



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Directorate of Intelligence
HUMINT Advisory Council

(U) Domestic HUMINT Vision Proposal

(U) Background

(U//FOUO) A confluence of events—from the revision of Executive Order 12333 to the naming of FBI Assistant Directors in Charge/Special Agents in Charge as Domestic DNI Representatives to the formation of Joint Regional Intelligence Groups—has increased the FBI's responsibility for strategic intelligence and domestically collected Foreign Intelligence (FI). These are significant clarifications of FBI authorities and responsibilities in domestic operations, requiring an expansion and enhancement of its Confidential Human Source (CHS) base. The FBI must maintain a pro-active posture in relation to CHS recruitment and intelligence collection. As FBI Human Intelligence (HUMINT) responsibilities broaden, its policies and procedures need to mirror those under which US Intelligence Community (USIC) partners operate.

(U) The FBI's effective execution of its aforementioned domestic intelligence responsibilities will depend, in part, on the successful implementation of the following recommendations¹:

- (U//FOUO) Adapt existing policies, e.g., CHS Policy Implementation Guide, and expand HUMINT efforts/resources to support and enhance FBI's domestic collection mission.
- (U//FOUO) Enforce the need of specialized HUMINT Training for all Special Agents and designated Intelligence Analysts.
- (U//FOUO) Develop robust Directorate of Intelligence (DI) support to field office HUMINT Programs.

¹ A majority of council members support the proposal's recommendations; however, there was dissent on certain recommendations, e.g., those pertaining to CHS Policy Modifications.

(U) HUMINT Squads and CHS Policy Modifications

(U//FOUO) The FBI continues to recruit CHSs both domestically and internationally, yet its governing policies restrict how CHSs are operated overseas. Considering the objective of HUMINT Squads is to increase and expand FBI intelligence collection, not evidence, the policies and protocols under which HUMINT Squads operate need to reflect this goal. Therefore, the council recommends:

- (U//FOUO) Allowing a CHS to be operated overseas pursuant to a Type 3 or 4 Assessment, enabling unrestricted ability to fulfill the FBI's foreign intelligence mission.
- (S//NF) Allowing HUMINT squad Special Agents to open and operate an individual without the person ever knowing they are an FBI CHS².

(U) Increase in FBI HUMINT capabilities and cadre needed to fulfill FBI intelligence responsibilities

(S//NF) In order for the FBI to reach its maximum potential in its enhanced role FBI HUMINT Squads must overcome the cultural bias against pro-active CHS recruiting outside of cases. Instead, focus should be on developing the HUMINT Squads ability to respond to FBI/USIC requirements and FI needs, by increasing its workforce and providing training necessary to enhance its spotting, assessing, recruitment, and debriefing capabilities³.

(S//NF) HUMINT target staffing levels within FBI field offices have not kept pace with the FBI's expanding jurisdictional mandate with regard to intelligence collection nor have they kept pace with the ever more demanding manpower realities on the ground, which require the FBI to emphasize the pro-active neutralization of national security threats over the collection of FI and recruitment for overseas placement rather than prosecution. Therefore, the council recommends:

- (S//NF) A minimum of 5% of the Special Agent full staffing level (FSL) should be assigned to the HUMINT squad(s) in each field office to conduct strategic collection focused on national security and transnational criminal threats. An allocation greater than 5% of FSL is recommended for field offices with a significant presence of cleared defense contractors, critical national assets, foreign diplomatic establishments, etc.⁴

² (S//NF) If the individual is a US citizen they have to be informed that they are speaking to the US Government.

³ (U//FOUO) Emphasis should also be put on non-HUMINT Special Agents to ensure they are actively collecting against FBI/USIC requirements and FI needs. Investigative squads can clearly report on FBI/USIC requirements as well, but sometimes fail to realize their CHSs can, often due to the tradition of CHSs not being queried for information outside of the cases for which they were recruited. In essence, investigative squad CHSs are frequently untapped resources capable of providing significant FBI/USIC reporting.

⁴ (U) This is especially the case in offices with nuclear or weapons research facilities, military facilities, and corporations with leading-edge technologies.

- (U//FOUO) Each HUMINT Squad should have a dedicated analyst at their disposal whose primary mission is to conduct source identification analysis⁵.

(S//NF) If the FBI fails to capitalize on this opportunity, it runs the risk the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or another USIC partner, e.g., Department of Homeland Security, requesting the Director of National Intelligence revise the current order to place themselves in the position of primacy with regard to domestic recruitment and FI collection.

