P1917312 JAN {35 FM FBIS RESTON VA UNCLAS SUBJ: BBC MONITORING: WAR ON TERROR DIGEST: 13-19 JAN 05 SOURCE: CAVERSHAM BBC MONITORING IN ENGLISH 1700 GMT19 JAN 05 TEXT: THE FOLLOWING IS A ROUND-UP OF THE LATEST REPORTS RELATING TO THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST LAUNCHED FOLLOWING THE SEPTEMBER ATTACKS. IT COVERS MATERIAL AVAILABLE TO BBC MONITORING IN THE PERIOD 18 - 19 JANUARY 2005. IN THIS EDITION: PAKISTAN POLICE ARREST 3 INVOLVED IN ATTACK ON PM AZIZ: POLICE ARRESTED THREE BROTHERS ON 18 JANUARY AND IDENTIFIED ALL OTHER FIGURES INVOLVED IN AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER SHAUKAT AZIZ ON JULY 30. 2004. THE NEWS REPORTED ON 19TH. ADDRESSING A PRESS CONFERENCE AT HIS OFFICE CHAUDHRY IFT IKHAR AHMAD, DEPUTY INSPECTOR -GENERAL (DIG) POLICE RAWALPINDI RANGE REVEALIE THAT A TOTAL OF 19 PERSONS WERE IN MASTERMINDING AND EXECUTING THE ASSASSINATTON PLAN. OF THE TERRORISTS INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION PLAN WERE LINKED WITH JAISH- E- MUHAMMAD JAMIATUL FUROAN AND OTHER BANNED MILITANT ORGANISATIONS HE SAID ADDING ALL OF THEM HAD FOUGHT HE AFGHAN JIHAD. (THE NEWS, 19 JAN 05) TWO FOREIGN MILITANTS IQLLED IN WAZIRISTAN: THE BODIES OF TWO FOREIGN MILITANTS, WHO APPEARED TO BE UZBEKS, WERE DELIVERED TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN MAKEEN iN SOUTH WAZIRISTAN TRIBAL AGENCY ON 18 JANUARY BY A PRO-GOVERNMENT TRIBAL ELDER WHO CLAIMED HE KILLED THEM THE NIGHT BEFORE OUTSIDE HIS HOME, THE NEWS REPORTED ON 19TH. (THE NEWS, 19 JAN 05) THREE AIRFORCE MEN JAILED FOR LINKS WITH MILITANT GROUP: MILITARY COURTS HAVE SENTENCED AT LEAST THREE PAKISTAN AIR FORCE (PAF) SERVICE MEN TO PRISON TERMS HANGING FROM TWO TO NINE YEARS FOR ALLEGED LINKS TO AN OUTLAWED MILITANT GROUP, THE NEWS REPORTED ON 19 JANUARY OUOTING RELATIVES OF THE MEN. THE TRIALS WERE NOT ANNOUNCED, BUT RELATIVES SAID THEY HAD TAKEN PLACE ON TWO SOUTHERN PAF BASES BETWEEN OCTOBER AND DECEMBER OF LAST YEAR. RELATIVES SAID THE THREE AIRMEN WERE CHARGED WITH GIVING DONATIONS TO THE BANNED SUNNI EXTREMIST GROUP RECEIVING TRAINING AT THE AMP IN BALAKOT. NEWS, 19 JAN 05) CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED CAVEATS: FOUO CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED CAVE ATS: FOUO DOR: 20030123 TITLE: Terror training camps in Afghanistan. Pakistan producing new wave of fighters TEXT: KATHY GANNON: ?Associated Press Writers PUBBJ. Pakistan (AP) A sixshour walk along a narrow path that runs like a seam through Afghanistan's Urgun mountains leads to a remote village near the Pakistani border. Grenades are lined up like sentries along a small patch of land. nearby there is a pile of explosives. Najibullah, a young Afghan. described the terrorist training camp where he was given exploslwas training just last month. even as special torces and helicopter gunships scoured the mountains of eastern Afghanistan searching tor mil:tants. For the first time. recruits told The Associated Press about terror camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan and gave details of how they learned to carry out bomb attacks and suicide ambushes. The camp near the village of Okal described by Najibuliah stilt operates. the 23-year?old said. Most of those in charge were Arabs loyal to Osama bin Laden; those in training were Aighans, Pakistanis. some Southeast Asians and some Arabs. Naiibullah said. Some of the trainees belong to the Taliban. some to bin Laden?s terror network. Naiibullah. a follower of Afghan wartord {3 ulbuddin Hettmatyar. said he was ready to die to help drive American and other troops from his country or ring sown the pro-US. government of Hamid Karzai. went there to learn to kill the foreign troops in Afghanistan. We will drive them out because theyare destroying our country." said the young Afghan. his board a wispy collection of hairs. The United Nations and intelligence officials hays said there is a resurgence of terrorist training camps in the remote regions along both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani herder. The U.S. military in Afghanistan says it has reports of many small, mobile camps. The camps now are revving back up after months oi having to lower their activity because of U.S.-ted troops' hunt for militants in the region, launched after the Taliban fell in December 2001 .- Najibullah and another trainee, Mohammad Zahidullah, gave a rare look into the camps. which they say are producing fighters ready to carry out attacks in Afghanistan. Pakistan and elsewhere. "Anywhere where non-Muslims are attacking Muslims." Zahidullah, a Pakistani. said. The camp near Okai. in Afghanistan's eastern Paktika province. was small and could be easily moved, said Najibuttah. Each ?class? had fewer than i 5 trainees, he said. Cot. Flogor King, U.8. military spokesman at Bagram Air Base north oi Kabul. said the mobile camps are ?of interest to us." But ?all the camps we have found so far have been abandoned." King said the resurgence of the training camps is evidence that the war on terror wilt be long. but also showed the coalition's success. ?We have also maintained that due to our early success, the enemy wasn?t capable of large scaie. coordinated actions. Small mobile camps would fit that mold," he said. Nallbuttah and Zahiduilah. a member of Pakistan's banned Lashkar?e-Tayyaba militant group who trained in a camp 90 miles west of lslamabad, said they mostly learned about explosives. ?We weren't there to team how to fire a Kalashnikov or rocket launcher. We already knew that." Najibultah said. They learned how to devise an ambush and lay land mines, where to lie in wait for coalition soldiers, how much explosives to set and how to detonate them. when to hurt a grenade. when to clutch It to your body and htow yourself up with your victim. ?The instructors were mostly Arabs." said Najtbuiiah, who speaks Arabic. He described the Chat camp in two interviews with AP. one in tslamabad and the other in a remote corner of the rugged North West'Frontier Province. which borders Afghanistan. The native of Afghanistan?s Paktiira province moves regularly back and forth across the porous border. Wrapped in a woolen shawl against the cold. Najihuliah retrieved a small piece of lrayed wood .a ?maswak,? or traditional toothbrush and held it with some reVerenco. ?This was from Osama," he said. meaning bin Laden. A friend at the training camp got it from the aI-Qaida cl'lief. Natibultah said. The herbal stick is used by those who imitate lslam's Prophet Muhammad, who used a similar stick in clean his teeth. Najibuitah said he was prepared to carry col attacks. though he would not discuss specifics. ?No one can stop us. We are not afraid of the 8623.? he said. referring to the bombers that pounded triangles; and CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED CAVEATS: FOLIO 2505452 FEB 04 SUBJ: PAKISTAN: CRACKDOWN ORDERED ON UNNAMED OUTFIT FOR INVOLVEMENT IN TERROR ACTS REF: 1. PAKISTAN: MISCREANTS SET GIRLS SCHOOL ON FIRE IN NORTHERN AREAS SAP20040221000047 DAILY TIMES (INTERNET ENGLISH 21 FEB 04 2. PAKISTAN: FIVE ARRESTED FOR TORCHING. BOMBING GIRLS SCHOOLS IN NORTHERN AREAS SAP200402220000I9 KARACHI DAWN (INTERNET ENGLISH 22 FEB 04 SOURCE: LAHORE DAILY TIMES (INTERNET IN ENGLISH 25 FEB04 THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS ORDERED A CRACKDOWN ON AN UNNAMED GROUP LED BY MAULVI SHAHZADA KHAN IN NORTHERN AREAS FOR ITS ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. AGENCIES HAVE WARNED THE GOVERNMENT THAT THE GROUP COULD RESORT TO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AT ANY PLACE AT ANY SOURCES TOLD DAILY TIMES. THEY SAID THE LINKS WITH JAISH MUHAMMAD. (TNSM) AND OTHER BANNED ORGANISATIONS HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED AND LINKS WITH AL OAEDA CANNOT BE RULED THE SOURCES ADDED. SHAHZADA INTERROGATION MAY LEAD TO THE ARREST OF SOME EXTREMIST SOURCES QUOTED A GOVERNMENT ORDER TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND THE NORTHERN AREAS ADMINISTRATION. IS INVOLVED IN BOMB BLASTS AND FIRING AT SOCIAL ACTION PROGRAMME SCHOOL BUILDINGS. BESIDES ATTACKS ON GOVERNMENT THE SOURCES SAID. THEY ADDED THAT THE PAKISTAN ARMY RECENTLY RAIDED MR TRAINING CAMP SUSPECTIIVG HIM OF LINKS WITH AL QAEDA, BUT FOUND NOTHING BECAUSE THE TRAINEES HAD FLED. SOURCES SAID THAT MAULVI SHAHZADA KHAN, THE SON OF SHAH SULTAN OF VILLAGE RIM SHEIKH, TEHSIL (SUB DISTRICT) TANGIR IN DISTRICT DIAMER, HAD ALLEGEDLY BEEN IMPARTING MILITARY TRAINING AND HAD LINKS WITH JIHADI AND PRO-TALIBAN ELEMENTS. IS REPORTED TO HAVE CONFRONTED THE GOVERNMENT ON VARIOUS ISSUES SUCH AS SHARIAT (ISLAMIC LAW) MOVEMENT ETC AND STAGED ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS DURING THE POST 9/11 US-LED ATTACK ON THE SOURCES SAID. SOURCES SAID ACCORDING TO THE INVESTIGATION BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, THE GROUP PLAYED A LEADING ROLE DURING THE INVASION CF SHIA LOCALITIES BY A TRIBAL LASHKAR (ARMY) IN GILGIT IN 1988. ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF MR KHAN RANGE FROM GETTING MILITARY TRAINING HIMSELF IN MIRAN SHAH IN THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE TO SETTING UP A MILITARY TRAINING CENTRE AT VILLAGE RIM SHEIKH IN 1997-438 UNDER THE HARKATUL MUJAHIDEEN. 300 PERSONS FROM NORTHERN AREAS AND OTHER PARTS IN PAKISTAN WERE TRAINED BY HIM IN SUICIDE BOMBING AND ATTACKS WITH GRENADES AND FIREARM THE SOURCES ADDED. SOURCES SAID THAT HE REMAINED IN CLOSE TH THE JA ABERSH-IR-ANDLEADERS OF FREQUENTLY VISITED RAINING CAMP AT SHAWAL IN BALAKOT HFWAS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH QARI SAIFULLAH, A JIH 1 FINANCIAL AID AND ARMS FROM THE SOURCES SAID. (DESCRIPTION 01- SUUHCE: LAHORE DAILY TIMES IN ENGLISH INDEPENDENT. MODERATE DAILY. RUN BY VETERAN JOURNALIST NAJAM SETHII PUBLISHED BY THE FRIDAY TIMES GROUP. CATERING TO THE. MIDDLE CLASS, WITH AN ESTIMATED CIRCULATION OF 2000.) THIS REPORT MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. COPYING AND DISSEMINATION IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS. UNCLASSIFIED CAVEATS: FOUO PUBNAME: DOW JONES NEWS SERVICE ORIGDATE: 20050118122900 TITLE: 3 Pakistan Serviceman Court-Martialed For Militant Links TEXT: (AH-Military courts have sentenced at least three Pakistan air force service men to prison terms. ranging from two to nine years for alleged links to an outlawed mititanl group. relatives of the men said on Tuesday. The trials weren't announced, but relatives said they had taken place on two southern air force bases between October and December of last year. Military trials in Pakistan are often shrouded in secrecy, and air force spokesman Air Commodore Sarlraz Ahmad wouldn't confirm the court martials. Aslam Khattak, a former air force chief warrant officer and the father of one of the defendants, Nasruminallah Khattak, said the three airmen were charged with gi emist group Jaish?e- Mohammed, and of receiving smatt~arms trainin?at the group's camp in 8W stern Pakistan. He said his son was innocent. The younger Khattak, 18, entancedjoMo?yea' prison, as was Saeed Alam, 19. Another young airman, Munir Ahmed. was given a nineuyear sentence. said Abdus Samad, Ahmed's brother. President Gen. Perver: Musharrat outtawed Jaish-e-Mohammed in 2001 as part of efforts to end isiamic extremism. lslamic groups are blamed for at least? three attempts against the Pakistani leader, including two in December 2004 when militants set off bombs as Musharraf's motorcade passed. The attacks raESed fears that they were receiving inside information on his movements. Since then. at least two soldiers have been convicted for their role in the attacks. One has been sentenced to death and the otter to to years in jail. Last week, officials said another air force servicemen, Mushtaq Ahmad, who was being held tor his role in one of the attacks on Musharraf, escaped from detention in Rawalpindi, a city near the capital Islamabad. The three young airmen whose cases came to light Tuesday weren't apparently involved in any of the attempts on Musharraf's tits. (0) 2005 Dow STAFF SUMMARY SHEET SEQUENTIAL COORDINATION SIMULTANEOUS COORDINATION TO ACTION SIGNATURE {Emma} AND DATE . TO SIGNATURE (Surname) AND DATE 1 OGC Coord Eemail coord' completed 1 - 2 DEC Log use. 4.24.1) 10.000 05 7 1.. 3. MK 3M9 Gama Pmou?d .Iosaoos 1 73?: (Board (berm ?he! as Coord 4 #11 5 Sign I??hfc?35 __111 SURNAME omcnon OFFICER I smaoumLsrep wears SUSPENSE DATE (DRE) INITIALS . . SUBJECT literal Imagery Derived Products for Support to the DATE Prosecution: US v. Hayat 14 o?t 05 SUMMARY 1. Purpose. Obtai.n formal approval for the NGA proposal to deolassify a set of LIDPS to assist the DOJ Presecution in izhe US v. Heist case. . had 2. Background. The- Imagery Policy and Security Committee no objection to this request Unclassified imagery derived products (IDPs) will be used to depict the facility in Pakistan that. matches the defendant?s description and loca_tion of a jihad? training c.amp he admitted to traveling to, in an interview. with the FBI. Later in the [i-nterview, he denied traveling to a camp and refused to cooperate with the investigat:ion. Deolassified IDPS of the Balakot Pakistan. area- and the camp are to be _introduced as evidence into? US District Court in the Eastern' District of California to support the indictment. The LIDPS will simply show that the defendant?s initial statements clearly describe his travel a known training camp and therefore_ cast serious doubt Iupon his' later statements that dehy that he traveled to this location. The LIDPs would be for release to the Prosecution for evidentiary purposes and will be supported wi?th expert witness testimony. The declassified IDES .would. therefore become public record. 35 Recommendation. formally approve. this request by signing the facing memorandum. 424 Director, Office of Internatidnal Affairs and Policy EDITION BE USift}. FORM 1768 SEP 84 INATIONAL AGENCY 4600 Sangamore Road Bethesda, Maryland 20816-5003 DEC 0 12905 - MEMORANDUM FOR item PROSECUTOR, US v. v.3. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SUBJECTE (U)'Approval for DeolaSsification of?Imagery DeriVed Products to Support the Prosecution: U.S. Department of Justice: United States V. Hayat (U) National Geospatial Intelligence Agency IDP Use Approval Request 020 14 October 2005 la The Imagery Policy and Security Committee' has endorsed the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) proposal to ?deolassi?y- -a spec-ifio set of Imagery Derived Products in support of the prosecution,IJS Hayat. I eppxove this request under authbrity delegated to me by the Director of National Intelligence. 2. The enolosed addendum provides the terms under which this issue was presented to the Intelligence Community and the cbnditions that govern this approval- Requests for deviations from the terms of this._ approval must be submitted to NGA Office of General Counsel ,for community coordination and NGA pie-approval 3- The point of contact for this issue is . Hm$H0U33?4g?mm I Assdciate.General Counsel, Mission I Internationel Law RMES CLAPP JR. Lieutenant General USAF {Ret. Direotor Enclosure . . IDP Use Request_Addendum, - 14 out 05, UPON REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURE THIS DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED IDP Use Addendum unions?020, IDP Support to the Prosecution: Ugs. Department of 1. Justice: United States v. Heyat version 1., 14 October 2005 This polioy addendum establishes the Intelligenoe Community terms for the approval of Modifications to this addendum requipe pre?epprovel and may require NGA coordination with the Intelligence Community. Thie approval is currently subject to the following terms of use; This approval provides for'release of the IDPs and associated NGAHprovided statements as unclassified information in a court setting; The IDPe-and NGAmprovided statements may be introduced as evidence and are fully available_for the public If a requirement is identified to_release IDPs onteide of the trial, or to otherwise-display the in a forum open to public outside the trial, please contact_the NGA action- offiCer for this issue. NGA will coordinate new release issues with.the 1C as required. Attribution National Imagery Systems? is eboeptable.i' No.0ther=revelations of details of the classified imaging [system,-nor the imagery taskingL collectidn, or erloitation proceSs is to be made. - This approval applies to the Specific eet?of-produots, referenced by graphic title and NGA tracking-number'direotly - below.'u . 