12.6

12.7

12.8

12.9

12.10

12.11

12.12

 

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

Fife, Lothian and Scottish Borders, and Edinburgh City Divisions (KB)

focused upon the directed surveillance authorisation processes in three Divisions:
In each i met with a Superintendent

utho sing car, a eepers, personne DlUs and proactive teams.

The ?ndings were very similar in all three of the Divisions. The majority of personnel
Interviewed had received the appropriate level of training for their role, with a few
exceptions. The level of knowledge of and associated legislation was good and
those interviewed were enthusiastic. professional and keen to ensure compliance. There
was an appreciation of the role of the CAB which was seen in a positive light, the
personnel being regarded as approachable and keen to give advice and guidance.

As previously referred to at paragraph 12.3, discussed with interviewees whether they
felt that the quality assurance role of the CAB should be undertaken prior to, or post, the
authorisation process. The consensus Was that the intervention of the CAB should be
prior to the authorisation process-.- lnterviewees stated that although Gatekeepers were
generally knowledgeable, they did not have the same level of expertise as members of
the CAB. Officer's felt that the intervention of the CAB prior to "authorisation
gave them a reassurance that they Were acting in a compliant manner, having regard to
the fact that they did not authorise surveillance on a-regular basis.

 

Division (Greater Glasgow (6w on)

This Division has it sub divisions and approximately 3,000 policeof?cers. The senior
management team comprises a? Chief Superintendent, five Superintendents and three
Detective Superintendents - who are part- of SCD but work locally to" the Divisional
Commander. All the senior managers are; trained as Authorising Of?cers but the role is
mainly undertaken bythe Detective SUpenntendents. -

There are - proactive teams, each of ocusing on
ge-ra hical areas. There are also? one and Organised Crime Teams of.

2 . All staff are trained in the use of static and foot
surveilance. An intelligence Hub and intelligence Development Team complete the
intelligence and proactive capability of the Division. There is no technical support
capability in the Division, any such requests would be made to the Force TSU. Basic"
surveillance equipment is retained and. managed by Equipment Officers.

 

.

Applications for directed surveillance are completed by local applicants and quality
assured by local Gatekeepers (supervisors from the intelligence Development Unit)
before being passed to an Authorising Officer. There were only ?gatekeepers at 
Division at the time of this inspection. This is a vulnerability for a Division of this size due
to the lack of resilience In this key function. it seems sensible for the Division to review
its gatekeeper provision in order to ensure that there is sufficient resilience
in place which accommodates its operational needs. it was reported that these
matters were already in hand.

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

 

12.13

12.14

12.15

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

Divisional intelligence Units (DIU), Aberdeen and Dundee (MA)

The DlUs of Aberdeen and Dundee within the Northern Area are both managed by a
Detective inspector each of whom i met during the course of the inepection. The structure
of each unit is similar in that the Inspector manages? Sergeants. one 'of whom
performs the role of Gatekeeper for applications. Sergeants, supported by a
combination of police of?cers and support staff. also perform a number of other
intelligence functions including research, development of target packages, problem
pro?les, etc.

it is apparent from meetings with the Inspectors and their Sergeants that as a team they
are committed to their roles and endeavour to provide a quality service to Divisional staff.
A high level of professionalism and enthusiasm was evident in all staff encountered during

the inspection.

i make the following comments and observations based upon my conversations with the
staff. and examination of systems and processes in place relating to regulated

activity:

The training inputs in respect of the Gatekeepers was not equitable. in that the
Gatekeeper within Dundee had received personal input via the CAB, whereas his
counterpart in Aberdeen had received little in the way of training

None of the staff within the DIU and indeed other units encountered in the Northern
Area save for the CAB and the Authorising Of?cers. had received input or training in
relation to the new surveillance iT system. nor was it apparent when such training would
be -rovided. and by whom .

    

In cosnvera run with all staff it was disappoin ng to dramaticlack of awareness of
the OSC Procedures and Guidance.

