Exhibit #1 LEGAL DEPARTMENT NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT AMERICAN UNION FOUNDAHDN arenas. asspcuo TO maroon Praises PROJECT 915 ISTH eraser. aw 7TH FLOOR woes-{moron on 200054?? 7/292 rm i930 M31 LU Cl R6 GAVID C. FATHI DIRECTOR ATTORNEY AT Llii?l' ADMITTEU IN PRACTICE LIMITED TO FEDERAL. January 13, 2015 SENT VIA E-MAIL and US. MAIL: Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act Section Of?ce of General Counsel, Room 84] Federal Bureau of Prisons 320 First Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20534 Re: FOIA Request Related to BOP Inspection of CIA Detention Site COBALT Dear Freedom of Information Of?cer: This letter constitutes a request (Request) pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 (FOIA). The Request is submitted on behalf of the American. Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The ACLU is also requesting a fee waiver, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. and 6 C.F.R. THE REQUESTOR The ACLU is a nationwide, nonpro?t, nonpartisan organization dedicated to protecting human rights and civil rights in the US. It is the largest civil liberties organization in the country, with of?ces in 50 states and over 500,000 members, The ACLU is speci?cally dedicated to holding the US. government accountable to universal human rights principles in addition to rights guaranteed by the US. Constitution. Though the ACLU has been involved in prison reform since its founding, in 1972 the organization consolidated various prisoners? rights efforts around the United States into the National Prison Project (NPP). The NPP promotes a fair and effective criminal justice system in which incarceration is used only as a last resort, and its purpose is to prepare prisoners for release and a productive, law- abiding life at the earliest possible time. Through litigation, advocacy, and public education, the NPP works to ensure that conditions of con?nement are consistent with health, safety, and human dignity, and that prisoners retain all rights of ?ne persons that are not inconsistent with incarceration, The current docket includes class action civil rights suits on behalf of prisoners in thirteen states-and the US. Virgin Islands. RECORDS REQUESTED As used herein, the term SITE means the detention facility identi?ed by the codename COBALT in the executive summary of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency?s Detention and Interrogation Program (relevant excerpts from which are attached as Exhibit Al), regardless of whether BOP records refer to the facility by the codename COBALT or by some other name(s). For convenience of reference, this facility was located in Afghanistan, and news reports indicate that it-was also named the ?Salt Pit.? As used herein, the term means any transmittal of information from one person or entity to another by any means, including letters, correspondence, notes, memoranda, records, reports, papers, facsimiles, electronic mail (whether to, from, copied or blind copied), electronic mail generated from a hand held personal device including a Blackberry or iPhone, instant messaging, electronic mail generated from business or personal email accounts, internet relay chat, news group, group or collaboration servers, electronic bulletin boards, electronic discussion boards, dictation tapes, video recordings, audio recordings, digital recordings, memoranda, telegrams, telecopies and telexes, teleconference, collaboration servers (including share point servers), web-based or software virtual meetings including Web?X and any other meeting software and share point servers, and oral contact such as face-to- face discussions or meetings, telephone conversations, and voice mail messages. As used herein, the term has the same scope used in Rule 34(a)(l) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and shall encompass every writing or record of every type and description and every tangible thing that is or has been in the possession, custody, or control of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and its employees, to which they have access, or of which they have knowledge, including,-but not limited to, newspaper articles, magazine articles, news articles, correspondence, letters, contracts, ?les, electronic mail, memoranda, stenographic notes, handwritten notes, drafts, studies, publications, books, pamphlets, catalogs, purchase orders, receipts, advertisements, direct mail solicitations, point-of?sale and point-of?purchase materials, notebooks, diaries, models, devices, pictures, photographs, ?lms, audiotapes, videotapes, computer records, voice recordings, maps, reports, surveys, minutes, data compilations, and statistical compilations, regardless of whether a particular DOCUMENT is privileged or con?dential, and regardless of the form of storage (including-but not limited to, paper, micro?che, magnetic tape, magnetic disk (hard disk or floppy disk), DVD, optical disk, or electronic storage device). 1 The complete executive summary is available online at gov! study 20 14/ executive-SL1mmawpdf?. The ACLU requests the following: 1. Any and all COMMUNICATIONS relating to DETENTION SITE COBALT, between the Federal Bureau of Prisons and any other Federal agency or agencies, from January 1, 2002 to January 1, 2005. 2. Any and all COMMUNICATIONS relating to DETENTION SITE COBALT, between BOP personnel, from January 1, 2002 to January 1, 2005. 3. Any and all DOCUMENTSIidentifying BOP personnel who Visited DETENTION SITE COBALT on or about November 2002. For convenience of reference, these activities are described on page 60 of Exhibit A. 4. Any and all DOCUMENTS relating to any and all visits, meetings, i inspections, assessments, recommendations, or training conducted by' i BOP personnel relating to DETENTION SITE COBALT on or about i November 2002. For convenience of reference, these activities are described on page 60 of Exhibit A. 5. Any and all DOCUMENTS relating to any and all brie?ngs or meetings between BOP and Central Intelligence personnel relating to DETENTION SITE COBALT on or about December 2002. For convenience of reference, these activities are described on page 60 of Exhibit A. 6. Any and all DOCUMENTS relating to the death of a detainee at DETENTION SITE COBALT on or about November 2002. For convenience of reference, this death is described as occurring ?at the end of the Federal Bureau of Prisons visit to the CIA detention site? in Footnote 297 of Exhibit A, and the cirCumstances of the death are described on pages 54?55 and 59-60 of Exhibit A. FEE WAIVER The ACLU requests a total waiver of document search, review, and duplication fees on the grounds that disclosure of the requested records is in the public interest and because disclosure ?is likely to contribute signi?cantly to the public understanding of the activities or operations of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.? 5 U.S.C. See also 6 C.F.R. 2 In the alternative, the ACLU requests a limitation on fees pursuant to 6 C.F.R. The detention and treatment of CIA detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT has been the subject of considerable public controversy, especially in the wake of the publication of the executive summary of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report that described the program of detention and torture. Abuses that took place at DETENTION SITE COBALT have been cited in numerous editorials condemning the torture regime. See, Editorial, The Senate Report on the CIA ?s Torture and Lies, NY. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2014 (citing detainee death due to suspected hypothermia at Editorial, The horrors in America?s ?dungeon? should never have happened, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 9, 2014 (describing conditions in COBALT and quoting of?cial who described it as a ?dungeon?); Editorial, Not in our name, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 9, 2014 (noting death from hypothermia at Editorial, A truly black day for the ?civilised? West, THE DAILY MAIL, Dec. 9, 2014 (citing detainee death from hypothermia at COBALT). Some news publications have written full- length articles devoted to describing what happened at DETENTION SITE COBALT. See, Richard A. Serrano, At CIA ?s ?Salt Pit? prison, torture reigned with little oversight, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2014, 20141210?st0rv.htm1 (describing conditions at COBALT and death of Gul Rahman); Tim Mak, Inside the CIA ?s Sadistic Dungeon, THE DAILY BEAST, Dec. 9, 2014, 12/09/inside?a?Cia- dung eon.html (describing conditions inside COBALT). The revelations about COBALT have sparked controversy inside Afghanistan, where COBALT was located. See Hamid Shalizi, Afghan leader says CIA torture in country 'shocking?, REUTERS, Dec. 10, 2014, artic1e/20 1 4/ 1 2/ .1 (reporting that following the report?s release, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani vowed to investigate CIA abuse at COBALT). And events at COBALT are frequently identi?ed as being among the most horrifying and important revelations from the torture report. See, e. Tim Dickinson, 10 Truly Terrible Things the CIA Did in Our Names, Because Freedom, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 9, 2014, (describing the conditions at COBALT and its very existence as two of the ten most ?despicable things the Central Intelligence Agency perpetrated in our names in the aftermath of Jeremy Diamond, Top Takeaways from the CIA torture report, CNN.COM, Dec. 9, 2014, report/ (describing the detainee death at COBALT and mismanagement at COBALT as two of the eight ?biggest conclusions and revelations? of the torture report); Amy Davidson, The Torture Report: Inhumane Scenes from the C.I.A. ?s Prisons, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 9, 2014, (referencing COBALT as part of a pattern in the ?playgrounds of impunity?). Illuminating the role that BOP played in evaluating and approving the conditions of con?nement at DETENTION SITE COBALT is an important part of this public discussion; by approving conditions ?of con?nement at DETENTION SITE COBALT as ?not in humane? in late 2002, BOP failed to do what it could to prevent the subsequent abuses. The requested records will contribute substantially to the public? 3 understanding of the role in this matter of great public concern. In addition, disclosure is not in the commercial interest. Any information disclosed by the ACLU as a result of this FOIA request will be available to the public at no cost. 1 See 6 C.F.R. 6 C.F.R. The ACLU publishes'newsletters, news brie?ngs, right-to?know handbooks, and other. materials that are disseminated to the public. These, materials are widely available to everyone, including tax-exempt organizations, not?for?pro?t groups, law students and faculty, for no cost or for a nominal fee through its public education department. The ACLU also disseminates information through its heavily subscribed website, The website addresses civil liberties issues in depth, provides features on civil liberties issues in the news, and contains hundreds of documents that relate to the - issues addressed by the ACLU. The website also speci?cally includes features on information obtained through the FOIA. . ,See, . :foi.a/index.htm.l.; The ACLU also publishes an electronic newsletter, which is distributed to subscribers by e- -mail.3- Depending on the results of this Request, the ACLU will likely disseminate the information obtained to the public through these kinds of publications 1n these kinds of channels. - . Thus, a fee waiver would ful?ll Congress?s legislative intent in amending OIA. See Judicial Watch, Inc. Rossotti, 326 F.3d 1309, 1312 (DC. Cir. 2003) (?Congress amended OIA to ensure that it be ?Iiberally construed in favor of waivers for noncommercial requestors.??) (citation omitted); Citizens for . Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. US. Dept. of Educ, '593 F. Supp. 2d 261, 268 (D.D.C. 2009) purpose . . . is to remove the roadblocks and technicalities which have been used by . . . agencies to deny waivers?) (internal. quotation marks and citation omitted). - 3 In addition to the national ACLU of?ces, there are 53 ACLU af?liate and national chapter of?ces located throughout the United States and Puerto Rico. These of?ces further disseminate ACLU. material to local residents, schools, and organizations through a variety of means, including their own websites, publications, and newsletters. The ACLU also makes archived material available at the American Civil. Liberties Union Archives at Princeton University Library. Additionally, ACLU publications are often disseminated to relevant groups across the country, which then further distribute them to their members or to other parties. On account of these factors, the ACLU has not been charged fees associated with responding to FOIA requests on numerous occasions.4 In any event, as discussed supra, the ACLU quali?es as a ?representative of the news media? and the records are not sought for commercial use. Accordingly, should fees be assessed for the processing of this Request, such fees should be ?limited to reasonable standard charges for document duplication.? 