VETERANS
AFFAIRS





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PRACTICE MANUAL
VETERANS AFFAIRS
PREFACE
This Practice Manual is issued by the Civil Division of
the Department of Justice for the exclusive use of Gov~rnment attorneys in connection with civil litigation arising under the provisions of federal legislation relating
to veterans. The material contained herein should greatly
:r:e?uc~ the a~o.unt of research need~d to effectively handle
litigation ar1s1ng under the subJect headings treated
her ein. The use of the material contained in this Manual
should also eliminate the necessity for much correspondence with the Civil Division in this area of litigation and
permit the earlier disposition of litigated cases.
Revised and supplement ary pages will be issued as
necessary. It is essential that all additions be incorporated
in the Manual as soon after their receipt as possible. Interim reports on decisions of special significance affecting
the precedential value of authorities cited in the Manual
will be included f r om time to time in the U. S. Attorneys
Bulletin.
Acknowledgment is made to Edward E. Odom, General
Counsel, and David A. Turner, Associate General Counsel,
of the Veterans' Administration for their assistance
throughout the preparation of the Manual as well as to
the personnel of the Veterans' Affairs Section of the Civil
Division under the guidance of its Acting Chief, Russell
Chapin. Some measure of tribute is also due to D. Vance
Swann who as Chief of the Veterans' Affairs Section for
a number of years prior to his untimely death on February 13, 1954, played a significant part in the development
of this branch of law.
Comments and suggestions from the field for further
r evision or additions are invited.
•

WARREN

E.

BURGER

Assistant Attorney General
Civil Division

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PRACTICE MANUAL
VETERANS AFFAIRS

TABLE OF TITLES
Page

Administrative Subpoenas____________________________________________ 1
Contractual Disposition of Personalty Under the Vesting
Statute________________

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Escheat_______________ _

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Finality_________________________

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United States Government Life and War Risk Insurance ________________ 66
National Service Life Insurance________ ___________________________________232
Loan Guaranty and Insurance_

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Reemployment Rights ·- - -- - - - --

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 ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
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§1. Intr oduction --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
§2. Terms and application of 38 U.S.C. 131 ----------------------------------------- 4

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§20. Inquiries which may properly be the vehicle for exercise
of the administrative subpoena power_____________________________ 7
§21. Demand contained in subpoena must be kept within
reasonable limits ------------------------------- --------------- - - - - 8
§22. Refusal of witness to comply with subpoena duces
tecum on claim of privilege against self-incrimination ------------------------------- - - - - - - --13
§40. Duty of the courts to enforce proper demands of administrative subpoenas _ ___________ _ _ _ _ _ ________ _________14
§41. Procedure for enforcement of administrative subpoenas --------------------------------- ----- - - - - -16
Appendix___________

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ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS
§1.

INTRODUCTION

. It has lo~g b_een recognized that Congress cannot effec~1vely ex~rc1se its J?OWer to legislate unless it has adequate
information and, in order to obtain such information it
may compel testimony and the production of books do~u­
ments, records and other evidence. McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U.S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 319, 71 L. Ed. 580, 50 A.L.R. 1.
Administrative agencies, such as the Veterans Administration, are similarly in need of factual information concerning matters within their respective jurisdictions in
order that they may carry out the mandates given them
by Congress and decide controversies which come before
them. Report of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure, S. Doc. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.,
p. 414.
In some respects, the fact finding function of administrative agencies is similar to that of a grand jury, or of
a court in issuing pretrial orders for the discovery of
evidence. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632,
642, 70 S. Ct. 357, 94 L. Ed. 401; Woolley v. United
States, 97 F. 2d 258 (C.A. 9); Consolidated Mines v.
S.E.C., 97 F. 2d 704 (C.A. 9). It is certain that the power
to compel testimony and the production of records and
other data is as essential to the work of many administrative agencies as the corresponding power of Congress is
to the effective functioning of the legislative branch of
the Government. "Experience has taught that mere requests for such information often are unavailing and also
that information which is voluntary is not always accurate or con1plete, so some means of compulsion are
essential to obtain what is needed, if the Act is to be fairly
applied without discrimination, and so Congress, considering these matters, gave to the Administrator a broad
power of inquiry with enforcing process."1 Walling v.
La Belle S. S. Co., 148 F. 2d 198 (C.A. 6) (involving the
subpoena provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act) .
While the subpoena authority of the Veterans AdminAdministrative agencies may obtain needed information in various ways.
By statute, Congress has given most agencies the authority (1) to require
reports, (2) to inspect books, records and premises, (3) to subpoena witnesses and documents, or ( 4) some combination thereof. Report of the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, S. Doc. 8, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 414. As that report indicates, the subpoena is the one
power most frequently employed by some agencies.
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is tra ti on has been
d
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use made of that use s~armgly, as compared with the
bureaus, it is none~~tyority by other departments and
e ess an important adjunct to the
powers of that a
pends more than
.roie Veterans A~min~s~rati~n exthe needs of m ' th ' ,000 annually m mm1stermg to
the dependents ~r~ b an lq,o~o,ooo living veterans and
dead Annual R n ene ciaries of veterans living and
Affairs for 1954 e:igrbof the Administrator of Veterans'
is estimated th' t . oc. ~' 84th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1. It
rendered each a appro x~mately 4,000,000 decisions are
ye':Lr on c1 aims filed with the Veterans Ad. .
.
:~<l!~~tif n. Wh~le t~at agency finds it possible to obtain
. n or!llat10n m most cases without compulsion
except10nal circumstances do require resort to use of th~
subpoen~ power to detect or prevent fraud and to protect
the pubhc purse. Cf. Carroll Vocational Institute v. United
States, 21~ F. 2d 539 (C.A. 5); General Trades School
Inc. v. United States, 212 F. 2d 656 (C.A. 8). The most
common use of the s~bpoena power in recent years appears to have been in connection with the nationwide
audit of schools receiving moneys under the educational
and vocational rehabilitation provisions of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944. See e.g. Carroll Vocational Institute v. United States, 211 'F. 2d 539 (C.A. 5);
General Trades School, Inc. v. United States, 212 F. 656
(C.A. 8).
A subpoena may be used for the purpose of compelling
the testimony of a witness (subpoena ad testificandum)
or to compel the production of books, papers, documents
and other evidence (subpoena duces tecum). While the
subpoena duces tecum usually contains an ad testificandum clause (Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 31 S.
Ct. 538, 55 L. Ed. 771), failure to incorporate such a clause
does not in any way invalidate or destroy the effect of the
subpoena duces tecum. Essgee Co. v. United States, 262
U.S. 151, 43 S. Ct. 514, 67 L. Ed. 917. If the ad testificandum clause has been incorporated in a subpoena duces
tecum unnecessarily, it may be disregarded as surplusage. McGarry v. S.E.C., 147 F. 2d 389 (C.A. 10).
This title of the Practice Manual is primarily concerned
with the use of administrative sub~oenas by the.Ve~erans
Administration and the construction and application of
the subpoena statute enacted for the benefit of that
agency. However, reference has b~en m!lde to nu!lle~ous
cases decided under other statutes in which the pr1nc1ples

