OFFICIAL . SENSITIVE The Rt. Hon. Lord Judge Chief Surveillance Commissioner Cities of Surveillance Commissioners PO Box 29105 London SW1V 1w 4.2 4.3 29 September 2015 OSC INSPECTION - POLICE SCOTLAND Date of inspection 14"' to 13m September 2015. Commissioner and date of visit You will visit the Force on a date to be advised in early 2016. inspectors Clare Ringshaw-Dowie (Chief Surveillance inspector); Martin Andrew; David Buxton; Kevin Davis; Neil Smart; Les Tumbuil' Graham Wright; and Sir David Clarke. Assistant Surveillance Commissioner (for September). introduction Police Scotland was established as a single nationwide force on 1 April 2013 and is responsible for policing the country's 28.168 square miles with 17.234 of?cers. 5.746 police staff. and 1.381 Special Constables . The force is the second largest in the UK after the Metropolitan Police Service. The force continues to be led by Sir Stephen House. QPM. although he will retire on 30 November 2015. He is supported by a Command Team of three Deputy Chief Constables; seven Assistant Chief Constables; and four Directors (for People 8 Development, Finance 8. Resources. Corporate Communications. and Corporate Services respectively). Annex A lists the senior of?cers' responsibilities. The force is divided into three Territorial Control Areas: North. East and West. which cover the 14 Local Policing Divisions. each of which is led by a Local Police Commander. Each of these Divisions has response officers; community officers; local crime investigation; roads policing; public protection; and local intelligence. Annex provides details of the Divisions. Figures provided by the force, as correct in early 2015. Unlike other forces. Police Scotland is politically mandated to maintain its number of regular o?icers available for daily duties. OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE 4.4 The Force also has six specialist divisions: Contact Command Control; Custody; Licensing 8: Violence Reduction; Criminal Justice; Operational Support; and Specialist Crime Division. It is the latter Division (300) which houses the main business areas with which the OSC inspection is concerned. including covert policing, intelligence. major crime, organised crime counter terrorism. 4.5 The Senior Responsible Of?cer is DCC lain Livingstone (Specialist Crime and Operational Support). We were weicomed by him at the start of the inspection, and he led a video conference enabling the inspection team to have a full update on deveIOpments from their reSpective basesz. The Chief Constable was on leave during the week of the inspection. but we were warmly welcomed by the DCC Designate. Mr Neil Richardson, OBE. QPM. both during the inspection and at ?nal feedback. 4.6 The recruitment of the next Chief Constable will shortly be underway. with a view to their appointment by December. Whilst Sir Stephen takes ?nal leave that is due to him, the DCC Designate is effectively acting in his stead to manage day to day business, but is not formally in an "acting up? position. 4.7 The report should be sent to the Chief Constable, Sir Stephen House, 0PM, at Police Scotland. Tulliailan Castle. Kincardine, Fife, FK10 48E. 5 Inspection approach 5.1 I The purpose of the inspection. was to examine policies, proceduresxand operations in respect of Part lil of the Police Act 1997. Part II of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000 and Part Iil of The methodology was agreed with the Force in advance following a pre-inspection visit by Mr Tumbuli. This year?s inspection? was or anised to enable, so far as possible, each of the inspection team to focus on a key aspe of covert activity, with visits to a variety of locations during the week. The whole inspection team then convened in Glasgow at the end of the week to share-their ?ndings with key officers at Gartcosh. with ?nal feedback to senior officers ln Stirling by .3 Ringshaw?Dowle and Mr Tumbull. A list of the key personnel met during the week is attached at Annex C. Key statistics 6.131 In the period covering 17?h October 2014 to ?l1?h September 2015 there ave been? property interference authorisations in the last reporting period)' for intrusive Tr; surveillance (up from directed surveillance authorisations last time): and :f'at the time of the inspection, there were.(compared to authorised with r'(down from .for national security. There have also been I. . r: (sei 49 Notis)hve been sought fro TC six occason. 2 Two Inspectors began the week in Aberdeen, two in Edinburgh, and three at Gartcosh. 3 Initials a?er report entry headings show the relevant Inspectors for subject areas. OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE 6.2 6.3 7.2 7.3 OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE These statistics appear to us to represent a healthy use of all types of covert tactic by a national police force and despite straightened budgets and staf?ng (an overall cut of ?180m, of which is still to be made). appear to con?rm the Senior Officer?s first day assurance that covert business areas are seen as key to the prevention and detection of'crime and" that. with the. support of the Chief Constable, he has continued to maintain its resource. Our onl observation. and it can only be that, is that During the course of the inspection, the following records were viewed: I directed surveillance authorisations and 10 urgent oral - property interference authorisations and 4 urgent oral - intrusive surveillance authorisations - CHIS records a source under recruitment records - Undercover officer authorisations 3 Section 49 Notices. Review of progress on recommendations Police Scotland shouid determine a single system of surveillance equipment management to enable the Force and the Senior Responsible O?icer; to oversee matters such as . procurement, deployment! and kit management This single structure should provide the e?ective audit of equrirrment across the. whole spectrum of- surveillance, from local diviSionel use of cameras and visual aidsto the-more specialised immature. devices used in higher level Investigations. To ensure that the single system can provide this, a final amnesty?of any unattributed surveillance equipment should be collect, and local ownership of any err-loan TSU equipment clearly allocated. Discharged. The force has selected the *Database and this should be fully operational force-wide ready being used by the TSU teams in and The roll-out hasbeen underpinned by a ?nal equipment amnesty an ongoing raining for TSU staff and locally based gatekeepers in its use. A compliance inspection regime should be introduced for Dedicated Source Units. Discharg' ed. Since June 2015. an Operational Security Officer (OPSY) has been appointed as part of a pilot scheme within the wider restructuring of the Human Coiiecttons (CHIS) department, This of?cer was selected for his knowledge of the CHIS wortd. and had previously been one of the Authorising Of?cer cadre in the force. The pilot has shown the bene?ts of this level of scrutiny and it is hoped to make the position a permanent feature. Undercover operative deployments, where possible, to be subject to a single authorisation. Discharged. The relevant Senior Authorlsing Of?cer and the FAO cadre have paid due regard to this recommendation during'the year and we are satisfied from our inspection of the records this year that the recommendation can be discharged. OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE 7.4 7.5 7.7 OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE More detail to be included within cancellation authorisations for directed surveillance. Discha ed but sub act to a revised recomm ndation. We are satis?ed that the force has provided clear instruction" on this matter through its Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and focused to responsible for authorisations. Our inspection found this was stjii'ihf in? many ofthe cases we inspected, albeit others had from: the; .AuthOrtsing Of?cer as to the management of any prodtmt. further detail, and-We set a fresh recommendation. in the khohriedge"'that'the ferce-wlde roll-out of the iT System will now? enable the CAB to undertake closer central scrutiny- of this issue. to use should refer only to activity and locations of use as set out in the application If the case for these has been made, supported by intelligence and that associated'risks with such use are property considered. . The Force should take immediate. steps to ensurethet all 'CHlS_records comply-with all of the maulremenis 01.8.31 200M051 are a" ed .. hints-db act-ore r?yls?e'fr?eamm?hdaea wear-a satis?ed that the?force; took. may ihls?i'i??on? Contrdiiars Federated-Area? andf'Nation?al 'Ali- (an lesue identi?ed in' 2014) are nOW"tetalned. hot the manner in which these are stibject to further? Scrutiny and carotid storage. differs hugely across the force and must now be" resolved to the satisfaction of the Senior Responsible Of?cer to assure him of the integrity of CHIS management processes. Establish a procedure whereby the CAB. is intenned of ell-Seeder) prosecutions and their results. Dischaggeg. The Head of Human Collections (DCI. has. secured the engagement of senior managers within the Crown Of?ce and ProouratOr Fiscal Service (oolioc?ated at Gartcosh) to ensure he receives quarterly updates on the progress of any Section 53(1) cases, and has offered to proVide training?to those concerned. An of?cer of the Policy Division of the Procuratcr FiscaiService, - has been designated as the single point of contact on this topic. He is presently engaged in investigating the outcome of all those cases in section 49 notices have been served, but the process is incomplete. OFFICIAL -. SENSITIVE 13 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 - SENSITIVE Ghra consideration ie the ailemativa procedures avaiiabie within Schedule 2 or The FAD cadre and CAB are aware of the alternative rooedures and will ?1353 3 re Peilciee and preset! ti res The Police Scotland CAB Is a single team. but based at three "hubs' and the Scottish Crime Campus in Gartoosh} and provides oversight of all authorisations for the use of covert tactics and develops the force SOFs. It continues to be staffed by highty skilled oitieers who bring recent experience from various areas of covert business and is still seen as part of their wider career development - there remains a healthy turnover of CA3 of?cers as they are promoted or return to operational and investigative posts where they use their experience here the CAB to good effect. DCI . Head of Human Collections. has overseen the CAB in Felice Scotland [and its equivalent in the old Police} for a number of years but will retire in coming months. He has a newly appointed Detective Inspector. to manage the CAB. The less of this vast experience is net lost on the force's senler ot?cers and will take time to rebuild. The force retains its Force D?icer cadre of the Detective Superintendents. with responsibilities as follows (although all can interchange to provide resilience and cover}: West - North - East - Detective Seperinlendent .is also res onsibie for? EHIS. TiDetEctive Superintendent is newly appoints (but. as always in Police Scotland. selected to the satisfaction of the Senior Responsible Of?cer for her skirts and abilities pertinent to this vital role]. Between the cadre. they authon?se all activity bar directed surveillance sanctioned at a local level by Divisional Superintendents. and also provide considered input to these authorisations resting with senior eit'rcers {property interference and intrusive The cadre is also responsible for the majority of EEO Communications Data authorisations {under Fart ?i The FAD cadre has enjoyed relative stability. but Detective Superintendent will be retiring in coming months. His knowledge and engagement with the wider covert community across the tilt will be a iurther less to the force. and again. was acknowledged by the senior of?cers during feedback. - SENSITIVE OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE 8.6 The -lT system has now been rolled out across the force and supports the authorisation and Central Record processes for all covert activities including undercover authorisations. Whilst property interference and intrusive surveillance are still managed on paper for final ?wet ink? signature and handwritten input by the Senior Authorising Of?cer, the IT system contains the complete records. The directed surveillance module only recently went live across the whole force (the week before the inspection) but the CAB will now be able to dip-sample all applications and authodsatlons at the touch of a button as part of their quality assurance processes. 8.7 The CAB is responsible for the various force covert SOPs and these were. as usual, provided to us at the outset of the inspection. helpfully identifying any updates during the past year. These are clear and comprehensive guides. available to all staff on the force IT systems. Whilst the 080's Procedures 8. Guidance document is available to key members of the CAB and Officer cadre; it has not been more widely promulgated and we found areas during the week where it was unknown. We understand that force lT policy is that guidance documents cannot be printed from the force Intranet. but we would urge that our Guidance is made available thereon, even it limited to a 'read only? format. It is acknowledged that a print facility may not be appropriate for all staff. but it was highlighted during the inspection that the lack of access to hard copy reference documents. including the Codes of Practice. Standard Operating Procedures. and 080 Procedures and Guidance. represents a signi?cant frustration to key users of 8.8 The inspection team reviewed various upon which we comment at relevant points within this report. A key SOP covers the authorisation of directed surveil ro interference and intrusive surveillance which includes sections relevant to? The content exam nea acco sw . rc urss an Guidance. The force has also produced a SOP for ?unregulated surveillance'. to cover activity that is not considered to merit an authorisation under such as the placing of a more in the house of a vulnerable repeat victim of domestic burglary. The SOP sets out a documented process mirroring that for directed surveillance. such that the force maintains an audit trail of all of its surveillance activity. CD (0 8.10 The SOP entitled ?Serious Crime in Action - Authorisation Guidance" assists those considering authorisations under or the Police Act 1997 in time critical and dynamic circumstances. The SOP provides suggested wordian for directed survsillance. property interference and intrusive surveillance authorisations. arising from differing scenarios. The introductory pages of this SOP would bene?t from a clear health warning to re?ect the guidance provided at Note 136 080 Procedures and Guidance. Specifically it should be made clear that the various suggested wordings of authorisations are not provided as a template for Authorislng Of?cers. as such entries can give the appearance that minimal thought has been applied to the key legislative requirements and they should therefore be avoided or used with care. The Standard Operating Procedure for Directed Surveillance, Intrusive Surveillance and Property Interference; The Investigation Electronic Information (Section 49 RIPA 2000); The Management of Unregulated Property Interference (interference with wireless telegraphy); Serious Crime in Action Authorisation Guidance; Technical Support Unit Undercover Advanced Of?cers and Undcrochr Foundation Of?cers; Legend Building and Pseudo-identity Support; Internet Legend Building; Manual of Guidance on Internet Investigations; Internet Research Interception of Communications; Onilns Safety; Standard Operating Procedures for the management of CHIS Management Guidance Manual; SOP for ?unregulated Surveillance?. OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE 9 9.1 9.2 9.3 10 10.1 10.2 11 11.1 OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE Related training We were provided with a detailed breakdown of the investment in training over the past year, much of which is delivered by the force CAB, the FAO cadre. else at the national training college. To summarise the investment. the following courses have been run since October 2014 for the stated number of participants: a National Observation 5 days 152 officers - Intelligence Officers 5 days 96 of?cers - Gatekeepers 1 day 29 of?cers - Authorising Officers 2 days 9 of?cers5 I "Relevant Sources" AOs bespoke 4 ACCs Each of these