Case 2:14-cv-08699-TJH-FFM Document 150 Filed 11/01/16 Page 1 of 14 Page ID #:3940 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 United States District Court Central District of California Western Division 8 9 10 11 12 WAVERLY SCOTT KAFFAGA, etc., 13 14 15 16 Plaintiff, v. THOMAS STEINBECK, et al., CV 14-8699 TJH (FFMx) Order [100, 119, 120] Defendants. 17 18 19 20 21 The Court has considered Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, together with the moving and opposing papers. 22 Plaintiff Waverly Scott Kaffaga, as executor of the estate of Elaine Anderson 23 Steinbeck [“the Estate”], filed this action against Defendants Thomas Steinbeck 24 [“Thom”], Gail Knight Steinbeck [“Gail”] and the Palladin Group Inc. [“Palladin”] 25 [collectively “TGP”], following a number of alleged improper communications by TGP 26 to third parties. The Estate asserted four claims: (1) breach of contract; (2) slander of 27 title; (3) intentional interferences with prospective economic benefit; and (4) declaratory 28 judgment. The Estate, now, moves for summary judgment as to liability on its claims. Order – Page 1 of 14 Case 2:14-cv-08699-TJH-FFM Document 150 Filed 11/01/16 Page 2 of 14 Page ID #:3941 1 2 3 BACKGROUND This case adds a new chapter to the Parties’ sprawling litigation history, which this Court previously characterized as litigation ad nauseam. 4 John Steinbeck’s works [the “Works”] can be divided into two categories — the 5 “Early Works” and the “Later Works” — based on whether a work’s copyright was 6 renewed before or after John Steinbeck died. Upon John Steinbeck’s death, his third 7 wife, Elaine Steinbeck [“Elaine”], inherited absolute control over the Early Works. See 8 Steinbeck v. McIntosh & Otis, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 395, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 9 [“McIntosh & Otis I”]. 10 The Later Works were a different story. In 1976, pursuant to an amendment of 11 the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 304(c), Thom (as well as his late brother, John 12 Steinbeck IV [“John IV”]) gained termination rights — in essence, the limited right to 13 cancel certain grants of copyrights — with respect to the Later Works. Steinbeck v. 14 McIntosh & Otis, Inc., 2009 WL 928189, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) [“McIntosh 15 & Otis III”]. Thom did not gain termination rights, or any other intellectual property 16 rights, with respect to the Early Works. McIntosh & Otis III, No. 04 CV 5497 (GBD), 17 2009 WL 928189, at *3. 18 Pursuant to an agreement entered into in the 1970s, Thom received twenty-five 19 percent of the royalties generated from the Later Works, Elaine received fifty percent, 20 and John IV received the remaining twenty-five percent. In 1983, Thom and Elaine 21 entered into an agreement [the “1983 Agreement”] by which Thom “ced[ed] control 22 over [his] copyright interests to Elaine Steinbeck” and, in exchange, “Elaine Steinbeck 23 relinquished her . . . right to a one-half share [of royalties] by agreeing to an equal 24 one-third split.” McIntosh & Otis III, 2009 WL 928189, at *3. The 1983 Agreement 25 “conferred upon Elaine Steinbeck ‘the complete power and authority to negotiate, 26 authorize and take action with respect to the exploitation and/or termination of rights 27 in the works of John Steinbeck in which . . . [Thom] ha[s] or will have renewal or 28 termination rights.’” Steinbeck v. Steinbeck Heritage Found., 400 F. App’x 572, 575 Order – Page 2 of 14 Case 2:14-cv-08699-TJH-FFM Document 150 Filed 11/01/16 Page 3 of 14 Page ID #:3942 1 (2d Cir. 2010). 2 In 1998, Congress amended the Copyright Act to create, under 17 U.S.C. § 3 304(d), a new right to terminate copyright grants during a five-year window that opens 4 seventy-five years after the first publication of a copyrighted work. Following Elaine’s 5 death in 2003, the ownership of intellectual property rights — including termination 6 rights under § 304(d) — of certain Works was vigorously litigated in federal courts in 7 New York. 8 9 In 2008, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether Thom had the authority to issue termination notices under § 304(d) with respect to certain Works. 