Agent Orange Investigative Report Series, No. 10 Contract: VA-101-12-C-0006 INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE ALLEGATIONS OF AGENT ORANGE ON AIR BASES IN THAILAND Compensation Service Department of Veterans Affairs 810 Vermont Ave., NW Washington, DC 20420 A. L. Young Consulting, Inc. Alvin L. Young, PhD Kristian L. Young, MA July 2013 A. L. Young Consulting, Inc. 1810 Tranquility Road Cheyenne, WY 82009-2903 307-638-6279 youngrisk@aol.com July 29, 2013 Mr. Michael D. Pharr Contract Officer’s Representative Compensation Service Department of Veterans Affairs 810 Vermont Ave., NW Washington, DC 20420 Dear Mr. Pharr, Please find attached to this letter the Final Report: Investigations into the Allegations of Agent Orange on Air Bases in Thailand. This report is the tenth of many reports that will be prepared in fulfillment of Contract VA-101-12-C-0006, Development of an Archival Directory of Agent Orange Documents. The Investigative Reports are supported by the archival research. The goal of developing the Directory is to search and identify the thousands of documents, reports, and correspondence located within our National Archives and Records Administration and other document repositories that relate to the use of “Tactical Herbicides”, including Agent Orange, outside of Vietnam. In the case of Thailand and its many air bases, the Compensation Service has not had a comprehensive search of the historical records that were dispersed to facilities across the United States, or comprehensive reviews of the scientific literature and environmental studies as they relate to allegations by Vietnam-era veterans of potential exposure to Agent Orange and its associated dioxin. Thus, the Department of Veterans Affairs has been dependent on minimal documentation in determining the validity of Veterans’ claims. Clearly it is beneficial to all parties to have all the available historical records and scientific studies related to events involving possible exposure to Agent Orange by our veterans that served in Thailand during the Vietnam War. In the case of this report, four allegations were investigated: 1) RANCH HAND aircraft were staged out of Thailand, and Agents Orange and Blue were pre-positioned at Thailand bases to service the UC-123K aircraft; 2) Veterans witnessed the spraying of tactical herbicides, or strong, commercial-type herbicides resembling tactical herbicides, on base perimeters; 3) Army and Air Force personnel, as well as military working dogs, were exposed to the toxic herbicides and dioxin; and, 4) Airbase personnel were frequently tasked with repairing the spray systems of RANCH HAND aircraft returning from hostile action in Laos. After carefully reviewing the extensive documents on the policies and use of tactical herbicides including Agent Orange in Southeast Asia, the allegations of exposure to Agent Orange by US veterans who served in Thailand could not validated. Moreover, the current position by the Department of Veterans Affairs on Thailand Military Bases and Agent Orange Exposure is completely inconsistent with the findings of this report. Sincerely, Alvin L. Young, PhD Professor of Environmental Toxicology Colonel, USAF (Retired) DISCLAIMER FOR VA REPORT The conclusions reached in this report are based upon a comprehensive review of the historical records maintained in the publicly available files of the National Archives and Record Administration, and other archival repositories. However, the conclusions reached do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Veterans Affairs or any other Department or Agency of the United States Government. This report is part of the Agent Orange Investigative Report Series, and should be considered as an amendable or living document. If additional authenticated documents or records are found that address the topic of this report, a re-evaluation of the conclusions may be necessary. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors wish to acknowledge the comprehensive reviews of this report by Dr. Paul Knese, Colonel, USAF (Retired), and Dr. Loyd Wax, Professor Emeritus of Weed Science, USDA Agricultural Research Service, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL. Colonel Knese was a RANCH HAND Pilot in Vietnam, and Research Test Pilot at Nahkon Phanom, Thailand during the Vietnam War. Professor Wax was a 1st Lieutenant with the United States Army Chemical Corps, Fort Detrick Maryland in 1963-1965, and was the Project Officer for the defoliation tests conducted at the Pranburi Military Reservation, Thailand. We wish to thank Colonel Ralph Dresser, USAF (Retired) for his insights to RANCH HAND operations during the years when he was Commander of the 12th Air Commando Squadron, Bien Hoa AFB, Vietnam. INVESTIGATION INTO THE ALLEGATIONS OF AGENT ORANGE ON AIR BASES IN THAILAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Recently, the US Department of Veterans Affairs issued a Public Health Notice related to Thailand Military Bases and Agent Orange Exposure. The Notice stated: “Vietnam-era Veterans whose service involved duty on or near the perimeters of military bases in Thailand anytime between 28 February 1961 and 7 May 1975 may have been exposed to herbicides and may qualify for VA benefits.” The Department of Veterans Affairs has been dependent on minimal and often confusing documentation in determining the validity of veterans’ claims. The purpose of this report was to assemble all available documents, reports, and correspondence within the National Archives and Records Administration and other document repositories that related to the use of “tactical herbicides” including Agent Orange and Agent Blue in Thailand. This documentation was then used to address the many allegations and claims of exposure to Agent Orange by veterans who served in Thailand. The allegations and claims of exposure to Agent Orange in Thailand can be summarized in the following four areas: 1. RANCH HAND aircraft were staged out of many Thailand bases for defoliation and crop denial missions in Laos. To accommodate these missions large quantities of Agent Orange and Agent Blue were stored (prepositioned) at Ubon and Udorn, thus exposure occurred during the handling of this inventory and loading of the UC-123K aircraft; 2. Vegetation control was a major factor in airbase defense in Thailand. Thailand veterans witnessed or participated in the spraying of Agent Orange, Agent Blue procured from Vietnam, or “strong, commercial-type herbicides resembling tactical herbicides”; 3. Airbase perimeters were repeatedly treated with tactical herbicides, and Army and Air Force personnel as well as military working dogs assigned to provide perimeter security were exposed to the toxic herbicides and associated dioxin contaminant on these perimeters; and, 1 4. Airbase personnel trained in maintaining aircraft were frequently tasked with repairing the aerial spray systems associated with RANCH HAND aircraft returning from hostile action over