State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

LORENZO RICHARDSON,
Petitioner,
v.
VIDYA GANGADIN, CITY OF JERSEY CITY
BOARD OF EDUCATION PRESIDENT, AND
RAMON RIVERA, BOARD ATTORNEY,

Respondents.

 

JERSEY CITY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,

RONALD F. GRECO, JR., MONIQUE K.

ANDREWS AND ELLEN ZADROGA,
Petitioners,

V.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF
JERSEY CITY AND DR. MARCIA V. LYLES,
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE JERSEY CITY
PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

Respondents.

 

Lorenzo Richardson, 

INITIAL DECISION

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03062-16
AGENCY DKT. NO. 62-216

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05307?16
AGENCY DKT. NO. 85-3I16

(CONSOLIDATED)

New Jersey is an EquaI Opportunity Employer

 

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Stephen J. Edelstein, Esq., and Kyle J. Trent, Esq., for Vidya Gangadin and
Dr. Marcia V. Lyles (Schwartz Simon Edelstein Celso, attorneys)

Christina M. Michelson Abreu, Esq., for Ramon Rivera (Scarinci Hollenbeck,

attorneys)

Louis P. Bucceri, Esq., for the Jersey City Education Association, Ronald F.
Greco, Jr., Monique K. Andrews and Ellen Zadroga (BuOceri and Pincus,

attorneys)

Perry L. Lattibourdere, Esq., for the Board of Educaiton of the City of Jersey
City (Adams Gutierrez and Lattiboudere, attorneys)

Record Closed: October 19, 2016 Decided: October 19, 2016
BEFORE RICHARD ALJ:

This consolidated proceeding involves two petitions seeking various forms of
relief in regard to the renewal or nonrenewal of the contract of the Superintendent of the
Jersey City Public Schools. In one petition, Lorenzo Richardson, who is a member of
the Jersey City Board of Education (?Board?), argues primarily that the Board should be
required to vote on the renewal of the contract. Respondents Vidya Gangadin and
Ramon Rivera maintain that the case is moot and that the petition is without merit as a

matter of law.

In the other petition, the Jersey City Education Association and three
individuals contend that the Superintendent?s contract was not renewed by the Board Or
by operation of law. Respondents Dr. Marcia V. Lyles and the Board maintain that
these petitioners lack standing and that the Superintendent?s contract was renewed by

operation of law and seek dismissal of the petition.

 

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Richardson filed his petition with the Department of Education on March 1, 2016,
pursuant to the authority of the Commissioner of Education under N.J.S.A. 18Az6?9 to
hear and determine controversies and diSputes arising under the school laws. Along
with the petition, Richardson filed a motion for emergent relief. The matter was

transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law for. determination as a contested case.

On March 7, 2016, Gangadin filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to
petitioner's request for emergent relief. An oral argument in regard to the motion for
emergent relief was conducted on March 8, 2016, at the Office of Administrative Law in
Newark, New Jersey. The undersigned?s Order dated March 9, 2016, denying the
request for emergent relief, was adopted by the Commissioner in a Decision on

Application for Emergent Relief dated April 6, 2016.

Rivera joined in Gangadin?s motion to dismiss, and Richardson submitted papers

in opposition. Both respondents filed replies to Richardson?s Opposition papers;

On March 14, 2016, JCEA and the three individuals filed a petition of appeal with
the Commissioner of Education challenging the view that Dr. Lyles? contract was
renewed by'the Board or by operation of law. On April 4, 2016, Dr. Lyles filed a motion
to dismiss in lieu of answer pursuant to N.J.A.C. The Board filed a similar

motion on the same date.

On April 7, 2016, petition was transmitted to the Office of Administrative
Law for determination as a contested case. On May 5, 2016, JCEA filed a motion for
summary decision and a brief in support thereof and in opposition to the motion to
dismiss. On May 16, 2016, the undersigned moved sue to consolidate the two
matters. An Order consolidating the two matters was issued on June 3, 2016.

 

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By letter dated July 6, 2016, the undersigned advised the parties that the 
motions to dismiss would be considered first and set a schedule for additional
submissions and that motion for summary decision would be held in abeyance.
In accordance with the schedule, the Board and Dr. Lyles submitted separate replies to

opposition to their motions to dismiss.

The two petitions in this matter are similar, but they are sufficiently different that
it is more appropriate to consider them separately. The motion to dismiss Richardson?s

petition will be considered first.
PETITION OF LORENZO RICHARDSON

Richardson?s petition is not set forth in separate counts, but there are in effect
two main contentions. The first contention is that the failure to vote on Dr. Lyles? new
contract violated N.J.S.A. which relates to appointments of superintendents.
The second contention is that Dr. Lyles? contract was nonrenewed pursuant to N.J.S.A.

which concerns reappointments of superintendents.

The petition states that it seeks to summon a special meeting of the Board to 
convene and vote on the renewal of the Superintendent's contract before March 1,
2016, in accordance with a Resolution, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
BE IT RESOLVED that the Jersey City Board of Education hereby
approves the renewal of the Superintendent's employment contract for a term to be

decided before the end of the current contract.?

Respondent Gangadin?s motion to dismiss in regard to this matter is based
primarily on mootness. Respondent Rivera adds failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. For purposes of the latter type of motion, all facts alleged in the
complaint and all legitimate inferences therefrom are deemed admitted. Rieder v. Dep?t
of Transg, 221 151,4, m. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987).

 

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The essential factual allegations as set forth in the petition are as follows: Vidya
Gangadin is the president of the Board, Richardson and Gerald Lyons are members of
the Board, and Ramon Rivera is the Board attorney. Dr. Marcia V. Lyles has been the
Superintendent since August 2012, and her contract was due to expire on June 30,

2016. A provision of Dr. Lyles? contract states as follows:

11. RENEWAL OR NON-RENEWAL

The parties agree that prior to October 31, 2015, the Superintendent shall
notify the Board of her desire to extend her employment on the terms
offered or upon other terms upon which the parties may agree. The
Board agrees that by December 31, 2015 it shall notify the Superintendent
in writing whether it desires to renew this Agreement for an additional
period of time, and of the terms and conditions proposed for that period.
Failure to notify the Superintendent by that date of an intention to renew
will mean that an offer of renewal is not being made.

At a caucus meeting on December 15, 2015, Lyons and Richardson demanded
that the Superintendent?s contract be placed on the agenda for a Board meeting
scheduled for December 17,? 2015. With three of the nine members not voting due to
conflicts and Lyons and himself opposed, Richardson anticipated that the resolution to
renew would fail to receive the five-vote majority of the entire membership needed for
approval. Contrary to the request of Richardson and Lyons, the resolution as prepared
for the December 17 Board meeting said "not renew" as opposed to ?renewal.? This

resolution was also likely to fail to receive five votes and in effect be reason for renewal.

Richardson does not mention the December 17, 2015 meeting itself, but
Gangadin?s certification indicates that Richardson and Lyons were not present for that
meeting. With only four non~conflioted Board members present for the meeting,
Gangadin pulled the resolution from the Board?s agenda. As a result, there was no vote

on any resolution in regard to the Superintendent?s contract.

 

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On December 31, 2015 and thereafter, Board attorney Rivera advised the Board
that the Superintendent?s contract was automatically renewed because the Board failed

to notify her of nonrenewal by the December 31, 2015 deadline in her contract.

Lyons attempted to add his resolution to the agenda for the Board meeting on
January 21, 2016, but was unsuccessful. Richardson made another request to
Gangadin to place a resolution concerning the Superintendent?s contract on the agenda
for the February 18, 2016 Board meeting. The resolution was not placed on the
agenda. Richardson made a motion during that meeting to place the resolution on the
agenda. Lyons was willing to second the motion, but due to difficulties with his
connection from a remote location, he was unable to do so. As a result, the resolution
was not placed on the agenda and was not considered at the Board meeting on
February 18, 2016.

There were three opportunities, the Board meetings in December 2015 and
January and February 2016, to vote on the Superintendent?s contract. Nonetheless,

the Board members were not given the opportunity to vote on the contract.

Richardson relies on N.J.S.A. which provides that a board of
education may by contract appoint a superintendent of schools ?by the recorded roll call
vote of the full membership of the board.? Based upon this statute, petitioner argues
that the president of board must schedule, and that there must be, a vote of the
members of the board on the Superintendent?s contract. Richardson also cites N.J.S.A.
which provides as follows: 

At the conclusion of the term of the initial contract or of any subsequent
contract as hereinafter provided, the superintendent shall be deemed
reappointed for another contracted term of the same duration as the
previous contract unless either: a. the board by contract reappoints him
for a different term which term shall be not less than three nor more than
five years, in which event reappointments thereafter shall be deemed for
the new term unless a different term is again specified; or b. the board
notifies the superintendent in writing that he will not be reappointed at the
end of the current term, in which event his employment shall cease at the

 

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expiration of that term, provided that such notification shall be given prior
to the expiration of the first or any subsequent contract by a length of time
equal to 30 days for each year in the term of the current contract.

The difficulty with Richardson?s first argument is that N.J.S.A. uses
the word ?may? and is therefore permis'sive by its terms. Nonetheless, in the case of an
original appointment, there does not appear to be any alternative to an appointment
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18Az17?15. A reappointment differs in that N.J.S.A. 
provides that a superintendent may be deemed reappointed under certain
circumstances. In effect, a superintendent can be deemed reappointed by operation of

law.

As a general principle of statutory construction, a specific provision controls over
a general one. Williams v. Am. Auto Logistics, 226 117, 126 (2016). This case
involves a reappointment of a school superintendent. Because N.J.S.A. 
specifically relates to reappointments, it is the applicable statute in this case. it follows

that N.J.S.A. does not mandate a voteunder the circumstances of this case.

Gangadin and Rivera further argue that the issue is moot because the last date
for a vote would have been March 2, 2016, which is 120 days prior to the expiration of
the contract of Dr. Lyles in accordance with N.J.S.A. A case is moot when
the decision sought will have no practical effect on the controversy. Greenfield v. New
Jersey DeD?t of Corrections, 382 254, 257-58 (App. Div. 2006). Here, the
deadline of March 2, 2016, for a vote in regard to the renewal of Dr. Lyles? contract is

 

now in the past, and a timely vote is not possible. It follows that Richardson?s request
that the Commissioner allow a vote on a resolution concerning Dr; Lyles? contract is

now moot.

Richardson also relies on N.J.S.A. In the petition, Richardson
requested recognition of December 31, 2015, as the contract notification deadline and a
determination that Dr. Lyles? contract was not renewed in accordance with its terms

because the Board did not give notice of its intention to renew the contract by that date.

 

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The main difficulty with this request is that the relief would adversely affect the
Board and Dr. Lyles. It is noteworthy that JCEA seeks substantially the same relief
against the Board and Dr. Lyles. While Gangadin and Rivera are the proper
respondents in regard to the question of a vote, the same cannot be said for this type of
relief. Because the requested relief cannot be granted in a petition naming Gangadin
and Rivera and not the Board and Dr. Lyles as respondents, this portion of the petition
must be dismissed. Under the circumstances, I CONCLUDE that Richardson?s, petition

must be dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.

PETITION OF JCEA

 

The petition 'of JCEA, Ronald F. Greco, Jr., Monique K. Andrews and Ellen
Zadroga (collectiver is set forth in four counts. Count I requests a
determination that Dr. Lyles' contract was not authorized for renewal by December 31,
2015, and that the terms of her contract stand as written notice to her of her
nonrenewal, barring the application of N.J.S.A. to create an automatic
renewal of her contract. Count I seeks to enjoin the Board from continuing the
employment contract of Dr. Lyles as Superintendent after June 30, 2016, unless the
Board votes on a resolution to extend her contract by a majority vote of its full
membership. In the event that the matter is not resolved by June 30, 2016, JCEA
seeks an order requiring the immediate termination of the employment contract of Dr.

Lyles as Superintendent of Schools.

Set forth in the alternative to Count l, Count ll requests a determination that if
any notice of contract renewal was issued by an agent of the Board to Dr. Lyles before
or after December 31, 2015, it was null and void as outside the authority of the issuing
party due to a lack of Board action or authorization. JCEA again seeks the same relief

as. set forth in Count I.

Set forth in the alternative to Counts and II, Count Ill alleges that an election of

Board members was held in November 2015 and that the Board?s organizational

 

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meeting with the newly elected board members took place on January 5, 2016. JCEA
further alleges that allowing the lame duck Board sitting in December 2015 to
automatically renew Dr. Lyles? contract, which was not due to renew until June 30,
2016, after the new board took office in January 2016, constitutes a violation of the
common law prohibition barring a sitting board from binding a successor board to a
contract which will begin during the new Board's term. As a result, alteration of the
timelines specified in N.J.S.A. to set December 31, 2015, as the deadline
for automatic renewal would be contrary to the intent of that statute and create a
violation of the prohibition barring a sitting board from binding a successor board.

JCEA again seeks the same relief as set forth in Count I.

Set forth in the alternative to Counts I, ii and Ill, Count IV alleges that the
requested relief must be granted based upon events that have transpired since the
Board?s reorganization meeting on January 5, 2016. JCEA alleges that on two
occasions, January 21, 2016, and February 18, 2016, motions to add renewal of the
Superintendent?s contract to the agenda were rejected or failed to come to a vote. in
. each case, Dr. Lyles was present at the meeting and observed the Board's failure to
agree to even vote on the renewal of her contract. According to JCEA, each of these
instances constituted clear and adequate notice prior to March 2, 2016, such that Dr.
Lyles? contract was not subject to automatic renewal under N.J.S.A. 
Based upon the allegations in Count IV, JCEA requests the same relief as in Counts I,
ii and ill.

As respondents in this matter, the Board and Dr. Lyles have filed motions to
dismiss petition. First, respondents maintain that JCEA lacks standing to
challenge the Board?s conduct as it relates to the continued employment of Dr. Lyles as
. Superintendent of Schools. Second, respondents maintain that challenge is
moot. Third, respondents contend that Dr. Lyles? contract has automatically renewed
by operation of law. The Board also maintains that the petition should be dismissed
because the District should not be required to provide separate defenses to the same

claim.

 

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Standing will be considered first. In Count I of its petition, JCEA set forth the

facts in regard to itself and the three individual petitioners as follows:

1. Petitioner Ronald F. Greco Jr. is a citizen and taxpayer of the City
of Jersey City and the President of the Jersey City Education
Association (?the Association?). The AssOciation is the majority
representative for grievances and collective negotiations for non~
supervisory and non~administrative certificated and certain non-
certificated employees of the Jersey City Public School District.

2. Petitioner Monique K. Andrews is a citizen and taxpayer of the City
of Jersey City whose children attend the Jersey City public schools.

3. Petitioner Ellen Zadroga is a citizen and taxpayer of the City of
Jersey City.

Standing is a threshold justiciability determination whether the litigant is entitled
to initiate and maintain an action before a court or other tribunal. In re Six Month
Extension of N.J.A.C. 5:91, 372 84% 61, 85 (App. Div. 2004), certif. denied, 182
(34,4, 630 (2005). New Jersey cases have historically taken a liberal approach to the

 

issue of standing. Crescent Park Tenants Ass?n v. Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y., 58
98, 101 (1971). Wide recognition has been given to suits by associations. at
109. To have standing, a party must present a sufficient stake in the outcome of the
litigation, a real adverseness with respect to the subject matter and a substantial
likelihood that the party will suffer harm in the event of an unfavorable decision. mi
Camden County, 170 439, 449 (2002). When a case presents a question of
substantial public interest, any slight additional private interest harmonizing with the
public interest is sufficient to give standing. Falcone v. De Furia, 103 219, 226
(1986).

 

Here, Greco, Zadroga and Andrews are residents of Jersey. City and taxpayers.
These individuals have a legitimate interest in the orderly, efficient and legally sound
administration of the Jersey City public schools. Andrews has a child who attends the
Jersey City public schools as well as a niece and a nephew. Greco is an employee of

the Jersey City School District and the Association President. The Association

10

 

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represents its members who are likely to be impacted by determinations made by the
Superintendent. Zadroga has two children who are employed by the Board and two
grandchildren who are students in the District. Finally, the appointment of the
superintendent has a substantial impact on the public interest as the position of
superintendent affects the quality of the public schools and their administration. It
follows that JCEA has standing to bring the petition in this matter.

The Board and Dr. Lyles maintain that petition should be dismissed as
the claims are moot since Dr. Lyles maintains a statutory right to employment because I
her contract was already renewed by operation of law. Further, alternative

cententions are irrelevant and meritless.

The law in regard to mootness is set forth above. The motions to dismiss on the
basis of mootness prematurely assume that Dr. Lyles? contract has been renewed by
operation of law. This assumption is unwarranted without full consideration of the issue
on its merits. it follows that the motions to dismiss on the basis of mootness are without

independent merit.

Pursuant to N.J.A.C. a petition may be dismissed on the grounds that
petitioner has advanced no cause of action even if petitioner?s-factual assertiOns are
accepted as true. This rule is analogous to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted under a 4:62 With this type of motion, all
alleged facts and legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom are deemed

admitted. Rieder v. Dep?t of Transp., 221 Super. at 552.

Counts I, II and Ill relate to Dr. Lyles contract and specifically the section, which
is set forth above, pertaining to renewal or nonrenewal. In Count I, JCEA maintains in'
essence that the Board did not vote to renew Dr. Lyles? contract and that in accordance
with the terms thereof the failure to notify the Superintendent by December 31, 2015,

means that an offer of renewal is not being made. Since the litigation has not been

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resolved by June 30, 2016, JCEA seeks the immediate termination of Dr. Lyles as the
Superintendent of Schools.

In Count Ill, JCEA maintains that allowing the lame duck Board sitting in
December 2015 to renew Dr. Lyles? contract, which remained in effect until June 30,
2016, which is after the new board took office in January 2016, would constitute a
violation of the common law prohibition barring a prior board from binding a sUccessor
board to a contract which will begin during the new board's term. Further, the alteration
of the timelines specified in N.J.S.A. to set December 31, 2015, as the
deadline for automatic contract renewal would be contrary to the intent of the statute.

JCEA seeks the same relief as in Count l.

position raises two. concerns as to the validity of the section of Dr. Lyles'
contract pertaining to renewal or nonrenewal. The first concern is that this section
violates the prohibition barring a sitting board frOm binding a successor board. The

second concern is that the section is inconsistent with N.J.S.A. 

The common law rule is that "an official empowered to appoint a public officer
may not forestall the rights and obligations of his successor by making an appointment
where the term of the appointee will not take effect until after the expiration of the term
of the appointing officer.? Georgia v. Suruda, 154 N.J. Super. 439, 448 (Law. Div.
1977). This principle was applied in Gonzalez v. Bd. of Educ. of the Elizabeth Sch.
 325 NJ. Super. 244 (App. Div. 1999), where a board of education gave its
superintendent notice one year before the expiration of his term, as was required by
N.J.S.A. at the time, that his contract would not be renewed. Thereafter,
on February 8, 1995, the board of education appointed a new superintendent for a term
of three years beginning on July 1, 1996, when the prior superintendent?s term expired.
After the annual school board election on May 1, 1996, the newly constituted board
reappointed the former superintendent to that position and returned the individual
appointed by the old board to his prior position as assistant superintendent. On appeal

by the individual appointed superintendent on February 8, 1995, the court determined

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that N.J.S.A. did not empower the old board to appoint a new
superintendent at the time that it gave notice of nonrenewal to the prior superintendent.
The principle barring an outgoing board from binding its successor applied in this 
situation, and the appointment of the new superintendent on February 8, 1995, was

void initio.

Here, Dr. Lyles? contract expired on June 30, 2016, and in accordance with
N.J.S.A. the Board had until March 2, 2016, to inform her as to
nonrenewal of her contract. According to the terms of Dr. Lyles? contract, the date for
the Board to advise her as to renewal or nonrenewal was extended to December 31,
2015. While a board of education may give notice at any time prior to the expiration of
the minimum period for notice required by N.J.S.A. the effect of the
contract provision was to give the old board the authority to make the determination as
to renewal or nonrenewal of the Superintendent?s contract for term to begin after the
new board takes office. This result is fundamentally inconsistent with the principle that
an outgoing board cannot bind its successor by making an appointment which does not
take effect until after the expiration of the term of the appointing officer} It follows that

the section of Dr. Lyles? contract concerning renewal or nonrenewal is not valid.

The second concern is whether the section of Dr. Lyles' contract concerning
renewal or nonrenewal is consistent with N.J.S.A. which provides in
pertinent part that the superintendent is deemed reappointedfor another term, unless
the board provides him with timely written notice that he will not be renewed. Reversing
the consequences of lack of notification, the contract provides that to notify
the Superintendent by [December 31, 2015] of an intention to renew will mean that an

offer of renewal is not being made.?

The question is whether the parties may alter the provisions of the statute by
contract. In some instances, the provisions of a statute may not be altered by contract.
In Spiewak v. Rutherford Bd. of Educ, 90 63, 66 (1982), the Court stated as
follows:

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[P]ublic employees and employers may not agree to contractual terms
that contravene a specific term or condition of employment set by a
statute. ?If the legislature establishes a specific term or condition of
employment that leaves no room for discretionary action, then negotiation
on that term is fully preempted.? at 76 (citation omitted)]

In Spiewak, the Court determined that this principle applies to tenure rights. In contrast,
where a statute by its terms provides for discretion, the parties may agree to contract
provisions within the range thereof. Wright v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of East Orange,
99 M112, 119 (1985).

N.J.S.A. states in part that the superintendent ?shall? be deemed
reappointed. This language is mandatory in nature, but the term ?shall? is modified by
the word ?unless? which applies in two situations. One is not relevant to this case, and
the second relates to a situation where the board provides timely notice in writing that
the superintendent will not be reappointed at the end of the current term. The provision
as to notice allows some discretion in that a board could provide a longer period for
notice provided that it did not violate some other provision of law such as the rule
barring a sitting board from binding a successor board as to an appointment which
takes effect during the term of the latter. Nonetheless, the discretion does not extend
to reversing the statdtes central purpose which was to provide that in the ab?sence of
timely written notice, the superintendent is deemed reappointed for another contract
term. It follows that the section of Dr. Lyles? contract related to renewal and nonrenewal

is invalid because it conflicts with a mandatory provision of N.J.S.A. 

These principles can now be applied to Counts I, ll and ill. With respect to
Count I, JCEA maintains that the Board did not give Dr. Lyles notice of its intention to
renew the contract by December 31, 2015, and therefore, the terms of Dr. Lyles'
contract give her written notice of her nonrenewal, barring the application of N.J.S.A.
to renew her contract automatically. The difficulty with JCEA's argument is
that the section of Dr. Lyles? contract concerning renewal or nonrenewal is invalid and

has no effect. It follows that Count I of petition must be dismissed.

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Count II is set forth in the alternative to Count I and states in part ?If any notice of
contract renewal was issued by an agent of the board to Dr. Lyles before or after
December 31, 2015, petitioners submit it is null and void as outside the authority of the
issuing party due to lack of board action or authorization . . . It is noteworthy that
Count ll does not actually allege additional facts and that there is no indication in the
other papers that any such notice was ever issued to Dr. Lyles. It follows that Count II

does not state any cause of action and should be dismissed.

Count is set forth in the alternative to Counts and II and states in essence
that allowing the lame duck Board sitting in December 2015 to automatically renew the
contract of Dr. Lyles would constitute a violation of the common law principle barring a
prior board from binding a successor board to a contract which will begin during the
new board?s term. assertion that the section of Dr. Lyles' contract pertaining to
renewal or .nonrenewal violates the above-mentioned common law principle has been
accepted as correct. Nonetheless, that assertion does not lead to the conclusion that
the requested relief should be granted. Rather, the present situation is governed by
N.J.S.A. without regard to the contract provision. Because Count does

not warrant any relief, it should be dismissed.

In Count IV, JCEA alleges that events in January and February 2016 constitute
clear and adequate notice to Dr. Lyles that the Board did not intend to renew her
contract. According to JCEA, Dr. Lyles was present at Board meetings on January 21,
2016, and February 18, 2016, where motions to add renewal of her contract to the

agenda were rejected or did not come to vote.

The question is whether it can legitimately be inferred from the meetings in
January and February 2016 that the Board did not intended to renew Dr. Lyles?
contract. A key consideration With respect to this question is that at the meeting on
December 17, 2015, its attorney had advised the Board that the notice of nonrenewal
had to be given to the Superintendent by December 31., 2015, or her contract would be

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OAL DKT. NOS. EDU 03062-16 and EDU 05307-16

renewed under State law. In view of this advice, the only reasonable inference is that
the Board did not address Dr. Lyles' contract during the meetings in January and
February 2016, because members. believed that the contract was already renewed. It is I
not a legitimate inference that the Board did not address the matter during its meetings
in January and February 2016 because members had the intention to advise Dr. Lyles
of nonrenewal of her contract. Additionally, the Board never gave Dr. Lyles notification

that her contract would not be renewed. It follows that Count IV must be dismissed.

The purpose of N.J.S.A. is to give superintendents a measure of job
seCurity. Gonzalez v. Bd. of Educ. of the Elizabeth Sch. Dist, 325 N.J. Super. at 254.
This case presents a good example of a situation where a superintendent should not
lose her employment because two members oppose her and the board of education
cannot make a decision requiring a majority its full membership as the result of
conflicts. It follows that petition should be dismissed in its entirety with

prejudice.

Based upon the above, I CONCLUDE that both petitions in this matter should be
dismissed. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

1. Richardson's petition be dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.

2. petition be dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.

I hereby FILE this initial decision with the COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.

This recommended decision may be adopted, modified or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Commissioner of the Department of

Education does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and

unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become .

a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:148-10.

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Within thirteen days from the date on Which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500, marked "Attention: Exceptions." A copy of any exceptions must be sent
to the judge and to the other parties.

 

 

 

I October 19, 2016  
DATE RICHARD ALJ
Date Received at Agency: October 19. 2016
Date Mailed to Parties: October 19, 2016

 

Ijb

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