x. I 3 913? ?Nb? ?is-i I '1 '4 .Ilv I -- I 1? -.- - Ir'i' .. I ff?? Preparedbyc 55ProfeSSOr of Environmental Toxicology and Principal Researcher"ii-Lift i - Respectlyely - - - - ?23! oak?R'idge Institute f5? Ed?caihNovgmb??r 3.1; I: A. -: 4d?, uh,- . 3; . Inn?5rTghe Eighthumtedstates Army. sur .onsulting, Inc. .1 -- 5w ammuaewsmursr-on . v; 7_ Oak Ridge A?ssociaf?dirU?i?ersities 7- a funny". .30 N0vembe1720] 1 David JfConboy, Brigadier General, USA Deputy Commanding Generals Eighth United States Army Yongsan Army Garrison The Republic of South Korea Dear Conboy, .. . .. Please find attached to this letter the Final Report on: Historical Review of the 1968 Project to Spray Tactical Herbicides: ontthe KOreaii DMZ. The report is in ful?llment of a contract between Oak?Ridge Institute for Science and Education and onsulting, IncJuly 2011, you tasked'ine with supporting the Eighth United States Army?s evaluation of the allegations of improper use and burial of Agent Orange in Korea. After a thorough examination of the historicpl records, documents and reports found in the United States Archives-"in Washington, DC, the only use of Agents Orange and Blue in Korea occurred 15 Mayu? 15 July 1968 on the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The use of these twbt?tactica1 herbicides? was jointly approved by wthe Governments of ?the United States and of. the Republic of South Korea, "and with? coordination of the United Nations Command. The actual application of the tactical herbicides was doneprofessionally and with the upmost care by the First Republic of KgrealAriny (EROKA). 't .1 ., After a thorough review of the. science, the prospect of any signi?cant exposure and subsequent health impact from the spraying of the dilute Agent Orange or its associated dioxin contaminant on the DMZ to the-soldiers of the FROKA or nearby residents seems unlikely in light of the environmental dissipation of the dioxin, it?s extremely limited bioavailability, and the properties of the herbicides and circumstances of application that occurred. 3 I It has been an honor to :be of service to the Eighth United States Army. Sincerely, ?i i, ro essor 0 Environmental Toxicology 1 DISCLAIMER The views and opinions eiipressed in this Report On: HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE?i'ass PROJECT TO SPRAY TACTICAL HERBICIDES ON THE KOREAN DMZ Do not necessarily represent those of The Eighth United States Army, The United States Department of Defense, or any Department A or Agency of the United States Government. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT - The authors acknowledge the contractual arrangements through Oak Ridge Associated University?s Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education, and the ?nancial support of the United States Army Environmental Corhrnian?d.? I BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF THE AUTHORS a! ?l I i ?1 For more than 40 years, Dr. ?has been involved in issues surrounding the use of Agent Orange and other;tact1ca Ier es in Vietnam. "He completed his in Herbicide Physiology and Environmental Toxicology at Kansas State University in 1968. In his 21 years with the USAF (Obtaining the rank of Colonel), he was involved with the testing and evaluation of the equipment used in Operation RANCH HAND, Vietnam, and ,with;the environmental and human health studies with the School of Aerospace Medicine and the Department of Veterans Affairs. He served as a Science Advisor on environmental issues including Agent Orange with the President?s Of?ce of Science and Technology Policy. He was the Director of the Depai'tment- of Energy?s Center forfRisk Excellence. He was a Visiting Professdr at the University of Oklahoma, 2001-2007, and is currently serving as the Senior Consultant-on Agent Orange for the Of?ce of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment). ?He hastnore than 300 publications in the scienti?c literature, including ?ve b'ookshon issues relatedwto Agent Orange and/or dioxins and linens. He is currently the CO-Editor of the international journal Environmental Science and Pollution Research1-. For the past ten years, as been the Principai Researcher for Consulting. He received his B_ac eor of Arts in Political Science from Delfaul ntversity, Chicago (Magna Cum Laude, Phi Kappa Phi, and Pi Sigma Alpha). He received the Master of Arts in International Relations in 2010 through Webster University?s Global Program having studied in Europe and China. He has provided support to the company in areas of public policy, technical issues, archival research, and the coordination of national and international projects. ?aar n? ?ma- HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE 1968 PROJECT TO SPRAY TACTICAL HERBICIDES ON KOREAN DMZ .3 5 if 1 ?Ph.nand?MA ,q 1 i ?be TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary, 1 Pagel Introduction 7 Page 3 The History of the Korean Militaryis Use of Tactical Herbicides Page 4 i. i ThesProposed Use of Herbicides .on r. 2' .. The Korean DMZ Page 5 The Selection of Tactical Herbicides Page 8 The Procurement of the Tactical Herbicides Page 10 Deploymentrofthe Herbicides ?on thejDMZ' 7 Page 1.71 =2 Condiicting the DMZ Shrit?y Operation i i 3 15 ApriF??J'S'July vi if ?b BagThe FROKA HadResponsibility: for the? i i i Spraying on the DMZ i I Page 13Tactical rig-bionic; Used Onlyin?1968 1 Page Findings and Conclusron: ,x The Vegetation?Control Plan 3. Page 55;; 7? A Brief Review?the'Science? ?i t: 4., Page? ?aw Ingriumerous dbmestic and international Kiddie reports throughout May :and Junie?I 2011, allegations were made that 'the military defoliaht A'g?ent'Orange?had been} buried in 1978 at Camp Carroll, a_ US military installation yitpSouthi Korea? Mortimer, some US vet?rans wh'o?had served?in South Kor?a in~the 3196gs.ande 19793 cl?aiineii that Agent?Qrarigeihadbeenroutinely sprayedjn, SoutthreaZ} Accordingly, a critical reyierwas iconiluctedof the historical records the US National Aichives ,or' the United?EStat'es Ail; Fpre??bf?he ar?t?hqnudgejndvacate. Genera1__ 5f the'Eighth US Army, Smith Koijea. In; addition: supporting books a?ii'rep?bijts detailingthe use of th?itactical herbi?ides, including Agent Qrkange and- Ag??ht Blue, in the Warfin Vietnam were eo?iisulted and Jetted. These records and public?ations??coii?rmed that thb?orily use of Agents Orange, and Blue, in Korea occurred in May July 1968p?on ?the Korean Deinilitariz?ed Zone (DMZ). This report is intended to clarify what occurred in 1968, tolexplasin why Agent Orange - could not have?been buried or sprayed'in other: locations in Korea, the: actual program on the DMZ, and to: brie?y review thegsupporting science. I H. I '1 if Early in 19:61 as part'of 1a general review of the DMZ defensesfthe United lil'ationst Command'j'the' United Statesl?Forces Korea, the Kerea'h Minisu?y?of National Defense concurred that dense vegetationwwithih the DMZ contiguous areas; provided cover for 'oi raiding parties. The vegetation in f; these areas Armistice and ?was, anjimportant part of 5the DMZ defeiisive1 problem. 'Inqconiprehensivei reSeai?ch?f?r?Epoits on the: Vietnam War, it was noted that Korean Forces in ?Vietnam (1965?; 1971)" had employedptactical herbicides, such as Agent Orange and Agent blue, for. the control of 'veg?etatioii on basejperim?ters to maintain ablear' ??eld of ?rej?. :The, Korean Forces ?fdund that the use; of such! tactical herbicides to e'dntrol' the perimeter" vegetation was Estraordi?arily effective in? denying, the enemy concealment and in?ltration.? 