5 U.S.C. See also 6 C.F.R. The ACLU is therefore entitled to a total waiver of fees associated with this request and should, in no event, be required to pay more than reasonable standard charges for document duplicatiOn alone. Thank you for your consideration of this request. If this request is denied in whole or part, the ACLU asks that you justify all deletions by reference to speci?c exemptions of the FOIA. We expect you to release all segregable portions of otherwise exempt material. We reserve the right to appeal a decision to withhold any information, or to deny a waiver of fees. We look forward to your reply to the records request within twenty (20) business days, as required under 5 U.S.C. 4 The following are recent examples of requests for which agencies did not charge the ACLU fees associated with responding to a FOIA request: (1) In March 2012, the Department of Justice Criminal Division granted a fee waiver to the ACLU for a FOIA request seeking records about . the govemment?s access to the contents of individuals? private electronic communications. (2) In June 2011, the National Security Division of the Department of Justice granted a'fee waiver to the ACLU with respect to a request for documents relating to the interpretation and implementation of a section of the PATRIOT Act. (3) In November 2010, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) granted a fee waiver to the ACLU for a FOIA request seeking documents concerning the FEMA?funded rebuilding of Orleans Parish Prison following Hurricane Katrina. (4) In October 2010, the Department of the Navy granted a fee waiver to the ACLU with respect to a request for documents regarding the deaths of detainees in US. custody. (5) In January 2010, US. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) granted a fee waiver to the ACLU for a FOIA request seeking documents concerning the deaths of detainees in ICE custody. (6) In January 2009, the CIA granted a fee waiver with respect to the same request. (7) In March 2009, the State Department granted a fee waiver to the ACLU with regard to a FOIA request submitted in December 2008. The Department of Justice granted a fee waiver to the ACLU with regard to the same FOIA request. (8) In November 2006, the Department of Health and Human Services granted a fee waiver to the ACLU with regard to a FOIA request submitted in November of 2006. I Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. We eagerly await your response, and thank you for your assistance. Please furnish all responsive records to: Carl Takei Staff Attorney ACLU National Prison Project 915 15th St. NW, 7th Floor Washington, DC 20005 Sincerely, at 1.5? Carl Takei Staff Attorney ACLU National Prison Project . 915 15th Street, NW - 7th Floor Washington, DC 20005 Tel: (202) 393-4930 1 Fax: (202) 393-4931 ctakei@aclu.org Excerpts from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency?s Detention and Interrogation Program ?Sze?masat-e Select Committee on Intelligence Committ?e Study ofltli'e CIA ?as-Deten'tibn: angnam Summary 201:2 .Updizp?dfor Rieleais?e Aprilf3r201'4? Dectassijfimt?ian Revisions Page 15015-4939 E13 UNCLASSIFIED Table of Contents I. Background on the Committee Study . '8 111. Overall History and Operation of the CIA ?s Detention and Interrogation Program" . 11 A. September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Noti?cation (MON) Authorizes the CIA to Capture and Detain a Speci?c Category of Individuals I. After Considering Various Clandestine Detention Locations, the CIA Determines That a U.S. Military Base Is the ?Best Option"; the CIA Delegates ?Blanket" Detention Approvals to CIA Officers in I I 2. The CIA Holds at Least 21 More Detainees Than It Has Repr;esented At Least 26 CIA Detainees Wtongly Detained 14 B. The Detention of Abu Zubaydah and the Development and Authorization of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques . I . Past Experience Led the CIA to Assess that Coercive Interrogation Techniques Were "Countetproductlve and ?Ineffective A?er Issuance of the MON, CIA Attorneys Research Possible Legal Defense for Using Techniques Considered Torture,- the CIA Conducts No Research an Effective Interrogations, Relies on Contractors with No Relevant Experience I 7 - 2. The CIA Renders Abu Zubaydah to a Covert Facility, Obtains Presidential Approval Without Inter- Agency Deliberation 21 3. Tensions with Host Country Leadership and Media Attention Foresltadow Future Challenges 4. FBI Officers Are the First to Question Abu Zubaydah, Who States He Intends to ooperate; Abu Zubaydah is Taken to a Hospital Where He Provides Information the CIA Later Describes as ?Important" and ?Vital" 24 5. While Abu Zubaydah is Hospitalized, CIA Headquarters Discusses the Use of Coercive Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah 25 6. New CIA Interrogation Plan Focuses on Abu Zubaydah ?s ?Most Important Secret": FBI Temporarily Barred from the Questioning of Abu Zubaydah; Abu anaydah then Placed in Isolation for 47 Days Without Questioning 2 7 7. Proposal by CIA Contract Personnel to Use Interrogation Techniques Leads to the Development of the CIA 's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA Determines that "the Interrogation Process Takes Precedence Over Preventative Medical Procedures 31 . 8. The CIA Obtains Legal and Policy Approval for Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques: The CIA Does Not Brief the President 3 7 9. The CIA Uses the Waterboard and Other Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah 40 IO. A CIA Presidential Daily Brief Provides Inaccurate Information on the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah 47 I I . The CIA Does Not Brief the Committee on the Interrogation ofAbu Zubaydah 48 C. Interrogation in Country I and the January 2003 Guidelines 49 I: The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE COBALT, Places Inexperienced First-Tour Officer in Charge 49 2. CIA Records Lack Information on CIA Detainees and Details of Interrogations in cauutty I 50 3. CIA Headquarters Recommends That Untrained Interrogators Country I Use the Enhanced Intel rogation Techniques on Ridha al-Najjar 51 4. Death of Cal Rahman Leads CIA Headquarters to Learn of Unreported Coercive Interrogation Techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT, CIA Inspector General Review Reveals lack of Oversight of the Detention Site 54 5. The CIA Begins Training New Interrogators; Interrogation Techniques Not Reviewed by the Department of Justice Included in the Training Syllabus 57 6. Despite Recommendation from CIA Attorneys. the CIA Fails to Adequately Screen Potential Intermgators in 2002 and 2003 58 7. Bureau of Prisons by level of Deprivation at CIA ?s COBALT Detention Site 59 Page 2 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED The CIA Places CIA Detainees Country I Facilities Because They Did Not Meet the MON 8. Standard for Detention 61 9. DC I Tenet Establishes First Guidelines on Detention Conditions and Interrogation: Formal . Consolidation of Program Administration at CIA Headquarters Does Not Resolve Disagreements Among CIA Personnel 62 D. The Detention and Interrogation of? Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri 66 1. interrogators Disagree with CIA Headquarters AboutAl-Nashiri? Level of Cooperation, Interrogato rs Oppose Continued Use of the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 66 2. CIA Headquarters Sends Untrained Interrogator to Resume AI-Nashiri' Interrogations, Interrogator Threatens al-Nashiri with a Gun and a Drill 68 3. CIA Contractor Recommends Continued Use of the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Al-Nashiri; Chief In terrogator Threatens to Quit Because Additional Teclmiques Might ?Push [Al- Nashiri] Over The Edge Refers to the CIA Program As a ?Train. Wreck [sic] Waiting to Happen? 70 E. Tensions with Country I Relating to the CIA Detention Facility and the Arrival of New Detainees 73 F. The Detention and Interrogation of Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh 75 1. Ramzi Bin Al- Shiblt Provides Information While' In Foreign Government Custody, Prior to Rendition to CIA Custody 75 2. Interrogation Plan for Ramzi Al- Shibh Proposes Immediate Use of Nudtty and Shackling with Hands Above the Head: Platt Becomes Template for Future Detainees 76 3. CIA Headquarters Urges Continued Use of the CIA ?s Enhanced Interrogation. Techniques, Despite lnterrogators? Assessment That Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Was 78 4. Information. Already Provided by Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh in the Custody of a Foreign Government Inaccurately Attributed to CIA Interrogations; Interrogators Apply the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Bin Al? Shibh When NotAddressed As "Sir" and When Bin Al- Shibh Complains of Stomach Pain 79 G. The Detention and Interrogation of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad 81 I. KSM Held' In Pakis.tani Custody, Provides Limited Information. Rendered to CIA Custody at DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM Is Immediately Subjected to the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 81 2. The CIA Tr?ansfers KSM to DETENTION SITE BLUE, Anticipates Use of the Waterboard Prior to His Arrival 83 3. The CIA Waterboards KSM at Least 183 Time s; Reporting Includes Significant Fabricated Infor mation 85 4. After the Use of the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against KSM Ends, the CIA Continues to Assess That KSM Is Withholding and Fabricating Information 93 H. The Growth of the Detention and Interrogation Program% I. Ifty- Three CIA Detainees Enter the Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003 96 2. Tire CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE BLA Countrv I and DETENTION SITE VIOLET In Country 97 3. At Least 17 CIA Detainees Subjected to the Enhanced Interr ogation- Techniques Without CIA Headquarters Authorization 99 4. CIA Headquarters Authorizes Water Dousing Without Department of Justice Approval; Application of Technique Reported as Approximating Waterboarding 105 5. Hambali Fabricates Information While Being Subjected to the CIA ?s Enhanced Interrogation 1.108 6. After the Use of the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, CIA Headquarters Questions Detention of Detarnee and Recommends Release; Detainee TI '."ansferred to U. S. Military Custody and Held for An Additional Four Years 109 Page 3 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 7. A Year After DETENTION SITE COBALT Opens, the CIA Reports "Unsettling Discovery That We Are Holding a Number of Detainees-About Whom WeKnow Very Little 110 8. CIA Detention Sites in Country I lack Suf?cient Personnel and Translators to Support the Interrogations of Detainees I I 1 I. Other Medical, and Behavioral Issues 111 I. CIA Interrogations Take Precedence Over Medical 'Care I I I 2. CIA Detainees Exhibit and Behavioral Issues J. The CIA Seeks Reaffirmation of the Detention and Interrogation Program in 115 I . Administration Statements About the Humane Treatment of Detainees Raise Concerns at the CIA About Possible Lack of Policy Supportfor CIA Interrogation Activities 115 2. The CIA Provides Inaccurate Infonnation to Select Members of the National Security Council, i - Repr.esents? that? Termination of This Pr ogratn Will Result' m. Loss of Life, Possibly Extensive I i Policymakers Reauthor' tze Prog rant 117 I . K. Additional Oversight and Outside Pressure' 2004: ICRC. Inspector General, CongressSupreme Court 1 l9 - 1. ICRC Pressure Leads to Detainee Tran sfers; Department of Defense Official Informs the CIA that the U. Government "Should Not Be' the Position of Causing People to Dr rappear the CIA Provides . Inaccurate Information on CIA Detainee to the Department of Defense 119 2. CIA Leadership Calls Draft Inspector General Special Review of the. Program ?Imbalanced and Inaccurate. Responds ivith Inaccurate Information: CIA Seeks to Limit Further Review of the CIA 's Detention and Interrogation Program by the Inspector General . .121 3. The CIA Does Not Satisfy Inspector General Special Review Recommendation to Assess the Effectiveness of the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 4. The CIA Wr ongfuiiy Detains Khalid Al-Masri; CIA Director Rejects Accountability for Of?cer Involved I 28 5. . Hassan Ghul Provides Substantial Information?~Including Information on a Key UBL acrirtator? Prior to the CIA ?s Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques I30 6. Other Detainees Wrongfully Held in 2004: CIA Sources Subjected to the CIA ?s Enhanced Interrogation. Techniques. CIA Of?cer Testi?es that the CIA Is "Not Authorized" "to Do Anything Like What You Have Seen in. Abu Ghraib Photographs I33 7. The CIA Suspends the Use of its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques. Resumes Use of the Techniques .- on an Individual Ba sis: Intermgations are Based on Fabricated. Single Source ..134 8. Country 'Detaius Individuals on the CIA 's I39 9. US. Supreme Court Action in the Case of Rasui v. Bush Forces Transfer of CIA Detainees from 1 . Guantanamo Bay to Country 140 L. The Pace of CIA Operations Slows; Chief of Ease ConCerned About ?Inexperienced, Marginal, Underperforming" CIA Personnel; Inspector General Describes Lack of Debriefers As ?Ongoing Problem" 143 M. Legal and Operational Challenges in 2005 l45 I. Department of Justice Renews Approval for the Use of the CIA ?s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques in May 2005 I45 2. Abu' Fara] Al-Libi Subjected to the CIA ?s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Prior to Department of Justice Memorandum on U. S. Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture, CIA Subjects Abu Faraj Al-Libi to the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques When He Complains of Hearing Problems . 146 3. CIA Acquires Two Detainees from the U. S. Military I48 4. The CIA Seeks "End Game? for Detainees in Early 2005 Due to Limited Support rom Liaison . Par tn ers . I 49 5. Press Stories and the Inability to Provide Emergency Medical Care to Detainees Result' tn the Closing of CIA Detention Facilities tn Countries I and I I51 - "Page 4 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED . 6. The CIA Considers Changes to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program Following the Detainee Treatment Act, Hamdan v. 157 N. The Final Disposition of CIA Detainees and the End of the Detention and Interrogation 1. President Bush Publicly Acknowledges the Existence of the Detention and Interrogation Program 159 2. Tire International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Gains Access to CIA Detainees After Their Transfer to U. S. Military Custody' In September 2006 . I 60 3. The CIA Considers Future of the Program Following the Military Commissions Act161 4. Tire CIA Develops Modified Enhanced Interrogation Program A?er Passage of the Military Commissions Act 162 5. Muhammad Rahim, the CIA 's Last Detainee, is Subjected to Extensive Use of the CIA 's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Provides No Intelligence 163 CIA After-Action Review of Raium Interrogation Calls for Study of E?ecttveness of Interrogation Techniques and Greater Use. of Rappor t-Bnilding Techniques In Future CIA InteI rogations 167 7. CIA Contracting Expenses Related to Company Formed by WIGERT and DUNBAR 168 8. The Detention and Interrogation Program Ends I 70 Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Multiple Constituencies 172 A. Background on CIA Effectiveness Representations - 172 B. Past Efforts to Review the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques . 78 C. The Origins of CIA Representations Regarding the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques As Having ?Saved Lives "Thwarted Plots, and "Captured Terrorists" 1'79 D. CIA Representations About the Effectiveness of Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Speci?c CIA Detainees 204 1. Abu Zubaytlah 204 2. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) 210 E. CIA Effectiveness Claims Regarding a ?High Volume of Critical Intelligence" 21.6 The Eight Primary CIA Effectiveness Representations?the Use of the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques ?Enabled the CIA to Disrupt Terrorist Plots? and "Capture Additional Terrorists? 217 1: . The Thwarting of the Dirtv Bomb/1' all Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla 225 2. The Thwar ting of the Karachi Plots 239 3. Tire Thwar ting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the AI- Ghuraba Group 246 4. The Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the Capture of Dhiren Barot. aka Issa 258 5. The Identification, Capture, and Arrest ofIyrnan Farrs276 6. Tire Identif cation Capture, and Arrest of Sajid Badat 284 7. The Thwartr'ng of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf . 294 8. Tire Capture of Hambah 301 G. CIA Secondary Effectiveness Representations?Less Frequently Cited Disrupted Plots, Captures, and Intelligence that the CIA Has Provided As Evidence for the Effectiveness of the 5 Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 31] 1. The Identification of Khalrd Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) as the Mastermind of the September 2001, Attacks 312 2. The Identi?cation ofKSM's "Mukhtar" Alias - 3 15 3. The Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh 3 16 4. The Capture ofKIIalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) 326 5. - The Capture ofMajid Khan 334 Page 5 Of 499 . UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 6. The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier I?lotring 336 7 The Assertion that CIA Detainees Subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help Validate CIA Sources 342 8. The Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Sai?tllah Paracha '..352 9. Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jajfar al-Tayyar - 358 10. The Identi?cation and Arrest of Saleh al?Marri 366 I 1 . The Collection of Critical Tactical Intelligence on. ShItai, Pakistan 368 12. Information on the Facilitator that Led to the UBL 378 11V. Overview of CIA Representations to the Media While the Program Was Classified. . .401 A. The CIA Provides Information on the Still-Classi?ed Detention and Interrogation Program to Journalists Who then Publish Classi?ed Information; CIA Does Not File Crimes Reports in Connection with the Stories 401 B. Senior CIA Of?cials Discuss Need to "Put Out Our Story" to Shape Public and Congressional Opinion Prior to the Full Committee Being Briefed 402 C. CIA Atto1neys Caution that Classi?ed Information Provided to the Media Should Not Be Attributed to the CIA 404 D. The CIA Engages with Journalists and Conveys an Inaccurate Account of the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah 405 V. Review of CIA Representations to the Department of ushm 409 A. August I, 2002, OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate Information Regarding Abu Zubaydah B. The CIA Interprets the August 1, 2002, Memorandum to Apply to Other Detainees, Despite Language of the - Memorandum; Interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and Other Detainees Dive1ge from the Representations to the OLC 4 C. Following Suspension of the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, the CIA Obtains Approval from the OLC for the Interrogation of Three Individual Detainees 4l 3 May 2005 OLC Memoranda Rely on Inaccurate Representations from the CIA Regarding the Interrogation Process, the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, and the Effectiveness of the Techniques E. After Passage of the Detainee Treatment Act, OLC Issues Opinion on CIA Conditions of Con?nement, Withdraws Draft Opinion on the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques After the U. S. . Supreme Court Case of Hamtlan v. Rumsfeld - 428 F. July 2007 OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate CIA Representations Regarding CIA Interrogations and the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; CIA Misrepresents Congressional Views to the Department of Justice 43] VI. Review of CIA Representations to the Congress .- 437 A. After Memorandum of Noti?cation, the CIA Disavows Torture and Assu1es the Committee Will Be Noti?ed of Every Individual Detained by the CIA 437 B. The CIA Noti?es Committee of the Detention of Abu Zubaydah, but Makes No Reference to Coercive Interrogation Techniques; the CIA Briefs Chairman and Vice Chairman After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; the CIA Discusses Strategy to Avoid the Chairman? 5 Request for More Information 437 C. No Detailed Records Exist of CIA Brie?ngs of Conunittee Leadership; the CIA Declines to Answer Questions from Committee Members or Provide Requested Materials 439 Vice Chairman Rockefeller Seeks Committee Investigation 441 E. In Response to Detainee Treatment Act, the CIA Briefs Senators Not on the Committee; Proposal from Senator Levin for an Independent Commission Prompts Renewed Calls Within the CIA to Destroy Interrogation Videotapes 443 Page 6 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED, F. CIA Director Goss Seeks Committee Support for the Program After the Detainee Treatment Act; CIA Declines to Answer Questions for the Record 444 G. Full Committee FII st Briefed on the CIA's Intenegation Program Hours Before It Is Publicly Acknowledged on September 6,2006 446 H. The CIA Provides Additional Information to the Full Committee and Staff, Much of It Inaccurate; I Intelligence Authorization Act Passes Limiting CIA Interrogations to Techniques Authorized by the Army Field Manual 449 I. President Vetoes Legislation Based on Effectiveness Claims Provided by the CIA Declines to Answer Committee Questions for the Record About the CIA Interrogation Program 452 VII. CIA Destruction of Interrogation Videotapes Leads to Committee Investigation; Committee Votes 14-1 for Expansive Terms of Reference to Study the Detention and Interrogation 455 1: Terms of Reference I 457 IX. Appendix 2: Detainees from 2002 zoos - . - 458 X. Appendix 3: Example of Inaccurate CIA Testimony to the Committee- April 12, 2007462 Page 7 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED: speci?c requests for additional information on the Detention and Interrogation Program. Internal CIA emails include discussion of how the CIA could off the hook on the cheap? regarding Chairman Graham?s requests for additional information.234 In the end, CIA officials simply did not reSpond to Graham?s requests prior to his departure from the Committee in January 2003. C. Interrogation in Country I and the January 2003 Guidelines 1. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE COBALT, Places Inexperienced irst-T our Of?cer in Charge in April 2002, with the intention that it would be ?totally under ]/Station Control."235 On June 6, 2002, CIA Headquarters-approved more than $200,000 for the construction of the facility, identi?ed in this summary as SITE In a 2003 interview with the CIA Of?ce of Inspector General, Associate Deputy Director for Operations described his Views of this facility and ?stated that - SITE was 0 ened because there needed to be a detention site in [Country for those detainees enroute to SITE 1: was not a place for the?use of DETENTION SITE COBALT, constructed with CIA funding, opened in Country 'in September 2002.?38 According to CIA records, the windows at DETENTION SITE COBALT were blacked out and detainees were kept in total darkness. The, guards monitored detainees using headlamps and loud music was played constantly in the facility. While in their cells, detainees were shackled to the wall and given buckets for human waste. Fourof the twenty cells at the facility included a bar across the top of the cell?? Later reports describe detainees being shackled to the bar with their hands above their heads, forcing them to stand, and therefore not allowing the. detainees to' sleep.240 (M) Plans for a specialized CIA detention faciliti in Country I began 23? Email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: John H. Moseman', cc: Scott Muller and James Pavitt; subject: [attached document] Re: Graham request on interrogations; date: December 9, 2002, at 05:46:11 PM. 235 By June 2002 the CIA had taken custody of ?ve detainees who were captured outside of Country and placed these CIA detainees in Country - detention facilities. The detainees were held at the Country facilities at - the re uest of the CIA and the CIA had unlimited access to them. See 21147 236 DIRECTOR - (0622122 JUN 02) . 237 Interview Report, 2003-712346, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, September 9, 2003. . 233 For additional information on DETENTION SITE COBALT, see Volume I and Volume The specific date has been eneralized at the nest of the CIA. - Hams For additional information on DETENTION SITE COBALT, see Volume I and Volume and amon other . documents: ?31118 DIRECTOR .:email from: to: subject: Meeting with SO Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002; email from: to: subject: Meeting with SO Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 5, 2002; Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-712346), May 2004; Memorandum for Deputy Director of erations, from January 28, 2003, Subject: Page 49 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED W11) The CIA of?cer in charge or DETENTION SITE COBALT, OFFICER was a junior officer on his first overseas assignment with no previous experience or training in handling prisoners or conducting interrogations. OFFICER 1] was the DETENTION SITE COBALT manager during the period in which a CIA detainee died and numerous CIA detainees were subjected to unapproved coercive interrogation techniques.241 A review of CIA records found that prior to - OFFICER 1?s] deployment and assignment as the DETENTION SITE COBALT manager,_other CIA Of?cers recommended OFFICER 1] not have continued access to classified information due to a ?lack of honest ,judgment, and maturity. "242 According to records, ?the chief of CTC told OFFICER that he would not . want [him]' In his overseas station. "243 A supervising of?cer assessed that OFFICER ?has issues with judgment and maturity, [and his] potential behavior in the field is also worrisome. [The of?cer] further advised that OFFICER was only put into processing for an overseas position so that someone would evaluate all of the evidence of this situation all together. [The officer further noted that OFFICER might not listen to his chief of station when in the ?eld.?244 2. CIA Records Lack Information on CIA Detainees and Details of lnterroga?ons in. Country I (M) Detainees held in Country I were detained under the authority of the however, CIA of?cers conducted no written assessment of whether these detainees Death Investigation - Gul and CIA Inspector General, Re rt of Investi ation, Death of a Detainee I (20113?740240), April 27, 2005. One senior interrogator, H, told the CIA OIG that ?literally, a detainee could go for days or weeks without anyone looking at him,? and that his team found one detainee who, ??as far as we could determine,? had been chained to the wall in a standing position for 17 days." According to the CIA interrogator, some of the CIA detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT "'literally looked like a dog that had been kenneled.? When the doors to their cells were opened, ?the cowered.?? (See Interview Report, 2003-7123?16, Review of Interro ations for Counterterrorism Purposes, b, April 30, 2003.) The chief of interrogations, i told the CIA OIG that SITE is good for interrogations because it is the closest thing he has seen to a dungeon, facilitating the displacement of detainee ex ctations." (See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, April 7, 2003.) An analyst who conducted interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT told the CIA 016 that SITE is an (See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, May 8,2003) See April 27, 2005, CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Death of a Detainee E. April 7, 2005, Memorandum for John Helgerson, Ins nector General, from Robert Grenier, Subject: Comments on Draft Retort of Investiation: Death of a Detaine (2003?7402- IG). 