2. The following IDPS ate.approved for use.under th? terms bf this addendumg04~qu~2005 idp_unc_pi:608654_ov_aUgD4 ivohbalakot. jug 04-Nov-2005. ?g 'ipg 0'4HNo'v 2005 (Jamey?2005 3 .35. 33 Erma .. .. 39539 36 magma. . . . .. - mEerw waFuEmm M. :1 I. I i 32am In. II. In - "h f. . 3?31 . . . - :a glib}! I "tn'hsg?i'llt?f l' nau-?wn-n-I OPEN AREA WITH LARGE anme AND SEVERAL SWLER BIHLDINGS .. 3-u'33:.?-ixlu?u was? Memorandum for the Record Date: 01 February 2006 Subject: NGA Support for US. Vs. Havat Participants: use. 4241mm; Location: Federal Court House - Saeramento, CA Purpose The purpose of the meeting was to prepare employee. espert witness in the ?eld of imagery analysis. to testify as an Protective Order 8: Stipulation The meeting began with an update on the protective order for the handling of classi?ed information and the stipulation regarding the authenticity of the imagery. Do] informed NGA that the defense had signed the protective order on 30 January and they expected it to be approved by the judge that day. They expected the defense to stipulate to the authenticity of the imagery on Fliday, 03 February. NGA To Testify In Two Trials Simultaneously Mr. Deitch informed NGA that in US. V. Hayat, two separate juzies will be impaneled and will simultaneously sit in judgment during the roceedin 3 That means 24 jury members and their alternates will be resent duringiib: 5; Itestimony. It is currently Mr. Deitch?s intention to call as the ?nal witness in the prosecution?s case against both Uniar and Hamid Hayat. Umar Hayat is charged with lying to a federal of?cial regarding Hamid?s attendance at a militant training camp in Pakistan. Hamid is charged with providing material support to terrorist by attending such a camp and also with lying to a federal of?cial about attending the camp. Mr. Deitch?s current strategy fo- testimony is divided into three sections of which Umar?s jury will hear the ?rst two and then be sent From the courtroom when-begins answering questions about the videotaped FBI interview of Hamid Hayat, as the Umarjury cannot hear testimony from Hamid against his father. Judge Garland E. Barrel], Jr. The judge in the case is Judge Garland E. Barrel], In, whom the described as trusting the prosecution on classi?ed issues. Although Judge Barrel] is new to he is willing to listen and looks to the prosecution for guidance and will accept it, if he believes it is grounded in the law. They also reported on his courtroom demeanor and treatment of witnesses. he AUSAs reported that Judge Burrell does not ?pick?on" Witnesses, and he chastises lawyers who attempt to prevent a witness in his courtroom from completely answering a question. Also, Judge Burroll, rarely questions a witness himself, except to clarify an answer. I Testimony: General Guidelines Del [never to feel rushed or ?put upon? at trial. They advised him to take his time and never rush into answers. He may be required to leave the witness box and approach the imagery, which will be mounted on easels directlv in front of the juries. Under no circumstances are his answers to be classi?ed. 1 0 [was advised to parse his answers out and give only unclassified information if that will satisfy the question posed to him. If for some reason the prosecution fails to ob'ect when he feels a complete answer requires the disclosure of classified information?is to state that his response is ?sensitive.? That will one the prosecutioa that they need to approach the judge to discuss the matter. Since the defense attorneys are not cleared for classi?ed information, it is eapected that they will voluntarily waive th to participate in discussion regarding such matters and how they relate to to; ?3210 Itestimony. Words . is to avoid in his testimony include; classi?ed and targets. Qualifying-as an Expert Witness There was a series of questions posed to about his background, experience and training as an imagery analyst (IA). His answers impressed the attorneys. This was followed by a series of questions about the work and the role of an imagery analyst. In this section of the questioning, the prosecutions? intent is to demonstrate that imagery analysis is just one source of intelligence and that an imagery analyst does not work in a vacuum but is well versed in a variety of intelligence sources other than imagery. An IA utilizes those other forms of intelligence (including open source or unclassi?ed infonnatiou) to better understand the subject matter that they are analyzing on imagery. Finally, we discussed the qualifiers, lAs use to describe an ob'eet on imagery, they include; ui?mown, possible, probable and con?rmed. ?indieated that he did not wish to attribute percentages to those quali?ers but did indicate that possible indicated less than 50% certainty, probable, more than 50% certainty, and con?rmed less than 100% certainty (possibly 70% to Testimony Based on Imagery Alone It is Mr. Dcitch?s intent to ?rst questior-solely on the imagery. In other words, he will be presented with the imagery and be asked to interpret for the jury what information he, as an imagery analyst, can derive from examining the images without utilizing any other sources of information. The questioning planned for trial involves correlating the images to the maps also entered into evidence, and then a basic description of what is contained on the imagery, including the presence or absence of signatures that indicate the presence of a militant training camp on the image. will provide several explanations for why some of the signatures may be absent from this imagery based on his knowledge of mi: itant training camps. Another line of questioning will center on whether or not ?i?i??ig 42 can determine if the camp is either inhabited or at least in a state of satisfactory maintenance and repair to facilitate operations. If pressed by the detbnse,_has indicated that he will testify that it is common knowledge that satellites are engaged in worldwide reconnaissance missions and our adversaries take measures to avoid detection. Further questioning may focus on why the images are not of a military training camp. images from both 2001 and 2004 will be entered into evidence and questioning will focus on the differences between those images. A magnifying glass will be provided at trial. Upon exhausting this line of questioning, will be asked by the prosecution to make a ?call? about whether this image contains a militant training camp. indicated that based on imageryr a one he can testify that these images are of a ?possible? militant training camp. informed that he was uncomfortable with fieldng questions based on the imagery alone, because this is not how an IA Operates in the real world. In fact, he explained that our images would never have been acquired if not for the reortin of collateral information or intelligence. D01 ?3 strategy is to gradually build Upon testimony by then adding in a re-examination of the imagery considering other intelligence sources, and then last] moving on to Hamid?s intewiew. This way the Ulnar jury can hear most omestimony before they are dismissed from the courtroom. Testimony Based on Additional Information This proved to be the most troubling line of questioning at our meeting. provided one Los Angelos Times article on militant training camps near or at Balakot. and several FBIS articles labeled FOUO. To use the F813 articles at trial would probably require permission from FBIS. Permission that I would not be easily obtained. One of the questions . was able to easily answer was ?how does the use of open source information point you to the camp on the imagery?? Windieated that it doesn?t, geography does and then he explained to Del why of all the militant camps in Pakistan known to the USG, only the one on imagery would be referred to as being at or near Balakot by both his and local peoples. This line of questioning serves the dual purpose of providing further weight to the imagery evidence and could also be utilized to refute the Ichrian camp that a CIA analyst has championed as being The camp in question. It was decided that this line of uestioning would be rethought and revisited at a subsequent meeting. However, did indicate that based on other types of intelligence or information he may be able to state before both juries that the camp depicted on imagery is a ?probable" militant training camp. Testimony Based on the Hamid Interview Mr. Deitch has currently flagged about 20 minutes of the Hamid interview to be shown in short bursts at trial (the longest continuous section runs about six minutes). At this point would respond to different questions asked after a short section of the interview is played for the jury. We reviewed those sections but did not go into a lot of detail about the questioning. 