10 Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2008) The suit arose 11 from the issuance of a termination notice under § 304(d) by Thom and John Steinbeck’s 12 granddaughter. Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc., 537 F.3d at 196–97. The Second Circuit 13 considered, inter alia, whether Thom had the authority to issue a termination notice 14 under § 304(d) in light of a 1994 agreement that Elaine entered into with a publishing 15 company relating to certain Works. Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc., 537 F.3d at 196. The 16 Second Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause the termination right provided by section 17 304(d) pursuant to which the . . . termination notice was issued applies only to pre-1978 18 grants of transfers or licenses of [a] copyright, and because the 1994 agreement left 19 intact no pre-1978 grant for the works in question . . . the . . . notice of termination 20 [was] ineffective.” Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc., 537 F.3d at 196. 21 On remand, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 22 York addressed the scope of the 1983 Agreement with respect to certain Works, as well 23 as with respect to Elaine’s authority to terminate the publishing company that the 1983 24 Agreement appointed as literary agent. McIntosh & Otis III, 2009 WL 928189; 25 Steinbeck v. McIntosh & Otis, Inc., No. 04 CV 5497 (GBD), 2009 WL 928171 26 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) [“McIntosh & Otis II”]. The McIntosh & Otis III District 27 Court found that “[t]he 1983 Agreement gave Elaine . . . the sole authority to control 28 the Steinbeck Works” at issue in that case. 2009 WL 928189, at *8. In McIntosh & Order – Page 3 of 14 Case 2:14-cv-08699-TJH-FFM Document 150 Filed 11/01/16 Page 4 of 14 Page ID #:3943 1 Otis II, held that, under the 1983 Agreement, Elaine could terminate the publishing 2 company in her sole discretion. 2009 WL 928171, at *3. In a consolidated appeal, the 3 Second Circuit affirmed McIntosh & Otis II and III. In doing so, the Second Circuit 4 held that Thom “surrendered ‘complete authority’ to Elaine Steinbeck to exploit John 5 Steinbeck’s copyrights at issue and also vested her with ‘sole discretion’ to terminate” 6 McIntosh & Otis’s [“M&O”] agency. Steinbeck Heritage Found., 400 F. App’x at 7 576. 8 The action before this Court centers on communications the Estate alleges Thom, 9 Gail, and Palladin made to third parties regarding certain Works between 2011 and 10 2014. First, the Estate claims that a film studio, Universal/Imagine [“Universal”], 11 terminated a film deal for East of Eden following communications by Gail to third 12 parties, including executives at the film studio. In September, 2013, the Estate, through 13 its publishing company, M&O, and its subsidiary, RWSG Literary Agency [“RWSG”], 14 accepted a financial offer from Universal for the film rights to East of Eden. 15 Subsequently, Gail, after learning of the deal, allegedly contacted one of the producers 16 and threatened to terminate the assigned rights to East of Eden, and claimed, elsewhere, 17 that Thom owned certain intellectual property rights, including those to East of Eden. 18 The Estate claims that in November, 2014, Universal “decided to back away from its 19 negotiations with M&O and the Estate for a film version of East of Eden.” 20 Second, the Estate claims that communications by TGP to third parties, including 21 Dream Works Pictures [“Dream Works”] — and the resulting deal between TGP and 22 Dream Works — diminished the amount of money the Estate ultimately received in a 23 film deal relating to The Grapes of Wrath. In June, 2013, through M&O and RWSG, 24 the Estate entered into negotiations with Dream Works for a film adaptation of The 25 Grapes of Wrath. Dream Works made the Estate an initial offer in July, 2013, and the 26 deal was executed in February, 2015. The Estate alleges that “starting as early as July, 27 2013, Defendants began to interfere with the Estate’s negotiations with Dream Works 28 and ultimately entered into their own confidential ‘side deal’ with Dream Works.” The Order – Page 4 of 14 Case 2:14-cv-08699-TJH-FFM Document 150 Filed 11/01/16 Page 5 of 14 Page ID #:3944 1 Estate claims that the “side deal” “likely detracted from the amount that Dream Works 2 was willing to pay the Estate . . . for the underlying rights since film studios typically 3 have a specific overall budget for a project and any amount dedicated to paying off 4 Defendants would need to come from” the amount earmarked for the Estate. 