A signi?cant Issue was identi?ed within both DlUs In addition to the OCCTU at-
(see following paragraph), and relates to the recording, retention storage and disposal of
product obtained as a consequence of surveillance activity. Surveillance product
including surveillance logs, surveillance management records (SMR) and productions. if
not required evidentially by the of?cer in the case, is forwarded to the Divisional
Gatekeeper for retention. However, there is a lack of clarity in respect of the systems and
processes the DIU must have in place to facilitate this. and more importantly there is
signi?cant ambiguity as to how long and under what conditions such material should be
retained. Different units believed that product should be retained for a period ranging
between three and twelve years. There is lack of a consistent approach to this issue at the
different OCCTUs and speci?cally in relation to surveillance product obtained in support of
Divisional operations and whether this is retained by the OCCTU or returned to a
Divisional Gatekeeper. Systems for recording movement and storage of product were well
managed within the at Dundee however activity is being undertaken without
reference to a clear and concise policy or guidance. (See also paragraph 12. 50;) and the
associated Recommendation)

OFFICIAL SENSITIVE

12.17

12.18

12.19

12.20

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

Organised Crime and Counter Terrorism Unit 

The OCCTU at. provide Level 1 surveillance in support of Divisional operations
in addition to covert activity undertaken In furtherance of Operations managed by the
OCCTU. During the course of the inspection I met with the Detective inspector for one of
the operational teams along with his Sergeants who have responsibility for surveillance

and investigations.

The unit appears professional and ef?cient and has systems and processes in place
which ensure covert activity is undertaken in a compliant manner.

In addition to the comment made at Paragraph 12.18 in respect of retention and disposal
of surveillance product. make two further observations:

Staff within the investigations syndicate who are responsible for submission of
applications under and the Police Act have not yet received any training in
respect of the new surveillance management system and are not aware of when such
training will be provided

The investigations syndicate have responsibility for completing applications in respect of
intrusive surveillance and property interference. A form is completed by the OCCTU
which contains all information required to satisfy legislation under or the Police
Act. which is then forwarded to the Covert Operations Unit (COU) who transfer the data
onto a andior Police Act application and submit to the CAB. The rationale for
completion of a document by the OCCTU which is then transferred to a 
document by the COU is unclear and may be considered to create unnecessary
bureaucracy. Allowing the OCCTU applicant to complete the or Police Act
application at the outset and then submit to the COD may assist in reducing
bureaucracy.

Urgent Oral authorisations (DB)

The force makes use of small booklets to document the urgent oral authorisation of
directed surveillance. which incorporate the guidance and means necessary for an
Authorislng Of?cer to record relevant details. All Authorising Officers have access to the
booklets. In terms of process, an applicant will contact an Authorislng Of?cer directly and
make written notes to record the detail of the authorisation granted. The Authorising
Officer will record rationale together with the relevant wording of the authorisation
granted. If the authorisation is cancelled rather than renewed then the mneellaticn details
are also recorded by hand in the booklet by the Authorislng Officer. The completed
booklet and the handwritten notes made by the applicant are forwarded to the CAB which

4 95w;

ensures that a record is made of the urgent oral authorisation on the rites-mm
Surveillance system so as to generate a unique reference number from the Central
Record of authorisations. 

 

 

OFFICIAL - SENSETIVE
3

12.21

12.22

12.23

13
13.1

13.2

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

in discussions with CAB staff in the East Area it came to light that there was concern that
the noti?cation to the CAB that an urgent authorisation had been given was solely reiiant
upon either the applicant or Authorising Of?cer being aware that it was their responsibility.
The force SOP states at' paragraph 4.4.5 that it is the responsibility of the applicant to
inform the CAB of an authorisation having been given under the urgency provisions. It
'was felt that as many of the applicants were not regular users of directed surveillance, let
alone the urgency provisions. the responsibility for" ensuring that the CAB is- notified may
be more effectively discharged if it became the Job of the Authorising Of?cer. The Force
may wish to consider changing the SOP.