2-12 OCFFIER OFFICER 11' OFFICER 11 Page 50 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ?pose[d] a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests [we]re planning terrorist activities." The CIA maintained such poor records of its detainees in Country I during this period that the CIA remains unable to determine the number and identity of the individuals it detained. The full details of the CIA interrogations there remain largely unknown, as DETENTION SITE COB ALT was later found to have not reported multiple uses of sleep deprivation, required standing, loud music, sensory deprivation, extended isolation, reduced quantity and quality of food, nudity, and ?rough treatment? of CIA detainees. 245 3 CIA Headquarters Recommends That Untrained Interrogators in Country I Use the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques on Ridha al-Najjar (M) Ridha al-Najjar was the- first CIA detainee to be held at DETENTION SITE COBALT. Al-Najjar, along with Hassan Muhammad Abu Bakr and a number of other individuals, was arrested in Karachi, Pakistan, after raids conducted - by akistan- in late May 2002.?5 Al-Najjar was identified by the CIA as a former bod uard for Usama bin Laden, and was rendered with Abu Bakr to CIA custody at a Countty I detention facility on June I 2002. 243 Ridha al-Naj jar was nansferred to DETENTION SITE COB ALT on September. 2002. 249 (M) While the CIA was describing to the Department of Justice why it needed to use the enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, a parallel internal discussion at the CIA was taking place regarding Ridha al-Naj jar An ALEC Station cable from a CTC officer stated that, on June 27, 2002: held a strategy session regarding the interrogation 01? high priority detainee Ridha Ahmed al-Naj jar in [Country The goal of the session was to review the progress of the interrogation to date and to devise a general plan as to how best to p1oceed once the new I detention/debriefing facility [i DETENTION SITE 1s completed. ?25" (M) The meeting participants included individuals who were also 7 involved 1n discussions related to Abu Zuba dah?s interrogation, includin de uty chief of .1111: Station _,*e1c Legal i and one of "5 The full Committee Study includes a CIA photograph of a water board at DETENTION SITE COBALT. While there are no records of the CIA using the waterboard at COBALT, the waterboard device 1n the photograph' 15 surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of unknown pink solution (tilled two thirds of the way to the top) and a watering can resting on the wooden beams of the waterboard. In meetings between the Committee Staff and the CIA in the summer of 2013, the CIA was unable to explain the details of the photograph, to include the buckets, solution, and waten?ng can, as well as the waterboard's resence at COBALT. 11443 246 247 2411 249 25? ALEC (1621352 JUL 02). Although the plans at the time were for DETENTION SITE COBALT to be OWned and operated by the Country I government, the detention site Was controlled and overseen by the CIA and- its of?cers from the day it became operational 1n Se tember 2002. 178155 Page 51 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED the .251 A cable followed on July 16-, 2002, to the CIA Station in Country suggesting possible interrogation techniques to use against Ridha al-Najjar, including: utilizing ?Najjar?s fear for the well-being of his family toour bene?t,? with the cable explicitly stating that interrogators could not ?threaten his family with imminent death?; 0 using ?vague threats" to create a ?mind virus" that would cause al-Najjar to believe that his situation would continue to get worse until he c00perated; 252 ?o manipulating Ridhaal-Najjar?s environment using a hood, restraints, and music; and . I . employing sleep deprivation through the use of round- the-'clock interrogations. 253 (M) The Cable went on to note that the ?possibility that [al-NaJ Jar] may I have current threat or lead information demands that we keep up the pressure on him "254 With the exception of a brief mention of ?diminished returns from the most recent interviews of al- Jar, ?and references to the detainee' 5 complaints about physical ailments, the cable offers no evidence al-Najjar was actively resisting CIA interrogators 255 (M) Ten days later, on July 26, 2002, CIA of?cers 1n Country I, none of whom had been trained 1n the use of the enhanced mterrogation techniques, proposed putting al-Najjar' 1n isolation256 and using ?sound disorientation techniques, ?sense of time deprivation,? limited light, cold temperatures, and sleep deprivation.257- The CIA officers added that they felt they had a ?reasonable chance of breaking Najjar? to get ?the intelligence and locator lead information on UBL and Bin Ladin?s family.?258 The plan for al-Najjar was circulated to senior CIA of?cers as part of the Daily?DCI Operations Update.259 25' ALEC - i.1621352 JUL 02) The deputy chef of ALEC Station, and ?10 Legal, would later travel to DETENTION SITE GREEN to observe the use of the 5 enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah. 252 The term ?mind virus" ?rst appeared 1n the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah. See - 10086 (2019002 APR 02). 253 Referenced July 16, 2002 cable ls ALEC - (162l352 JUL 02). ALEC (1621352 JUL 02) 355 ALEC (1621352 JUL 02) 15" At this time, July 26,2002, Abu Zubaydah was in isolation at DETENTION SITE GREEN. Abu Zubaydah was placed' 1n isolation on June 18,2002, and remained' 1n isolation for 47 days, until the CIA began subjecting him to its enhanced interro ation techni ues on August 4,2002. 1'57 25107 (260903Z JUL 02) 25? 25107 (2609032 JUL 02) ?59 Brand from to Buzz Krongard, John O. Brennan, H. Moseman, immerse], Jose Rodriguez, ,John P. Mudd, (Page 52 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED I hooding. UNCLASSIFIED (M) On August 5, 2002, the day after Abu Zubaydah?s interrogation using the enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE GREEN began, CIA Headquarters authorized the proposed interrogation plan for al-Najjar, to include the use of loud music (at less than the level that would cause physical harm such as permanent hearing loss), worse food (as long as it was nutritionally adequate for sustenance), sleep deprivation, and 260 . (M) More than a month later, on September 21, 2002, CIA interrogators described al-Najjar as ?clearly a broken man" and ?on the verge of complete breakdown? as result of the isolation.261 The cable added that al-Najjar was willing to do whatever the CIA officer asked?? (M) In October 2002, of?cers from the U.S. military conducted a short . debrie?ng of al-Najjar at DETENTION SITE COBALT and subsequently expressed an interest in a more thorough debrie?ng.263 On November I, 2002, a U.S. military legal advisor visited DETENTION SITE COBALT and described it as a detention facilit noting that ?while CIA is the only user of the facility they contend it is a [Country facility."264 The U.S. military of?cer also noted that the junior CIA officer designated as warden of the facility ?has little to no experience with interrogating or handling prisoners.? With respect to al- Najjar speci?cally, the legal advisor. indicated that the interrogation plan included ?isolation in total darkness; lowering the quality of his food; keeping him at an uncomfortable temperature (cold); [playing music] 24 hours a day; and keeping him ?shackled and hooded.? In addition, al-Najjar was described as having been left involved handcuffing one or both wrists to an overhead bar which would not allow him to lower his arms??for 22 hours each day for two consecutive days, in order to ??break? his resistance.? It was also noted al- Najjar was wearing a diaper and had no access to toilet facilities.265 (M) The U.S. military legal advisor concluded that, because of al- aj jar?s treatment, and the concealment of the facility from the ICRC, military participation in al-Najjar?s interrogation would involve risks for the U.S. military -. ,The 1e al advisor recommended briefing the detention and interrogation activities to U.S. subject: ABU ZUBAYDAH - SENSITIVE ADDENDUM T0 DCI DAILY I630 OPS UPDATE - 26 date: July 26, 2002. .260 DIRECTOR - (0523092 AUG 02). The OLC opinion that reviewed and appr0ved the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, signed on August 1, 2002, was speci?c to Abu Zubaydah. The Of?ce of Legal Counsel did not produce legal opinions for al-Najjar or other detainees held by or for the CIA until August 2004. 25' 27297 (2107132 SEP 02) 252 27297 (2107132 SEP 02 353 November I, 2002, Memorandum for Subject: Legal Analysis of - Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in (aka SITE . - 2'3" November I, 2002, Memorandum for Subject: Legal Analysis of - Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in (aka SITE . 265 November I, 2002, Memorandum for Subject: Legal Analysis of - Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in (aka SITE . Page 53 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED - [combatant command] to alert the command of the risks prior to the U.S. military being involved in any aspect of the interrogation of aleNajjar.266 According to the CIA inspector general, the detention and interrogation of Ridha al-N?ajjar ?became the model? for handling other CIA detainees at DETENTION SITE The CIA disseminated one intelligence report from its detention and interrogation of Ridha 4. Death of Gui Rahman Leads CIA Headquarters to Learn of Unreported Coercive Interrogation Techniques at DETENTION SITE CIA Inspector General Review Reveals Lack of Oversight of the Detention Site (M) In November 2002, ALEC Station officers requested that CIA contract interrogator Hammond DUNBAR, one of the two primary interrogators of Abu Zubaydah in August 2002, travel to DETENTION SITE COBALT to assess a detainee for the possible use of the enhanced interro ation techni 1168.269 While DUNBAR was present at DETENTION SITE COBALT, he assisted? OFFICER l] in the interrogations of Gul Rahman, a suspected Islamic extremist. As reported to CIA Headquarters, this interrogation included ?48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness, isolation, a, cold shower, and rough treatment.? CIA Headquarters did not approve these interrogation techniques in advance. Upon receipt of these cables, however, officers at CIA Headquarters responded that they were ?motivated to extract any and all operational information on al-Qa?ida and Hezbi Islami from Gul Rahman" and suggested that ?enhanced measures" might be needed to gain GulRahman?s compliance. CIA Headquarters also requested that a assessment of Rahman be completed.270 Prior to DUNB departure from the detention site on November I, 2002, [a few days before the death of Gul Rahman] DUNBAR proposed the use of the enhanced interrogation techniques on other detainees and offered suggestions to OFFICER the site manager, on the use of such techniques?? (M) On November I, 2002, OFFICER ordered that Gul Rahman be shackled to the wall of his cell in a position that re uired the detainee to rest on the bare concrete floor. Rahman was wearing only a sweatshirt, OFFICER had ordered that Rahman?s clothing be removed when he had been judged to be uncooperative during an earlier interrogation. The next day, the guards found Gul Rahman?s dead body. An internal CIA review and autopsy assessed that Rahman likely died from hypothermia?in part November I 2002. tm Subject: Legal Analysis of -Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in (aka SITE According to the report, ?in late July or early August 2002, a senior erations officer on TDY to interrogated a particularly obstinate detainee [Ridha al-Najjar] at detention facility that was used before was opened. The of?cer drafted a cable that proposed techniques that, ultimately, became the model for See April 27, 2005, report by the CIA Inspector General, Death of a Detainee I (2003?7402-10 . See also Interview Report, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, A ri130, 2003', Interview Report, 2003-7 123-16, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, April 2, 2003. ?8 See Volume II and Volume for additional information. Page 54 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED from having been forced to. sit on the bare concrete ?oor without pants.272 OFFICER 1?s] initial cable to CIA Headquarters on Rahman?s death included a number of misstatements and omissions that were not discovered until internal investigations into Rahman? death. 273 - (M) The death of Gul Rahman resulted in increased attention to CIA detention and interrogation activities in Country I by CIA Headquarters. The CTC formally designated the Renditions Group274 as the responsible entity for the management and maintenance of all CIA interrogation facilities, including DETENTION SITE COBALT, in early December 2002.275 Despite this change, many of the same individuals within the including DUNBAR, of?cers at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and of?cers within ALEC Station who had recommended the use of the enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul Rahman-wremained key figures in the CIA interrogation program and received no reprimand or sanction for Rahman?s death. Instead, in March 2003, just four months after the death of Gul Rahman, the CIA Station in Country I recommended that OFFICER 1] receive a ?cash awar of 500 for his ?consistently superior work. ?276 OFFICER remained' 1n his position as manager of the detention site until July 2003 and continued to be involved 1n the interrogations of other CIA detainees. He was formally certi?ed as a CIA interrogator in April 2003 after the practical portion of his training requirement was waived because of his past experience with interrogations at DETENTION SITE 212 Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation Gul RAHMAN. Other contributing factors were identified as dehydration, lack of food, and immobilit due to ?short chaining." ?3 30211 See Volume [and for additional details. 