'I?he prosecution?s goal is for-t0 categorically state for thejury that based on his viewing of the Hamid interview, it is his professional opinion as an IA that the images entered into evidence at trial depict a ?con?rmed? militant training camp. -indieates that he would review the testimony (we received 4 DVDS and 2 copies of the transcripts at the meeting) and would think about his answer to this question for our next meeting. Next Steps It is Mr. Deiteh?s assessment that we completed roughly 70% of the trial preparation work at the meeting. Another meeting is planned for the week of 06 February, either at Do] in Washington, DC on Monday, 06 February, or by video teleconference later in the week. Mr. Deitch is tern orar relocating to Sacramento for the trial on 07 February. As stated earlier, currently?is scheduled to be the prosecution?s last witness, with testimony expected to be given sometime durin 1 the week of 06 March; however, if Urnar Hayat should plead-out of the case?could be called several weeks earlier. Based on the day of his testimony (a Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday), it is DoJ?s wish that he be available for another meeting the day before to review and polish his testimony. Other action items include, securing permission from to use the LIMDIS maps at trial, and removing the reference to Baiakot on the title of the commercial imagery of the Ichrian camp. If you have any questions or cemments regarding this MFR, please do not hesitate to contact me. (W5) {we U.S. Department of Justice Office of CounterHTerrorism Washington, DC The following are conditions and restrictions that the National Agency (NGA) requires the Department of Justice obtain from the trial COurt, in accordance with the Classified Information Protections Act, in order for NGA to provide evidence and testimony concerning that evidence, on behalf of the United States government for the case of US v. Hayat. Imagery The source of the imagery can only be identified as either commercial or United States government. The following is an approved explanation about the imagery: ?The imagery_provided represents a true and accurate representation of the features of and On the Earth, as they was when the image was acquired. Each of these images were taken by an overhead satellite, and ,processed in computers operated by.Department of Defense agoncies. The digital images were sent to digital printers that generated these prints referred to as imagery derived products (IDP). IDPs may be printed at various degrees of resolution. Resolution levels are analogous to different settings on a zoom lens for a camera; as levels of resolution increase it becomes possible to identify smaller features within the image. The IDPs for this case were produced at a level of resolution approximately equivalent to the best commercial imagery currently available (one meter).? No further statements can be made about the following: How the satellites function? a Who controls the satellites? How the imagery is created? UNCLASSIFIED 20060643 The Further details about when the imagery of the camps was generated, other then that information contained on the IDP . Further details about why the camps were imaged, other than national security. Further details about how frequently the camps are imaged. The Imagery Analyst The analyst must be identified as werking for the Department of Defense. It is permissible to identify the imagery analyst (IA). It is permissible to identify the IA's rank/position. It is permissible to discuss the IA's training and education. It is permissible to discuss the prefessional experience, including subject?matter expertise of the camps depicted on imagery. IA may discuss the following about the imagery: Open source material that contributed to the IA's knowledge cencerning the camps depicted on the imagery. The imagery itself, meaning what is depiCted on the image, and the intelligence derived from it for purposes of what the prosecution plans on entering into evidence. Thank you for your time and attention to this matter. The point of contact for this matter OGCM, mail stop Sincerely, 424 General Counsel UNCLASSIFIED WP F_20040101_91120.htm PATHFINDER RECORD NUMBER: 9112 0 GENDATE: 20040128 GENTIME: 01:50:05 TITLE: 20040128 TFW INTSUM INFODATE: 20040128 DATE: 200A 01 28 TEXT: 04 TO 02003 28 JAN 04 P. (U) Pakistan: 500 militants sent to Wane: In late December 2003 the fundamentalist Islamic group Jaish Mohammad (JEM) sent 3,500 militants to areas near Wane and Shewal, Pakistan, to prepare for attacks (NFI) against Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Initially, 4,000 militants were to be sent, but the number was decreased to 3,500. The 3,500 militants were separated into ten groups, with each group being sent out at different times and to different locations. By the end of December 2003, all ten groups had already left from the JEM training came in Balikot, Pakistan. _The militants were instructed to shave'their beards and Change their appearance so that they would not look like Taliban. The militants were sent to the Waziristan area by the request of former Taliban supreme leader mullah Mohammad (Source comment: Jaish?E Mohammad is the only Pakistani fundamentalist faction that is assisting MUllah Omar.) WARRIOR ANALYST The number of fighters listed above is likely highly exaggerated. Due to the early January 04 operations by the Pakistani militarv, these fighters have likely dissipated from the area. we) DATABASE: AfghanistangTactical RECORD: 91119 ?If33Iltm ..-. .. .. I I .I I Ha.I.l.hIILH?awn uh. . an...ouI I I a I I ..LI..- .. . . . I . . I I II Inn! {1..I..Intan?. I .II.. I ..IHI..Iztu I I ....IL . I IIHNII I II I. I. InnsInn-:IL.I..I.I..5123 m?.mmnu? .um. ?.mn?udm? an. ?urn ?rm . as. 3 788164 . 3 Intelligence Report National Geosp?atiztl-mtelfigence A gentry Status of Kashmiri-w-Based Militant Camps Since the 8 May 2003 Demerehe: An imagery Perspective 5 March 2004 :in} (U) Kashmil?i Militants Training on Ohstaclc Course Reseamh Paper (may: mumm?: mac'l UN: EL. I Derived l'usm' i (U) ?uoridation as of I February 2004 was used in this report. (U) Summary (57433053 . [This intelligence report summarizes Kashmiri militant-related ac? tivity in northeastern Pakistan from Apri l" 2003 through early February 2004 and serves as an update to the Militant?Related Facilities in Pakistan report published in May 2003. 