There were- urgent oral authorisations examined and the tendering comments and
observations are made: 

The applications and authorisations were generally of a good standard and there was
compliance with the. statutory requirements. in a number of authorisations there was a
failure to indicate when the information or intelligence became available which is a
crucial factor in determiningwhether the case forurgency has been madeout. in two of
the authorisations examined (Operations?it was feit debatable whether
theurgency criteria had been met owing to the time between "the initial intelligence and
the urgency request being made.

in a number of cases there was a lack of detail within the cancellation in reapect of the
activity undertaken.

Further observations relating to directed surveillance and product management are
contained within the relevant ?Visits to other units? paragraphs starting at section 19 of this
report. 

CHIS (L7)

Since the previous inspection the structure for the management of CHIS has not changed.
There continues to be a dedicated source management unit (DSU) based within the
Crime Directorate at Gartcosh; this deals With CHIS activity at higher levels of criminality
(see paragraphs 13.15?' below). The bulk of CHIS activity remains located within

uraphic areas where are situated within territorial Divisions. 

      

Whilst there are variations in the number of officers employed in the various DSUs, the
structure is essentially the same with a BI (Detective inspector) as Controller, DSs
(Detective Sergeants) as deputy Controllers and DOS (Detective Constables) as Handlers.
As said, general crime are managed in Divisions by DSUs whose staff are members
of SCD. Within each of the three geographic Areas of Police Scotland, there are 
(Detective Chief inspectors) who have oversight of the activities of the DSU working within
their region. The responsibilities of do not concern the day to day management of
CHIS, but are more aligned to personnel and staf?ng issues. the identi?cation of
intelligence gaps, etc.

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

   

13.3

13.4

13.5

13.6

13.7

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

The FAO cadre has responsibility for authorising CHIS activity across the whole of
Scotland; there is one A0 located within each of the regions who is responsible for
authorising the bulk of CHIS activity there. When absent this responsibility fails to one of
the other members of the FAO cadre. Since the previous inspection this has become a
more straightfonnrard task with the introduction of the computerised system across
the whole force. This allows for CHIS records including applications, risk assessments
and authorisations to be easily accessible to those requiring access.

During the course of this inepection CHIS records were examined either in the CAB for
the East region located in or in the four DSU offices visited, at"

CHIS policies

Since the previous inspection the force has developed SOPs for the management of
CHIS. supported by a very comprehensive Management Guidance Manual?. It is
Interesting to note that this manual contains detailed eXplanatlon of the processes to be
used when recruiting CHIS. It is quite clear that the responsibility for recruitment of CHIS
lies with the DSU Controllers who will monitor meetings and other contacts with potential
sources; the manual also outlines the need by Controllers to record the reasons why
approaches are to be made and the reasons for discontinuance of recruitment should that
be the case. The use of the policy recording facility on the - system is also
discussed. There are also detailed discussions within the body of the manual regarding
the statutory criteria for authorisation and how these matters should be addressed in

applications.

Police Scotland has developed what is termed a generic risk assessment for all CHIS.
essentially covering the potential risks that all CHIS are exposed to because of the role
they perform; there is a great deal of discussion of this logic in the manual. What is more
relevant however. are the speci?c risks that each source may encounter when performing
the role of whilst those are mentioned, it would be bene?cial to outline in more
detail what these might be and how they might be addressed, e.g. who are the
targets of the operation and what is their propensity for violence; and what are the risks
associated with the CHIS acting In the way envisaged.