5 Lastly, the Estate claims that TGP made a number of communications to third 6 parties asserting ownership of intellectual property rights to certain Works. These 7 communications fall into two categories. The first category of communications were 8 communications included in, or relating to, a petition Gail filed with the California State 9 Labor Commissioner alleging that some of RWSG’s agents had operated without a 10 license [the “RWSG petition-related communications”]. Specifically, these were: 11 East of Eden: 12 • Gail Steinbeck filed a Petition against RWSG with the California State 13 Labor Commissioner [the “RWSG Petition”] alleging that RWSG’s agents 14 had been operating without a license and that Thom “owns or controls” 15 two thirds of the domestic rights to East of Eden. 16 17 Grapes of Wrath: • The RWSG petition, also, referenced Thom’s alleged ownership of 18 intellectual property rights stating, “Thom[] either owns or controls 2/3's 19 of the domestic intellectual property rights [to The Grapes of Wrath].” 20 The second category of communications were communications that were neither 21 included in the RWSG petition nor communicated in relation to the RWSG petition [the 22 “non-RWSG petition-related communications”]. Specifically, these were: 23 East of Eden: 24 • In September, 2013, Gail allegedly told a third party that M&O did not 25 represent her and Thom “on a copyright termination because it creates a 26 brand new set of rights,” and said that someone needed to call her in 27 relation to “who is out there marketing [the ‘brand new set of rights’] 28 . . because somebody could get in trouble and [she and Thom] don’t want . Order – Page 5 of 14 Case 2:14-cv-08699-TJH-FFM Document 150 Filed 11/01/16 Page 6 of 14 Page ID #:3945 that to happen.” 1 2 3 Grapes of Wrath: • On October 2, 2013, Gail allegedly emailed the Executive Vice President 4 of Business Affairs at DreamWorks saying “you should read this 5 attachment very carefully before you decide to make a deal with the Scott 6 family alone. . . . As I stated in our last conversation, the two/thirds 7 owners of the copyright formed by this first termination notice want to 8 make a deal with you. The Steinbeck family goal is to give you the chain 9 of title you need.” 10 11 The Pearl: • In an April, 2013 e-mail, Gail allegedly listed Thom’s adaptation of The 12 Pearl as one of a “few current projects for which we control the 13 underlying rights.” 14 • In January, 2014, Gail received notice from a third party that an executive 15 in Business Affairs at Disney had indicated that Disney was open to 16 negotiations regarding The Pearl, to which Gail responded “[w]e can look 17 to fund independently and maybe do a distribution deal with Disney. 18 19 The Long Valley: • Thom recorded an audio version of The Long Valley, which Palladin 20 offered for sale on, inter alia, amazon.com. Gail had allegedly told 21 publishers that Thom “own[s] the rights to the copyright of that particular 22 CD.” 23 • In September, 2011, Gail allegedly asserted to someone associated with a 24 database for film and television rights that Palladin represented the “film 25 and/or stage rights” to the short stories in The Long Valley including 26 Flight. 27 28 • In December, 2012, Gail allegedly wrote and signed a letter that served as “an informal statement of a non-exclusive, one-time Grant of Rights to the Order – Page 6 of 14 Case 2:14-cv-08699-TJH-FFM Document 150 Filed 11/01/16 Page 7 of 14 Page ID #:3946 1 Underlying Literary Property ‘Flight.’” The letter purported to “grant said 2 rights . . . to Summer-Joy ‘SJ’ Main to adapt the story entitled ‘Flight’ 3 onto a short film[.]” 4 The Log from the Sea of Cortez: 5 • In November, 2010, Gail told a producer interested in the film rights to 6 The Log from the Sea of Cortez that “any attempts to move forward with 7 a project without Thomas Steinbeck’s permission could place the project 8 in jeopardy.” 