27" As noted, the Renditions Group was also known during the program as the ?Renditions and Interrogations Group," as well as the ?Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group?f and by the initials, and 275 DIRECTOR 0323362 DEC 02) 27" 34909 . 217 DIRECTOR . In late? 2005, the CIA convened an Accountability Board to review the actions of CIA personnel in Gul Rahman' ?5 death. The board recommended that the executive director ?impose a 10 day suspension without pay"o on- OFFICER and noted that this action would ?strike the appropriate balance between. I) the fact that OFFICER was the only individual who made decisions that led directly, albeit unintentionally, to Rahman' 5 death, and 2) the signi?cant weight the Board attached to the mitigating factors at play In this incident." (See Memorandum for Executive Director from -. Deputy Director for Science and Technology, re. Report and Recommendations of the Special Accountability Board Regarding the Death of Af han Detainee Gui Rahman. 011 February 10, 2006, however, the CIA Executive Director K.B. Foggo noti?ed OFFICER that he intended to take no disciplinary action against him. In his memo describing that decision, the executive director stated: ?While not condoning your actions, it is imperative, in my View, that be judged within the operational context that existed at the time of Rahman?s detention. cable traf?c reviewed by the board shows conclusively that Headquarters generally was aware of, and osed no objections to, the con?nement conditions and interrogation techniques bein imposed on Rahman as late as November. On that date, Headquarters noti?ed [the CIA Station in COUNTRY that it was ?n1otivated to . extract any and all operational infonnation? from Rahman, that it rated achieving Rahman?s cooperation to be of ?great importance' and that it acknowledged that Rahman ?1nay need to be subjected to enhanced interrogation measures to induee him to comply. (See February 10, 2006, Mem01and1'1m for OFFICER CounterTerrorist Center, National Clandestine Service, from Executive Director, re: ?Accountability Decision. With regard to the death of Ga! Rahman, the 5 June 2013 Response states: ?Most cg1egiously, we believe that CIA leaders erred' 1n not holding anyone formally accountable for the actions and failure of. management related to the death of Gul Rahman at In 2002. We understand the reasoning underlying CIA management? decision to overturn an accountability board recommendation that would have imposed sanctions on the least - Page 55 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED (M) Later investigations of DETENTION srra COBALT conducted by the CIA inspector general and the deputy director of operations following the death of Gul Rahman found that the use of the enhanced interrogation techniques?and other coercive interrogation techniques?was more widespread than was reported in contemporaneous CIA cables. Speci?cally, the interrogation techniques that went unreported in CIA. cables included standing sleep deprivation in which a detainee?s arms were shackled above his head, nudity, dietary manipulation, exposure to cold temperatures, cold showers, ?rough takedowns,? and, in at least two instances, the use of mock executions. 273 On November 18, 2002, staff from the Of?ce of Inspector General contacted CTC Legal, ,to indicate their interest in being briefed by CTC on the detention facility" 1n Country .At their meeting with the BBQ and the chief of CTC on November I, 2002, the OIG staff explained that, while to that country on a separate matter, the staff had overheard a conversation that included references to? ?war crimes? and ?torture? at a CIA detention facility and were therefore seeking to follow-up on this information. According to notes from the meeting, the DDO described the? ?most recent event concerning Gul Rahman?? his death, which occurred on November I, 2002. 279 experienced of?cer involved. The most junior in the chain of command should not have to bear the full weight of accountability when larger, systemic problems exist and when they are thrust into dif?cult battle?eld situations by their supervisors and given a risky and dif?cult task and little preparation or guidance. Still, it is hard to accept that a CIA of?cer does not bear at least some responsibility for his or her actions, even under trying circumstances.? 2" Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) May 7, 2004; Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from January 28, 2003, Sub'ect: Death Investigation Gul CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee (2003-7402-IG), April 2'7, 2005. Inspector General records of the interview of a senior CIA debriefer indicated that, ?[d]uring the two weeks of interrogation training, she heard stories of detainees being 'hung for days on end,? not being fed, mock assassinations, and at least one case of a detainee being repeatedly choked." The senior debriefer also informed the Of?ce of Inspector General that, ?[s]he heard that while at aka OFFICER had hung detainees up for long periods with their toes barely touchin the und." (See interview report, 2003-7123-16, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, g, April 5, 2003.) DUNBAR described a ?rough takedown" following the death of Gui Rahman at COBALT. ?According to there were approximately ?ve CIA of?cers from the renditions team. Each one had a role during the takedown and it was thoroughly planned and rehearsed. They opened the door of Rahman's cell and rushed in screaming and yelling for him to ?get down.? They dragged him outside, cut off his clothes and secured him with Mylar tape. They coyoted his head with a hood and ran him up and down a long corridor adjacent to his cell. They slapped him and punched him several times. stated that although it was obvious they were not trying to hit him as hard as they could, a couple of times the punches were forceful. [As they ran him along the corridor, a couple of times he fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the floor outside of the cells is dirt). Rahman did acquire a number of abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but nothing that required medical attention. (This may account for the abrasions found on Rahman's body after his death. Rahman had a number of surface abrasions on his shoulders, elvis, arms, le s, and face.) At this point, Rahman was returned to his cell and secured. stated that OFFICER [the CIA of?cer in charge of DETENTION SITE may have spoken to Rahman for a few moments, but he did not know what 1_ OFFICER said. stated that after something like this is done, interrogators should speak to the prisoner to ive them something to think about. (See Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from January 28, 2003, Subject. Death Investigation? Gui RAHMAN, pp. 21- 22. mber 279 at: Notes of ove 2002 meetini Page 56 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED (M) In January 2003, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson began a formal review of the death of Gul Rahman and began a separate review of the entire CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. The'resulting Special Review of Countertetrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (?Special Review?) found that there were no guidelines for the use of the enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE COB ALT prior to December 2002, and that interrogators, some with little or no training, were ?left to their own devices 111 working with detainees. ?280 (M) The Inspector General?s Special Review also revealed the lack of oversight of DETENTION SITE COBALT by CIA leadership. DCI Tenet stated that he was "?not very familiar? with DETENTION SITE COBALT and ?what the CIA is doing with medium value targets.?281 Associate Deputy Director of Operations stated that he was unaware that the enhanced interrogation techniques were being used there.282 In August 2003, CIA General Counsel Scott Muller relayed that he was under the impression that DETENTION SITE COBALT was only a holding facility and that he had ?no idea who is responsible for ?283 Senior Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo informed the OIG that he knew little about DETENTION SITE COBALT and that his focus was on DETENTION SITE GREEN and DETENTION SITE BLUE. 284 CTC Chief of Operations stated that he had much less knowledge of operations at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and that the GREEN and BLUE detention sites were more important to him. 285 Finally, Chief of CTC Jose Rodriguez stated that he did not focus on DETENTION SITE COBALT because he had ?other higher priorities. ?285 5. The CIA Begins Training New Interrogators; Interrogation Techniques Not Reviewed by the Department of Justice Included' the Training Syllabus . 29? See Of?ce of Inspector General Special Review of Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001-Oetober 2003), May 2004, p. 52. According to an OIG interview with an analyst who conducted interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT, "indicative of the lack of interrogators was the fact that OFFICER enlisted a case officer to conduct interro ations at srra after he completed his business in (See Interview Report, Review of Interrogations for CounterterrorisrnPurposes, May 8, 2003.) Inspector General records of an interview with a senior CIA debriefer indicate that the debriefer, ?heard prior to taking the [interrogator] training that people at had debriefed detainees on their own, sometimes going out to the site at night. (See Interview Report 2003-7123? IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, ,April 5,2003.) As described elsewhere, DCI Tenet issued formal interrogation guidelines for the program on January 28,2003. (See Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Noti?cation of [7 September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Cent1al Intelligence, January 28,2003.) 2? Interview of George Tenet, by Of?ce of the Inspector General, memorandum dated, September 8,2003. . ?1 Interview of Of?ce of the Inspector General, Septembet 9,2003. ?3 Interview of Scott Muller, by and Of?ce of the Inspector General, August 20, 2003. 23? Interview of John Rizzo, by and Of?ce of the Inspector Geneial, August .,l4 2003. ?5 Interview of Of?ce of the InspeCtor General, February 112003. 2116 Interview of Jose Rodriguez, by and Of?ce of the Inspector General, August 12 2003. Page 57 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED (M) The CTC Renditions Group began preparing for the ?rst CIA interrogator training course in August 2002?paring the period in which Abu Zubaydah was being interro ated usin the enhanced interrogation techni ues at DETENTION SITE . GREEN. H, the chief ofinterrogations,287 andq?, the CIA officer with OTS who had spent. years as a SERE Instructor with JPRA, led the interrogation training. The first interrogation training, conducted with the assistance of JPRA personnel, occurred from November 12, 2002, to November 18, 2002. 283 The class included eight students who were seeking to become CIA interrogators and three students seeking to support the CIA interrogation process. ?89 The CIA training program involved 65 hours of instruction and training on the 3 enhanced interrogation techniques, including at least two interrogation techniqUes whose legality had not been evaluated by the Department of Justice: the ?abdominal slap" and the ?finger press. Although a number of personnel at CIA Headquarters reviewed the training materials, there are no CIA records of any CIA of?cer raising objections to the techniques being- inclmuded 1n the syllab'f?us ?9 . 6. Despite Recommendation from CIA Attorneys, the CIA arts to Adequately Screen Potential Interrogators in 2002 and 2003 On November 2002, after the completion of the ?rst romel trainini class, CTC Legal, ,.asked CTC attorney - it known that from now on, must vet all personnel who are enrolled' 1n, observing or teaching? or otherwise associated with? the class. ?29? added: ?Moreover, we will be forced to DISapprove [sic] the participation of specific personnel in the use of enhanced techniques unless we have ourselves vetted 28" December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interro ation and Ex loitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12? 18 Nov 02 ilot running) at 4. See also email from: to: subject. Formation of a High Value Target Interrogation team (describing initial . training plan and requirements); date: August 30, 2002, at 8:30 AM. December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12? 18 Nov 02 (pilot running). ?39 December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12- 18 Nov 02 (pilot runnin at 15. See for example, email from: hm) sub ect.HVTt1ainin date: October 10, 2002; email from: to: m-c? subject. HVT tralmn date. October 10, 2002; Novemberl, 2002, Memorandum for: Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, from h, Chief, Renditions Group, CTC, re: Request for use of Military Trainers in Support of Agency Interrogation . Memo for were rtom 26 Au 02, Same Subject. . 29? Email from: to: Jose Rodriguez, ;subject: EYES date: November., 2002 at 0313.01 PM. As .described above, Gui Rahman likel froze to death at DETENTION SITE COBALT sometime in the morning of Novemberl, 2002. email, however, appears to have been drafted before the guards had found Gul Rahman? 