Signi?cant issues

Dealing first with sources under recruitment (SUR in each DSU Handlers and Controllers-

make use of the recruitment facilities on the system to record why approaches are

to be made; this includes in general terms how SUR have come to the attention of the

DSU, usually by referral from other of?cers, identification as potential CHIS by members

of the DSU, or by other means. The Issue of CHIS recruitment is dealt with in different

was across the force; in the East there is a CHIS recruitment team consistln.772;- :3 .Y. 3-. 3. ?3:33

,mii??f. 
. time-t. 5:713" 
tzf?'?fyg?regalg 1
A the North Area, there are . any?-
CHIS recruitment is addressed from within DSUs by CHIS Handlers.

    
   
   
   

    
  

       

 

 

    
 

  
  

 

   
   
 

 



   
   
 



    

   



4 
. 
ifasfnf?f; 

.
Elsewhere

LT 

 

        

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE
5

13.8

13.9

13.10

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

It was evident that each Controller had a different view of what force policy has to say on
the subject of CHIS recruitment. One Controller was of the View that he had up to 28 days
to make a decision as to whether an application should be made to use the person as a
another Controller always wanted his Handlers to meet a prospective CHIS

-before making a similar decision; whilst another Controller was much clearer In his
view that atter decision could be made to progress an application. This
variation In approach has the potential to leave the force vulnerable should sources be
used as CHIS without authorisation. The following are some examples of where such

vulnerability could apply: . . 

 

it was noted when examining the SUR records that In some mass recruitment of potentiai
sources was stopped for a variety of reasons. Some Controllers made full use of the

-policy facility to record their rationale for such decision making: other Controllers

did not. In some cases there was little or no explanation as to why recruitment was
stopped. Whilst not sbictiy a compliance matter, such detail can be
important for future considerations as to a person's suitability for authorisation and
potential risirs of such use.

Once a decision regarding a prospective CHIS has been made, an application to use the
source is davelopedfor consideration by the relevant A0. It was noted when examining
such applications that the case was usually made for use which could have been
enhanced by more detailed explanation, in some cases. as to how the source would
obtain their lnfomration. This level of detail and explanation will help to Inform risk
assessments. Police Scotland should take steps to ensure that where sources are
being recruited as CHIS, any decisions made to seek authorisation for their use as
CHIS. are made quickly and that authorisation is granted before they are so used.
Where it Is felt necessary to delay the melting of an application, for whatever
reason, a full record should be made to explain why this was necessary.
(Recommendation)

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

 

13.11

13.12

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

it was noted during the examination of risk assessments contained in records that
not all detailed the speci?c risks to sources being used in the way proposed. it was rare to
ever find in risk assessments any discussion regarding the risks associated with the
subjects-of police activity. e.g. their criminal history. and if relevant. their propensity for
violence. all of which could have a direct effect on the risks to sou being asked to
provide information on these individuals. In one example. the source to re ort on

  
    
 
 

 

there should have been a
full discuss on In assessment regarding as issues and how any attendant risks

would be addressed. In another case. the source ad
no detailed discussion regarding any attendant risks was found in the

   
  

records.

With regard to other aspects of CHIS management. particularly record keeping. a number
of issues were found:

The way In which each DSU maintained the original notes of meetings with CHIS varied.
In the East. Handlers simply put their notes of meetings with CHIS in a folder and kept
this until there were suf?cient numbers to transfer them to the East CAB for storage:
when checked. one page of a note fluttered to the floor; it was part of a record consisting
of more than one page. Once in the CAB they are stored in a filing cabinet in no
particular order. To find a particular record would entail a trawl through all the original
source records kept there. in other locations. there were variations on a theme. with
original notes being stapled to a front sheet identifying the source with a date and time of
the contact; these would then be filed chronologically In the paper ?le of the relevant
source. and in some cases also appended to the front sheet would be receipts for
rewards. expenses etc. in one Area Handlers kept a hardback book for. the purpose of
storing original notes which would be stapled onto one of the pages. in some cases
Controllers are not checking the content of these notes against the contact records and
Intelligence logs. The force Guidance Manual provides some Instruction on this Issue.
but it ought to be more specific regarding how these issues will be addressed.
Once authorised. CHIS are subject of tasking where they are asked to obtain. If possible.
information regarding crimes or Individuals. These requests for such taskings are
recorded in the appropriate part of the ystem. It was not possible to find whether
such tasks had in fact been given to uring contact with them. and if so. the result.
There Is a facility on the database to cross reference these records to enable easy
searches to be made. It would see some Handlers are not doing so: however. it was
also said that there Is a fault on the system that prevents the required links being
made.