9 10 Cannery Row: • In October, 2013, Thom allegedly granted an author permission to use a 11 passage from Cannery Row in a book and added, “[s]hould you need any 12 more legal proof than [this e-mail], please send it along. I would be happy 13 to sign off on whatever you need.” 14 15 The Later Works: • In June, 2013, Gail allegedly informed a journalist that “Thom still owns 16 rights in what are termed the Later Works. . . . Thom still owns the 17 copyrights. . . .” 18 DISCUSSION 19 To prevail on summary judgment, the Estate, as the party with the burden of 20 proof at trial, has the initial burden to establish the essential elements of each of its 21 claims. See S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003). 22 All inferences will be viewed in the light most favorable to TGP. See United States v. 23 Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). If the Estate meets its burden, then the 24 burden shifts to TGP to show that a triable issue regarding a material fact exists. See 25 Gasaway v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir.1994). TGP 26 may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of their pleadings. See Gasaway, 26 27 F.3d at 960. 28 “[F]ederal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal Order – Page 7 of 14 Case 2:14-cv-08699-TJH-FFM Document 150 Filed 11/01/16 Page 8 of 14 Page ID #:3947 1 procedural law.” Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1090 (9th 2 Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the contract underlying the Estate’s 3 breach of contract claim has been interpreted under New York law by the Southern 4 District of New York and the Second Circuit. Accordingly, this Court will apply New 5 York law to the breach of contract claim. The remaining state law tort claims, bearing 6 no clear connection to New York, will be construed under California law. 7 Breach of Contract 8 A claim for breach of contract, under New York law, requires a plaintiff to 9 establish that: (1) a contract between the parties exists, (2) plaintiff performed its 10 obligations under the contract, (3) defendant breached the contract, and (4) damages 11 were caused by the breach. Diesel Props S.r.l. v. Greystone Bus. Credit II LLC, 631 12 F.3d 42, 52 (2d Cir.2011). Further, the “strict enforcement [of settlement agreements] 13 not only serves the interest of efficient dispute resolution but is also essential to the 14 management of court calendars and integrity of the litigation process.” Hallock v. 15 State, 474 N.E.2d 1178 (1984). 16 Here, the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit have recognized 17 that the 1983 Agreement is a valid, binding settlement agreement. See, e.g., Steinbeck 18 Heritage Found., 400 F. App’x at 575. The 1983Agreement provided Elaine — and 19 now provides the Estate — with the “complete power and authority to negotiate, 20 authorize and take action with respect to the exploitation and/or termination of rights 21 in the works of John Steinbeck. . . .” Steinbeck Heritage Found., 400 F. App’x at 575. 22 The Estate has, also, shown that it has met its obligations under the contract. It is clear 23 that Thom had been receiving the benefit of the 1983 Agreement. See McIntosh & Otis 24 II, 2009 WL 928171, at *3. 25 Some of TGP’s communications to third parties in which TGP claimed ownership 26 of intellectual property rights to the Works or sought to exploit the Works constituted 27 breaches of the 1983 Agreement because Thom ceded to the Estate “complete power 28 and authority to negotiate, authorize and take action with respect to the exploitation Order – Page 8 of 14 Case 2:14-cv-08699-TJH-FFM Document 150 Filed 11/01/16 Page 9 of 14 Page ID #:3948 1 and/or termination of rights in the works of John Steinbeck. . . .” Steinbeck Heritage 2 Found., 400 F. App’x at 575. Both the RWSG petition-related communications and the 3 non-RWSG petition-related communications breached the 1983 Agreement because 4 those communications either claimed ownership of copyrights in the Works, sought to 5 exploit the Works, or both, in contravention of the 1983 Agreement. 