1 1 i a ?32 Thefde?Eisibnghoivever,?to usetagtical hefbiciiles in Korea oiirthe reciuired' obtaining ?approiral of the Unitledk'Stat??s Government?; the Republic of Southd?Kofea Government, and the United Nations Coimin?and." Numerous messagesf were dispat?hed during'the =period May through September 1967: Throughoiit September 1967, theiUS secretary of'State?conti1iued discussidn of the progtaniiwith.,the Republic of South Korea These discussions previded the acceptance of the program by the ROK Prime Minister, and on 20 September 1967 both governments (ROK and US) granted permission for the use of both of the tactical herbicides to be sprayed in? the area between the DMZ South tape and the latt7 Civilian Control Line, a strip of land that would be roughly 320 meters wide and 240 kilometers long. On 20tJanyary 1968, the Command, Military Armistice Commission, dis?cldSed to North Korean counterparts that the UN Command may use military defoliants to clear underbrush fromw?gelds? of?re inthe - a ain'dfhereby reduce? North Korean a! - i Based upon?c'ables in the National Archives Washington, two tactical herbicides were ?acqmr?d frotnithie i?bntories in__Sbuth Vietharnj' an?aj'shipp?eatd' the Port-of Inchon. The inventory of Xgegit Orange 2and Agent glue, arritaedigi the Port or Inchon on? 2Q March 196830}: 10 April of arid Blue were oft-hand in fforwlard? locationshn?ear the Documents also con??rmedgtliatrall? (if the; herbicides were sprayed by th??gFirist Rep?blic?of Kbre?aArm?y that all of the hei?bicides were expended on i ?the DMZ. do?ii?ient. also con?rmed that the em?ty drums wereothe?propertysofi andjiyere appropriately rinsedfclappeg disposed? 1" 7 a ?a The controyersibs surrounding Ag?nt Orange in ?9uthea?t Asialresulteg in"; signi?bant'lreistfictions for its use in late $68, andigll uses? terminated April 1970. A message from the liaci?? Air Forces dated 13-October 1971 to all military units inhsoutheast Asia, directed that any remaining stocks of Agent Orange {were to be consolidatea and processed for reinOval to j'bhns'toni Island. There {titere host?ockgidenti?ed from South Korea, thus con?rmingthat there were no ibxcess stocks?remainingfafter application on the K?iean DMZ, for their..u_se in :1969, In MS Depai?tnient of Defense Directives dictateddthaat US Army personnel 0hr, th?ir contractors were not authorized to acquire or _spray Agent Oragge aft?lgjs?tmilitary installationsThe?" allegations abgut theiburying or Fontine Spraying of Agent Orange'iwere not based on Military ?directives or the facts found Within "the historical gecords; 1 namely, therierwas?nexier my Agent Orange sent?gtog or buried at Camp Carroll, orh sprayedhelseWherefin So?uth Korea'except at the'DMZ 1968'. a 7 A brief revielwiof the supporting sciencebp ?theh?erbicides that comprisedAgent Orange arfd its lassociated aconclqueg: that the prospect of any signi?cant exposure and subsequent "healthiifnpacrts from Agent Orange} i in the 01- nearby residents seems unlikely in light o? the envirbnmentalIdiSSipatio'n of TQDP, its limited bioagailabiigity, and the properties of the herbicides :circumstan'ces o'f?applicat'ionlthat occurred -. r? i I i 5 INTRODUCTION I For almost ,fou'r?decades, controversy has sur'rqtinded?the tactical usleof herbicides,I speci?cally ?Agent. Orange?, in Southeast Asia by the United States Department of Defense Thei breadth of the controversy has spanned the gamut from alleged military use of ?chemii'cal weapons,?to ecological?damage and public health, impacts, and to social and political concerns.l Most recently there was controversy over the use of Agents Orange and Blue in South Korea and the all?ged subsequent disposal of the-rsurplus inventories of the tactical herbicides on US military? installations in SOuth Korea. In May? 2011, three US veterans told atPhoenix, Arizona television station that the Eighth United States Army (EUSA) had buried the defoliant Agent Orange at Camp: Carroll, Korea in 1978.?iAsia" result of their alleged actions to help bury large amounts of the chemical in a ditch'o'n the} installatiohtthey claimed tohave suffered health problems from their?exposureito Agent Orangeni-Because of their claims,? other US veterans and Korean citizens made new Agent Orange was also buried or spilled at, other USmilitary installations. and that it was sprayed near= villages. adjacent: to the Korean Demilitarized zone and elsewhere in Korea. 3? 4 The time" span for these allegations was from 1963 through 1978, In December 2006, the Department. of Defense documented the history of the Deparnnent?_s_programs for the testing, evaluation, and'storagerof tactical herbicides, including Agent-Orange, other than theirh use ,in, South Vietnam.5 The ,Lonly reported documented use of tactical herbicides: in Korea occurred in May July-1968 as part of a? program to control vegetation. on the Korean Demilitarized Zone and includedsAgents Orange and .1. Young, "Agent Orange: A History of Its-Use, Disposition, ~and~Environmeittal Fate (Prepared for, the Of?ce of the Under Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, June 2008). Availablefrom the Armed Forces Pest Management Board, Literature RetrieVal System (AFPMB?Acces'sion No. 188312. a -4 2,7 A. Rowland and Chang, .SI'IKorea probes allegations of'lmriied chemicals at base . (Stars and Stripes, May 25, 2011). t. . 3. N. long-young, Allegations civilian mobili?ationfor DMZ dump.- (Yonlmp News, May26,2011Kirk, Agent Orange in Institute for Policy Studios, WaShington,"? Dcr?iuiw, 2011). 5. A. L. Young, The History of the,L US Department of Defense Programs for the Testing, Evaluation. and Stafage of Tactical Herbicides (Prepared for the Of?ce of the Under Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, December 2006). AFPMB LRS, Accession No. 182581. @110! Report, Vegetation Control Plan CY 68? (Preparedfor- the Combat Deve opments ommand, Alabama, June 2, 1969). AFPMB LRS, Accession No. 189788. 6. I 3 68?? The purpose of this Report is to: (1) document the history of the Korean military?s use of tactical herbicides in Vietnam and how this provided the justi?cation for their use on the Korean (2) document the political, scienti?c and logistical processes used in selecting, obtaining, and transporting the,tactical herbicides for . uSeion the DMZ in document the. actual application of the ita?ctical herbicides on the Korean (4) drieument?that Agent Orange could. not have been buried or?s'prayed in other locations in Korea; and (5) review the science that- concluded that the use of the tacticalx?herbicidespn the Korean resulted in?; minimal environmental and human impacts. hi THE OF KOREAN i i I a The?ihisto?y of Agent Orange and Korean veterans does not begin With the use of Korean soldiers-to Spray Agent Orange and Agenf?Blue?cn the Koi?ea'n DMZ, but' ratherf'it begins with the-ruse of tactical herbicides as tools to-prevent in?ltration of Korean base per'imeters in SOuth Vietnam during the Vietnam WarnMore' than 312,800 *Ko'rean'c?ombat veteranswere? statiohe?d in South Viemam??s?ll Corps the?- 3 seven years from their arrival in 1965 to their departure in 1971"?; The?motto' of the men Who sewed from Korea 'in Sbuth?Vietnamrwas Years for Peace and Construction? and the accomplishments of the Korean-lforces in'Vietnarn were great sen?se'of pride'to the'AKorean people. 