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ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS

involved are applicable either directly or by analo~y.
The sectional numbering system will permit t he inclusion
of additional subject matter from time t o time.
§2. TERMS AND APPLICATION OF 38 U.S.C. 131
§300 of the Act of June 29, 1936, 49 Stat. 2033 [P.L. 844,
74th Cong., 2nd Sess.], 38 U.S.C. 131, confers authority
upon the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, and other
p~rsonnel designated by him, to issue administr ative subpoenas. That statute provides in pertinent par t as follows:
For the purposes of the laws administered by the
Veterans' Administration, the Administr ator of Veterans' Affairs, and those employees to whom the Ad-.
ministrator may delegate such author ity, to the ex-:
tent of the authority so delegated, shall have the
power to issue subpoenas for and compel the attendance of witnesses within a r adius of one hundred
miles from the place of hearing, to require the production of books, papers, documents, and other evidence, and to make investigations and examine witnesses upon any matter within the jurisdiction of the
Administration. 2
This statute has been incor porated by reference in
Title V of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944
r elating to r eadjustment allowances (see 38 U.S.C. 696j),
in the National Ser vice Life Insurance Act (see 38 U.S.C.
816), in the Servicemen's Indemnity Act (see 38 U.S.C.
858) and in Title II of the Veterans' Readjustment Act
of .1952 which relates to educational and vocational assist• R.S.- 184, 186, 5· U.S.C. 94, 96, February 14, 1871, authorized the head of

any department or bureau to apply to the judge or clerk of any court of
the United States for the issuance of a subpoena for the purpose of questioning witnesses concerning claims pending against the United States in
the department or agency concerned. §3 of the Act of July 25, 1882, 22 Stat.
f75, as amended, 38 U.S.C. 124, noting the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 94 made
~pecific provision for the issuance of subpoenas on application of th~ Commission~r of Pensi.ons fo! the p~rpos~ of. inves.tigatin~ or examining into
the merits of pension claims. This legislation still retamed the requirement
that the Comm.issioner apply to a judge or clerk of a court of the United
States for the issuance of a subpoena. §15 of the War Risk Insurance Act
as amended by the. Act of Oc~ober 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 398 [P.L. 90, 65th Cong.:
1st Sess.], authonzed the Director ~f the Bureau of War Risk Insurance
a_nd other officers of that .agency to issue subpoenas without prior applicaticm to a court of the Un~ted ~tat~s. ';[1he language of · that legislation, like
the present statute,, authorized mqmry mto any matter within the jurisdiction
of the agency. Unlike the Act. of July 25, 1882, it also authorized the subpo~na of books, papers, do~uments and other evidence. When the laws relatmg to ve.terans were revised and codified in 1924 comparable p
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f or th e issuance
of a d mm1strative
subpoenas were ' included in §8rovisions
of th
World War Veterans' Act, 43 Stat. 609, 38 U.S.C. 431 [P.L. 242, 68th Con e
1st. Se~s.]. 38 U.~.C. 124. and 431 were repealed and superseded by th
which 1s quoted m par t m the text above.
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980. However, the statute speaks
b th V
~ t e purposes of the laws administered
Y .e . et~r~ns Administration" and "any matter within
~he JUr1sd1ction of the Administration." This language
is broad enoug~ to include all matters within the field of
~w~rs ~nd duties of the Veterans Administration in adnister1ng and enforcing the veterans' laws, even though
enacted after the subpoena statute and it has been so construed. Carroll Vocational Institute v. United States, 211
F. 2d 539 (C.A. 5); General Trades School, Inc. v. United
States, 212 F. 2d 656 (C.A. 8); Chapman v. Maren Elwood
College, 225 F. 2d 230 (C.A. 9).
In Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 62 S. Ct.
651, 86 L. Ed. 895, decided under the Fair Labor Standards. Act, the Supreme Court ruled that the function of
s1g!11ng and issuing administrative subpoenas was one
wh1c? .could not be delegated in the absence of statutory
prov1s1on therefor. But cf. Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking
& Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 67 S. Ct. 1129, 91 L. Ed. 1375,
subsequently decided under the provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act. No doubt should prevail as to the
right of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to delegate to subordinate officials of the Veterans Administration the authority to sign and issue subpoenas since the
statute, unlike those construed in the Supreme Court,
expressly provides for the delegation of such authority.

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u.s.c. 131.

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Congressional recognition of the necessity and importance of the subpoena power to administrative agencies
is amply demonstrated by the many instances in which
such authority has been given to them. A partial recapitulation of the acts in which subpoena power has been conferred upon administrative agencies is contained in the
appendix h~reinafter. Although Co~gress inclu?~d a p:ovision relating to agency subpoenas in the Adm1n1strative
Procedure Act (see §6 of that Act, 60 Stat. 240 [P.L. 404,
79th Cong., 2nd ·s ess.], 5 U.S.C. 1005), it does not appear
that this enactment was intended to change the law relating to administrative subpoenas in any substantial re-

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a Veterans' Administration Regulation .1 formally delega~es .the power to
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· ue subpoenas to "Managers and actmg managers of d1str1ct offices, re\_
·s nal offices and centers having district office and/or regional office activr ~·~s and su~h other employees to whom such authority is delegated by the
Ad~inistrator through 'Administrator's Authorization Orders.'" See 13 F.R.
6997; 14 F.R. 5806, 5855.

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spect.' Cf. D. G. Bland Lumber Co. v. N.L.R.B., 177 F. 2d
555 (C.A. 5), and Tobin v. Banks & Rumbaugh, 201F.2d
223 (C.A. 5), certiorari denied, 345 U.S. 942, 73 S. Ct. 832,
97 L. Ed. 1368, discussed in Footnote 6 following §20
hereinafter.
Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
relates to the issuance and enforcement of subpoenas, has
no application to administ r ative subpoenas. Bowles v. Bay
of N. Y. Coal & Supply Co., 152 F. 2d 330 (C.A. 2); and see
the Notes of the Advisor y Committee on Rules reprinted
following Rule 45 in 38 U.S.C. Although the Notes of the
Advisory Committee indicate subpoenas of the Veterans
Administration may be served anywhere within the
United States, it should be noted that 38 U.S.C. 131 does
not require the attendance of a witness if the distance involved is more t han 100 miles.
' The Attorney General, whose agreement to the bill which becam~ . the
Administrative P rocedure Act was important, stated that these provisions
merely restated existing law, and a Senate Judiciary Committee Print of
June 1945 is of like effect. See S. Doc. 248, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp 27,
206, 227' 265, 411.

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§20. INQUIRIES WHICH MAY PROPERLY BE THE
VEHICLE F OR EXERCISE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUBP OE NA P OWE R
. The constitutionality of legislation authorizing the
issuance of administrative subnoenas is beyond dispute.
l.C.C. v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447~ 14 S. Ct. 1125, 38 L. Ed.
1047; Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
186, 66 S. .c~. 494,. 90 L. Ed. 614. However, this is not to say
!hat adm1n1strative agencies ar e thereby given license to
in~erroga.te ~ny. w!tness or subpoena r ecords and other
evidence ind1scr1m1nately in the hope that something discreditable will t urn up. Ellis v. I.C.C., 237 U.S. 434, 35 S.
Ct. 645, 59 L. Ed: 1036. F.T.C. v. American Tobacco Co.,
246 U.S. 298, 44 S. Ct. 336, 68 L. Ed. 696, 32 A.L.R. 786. A
fishing expedition conducted through the instrumentality
of a subpoena duces tecum falls within the interdiction of
the 4th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States which guards against unreasonable searches and
seizures. F .T.C. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 298,
44 S. Ct. 336, 68 L_Ed. 696, 32 A.L.R. 786.
It is not necessary that a charge or complaint be pending in order to justify the issuance of an administrative
subpoena. 5 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Wailing, 327
U.S.186, 66 S. Ct. 494, 90 L. Ed. 614; S.E.C. v. Vacuum Can
Co., 157 F. 2d 530 (C.A. 7), certiorari denied, 330 U.S. 820,
67 S. Ct . 770, 91 L. Ed.1271; Consolidated Mines v. S.E.C.,
97 F. 2d 704 (C.A. 9); cf. McGarry v. S.E.C., 147 F. 2d 389
(C.A. 10). The purpose of the administrative investigation ordinarily is not to prove a pending charge but to
obtain evidence upon which to make a charge. Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.186, 66 S. Ct. 494,
90 L. Ed. 614. Congress has made no requirement that
there be a showing of "probable cause" as in the case of
a warr ant. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 66 S. Ct. 494, 90 L. Ed. 614; Bowles v. Insel, 148
F. 2d 91 (C.A. 3); Provenzano v. Porter, 159 F. 2d 47 (C.A.
9), certiorari denied, 331 U.S. 816, 67 S. Ct.1303, 91 L. Ed.
1834; Mines & Metals Corp. v. S.E.C., 200 F. 2d 317 (C.....\.
9) certiorari denied, 345 U.S. 941, 73 S. Ct. 832, 97 L. Ed.
13G7· Westside Ford, Inc. v. United States, 206 F. 2d 627
(C.A'. 9). It is sufficient that the investigation or inquiry
is one which the demanding agency is authorized by law
to make. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Wailing, 327
11 Cf. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S.. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652, applying the
same principle in the case of a grand Jury.

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U.S. 186, 66 S. Ct. 494, 90 L. Ed. 614; S.E.C. v. Vacuum
Can Co., 157 F. 2d 530 (C.A. 7), certiorari denied, 330 U.S.
820, 67 S. Ct. 770, 91 L. Ed. 1271.
Because of the broad language of 38 U.S.C. 131 and the
clear cut boundaries of authority established for the Veterans Administration by statute, little difficulty should be
encountered in determining what matters are properly
the subject
of inquiry under that agency's subpoena
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power. Cf. Carroll Vocational Institute v. United States,
211 F. 2d 539 (C.A. 5); General Trades School, Inc. v.
United States, 212 F. 2d 656 (C.A. 8); and see §2 above.
The administrative subpoena may not be used for a purpose not intended by the statute. 7 See, e.g., In re Merchant
Mariners Documents Issued to Dimitratos, 91 F. Supp.
426 (N.D. Calif.) in which subpoenas were sought for the
purpose of impounding documents held by merchant seamen to prevent their use by them. Cf. Chapman v. Maren
Elwood College, 225 F. 2d 230 (C.A. 9).
§21. DEMAND CONTAINED IN SUBPOENA MUST
BE KEPT WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS
In the preceding section, it was pointed out that an
agency investigation may be so sweeping in nature and
so unrelated to matters properly the subject of inquiry
as to offend the 4th Amendment to the Constitution of
e A more difficult question would normally be presented if the jurisdiction
of the agency concerned depended upon the determination of coverage under
the Commerce Clause as, e.g., in cases investigated under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. However, in those cases it is held to be sufficient to withstand challenge to the Administrator's preliminary right of investigation,
including use of the subpoena power, if it can be shown that it is possible
for the Wage Hour Division of the Labor Department to find coverage.
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S. Ct. 494, 90
L. Ed. 614; Tobin v. Banks & Rumbaugh, 201 F. 2d 223 (C.A. 5), certiorari
denied, 345 U.S. 942, 73 S. Ct. 832, 97 L. Ed. 1368; cf. Endicott Johnson
Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 63 S. Ct. 339, 87 L. Ed. 424 (arising under
the Walsh Healey Act relating to public contracts); D. G. Bland Lumber Co.
v. N.L.R.B., 177 F. 2d 555 (C.A. 5); and cf. Blair v. United States, 250 U~S.
273, 39 S. Ct. 468, 63 L. Ed. 979 (involving an attempt to challenge the
jurisdiction of a grand jury). In the Tobin and D. G. Bland Lumber Company
cases it was pointed out that the Administrative Procedure Act, when originally introduced as a bill in Congress, included a provision that would have
permitted litigation of the question of coverage in a subpeona proceeding
but that such language was removed, thus following the rule laid down in
the Endicott Johnson Corporation case. This further verifies the statement
contained in §2 above that the Administrative Procedure Act made no
change in the law relating to administrative subpeonas.
7 An administrative subpoena may be used to obtain information for use in
a quasi-judicial proceeding involving the determination of the merits of a
claim, in a quasi-legislative proceeding, as for the establishment of rates
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, or, more commonly, in an investigative capacity to obtain information and evidence.

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~h~0 ~ni~ed States. The legality of a particular subpoena

is

e Judge_d in _the same manner. 8 The 4th Amendment
? :s not bar inq~iry so long as the scope of the subpoena
is ieasonable. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,
321 f!·S: 707, 64 S. Ct. 805, 88 L. Ed.1024; Oklahoma Press
Publishing ~o. v. Walling, 327 U.S.186, 66 S. Ct. 494, 90 L.
Ed. 614; United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632,
70 S. Ct.. 357, 94. L. Ed. 401. "The process is lawful if it
~onfines ~ts requirements within the limits which reason
imposes in the circumstances of the particular case."
McGarry v. S.E.C., 147 F. 2d 389 (C.A. 10). The 4th
-f\..mend;nent guards against abuse only by way of too much
indefiniteness or breadth in the things required Oklahoma
Press Publishing ~o. v. Walling, 327 U.S.186, 6G S. Ct. 494,
90 L. Ed. 614; United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S.
632, 70 S. Ct. 357, 94 L. Ed. 401.
Although the criteria for determining the "reasonableness" of a subpoena cannot be reduced to a formula
(Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186,
66 S. Ct. 494, 90 L. Ed. 614), it is generally stated that a
subpoena is sufficient if it (1) indicates the subject matter
of the inquiry (Cf. the preceding section), (2) describes
the books and papers desired specifically enough to identify them, (3) demands records covering a reasonably
limited period of time, and (4) the records demanded are
relevant to the inquiry.9 See l\'1cGarry v. S.E.C., 147 F.
2d 389 (C.A. 10); Bowles v. Beatrice Creamery Co., 146
F. 2d 774 (C.A. 10). The element of materiality or relevance is usually the most important consideration in determining whether the production of records or other
evidence demanded may properly be required.
The standards of materiality and relevance applied in
proceedings for the enforcement of agency subpoenas are
much less rigid than those applied in determining the admissibility of evidence in the trial of a case. I.C.C. v. Baird,
194 U.S. 25, 24 S. Ct. 563, 48 L. Ed. 860; Woolley v. United
States, 97 F. 2d 258 (C.A. 9); Hagen v. Porter, 156 F. 2d
362 ( C.A. 9), certiorari denied, 329 U.S. 729, 67 S. Ct. 85,
91 L. Ed. 631. Relevance and materiality are to be determined by standards more nearly like those applied in pre0

Most of the decided cases involve the question of the reasonableness of
subpoenas duces tecum as distinguished from subpoenas ad testificandum.

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e §6 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 240 [P.L. 404, 79th Cong.,
2nd Sess.], 5 U.S.C. 1006, states that agency subpoenas shall be issued "upon
8 statement or showin-¥ of general relevance and reaso?~ble scope of the
evidence sought." This is but a restatement of the prevadmg rule.

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trial discovery proceedings. Oklahoma Press Publis~f/
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S. Ct. 494, 90 L. Ed.
·
The. agency issuing the subpoen~ need not make a finding that the records sought are 1n fact rel~vant before
seeking their production. Penfield Co. of Cabf. v. S.E.C.,
143 F. 2d 746 (C.A. 9), 154 A.L.R. 1027, certiorari denied,
323 U.S. 768, 65 S. Ct. 121, 89 L. Ed. 614. Nor must the demand be limited to the records which the party served
considers to be relevant. Cf. Fleming v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 114 F. 2d 384 (C.A. 7), certiorari denied, 311
U.S. 690, 61 S. Ct. 71, 85 L. Ed. 446. As the Supreme Court
stated in Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S.
541, 554, 28 S. Ct. 178, 52 L. Ed. 327, "We see no reason
why all such books, papers and correspondence which related to the subject of inquiry, and were described with
reasonable detail, should not be called for and the company directed to produce them. Otherwise the State would
be compelled to designate each particular paper which it
desired, which presupposes an accurate knowledge of
such papers, which the tribunal desiring the papers would
probably rarely, if ever, have." In many cases, the materiality of the documents desired will appear from the face
of the subpoena. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 276 U.S.
134, 48 S. Ct. 288, 72 L. Ed. 500; Provenzano v. Porter, 159
F. 2d 47 (C.A. 9), certiorari denied, 331 U.S. 816, 67 S. Ct.
1303, 91 L. Ed. 1834.
While it is sometimes stated that the records demanded
by a subpoena duces tecum should cover only a limited
period of time (see the 1st paragraph of this section), the
relevance of the records sought would appear to be the
overriding consideration in determining whether or not
production should be required. Thus, a demand for records
as much as ten years old may be unreasonable when considered in conjunction with other circumstances, such as
a demand that the recor~s be b~ought a long distance
(See, e.g., Bank of America National Trust & Savings
Assn. v. Douglas, 105 F. 2d 100 (C.A. D.C.), 123 A.L.R.
1266), and yet perfectly proper in the context of a different set of f acts. 10
10

Thd

Administrator of Veterans' Affairs has promulgated a regul t•
•th
regar 3t8o tCheFrRetention of ce~ail_l records for a period of not less fh~~n
years.
. . . 21.672. While it has been
t d d th
.
ree
serves to limit the authority of the Veterans Adon.1 e.nt e t• at this regulation
records (See Chapman v. Maren Elwood Colleg: ~~ Fa ~dn t~ su(CbpAoena o.Id~r
clear that the thrust of the regulati 1· d"1
'
•
• • 9), it is
n.ot their destruction, and that it wa:~ : . [ec~e~ to the r~tention of records,
ri~ht of the Veterans Administration t~ Ibte~ e Ito and did not abrogate the
without regard to any such narrow restricti~1; 0rfe teyant Irfectohrds by subpoena
ime.
e records are in

t'b1

20

 ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS

11

Failure to spe ·f th
.
t• ci Y. e records sought with a reasonable
degree of
th
par icu1ar1ty may place an undue burden upon
cu~~:;~~n on whom demand is made. However, the cirre d ~ll may be such that a subpoena for "all" relevant
. coCr s wiVnot be unreasonable. Cf. Consolidated Renderin.g o. v. ermont, 207 U.S. 541, 28 S. Ct. 178, 52 L. Ed.
~~ 7{ ~~w n v: CUnited. States, 276 U.S. 134, 48 S. Ct. 288,
· ·
' onsohdated Mines v. S.E.C., 97 F. 2d 704
~fA. 9); General Trades School, Inc. v. United States,
2 F. 2d 656 (C ..A. 8). The specification of the documents
and reco~ds desired should be adequate but it need not
be excessive. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186, 66 S. Ct. 494, 90 L. Ed. 614.
Alth9ugh the agency issuing an administrative subpoena is allowed a great deal of latitude in demanding
what appear to be relevant documents and other data,
some demands may be so out of proportion to the end
sought as t? be unre~sonable and even oppressive.11 However, mere inconvenience to the party served with a subpeona is not a proper basis for refusing enforcement.
Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F. 2d 384 (C.A.
7), certiorari denied, 311 U.S. 690, 61 S. Ct. 71, 85 L. Ed. 446;
Bowles v. Abendroth, 151 F. 2d 407 (C.A. 9); Westside
Ford, Inc. v. United States, 206 F. 2d 627 (C.A. 9); Application of Compton, 101 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Tex.). The
fact invesigators of an agency have previously examined
the records subpoenaed does not preclude enforcement of
the subpoena. Penfield Co. of Calif. v. S.E.C., 330 U.S. 585,
67 S. Ct. 918, 91 L. Ed. 1117; Bowles v. Abendroth, 151 F.
2d 407 (C.A. 9) ; Tobin v. Banks & Rumbaugh, 201 F. 2d
223 (C.A. 5), certiorari denied, 345 U.S. 942, 73 S. Ct. 832,
97 L. Ed. 1368; General Trades School Inc. v. United

500

existence and are relevant, they may be subpoenaed. Cf. Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F. 2d 384 (C.A. 7), certiorari denied, 311 U.S. 690,
61 S. Ct. 71, 85 L. Ed. 446. It is not important that the records subpoenaed
are not among those required to be kept in order to comply with the provisions of a contract between the Veterans Administration and a school
training veterans under the educational and vocational rehabilitation provisions of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act. General Trades School, Inc.
v. United States, 212 F. 2d 656 «;.A. 8). For the effect of .ordinan~e~ requiring the main~ei:anc.e and retention of .records .upon the claim of privilege
against self-incrimmation, see the followmg section.
11 The distances which records are required to be brought may be a substantial factor in determining the reasonableness of demand in some cases. See,
e g Bank of America Savings Assn. v. Douglas, 105 F. 2d 100 (C.A. D.C.),
123.,A.L.R. 1266; N.L.R.B. v.. Pesante, 119 F. S~pp. 444 (S.D. Calif.). Because
of the limitation contained m 38 U.S.C. 131, it would appear that distance
should be a far less important consideration in cases involving Veterans
Administration subpoenas.

 12

ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS

States, 212 F. 2d 656 (C.A. 8); but cf. Chapman v. Maren
Elwood College, 225 F. 2d 230 ( C.A. 9). If the records
have been produced once without undue interferen~e,
there is no reason why they cannot be produced agam.
Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134, 48 S. Ct. 288, 72 L.
Ed. 500. Nor do impulsive or imprudent statements by
agency investigators constitute such an abuse of administrative function as to control the reasonableness of the
subpoena or the relevance of the documents demanded.
Tobin v. Banks & Rumbaugh, 201 F . 2d 223 (C.A. 15),
certiorari denied, 345 U.S. 942, 73 S. Ct. 832, 97 L. Ed.
1368; cf. Westside Ford, Inc. v. United States, 206 F. 2d
627 (C.A. 9); but see Chapman v. Maren Elwood College,
225 F. 2d 230 (C.A. 9).
There is a well recognized presumption of regularity on
the part of administrative officials which has been relied
upon by the courts in holding that an administrative official will be presumed not to have issued a subpoena
arbitrarily or under circumstances in which there was no
need for one. 12 See, e.g., Bowles v. Glick Bros. Lumber Co.,
146 F. 2d 566 (C.A. 9), certiorari denied, 325 U.S. 877, 65
S. Ct. 1554, 89 L. Ed. 1994; Mississippi Road Supply Co.
v. Walling, 136 F. 2d 391 (C.A. 5), certiorari denied, 320
U.S. 752, 64 S. Ct. 57, 88 L. Ed. 447; Kilgore National Bank
v. Federal Petroleum Board, 209 F. 2d 557 (C.A. 5). Cf.
Hagen v. Porter, 156 F. 2d 362 ( C.A. 9), certiorari denied,
329 U.S. 729, 67 S. Ct. 85, 91 L. Ed. 631, wherein the court
ruled the official signature of a public officer was presumed
to be genuine. In some instances, subpoenas have been
drafted so as to permit the person served to choose the less
burdensome of two alternatives, if he desires to do so.
See, e.g., Cudmore v. Bowles, 145 F. 2d 697 (C.A. D.C.),
certiorari denied, 324 U.S. 841, 65 S. Ct. 588, 89 L. Ed.
1403; Winn v. Lovett Grocery Co. v. N.L.R.B., 213 F. 2d
785 (C.A. 5). In any event, the court which is called upon
to enforce an unreasonable or oppressive subpoena may
so limit its requirements as to bring them within the
bounds of reason. See §40 hereinafter.

u Th~ question of wh.ether or not a s.ub:poena is unreasonable in scope may
also mvolve a balancmg of the public mterest under a declared policy of
Congress against considerations of private security. Cf. Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S. Ct. 494, 90 L. Ed. 614.

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ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS

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22· REFUSAL OF WITNESS TO COMPLY WITH SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM ON CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
§

A ; i'tness may invoke
·
the protection of the 5th Amendmh~ hto ~he.Co~st~tution and refuse to give oral testimony
w ic will incriminate him. Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361, 31 S. Ct. 538, 55 L. Ed. 771; In re O'Shea, 166 F.
180 (D. N.J.); and see lJnited States v. Bell, 81 F. 830
(\Y.D. Tenn.). However, the privilege is personal to the
witness. Hale v. H~nkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370, 50 L.
Ed: 65.2. 9~rporations do not have the same immunity
which ind!viduals enjoy under the 5th Amendment. Essgee
Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151, 43 S. Ct. 514, 67 L. Ed.
917. An officer of a corporation may not refuse to honor
a subpoena. du~es. tecum. on the ground the records produced may incriminate either the corporation or himself.
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 31 S. Ct. 538, 55 L.
Ed. 771; Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151, 43 S.
Ct. 514, 67 L. Ed. 917; Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v.
'Valling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S. Ct. 494, 90 L. Ed. 614; Davis
v. S.E.C., 109 F. 2d 6 (C.A. 7), certiorari denied, 309 U.S.
687, 60 S. Ct. 889, 84 L. Ed. 1030; United States v. Cream
Products Distributing Co., 156 F. 2d 732 (C.A. 7).
The attorney-client privilege does not attach to corporate records because they are entrusted to an attorney
for the defense of an officer of the corporation. Wheeler
v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 33 S. Ct. 158, 57 L. Ed. 309.
Nor may a former officer of a dissolved corporation invoke the 5th Amendment to avoid disclosure of records
of the dissolved corporation. Grant v. United States, 227
U.S. 74, 33 S. Ct. 190, 57 L. Ed. 423. Nor are the official
records of an unincorporated organization privileged
from disclosure under the 5th Amendment. United States
v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 64 S. Ct. 1248, 88 L. Ed. 1542.
Congress may require that records be maintained and
preserved as a means of enforcing a statute. United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609. Records required under sta~ute or regul~tion as a means of
enforcing a statute are in effect pubhc documents and a
claim of privilege against self-incrimination may not be
asserted as to such records even by a natur al person.
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 1375, 92 L.
Ed. 1787; cf. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 66 S.
Ct.1256, 90 ·L. Ed.1453.

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ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS

§40. DUTY OF THE COURTS TO ENFORCE PROPER
DEMANDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS
§302 of the Act of June 29, 1936, 49 Stat. 2033 [P.L. 844,
74th Cong., 2nd Sess.], as amended, 38 U.S.C. 133,
provides:
In case of disobedience to any such subpena, the
aid of any district court of the United States or the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia may be invoked in requiring the attendance
and testimony of vdtnesses and the production of
documentary evidence, and such court within the
jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on may,
in case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpena
issued to any officer, agent, or employee of any corporation or to any other person, issue an order requiring such corporation or other person to appear
or to give evidence touching the matter in question;
and any failure to obey such order of the court may
be punished by such court as a contempt thereof.
This provision is similar to the enforcement provisions
of many other statutes providing for the issuance of administrative subpoenas, references to which are contained
in the appendix hereinafter. Thus far Congress has entrusted the enforcement of administrative subpoenas to
the courts and not to officers of the administrative agencies issuing them. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Wailing, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S. Ct. 494, 90 L. Ed. 614. The duties
imposed on the courts to direct enforcement of such subpoenas are judical in nature. I.C.C. v. Brimson, 154 U.S.
447, 14 S. Ct. 1125, 38 L. Ed. 1047. Thus, some necessity
must be shown for the enforcement of the demand to compel testimony or the production of documents and other
evidence. F.T.C. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298,
44 S. Ct. 336, 68 L. Ed. 696, 32 A.L.R. 786; cf. Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652.
.
While the statute gives the courts jurisdiction to enforce agency subpoenas and the discretion that such a
grant necessarily entails, the opinions of courts in cases
decided under similar statutes speak of the "duty" of the
courts to enforce compliance in proper cases. Thus, in
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509, 63
S. Ct. 339, 87 L. Ed. 424, the court indicated that since
the evidence sought was not plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose "it was the duty of the District
Court to order its production." Similarly, the Supreme

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 ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS

15

fhourt has ruled that in the absence of a basis for saying
at an a!~ncy s~bpoena exceeds lawful limits the agency
iinperie Id1 entitled to the aid of the cour t in enforcing
o. of Calif. v. S.E.C., 330 U.S. 585, 67 S. Ct.
9i 8 en e
'91 ~-Ed. 1117. Compare Mississippi Road Supply Co.

C

U
r~52•ng64, 1S36 F. 2d 391 (C.A. 5), certiorari denied, 320
. · ·
'
· Ct. 57, 88 L. Ed. 447, wherein the statement
11

is made ~hat .it is the court's duty to use the enforcement
pow~r g;;en it and that the court ought to assist a lawful
~nqu1ry. In. that case, the court held the burden of showing that an inquiry was unlawful was upon the person to
who:n the subpoena was directed. Accord, see Kilgore
National Bank v. Federal Petroleum Board, 209 F. 2d 557
(C.A.5).
, ,
The Administrative Procedure Act which is considered
to b~ ~ res~atement of the existing 'law with respect to
adm1n1strative subpoenas, recites that:
Agency subpenas authorized by law shall be issued
to any party upon request and, as may be required
by r ules of procedure, upon a statement or showing
of general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought. Upon contest the court shall sustain
such subpoena or similar process of demand to the extent that it is found to be in accordance with law * * *.
5 U.S.C. 1005. The italicized language emphasizes the
teaching that the courts have a duty to aid in the enforcement of proper administrative demands for the compulsion of testin1ony and the production of records.
The enactment of the provision of the Administrative
Procedure Act relating to agency subpoenas which speaks
of sustaining a · subpoena "to the extent that it is found
to be in accordance with law" codifies the practice observed by most courts. That is, except in extreme cases,
the courts will enforce so much of an agency's demands
as are reasonable under the circumstances. 14 For examples
of cases in which the courts have enforced the production
of records or other evidence on terms differing from those
initally demanded, see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
13 Jn Bowles v. Abendroth, 151 F. 2d 407 (C.A. 9), the court indicated that
it should not substitute its judgment as to the necessity or desirability of
an investigation for that of the agency concerned. See in addition Application
of Compton, 101 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Tex.).

u Even if the demand made is not oppressive, it is not necessary that the
subpoena be enforced precisely as written. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Anchor Rome
Mills, Inc., 197 F. 2d 447 (C.A. 5).

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ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS

N.L.R.B., 122 F. 2d 450 (C.A. 6), 136 A.L.R. 883; Walling
v. American Rolbal Corp., 135 F. 2d 1003 (C.A. 2); Bagen
v. Porter, 156 F. 2d 362 (C.A. 9), certiorari denied, 329 U.S.
729, 67 S. Ct. 85, 91 L. Ed. 631. General Trades School, Inc.
v. United States, 212 F. 2d 656 (C.A. 8); Westside rord,
Inc., v. United States, 206 F. 2d 627 (C.A. 9); Fleming v.
Cudahy Packing Co., 41 F. Supp. 910 (S.D. Calif.). If an
agency's demand appears to be excessive or oppressive,
it is the duty of the court to fix what it was reasonable to
require. lUcComb v. Hunsaker Trucking Contractor, 171
F. 2d 523 (C.A. 5). In the event an appeal is taken from an
enforcement order, the reasonableness of the production
required is to be determined on the basis of the restrictive
terms of the order rather than the more sweeping terms
of the subpoena itself. Detweiler Bros. v. Walling, 157 F.
2d 841 (C.A. 9); General Trades School, Inc. v. United
States, 212 F. 2d 656 (C.A. 8).

Ml. PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS
The statute providing for the enforcement of subpoenas
issued by the Veterans Administration makes no specific
requirement as to the form of application which should
be filed with the court and the procedure to be adhered
to therein. Proceedings for the enforcement of administrative subpoenas are summary in nature and to follow
the procedures obtaining with respect to routine civil
suits would in many cases greatly delay effective relief.
Cf. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. N.L.R.B., 122 F. 2d
450 (C.A. 6), 136 A.L.R. 883; Cudahy Packing Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 117 F. 2d 692 (C.A.10).
In some districts, it is the practice of the court to issue
a show cause order upon the filing of an application for
enforcement of an agency subpoena. 15 See, e.g., Mississippi
Road Supply Co. v. Walling, 136 F. 2d 391 (C.A. 5), certiorari denied, 320 U.S. 752, 64 S. Ct. 57, 88 L. Ed. 447; In
re Bleichfeld Bag & Burlap Co., 105 F. Supp. 162 (W.D.
N.Y.). In any event, the respondent should have notice
and an opportunity to be heard. Shotkin v. Nelson, 146
F. 2d 402 (C.A. 10). After an opportunity has been had
for a showing by affidavits, depositions or oral testimony,
as the court may require, an order is normally entered
11
The procedure may vary from district to district depending upon local
rules and practice.

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ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS

17

directing ~omp~iance with the subpoena as written or with
such modifications as are proper under the circumstan~es.16 See the orders quoted in Detweiler Bros. v.
Walling, 157 F. 2d 841 (C.A. 9), and In re Bleichfeld Bag
& Burlap Co., 105 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. N.Y.). A subpoena
may be enfor.ced against a person or corporation no~ a
p~rty t~ the dispute with the administrative agency which
gives rise to the issuance of the subpoena. See, e.g.,
McMann v. S.E.C., 87 F. 2d 377 (C.A. 2), 109 A.L.R. 1445,
certiorari denied, 301 U.S. 684, 57 S. Ct. 785, 81 L. Ed.
1342; Newfield v. Ryan, 91 F. 2d 700 (C.A. 5), certiorari
denied, 302 U.S. 729, 58 S. Ct. 54, 82 L. Ed. 563; United
States v. Southern Tool & Supply Co., Civil No. 2131 (W.D.
Tenn.) (unreported - involving the subpoena of records of
a company furnishing supplies to a school training veterans under a contract with the Veterans Administration) ;
United States v. Woods, Civil No. 3869 (W.D. La.) (unreported - involving the subpoena of records of a company
furnishing supplies to a school training veterans under
a contract with the Veterans Administration). Moreover,
the court may compel the production of records from a
foreign country. S.E.C. v. Minas De Artemisa, SA, 150 F.
2d 215 (C.A. 9). In the event of disobedience of the co.urt's
order, the recalcitrant person or firm may be punished
for contempt. 38 U.S.C. 133; cf. Penfield Co. of Calif. v.
S.E.C., 330 U.S. 585, 67 S. Ct. 918, 91 L. Ed. 1117.

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Trial by jury is not authorized. See I.C.C. v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 14
s. Ct. 1125, 38 L. FA. 1047.
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ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS

APPENDIX
1. The following statutes are illustrative of the subpoena authority con-

ferred upon administrative agencies by Congress.
§12 of the Hatch Political Activities Act, as added by §4 of ]the Aue~ Cf
July 19, 1940, 54 Stat. 767 [P.L. 753, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. , 5 · · ·
118k( d).
§29 of the Federal Employees Compensation Act, 39 Stat. 748 [P.L. 267,
64th Cong., 1st Sess.], as amended, 5 U.S.C. 780.
§402 of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 Stat. 168 [P.L. 51, 67th Cong.,
1st Sess.] , as amended, 7 U.S.C. 222.
§13 of the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 46 Stat. 536 [P.L.
325, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess.] , 7 U.S.C. 499m.
§15 of the Tobacco Inspection Act, 49 Stat. 735 [P.L. 314, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess.] , 7 U.S.C. 511n.
~413 of t he Federal Seed Act, 53 Stat. 1289 [P.L. 354, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess.], 7 U.S.C. 1603.

§§235(a) and 335 (a ) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66
Stat. 198, 255 [P.L. 414, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess.], 8 U.S.C. 1225(a), 1446.
§§9 and 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 722-723 [P.L.
203, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess.], 15 U.S.C. 49-50.
§§19(b) and 22(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 85 [P.L. 22,
73rd Cong., 1st Sess.], 15 U.S.C. 77s(b), 77v(b).
§21 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 899 [P.L. 291, 73rd
Cong., 2nd Sess.], 15 U.S.C. 78u.
§18 of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act, 49 Stat. 831 [P.L. 333,
74th Cong., 1st Sess.], as amended, 15 U.S.C. 79r(c).
§321 of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, as added by the Act of August 3,
1939, 43 Stat. 1174 [P.L. 253, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.], 15 U.S.C. 77uuu(a).
§§42 and 209 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 842, 853
[P.L. 768, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess.], 15 U.S.C. 80a-41(b) and (c), 80b-9(c).
§14 of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 828 [P.L. 688, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess.],
15 U.S.C. 717m.
§307 of the Federal Power Act, as added by §213 of the Act of August 26,
1935, 49 Stat. 857 [P.L. 333, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.], 16 U.S.C. 825f(b)
and (c).
§333 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 699 [P.L. 361, 71st Cong., 2nd
Sess.], as amended, 19 U.S.C. 1333.
§4 of the International Claims Commission Settlement Act of 1949 64
Stat. 14 [P.L. 455, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess.], 22 U.S.C. 1623.
'
§9 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1065 [P.L. 718, 75th Cong.,
3rd Sess.], 29 U.S.C. 209.
§11 of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 455 [P.L. 198, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess.], as amended, 29 U.S.C. 161.

 ~DMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS _ _ _ _ _ _1_9

APPENDIX-Continued

J~?; ~~ tf95 ~e~~rasl
475.

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Coal Mine Safety Act, as added by §1 of the Act of
tat. 697 [P.L. 552, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess.], 30 U.S.C.

~!t 0§e~~e

Act of August 21, 1935, 49 Stat. 671 [P.L. 296, 74th Cong.,
over nav.,J' bals amended, 33 U.S.C. 506 (regulation of tolls on bridges
iga e waters).

~~~t 0 ~ 4~1ge [LPoLngs8h0oremen's
·

· ·

and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44
3, 69th Cong., 2nd Sess.], 33 U.S.C. 927.

!5 of the Walsh Healey Act, 49 Stat. 2038 [P.L. 846, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess.],
s amended, 41 U.S.C. 39 (requirements relating to public contracts).
p3(d) (3) of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 662 [P.L. 395,
18th Cong., 2nd Sess.], as amended, 41 U.S.C. 113.
§§1 and 3 of the Act of January 31, 1903, 32 Stat. 790 [P.L. 46, 57th
C<;>ng., 2nd Sess.], as amended, 43 U.S.C. 105 (compulsory attendance of
witnesses before land office officials).
§12 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 770 [P.L. 585, 79th Cong.,
2nd Sess.], as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1812.
§12 of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 52 Stat. 1107 [P.L. 722,
75th Cong., 3rd Sess.], as amended, 45 U.S.C. 362.
R.S. 4450, as amended, 46 U.S.C. 239(e) (Bureau of Marine inspection and
Navigation).
§214 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, 49 Stat. 1991 [P.L. 835, 74th
Cong., 2nd Sess.], as amended, 46 U.S.C. 1124.
§409 of the Conmmunications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1096 [P.L. 416, 73rd
Cong., 2nd Sess.], as amended, 47 U.S.C. 409.
§12 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 383, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 12.
§205 ( e) of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, as added by the Act of August 9,
1935, 49 Stat. 548 [P.L. 255, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.], 49 U.S.C. 305(d).
§1004 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1021 [P.L. 706,
75th Cong., 3rd Sess.], 49 Stat. 644.
§§13 and 109 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat.
998, 1025 [P.L. 831, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess.], 50 U.S.C. 792, 819.
§§301, 1302 and 1303 of the Second War Powers Act of 1942, 56 Stat.
179, 185-186 [P.L. 507, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess.], 50 U.S.C., App. 633,
643a and b.
§202 of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 30 [P.L. 421,
77th Cong., 2nd Sess.], 50 U.S.C. App. 922.
§12 of the Rubber Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 106 [P.L. 469, 80th Cong., 2nd
Sess.], 50 U.S.C., App. 1931.
§705(a) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 816 [P.L. 774,
Slst Cong., 2nd Sess.], as amended, 50 U.S.C., App. 2155(a).