6 Those breaches caused damages. “Causation is an essential element of damages 7 in a breach of contract action; and, as in tort, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant’s 8 breach directly and proximately caused his or her damages.” Nat’l Mkt. Share, Inc. v. 9 Sterling Nat. Bank, 392 F.3d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). The 10 declaration of expert Kathryn Arnold sufficiently establishes a prima facie case that 11 TGP’s communications, identified above, to third parties “have harmed and continue 12 to harm the value of the entire catalogue of Steinbeck Works[.]” 13 TGP did not raise a triable issue of fact by directing the Court’s attention to 14 Defendants’ Exhibit X — which appears to be a series of website screen-shots from an 15 intellectual property rights database — as it is not relevant. Nor was a triable issue of 16 fact raised by TGP’s apparent reference to Defendant’s Exhibit W. In TGP’s counter 17 statement of facts, TGP indicated that Exhibit W, a spreadsheet, showed that “[t]he 18 income has remained relatively static since 2005 [through 2015].” Arguments are not 19 a substitute for evidence. See Gasaway, 26 F.3d at 960. Thus, TGP’s argument, 20 alone, does not raise a triable issue of fact. TGP failed to explain with specificity how 21 Exhibit W contradicted Ms. Arnold’s declaration. TGP ,thus, failed to raise a triable 22 issue of fact as the Court “need not paw over the files without assistance from the 23 parties.” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 775 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal 24 quotations and citations omitted). 25 TGP, also, contended that the doctrine of unclean hands bars relief for breach of 26 contract. This argument is inapposite, however, as the doctrine does not prevent relief 27 for breach of contract claims as it is “unavailable in an action exclusively for 28 damages[.]” Manshion Joho Ctr. Co. v. Manshion Joho Ctr., Inc., 806 N.Y.S. 2d 480, Order – Page 9 of 14 Case 2:14-cv-08699-TJH-FFM Document 150 Filed 11/01/16 Page 10 of 14 Page ID #:3949 1 481 (App. Div. 2005). Accordingly, the Estate is entitled to summary judgment as to 2 its breach of contract claim. 3 Slander of Title 4 To prevail on a slander of title claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a publication, 5 (2) without privilege or justification, (3) falsity, and (4) direct pecuniary loss.” Sumner 6 Hill Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC, 205 Cal. App. 4th 999, 1030 7 (2012). The Estate provided evidence that “Defendants have repeatedly” and falsely 8 “asserted throughout the industry and the media that they have an interest in and/or 9 control over the . . . Works which entitles them to a role in Steinbeck-related 10 negotiations.” The RWSG petition-related communications and the non-RWSG 11 petition-related communications satisfy the first element, publication, because “[t]he 12 falsehood must be communicated to a third person.” See Boys Town, U.S.A., Inc. v. 13 World Church, 349 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1965). 14 However, only some of the communications were made “without privilege or 15 justification.” See Sumner Hill Homeowners’ Ass’n, 205 Cal. App. 4th at 1030. 16 Although no privilege issue had been raised by the Parties, the RWSG petition-related 17 communications may be shielded by California’s litigation privilege because they were 18 made in a “quasi-judicial” proceeding. Ascherman v. Natanson, 23 Cal. App. 3d 861, 19 865 (1972). Quasi-judicial proceedings include proceedings before administrative 20 boards. Ascherman, 23 Cal. App. 3d at 865. Thus, the RWSG petition-related 21 communications, having been made before an administrative board, are immunized 22 from tort liability. The non-RWSG petition-related communications, on the other hand, 23 do not benefit from such immunity. 