7 It Waszof great political signi?cance -'for the- Koreaiit?government-to be able to send- its army? as an "independent force. The majorKorean Forces eonSisted-of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Capital =DiVisioh, ROK?9tll Division, ?and the 2nd~MarineiBrigad?sfiFrom their first depIOyment in Corps (from Qui NhOn t0? Phan Rang) until their departure, a major concern was securing the base perimeters so as to_maiptain__a clear fieldpof ?re. Of the many,- m?thods used to do that task by the Allied forces (including thehKorean forces) was the-use of the t'aC?tical herbicides _to control the perimeter vegetation, ,9 According to a comprehensiVe research report on the Vietnam War, Kprean Unitsdn Vietnam received tactical herbicides such as Agent Orange, Agent White and: Agent Blue from the US Chemical- Corps, but the Koreanamilitarys did ?notfpermit the US Chemical Corps to conduct the spray operations. That "was- the duty? and responsibility of the Korean forces within their tactical area of responsibility, and they, employed their own?ground and helicopter equipment to do.the"applications.- S. R. Larson and J. L. Collins, 11:, The Republic bf'Korea, Chapter V15 IN: Vietnam Studi?s: Allied ?Participatir'm in Vietnam (Department of the Army, Washington DC, 1975) 131. 8. Larson and Collins, TheRepubllic of Kor?a,134? I 7 9. Fox, Defense in the?Republz'c of Vietnam, of AierOI'Ce History, washington, DC 197934-75); i a 4 49?00 . rbicides 11 Most Korean,military units below the division level used tactical he extensively because of, their effectiveness :inmcontrolling perimeter vegetation. Thus, it was notsurprising that the KoreanMinistry of National Defense jointly .- supp?rted With thegEUS?A a .subsequent, recommendation forisusing tactical herbicides on the Korean DMZ in 1968. .1. I at THE ?Papyositin USE oi? ON THE KOREAN it. i? at In the period of i966 through :1969, United States and :South Korean trOOps fought . a series of skirmishes against North Koreansoldiersin an undeclared .yyar DMZ. Sarantakes has" described in detail threwoujet wet", He noted that the frequency' of attacks South Korean and A'mericanhtroops increased in. relationship to the densitytof'the vegetation. Thus, by 196.8 'Ar?my Engineers ?rom', the First Republic" of Korea Army (FROKA) implemented. the use ,of heavy diesel plows and defoliants to remove much of the shrubbery along the demarcation making, it harder for, enemy troops to -hide__'and {conduct ambushes; l2'This.was.not the ?rst time that herbicides "were used to defoliate?? vegetation on the DMZ. However, 1968 wasgthet ?rst-time that ?tactical herbicides,? were used to defoliate vegetation ongthe DMZ. Tactical .herbicides i were herbicides speci?cally developed and tested to.be used intrcornbat military operations, the.us_e in Vietnam. 13 These tactical Therbicidestincludedt Agents .t Orange, White and Blue and were not registered forcommercial use, or- for routine, useLon.militaJyJinstallations. The only US military units authorized to Spray tactical. herbicides were?the US Army Chemical Corpseand the US Air-Force Units that comprised,OperationRANCH HAND. .. a t. 5? In-November 1963, EUSA recognized the? success ?of defoliation bperatiohE?in Vietnam conducted by personnel of Operation RANCH HAND: The Commanding General of requested technical assistance from RANCH HAND in determining feasibility' of conducting" defoliation operations along 5? ?If effective the operation should improve capability; of UN Forces to detect and apprehend in?ltratons, provide prominer delineation oft/1e. soul/rem boundary 10. K. Kyong-hyun, C. Song-ry?ong, and E. Din-ho, Vietnam War 22nd Ag?nt Orange, Vol?l, English Translation (Medical Bureau'o?fithe Korean *Armed' Forces, Ministry?of National Defense, KoreaPark, Scienti?c Evaluation erhe Results of the Thin}! Epidemiological Study on 5401:21an (The Korean Society for Preventive Medicine commissioned by the Minister of Patriots Veterans Affairs, December 2006). 12. N. E. Sarantakes, The Quiet War: Combat Operations Along the Korean Dernilitarized Zone, 1966 - 969 (The Journal of Military History 64:439?458. April 2000). 5 MW of the DMZ to insure against accidental ovei?ight by friendly aircraft, and, (0) reduce amount of troop labor required to maintain cleared area immediately south ofeDMZ.? The Commahder of RANCH HAND "visited?EUSA on 161November 1963?=and provided recommendations to EUSA, but the decision to use tahciicali h'ei?bici'des was denied due to the possibility ?of accusations ?of armistice violations, and atresultihg'po't?ntia] propaganda the Cblniniinist world, 15 i i Although the use of tactical herbicides was denied, the Chemical corps of the Sixth Repub'lih of eKorearArmy- did apply a small aniount of herbicide (2,4-dichlor0phen0xy acetic late 1963 in selectedmareas such is observ?ation posts and guard posts?to clear ?elds ?of ?re. In 1965, the 2nd US Infantry Divisionjrequested that he use of herbicides inv?sti?gatedtfor continuing-vegetation"within the anti?in?ltratiOn barrier on the?DMZ. Was noted that corrim'ercial herbicides and appiication equipment were already on hind and capable o?u?s'e. The request was staffed and again denied due to: possible adverse,? N'c?jrth Korean readtions1966, of the EUSA stated: ?Good ?elds of fire?and ?eigic?iof observation tare esSen'tial to DMZ Operations. Various v' methods inZ'lu-dingr; chemicals, mebhanical deitices, and hand labor may be used to clear these fields.? Each method is re?ective, but Conditions and locations will dictate which should be employed ?Plant maybe killed at the roots thiough the application of chemical estse conducted by?? the US 3d Brigade, 2d infamy- division favorfuse 07a herbicide called TEL VAR MONURON which can b?eapplied by useiof the Poitier?Driven Decdn?tamin?ation Mpparatas. Other? herbicides were 5 considered either'ineffectiveor creative of uhdesirable butside the area?of i- Tests are plannedfor spraying the wire with wasteh?oil or?diesel oil "as are preservative. Results remain to be seen'd?binal Re?ort, Vegetation -'Control 'l?rograni. 68, 1129. 14: ?ir Technical Assistance, E: - 5 Directorate of Operations, to AC and Obtained from the?HiStbricai Records bf the {Eighth United States Army, Series 338, Washington NatiOnai - Reclordsr?Center. 3 a I i? . inal Report, Vegetation Control Program CY '68, 15! *16. - *in?iil Re?ort, Vegetation Control CY 68:1.? 17. inal Report, Vegetation Control Program CY 68, 1., he ?18. fEUSAZ?StudyH/iniilysis of DMZ and Contiguous Operations: The Rice Report". (Historical Records of the Eighth US Army, 1966. Extracted by the US Army Joint. ServicesRecords Research Center for the Department of yeterans Affairstitted I I . Des?ite~tlie?cbimne?t o?n herbicides? the 2,421) was recommended with ?the commercial herbicide (Monuron) for limited vegetation control on the DMZ in? 1967. on 20 September 1967, the EUSA issued implementing instructions to the first Republic of Korea Army (FROKA) and the 1 US Corps to make test applications of 'Monuron and 2,45- on' ?at terrain (2?d US Intfantry DiVisibnfand in' th? mountains (213?: ROK Infantry Division). It was decided that Idespite the lateness" of the season 1967), it was necessary to train personnel and to "evaluate! spray equipment for any ?iture operation, and to test any reaction from the? Nortti Korean governmentEarly in1967, as part of a general review of the Demilitarized Zone defenses, the? United Nations Com?ran?d (UNC), the? United States Forces Korea (USFK), and the Korean Ministry of National Defense found that dehse vegetation within'the DMZ and contig?dous areas continued to'prd'vid'e cover in?ltration, by- raidir?ig'parties. The vegetation in indSt areas had gro'wn unencumbefed since?the? Armistice and was at important'pait of the? defensive problem. In Match 1967, representatives "of?the Plant -Sciences Eabdratory, US Army" Bitilog?ical Laboratories, Fort Detrick, Maryland visited Korea*_ and inspected typical vegetation growth in selected areas contiguous to the DMZ. Based upon-this evaluation, the Plant "Sciences Labor?atorywecomm?nded the use of tab?tical herbicides: "Speci?cally- Herbicides Orange 'and Blue, and the available Monu'ron?