5 body and before that death was reported to CIA Headquartels. See 30211 ,describing the guards observin Gul Rahman alive' 1n the morning of November I, 2002. Out Rahman's death appeared' to cable traf?c at least after 8 email. No records could be identi?ed to provide the impetus for email. I Page 58 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED them and are satisfied with their quali?cations and suitability for what are clearly unusual measures that are lawful only when practiced correctly by personnel whose records clearly demonstrate their suitability for that role. The vetting process will not be that dissimilar from the checks that are provided by . the OIG, OS, etc. in certain cases before individuals are promoted or receive awards, and the selection and training of aggressive interrogators certainly warrants a similar vetting process. ?292 (M) The chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez, objected to this approach, stating: do not think that should or would want to get into the business of vetting participants, observers, instructors or others that are involved in this program. It is "simply not yourjob. Your job is to tell all what are the acceptable legal standards for conducting interrogations per the authorities obtained from Justice and agreed upon by the White House.?293 (M) Contrary to statements later made by CIA Director Michael Hayden and other CIA of?cials that ?[a]ll those involved in the questioning 'of detainees are carefully 'chosen and screened for demonstrated rofessionaljudgment and maturity,?294 CIA records suggest that the vetting sought by i did not take place. The Committee reviewed CIA records related to several CIA of?cers and contra?tors involved in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, most of whom conducted interrogations. The Committee identi?ed a number of personnel whose backgrounds include notable derogatory information calling into question their eligibility for employment, their access to classified information, and their participation in CIA interrogation activities. In nearly all cases, the derogatory information was known to the CIA prior to the assignment of the CIA of?cers to the Detention and Interrogation Programs This group of officers included individuals who, among other issues, had engaged in inappropriate detainee interrogations, had workplace anger management issues, and had reportedly admitted to sexual assault.295 7. - Bureau of Prisons by Level of Deprivation at CIA ?s COBALT DetentionSite (M) In December 2002, the Renditions Group sent a team of recently trained interrogators to DETENTION SITE COBALT to engage in interrogations. The interrogation plans proposed by that team for at least three detainees at DETENTION SITE 292 Email from: 1?93 Email Jose Rodriguez; to: PM. 29" Transcript of hearin til 12, 2007 DTS #2007-1563 . 295 The information is described at length in the Committee Study in to: cc: Jose Rodriguez, sub'ect: EYES date: November', 2002, at 03:13: 01 PM. .CTCILGL- cc. :subject: EYES ONLY, date. Novembe1 I, 2002, at 04:27 Volume Page 59 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED COB ALT included the use of interrupted sleep, loud music, and reduction in food quality and quantity. Less than a month after the death of Gui Rahman from suspected hypothermia, the plans also called for detainees? clothes to be removed in a facility that was desCribed to be 45 degrees Fahrenheit. CIA Headquarters approved the proposals for these detainees, whom the CIA described as ?Medium Value. "295 (M) Prior to this, in November 2002, a delegation of several of?cers from the Federal Bureau of Prisons conducted an asseSsment of DETENTION SITE COBALT. Following the November I, 2002, through November I, 2002, visit?? CLA of?cers in Countiy I remarked that the Federal Bureau of Piisons assesSments, along with recommendations and training, had ?made a noticeable improvement on how the day to day operations at the facility are erformed,? and made the detention site a ?more secure and safer working environment for - officers.?29 (M) On December 4, 2002, of?cers at CIA Headquarters met with individuals from the Federal Bureau of Prisons to learn more about their inspection of DETENTION SITE COBALT and their training of- security staff.299 During that meeting, the Federal Bureau of Prisons personnel described DETENTION SITE COBALT and stated that there was ?absolutely no talking inside the facility,? that the guards do not interact with the prisoners, and that ?[e]verything is done in silence and [in] the dark ?300 According to a CIA of?cer, the Federal Bureau of Prisons staff also commented that ?they were ed?? at ?rst by the facility, because: ?They have never been in a facility where individuals are so sensory deprived, constant white noise, no talking, everyone in the dark, with the guards wearing a light on their head when they collected and escorted a detainee to an interrogation cell, detainees constantly being shackled to the wall or ?oor, and the starkness of each cell (concrete and bars). There is nothing like this in the Federal Bureau of Prisons. They then explained that they understood the mission and it was their collective assessment that in spite of all this sensory deprivation, the detainees were not being treated in humanely [sic]. They explained that the facility was sanitary, there was medical care and the guard force and our staff did not mistreat the (M) By the end of December 2002, the CIA Renditions Group that had visited DETENTION SITE COBALT had concluded that the detention facility?s initial ?baseline conditions? involved so much deprivation that any further deprivation would have limited impact 296_31118 E: DIRECTOR 297 CIA detainee Gul Rahman died at DETENTION SITE COBALT at the end of the Federal Bureau of Prisons visit to the CIA detention site. 29? 30589 (2716262 NOV 02) 299 Email from: to: subject: Meeting with SO Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002. 300 Email from: to: subject: Meeting with SO Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002. Email from: to: subject: Meeting with SO Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 5, 2002. Page 60 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED on the interrogations. The team thus recommended that ?experts and authorities other than the individuals who crafted the process? review the interrogation process and conditions, and that a legal review be conducted.302 CIA Headquarters does not appear to have taken action on these recommendations. 8. The CIA Places CIA Detainees in Country I Facilities Because They Did Not Meet the MON Standard Detention In the spring of 2003, the CIA continued to hold detainees at facilities in Coun who were known not to meet the MON standard for detention. CIA officer OFFICER 1] described the arrangement he had with Country I officers in an email, writing: I. They also happen to have 3 or 4 rooms where they can lock up people discretely [sic]. I give them a few hundred bucks a month and they use the rooms for whoever I bring over - no questions asked. It is very useful for housing guys that shouldn?t be in. SITE for one reason or another but still need to be kept isolated and held in secret detention.?303 (M) CIA cables indicate that CIA of?cers transferred at least four detainees to these Country I facilities because they did not meet the standard for CIA detention under the MON .304 (M) In total, four CIA detention facilities were established in Country I. CIA records indicate that DETENTION SITE COBALT held a total of 64 detainees during the period of its operation between Se tember 2002 andmm, while DETENTION SITE GRAY held eight detainees between 2003 and 2003. The CIA later established two other CIA facilities in Countr DETENTION SITE ORANGE, which held 34 detainees between 2004 and 2006; and DETENTION SITE BROWN, which held 12 detainees between 2006 and 2008.305 CIA document entitled Renditions Group Interrogation Team (RGIT), Baseline assessment for MVT, Detainee/Prisoner management, December 30, 2002. The CIA does not appear to have taken action on this recommendation. - 303 Email from: OFFICER to: subject: Thanks and Query re: List of date: March 14, 2003. The cables did not explain any legal basis for detainin individuals who did not meet the detention re uirements . of the Sc tember I7, 2001, MON. HEAD UARTERS 36682 38836 HEAD UARTERS - 41204 ALEC 395 See Volume for additional information. Page 61 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED Exhibit#2 U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons Freedom of lnformation/P?vacy Act Central O?f'ce January 15, 2015 Carl Takei ACLU National Prison Project 915 15th St. NW, 7th Floor Washington DC, DC 20005 Dear Mr. Takei: The Federal Bureau of Prisons' is in receipt of your Freedom of Information Act/Priiracy Act (FOIA) request. Your request has been assigned a number and forwarded to the processing" of?ce noted below. Please make a note of the request number and processing of?ce as you will need to include it in any correspondence of inquiry regarding your request. . Request Number: 2015-02312 Processing Of?ce: CO Request Summary: 1 Any and all Communications relating to Detention Site Cobalt between. BOP and other agencies from 1-1-02 to 1- 1-;05 2.) Any and all Commuhications relating to detention site cobalt between BOP personnel; 3.) any and all documents pertaining to BOP personnel visiting Cobalt; 4.) All Documents visits, meetings, inspections, assessments, recommendations, or training by BOP personnel relating to cobalt on or about 11 -2- 02; 5.) any and all documents relating to meetings between BOP and CIA personnel relating to cobalt on 1-2 2002; and 6.) all documents relating to the death of a detainee at cobalt on or about Nov. 2002 . - to the large number of requests received by the Bureau of Prisons for disclosure of records pursuant to the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts, and due to the limited rescurces available to process such requests,- the Bureau of Prisons has adopted a first-inl?rst- out practice of processing all incoming requests. Your request has been placed in chronological order based on the date of receipt and will be handled as expeditiously as possible when it is assigned for processing. While most requests can be processed within 20 working days, exceptions may exist. We have examined your request and have determined that the following unusual circumstances apply to your request. . U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons Freedom of Information/Privacy Act I - Central. O??ice 2015-02312 Ithe need to search for and collect the requested records from ?eld facilities or other establishments that are separate from the of?ce processing the request; the need to search for, collect, and appropriately examine a voluminous'amount of separate and distinct records which are demanded in a single request; the need for consultation, which shallvbe conducted with all practicable speed, with another agency having a substantial interest in the determination of the request or. among two or more components of the agency having substantial subject-matter interest therein. As a result, the amount of time necessary to respond to your request will increase by an estimated thirty days. Once documents have been collected we will process your request In the order that it was received. You may modify-your request by limiting the scope of the request so that it may be processed within the statutory time frame. . Unless you indicated otherwise by submission of your request you have agreed to pay fees Up to $25.00, as stated in 28 C. F. R. 16. Please note that pursuant to 28 C. F. R. 16.11, we are required to charge fees for time spent searching for or duplicating responsive documents. If we anticipate that your fees will be' In excess of $25.00 or the amount you indicated you are willing to pay, we will notify you of the estimated amount. At that time, you will have the option of modifying your requests to reduce fees. If you have questions regarding the stands of your request, you may contact the Bureau of Prisons FOIA Service Center at 202-514-6655. You can also check the status of your request on line at 320 First Washington, DC 20534 - 202-616-7750 - 1 Exhibit #3 I U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons Freedom of Information/Privacy Act I - 1 Central Orifice April 22. 2015 Carl Takei Staff Attorney ACLU National Prison Project 91515th St., NW 7th Floor Washington DC, 20005 Request Number: 2015-02312 Dear Mr. Takei: This is in response to the above referenced Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. Specifically, you seek copies of 1.) Any and all Communications relating to Detention Site Cobalt between BOP and other agencies from 1-?1-02 to 1-1-05; 2.) Any and all Communications relating to Detention Site Cobalt. between BOP personnel, from 1-1-02 to 1-1-05; 3.) any and all documents pertaining to BOP personnel visiting Cobalt on or about November 2002; 4.) All Documents relating to any visits, meetings, inspections, assessments, recommendations, or training by BOP personnel relating to Detention Site Cobalt on or about 11-2-02; 5.) any and all documents relating to meetings between BOP and CIA personnel relating to Cobalt on 12-2002; and 6.) all documents relating to the death of a detainee at Detention Site Cobalt on or about November 2002. Bureau of Prisons staff conducted a search through multiple divisions for responsive, records to your request. A search was conducted, utilizing but not limited to, search parameters you provided in your request, by the Correctional Programs Division (CPD), Administrative Division (ADM). Office of the General Counsel (OGC), andinformation, Policy, Public Affairs Division (IPPA) and no records were found. There are no other locations where this type of record would be stored that would likely lead to the discovery of the record with a reasonable amont of effort. If you consider my response to be a denial of this request, pursuant to Title 28 Code of Federal Regulations, Section 16.9 or 16.45, you may appeal the adequacy of the search to the Office of Information Policy. This written appeal must be received by the Office of Information Policy (OIP) within 60 days from the date of this letter. Both the appeal letter -l U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons Freedom of Information/Privacy Act 2015-02312 Page 2 and face of the envelope should be marked ?Freedom of Information Act Appeal," and should be addressed to the Office of Information Policy. US. Department of Justice, 1425 New York?Ave.. Suite 11050, Washington, DC. 20530-0001. To avoid delays, . you should include a copy of this response letter with your appeal. Sincerely, ABW Ronald Rodgers Senior Counsel Section .320 First SL. NW Washington. DC 20534 - 202-616-7750 Exhibit #4 I a LEGAL DEPARTMENT NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION PLEASE RESPOND TO: - NAHONAL PRISON PROJECI STREET.