'lPriot' to early May 2003, activity levels at many Kashmiri-based militant camps appeared relatively normal when compared to those levels observed in previous years. However, after the 8 May 2003 US dcmarche to the Government of Pakistan, militant activity decreased sharply in Axed Kashmir and increased in the neighboring North-West Frontier Province (?gures I and 2). Activity levels remained steady at most militant-related facilities throughout the summer, but began to decline during November. This decline probably can be attributed to several factors, ranging from the onset of winter in the region to cll?oris by Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf to curtail militant activities. [Signi?cant developments observed during the reporting period included: The two camps revealed in the US dcmarchc, Muzall?arabad Militant Training Camp Northwest and Sirikot Militant 'l'rahiing Camp, showed virtually no activity after 8 May 2003. Activity levels at other militant camps in Azad Kashmir also declined alter that date. Four inactive camps in the North?West Frontier Province were reactivated alter the demarche to receive militants being relocated from deactivated camps in Azad Kashmir. Additional building construction was $6611 at several camps, indicating continued support from elements within the Governnient of Pakistan and possibly from local indigenous groups. - Six sites were newly identi?ed 000) with the aid of other Sources, as militant?related facilities. (U) Background [Low-level insurgency has endured in Kashmir t? or more than hall?a century. Driven by the partition of the region after Britain?s departure in l947, Kashmir has remained a ?ash point between Muslim-dominated Pakistan and largely l-lindn-populated India. Rather than accepting the sta? tus one division of the region, Muslim militants, with varying degrees of support from the Pakistan Govern- ment and the intelligcn cc services. have created and sustained an insurgency in lndian-hcld pa of Kashmir, which New Delhi has been unable to quell. The militancy has matured into an organized effort funded at home and abroad and operates through a series administration, training, and holding (?3113de Mimi?) IKashmir has been directly or indirectly the catalyst for three major conflicts between india and Pakistan, and it remains the most likely ?ash point between the two countries. Sevv eral efforts have been made to limit or halt militant activities from Pakistan into htd'ian Kashmir. Despite sen suranccs and commitments item the Pakistan Government and President Musharraf, imagery from April 2003 through early February 2004 shows that while some camps were deactivated in 2003, others were either reac- tivated or remained active. l. ill January 2000. ?More on Report on Militant-Training Camps in Pakistan.? Bangalore Herero: Hernia! (Internet ll} January 2000. Document is classi?ed ll. {Si-Militant Camps in Pakistan Kashmir - [The Pakistan-based militant camps are situated primarily along the southern end ofthc line of control (LOG) and in the region around Muzatiarabad. These camps can be classi- ?ed into three cateorics: recruiting and administration of?ces, training and holding camps, and launching ?{bl(il camps. While utilizing collateral and other information such as ground-level photographs, has been successful in locating militant Facilities, we only have been able to independently identify and men itor activity at larger training and holding - I [As a general rule, these types of facilities are usually found in forested areas, away from major roads, and often in mountainous terrain (figure 3). As of early February 2004?, we have identi?ed 20 training and two holding camps. . The other two categories champs?recruiting and administration of?ces and launching cam ps?are difficult to locateliblm IRccruiting and administration of?ces, for example, tend to be located in cities and towns and may consist ofa single building or even just part of a building. Similarly. launching camps are either rural buildings or tents dispersed (normally) near Pakistan border defense units in the ticldz. Without sufficient collateral to indicate otherwise, we cannot discern a "militant" building or tent from any other building or I ?it-Militant. Camps Revealed in 8 May 2003 Ilelnarche [Both militant camps mentioned in the 8 May 2003 dentarche are in Azad Kashmir, one ot?two areas in Kashmir currently occupied by Pakistan. These camps were included in the demarehe because of the military-related training that was observed. fa-Muzal?farabad Militant Training Camp Northwest IMuzaffarabad Militant 'l?raining Camp Northwest was revealed I in the demarche because marksmanship training was observed on two dates in early 2003. 18 March three instructors were teaching at least l8 people basic ri?e marksmanship skills. The students were in the ?prone? position, with legs spread on light?toned mats. At least 24 people Were involved in the Sartre activity on 3 April (figure IAetivity levels remained high at this camp through early May. However, these levels Fell sharply after i May, probably as a result of the demarche. Dismantlement of the roofs of two support buildings began between 5 and it June. but this activity had ceased by mid-June. Only portions of each mo f' were actually removed, and little activity has been seen at this site since. People have been observed occasionally, but their numbers are far ?ower than those seen prior to the demarchc. These personnel probably remain to provide on?site maintenance and security. ?li'tiirikot Militant ?l'rainiua Cami? Mimi? lSirikot Militant 'l?raining Camp was also mentioned in the demarche, due to the large numbers olipeople Frequently observed throughout the Facility. At least 125 people were present at this camp on 8 April, along with an obstacle course at the north end oi? the camp (?gure 5). This was the ?rst time that an obstacle course was observed at this particular camp. 2. Whirl. (mild-'HBYS. similar: Mim?stij' Provider hg?'urualicu (3n :li'i't?i'trm! .rlr'u?t'ilies. Document is classifiable?? uhh' 3 1'1 I High levels ot?aetivity were seen at Sirikol through early May. Like Muzattarabad Northwest, these levels dropped signi?cantly after 11 May. By late May relatively few people were observed in the camp proper. However. increased activity was seen at a clearing in a forested area approximately (300 meters north of the camp mosque. Between 14 May and 7 .lune, groups of up to (it) to 70 people were observed on several occasions at the clearing, probably in an effort to conceal training as a result of the demarehe (?gure 6). Sn?lallei' groups ofpeoplc were seen periodically at the clearing through late July. @4033?) I Little activity has heen observed at this camp since last summer. Groups of 20 to 30 people were present on at least three occasions during the latter half of the year, but relatively few people, if any, have been seen in the main camp area. The presence of foot trails, cleared of snow, in January and early February 2004 indicate that some personnel had remained at this site. However, these personnel probably serve only in an on?site maintenance and security capacity. ?(?thher Militant Camps in Anad Kashmir Wages]: Militant Camp . Low levels ol?activity were ebseWed at Fagosh Militant (Lamp during most of the reporting period. Because activity levels had already fallen lay April 2003, this camp did not appear to be affected as much by the detnarehe as were other camps in Aaad Kashmir. ?f?r?lhllil [Significant increases in activity were seen On several occasions after the demarehe. 011 2 July approximately 30 people, probably engaged in physieal training, were loosely assembled in several rows in the open area south of the mosque. This activity was unusual given efforts by the Pakistan Government at that time to relocate militants to camps outside of Azacl Kashmir. No signi?cant activity was observed until later in the year when groups of 20 to 40 people were seen on several dates in October (?gure 7). "?tHir K0 tli Militant 'I?l?aipintaI Camp Willi?) I IA signi?cant decrease in activity was observed at Hir Ketli Militant 'l?raining Camp after the demarehe. This facility, which lies within several kilometers of both Muzaf?trabad Nerthwest and Sirikot, was ?rst identi?ed as a militant camp in late April 2003, when at least 35 people were seen at the training field (figure 8). Personnel and tents were present at this site through early May. However, all tents were removed from the hivouae area between 7 and 11 May. No signi?cant activity has been seen at Hir Kotli since last May. ??amani Militant Training} Camp [Little activity has been observed at Samani Militant Training Camp since the demarche in early May 2003. Prior to that date, tents and personnel were seen on numerous occasions at this site. Between 7 and 1 May, however. all tents for student housing had been removed. ?amani Camp Southeast lT he demarehe appeared to have no effect on activity levels observed at Samani Camp Southeast during the reporting period. Activity levels were already lowjust prior to the demarche and remained relatively low thereafter. Groups of up to 20 people were seen in the courtyard north of the main building (where training normally occurs) on two occasions?