- (UROXJ 22) to control gen?e?i'a'l' and speci?c the DMZ. 9? This i'ecommen?datibn was jointly-supp?orted by?the US Department of Defense and the Kbrean'M'iniStiy of NationalDef?nseTherdecision; however, 'to use tactidal'he'i?bicides' ret?luifed obtaining approval of the United States Government, the Republic of South and the United Nations Command. Nuinei?ous:me?SSages were dispatched during the period May through" September 1967. Throughout September E1967, the US Secretarj'z?bf State continu?d?discussionof the program with the Republic of Korea. Government.-.These discussions provided the acceptance of the program by the ROK Prime Minister, and on 20 September 1967 both governmentS'(ROK and US719?.) HQ EUSA _Ltr,.Special Analysis of the DMZ and Contiguous Operations (Historical Records of the Eighth US Army, 1967.. xtracted by the US Army Joint Services Records Research Center for the Depamnentof Veterans Affairs). . .1 20. Young, The History of the Department-of DefensePrograms for the YbstingrEvaluation, cind Storage of Tactical Herbicides. 51. I 21. inal Report, Vegetation Control Plan. CY 68, 2. 7 e303 gave permission for the use of the tactical herbicides to be sprayed in the area between the DMZSouth tapes,rand.the Civilian Control Aidjacent to theiSouthein Limit Line?, his would total .a strip :of.,1and that would be roughly 320 meters wide and 240 kilometerslong20:,lanuary 1968, RADM John Smith, Senior Member of the United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission, disclosedain answer to North Korean- charges bitchemical warfare, ,that the Command may use defoliants tq-clear underbrush from fields of tire, in the? and therebygeduce Communist infiltrationTHE SELECTION OF TACTICAL HERBICIDES .- . Why select tactical herbicides for defoliating the Korean? DMZ "in 1968*;when. commercial herbicides were available in 71967? The commercial and other ?phenoxy?,herbicides were widelynsed in KorearDatar from the, Korean Yearbook of Agricultureand Forestry Statisticsncon?rmed thatin 1967,.moregthan 18?] metric-tons of phenoxy herbicides, including had been used ianorean i agriculturehand fogestry-programs. 24 However, there were four major reasons for selecting Agentprange and Agent Blue; ., . I kextBoth, the Korean, Forces and, the, United States, Forces had extensive .eXperience withlusi?ng tactical herbicides for vegetation control around bas?e 71? perimeters in south? Vietnam, and the mixture of and 2,4,5- i tifichlorophenoxy aceticacid Agent Orange, was especially effective against a wide variety of herbaceous weeds and shrubs. Agent Blue ,(cacodylic acid) was veryieffe'ctive for controlling grasses, elephant grass, that also characterized the vegetation 'growing adjacent- to base perimeters; 25 is 22. Tlib?i?Area Adjacent to southern Limit Line??was det?rinined pursuant to the provisions 'oi: Article 2-.of the Korean Ministry of Patriots& Veterans. Affairs Regulations Regarding the; Scope of 41120 Adjacent to Southern Limit Line Where Dafoliants Were Used. The area refersto ?5 the area lOO?meters away from the north or south of the SouthemLimit Line, (2) the area adjacent to? observation command poSts and other important military installations?built 5! near the Area ?Adjacent to the?Southern Limit Line, and (3) the area 30-meters away from the? right orrxleft side-of thetactical road near iron railings (or fences) ?installednearthe Southern .9. Limit Line.~ are - 23. J. V. Smith, RADM, Senior Member UN CMACN con?rmed that the United Nations Command w?a?s aware'that the FROKA was preparing to 'use defoliants'on the DMZ Army is; Chronology, published by the-Staff?Historian Of?ce, 9630]), 24. Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics, rends'qf Herbicides by Group in? Korea (Published?by the .?Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries,?Seoul, Korea). 8? 6904 :aw I?m r: (a my{The two tactical herbicides were readilyavailable in SouthVVietnam in 31968., Ilh?FYf?l?968, 30, September .1968), the;United,States Air?: Force Legistie golnmand'__ delivered more than 178,000,, drums, (each 208 litErsf?pf?tactical? herbicide ,to fSouthg'Vietnamf-dTactical herbicides were; availablei?at, the .Arrny! of the.Republic of Vietnam, ARVN, .(SoL?ithj' 'Vietnam) Ordnance Storage Depot, Saigong?and Storage, Depot, Da Nang; 25 Therengwas an? extensivelysdocumented ascienti?c history. .availabl?eron. the safetyoflusing cacodylic?acid. As earlyfas. 1953, the two?l phenoxy herbicides were Considered(Essentially, harmless" with only "air, moderate toxicity toemammals. In report apublished by} Midwest Research Institute, Kansas City, Kansas, on the safety and ecological, censequencesmf the repeated use'~of? tactical heibicides in? direct to?xic'it?y, Hazard td'peOple?an?d animalson the ground is nearly nonexistent; (2) food produced from land treated with ?these herbicides will.not.~be poisonou?s'or sig?hi?cantly??lt?red in nutritional: - ?quality; (3) toxic residueszo?these herbicides will nOt accumulateinthe fish?ri? randt?meat to-rthetpoi?t where man, will bepois'oned by primary. ecological:change, is the destruction _of vegetatio?an'ti? the resulting ecological suCCessionin the'replacement of this vegetatio?; 26 and; is Perhaps equally lateT?1967 the of herbicide were: no, longer available to be?purchased in the United Sfat'?s. By?FYil968, the demand ?for and use "of Agent! Orange ou?t?stripped. u, the ability of the US Department of Defense to pii'rcheise it.? As consequence, the US Government directedrthatall chemical icompahieSi?thata manufactured herbicide must prbviderethat herbicide fo?r?t'the prodtmtibn of Agent "Orange. H?'nEe, if was going to?be used f0? vegetatiOn?contfol Onith? DMZ in 1268, it wdiild'hav? to be forinulated with 2,4-Das? Agent'Of?angeisA.?Cra1g, Use muSoutheaiit Asza, (Directorate of San AntomoiEnergy Management, San AntOnio Logistics Center, Kelly AFB, TX, USA, 1975). AFPMB Les, 3 Accession 2403188338House, L. H. Goodson, H. and Dockfor, Assehsment quc'bIogica! ?E?ecfs quxtensive?or Repeated Use of Herbicides, (Midwest Research institute, Kansas City, MO, USA, I967). AFPMB LRS, Accession No. 41243. 27. Joint Message, Total National Production of Butyl Esters Qf 2, 4, 5-T Restricted for the SEA Damnation Program, (Commander of the Defense Supply Center, Richmond, VA to Army Logistical and SuPport Commands, 16 December 1967). AFPMB LRS, Accession No. 40654. a .53: 9 (0705? rm THE PROCUREMENT OF THE TACTICAL HERBICIDES Based Tuition "the approxiai? of {the Secretaries of State and Defense?kkin the United Goi?r?inent of Korea; the followi?g rriessage dated? 1 7 Feb 68 was sent ??hm the Chief of Staff of the United" States Army to-rt?he Air Fpi'ce? Legistics Co?rpmand- (S?trr Antonio Air *Materiial Area, ?to? the Corriniander, US Military Assisiancecor?mand, Vietnam moraine-15' Logistics Command ?t Ta?h SoniNhu't, Vietnam? ?is? it? 5'9 :ZRequest folio'iving herbicides besreleased- to-tthe UStArrit from Stoclis: FSC 6840192639094 Herbicide Bind, 610 EA 55 gal-dFumi?} FSG 6840-926- 9095 Herbicide Orange, 350 EA 3?55 gal drtims.- Army will if arrange transportation to and arrival in Korea no? later than 120 March 1968it: On+12l Merchial968, the following message was sent from COMUSMACV to the Commander of theUnite?d States Eighth Seoul? Koregist? i. ?Direct; transfer .of following; herbicides to? the US Ame from E'Saigon RVN Subsequent Moii?imen't totKoi?ea with a ?*Delivetj: Date. of 204March 1968: 61 0.Drums of Herbicide Blue, 350 Drums of Herbicide Orange. Herbicide specified above loaded aboard Joblin Vietmgg Saigon 0n 9 March 1968: SS Jlein Victory, Voyages-Number Expected Time of Depairture, Saigon I 4rM91j?Ch? with. Expected Time Korea 720 March 196851-22 a. The message to COMUSMACY oil 10 K. gt ?a s" ?Informationtrequ?steti is a follows: SSrJioplin at13'0Q hours: 20'March'196 3028. The authorization process required that a message COMUSMACV, i RVN. This was a?complished on 1'7 Feb 68'. COMUSMACV notified"Comniander?EUSA, Wt transierzand provided a fund citation. These messages were in the United States National i,?ArchivesatiQOHegeleark, Marylend and?twereipartofi-the records from?the United,States 'Air Force Judge Advocate. t. .1 A i 9. This Inessage was also in the National Archives at College Park, Maryland,-and was part of the records from the United: States Air Force Judge Advocate: is 2* 30; Tliisi-ipessagewgs also part of the the United States Air Force Judge) AdvocateKorea of the transfer of the requiredjnventoiyt and theAir ForceChie?f of Staff ?nali?zedtthe P.- HH-ll ll? The record is incompIEte asto the movement of the tactical herbicides frorh Inchon Harb?ors oil-20 March 1968 until their arrival at the FROKA units 0ri the DMZ on 10iAp?ril?il-968ixm' Htiw?ver', raviet?namjAgem Orange thereof-loaded, directly frorn the cargo?vessels at the Port of Sdigofi or the l?ort of Da Nahg into semiltrailei's. ?Each, trailer held 48 drums ?and they were placed ?upright; transported to the HAND bases. This generally required appropriate coordination of vehicles, authoiization for transport, the laborarrangements for the handling of the dmms;"ahd for a required tirne period qf'one to two'weeks., 3:2 DEPLOYMENT OF THE HERBICIDES ON THE DMZ ?3 I i. conferences, a comprehensive vegetation control program Was 10 March 1968, the Commander, Forces in Korea and the Commander, First Republic of Korea Army were authorized to deploy tactical herbicides as part of the vegetation control program inlthe Korean 33 To preclude?th?e possibility of unfavorable propaganda and to ensure ?that defoliants would beproperly einployed with a_ margin of safety, the following constraints were_placed,upon the vegetationacontrol prograrq; Defoliants were; not to be. deployed'blorth of the Southern boundary of the During application, care was to beltaken tokensinethat therewas nor spray drift into areas North of the Southern boundary of the (0)7Defoliants would not be applied during precipitation or when rain was eXpected within 12 hours after application; Eritrerne caution Was to be?ex?ercised to avoid dar?age tov"food crops; Defoli??tsiiro?uld not be dispensed from aircraft of any kind; and a_ Korean Military Assistance Group (KMAG)'Representativi? 52 (a Chemical CorpsUf?cer assigned torthis Subordinate element of the Eighth?US Army'fwould'be physically present 'Wh'?'never defo?liants 'were deployed. By 20?March 19'685'the ?rst herbicide equipment ?ar?riye'd inf country from the 'S?tates. Ofi?31 March?, ir?plementation of the Vegetation Control Program CY 68 was ordered to begin-on or about 1968. As previously noted, on 111 April 1968 of Agent Orange and Agent Bluewere oil-hand if] fonvar?d locations riear 3?4 However, .the actual numbers, of dru_ms shipped from Saigon and arriving on the drums of Agent Orange and 625 drums'of Agent Blue.? 7 31. grind! Report; Vegetation Con?'olilei CY 68, 3. 32. Young, Agent Orange: A History of Its Use. Disposition, and Environmentbl Fate, Chapter 3, Pi ure 3.11 and accompanying text. 33. - Final Report. Vegetation Control Plan CY 68, 4. 34. Final Report, Vegetation Control Plan CY 68, 8-10. It should be noted that the allegation by US Korean Veterans that the two tactical herbicides were ?rst sent to Camp Carroll is not supported by the messages, the required coordination time, or the on-site observations at the Korean DMZ. No records were found in the archival searches that provided an explanation for shipping invoice and the receiving receipt had differentnurnbers of drums. However, this difference in the number of drums, of Agent Orange and AgentBlue as reported by Bucknerrmayhbe resolved! by examining the?number of drums sent to 5 the Port of Saigon from the Port of Mobile oni 5 January 1968 (it took approximately 50 days for the herbicide tolbe' transported to the_?l?ortv of Saigon)? Piocurement Records obtained from, one of the Chemical Companies that produced tactical herbicides indicated thaf?vpallets containing 380. drums of Agent Orange were shipped ?to Saigon from the Port of on the 5 January-1968 date, 35 it was also pbssibler that the numbers Were based on the number bf drums per transport pallet. Another alternative: is that the} Military: Assistance Command, Vietnam wanted to ensure that suf?cient herbicide was available recognizing that the handling of the drums could result in damaged? and" leaking drums, although "the projected loss of damage was less than ?sfconpucrmo THE OPERATION, -155JULY 1968 Soldiers l??oni the were responsible for the task of applying the herbicides, an?difor managing the entire prejeetf Monuron was spread by? hand or mechanical broadcast beginning on 15 April "1968 and ending 28:April"1968. ApprOximately 7,800 drums (180,400 kg) of palletized?herbicilde weie applied (in 630 hectares-or at rate of 285 kg/hat 37 ?l -- - i Applications of theitaetilcal herbicides Agent Orange and Agent Blue:began onalS May 19518 upon the emergence of foliage, and terminated on,15 July 1968,7The Orange herbicide was mixed with diesel oil at a'ratioof 11 liters "of Orange to 190: liters of diesel. EUSA furnished.7,000 drums of diesel-oil for the mixing with the Orange=herbicide. Sihee many application areas selected for spraying with_,0range were relatively inaccessible fpr.-use of the modi?ed, MSAZ Decontamination t- Trailer; 22,.liquid defoliant spray sets were employed. These unitswereinsec?ticide Sprayers?ommonly used in Engineer ?Entomological Services an?d?consisted-Lof a portable lightweight hypro-type pump with-a standard gasoline engine. - 35. Procurement "and shipping information was provided to the Multi-District Litigation RE: Agent Orange 'Piioduct Liability Litigation, case MDL 381, Records are 'archiv?ed?at the? Washington Na?tiOnal Records Center, Suitland, MD, USA. I 36. Young, A Histon Use, Disposition, and Environmental Fate, Chapter 3, Figure 3210, and L-aecornpanying text. .i 37.-. Final Report, Vegetation Control Plan . TheRepublic of Korea. Army also had available ten M7106. E,?lvl?itey Mite?_dispensers7 that were Fused to supplement liquid spray capabilities. The was a? commercial, backpack sprayer that consisted 'of a_ compact two-cycle gasoline engine th?atldispersed the herbicide through a .l,8.m hoseg-The tank contained liters of liquids The modi?ed Decontamination Trailers were?used?for spraying 50th Orange and Blue. The unit consisted of a_76_0:1iter capacity tank and a725 HP GED, pump mounted on a .1 1/2?l0n trailer. A Lsingle hose reel allowed-the- operator to move approximately 15 the trailer;and direct-a liquid spray: through the Adjustable Beam?type spray gun at a rate of 75 lit?rs per minute. Approximately": 380 drums of "Orange f72',040' liteis)? were 1to be applied on approximately 2,820 hectares" was to Be'app?lied as alliquid spray mixe?d with-water 21136 at a fatio of approximately 1 1 liters? of herbicide to 119p liters of water. Approximately 625 drumsof Blue (130,000 liters) were toibe? applied on? approximately 4,660 hectares: All app?liCations weie done by ground-based spray .