- NW 7TH FLOOR WASHINGTON. DC l2 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION E119: . 1356 FOIA APPEAL Bop June 11, 2015 2 'Io-n 2 SENT VIA HAND DELIVERY Of?ce of Information Policy- US. Department of Justice . . - 1425 New York Ave, Suite 11050 . AR I Washin on, DC 20530-0001 - gt JUN 11 2015 RE: F015 201502312 Of?ce of Information Policy To Whom 11 May Concerns I write to appeal the Bureau of Prisons April '22, 2015 response (hereinafter to equest - 312, on the following grounds: (1) BOP conducted an inadequate search, and (2) if BOP found records but falsely stated to the ACLU that no records exist, it violated FOIA by withholding responsive documents without justi?cation and without invoking an exemption, the Glamor response doctrine, or 5 U.S.C. 552(c). - - The FOLA request (hereinafter was received by BOP on January 13, 2015. On January 15, 2015, BOP responded-and stated that additional time was i, needed to respond on three bases, including ?the need for consultation . . . with another agency having a substantial interest in the determination of the request ,or among two or more components of the agency having substantial subject?matter interests therein.? 011 April. 22, 2015, BOP issued the denial that is appealed herein. The REQUEST seeks various BOP records related to DETENTION SITE COBALT, a Central Intelligence Agency detention facility that, according to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency?s Detention and InterrogationProgram, was inspected and assessed by BOP - personnel on or about November 2002, and was the subject of at. least one meeting between BOP and CIA personnel on or about December 2002. -The REQUEST de?nes DETENTION SITE COBALT as follows: As used herein, the term SITE means the detention facility identi?ed by the codename COBALT in the executive summary of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency?sDetention and Interrogation Program (relevant excerpts from which are attached as Exhibit A), regardless of whether BOP records refer to the facility by the codename COBALT or by some other name(s). For convenience of reference, this facility was located in Afghanistan, and news reports indicate that it was also named the ?Salt Pit.? I The RESPONSE stated that no responsive records were found. It did not assert any exemptions. It did not provide a Glamor response, see Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (DC Cir. 1976), nor did it provide notice that BOP may invoke 5 U.S.C. 552(c). I Accordingly, 17am appealing the RESPONSE on the grounds set forth herein. . AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION I. Search Was Inadequate In response to a request, BOP must make ?a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested.? Oglesb'y v. US. Dep 't of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The RESPONSE claims that no responsive records were found after searching the files of the Correctional Programs Division (CPD), Administrative Division (ADM), Of?ce of the General Counsel (OGC), and the InformatiOn, Policy, . Public Affairs Division (IPPA). The argument in this-sectiOn assumes the RESPONSE was truthful.l A. The'Search Did Not Cover is Suf?cient Number of BOP . Components - - The search described by BOP did not cover a suf?cient number of BOP components. The search did not include the ?les of the Director or Deputy Director, both of whose ?les could reasonably be expected to contain responsive records, given the national signi?cance and interagency nature of the DETENTION SITE COBALT inspection and meetings. The search also did not include the ?les of the National Institute of Corrections which provides training, technical assistance, information services and policy/program development assistance to other correctional agencies, and which I could reasonably be expected to have been consulted about or involved in discussions related to DETENTION SITE COBALT. B. It is Simply Not Plausihle that a Good-Faith Search Effort Would Have Failed to Find Any Responsive Records Given the nature of the request, the asserted failure of search to identify any responsive records is prima facie evidence that the search was not a good faith effort and/or did not use methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested. It is simply not plausible that no responsive records exist. DETENTION SITE COBALT, also known as the ?Salt Pit? (and possibly by other codenames unknown to the ACLU at this timez), was a CIA detention facility constructed in Afghanistan in 2002. The declassi?ed Executive Summary of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence?s Study of the Central Intelligence A gency?s Detention and Interrogation Program Report'?) states that ?in November 2002, a delegation of several of?cers from the Federal Bureau of Prisons conducted an assessment of DETENTION SITE SSCI, Report at 60. This assessment involved a multi-day inSpection 1 However, if BOP did ?nd some responsive recOrds but falsely stated that it found none, the ACLU nevertheless objects to the adeqUacy of the search. - 2 Because BOPr?documents may refer to DETENTION SITE COBALT by a di??erm codename(s), the REQUEST was careful to de?ne DETENTIONSITE COBALT as ?the detention facility identi?ed by the codename COBALT in the Report] . . . regardless of . whether BOP rec0rds refer to the facility by the codename COBALT, or by, some other . 3 Relevant excerpts of the SSCI Report were attached to the REQUEST as Exhibit A. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION of DETENTION SITE COBALT. 1d. BOP personnel then provided ?recommendations and twining? to CIA personnel. Id. The Report further states that on December 4, 2002, ?of?cers at CIA Headquarters met with individuals from the Federal Bureau of Prisons to learn more abOut their inspection of DETENTION SITE COBALT and their training of [redacted] security staff.? Id. CIA records cited in the SSCI Report, including a series of emails with the subject line ?Meeting with SO Federal Bureau of Prisons? describe what BOP officials said to CLA of?cials . during this meeting. Id. at 60 an. 299-301. In other words, BOP personnel traveled to a foreign country where the US. military . was actively ?ghting a war, conducted an assessment that included a multi-day inspection of a CIA detention facility in that country, provided recommendations and training to CIA personnel based on that assessment, and subsequently met with CIA personnel at CIA Headquarters to further discuss this' Inspection and the training of security staff. It" Is implausible that federal employees would travel to a war zone, inspect detention facilities, and meet With of?cials ?'om other agencies without generating some kind of paper trail. At the very least, this process involved internal planning by the BOP, interagency communications with the CLA, travel authorizations, travel arrangements, brie?ngs and debrie?ngs, inspection notes, assessment documents, and training documents. All such documents would be responsive to the REQUEST. [f BOP truly conducted ?a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested,? see Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68, then it would have been able to identify at least some responsive records. n. It BOP Actually Found Records and Seeks to Avoid Con?rming or Denying that Fact, it May Not Make a False Statement to the ACLU and Must Instead Use Alternatives Consistertt with FOIA. It is possible that BOP searched for and found responsive records, but seeks to avoid cOn?rrning or denying the existence of such documents. If so, BOP may not make a false representation to the ACLU that records do not exist, but must use alternatives that are consistent with FOIA, and that permit judicial review of claim. BOP has two such alternatives: it may assert a Glomar response in which it ?neither confirms nor denies? that responsive records exist, or (ii) if it determines that the ACLU Is seeking information excluded ??om FOIA under 5 U. C. 552(c), BOP should provide notice to the ACLU. 4The argument in this section assumes BOP seeks to avoid continuing or denying the existence of records and that It misrepresented the non?existence of records to the ACLU. It addresses the alternatives available to BOP and explains why one or the other must be invoked' In order for BOP to comply with FOIA, and further explains why, if invoked, neither alternative Is applicable. 4 An appropriate 5 U. S. C. 552(c) notice would read' sum and substance: interprets all or part of your request as a request for records 1Which, if they exist, would not be subject to the disclosure requirements of FOIA pursuant to section 552(c), and we therefore will nor process that portion of your request. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES FOUNDATION law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to . interfere with enforcement proceedings?). In this case, the requested records were not compiled for law enforcement purposes; they were compiled to assist the non-law-enforeement program of detention and interrogation for purported intelligence?gathering purposes. Even if they were at some point compiled for law enforcement purposes, disclosure of these records cannot reasonably be expected to interfere with any extant law enforcement proceedings. Section 552(c)(2) does not apply because the REQUEST does not seek records maintained under an inforrnant?s name or personal identi?er. Section 552(c)(3) does not apply because the REQUEST seeks records maintained solely by BOP, not the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Accordingly, BOP lacked any basis for invoking section 552(0) and must produce responsive documents. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the appeal should be granted. Thank you for your attention to this appeal. I look forward to receiving your response. Si 1y, Carl Takei Staff Attorney Exhibit #5 U.S. Department of Justice Of?ce of Information Policy Telephone: (202) 514?3642 Washington, D. C. 20530 July 15, 2015 Mr. Carl Takei ACLU National Prison Project 915 15th Street, NW 7th Floor Washington, DC 20005 ctakei@aclu.org Re: Request No. 2015-02312 Dear Mr. Takei: This is to advise you that your administrative appeal from the action of the Federal Bureau of Prisons was received by this Of?ce on June ll, 2015. The Of?ce of Information Policy has the responsibility of adjudicating such appeals. In an attempt to afford each appellant equal and impartial treatment, we have adopted a general practice of assigning appeals in the approximate order of receipt. Your appeal has been assigned number Please mention this number in any future correspondence to this Of?ce regarding this matter. Please note that if you provide an e-mail address or another electronic means of communication with your request or appeal, this Of?ce may respond to your appeal electronically even if you submitted your appeal to this Of?ce via regular U.S. Mail. We will notify you of the decision on your appeal as soon as we can. If you have any questions about the status of your appeal, you may contact me at the number above. If you have submitted your appeal through this Of?ce's online electronic appeal portal, you may also obtain an update on the status of your appeal by logging into your portal account. Sincerely, Priscilla Jones Supervisory Administrative Specialist Exhibit#6 U.S. Department of Justice Of?ce of Information Policy .2 Suite 11050 1425 New York Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0001 Telephone: (202) 514-3642 Mr. Carl Takei ACLU National Prison Project 915 '15th Street . 7th Floor . Re: Appeal No. 2015- 04543 Washington, DC 20005 Request No. 2015- 02312 ctakeigjlacluorg MWH: RRK VIA: E-Mail 7 Dear Mr. Takei: You appealed from the action of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) on your Freedom of Information Act request for access to records concerning a visit by BOP of?cials to a "Detention Site Cobalt" in November 2002. . After carefully considering your appeal, I am af?rrning BOP's action on your request. BOP informed you that it could locate no responsive records subject to the FOLA 1n its ?les. I have determined that BOP's action was correct and that it conducted an adequate, reasonable search for such records. BOP searched multiple divisions of it Central Of?ce, including the Correctional Programs DivisiOn, Administrative Division, Of?ce of the General Counsel, and information, Policy, Public Affairs Division.? Please be advised that this Of?ce's decision was made only after a ?ill review of this matter. Your appeal was assigned to an attorney with this Of?ce who thoroughly reviewed and analyzed your appeal, your underlying request, and the action of BOP 1n response to your request. If you are dissatis?ed with my action on your appeal, the FOIA permits you to ?le a lawsuit 1n federal district court in accordance with 5 U. S. C. For your information, the Of?ce of Government Information Services (OGIS) offers mediation services to resolve disputes between FOIA requesters and Federal agencies as a non? exclusive alternative to litigation. Using OGIS services does not affect your right to pursue litigation. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Of?ce of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, Room 2510, 8601 Adelphi Road, -2- College Park, Maryland 20740- 6001; e-mail at ogis@nara. gov; telephone at 202-741- 5770; toll free at l- 877? 684? 6448; or facsimile at 202- 741 -5769. . Sincerely, 9/10/2015 Matthew Hurd, Senior Attorney, for Sean O?Neill, Chief, Adm?nistrative Appeals Staff Signed by: Hurd, Matthew (DIP) 1 Exhibit #7 Feden? BLweau oflhisons 1i . I.) $70534 Kuss? 2016 Carl Takei Staff Attorney ACLU National Prison Project 915 15th Street, N.W. 7th Floor Washington, D.C. 20005 FOIA Request number 2015?02312 Dear Mr. Takei: This is a supplemental response to the above referenced Freedom of Information Act request that you submitted on January 13, 2015 and in which you requested the following: (1) Any and all communications relating to Detention Site Cobalt between the Bureau of Prisons and any other Federal agency or agencies from January 1, 2002 to January 1, 2005; (2) Any and all communications relating to Detention Site Cobalt between BOP personnel from January 1, 2002 to January 1, 2005; (3) Any and all documents identifying BOP personnel who visited Detention Site Cobalt on or about November 2002; (4) Any and all documents relating to any and all visits, meetings, inspections, assessments, recommendations, or training conducted by BOP personnel relating to Detention Site Cobalt on or about November 2002; (5) Any and all documents relating to any and all briefings or meeting between BOP and Central Intelligence personnel relating to Detention Site Cobalt on or about December 2002; and (6) Any and all documents relating to the death of a detainee at Detention Site Cobalt on or about November 2002. 2016, utilizing search parameters articulated in FOIA Request 2015?02312, including, but not limited to, and ?Afghanistan,? for records responsive to your request in the following components of BOP: the Intelligence and Counter Terrorism Branch, Correctional Programs Division; the National Institute of Corrections; the Correctional Programs Division; the Finance Section of the Administrative Division; the Information, Policy and Public Affairs Division, including the Office of Security Technology of that Division; and the Office of the BOP Director. Accordingly, we are-hereby releasing ll pages of records. Out of an abundance of caution, some pages are included that may not be strictly responsive. Ten pages contain redactions of information protected by exemptions b(l) and b(3) of the FOIA, including information that is classified in context, and by exemption b(6) of the FOIA, which permits the redaction of information that would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion 'of the personal privacy of third_parties. Some exemptions are Iapplied at the request of another agency. Finally, two pages of records in the form of e-mail communications have been withheld in their entirety as a result of the application of the aforementioned exemptions b(l) and b(3) of the FOIA. As this matter is already in litigation, I have opted not to include in this correspondence the normal administrative appeal rights that are typically contained in similar correspondence. Having said that, I would respectfully invite you to contact litigation counSel if yOu have any concerns or questions regarding the matters released or referred to in this missive. Sincerely, Ronald L. Rodgers Senior Counsel Information and Remedies Processing Branch Office of General Counsel Federal Bureau of Prisons Attachments Exhibit#8 . BOP [0 30900513er 016 9115057241", I . . CTS 03mm. .. Stamng EndIng El DOJControi While HOUSE 1Dams .- - i . I .1..1. SSUS ..: a Le'te' Fran .. 4-: Dams Lual-Pldo - I ti. Issue i i OnBehalICl! .1 . .. . .. Sale Due ?1 i5 .-.. . ISSUE 2 T-"inglo. 7 5,30ate Entered i. Law-me V5: 1:}Daie Closed - 3 . 1 .. --. LetterTo Abstract. E'Mfr?: 43'? hearth Useric . 1 m_ . Soc-c Ial Inst .. .w 53' ?or Returned Records 5 . I .1 iCircka row beimuto oven the ccrremcndence 'it?Page? I of1 CTS LauerDaze Response Date Send-3r Type lane Relate nced Corresponde no: i CTSOO11259 1r?18f199-l Abdul Raine: Ghnfomzai Foreign In rri Pardon 3 3 Nghanisan Consulate Country f? crasocrsa 10 29.12053 1111212003 Debra om Information I LTl?Siilii'i?TSS 31532004 326'20 0-?l Connie Patrick Federal lrII'crrnaliaI-I Got. 3' ?g M?ff-Jue-_ A. a? . (5. . ?Ii: ?Mu ?7.qu $1 mittCT50011259 request for status report on previous correspondence sent to the Pardon Attorney seeking a release of an Inmate to his home In Afghanistan. . CT5606764 request from the Director of Human Resources, for information on employees serving in the Reserves of the U. S. Armed Forces In iraq and Afghanistan. request to provide information on FLETC graduates who died in the line of duty in CY 03. CT5611445- The inspector General requests copies of any and all documents created after September 11,2001 relating to FBI observations ofor concerns about treatment or interrogation of detainees or any individual detainee, held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; iraq; Afghanistan; or any other venue controlled by the S. military. Closed 6/24/05 Negative response per Correctional Programs Division. Exhibit #9 Page 1 0f 1 Ronald Rodgers - Netmail Archive Status From: BOP?IPP/Computer Network Support~ To: Central Office Staff - No UNICOR Date: 10/13/2016 2:48 PM Subject: Netmail Archive Status The Netmail Archive System is now accessible. The initial process to re?associate the archived messages to individual mailboxes has completed. Please be aware that this initial re?indexing does not guarantee that 100% of the archived eV-mail is yet accessible. Some items and messages may not be visible due to indexing errors. To redress this risk, we will be performing additional re-indexing of any accounts associated with active and pending litigation (e-Discovery) or investigations. If you have searched your archive and believe that you have an email item which is critical and is required immediately to respond to an external query but it is not being displayed, please submit a help desk ticket to request that your email account be re?indexed. Please explain the reason and providejustification as to the criticality so that we can prioritize tasks accordingly. Priority has been and will be given to Executive staff and any pending litigation/investigation requests. The Network Management Branch wants to thank you for your patience and understanding while we continue in this effort. We will continue to analyze opportunities to optimize and speed up this secondary re- indexing effort enterprise- w?ide. 10/20/2016 Exhibit #10 Re: Question From (6) To' Charles Samuel-.? Dnte 201 ?03/31 18:04. Subject: Re: Question Charles, sometime in 2002, 1 went to Gitmo and (1). to conduct training for DOD personnel. My training consisted of basic correctional techniques, correctional duties, abnormal inmate behavior etc. Mr (6) assigned me this task. When I-got back from Gitmo had to do. an ACA presentation on Gilmo and a article was written on it. The training was top secret and we had to sign a secrecy agreement. We were not even allowed to speak with our'supcrv?isor about what was going on. did mention to the DOD personnel that they lack of between the guards and inmates may result in some unrest detainees. Charles Samuels. 3/3 1/2011 5 :07:19_? PM - Please answer the question below I. just received. I don?t recall any training being provided. The Director thinks that we?ve provided some form of training "on suicide prevention and forced feeding. The Director also. believes there were articles on the training but is not sure. - "To what extent if at ?all has the Bureau or any other nommilitar-y federal agency been involved in training Gitmo?based? military staff in the management of inmates and prison operations, etc.?" ., Charles E. 'Samuels, Jr. Assistant Director Federal Bureau of. Prisons Correctional Programs Division 3?20 First Street, NW Washington, DC 20534 OfficePhone: (5) 'Re: Question Front (6) To (bl (6) Date 18:11 Subject: Re: Question No (5) 1 3/31/2011 6:09:43 PM (W16) Did you provide any training on Suicide or three feeding? 3/31/2011 6:04:23 PM Charles, sometime in 2002, I .went to Gitmo and- to conduct training for DOD personnel. My training consisted of basic coirectional techniques, correctional duties, abnormal inmate behav or etc b) (6) assigned me this taslc When I got back from Gitmo I had to do an ACA presentation on Gitmo and a article was written on it. The ?.training was top secret-and we had to Sign a secrecy agreement. We were not even allowed to speak with our 311pervisor about what was going on- We did mention to the DOD perSonnel that they lack of communication between the guaids and inmates may result 111. some unrest amongst the . . detainees. Charles Samuels 3/31/201 1 5:07: 19 PM - Please answer the question below Ijust received I don't recall any training being provided. The Director thinks that we?ve provided some fonn of training on suicide prevention and 1?01 ced feeding. The Director also believes their: Were newspaper articles on the training, but 15 not sure. .. "To what extent if at 1111 has the Bureau or any other non-military federal agency been involved 111 training Gitmo- based military staff in the management of inmates and pri'sc'm Operations, etc. Charles E. Samuels, Jr. Assistant Director Federal Bureau of Prisons Cmrectio?nal Programs Division 320 First Sheet; NW Washington DC 20534 Of?ce Phone: (6) Re: Question FrOm (6) To Charles Samuels Date 2011/03/31 18:24 Subject: Re: Question Charles is) also went after I did and provided training in (1). Charles Samuels 3/31/7011 5:07: 19 PM Please answer the question belOw I just received I don't recall any training being provided The Director thinks that we 've provided some for or" training on suicide prevention and forced feeding. The Director also believes there were neWSpaper articles on the training, but is not sure. "To What extent if at all has the Bureau or any other non-military federal agency been involved in training Gitmo-based military staff in the management of inmates and prison operations, ctc.. 9" Charles E. Samuels, Jr. Assistant Director Federal Bureau of Prisons Correctional Programs Division 320 First Street, NW Washington, DC. 20534 Office Phone; lb) about? 15' it the one from . A . (bus) 2011707/30 08:06 Attachmonts: Mime.822 Ho 3 this ?nds?you doing well. Congratulations on your selection as Ch) 7. I understand you have an old case involving me you wouldlike, to talk to me (hm) (bl From To Date 2011/07/30 12: 33 "Subject: (bll Well give me a number! can call at 7/30/2011 10: 51 :00 AM I thought so, I 1ead'1n the paper they were investigating it I live 1r_(f Moved here last year to be closer to my kids ando grandkids. I am good, enjoying retirement. Not working, no future in it. Keep in touch! Sent from my iPad On Jul 30. 20! l, at 8:16, lb) wrote: Yes it goes back to the last time we were interviewed in 2003 they wantsome followup questions FBI7/30/2111 1 3:05:17 AM Hepe this ?nds you doing well Congratulations on your selectibn as( (6) I understand you have an old case involving me you wouldlike to talk to me about? Is it the one from (1) ?3 I see . (T), . From ., To {pl-(16) Date 2011/07/30 10:51 Subject: (bill), I Attachments: Mimet822 [thought so, I read in the paper they were investigating it. I live mu?) Moved here last year to be closer to my kids and grandkids. I am good, enjoying retirement. Not working, no future in. it. Keep in touch! (5) Sent from my iPad wrote 2 OnIu130, 20.11, at8:16, - Yes it goes back to the last time we were interviewed in 2003 they want some follow up questions FBI. How u? in 1 3:05:17 AM Hope this ?nds you doing well. Congratulations on your selection as @3515} I understand you have an .old case involving me you wouldlike to talk to me, about? Is itthc one from lb) see 5) (H.119) A From To (5-) 7 Date 201 1/08/08 09:14 Subject: (1)457) Attachments: Here it is. 7/30/2011 8:05:17 AM Hope this ?nds you doing well. Congratulations on your selection as (36). I understand you have an old case involving me you wouldlike to- talk to me about? Is it the one from I see (.31 From To (1311.?) 7_ Date 2011/10/13 15:52 Subject: (131(1), (3) Yes. 10/18/2011. 3:23:01 PM Do you have to go to' DC for this? Sent from my iPad 131(3). From To (6?3 Date 2011/10/18 20230 Subject: (2b) 0 3., (3) I tried that it did not work 10/18/2011 7:55:36 PM am trying to go in December. Sent from my iPad On Odt [8,2011, at 19:07, wrote: When going? . 10/18/2011 3:23:01' PM Do you have to go to DC for this? Sent from my iP ad . This message is intendgd for of?cial use and may contain SENSITIVE in?ammation. if this message. contains SENSITIVE information, it should be properly delivered, labeled, stored, and disposed of according to policy.? .:Re Did US prison o?icials visit a secret CIA pxison inAfghanistan?- CBS News From (6) To (b.1151 Date 2015/06/19 15: 31 Re: Did US prison officials 111311 a secret CIA prison inAfghanistan?~ . abject: C138 News - Attachments: Theyjust won't let it go Sent from my Blackqury 10 smartphone on-?chra11131131111T Wireless-AG LTE network. Sent' r1 :1 June 1' 12015 2:22 PM To: Sumac-c: Fw: 01121 US prison of?cials visit a _secret CIA prifson 1n Afghanistan??CBS News FYI Sent from my BlackBerry to smartphone on the Verizon Wireless 46 network From: (@132 Subject. Did US prisqn of?cia 5 visit a secret CIA prisqn ir__1 Afghanistan? -CBS News 1111 rison?ihmeanistam? Sent from my Blackaerry 10 smartphone on the Verizon Wireless 46 LTE network.