<9 October and 22 December?in late 2003. However, most of the training activity observed during 2003 occurred well before the issuance of the demarehe. ??densa Militant Training Camp Willi?) [Minimal levels of activity were observed periodically at Sensa Militant Training Camp prior to the demarche last year. This activity generally included the presence of several personnel and tents throughout the facility. By 17 May, however. all of the tents had apparently been removed from this site and there were no additional sightings of personnel. Tent activity increased {up to three tents) in late September and in early December but none ot'this activity appeared to be sustained for very long. ?it-(Thelma Militant Training Caron l't'hamla Militr nt 'l'raining Camp was first identified as a militant camp in June 2003. A revealed that the camp had been occupied from at least early February to early May. Several tents were present in the forested area nearby during that period. After the denial-elm, only one tent consistently remained in the area. The most signi?cant activity observed at this site since the demarehe involved the construction of a fence just east of the probable mosque in late September. The fence enclosed an adjacent area approximately 12 by 20 meters in size. - of one large building (probably a mosque), two small buildings, and an athletic ?eld with training apparatus (?gure 9). This camp is 5 km north of Sensa Militant Training Camp, 18 km west ol? Kelli, and 30 km west of the LOC. {IS-Militant Camps with Nortln?i?i?est Frontier Province lnereased activity was observed at several militant camps in the North-West Frontier Province after the dentarche. Four inactive camps were reactivated to accommodate militants being relocated from camps in Assad Kashmir. Sustained levels of activity continued to been Seen at most camps in the North?West Frontier Province through much of last year, though overall activity levels at all camps began to decline in November. ??-Bairasi Gall Militant Training: Cam!) lBatrasi Gall Militant ?i'raining Camp was one offour camps in the Nortanest Frontier Province reactivated alter the demarche. This camp, which was deactivated in June 2002, was reactivated apparently between 11 and 16 May 2003. By 16 May six tents had been erected near the former site of the camp mosque. 'l?hirteen tents and at least 40 to 59 people were present by 2 May (figure ill). The number of tents observed at Batrasi Gail increased to at least 32 in early June. However, tent activity declined gradually in mid?June. and later dropped sharp! alter 24 June. Several 11?1 ?r tents, including a newly erected large tent, continued to been seen through July, but all of the tents were eventually removed from this camp by early August. The sudden increase and subsequent decrease in tent activity during this time period suggests that Batrasi Gali was merely a transition point for militants relocating from Azad Kashmir to other camps in the North?West Frontier Province. "t Militanti?ainin Cam Northwest ?ll-3X1) IMansehra Militant Training Camp Northwest was apparently the second militant camp in the North-West Frontier Province to receive personnel from camps in Azad Kashmir. Though this site was not formally identified as a militant camp until late June 2003, tent activity had already been observed by 16 May. No activity was seen at this camp from at least mid-March 2002 to early April 2003. ?le/1M1) [At least 50 people and at least 12 tents were observed at Mansehra Northwest on 25 June 2003. On 1 July approximately 80 people and two pickup trucks were present in the open area near the camp entrance (?gure 11). A group of approximately 80 people was seen again on 7 July. However, this group was assembled at the athletic ?eld in the northern portion of the camp. groups of up to 20 people were periodically observed after July 2003, usually in the open area near the camp entrance. The number oi" personnel tents observed at Mansehta Northwest fluctuated occasionally during the reporting period. Generally, at least several tents were consistently present at this camp?most in the southern tent area. Iligh tent counts included at least 14 in early July and as many as 19 in late August. Fluctuations in tent counts during last summer and early fall were probably related to transitory personnel activity. [Two large tents also were erected at this camp during the reporting period. These types of tents are usually used for meetings, ceremonies, or receptions. One large tent?approximately [3 by ll) meters in size?wast erected near the camp entrance between 28 May and June 2003. This tent was later removed by 241nm. Within several weeks, a large building had been built on the some site. Another large tent?approximately 12 by ll) meters in sizewwas erected on the east side of the road that links the southern and northern portions of the camp. This tent was removed by midi September. tMansehra Northwest consists ot?two large huilrliirgs, several - small support buildings, two bivouac areas, an athletic ?eld, and two latrines. This camp is 5 Ion northwest of Mausehra and 45 km west of the LOCI. agan Cali Militant TrainingI Qamp {Kagan Gall Militant Training Camp, which also was deactivated in .lune 2002, was reactivated between 23 and 28 May 2003. 28 May at least six tents had arrived in the vicinity ot?rhis campsite. In addition, training had resumed by 24 June when at least 25 people were observed in the open area in the central portion ol?the camp (?gure Sevcral tents were consistently present at this site late June to late October. Slight fluctuations were occasionally observed during this period, but some of these l3 variances could probably be attributed to dense tree foliage and terrain masking rather than to ?eeting perconncl activity alone. in October a building?l 2 by 8 meters in size -~?was erected in the central portion of the camp. This structure probably serves as an assembly area for prayer and instruction. Relatively low levels of activity have been seen at Kagan Gali since last October. lcollistHaarat Abu Bakr Si driio ui Militant: Canto ll?laarat Abu Bakr Siddiqui Militant Canto was reactivated in June 2003 to accommodate personnel relocating from Azad Kashmir?this camp had been inactive since November 2002- At least two tents had been erected by 13 June. By 27 June at least 34 tents were present. The number of tents observed from late June to late October generally remained above 20 throughout the entire camp area. Fluctuations in lent counts during this period probably were due to dense evergreen tree Foliage and variances in imaging angles. A decline in tent activity has been seen since last November. l-lowever, it is difficult to assess how much of this decline can actually be attributed to reductions in militant activity. The presence of snow on the ground, in addition to dense tree foliage, has made it difficult to discern the light?toned tents normally seen at this site. I Signi?cant construction also was seen at Hazrat Abu Bakr Siddiqui during the reporting period. Much of this activity occurred in the main camp area where several small support buildings and probable storage sheds had been built. Two large tents were also erected in the same area. The first large tent, which probably serves as a temporary mosque or prayer tent, was erected in late one. A smaller tent, measuring 12 by 7 meters, was erected adjacent to and on the east side of the large prayer tent by late August. This smaller tent, which possibly serves as an additional prayer tent, was later enlarged in late September so that it Incasw?cd the same size as the larger prayer lemma?approximately 27 by 8 meters. In January 2004 tlte roof of the newly enlarged tent had been removed, possibly due to damage from heavy snow. Framework for