24 The non-RWSG petition-related communications were made without privilege as 25 they were not communicated in, or bear any relation to, a judicial or quasi-judicial 26 proceeding. Nor are TGP’s justifications for these communications availing. TPG did 27 not dispute that Gail sent the e-mail asserting ownership of the “underlying right[s]” to 28 The Pearl screenplay, nor did TPG dispute that the claim was false. With respect to Order – Page 10 of 14 Case 2:14-cv-08699-TJH-FFM Document 150 Filed 11/01/16 Page 11 of 14 Page ID #:3950 1 the e-mail claiming that Thom “own[s] the rights to the copyright to [The Long Valley 2 audio] CD,” TGP argued that “Thom owns the copyright to his performance under 17 3 U.S.C. § 106 of the Copyright Act.” He does not. The Second Circuit held that the 4 1983 Agreement vested Elaine — and, accordingly, the Estate — with “the complete 5 power and authority to negotiate, authorize and take action with respect to the 6 exploitation and/or termination of rights in” the Works including The Long Valley. 7 Steinbeck Heritage Found., 400 F. App’x at 575. Consequently, the Estate has 8 established the second and third elements of the slander of title claim with respect to the 9 non-RWSG petition-related communications. 10 Lastly, the Estate has established the last element — direct pecuniary loss — with 11 respect to the non-RWSG petition-related communications. “Direct pecuniary loss” is 12 restricted to: “(a) the pecuniary loss that results directly and immediately from the effect 13 of the conduct of third persons, including impairment of vendibility or value caused by 14 disparagement,” and “(b) the expense of measures reasonably necessary to counteract 15 the publication, including litigation to remove the doubt cast upon vendibility or value 16 by disparagement.” Appel v. Burman, 159 Cal. App. 3d 1209, 1215 (1984). Here, the 17 Estate has presented an expert’s declaration — the veracity of which TGP does not 18 dispute — that TGP’s communications caused harm to the Works as a whole. 19 Accordingly, the Estate has established a prima facie case as to the slander of title 20 claim with respect to the non-RWSG petition-related communications. Because TGP 21 has not raised a triable issue of fact, the Estate is entitled to summary judgment on the 22 slander of title claim with respect to the non-RWSG petition-related communications. 23 Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage 24 The Estate argued that TGP tortiously interfered with the East of Eden 25 negotiations and The Grapes of Wrath negotiations. The Estate, however, did not 26 present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for either argument. 27 As to the interference claim with respect to the East of Eden negotiations, the 28 Estate failed to present admissible evidence that an “actual disruption” in the Order – Page 11 of 14 Case 2:14-cv-08699-TJH-FFM Document 150 Filed 11/01/16 Page 12 of 14 Page ID #:3951 1 relationship between the Estate and Universal occurred. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed 2 Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 950 (Cal. 2003). The Estate relied on two documents in 3 support of its claim that Universal “decided to back away from its negotiations with . 4 . . the Estate for a film version of East of Eden.” The first was an e-mail from 5 Elizabeth Rubinstein, the president and managing agent of M&O, to Elizabeth 6 Kohlmann, an attorney for the Estate, indicating that the East of Eden film deal 7 negotiations had been terminated. The email’s content, however, is inadmissable 8 hearsay and, thus, cannot be used to demonstrate that the East of Eden deal was 9 terminated; “hearsay evidence . . . may not be considered” at summary judgment. See 10 Blair Foods, Inc. v. Ranchers Cotton Oil, 610 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1980). 11 The second document was an e-mail from Ms. Kohlmann to, what appears to be, 12 colleagues at Jenner & Block LLP in which Ms. Kohlmann forwards a Daily Journal 13 article reporting on two matters before this Court. The e-mail did not refer to the East 14 of Eden negotiations, nor was there any mention of Universal’s decision to terminate 15 the deal. The only hint the Estate provided the Court as to the e-mail’s relevance was 16 a highlighted portion in which Ms. Kohlmann declined to comment on the matters 17 reported by the Daily Journal. As this e-mail did not have “any tendency to make [the 18 termination of the East of Eden deal] more or less probable than it would be without the 19 evidence,” it was not relevant. See Fed. R. Evid. 401(a). 