(U) Training

(U) Fulfilling the FBI's expanded HUMINT mission requires the participation of all FBI agents, in partnership with their analytic colleagues. The FBI should therefore provide additional HUMINT training to all FBI agents and select analytic personnel. This training will enhance their overall performance as both case agents working sophisticated prosecutions or as intelligence agents generating intelligence responsive to requirements that can drive, identify or support new investigations, or address intelligence gaps. Increased numbers of agents who have completed HUMINT training will reveal/identify those agents with a particular acumen for source recruitment, kindle interest in others who lack knowledge about the program, and provide a cadre of HUMINT specialists for the future from which the FBI can select the very best. Therefore, the council recommends:

- (U) Mandate *HUMINT Intermediate Course* attendance for all Special Agents, regardless of career path, and a requirement for promotion to GS-13.
- (U) Mandate *Advanced HUMINT Operations Course* attendance for all Special Agents assigned to HUMINT squads—regardless of their career path—and encourage attendance for Special Agents in all other career paths.
- (U) Mandate *HUMINT Tradecraft for Managers* course attendance for all Assistant Special Agents in Charge and operational squad Supervisory Special Agents, and open to field Supervisory Intelligence Analysts.
- (U) Establish targeting courses—at the basic, intermediate, and advanced levels—for Intelligence Analysts, other targeting personnel, and management across the FBI to maximize targeting capabilities, ensure efficient use of resources, and ensure proper oversight of targeting efforts from FBIHQ.

⁵ (U//FOUO) The 2012 HUMINT Squad Strategy (800A-HQ-1543216) called for similar Special Agent FSL ratios, as advocated for in the previous recommendation, as well as the assignment of an embedded IA to perform targeting analysis in support of the HUMINT Squads' responsibilities to identify and recruit individuals (CHSs) exhibiting broad placement & access to strategic threat issues.

(U) DI Support to the Field

(U) A robust field HUMINT Program requires a robust support operation at FBIHQ. The DI is still lacking in this regard in several areas. Therefore, the council recommends:

- (U//FOUO) Targeting – The council has previously advocated for more robust targeting capabilities at FBIHQ and in the field to support the HUMINT Program⁶. The DI currently provides no support to the field intelligence component in the area of high value strategic targeting or lead information for source development. This is in stark contrast to every other investigative component of the FBI ranging from criminal, counterterrorism, and counterintelligence (CI) to cyber-related investigations, which receive operational leads.⁷ Furthermore, the FBI's HUMINT peers (i.e., the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency) have far more robust targeting efforts, to include a defined career path for targeting analysts that recognizes the ability of targeting to integrate intelligence analysts and advance operations. The National Targeting Center⁸ concept, as it has been briefed to the *HUMINT Advisory Council*, would likely advance this goal significantly.
- (U) National and/or Regional Level Collection Products –The DI should consistently provide regional and national pictures of FBI's Collection Capabilities.⁹
- (S//NF) Liaison with IC agencies – The DI should be expected to provide rapid, fully comprehensive CIA name trace support on HUMINT targets which includes all biographical information, prior recruitment attempts, associations, and prior or current FIS affiliations.
- (S//NF) Detailees – DI detailees assigned to CIA should be tasked with ensuring the receipt of CIA concurrence for international operational travel and unilateral tasking operations of FBI HUMINT squad intelligence assets. This would help the CIA to increase accountability for those requests that might otherwise not be examined quickly.

⁶ (U) HUMINT Advisory Council's Targeting Implementation Proposal, June 2011

⁷ (S//NF) For example, NSA related intelligence leads are utilized on an ad hoc basis by CI squads in the field, but the field intelligence HUMINT component which is best prepared to exploit this intelligence, is never given access to these leads as they pertain to HUMINT development, despite their arguably having the greatest need for same for purposes of strategic targeting.

⁸ (U//FOUO) Establishing a National Targeting Center at FBIHQ would accomplish (1) the ability to engage in high value strategic targeting focused on Threat Review Prioritization Band I & II topics, (2) Oversee the CHS identification analytic process, and (3) Provide support to field targeting efforts.

⁹ (U//FOUO) FBIHQ, specifically the former Regional Intelligence Groups, has produced regional and national level collection products in the past. And there have been national level Collection Action Plans, though infrequent and with little standardization. Further, the various ways in which field offices currently assess their individual collection posture limits the effectiveness and accuracy of the national product. Formalizing the process by which, and standardizing the format in which, field offices prepare and present collection postures would aid the development of a comprehensive, national view of FBI's collection capabilities against myriad threats. (Example: Field offices are directed to produce collection matrices using the same template. These matrices are sent to, and reviewed by, the appropriate Field Intelligence Management Unit (FIMU) from a regional perspective. The FIMUs then consolidate the regional matrices into a national matrix, from which a national level Collection Action Plan is developed.)