- . . . . - - a a" systems. The use of masks and handling precautions were mandatory. 1 . b' 2. 1 3..- .: - The-?15m noted" that 3,345- FROKA soldiers were involved inthe' actual Spray. operations. No USi.militafy personnel were-"used *tospray'rther tactical a herbicides, or" were involved innany ?of the spray?operations; .mix?ing- o?th? rbicides .and?diluents. Only one US military person (a Chemical Corps 'Of?cer, 3 t! onitor'edand reported 'on the activitiesof FOrces. And, as noted, the, only year that the tactical herbicides were'sprayed was 1968. 39 THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 0N DMZ In 1967 (and subsequently in 1969) members of the EUSA did participate in herbicide -on the" Koreani DMZ. In both. 1967 and: 1969 commercial herbicides were procured'for the Operation. Under the Department of Defense?s Armed ForcesPest Control Board now?the Pest Management Board; the selection and acquiSition of pesticides (including herbicides) for use by military ihstallations had to be approved by. the AFPCB and be under ?th? (direction of -the Installation Civil Engineer and the Command Entomologist. 40 In addition, any pesticide used must have regulatory approval of . A 38.j??i?al Reportfl?cgctation Control Plan CY 68:348. Both? Agents Orange?aird Blue A. were sprayed; on the vegetation?a-Iintil satilrated. This ensured cOmplete coverage of the vegetation. - 39. Find] Riapurl, Vege'laliun?Cuntrof Plan 68, 20. T. Korea?! Vets Agent Orange, WFW Magazine, January 2004) incorrectly noted that Age?nt Orange? was used from April 1968 through July 1969. This incorrect information was used in the determination by the US Department of Veterans Affairs in decisions on presumptive compensation. ?It Q. 13 3* both the. US (USDA at the time, now EPA) and the host country regulatory program. 41 The confirmation _of this requirement is noted in a Report of a Staff Visit- ~to bsan? Air? Base, Korea in? December 1967* by a Civil Engineering Repres?ntiitixie (the Command Agropdmist) from the Headquarters of the Paci?c Air Force. The'Agronomist notedithat the lush vegetation growing in and around the periinet?i fence at Osan provided excellent c0ver?f6r the! entrance and hiding of in?ltrators. He recommended that 2,2-Dichlorpropioni? and (Simaz?ine) ?be appliedga ?2 Both herbicides-thaddUSDA Registration and were approved by th?e? AFPCB and by the Korean Ministry of Forestry and-FisheriesBytDepartrnentzof Defense Directive, the .acquisition and spraying of Tactical Herbicides could done by the US Army Chemical Corps and the Air Force RANCH HAND ?program: Tactical herbicides did not come under?regulatoly . re?viewyinor should they be purchased by the Base Civil Engineer. ?3 Indeed, the* 1970' list of a?ppi'ioved pesticides By the'Artned .lforces Pest control. Board noted that Agents Orange: White and Blue were available ONLY for tactical purposes and NOT for base type pest control. 44 Thus, in 11968 Agent Orange and Agent Blue could not be sprayed by?members ofthe EUSA. The FROKA forces werenot under the safne ?Directive and thusthe spraying of tacticaLherbicide?s on theDMZ was. a Korean Military Project, by agreement of the Korean ?and United States Governments. From-the beginning, the ROK assumed full responsibility for the-a i entire?on?_jsit_e Operation of organizing and spraying the defoliants. Although LTC was an? observer forgthe Operation, he stated?nn his report?that: "?Thie FRO A ?iliaye shown that they have the technical competence and capa?bilig) to conduct HefOIz'atl'on'operations on a massive scale40. Young, The Historyof the US of Defense Programs for the Testing. Evaluation: and Storageiof rd?a?az Herbicides. 7-]4Jhis Report described the distinction between tactical Hi "'andicommercially apprOved herbicides used by the US Department of Defense: 4 '41. EditorFS?binis?sion, USDA Moves to Tighten Pesticide Labeling Regulations, (Agricultural! Chemicalsipctoberd 963,Vpp;38, The revision of the regulations also required the use 7} of appropriate [oreign language Version of the label, in addition torthe English version. a . 42. Command Agronoinist, Repor?t of Stem" Visit to Japan?and Korea, (Approved by the A. Director of Operations Engineering, Heaidquartersl?aci?c AiiFor?e, 3' 3. 8Janualy 1968) a 43?. Young;Agent Orang?efA?His?toTj) oflts Use, Disposition, and Environmental Fate, Chapter 2. It noted that, the AFPCB required all agencies to use "pesticides that had ?Federal ,Speci?cations?i in connpliancethh HERA. 'l?acticaiiherbicides were'required to meet .?Military Speci?catio and ,were exempt from. regulatcry approval or oversight process. esticrides and Pest Control Equipment. AFPMB LRS,~AccessiOn 57009. inql Report,? Vegetation Control Plan 68,risile 5" in F, a .- til." 3 i a Eaxo USED ONLY IN 1968 a ll . a if (In. 5 ., I In the latter?part, of ?conti?over'Sy began to surround the use'of Agent Orange in Vietnam. ,The ass?ssmenteof the Report in*-1967 did not dampen the concerns of scientists. In July 1968, the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the National Academy of Sciences issued?statementsnoting that mahyquestions abb'Lit the ecological effects of tactical herbicides in Vietnam remained unanswered and recommended an international ?eld study under the of the*Unite?d. Nations be undertaken ,to analyze the long-range effects of the herbicides on Vietnam?s ecology. These-controversies surrounding Agent Orange in? Southeast Asia- resulted in;a significant restriction for its use inlate 1968, andall uses terminated in April 1979. --6 The controversy-also had the immediate effectin Korea (if in?uencing the decision that tactical,herbicide_s would not be used in 1969: Indeed,*re,cords confirmedthat tactical herbicides were-only used in: 1968?,and that alternatives would beselected for use in 1969_Message from USAEIGHI to, (Commander in Chief, Paci?c Air Forces), da_ted20 September 196? included the statement: i a a i ?Request this Headquarters be advised of the possibility of soil applied herbieides, excess in RVN, be furnished this Command at no,cost to plan, continilation?of Vegetation Control Program to begin 15, April 1269.? 47 In a subsequent message from COMUSMACV Soil sterilant TELVAR (MONURON), .6840?514-0644aon hand andexcess in .RVN ~i's approximately?2,000 Fiber) Drums, 160 pounds each, which is sufficient quantity to treat approximately 1,600 aeres. This .amountlean be provided on non-reimbursable basis. Recommend shipping instructions be provided directly to CG, MAF, Da Nang, 48 P46. G. Reggiani, Histo?cal ovendew thhe?contmvemy surrounding Agent Orange, (Chapter 3 in A. L. Young and G. Reggiani, Agent-Orange and'h?s Associated Dioxin: Assessment Qfa Conn-oversy, 1988). On' 15 April 1970, the US Departments of Health, Education, and Welfare, 3 Interior; Agriculture and Defense announced the immediate suspension of the major: usEs oi" At the direction of the Department of Defense, RANCH HAND flew its last'mission involving Agent Orange on 16 April 1970. 1* 4'l..Joint Message, Subject: Vegetation Control. Th?e?i?nessage also noted that Ersomiel from Fort Detrick were evaluating soil appliedherbicides. and [he Lateral and Vertical Movement of Four Herbicides Applied to l"a Grassland Soi Technical Memorandum 212, Department of the Army, Fort Detrick, October 1970. 