the tent, however, remained intact through early February. $9403?) ll?ersonnel activity was observed on numerous occasions during the reporting period. Prayer activity was seen on several dates from late June to late September. In October large numbers of personnel were cheerved on at least three occasions in the open area east of the prayer tent area. On each occasion, these personnel were arranged in a circular pattern and appeared to be receiving instruction (?gure 13). ??ther Militant Camps in the North-West Frontier Province maria Habibullah Khan Militant Cam]; [Minimal levels of activity were observed at Grarhi Habibullah Khan Militant Camp during most ofthe reporting period. At least two tents were observed in the forested area near the camp prior to the demarchc. After the dental-cite, several tents were seen in the same area. Between 15 and 17 August, a temporary shelter was erected in the open area west of the mosque! administration building. This temporary structure was probably built to accommodate people attending a ceremonial function at the aforementioned building. By 19 August the shelter had been dismantled and removed (figure 14). Mild?) [At least two to three tents have been obServcd in the lbrested area since late August. Small groups oi? people have been seen occasionally at this site, especially at [he athletic lield east oi'thc Inosqttefadministt?alion building. 'l'hcsc personnel oil-en appear to be engaged in 7 recreational activity rather than organized physical training. ?Kalas Militant Training Camp #54033?) [Activity levels were already high at Kalas Militant 'l?raining Camp in early May 2003. As a result, it was dif?cult to assess the impact of the demarche on overall activity levels at the site. fS?tbitt) t?rior to the demarehe, large numbers of personnel were observed arriving at this camp on several dates in April 2003. This activity, in addition to increased vehicle activity, indicated that Kalas had probably reopened to accommodate incoming students for a new training course?the ?rst held at this site since it was closed in early March 2002. At least 30 tents were seen throughout the camp before the 8 May 2003 demarehe. However, most of? these tents were dispersed in tin'estcd areas nearby and in the valley north of the camp mosque between i i and it) May, probably in response to the demarehe. Increased personnel and tent activity were observed frequently in the northern valley area after the dcniarehc (figure 15). . [The number of tents observed at Kalas ?uctuated from May to October 2003. Dense tree foliage and variances in imaging an ol'ten precluded a complete tent count. At least 10 to 12 tents werepresent on a daily basis during that time period, though higher numbers were ii'equcnliy observed. 'l?ent activity began to decline in November. @6310) [At least two additional structures were built at Kalas during the reporting period. In October 2003 construction of a large rectangular-shaped building began in an open area approximately 200 meters north ot?the access control point. Construction progressed slowly from October to early December, but the building appeared externally completed by By early February 2004, a small tent also had been erected adjacent to an exist ing tent at the access control point, possibly to serve as an annex to the existing structure. ??ail: Basti Militant: Training Camp East 1&8?in IKalu Basil Militant 't'raining (lamp East, which was identi?ed as a militant camp in late September 2003, showed low levels of activity during the reporting period. A large building in the administration area was dismantled in 1nid~Oetobe12 However, the structure was rebuilt in the same location in early November. Activity was also seen occasionally at the assembly area in the nearby support area. A medium~sized tent?approximately 7.5 by 7.5 meters in sizcwwas erected there in mid-November. The tent was later removed by 17 December. Several personnel tents have been consistently observed at this camp since last fall. Most were observed in the administration area. dill?vim? I Kale Basti East consists of two main areas --an administration area and a support area. The administration area is in the eastern portion of this camp and includes one large building, one support building, at least 10 tents, and latrines (?gure 17). The support area, located in the western part of this camp, consists of three support buildings, at least two tents, an assembly area, and a six-unit l'atrinc (?gure 18). This camp is approximately ion east of Kain Basti, 23 [on west-northwest of Mansehra, and approximately 1.7 km northeast oi?ueat'by Kain ilasti Militant 'l?rainiug Camp South. ?Kaln Basti Militant Training Camp South $14031?) [At least seven personnel tents and two buildings were present at Kain Basti Militant Training Camp South when this site was ?rst identified as a militant camp in September 2003 (figure 19). However, all tents had been removed by 16 October. No signi?cant activity has been seen at this site since that date, indicating that the camp was deactivated probably at that time. [Kale Basti South consists of one large building, one support building, framework for one large tent, and at least 10 delineated sites for personnel tents. The camp is in a heavily forested area approximately 1.5 km south of the village oflialu Basti and 23.5 km west?northwest ol? Mansehra. This camp is also approximately km southwest of nearby Kalu Basti Militant 'l?raining Catnp East. ??ts-Orthi 'l?raining Canm (bill) Minimal levels ol?activity were observed at Oghi Militant Camp during the reporting period. Small groups of people and one to two vehicles were periodically seen in the open areas near the Camp mosque. Tent activity was dif?cult to assess because the bivouac area is in the densely forested area. south-southwest ol?ihe mosque. However, a tow tents were observed in that area on several occasions during the reporting period. new fence was constructed just west of the mosque at Oghi last summer (?gure 20). In addition, a row of latrines was installed at the south end of? the mosque. ?l?al Bivonae Area M0310) glide Oghi, minimal activity levels were Seen at Pal Bivouac Area throughout 2003. Small groups ofpcoplc and one to two vehicles were occasionally observed in the I main camp area and at the athletic field through late September. in October small groups of it} to 15 people were frequently observed at the athletic ?eld. but these personnel did not appear to be engaged in any organized physical training [le1] . [By early February 2004, small groups ofpeopie were seen again at the athletic ?eld. This activity appeared similar to that seen in October 2003. ?will I111 June 2003 construction of a small bridge began in the southwestern portion of the camp. Upon completion, the bridge would serve as a road link between the main camp area and the northern portion ofthe camp where the athletic ?eld is located. Construction of a medium-sized building also began just west of the athletic ?eld during the same period. By 3 July roo?ng had been completed and the building appeared externally complete. By 13 July work alSo had concluded on the deck ofthc small bridge (?gure 21). Whinkiari Militant rainina Cain]; Shinhiari Militant 'l?raining Camp was formally identi?ed as a militant camp in October 2003 when minimal levels oi?activity were seen for the ?rst time. At least one vehicle and several possible personnel were seen daring the latter part of the month. In addition, at least one tent was erected at the site. This camp has been present since April 20oz; however, a lack of discernible activity had precluded its designation as a militant?related facility. [Shinltiari Militant Training Camp consists oi" one C-?shaped building, one rectangular-shaped building that is built into the slope of a nearby hill, one small ?llshapcd building, two small rectangular-shaped buildings, and several probable storage buildings. A small open area, possibly used as an exercise ortraining area, is near the central portion of the site. An obstacle course and a walled structure without a roof are in the southern portion. This camp is approximately 2 km east of Shinkiari Military Barracks Storage Area and 1.3 km from the village ofKalas. ??trbela Militant Training?I Camp ?($19333 signi?cant increase in activity was observed at. Tarbela Militant Camp after the tlen'iarche. Small groups of people and at least one to two vehicles were periodically seen from to late September. Personnel were usually at the athletic field, while almost all vehicle activity occurred in the southern portion of the camp. Personnel activity increased signi?cantly in November. At least 50 people were observed at the athletic ?eld on ll November. On 30 November approximately 20 people were at the ?eld and at least 30 to 35 additional people were in other portions ofthe camp. In addition, smaller groups of people were seen more frequently during the month. This activity continued through early February 2004. Groups of at least 20 people were seen on three occasions in January and February 2004. . .033? I larhela Militant Canon was fi1st identi?ed as a militant?related Facility on 17 May 2083. This camp is wall secured and contains a mosque l4 administration and housing, buildings, a gate security building, one vehicle shed, and a water tower an anged around a ceottal athletic field. 'lhis facility is on the border the Punjab and North ?West Frontier Provinces and is 10 km southwest of ?larbela Dam and 50km northwest of I slamdbad. ?d-cher Militant-?Related Faculties M0336) - increase in personnel activity was observed at Haripur Fertilizer Complex Ilazara or at llatar Cement Plant 2 after the demarchc. increased activity was anticipated at these - sites because both have served as relocation facilities or militants transiting between Azad Kashmir and the North-West Frontier Province in the past. Warlnur Fertilizer Complex Hazara Mimi? significant activity was observed at l-laripur Fertilizer Complex Ilazara during the reporting period. Groups ol'up to 40 people were present on several occasions prior to early April 2003. sightings oi" personnel declined sharply thereafter. Similar declines in personnel activity also were observed at ilatar Cement Plant 2 during the some period. Vehicle activity continued alter the demarehe, hot the number of vehicles observed on any given date generally remained within normal parameters -?three to six vehicles. ill Mater Cement Plant 2 163$ (bill) Like Hariptn', no significant activity nets observed at Hater Cement Plant 2 during the reporting pCl'lOtl. Almost all personnel and vehicle activity hail ceased by early April 2003, and little subsequent activity was seen at Hater 2 after that period. ?gu'l?he Use of Denial and Deception most) libitt) [Several eamps? - inelnding Muaat?tarabad Northwest, Garhi Habibullah Khan, and Sensa?do have main buildings with eamoullagokpainted roofs. llowe ver, the paint schemes and colors used are probably meant to deceive Indian strike (Ui Outlook and Implications . (hm As ot?early February 2004, there is no indication that Islamabad is dismantling its extensive support infrastructure for the militants. The Goverrunont ofPaltistan--?or at the very least, elements within the government.- employed a ?shell game? strategy in reopense to the May 2003 demarehe. Militants were simply relocated from camps in Axed Kashmir to other moms in the North- West Frontier Province. More troubling, however, is that many ofthe main structures at camps in Azad Kash- mir remain intact and most of the sites appear to be relatively well maintained. This suggests that the respite in activity seen at these camps through most oi'2003 could easily? be reversed, il?lslamahad chooses. (U) Conclusion [during the reporting period shows that Pakistan continues to at least give tacit support to the militancyilblm {bill} (bill) training levels prior to the deznarche appeareu snrmar to those onserveu in aunt; and i . aetivily seen at camps outside OFAzad Kashmir has con?rmed collateral reports that the ISID and the Pakistan Government continue to support the militancy, although they state otherwise. The real test of?Musharraf's resolve to reign in Kashmiri militants will come later this spring, when weather renditions improve in the region. (U) References Target References: . . . . IBalrasi Gall MilitantTraining Camp, Geographic coordinates: 073?1945?: a I l-?agosh Militant Camp Geographic coordinates: 33-27-31N 073-54401}. . lG?thl Khan {lame . Geographic coordinates: 34H25ni?N 073?22?3313'. (131(1) . ?es-whit?) Iilariptu' Fertilizer Complex Hazara, Geographic coordinates: 34?29u28N {373-12?08Jj Willi?) . Illaxrat Abu BakrSitldiqui Militant Catnip, Geographic coordinates: 34~2ll?28N 073?124l813 ?i-Himm Halar ('Icnicnt Plant 2, Geographic coordinates: 072-50?2913 . Itiir Kotli MilitantTraining Camp, 932(1) I I Geographic coordinates: 34-25-45N ?684mm lKagan Gali MilitantTraiuing Canip, (max Geographic coordinates: 34-28-09N IKalas Militant 'i'raining Camp, coordinates: 073-19?08Ft (W) . Geographic .. [Kain Basti Militant Training Camp South, . Geographic coordinates: 34-21-15N 07266-4113 Mimi? IKalu Basti Militant Training Camp Bast, Geographic coordinates: 072?57-0413 . worm Mansehta Militant Training Camp Northwest, IGeographic coordinates: 340. 1-44N 073-106315 a Mtbitil Mundhar Suspect Military Facility, Geographic coordinates: mm? [Muzal'iarabacl Militant ?l?raining Camp Northwest, Itbittl IGeographic coordinates: - g?tbit? IOghi Militant Training Camp Goga, Geographic coordinates: 34~31v36N 073-07-0111 - $74033?) Pal Bivouac Area, (bit?) . Geographic coordinates: 34? i 8-0414 073-26- i613 . ?es-?libltii ISamani Camp Southeast (Samani Geographic coordinates: 074?08421? ISamani Militant Training Camp, . Geographic coordinates: 33-04u18N 074-041-583 - mom) coordinates: O73-45-37ii SW Militant 'I?raining Camp, Geographic - Shinkiari Militan- Barracks and Storage Area,- Cieographic coordinates: 3437-4751 073-] (1-5913 not-hi- (WU) Shinkiari Militant Training Camp,- Geographic Goographic coordinates: i4r27r-20N 073~l??43E - tht1)_ Sirilcot Militant Training Camp, Geographic coordinates: 34~2su57N 073-25-54E Militia} [Tarbela Militant Camp Geographic coordinates: 072-35485 ?worn l'l?hamla Militant 'i?raining Calrip, Mutt . Geographic coordinates: 07343?5913. . . . and queries regarding, this NGA Report only be U-S-C- ?4333(5) l?aoi "io (ioonnzitiai lntciliucj cc Division Washingtom?i?AC tti {b)(3)110 U.S.C. 424, tsia Branch. onl??iil 0 U-S-C- mm Contributions were n'ovidctl Pacific Geospaital Intelligence Ummon South Asia Branch, on {153533110 3-3. 424903363) Pacific (icoslattial intciligcnco Division Washinglonri?ACAS, South Asia Branch. on - . ..- .--: "urn-*9 1: . ., -- :3 21:? 0534? w" Mfg.231: g: t; If .- .. Major Militant Training Camp5 and Relocation Facilities Pakistan cs. BY: 8018225 CL REASON: 1584 [350111" 3'13 ?2.33? 1; . PAKISTAN . :l-r 1" I. I . "llul 1_13' :1;1.r?a?vt .. . 1..- - 1? .113 . . . . ra' . ,erwf ?r-r . m. ,lslamabad .wJ Figure 1 a 1a 20 Militant Camps - I Azad Kashmir border Line of Control Hume China Capital 13. Kalu Basti Militant Training Camp East Alghanistan 14. Kalu Basti Militant Training Camp South 15 Haripur Fertilizer Complex Hazara 16 Tarbela Militant Camp 17. Halar Cement Plant 18 Thamla Militant Training Camp 19. Sense Militant Training Camp )3 20 Fagosh Militant Camp 21. Sa mani Camp SE (Samani-A) 22. Sa mani Militant Twining Camp Pakistan . indaa See map 2 for camps?! through 12 :7 3? (1 a ?an. (bill) 178 Bz??d??iiar C1. BY: 801 8225 CL REASON: 1.53:] DECL ON: in "i ?wan?j dew-i? W45 Militant Camps Cities Azad Kashmir border Ughi Militant Training Camp 2. Hazrat Abu Bakr Siddiqui Militant Camp 3. Kagan Gall Militant Training Camp 4. Kaias Training Camp 5. Shin-kiari Militant Training Camp ES. Sirikot Militant Training Camp Hr Ko?tli Militant Training Camp i 8. Gal-hi Habihullah Khan Militant Camp 9. Muza?arabad N?litant Training Camp NW 10. Batmsi [Bali Militant Training Camp 11. Mansehra Militant Training Camp NW 1 12. Pal Bivouac Area Figure 2 3mm DERIVED FROM: IFS u-c 5 Muza?arabad ?2 . 1i?" '1 (ll-W 5: a; Azad Kashmir ASE 85 6x: rib-? [xx n33 on- ?.33 83 mg: . 85 8E .. LNG) b" 85 Dita} Jinn" Aux: as: 3.: