a world-class ?battle current and projected intelligence operations. Gk i. lab? .2 9 C0 :e :3 .(Srln the interim, investigate the possibility of designating another large 53 building on Naval Base Guantanamo If a building exists, a small amount of construction money may tically change this 5 situation for the better. IE a Aer-o. COLLECTION MANAGEMENT: Mines tion: Direct taskings from senior headquarters to . hinderehoperations at Guantanamo Bay. . Mecommendation: sou'rn'coM should delegate authority to 170 to accept or reject requirements tasking, Discussion: - Mhe JTF-GTMO Joint Manning Document authorizes seven billets: O?icer in Charge Requirements omcer IN PART Requirements oncommissioned O?icer in Charge Div. WHB Requirements clerk Date: Collections O?icer AUG 3 2315 Collections Noncommissioned Of?cer in Charge Collections Clerk The External Review Team feels that an additional three personnel are required to provide for the dissemination function: Reports O?icer Reports Noncommissioned O?icer in Charge Reports clerk Three personnel ph si at USSOUTHCOM presently work the JTF- 170 account: the and two dissemination perso respon' 'e or proce - reports. The increased connectivity now available at Guantanamo Bay should enable these three people to move fo '1 - Recommendation 3. TRAINING Jerk. New Skill Sets: Nomadic}; 7 I Dismal) 05D 1-4 my,st nus an 2015 ,(Sf Most interrogators have a general understanding of the Intelligence community in concept but have not worked jointly with other agencies pnor to arrival. Strategic debriefers frequently work with other agencies in the course of their normal duties. Most interrogators understand the Intelligence Collection Management System from a tactical interrogator perspective only. Because of their experience and training, most strategic dcbriefers have a greater understanding of the Collection Management System. Recommendation: to provide a common 0 on curriculum for personnel assigned to 25 OSD 1'4 (Q- I it: seemsansomma?r Date: the GTMO operation. training would target all personnel who contact detainees with speci?c training focus on their particular billet or function. This training should be received prior to their deployment in order to minimize the degradation and impact on the operation conducting remedial training. Interrogators and debriefers who have worked at detention center should be sent to as advisers instructors. (See Annex A ?Curriculum?) W3. Lessons Learned: i Observation: ?Lessons Learned? are not being captured at Joint or Service Levels. Recommendations: The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) should visit and publish ?ndings from GTMO operations. The Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS) should become involved (organization, operations, service missions). Service Schools need to harvest current operations for Lessons Learned and TTP [Intel School, School, 081, ONCIS) The Army should set up ?Project Warrior? assignments for GTMO of?cers and NCOs to school-houses [including MP3, lnterrogators, and Counter-intelligence Agents). 4. p1 reasomn MA. Tour Observation: Personnel turbulence caused by the current JTF-170 Joint Manning 3 severe in: acts and a its ability to immediately support 50-60 families inbase?housin . Essential ersonnel interrogators We: an mobilized ass-vista - sho? be treate as mid-term priorities under one-year unaccompanied tours. The balance of personnel [other staff and support personnel) may be assigned on temporary duty tours so long as adequate provisions are 26 DECLASSIFIED IN Authority: ?0 13526 05D 1.4 (-6. )1 [Dc-lag) Chintliscordsamclaos Dlv??is AUG 3 2015 made for on-site overlapping turnover time. All services should follow similar assignment guidance. 48)- Recommendations 18} The new JMD specify JTF-GTMO leadership and key] essential personnel be assigned for two year accompanied tours. These ?key? (2 year PCS accompanied tours) should include JTF leadership, The JMD should also include ?essential? (1 year PCS unaccompanied tours) for interrogators, and mobilized Reservists, and ?temporary? (179 day TDY tours for or support (J1, J4, J6) staff onnel. This assignment policy in concert with 100% JMD ?ll will Current aval Base infrastructure support two-year accomp tours for at least families. Assignment policies on the JMD should be consistent for all Services. (B) B. Forcestructure 15} Observation: Service force structures will continue to encounter continued accordance with the propos . 48) Discussion: Service force structures still re?ect ?Cold War" threat scenarios and are not optimized to prosecute a Global War On Terrorism. All Services can depend on and should build on a continual future expanding requirement to The 1997 Army FORCES COMMAND ecision to inactivate two actical Exploitation Battalions (TEBs) subordinate to I Corps andiil Corps is the critical data point in the Army?s current sourcing dilemma. The military specialties now most required in all theaters for the GWOT (interrogators, linguists and counte?ntelligence agents) re?ect the exact composition of these inactivated units. FORCES COMMAND currently estimates the Army?s entire inventory of these soldiers [both Active Duty and Reserve) will be exhausted in less than thirty months. 43} The Army (32 has identi?ed 102 non-Military Intelligence soldiers assigned within Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) currently receiving seem-Hessian. 27 DECLASSIFIED IN PART Date: AUG 3 2016 Foreign Language Pro?cien Pay (FLPP) a?he?tage speakers?. Seventy-eight of these peakers are in grade of E-5 or below (no key leadership) an of the 102 identi?ed, no unit has more than one assigned. FORSCOM has refused to task any of these linguists for duty at GTMO despite the fact they are receiving language pro?ciency pay and has declared this a ?unit readiness issue?. The ?All-Source? nature of intelligence operations demands interro ators and cleared for Top Secret information. min-170 initially suppo Following a visit to arr-17o Sta??, it was determined tha ?r caramendattb?s?t Direct The Joint Sta?? and the Services to ?ll the pro osed JMD despite requisite shortages in hi demand/low densigh Request the? Secretary of Defense to resolve priorities for assi ent of hii demandilow density occupational special?es? Direct the Services to take decisive and concrete steps to recruit, train, and maintain force strength that will meet or exceed the Joint personnel requirements for the GWOT. - Army personnel) _y leVel clearances were unable Minimalism me--v? -r u- 1N PART OSD 1.4 ms 3 2015 impossible the Of?ce of the Chief of Military Intelligence USA Center to examine the requirement fo v?Frnj-t 181? Observation: Inadequate numbers 0 runs a linguist pool to suppo I linguist pool does a; .su prtallt'th?fe?na detainee populating? ,(Br?l?he War on Terror requires the US Government, the Department of Defense, and the Services to reexamine the requirement for linguists, both in terms of numbers and language capabilities. Machine translation offers a tool to enhance existing language capabilities. -: - 050 1.4 C) rm 1-. r- ?na'aerzr r' - - ..-3 ?rm$557151 PART . .501 MWDN.WHS 2.0-. a 02015 Recommendations: Request the Director of Central evaluation of future government, speci?cally intellig requirements. . 1' I ,(S'HJirect the Defense Language Institute to accommodate the requirements iden??ediinfthe Del-study. Maine: the Services to conduct a 100% survey to language capabilities. Soldiers receiving Foreign Language Pro?ciency Pay (FLPP) should be available for linguist duty worldwide. 46)) Direct the Services to incorporate language capabilities within their respective personnel [training management systems, and make the results available to guide personnel assignments. Encourage Services to use bonus and incentive pay to retain inherent language capabilities and future languagerequirements. Examine the possibility of expanding the use of contract linguists, coalition support, and interagency augmentation to meet mission requirements at Guantanamo Bay. miramine the exploitation enhance meeting an unnt?namo Bay.