15 ?Lu. An additional con?rmation was a MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD prepared in October 1968 by the Of?ce of the Senior Chemical Adviser, US Army Advisory Group, Korea. The Memorandum described small ?eld tests'conduCted' atathei' DMZ in August and September 1968 that had been recommended by the Plant Sciences Laboratory, Fort Detrick, Maryland, to test and evaluate different? Monur?on formulations and the soil-applied commercial? herbicide Bromacil, Thus in 1969, the plan was to Mon'uron and momenta- FINDINGSAND CONCLUSION: .THE CONTROL PLAN ?an?d the initial planning had proposed to treat 8:1101'ha, but in reality the FROKA personnel'wereonly able to treat 7,330 h?a,indicating that all of theOrange, Blue and Monuron 'that had been obtained were depleted. Thus, there was apparently no surplus Orange or Blue tobe sent to Camp Carroll? Mere? importantly, all of?the Blue and Agent Orange drums became the property of the FROKA, and were? rinsed with 'water or diesel fuel, respectively, and-capped. 5" No records were-found on the ultiinate disposition of the empty'herbicide drums by FROKA. The 7,600 ?ber drums that had contained the Monuron were burned "i onsite after they were emptied. The disposal of the 7,000 drums that had contained dieselarfuel. also-presumably became the responsibility of since there were no records in the Archives that any empty?diuinsvrivere sent to-the'l-Eighth Army Material Centeradditional con?rmation that no surplus Agent Orangewas?present?in Korea came for Joint Messages and documents of Oper?ition the Operation responsible for the removal of the remaining stocksof Agent Orange in Vietnam. One of the messagesi?rom-PACAF, dated 13 October 197l?t'o all'units in Southeast Asia. pertained to the consolidation and processing of all AgentDrange stocks for removal from Vietnam or elsewhere to Johnston islands: There were nonslocks i" 48. J'oint'Message, Subject Herbicidestonuron was routinely iused-in Vietnam as a soil stierilant ?iforruse around military" facilities and fence lines. It was approved by AFPCB for use Army/"Chemical Corps, Summary of1938Vegetation Control Tests, (US 1 Anny Advisry Group, Korea, and Of?ce of the Senior Chemical Adviser, October 1968). 50.? vino] Report, Vegetation Control Plan CY 68, This Detachment provided e,Standard for, Vegetation control and Drum Disposal and was written in both Korean and English;- a 51. Young, Agent Orange: A History of Its Use. Disposition, and Environmental Fate.?Chapter 4 documents Operation IVY, the removal of Agent Orange ?'Om Vietnam-There were a series of Joint Messages and Memoranda noted inxthe Chapter. 2 i 585? a I 16 one} nusidenti?ed from Korea, thus supporting the conclusion that there were no excess stocks remaining in storage after application on the Korean DMZ. This cohtintied tg?reon?rm that the only Agent Orange stocks in Korea were thosedelivered to the of Inchon on 20 March 1968 . . i .- Because of and 4150.7, the Department of Defense gave the Armed Foices Pest Control Board/Armed Forces Pest Management Board the authority to set pestmanagement policy ?applicablefor all Department of Defense pest management; activities in, any, unit, at any, time,- ,_in any place, even when: conducted by operations. The signi?cance of these Directives ,iS?that. any herbicides usedtafter, 1961 ?on the Department of aDefehseis smote than 600 installations had to be approved by the Board, and had to nieet USDAl?s'r?egulatodry requirements, and'all ,the requirements of 52 AS previously noted the exception theirdevelopment either; ?tactical herbicides? sprayed in combat- military operationsin Vietnam, or as noted by US and Korean Governments approval as usediadjacent to the Demilltarized Zone in 1968.: This ?=requiremen_t also meant" that Agent Orange or anyttacticali?t herbicide could not be sprayed in Korea by basepersonneh or their contractorsat Military installations or disposed of ,in a routine manner. In addition, the, AEPCB and the Department of Army, including EUSA, had strict guidelines "on the" handling and disposal of pesticides and pesticide containers, especially ?on large quantities; oi" hazardous-materials,f3: 54 It was-noted in.the August 19724 report at that time, the US Army?s Environmental Engineering Research Arsenal: ?The disposal of the Department of the Army is surplus pesticides of'all. types present serious problems. Significant among the various types of pesticides are, large quantities of organochlorine insecticides and phenoxy acid herbicides. Recommendations are phenoxy acid herbicides, including methods for incineration and ?nsecondaiy disposal of ash and scrubbing, and disposition in chemically or biologically active soils, 55 . i I 3' 52.? Recommended Statement on Use and Dispbsition of PesticideSI The 5' Board is located in the Forest Glen! Section, Walter Reed "Army. Medical?Ccnter, Washington DC, ,1 971 .-AFPMB 764.7 53. Department of Defense Instruction, Pest Control Operations at Militaiy Installations. Directive 4150.7 was prepared .by the Of?ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics, 23 July 1964. . .. .T, 54. USFK Regulation 700-17, Use of Herbicides imthe Republic of Korea. Thisregulation was initially issued by MO, United States Forces Korea, 12 Marc]: 1984. 1 55. US Army Medical Environm'?ntal Engineering Research Unit, Problem Definition Study: Evaluation of Health and Hygiene Effects of the Disposal of Pesticides' and Pesticide Containers. AFPMB LRS Accession No. 86453. i A. - 17 4.23/3 3. - Another ?nding and conclusion of. the Spray program involved the effectiveness of the tactical herbicides on the DMZ and was described by-gas follows: . lob "The effect (if/agents Blue and OFange were negated by regrowth of the vegetation ingtho'se areas that defoliation was'not followed rup by controlled binning. The application of these agents in. areas other than the DMZ fenoeitrace was of doubtful value. In. addition, the drenching of vegetation with Agent Orange/oil . . a 5? - i 6 mtxture and use of Orange on grassy areas were ?a waste of ttme and effort. 5 i i Buckner also realized that the real failure for the signi?cant ie-grovvth" df? vegetation in the?case? of Agents Orange and Bhie? was the *dilutidn, mixing, and liquid spray reduced the oVera?ll effectiveness of the? vegetation. ?The? herbicides and werencommercially available and approved by the as 5? Killer?, and it was formulated as the low volatile esters?of' 2,4?15 2,4531: Typically, ?Brush Killer? was aerially applied at the'rate 4.48 kg a?tive'Lingredient? per hectare, ai/ha. ??58 Agent Oi'ange was formulated as the t-cdnc?entrated Chigh volatile esters'and' wais?uapplied aerially in Vietnam at the?rate of 28 kg/ha. The recommendation for applications of Agent Orange the DMZ was to dilute the Orange by pouring lie liters of the Orange into 1'97 liters of dies?elfu?l, which meant that although-the spray was diluted'for the?sp?rayer, th'e total-?vamOunt applied ta hectare "of vegetation was similar to ?Vietnam, 82,460 kg ai applied to 2,820 ha or approximately 29 kg ai/ha. However, muchlof th? effects on the .yegetation did a. not occur as a consequence of-?the herbicidestbut rather as a consequenceof the diesel? fuel drying out the" leaves before the?herbic'ide could penetratetto thetroots (In Vietnam, Agent Orange was not formulated with ?di?Sel fuel, but was?appliedas the concentrateAfter a thorough examination of the records foundih the United States National Archives and: a veritical assessment of the . and supporting documents, the following conclusion can be made: The allegations noted in the introduction were simply not based on military directives?or-the facts found within the historical records; namely, there was never any Agent Orange sent in to or buried at .Camp Carroll, or sprayed elsewhere . a South Korea, except at the DMZ 1968. i 56. Final Report, Vegetation Control Plan CY 68, 25. i 57. tnal Report, Vegetation. Control Plan CY 68, 26. 