Different standards are being applied to the content of contact records with sources. In
some areas Handlers are abbreviating the contact records to such an extent that without
reading Intelligence logs it is dif?cult to gain any impression of what activity the source is
engaged In. Again this Is an Issue addressed in the force Guidance Manual. at page 41.
but the records seen do not always conform to what is required.

it was noted that each A0 has a different approach to authorising CHIS. Some
authorisations seem to be more widely based and include reporting on activity across the
whole of Scotland; the case for this was not always made.

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

i7

 

13.13

13.14

13.15

13.16

13.17

13.18

OFFICIAL -- SENSITIVE

It was noted that in some cases the deputy Controllers had made many of the decisions
regarding CHIS. e.g. authorising recruitment of sources, authorising contact. dealing with
dissemination of intelligence, etc and many other decisions ordinarily addressed by
Controllers. It may have been that on every occasion the deputy was in fact acting
appropriately but it was not possible to determine whether this was the case. by checking
the CHIS records to ascertain who holds or has held responsibility for sources as
required by 2000I205 (relating to source records).

It is worth reiterating. in terms of actual day to day CHIS management, that" therstafi seen,
Controllers and Handlers. presented as professional in their approach to 
management and were clear of their responsibilities to The issues above relate to
note and record keeping in the main; there also remains a tendency to allow Some CHIS
recruitment to be more prolonged than is necessary to make a determination regarding
the need for authorisation. The force is already aware of some of these issues and taking

steps to address them. 

It is also clear that the FAQ cadre contains of?cers who are entirely professional in their
approach and are robust. However, for the force to be assured that any vulnerabilities are
fully addressed, there needs to bee concerted effort to ensure that common standards
are applied across the whole organisation with regard to recruitment and authorisation of
CHIS. immediate steps should be taken to ensure that all CHIS records comply fully
with the requirements Of SSI 2002 No. 205 which relates to source records.

(Recommendation)

Serious Organised Crime DSU (GI/lo

 
 
   

articui'a- rs comrises-a -

5' 

 

The

 
     
  
 

addition. there-are .
supports the work of the DSU. At the time of my visit there; were
healthy ratio of CHIS to Handlers). -

Locaintelgecelin .f?cers. Source Tar etin'g Un_i_t__-ln the 
gaauthorised CHIS (a

   

In relation to the role of Controller. there was absolute clarity that the Inspector carries out
this role and only if hei?s absent for a sustained period. or in an urgent scenario, will the
Sergeant assume the role of Controller. This Is reflected in the audit trail of case
management records.

I examinedm CHIS cases andgeneraiiy found them to be managed in a compliant and
professional manner. Authorisations were comprehensive and the Authorising Of?cer
made pertinent inputs and demonstrated a good consideration of the key elements. Risk
assessments contained good detail speci?c to each case and were. dynamically
maintained. Contact with the CHIS was regular and well documented (with the caveat
below In this regard). I found no evidence of 'status drift' and recruitment was
comprehensively reported upon.

The contact notes contained rather scant detail in all aspects of a meeting being reported.
I found this at odds with all other aspects 'of the case management records and was
somewhat perplexed until I discovered that the records of ?meeting requests' actually
contained the detail that I was expecting to be on the contact note. At the end of the day
the full records were on the tile somewhere, just not in the obvious place. The need for a
more corporate approach is identified by comparing these comments with those made, for
example. at paragraphs 13.8, 13.30(iv) and 

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

13.19

13.20

13.21

13.2.3

 

 

13.24

13.25

13.28

13.29

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE