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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
HAZELL HAYES AND
MELVIN SHORT

)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
DEMAND
)
FOR
CITY OF DETROIT, AND
)
JURY TRIAL
POLICE OFFICER JOHN DOE NO. 1,
)
POLICE OFFICER JOHN DOE NO. 2,
)
POLICE OFFICER JOHN DOE NO. 3,
)
POLICE OFFICER JOHN DOE NO. 4,
)
POLICE OFFICER JOHN DOE NO. 5
)
POLICE OFFICER JOHN DOE NO. 6
)
Defendants.
)
____________________________________________________________/
COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs Hazell Hayes (“Hayes”) and Melvin Short (“Short”), by and
through their attorney, Olson PLLC, state the following for their Complaint
against Defendant City of Detroit (“Defendant City”), Defendant Police
Officer John Doe No. 1 (“John Doe No. 1”), Police Officer John Doe No. 2
(“John Doe No. 2”), Police Officer John Doe No. 3 (“John Doe No. 3”),
Police Officer John Doe No. 4 (“John Doe No. 4”), Police Officer John Doe
No. 5 (“Howell”) and John Doe No. 6 (“John Doe No. 6”):
1.

This is a civil action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

common law avenues of recovery for deprivations of Plaintiffs’ rights.

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2.

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Plaintiffs sue the Defendants John Doe No. 1, John Doe No. 2,

John Doe No. 3, John Doe No. 4, John Doe No. 5 and John Doe No. 6 (the
“Police Officer Defendants”) in their individual capacities.
JURISDICTION
3.

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1331, 1367(a) and § 1341.
VENUE
4.

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

5.

At all times relevant herein, Plaintiffs resided in and were

citizens of Detroit, Michigan.
6.

Defendant City is a political subdivision of the State of

Michigan acting under color of State law, and is a person for purposes of a
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.
7.

The “Police Officer Defendants” were at all relevant times

police officers employed by Defendant City.
COLOR OF STATE LAW
8.

At all times relevant herein, The Police Officer Defendants

acted under color of state law.
9.

Particularly, the Police Officer Defendants acted under color of

the laws, statutes, ordinances, regulations, policies, customs and usages of

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the State of Michigan, and its political subdivisions, including the City of
Detroit.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
10.

On or about June 23, 2016, Plaintiffs owned a dog-named

Penny.
11.

On or about June 23, 2016, Plaintiffs and their dog Penny

resided at 18601 Moenart, Detroit, Michigan 48234.
12.

On or about June 23, 2016 at approximately 1:15 p.m., a team

of six of Defendant City’s police officers, including the Police Officer
Defendants, arrived at the residence to execute a search warrant.
13.

Shortly after the Police Officer Defendants entered Plaintiffs’

residence, a Police Officer Defendant shot and killed Plaintiffs’ dog, Penny.
14.

Plaintiffs’ dog, Penny, did not attack or threaten any Police

Officer Defendant in any way.
15.

Plaintiffs’ dog Penny did not pose any threat to any Police

Officer Defendant or anyone else for that matter.
16.

Plaintiffs’ dog, Penny, did not interfere with any police

objective.
17.

It was objectively unreasonable for the Police Officer

Defendants to shoot and kill Plaintiffs’ dog.

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The Police Officer Defendants acted in concert and took no

action to stop the Constitutional violations alleged here.
19.

Plaintiffs’ dog, Penny, did not bark at the police officers in

Plaintiffs’ home.
20.

Approximately seven seconds after the police officers entered

Plaintiffs’ home, a Police Officer Defendant shot and killed Plaintiffs’ dog,
Penny.
21.

The Police Officer Defendants subsequently gathered on

Plaintiffs’ lawn.
22.

A City of Detroit employee asked one of the Defendant Police

Officers, “y’all over here shooting dogs now?”
23.

One of the Police Officer Defendants respond, “nah, it

committed suicide” and laughed.
24.

A Police Officer Defendant said, “I shot that mother fucker.”

25.

A Police Officer Defendant said, “I don’t take no chances with

dogs.”
26.

Plaintiffs’ dog, Penny, was well known in the community.

27.

Plaintiffs’ dog, Penny, was not vicious.

28.

Plaintiffs’ dog, Penny, was pregnant at the time that one of the

Police Officer Defendants shot and killed Penny.

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COUNT I
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
42 U.S.C. § 1983 AND FOURTH AMENDMENT
AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES, PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AND ATTORNEY’S FEES
29.

Plaintiffs re-allege all of the preceding paragraphs.

30.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, U.S.

Const. amend. IV, prohibits the government from unreasonably destroying
or seizing a citizen’s property.
31.

"The destruction of property by state officials poses as much of

a threat, if not more, to people's right to be 'secure . . . in their effects' as
does the physical taking of them." Fuller v. Vines, 36 F.3d 65, 68 (9th Cir.
1994), overruled on other grounds, Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d
1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
32.

"The killing of [a] dog is a destruction recognized as a seizure

under the Fourth Amendment" and can constitute a cognizable claim under §
1983. Id.
33.

Dogs are more than just a personal effect. San Jose Charter of

the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 975 (9th
Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant police’s shooting of plaintiff’s dogs was
an unreasonable seizure in particular where defendant police officers had

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notice of the dog’s presence and were not surprised by them and had no plan
to deal with the dog other than by shooting it).
34.

The emotional attachment to a family's dog is not comparable

to a possessory interest in furniture. Id.
35.

Indeed, Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment interests involved are

substantial because "the bond between a dog owner and his pet can be strong
and enduring," and Plaintiffs think of their dog “in terms of an emotional
relationship, rather than a property relationship." Altman v. City of High
Point, N.C., 330 F.3d 194, 205 (4th Cir. 2003).
36.

In circumstances where, as here, the dog does not pose an

imminent threat, or the officer is not surprised by the dog and has had time
to make alternate plans to control the dog, other than shooting, the shooting
of the dog has been found to be an unreasonable seizure. Dziekan v. Gaynor,
376 F. Supp. 2d 267, 270-71 (D. Conn. 2005). (citing cases and discussing
San Jose Charter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, 402 F.3d at 975).
37.

Defendants’

acts

described

herein

were

objectively

unreasonable allowing for the fact that police officers are often forced to
make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a

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particular situation." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97, 109 S. Ct.
1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989).
38.

Indeed, the Police Officer Defendants’ acts described herein

were intentional, grossly negligent, amounted to reckless or callous
indifference to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
39.

The Police Officer Defendants’ premeditated shooting and

killing of Plaintiffs’ dog was unreasonable under the totality of the
circumstances and therefore constituted an unreasonable seizure under the
Fourth Amendment in particular because there was no exigency and police
officers could have conducted their business without killing Plaintiffs’ dog.
40.

Defendants’ premeditated shooting and killing of Plaintiffs’ dog

was more intrusive than necessary. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504
(1983) (“A seizure becomes unlawful when it is 'more intrusive than
necessary”).
41.

No governmental interest justifies the severe governmental

intrusion involved in this case.
42.

Defendants’ shooting and killing of Plaintiffs’ dog was

objectively unreasonable because Plaintiff’s dog did not surprise, threaten or
attack any Police Officer Defendant.

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There was no exigency and the Police Officer Defendants were

not in any immediate danger that would have justified the use of deadly
force. Fuller v. Vines, 36 F.3d 65 (9th Cir. 1994).
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
44.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs are each entitled to an award

of compensatory damages against each individual Defendant in their
individual capacity.
45.

Compensatory damages include mental anguish and suffering.

Moreno v. Hughes, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5697 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 19, 2016).
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
46.

The Police Officer Defendants’ actions were:
a.

Reckless;

b.

Showed callous indifference toward the rights of
Plaintiffs; and

c.

Were taken in the face of a perceived risk that the actions
would violate federal law.

47.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of punitive damages against

each individual police officer in their individual capacity, in order to punish
them and to deter others.

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Apparently, such deterrence is necessary in light of the fact that

Detroit Police Officer Darrell Dawson unreasonably shot and killed Detroit
citizen Darryl Lindsay’s dog, Babycakes, which culminated in a November
18, 2015 settlement by the City of $100,000 that was apparently insufficient
to deter Defendant police officers from shooting Plaintiffs’ dog in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
49.

Numerous other lawsuits have been filed against the

Defendants for the same unconstitutional acts involved in this case (i.e.,
Detroit Police unreasonably shooting dogs).
50.

On information and belief, Detroit police officers in the process

of executing search warrants and other police activities routinely kill dogs in
violation of and in reckless and callous indifference towards the Fourth
Amendment rights of Detroit citizens that they have a duty to protect.
ATTORNEY’S FEES
51.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in

this litigation, then they will be entitled to receive an award of reasonable
attorney’s fees, non-taxable expenses and costs.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request a judgment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and 1988 against each Police Officer Defendants in their individual capacity,
for compensatory damages in a fair and reasonable amount, for punitive

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damages, for reasonable attorney’s fees, for and non-taxable expenses, for
costs, and Plaintiffs pray for such other relief as may be just under the
circumstances and consistent with the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT II
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
42 U.S.C. § 1983 AND FOURTH AMENDMENT
AGAINST DEFENDANT CITY
FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES
52.

Plaintiffs re-allege their prior allegations.
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
1ST ALTERNATIVE BASIS OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
DELEGATION TO INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANT

53.

As the first alternate basis for liability against Defendant City,

the policy maker for Defendant City, the mayor, or someone else, and that
person delegated full authority and/or empowered

the individual

Defendants’ policy.
54.

That delegation of authority by the actual policy maker of

Defendant City placed the individual Defendants in a policy making
position, and the acts of the individual Defendants may fairly be said to be
those of the municipality. Id. at 483, and Kujawski v. Board of Com’rs of
Bartholomew County, Ind., 183 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1999).
55.

Those acts therefore subject Defendant City to liability for the

constitutional violations of the individual Defendants. Id. at 483; Kujawski

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v. Board of Com’rs of Bartholomew County, Ind., 183 F.3d 734, 737 (7th
Cir. 1999).
2ND ALTERNATIVE BASIS OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY – FAILURE TO TRAIN,
SUPERVISE, CONTROL
56.

As the second alternative basis for liability against Defendant

City, Defendant City failed to properly hire, train, supervise, control and/or
discipline the Police Officer Defendants with respect to encounters with
dogs such as Plaintiffs’ dog, who live throughout the City.
57.

Defendant City was thus deliberately indifferent to the rights of

others in adopting its hiring and training practices, and in failing to
supervise, control and/or discipline the Police Officer Defendants such that
those failures reflected a deliberate or conscious choice by Defendant City
made from among various alternatives. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 389 (1989).
58.

Those deficiencies were the moving force that caused

Plaintiffs’ damages. Larson By Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1454 (8th
Cir. 1996).
59.

In light of the fact that it was the Police Officer Defendants

who engaged in the constitutional violations, the need to correct the
deficiencies is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the
violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of Defendant City
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can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.
Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996).
60.
controlled

If Defendant City had properly hired, trained, supervised,
and/or

disciplined

the

Police

Officer

Defendants,

the

constitutional violations that the Police Officer Defendants committed would
not have occurred.
61.

These failures by Defendant City to hire, train, supervise,

control and/or discipline the Police Officer Defendants subject Defendant
City to liability for the constitutional violations committed by the Police
Officer Defendants.
62.

On information and belief, Defendant City had no policy or

training in place in how to constitutionally handle encounters with dogs,
which was evident in the Police Officer Defendants’ egregious actions
alleged herein.
63.

Such training was at all relevant times available online at no

cost to Defendant City.
64.

Defendant City has had notice of the availability of the no cost

online police officer training yet has not taken any efforts to provide such
training to it’s police officers.
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

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Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of

compensatory damages against Defendant City.
ATTORNEY’S FEES
66.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in

this litigation, then they will be entitled to receive an award of reasonable
attorney’s fees, non-taxable expenses and costs.
THEREFORE, Plaintiffs request a judgment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and 1988 against Defendant City for compensatory damages in a fair and
reasonable amount, for reasonable attorney’s fees, and non-taxable expenses,
for costs and such other relief as may be just under the circumstances and
consistent with the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT III
CONVERSION
67.

Plaintiffs repeat their prior allegations.

68.

"Conversion is any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted

over another's personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his rights
therein." Thoma v. Tracy Motor Sales, Inc., 360 Mich. 434, 438, 104
N.W.2d 360 (1960)(quoting Nelson & Witt v. Texas Co., 256 Mich 65, 70)).
69.

The Police Officer Defendants’ summary execution of

Plaintiffs’ dog was a distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over
Plaintiffs’ dog in denial of or inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ rights.
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THEREFORE, Plaintiffs request relief under applicable law or in
equity, including, without limitation, a judgment and an award of statutory
treble damages and all reasonable costs, interest and attorney fees. M.C.L. §
600.2919a.
COUNT IV
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
70.

Plaintiffs incorporate their prior allegations.

71.

The Police Officer Defendants’ conduct described herein was

extreme and outrageous conduct because it was beyond all possible bounds
of decency and could be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community and would (and in fact has) cause an average member
of the community would . . . exclaim, “Outrageous!”
72.

The Police Officer Defendants’ actions described herein were

intentional or reckless.
73.

The Police Officer Defendants’ actions caused Plaintiffs severe

emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to
endure it, including without limitation, severe horror, grief and anger over
the loss of Plaintiffs’ dog, nausea, inability to eat, loss of sleep, inability to
concentrate, concern and fear for their safety. Haverbush v. Powelson, 217
Mich. App. 228, 234-35 (1996).

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THEREFORE, Plaintiffs request a judgment for damages, exemplary
damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and any other relief that the
Court deems just and equitable.
Respectfully submitted,
Olson PLLC

s/Christopher S. Olson_______
Christopher S. Olson (P58780)
32121 Woodward Avenue
Suite 300
Royal Oak, Michigan 48073
(248) 672-7368
(248) 415-6263 Facsimile
colson@olsonpllc.mygbiz.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
August 25, 2016
Detroit, Michigan

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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs
demand a trial by jury in this action of all issues so triable.
Respectfully submitted,
Olson PLLC

s/Christopher S. Olson_______
Christopher S. Olson (P58780)
32121 Woodward Avenue
Suite 300
Royal Oak, Michigan 48073
(248) 672-7368
(248) 415-6263 Facsimile
colson@olsonpllc.mygbiz.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
August 25, 2016
Detroit, Michigan

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