58. R. Brigvey, Uses ofPhenoWJ-ierbicz?des 'and'l?heir Methods of Application, (Chapter 3, IN: R. W. Bovey and, L. Young, ?The Science of 2, 4.7-7? and Associated Phenol}; ?efbicmes, John Wiley ,York, 1980). p, tat/4t -- at A BRIEF REVIEW Newtoniand: Norris reported on a study of; human exposures to and TCDD through:derrnal contact, researchand monitoring of ?eld applications-fend water quality since 1963, and-studies of, wildlife contamination occurring. with-?eldusei otherbicides in the :0regon Coast Ranges. ofethe United States;- They ?hdted'~the following?7712hum5? he?olth righfromr A'hort??term exposure to a chemical 2,173}? a ?mctt?on of the level, duration, alnd?equency ercog?t-ffld dose the chemical, . compared with the maximum level, duration, and frequency of exposure producing no The?'equency of exposure producing iS'estimdted?orrt- ammo] tests in, the absence of controlled. human ?experiments: we are operating under.the general assumption-that exposure has no? health?impli'cdtions vuriless the} chemical enters the body where physiologichprocessesrmust deal With 11.5the studies by Newton and Norris myolved the measurement cf exposure 1nd1v1dua] that was more than 200 meters the4spraytng 1 They estimatedthat dtfring the ?rst week after epplication, the resident received a total dose of 0.0019 mg for a 70-kggadult, a total dose of 1.9 mg? Nearly half ?the total exposure occurred on day _1 of spraying 4 i 4' (indicating the rapid half-life of acutek?nq?effec?t estimates were 40 mg/kg for mg/kg for TCDD: EXposure of applicators whose soaked clothing, or whootherwise came in continUOus contact with a Spray mixture (directly sprayed with 2.2 kg/ha eight?times per day) had a ne?jdose of 0.059 mg a '3 kl Nev'vton "Ef?d Norris also t?ouhd in. theirumonii?tbring programs Ithat, with few exceptionshherbicidefound-z in stream water waskth?e resultof direct-Tappl'iCation to the water. The .low solubility of that there Would be a greater diffetbntial adsorption of TCDD o? sediments in preference to aiid that the actual levels would be lowe? than?calculatedNewton and L. A. Non-is, Potential Exposure of Humans to and TCDD in the Oregon Coast Ranges, (Fundamental and Applied Toxicology 1:339-346, 1981). 60. These conditions of soaked clothing/continuous contact were very likely the conditions encountered by personnel spraying the dilute Agent Orange on the Korean DMZ in 1968. it. .v 19 Lavy et al have also conducted numerous studies of phenoxy herbicide applicators. The results of one six-day study of both a backpack crew and fromqajcrew?spraying? from a tractor showed that the degree of exposure was related to the worker?s job.1 External dermal and respiratory exposures,?were meiasured and total?i intake ?01: was determined ,from total urine collectedr??om each: worker for a 6-day period: The greatest, amounts of exposure to were detected in mixers of the compounds and least amount inithe sprayers.? The?exposure to averaged 0.0005, 0.586, and 0.033 mg/kg body weight for inhalation, patch, and internal measurements, respectively. These measurements indicated that 2the? worker excreting the highest amount lof (the mixer) received exposure levels signi?cantly below those toxic to "laboratory animals. 6' i Smith et al conducted a study of_the blood serum levels of TCDD'inra group of nine professional applicators in, New Zealand. wThe nin'??i?applioatoi?s had Sprayed 2,4,57'1: for arange of 83-372 months. They measured the blood shrum levels of pols/chlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins? and dibenzofurans; which+ Were substituted with chlorine at the 2,3,7,8 position, in the; nine applicators and me match?d group "?of nine control "subjects. The average serdm level; of TCDD fdiri applicatoi's was almost 10?times that for thermatched control subjects, yvhile the average levels of all other ?congener's? and isomersmmeasured ih the itwol'groups did i not 'differ sub?istantially. They that increased risks of cancer from brief exposure to ph?enox?yherbicides reported in. other countries are? probably not? attributable to that ?codtaminated 62 1 5.: I ,61. J. S. Shepard, and J. Mattice, Eh'posure Measurements oprpIi?a?tors ?w Acid in the Forest, (Journal of Agricultu?i'e and Food Chemistry? 28: 626?630, 1980). The oral LDgo for was 300 rug/kg forirats and 100 [pg/kg for dogs. In a chronic 2-year feeding study, the no-effect level for was at a dosage rate of 3 mg/kg per day. The hazard to wildlifefrom at used and recommended rates was '5 negligible. I 1 o2. A. D. Patterson, L. Warner: RsMac'Kenzie, ?ndEL?. Needham, Sertim 2,3, etrachIorodibenzo?p-dioxin Levels {of New, Pesticide Appliede and Their Implicafignfor Cancer therNationaI Cancerilnstitute 84 (2): 104-108. "s q. -. Jr This lack of evrdence does not mean that TCDD does not cause cancer, but the current scrence . ?f a 0 i i" does not establishacause and effect relationship In 1982, the United States Air Force initiated the Air Force Health Study, a study of the Air Ferce personnel involved in Operation RANCH HAND the program responsible for tactical herbicide spraying in Vietnam. The 20?year matched cohort study consisted of independent mortality, morbidity and reproductive health components. An appraisal of the study nearly a decade since the ?nal follow up examination indicated that the results do not provide evidence of disease in the RANCH HAND veterans Caused by their elevated levels of exposure to Agent Orange. 63 Finally, the following studies may be relative to the exposure of ROKA soldiers who sprayed Agent Orange on the Korean DMZ in 1968. Studies of the preperties of plant surface waxes of the cuticle layer have shown that Agent Orange, . including TCDD, would have dried be absorbed into the wax layer of the plant cuticle) upon spraying within minutes and could not be physically dislodged. Studies of Agent Orange and the associated TCDD on both leaf and soil surface have demonstrated that photolysis by sunlight would have rapidly decreased the concentration of TCDD, and this process continued in the shade. Studies of ?dislodgeable foliar residues? (DFR, the fraction of substancevthat is available for cutaneous uptake from the plant leaves) showed that only 8% of the DFR was present 1 hour after application. This dropped to 1% of the total 24 hours after application. Studies with human volunteers continued that after 2 hours of saturated contact with bare skin, only 0.15 0.46% of entered the body and was eliminated in the urine. 6" After a thoroughreview of the science, the following conclusion can be made: The prospect of any signi?cant exposure and subsequent health impact to TCDD from Agent Orange in the FROKA soldiers or nearby residents seems unlikely in light of the environmental dissipation of TCDD, little bioavailability, and the properties of the herbicides and circumstances of application that occurred. 63. P. A. Buf?cr, M. E. Ginevan, J. S. Mandel, and D. K. Watkins, The Air Force Health Study: An Epidemiologic Retrospective, (Annals of Epidemiology 21 (9): 673?687, 2011). 04. A. Young, J. P. Giesy, P. D. Jones, and M. Newton, Environmental Fate and Bioavailability of Agent Orange and Its Associated Dioxin During the Vietnam War, (Environmental Science Pollution Research 11 (6): 359-370, 2004). 21 '43.-.Eli?3339.31?Jr; a ?32, n5 an! r; (yd-kl . a" a 15rd. rut5-: 1?'5215my. aimwhy