20 As to the interference claim with respect to the Grapes of Wrath negotiations, the 21 Estate’s claim failed to present evidence “that it is reasonably probable that the lost 22 economic advantage would have been realized but for the defendant’s interference.” 23 See Kasparian v. Cnty. of L.A., 38 Cal. App. 4th 242, 271 (1995) (emphasis in 24 original, quotations omitted). 25 “reasonably probable.” See Beckwith v. Dahl, 205 Cal. App. 4th 1039, 1055 (2012). 26 The Estate asserted that it was harmed by a “side deal” reached by TGP and 27 DreamWorks relating to the Grapes of Wrath film deal. The Estate asserted that the 28 side deal “likely detracted from the amount that DreamWorks was willing to pay the Claims that are “inherently speculative” are not Order – Page 12 of 14 Case 2:14-cv-08699-TJH-FFM Document 150 Filed 11/01/16 Page 13 of 14 Page ID #:3952 1 Estate . . . since film studios typically have a specific overall budget for a project and 2 any amount dedicated to paying off Defendants would need to come from the budget for 3 acquiring the underlying rights from the Estate.” 4 insufficient to establish a prima facie case that there was a reasonable probability of the 5 lost economic advantage. Basing the claim on how “film studios typically” manage 6 budgets is “inherently speculative” as it entirely hinges on the speculation that 7 DreamWorks budgeted the Grapes of Wrath deal in the same way that “film studios 8 typically” manage budgets. See Beckwith, 205 Cal. App. 4th at 1055 . 9 (Emphasis added). This is Accordingly, the Estate is not entitled to summary judgment for its intentional 10 interference with prospective economic advantage claim. 11 Declaratory Judgment 12 Declaratory relief is discretionary. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 13 491, 494 (1942). It “is appropriate (1) when the judgment will serve a useful purpose 14 in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue, and (2) when it will terminate and 15 afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the 16 proceeding.” Eureka Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 873 17 F.2d 229, 231 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotations omitted). 18 The Estate seeks a declaration from this Court that “the decisions issued by the 19 Southern District and the Second Circuit interpreting the 1983 Agreement bar any claim 20 that TGP might assert with respect to (1) control over the exploitation of the Steinbeck 21 Works and (2) ownership of the copyrights in the Early Steinbeck Works.” 22 Nonetheless, the Estate concedes that decisions by the Southern District and the Second 23 Circuit “left unresolved the narrow question about termination under the 1983 24 Agreement” and that a termination notice with respect to Of Mice and Men is “currently 25 at issue before the Ninth Circuit.” These unresolved issues give this Court pause. Far 26 from “clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue,” declaring ownership of 27 unresolved intellectual property rights would almost certainly lead to increased 28 “uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Eureka Fed. Order – Page 13 of 14 Case 2:14-cv-08699-TJH-FFM Document 150 Filed 11/01/16 Page 14 of 14 Page ID #:3953 1 Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 873 F.2d at 231. Thus, declaratory relief is not appropriate here. 2 3 Accordingly, 4 5 It is Ordered that Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment be, and 6 hereby is, Granted as to liability for Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim and Plaintiff’s 7 slander of title claim with respect to the non-RWSG petition-related communications. 8 9 It is Further Ordered that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be, and 10 hereby is Denied as to Plaintiff’s slander of title claim with respect to the RWSG 11 petition-related communications. 12 13 It is Further Ordered that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be, and 14 hereby is Denied as to Plaintiff’s interference with prospective economic advantage 15 claim and request for declaratory judgment. 16 17 Date: November 1, 2016 18 ___________________________________ 19 Terry J. Hatter, Jr. Senior United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Order – Page 14 of 14