Laos. RANCH HAND UC-123s (B and K models) conducted defoliation missions over the Ho Chi Minh Trail and crop denial missions in Laos, and were sometimes staged out of Ubon or Udorn. However, the loading of the aircraft with defoliants (Agent Orange and Agent Blue) was done from tactical herbicide inventories at Da Nang Air Base in Vietnam, not from stocks allegedly pre-positioned and stored in Thailand. After conducting missions in Laos, the aircraft would fly to Da Nang for re-supply and refueling and return to Ubon or Udorn for staging to conduct early morning missions. The overall policy and procedures for herbicide operations in Vietnam were set forth in MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) Directive 525-1, which governed all herbicide use by both US and Free World Military Assistance Forces, i.e., Allied Forces. A careful examination of the intent of the Directive was that it “prescribed policies, responsibilities, and procedures governing the operational employment of herbicides within South Vietnam, including all fixed wing, helicopter, and surface-based methods of herbicide application.” What this means is that tactical herbicide use by Free World Forces was restricted to their use on base perimeters in South Vietnam only. The allegation that Thailand veterans witnessed the spraying of Agent Orange or Agent Blue on airbase perimeters in Thailand is without documentation. Thailand veterans alleged that the barren soils of the base perimeters were an indication of the frequent use of Agent Orange or Agent Blue. In the 1973 CHECO Report, Air Base Defense in Thailand, the authors noted that perimeter areas were initially cleared of all vegetation during construction, and then maintained by the “heavy use of herbicides that kept the growth under control within the fenced areas.” The situation for the use of herbicides in Thailand was complicated by the fact that only the US Army Chemical Corps had the responsibility for spraying herbicides OUTSIDE the base perimeters, and then only with tactical herbicides, i.e., Agent Orange and Agent Blue. However, MACV Directive 525-1 did not permit the use of tactical herbicides to be used in Thailand. Thus, the Base Civil Engineer had the requirements for obtaining commercial herbicides that had 2 been approved by the Armed Forces Pest Management Board through the normal supply channels. The commercial herbicides could only be used INSIDE the base perimeters. The Base Civil Engineer selected commercial herbicides designed to maximize the removal of vegetation including grasses, weeds, shrubs, etc., while minimizing the frequency of treatment. Ideally, the Base Civil Engineer or the Command Entomologist would have recommended the selection of herbicides that provided 4 to 6 months of vegetation control. Federal Stock Numbers (FSN) from the Defense Supply Agency were available for ordering the three major herbicides recommended for base perimeters, Monuron, Fenuron, and Diuron, and approved by the Armed Forces Pest Control Board because of the ease of application, their efficacy and their safety. The toxicities of the three non-selective herbicides were rated as having a significantly lower order of toxicity than Agent Orange, Agent Blue or even aspirin. Thus, DVA’s Public Health Statement on the source of herbicides and toxicity of the commercial products is not valid. In mid-1968, a disease outbreak occurred which threatened the Working Dog program in both Thailand and South Vietnam, and led to a large number of canine deaths. Veterinarians determined that the death of these Military Working Dogs was caused by Canine Ehrlichiosis, a highly fatal tickborne rickettsiosis caused by Ehrlichia canis, not a chemical exposure as alleged. Lastly, the allegation that airbase personnel in Thailand that were trained in maintaining aircraft were frequently tasked with repairing the aerial spray system associated with RANCH HAND UC-123B/K aircraft returning from hostile action over Laos is not correct. The maintenance on the RANCH HAND aerial spray system was the exclusive responsibility of the RANCH HAND squadron. INTRODUCTION Two Veteran groups have provided documentation to the Department of Defense, Department of Veterans Affairs, members of Congress, and to the media on Thailand and the use of Agent Orange [1, 2]. Adams et al entitled their report: “A Report to Congress, Inequities in Treatment of Vietnam Veterans, and the Exclusion of Thailand Veterans.” The Report was apparently released in 2006 and was unsigned, i.e., without a letter of transmission [1]. Priessman, VA 3 Watchdog dot Org, entitled his report: “Herbicide Use in Thailand – The Relationship to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Use in Vietnam and Laos”. This Report was apparently released in 2009 when it was submitted and presented to the Vietnam Center and Archives, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas [2]. Both reports can be found in numerous blogs on the Internet. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals, Department of Veterans Affairs restored an entitlement of service connection to a veteran for a disease allegedly caused by exposure to Agent Orange in Thailand [3]. The veteran claimed that he was exposed to Agent Orange at Ubon, Thailand, where he worked on airplanes which were used for spraying herbicides in Vietnam. Specifically the veteran stated that he worked on Hayes Dispensers which were coated with a substance, which was foreign to him, and which he now believes was Agent Orange [3]. To clarify, the veteran claimed that he worked on the Hayes Weapons Dispenser associated with the B-57G aircraft, and that B-57G aircraft were used in the Operation RANCH HAND, the defoliation program in South Vietnam. THE PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT Although Thailand was one of five nations that provided combat troops, i.e., Allied Forces, to support the war in South Vietnam, it was the contribution and commitment of Thailand’s government to provide its airbases for the Allied Forces that was critical to the war effort. Indeed, Thailand with its many airbases played a strategic role in the conduct of the Vietnam War. Thousands of US military personnel served in Thailand during the war in Vietnam. Operation RANCH HAND was one of many military operations that depended upon the support of airbases in Thailand. As noted above, claims have been made to Compensation Service for Agent Orange – related veteran benefits for veterans who served in Thailand. The Department of Veterans Affairs has been dependent on minimal documentation in determining the validity of veterans’ claims. The purpose of this report is to assemble all available documents, reports, and correspondence within the National Archives and Records Administration and other document repositories that relate to the use of “Tactical Herbicides” including Agent Orange in Thailand. This report will first review the 1964-1965 Project to evaluate defoliants, including Agent Orange, conducted in Thailand by personnel of the US Army Chemical Corps, Fort Detrick, Maryland on the Pranburi Military Reservation. This is 4 followed by a discussion of Operation RANCH HAND and the reviews that have been conducted on the defoliation program in Vietnam, including the results of CHECO reports relative to the use of herbicides in Thailand. A list of the allegations from Thailand veterans who claimed exposure to Agent Orange is provided. This is followed by a careful assessment of the available documentation for those claims and a conclusion. HERBICIDE TESTS ON THE PRANBURI MILITARY RESERVATION The objectives of the US Army Chemical Corps defoliations tests in Thailand were to (1) determine minimal rates and volumes of Agents Purple, Pink, Orange and Blue applied at different seasons of the year for effective defoliation; and, (2) evaluate the effectiveness of other selected defoliants, desiccants, and herbicides applied singly or in combination mixtures at different seasons of the year on representative vegetation of Southeast Asia [4, 5, 6]. The test site locations were established on the Pranburi Military Reservation. Arrangements were made with Thai governmental authorities to use the facilities of the Ministry of Communications Airport at Hua Hin (25 miles from the test site) as a base of operations for the twin engine Beechcraft (C-45) used for test applications. The test herbicides were sent from Fort Detrick in 5-gallon cans by air to Bangkok. Survey and preparations of two test sites were initiated in August 1963. Lanes were cleared to mark boundaries of a series of 10-acre test plots for potentially 2,000 acres available for aerial applications. The first year of trials began in April 1964 and continued through September 1964 with duplicate 10-acre plots treated with each chemical mixture using three 100-foot swaths per plot flown at a height of 30 to 50 feet above treetops. The second year of trials began in October 1964 with the same treatment design and continued through February 1965. Approximately 170 and 220 acres were actually treated over the two years, 1964 and 1965, at the test sites, respectively. Evaluations of vegetative responses to chemical treatments were made at periodic intervals primarily by photographic techniques. Observations of all plots continued through 1965. This research confirmed the selection of Agent Orange and Agent Blue for incorporation into the expanding defoliation program via Operation RANCH HAND. 5 Five civilians and 5 military personnel from Fort Detrick, Maryland conducted the spray operations and subsequent research. Approximately 25 Thai civilian workers were involved in the preparation of the test sites, and 4 US civilian workers were involved in evaluating the results of the spraying through the end of 1965. The names of the US personnel were listed in the two Semiannual Reports [4, 5]. BACKGROUND ON C-123 UNITS AND UC-123B/K RANCH HAND UNITS During the Vietnam War, the following seven airbases in Thailand supported the United States air missions in Vietnam: Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB), Nahkon Phanom RTAFB (NKP), Ubon RTAFB, Udorn RTAFB, Don Muang RTAFB (Bangkok), U-tapao Royal Thai Naval Air Base, and Takhli RTAFB [7]. With the advent of the War, the United States Air Force (USAF) sent more than 200 C-123 aircraft to Southeast Asia, the first arriving in Thailand in 1963. The C123 “Provider” was the ideal aircraft for tactical airlift, moving massive quantities of supplies and troops throughout Vietnam and Thailand [8]. The C-123s in Thailand included the 606th Special Operations Squadron stationed at NPK [7]. The initial UC-123s assigned to RANCH HAND (1962) were subordinate to the 315th Troop Carrier Group at Tan Son Nhut Airport near Saigon (the “U” designated that it was configured with an internal spray system). In July 1964, the RANCH HAND Unit was assigned to the 315th Air Commando Group and, in October 1966 it became the 12th Air Commando Squadron assigned at Bien Hoa AFB, Vietnam. In July 1968, RANCH HAND became the 12th Special Operations Squadron, and on 31 July 1970 the remaining RANCH HAND aircraft were assigned as A Flight, 310th Tactical Airlift Squadron. The A Flight terminated on 28 January 1971 [9]. Although RANCH HAND’s mission was primarily in South Vietnam, RANCH HAND aircraft were staged out of a number of airbases in Thailand for the defoliation of the Ho Chi Minh Trail that extended from North Vietnam through Laos to South Vietnam, and for crop denial missions in Laos [10]. In October 1966, USAF Headquarters authorized one UC-123 defoliation aircraft to be reconfigured for the spraying of the insecticide malathion, as part of a program to reduce mosquitoes, and hence malaria, in South Vietnam [11]. On 14 October 1966, a RANCH HAND aircraft, thoroughly cleaned of herbicide residues and equipped with the finer orifice nozzles needed for insecticide dispersal, left 6 Saigon for Bangkok, Thailand for trials and evaluation [11]. Immediately following successful tests in the Mekong delta, the 12th Air Commando Squadron permanently assigned two UC-123 aircraft to fulltime pesticide duty under the control of the MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) Surgeon General’s Office and under the code-named Operation FLYSWATTER [11]. At the request of USAF units in Thailand, FLYSWATTER missions were authorized [12]. Operation FLYSWATTER continued until its termination in December 1971 [11]. William Buckingham in his book OPERATION RANCH HAND: The Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia, 1961 – 1971 [9] and Paul Cecil in his book HERBICIDAL WARFARE: The RANCH HAND Project in Vietnam described the following missions that required staging at airbases in Thailand [10]: • February 1966: Staging of RH aircraft out of Nahkon Phanom (NKP) and Takhli, for a Defoliation project in Laos that required 1,130 drums of Agent Orange, UC-123Bs; • 12 - 15 November 1968: Staging of four UC-123K aircraft out of Udorn, Crop denial project in Laos that required 145 drums of Agent Blue; • 18 January 1968: Staging of seven UC-123K aircraft out of Ubon, Crop denial project in Laos, aircraft loaded with Agent Blue at Da Nang on the 17th; • 1- 7 September 1969: Staging of five UC-123K aircraft out of Udorn, Crop denial project in Laos that required 115 drums of Agent Blue; and, • 1 May 1970: The 12th SOS sent aircrews and support personnel to NKP to study flare operations with the 606th SOS. HERBICIDE POLICY REVIEWS, CHECO REPORTS & DOCUMENTS From a historical setting, the use of tactical herbicides in the Vietnam War took place in two phases. The first phase, January 1962 – March 1965, involved the evaluation of the first tactical herbicides and the development of spray equipment and tactics for the UC-123 aircraft deployed by Operation RANCH HAND for defoliation and crop denial operations. The second phase began in March 1965 with the deployment of additional UC-123 aircraft and the acquisition of large quantities of Agents Orange, White and Blue for large scale defoliation operations. 7 This phase occurred simultaneously with the deployment of US Marines at Da Nang and the subsequent build up of US and Allied Forces [10]. On 10 August 1961, as part of Project AGILE, Fort Detrick personnel conducted successful defoliation tests in South Vietnam [13]. With the full concurrence and support of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), USAF Operation RANCH HAND was initiated on 7 January 1962. The value of collecting and documenting the Southeast Asia (SEA) experiences was recognized at an early date. It was projected that the counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare environment of SEA would likely result in the employment of USAF airpower to meet a multitude of requirements [14]. Thus in 1962, Headquarters USAF directed the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Air Forces to establish a project that would provide a scholarly “ongoing” historical examination, documentation, and reporting on USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine in the growing involvement of airpower in Southeast Asia [14]. Project CHECO, an acronym for Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations was established to meet this Air Staff Requirement. The Project involved the selection of Captains or Majors who were assigned to Air University, or were members of the faculty of the Military Academies that had obtained advanced degrees in academic areas appropriate to conducting the required evaluations. These selected scholars were assigned 90-day temporary duties to Southeast Asia in various military areas where Air Force Commanders recognized the need and value of a CHECO Report [14]. There were three CHECO reports reviewed for information on the use of herbicides in Southeast Asia including Thailand. These three reports were as follows: • 1967, Herbicide Operations in Southeast Asia, July 1961 – June 1967 by Captain Charles V. Collins [15]; • 1971, RANCH HAND: Herbicide Operations in SEA by Captain James R. Clary [16]; and, • 1973, BASE DEFENSE IN THAILAND, by Major Benjamin H. Barnette Jr. and James R. Barrow [17]. 8 In addition to CHECO Reports, USAF initiated Project CORONA HARVEST, a project to earmark unit histories, end-of-tour reports, and lessons learned from special operations (often CHECO Reports were also listed as Corona Harvest Reports). For example the following two documents were reviewed: • 1969, End-of-Tour Report, Commander of 12th SOS (Operation RANCH HAND) for the period September 1968 – 1969 [18]; and, • 1969, USAF F-4 Defoliant Spray Project [19]. Because of the controversial nature of the defoliation program and of Operation RANCH HAND, the USAF, MACV, or the US Ambassador to Vietnam commissioned special reports to be prepared. The following three reports were reviewed: • 1966, CHEMICAL DEFOLIATION OF THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL [20]; • 1968, THE HERBICIDE POLICY REVIEW, a report requested by the US Ambassador to Vietnam [21]; and, • 1968, A REVIEW OF THE HERBICIDE PROGRAM IN SOUTH VIETNAM, a report prepared for the Commander In Chief Pacific, by the Scientific Advisory Group [22]. Another source of information on both ground and aerial operations where tactical herbicides were employed by either the US Army Chemical Corps or Operation RANCH HAND is often found in Operational Reports. A review was conducted of an Operational Report prepared by the Headquarters 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for the period ending 31 October 1969 [23]. Lastly, one of the most comprehensive reviews of Thailand’s participation in the Vietnam War was Larsen and Collins “Allied Participation in Vietnam”, prepared for the Department of Army in 1975 [24]. ALLEGATIONS OF EXPOSURE BY THAILAND VETERANS Outside of the Pranburi tests involving the actual use and evaluation of tactical herbicides, there were two major sources of allegations related to Agent Orange and other tactical herbicides in Thailand. Adams et al and Priessman reported C123s, and Agent Orange in storage, or being used at Takhli (1966), Korat (1966, 9 1972), NKP (1967), Ubon (1969, 1970) and Udorn (1969-1970) [1, 2]. Priessmans supposition was that in order for RANCH HAND aircraft to fly out of Thailand it would have required the pre-positioning or storage of Agent Orange or Agent Blue. Both Adams et al and Priessman repeatedly noted that C-123 aircraft were present at these airbases, and that they were assigned to the 315th Special Operations Wing in 1967. Adams et al also discussed the deployment of Military Working Dogs to Thailand in 1968, and subsequent death of those dogs that patrolled base perimeters. Their deaths were allegedly due to the dioxin from the Agent Orange that was allegedly sprayed on the base perimeters [1]. The second source of allegations involved Internet statements by Vietnam-Era Veterans who served in Thailand 1967-1971 and who alleged that they were exposed to Agent Orange [http://www.veteransvoteyourcause.com; subject “Help for Thailand and Korean Veterans for Exposure to Agent Orange]. Thus, the allegations and claims of exposure to Agent Orange in Thailand can be summarized in the following four areas: 1. RANCH HAND aircraft were staged out of many Thailand bases for defoliation and crop denial missions in Laos. To accommodate these missions large quantities of Agent Orange and Agent Blue were stored (prepositioned) at Ubon and Udorn, thus exposure occurred during the handling of this inventory and loading of the UC-123K aircraft; 2. Vegetation control was a major factor in airbase defense in Thailand. Thailand veterans witnessed or participated in the spraying of Agent Orange, Agent Blue procured from Vietnam, or “strong, commercial-type herbicides resembling tactical herbicides”; 3. Airbase perimeters were repeatedly treated with tactical herbicides, and Army and Air Force personnel as well as military working dogs assigned to provide perimeter security were exposed to the toxic herbicides and associated dioxin contaminant on these perimeters; and, 4. Airbase personnel trained in maintaining aircraft were frequently tasked with repairing the aerial spray system associated with RANCH HAND aircraft returning from hostile action over Laos. 10 REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF DOCUMENTATION Allegation – Pre-positioning of Tactical Herbicides: In his book, Cecil described the February 1966 staging of RANCH HAND aircraft out of NKP and Taklai (Takhli) for a defoliation project in Laos [10]. Buckingham noted that this project, Project Number 22W, required 62,150 gallons (~1,130 drums) of Agent Orange [9]. The storage at Da Nang, or the possibility of pre-positioning of Agent Orange in Thailand were not mentioned by either author. Collins described this “mission” as requiring 59,800 gallons of Agent Orange and that the UC-123B aircraft were loaded at Da Nang and the targets for the herbicide were against lines of communication and suspected VC supply areas in Laos [15]. Clary identified two missions in the same period, but with Project Number 20W, one requiring 62,150 gallons of Orange and the other 59,800 gallons of Orange [16]. Added Note: [On 18 July 2013, the authors contacted Colonel Ralph Dresser, USAF Retired, and former Commander RANCH HAND in 1966. He reported that aircraft assigned to defoliation missions in Laos were always loaded with Agent Orange at Da Nang, but sometimes staged in Thailand so as to conduct early morning spray missions.] Clary identified the two projects involving Agent Blue, November 1968 (8,000 gallons, 145 drums) and September 1969 (6,350 gallons, 115 drums), however he did not describe the source of the Agent Blue, at either Da Nang, or the possibility that it was pre-positioned in Thailand. Thailand veterans alleged that they witnessed the storage and loading of Agent Blue at both Ubon and Udorn [1, 2]. However, Lt. Col. Rex Stoner, the Commander of RANCH HAND in 1968 and 1969 stated that Agent Blue was only available at Phu Cat, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, and Da Nang, all in Vietnam and at RANCH HAND locations [18]. Moreover, the distance from Ubon to Da Nang via Laos was approximately 230 air miles, while from Udorn via Laos was approximately 350 air miles from Da Nang, thus flying from Laos to Da Nang and returning to Thailand for staging early morning missions was logistically possible. The UC-123K had sufficient fuel for 8 hours of flying time. Equally important, any storage or pre-positioning of Agent Blue in Thailand would have required RANCH HAND personnel to go TDY to that location, a situation that would have 11 unnecessarily complicated the RANCH HAND mission. To transport 115 or 145 drums to Thailand for pre-positioning, would have required the services of at least the lift capacity of the C-141 Starlifter, which entered service in Vietnam in 1965 [7]. Commander Stoner in his “End of Tour Report” in 1969 made no mention of pre-positioning any tactical herbicides in Thailand [18]. In the report on the use of F-4Es equipped with a defoliant spray system, the operational mission involved the spraying of a defoliant in Laos, presumably Agent Blue, which had been used in the tests at Eglin AFB, Florida [10, 19]. No information was provided as to the base where the F-4Es were loaded with the herbicide. At 550-knot airspeed, the F-4Es covered a 100-foot-wide, 16-kilometerlong area in only 70 seconds; it was assumed that this brief exposure time would not require fighter escort. During the test, however, one F-4E spray plane was shot down by enemy ground fire – evidence that speed was not the only answer [10]. The report on chemical defoliation of the Ho Chi Minh Trail emphasized the requirements for special tactics and basing requirements that needed to be employed by RANCH HAND to successfully defoliate the heavily defended targets in Laos [20]. Allegation – Rules of Engagement and Authorized Use of Agent Oange in Thailand: Priessman argued that the “Rules of Engagement” for tactical herbicides in South Vietnam applied equally to their use in Thailand [2]. His proposed evidence was that the overall policy and procedures for herbicide operations in Vietnam were set forth in MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) Directive 525-1, which governed all herbicide use by both US and Free World Military Assistance Forces, i.e., Allied Forces [2, 25]. What this means is that tactical herbicide use by Free World Forces was restricted to their use on base perimeters in South Vietnam only. A careful examination of the intent of the Directive was that it “prescribed policies, responsibilities, and procedures governing the operational employment of herbicides within South Vietnam, including all fixed wing, helicopter, and surface-based methods of herbicide application [25]. What this means is that tactical herbicides by Free World Forces was restricted to their use on base perimeters in South Vietnam only. Annex K, Chemical Herbicide Operations, and specifically Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for I Corps Field Force Vietnam (I FFORCEV), dated February 1968 stated: 12 The use of defoliation and crop destruction is primarily a GVN venture supported by the US Government. The GVN responsibilities are exercised through the JGS 202 Committee [26]. Free World Military Assistance Forces desiring a herbicide project (within this Corps) should effect coordination with the sector advisory team…A formal request should be forwarded to this Headquarters (Nha Trang, South Vietnam) [26]. There is nothing in the directive or annex that suggested the legitimacy of using of tactical herbicides, i.e., the authorizing of Agent Orange or Agent Blue for use in Thailand by US military units stationed in Thailand or by Thailand Military Forces in Thailand. The Herbicide Policy Review conducted in August 1968 at the direction of the American Ambassador to Vietnam [21], and the Scientific Advisory Group [22] reviewed the policies and procedures for both defoliation and crop destruction. Neither report discussed the use of tactical herbicides on bases outside of South Vietnam. They did recommend: “That the authority be delegated to major field commanders to approve helicopter defoliation operations for vegetation control in support of local base defense, known ambush sites along lines of communication and Rome Plowed areas” [21, 22]. However, the responsibility for helicopter defoliation remained with the US Army Chemical Corps. The revision of Directive 525-1 in August 1969 continued the policy that the COMUSMACV (Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) “exercise command supervision, coordination, liaison, and control of all US and Free World Military Assistance Forces” [25]. COMUSMACV had previously authorized RANCH HAND to conduct herbicide operations OUTSIDE of South Vietnam, e.g., in Laos [21, 22, 25]. Thus, the allegations that Thailand veterans witnessed the spraying of Agent Orange or Agent Blue on airbase perimeters in Thailand is without documentation. The use of helicopters for the spraying of insecticides did not come under Directive 525-1, but rather under Directive 40-10, Medical Service Aerial Dispersal of Insecticide, revised March 1970, and issued by Headquarters, MACV [11]. All insecticide operations for both helicopters and the UC-123 aircraft were under the control of the MACV Surgeon General’s Office. If a US military unit stationed at an airbase in Thailand requested a malathion mission for the control of mosquitoes or other insects, the approval rested with the MACV Surgeon General’s Office in Vietnam [11]. The MACV Surgeon would have authorized RANCH HAND to fly 13 a fixed-wing insecticide mission in Thailand. The Air Base Preventive Medicine Unit on the installation in Thailand would have been authorized to spray insecticide from an appropriately equipped helicopter made available from any Navy, Army, or Air Force units, or even equipment belonging to Thailand Forces [25, 26]. The helicopter spraying of insecticides would have been a common sight at Ubon, Udorn, Korat, NKP or other airbases in Thailand. Collins also described insecticide operations in Thailand by two UC-123Bs in 1963[15]. Allegation – The Use of Agent Orange at Korat: Adams et al described the major efforts of defoliating the perimeter of Korat RTAFB beginning in the early months of 1970 and continuing through1972: “The cleared area that surrounded the MSA (Munitions Storage Area) perimeter is a prime example of defoliation giving ground troops an “increased field of fire” …The long period of time with no sign of plant growth that has been attested to is a classic example of Agent Orange defoliation [1]. The veteran stationed at Ubon implied that the aircraft had been spraying defoliants after he was assigned in March 1970 [3]. In November 1969, the Department of Defense made the decision to restrict Orange herbicide to “areas remote from population” [10]. On 15 April 1970, the Department of Defense terminated all spraying of Agent Orange, and on 28 January 1971, the spraying of all defoliants terminated [10, 28]. Obviously the allegations by Adams et al and the aforementioned veteran that the use and exposure to Agent Orange occurred after April 1970 are without merit, and the actual herbicides used were commercial. The commercial use of herbicides by the US military in Thailand was under the authority of the Armed Forces Pest Control Board, and the spraying was done by certified applicators assigned to the Base Civil Engineer [27]. Vegetation Control at Airbases in Thailand: At airbases in Thailand, the “first “ring of defense’ within the bounds of USAF responsibility was the base perimeter, usually composed of fence lines and other integrated defenses, all designed to expose the enemy to an increased risk of observations and detection” [17]. The Thailand veterans alleged that the barren soils of the base perimeters were an indication of the use of Agent Orange or Agent Blue. In Chapter III, Physical Defenses and Limitations, of their 1973 CHECO Report, Major Barnette and Captain Barrow noted that perimeter areas were initially cleared of all vegetation during construction, and maintained by the “heavy use of herbicides that kept the growth under control in the fenced areas” (underlined for emphasis by 14 authors)[17]. They indicated that the ROE (Rules of Engagement) prohibited the use of herbicides outside the perimeter. The situation for the use of herbicides in Thailand was complicated by the fact that only the US Army Chemical Corps had the responsibility for spraying herbicides OUTSIDE the base perimeters, and then only tactical herbicides, i.e., Agent Orange and Agent Blue. However, MACV Directive 525-1 did not permit the use of tactical herbicides to be used in Thailand [25]. Thus, the Base Civil Engineer had the requirements for obtaining commercial herbicides that had been approved by the Armed Forces Pest Control Board through the normal supply channels, and commercial herbicides could only be used INSIDE the base perimeters [27, 28]. Since the US Army Chemical Corps did not operate outside of Vietnam, base defenses in Thailand relied upon other options, including physical and passive defenses [17]. For example, perimeter lines at most bases consisted of various combinations of rolls of concertina wire, “tangle-foot” barbed-wire barriers and occasionally chain-link fences. Some bases positioned heavily wired trip-flares to assist in detecting intruders. Most bases had Xenon lights with the capability of lighting several hundred meters with either infrared or visible light [17]. Passive defense for enemy attacks, such as revetments for aircraft and personnel shelters differed widely. Aircraft dispersal was limited by available ramp parking space. At a few of the bases, high observation towers located close to the perimeter afforded excellent visibility at all points [17]. The use of Military Working Dogs added another layer of base security [17]. The lack of vegetation control using herbicides OUTSIDE of the base perimeter was a frequent complaint at every airbase in Thailand. Ubon’s Base Civic Action had undertaken a unique approach to controlling off-base vegetation. It had contracted the local villagers to clear 150 meters of dense underbrush from around the base perimeter. The project was inexpensive, cleared a wide field of observation, and put money into the local economy [17]. At Ubon and other airbases in Thailand, interior vegetation was usually kept closely cut, with the “heavy use” of non-tactical, i.e., commercial herbicides, keeping the growth under control in the fenced areas [17]. The Heavy Use of Herbicides: In the 1973 CHECO Report, the description “heavy use of herbicides” is frequently noted [17]. However, this statement does 15 not mean “a strong commercial-type resembling tactical herbicides”, as is in the Department of Veterans Affairs Public Health Notice on Thailand Military Bases and Agent Orange Exposure [29]. Indeed, the selection of herbicides by the Base Civil Engineer was designed to maximize the removal of vegetation including grasses, weeds, shrubs, etc., while minimizing the frequency of treatment. Ideally, the Base Civil Engineer or the Command Entomologist would have recommended the selection of herbicides that provided 4 to 6 months of vegetation control. Federal Stock Numbers (FSN) from the Defense Supply Agency were available for ordering the three major herbicides recommended for base perimeters, Monuron, Fenuron, and Diuron, and approved by the Armed Forces Pest Control Board because of the ease of application, their efficacy and their safety [27, 30, 31]. These herbicides were in granular or water soluble formulations and easily applied by ground application equipment [30, 31]. As with all pesticides, the Base Civil Engineer/Command Entomologist required the pesticide applicator to be certified by the Armed Forces Control Board [32]. These three herbicides were applied at rates from 20 to 50 pounds per acre, hence the statements by the authors of the CHECO Report or DVA “heavy use herbicides” or “strong commercial type”, respectively. They were neither, since these herbicides were those typically used on many US military installations, and at application rates recommended by USDA and approved on the registration label. The toxicity of the three non-selective herbicides had LD 50 values (median lethal dose that kills 50% of the test animals, usually expressed as mg herbicide/kg body weight for the rat) from 3,400 mg/kg to > 6,000 mg/kg, thus they were rated as having a significantly lower order of toxicity than Agent Orange with an LD 50 = 350 mg/kg , or Agent Blue with an LD 50 = 2,600 mg/kg, or even aspirin with an LD 50 = 815 mg/kg [16]. The Weapons Dispenser on the B-57 “Canberra”: The allegation that airbase personnel in Thailand, who were trained in maintaining aircraft, were frequently tasked with repairing the aerial spray system associated with RANCH HAND UC123B/K aircraft returning from hostile action over Laos is not correct. In the early years of RANCH HAND missions, the B-57 “Canberra” tactical bomber frequently provided cover and strike operations for defoliation missions, especially along the Ho Chi Minh Trail [7, 10, 19]. The target-detection and truck-killing capability of the B-57G was outstanding [7]. However, it was never equipped to conduct spray 16 missions. The Hayes Weapon Dispensers were external to the aircraft and were used for dispersing such weapons as the BLU bomblet canisters [10]. The RANCH HAND UC-123 aircraft were first equipped with the MC-1 “Hourglass” system which consisted of a 1,000-gallon tank that could be installed in the bay of the aircraft. It was designed and built by the Hayes Aircraft Corporation. Beginning in July 1965, this spray system was replaced by the Hayes Corporation A/A 45Y-1 Internal Defoliant Dispenser [10]. However, the maintenance on this system was the exclusive responsibility of the RANCH HAND squadron [10]. Death of Military Working Dogs: Adams et al expressed concern over the Military Working Dogs that patrolled the perimeters of military bases in Thailand in 1968 and that allegedly had been exposed to Agent Orange and dioxin [1]. However, in mid-1968 an epizootic occurred during the Vietnam War which threatened the Working Dog program in both Thailand and South Vietnam and led to 250 canine deaths. [33]. Military veterinarians launched an extensive effort to control this disease and to determine its cause. Canine Ehrlichiosis, a highly fatal tickborne rickettsiosis caused by Ehrlichia canis, was identified as the cause of the epizootic, not a chemical exposure [33]. CONCLUSION After carefully reviewing the extensive documents on the policies and use of tactical herbicides including Agent Orange in Southeast Asia, the allegations of exposure to Agent Orange by US veterans who served in Thailand could not be validated. Moreover, the current position by the Department of Veterans Affairs on Thailand Military Bases and Agent Orange Exposure is completely inconsistent with the findings of this report. REFERENCES 1. Adams D, Cummings B, Homa J, Oliver M, Moore M (2006): A Report to Congress, Inequities in Treatment of Vietnam Veterans, and the Exclusion of Thailand Veterans. Thailand Vietnam Vets for Equity in Treatment, http://www.viet.remf.net 2. Priessman K (2009): Herbicide Use in Thailand – The Relationship to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Use in Vietnam and Laos. VA Watchdog dot Org, http://www.vawatchdog.org 3. Department of Veterans Affairs, Board of Veterans’ Appeals, Docket NO. 99-08 894A, Citation Nr: 0418252, Decision Date 07/09/04, Archive Date: 07/21/04, Washington DC 17 4. US Army Biological Laboratories (1964): OCONUS Defoliation Test Program, Semiannual Report, 1 April to 30 September 1964, US Army Biological Laboratories, Fort Detrick MD (Available from the Alvin L. Young Agent Orange Collection, National Agricultural Library, Accession No. 00012) 5. US Army Biological Laboratories (1965): OCONUS Defoliation Test Program, Semiannual Report No. 2, 1 October 1964 to 31 March 1965, US Army Biological Laboratories, Fort Detrick MD (Available from the Alvin L. Young Agent Orange Collection, National Agricultural Library, Accession No. 00015) 6. Darrow RA, Truchelut GB, Bartlett CM (1966): OCONUS Defoliation Test Program, Army Biological Defense Research Center, Frederick MD (Available from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), Accession No. AD-486540) 7. Berger C, Editor (1977): The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961 - 1973. Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, Washington DC 8. Virtual Aircraft Museum: History of the Fairchild C-123 Provider. http://www.aviastar.org 9. Buckingham WA (1982): Operation RANCH HAND: The Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia, 1961-1971. Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, Washington DC 10. Cecil PF (1986): Herbicidal Warfare: The RANCH HAND Project in Vietnam. Praeger Special Studies, Praeger Scientific, New York NY 11. Cecil PF, Sr., Young AL (2008): Operation FLYSWATTER: A War Within A War. Env Sci Pollut Res 15(1): 3-7 (Available from the Armed Forces Pest Management Board Literature Retrieval System, Accession No. 187736) 12. Downey RA (1967): Spray Aircraft for Mosquito Control. Memorandum for General Momyer. (Available from the Alvin L. Young Agent Orange Collection, National Agricultural Library, Accession No. 00229) 13. Brown JW (1962): Vegetational Spray Tests in South Vietnam, Biological Laboratories, US Army Chemical Corps, Fort Detrick MD (Available from the Alvin L. Young Agent Orange Collection, National Agricultural Library, Accession No. 00336) 14. CHECO Reports. Available through the Vietnam Center, Texas Tech University, Lubbock TX 79409-1041, website: www.lib.ttu.edu/vietnam 15. Collins CV (1967): Herbicide Operations in Southeast Asia, July 1961 – June 1967. Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, CHECO Division, Directorate, Technical Evaluation, HQ PACAF (Available from the Alvin L. Young Agent Orange Collection, National Agricultural Library, Accession No. 03116) 16. Clary JR (1971): RANCH HAND – Herbicide Operations in SEA. Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, CHECO/CORONA HARVEST Division, Directorate of Operations Analysis, HQ PACAF (Available from DTIC, Accession No. 7104020) 18 17. Barnette BH, Jr. Barrow JR (1973): Base Defense in Thailand. CHECO/CORONA HARVEST Division, Directorate of Operations Analysis, HQ PACAF (Available from DTIC, Accession No. 0581501) 18. Stoner RK, Jr. (1969): End of Tour Report, 11 September 1968 – 8 September 1969. Project CORONA HARVEST End of Tour Report (Available from the Paul Cecil Collection, The Vietnam Center, Texas Tech University, Lubbock TX, 79409-1041, website www.lib.ttu.edu/vietnam) 19. Secino JC (1969): USAF F-4 Defoliant Spray Project, Project CORONA HARVEST (Available from the Priessman Collection, The Vietnam Center, Texas Tech University, Lubbock TX, 79409-1041, website www.lib.ttu.edu/vietnam) 20. Schwartz RN (1966): Chemical Defoliation of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. WSEG Staff Study 127, Weapons System Evaluation Division, Institute for Defense Analyses, Arlington VA (Available from NTIS, Accession No. AD-30154341) 21. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (1968): The Herbicide Policy Review. A Report Commissioned by the American Ambassador to Vietnam. (Available from NTIS, Accession No. AD-779794; Available from the Alvin L. Young Agent Orange Collection, National Agricultural Library, Accession No. 03120) 22. Warren WF (1968): A Review of the Herbicide Program in South Vietnam, Scientific Advisory Group (Navy), FPO San Francisco 96610 (Available from NTIS, Accession No. AD-779797; Available from the Alvin L. Young Agent Orange Collection, National Agricultural Library, Accession No. 03121) 23. McDonald HG (1969): Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOB-65. Office of the Chief of Staff, Headquarters 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), APO San Francisco, 96383 (document from historical records, NARA, NVO 927627) 24. Larsen SR, Collins JL Jr. (1975): Vietnam Studies – Allied Participation in Vietnam. Chapter II, Thailand. Department of the Army, Washington DC (Available fom the Library, Army War College, Document No. DS557.V5U545 L3) 25. MACV (1968, 1969): Directive 525-1, Herbicide Procedures and Operations (revised 15 February 1966, revised 22 November 1967, revised 15 December 1968, revised 12 August 1969), US Military Assistance Command Vietnam, APO San Francisco CA 26. MACV (1968): Directive 525-1, Annex K, Chemical and Herbicide Operations: SOP to FFORCEV 011808Feb68, US Military Assistance Command, APO, San Francisco CA 27. Armed Forces Pest Control Board (1966): Pest Control in the Armed Forces. Armed Forces Pest Control Board, Forest Glen Section, WRAMC, Washington DC (Available from the Armed Forces Pest Management Literature Retrieval System, Accession No. 28090) 28. Young AL (2006): The History of the US Department of Defense Programs for the Testing, Evaluation, and Storage of Tactical Herbicides (Available from the Armed Forces Pest Management Board Literature Retrieval System, Accession No. 182581) 19 29. Department of Veterans Affairs (Updated 22 February 2012): Thailand Military Bases and Agent Orange Exposure. Public Health Notice, US Department of Veterans Affairs. http://www.publichealth.va.gov/exposures/agentorange/thailand.asp 30. United States Navy (1966): Pest Control Equipment Manual. Disease Vector Control Center, US Naval Air Station, Jacksonville Florida (Available from the Armed Forces Pest Management Board Literature Retrieval System, Accession No. 40631) 31. Tri-Service (1970): Herbicide Manual for Noncropland Weeds. Army TM 5-629, NAVFAC MO-314, AFM 91-19, Department of Defense, Washington DC (Available from the Armed Forces Pest Management Board Literature Retrieval System, Accession No. 167371) 32. Department of Defense (Revised 1 July 1977): Plan for Certification of Pesticide Applicators. Armed Forces Pest Control Board, WRAMC, Washington DC (Available from the Armed Forces Pest Management Board Literature Retrieval System, Accession No. 96815) 33. Kelch WJ (1981): Military Dogs and Canine Ehrlichiosis (Tropical Canine Pancytopenia) in the Vietnam War. Master’s Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS (Available from the Armed Forces Pest Management Board Literature Retrieval System, Accession No. 110623) BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF THE AUTHORS For more than 40 years, Dr. Alvin L. Young has been involved in issues surrounding the use of Herbicide Orange and other tactical herbicides in Vietnam. He completed his PhD in Herbicide Physiology and Environmental Toxicology at Kansas State University in 1968. In his 21 years with the USAF (obtaining the rank of Colonel), he was involved with the testing and evaluation of the equipment used in Operation RANCH HAND, Vietnam and with the environmental and human health studies with the USAF School of Aerospace Medicine and the Department of Veterans Affairs. He served as a Science Advisor on environmental issues including Agent Orange with the President’s Office of Science and Technology Policy. He was the Director of the Department of Energy’s Center for Risk Excellence. He was a Visiting Professor at the University of Oklahoma, 2001-2007, and has served as the Senior Consultant on Herbicide Orange for the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment). He has more than 300 publications in the scientific literature, including five books on issues related to Herbicide Orange and/or dioxins and furans, and Vietnam. From 2000 to 2012, He was the Editor-in-Chief of the international journal Environmental Science and Pollution Research. For the past ten years, Kristian L. Young has been the Principal Researcher for A.L. Young Consulting. He received his Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from DePaul University, Chicago (Magna Cum Laude, Phi Kappa Phi, and Pi Sigma Alpha). He received the Master of Arts in International Relations in 2010 through Webster University’s Global Program having studied in Europe and China. He has provided support to the company in areas of public policy, technical issues, archival research, and the coordination of national and international projects. 20 28 July, 2013 Subject: Critical Review by Loyd M. Wax of the following manuscript: INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE ALLEGATIONS OF AGENT ORANGE ON AIR BASES IN THAILAND, by A. L. Young and K. L. Young The authors have produced an outstanding manuscript based on an extensive search of all available records, reports, and various documents available through the National Archives and Records Administration, and other document depositories that deal with the use of “Tactical Herbicides” including Agent Orange in Thailand. They also complemented these findings by communication with retired military personnel who were in charge of various units and activities at the time of the alleged operations. This report provides a very effective introduction to the subject and gives a clear message as to the purpose and structure of the report. It describes the herbicide test program carried out on the Pranburi military reservation and then follows with very good background information about the primary aircraft used for application of herbicidal agents in Vietnam and Laos, as well as pointing out that some of the aircraft were used for insecticide applications for mosquito control both in Vietnam and in Thailand. The authors provide extensive information from various reports to indicate when, where, and how various herbicidal agents were used or not used, and clearly outlined the policies set up to govern the use of these agents. This report addresses the four main allegations and claims one by one, and effectively provides documentation to show that the allegations could not be substantiated, based on the extensive documents and reports and the rules governing the use of the herbicidal agents. 21 Based on the evidence provided, I am in complete agreement with the conclusion drawn by the authors in this report. Further, I compliment the authors highly on their exhaustive search through the literature and on the clear and forthright presentation of their findings. Loyd M. Wax 1962 - Ph.D., Univ. of Minnesota in Agronomy/Weed Science 1963-64-Second and First Lieutenant, U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Ft. Detrick, MD 1965-2002 - Research Agronomist (emphasis on weed science), USDA/ARS and Professor, Crop. Sci. Dept., Univ. of Illinois 2003 to present-Retired USDA/ARS and Emeritus Professor, Univ. of Illinois 2003 to present- Agricultural Crop Consultant 22