courses has been tailored?for the speci?c audience and the types of activity they are likely to be engaged with in their various roles. Also, each course includes learning from the last 080 inspection, and the courses are well attended and in high demand. We were also advised that ACC Graham (Major Crime Public Protection) will attend the national Autho?sing Of?cer course for "relevant sources" in order to provide resilience to ACC Ruaraidh Nicoison. QPM. There will also be further training across the force for those starting to use the relied-out directed surveillance application, and the asset management IT system. Signi?cant issues arising Breaches The force was pleased to report there have been no breaches identi?ed during the course of the past year. Con?dential information Use of the statutorv powers Property interference and intrusive surveillance (0RD) Section 93(5)(d) of the Police Act 1997 (as amended by the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012) provides that the Chief Constable for Police Scotland can be supported in his Senior Authorising Officer role by those holding the rank of 000 or A00. A5 in previous years. Sir Stephen had continued to authorise the majority of property interference and intrusive surveillance, evidencing his close interest in his force's use of covert tactics. However, over recent months. the Chief Constable has had to deal with a number of incidents and external scrutiny reports that have demanded his personal attention, and so latteriy for this inspection period, the SAC role has been performed primarily by DCC Richardson, with DCC Flthatrick in support. 5 A further six Authorising Of?cers have been provided iocaily tamed training by the CAB OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE 11.2 11.3 OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE i examined just over a third of the past year?s preperty interference authorisations and over half those granted for intrusive surveillance. The quality of buth the applications and authorisations was very good. All ?les included a copy of the contemporaneous directed surveillance authorisation where this (usually) existed, and also a copy of the TSU feasibility report. Whilst the FAQ cadre input prior to Senior Authorising Of?cer- oonsideration is not a statutory requirement, those inputs were highly pertinent and well documented. Reviews were undertaken with the Chief Constable in particular setting earlier review dates where he wished. to see increased proactivity. All entries by the chief officers were handwritten. and "whilst not always'iegible to the unfamiliar reader, were typed out by the CAB to provide the clarity essential to goOd Sutheriand practices. lf Senior Authorising Of?cers were to use the lT' medule for directly typed entries, this could be a time-saver. was also pleasing to see that in a number of authorisations inspected,.there had been very positive results in terms of arrests and seizures. i have only a few observations to make: As stated in the 2014 report, the intelligence cases were frequently and often ran to three or more. sides of typed A4 and so could be less prolix. But in fairneSS, each told- a clear tale, suitably assessed for relevance-and novelty, of what was invariably a highly complex and sophisticated organised criminal enterprise. I In two of the cases inspected, at Surveillance Commissioner had required there to be more frequently timed reviews to ensure that collateral intrusion Was closely managed. There was no documentary evidence on the ?le, nor by way of amendment to the- authorisation paperwork?s originally set review date, to convince methat the comments- by the Commissicners had been passed onto the Chief Constable and adhered to. All comments by a Surveillance Commissioner must be communicated to the Senior Authorising Officer, and by way of good Sutherland practice, to those undertaking the. activity, in every ease. (Recommendation) in a small number of cases inspected, prbcessing errors had cocurred, meaning that effective dates had not been entered on the paperwork once approved by a. Surveillance Commissioner; a couple of cancellation documents in a multiple-authorisation case had been transposed due to an erroneous or in one case, a missing OSC noti?cation sheet had not been chased. DCI immediately took action to remedy shortcomings as they were identi?ed during the inepection. At cancellation, there was sometimes meaningful comment by the Senior Authorising Officer about the outcome and manaeme?nt of an? roduct, but in others this was lacking. One stark example was Op where the Chief Constable ."technicai noted there was product from the activity and also collateral intrusion duo to the sub'ects not havin it was unclear from the Chief Constables-entry whether the two disks containing surveillance product from the property interference should have been, or had since been, destroyed. - . -- ?49. -r OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE 11.4 One case (Op was inspected me and the Assistant Surveillance 11.5 11.6 12 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 Commissioner. The activity-authorised Involved Directed surveillance (K0, DB and MA) The disparate IT and paper systems which were In place previously across the force to manage directed surveillance authorisations have now been migrated to a single IT system, the now fully networked across the whole of Police Scotland. All new directed surveillance authorisations are managed on the new system together with those for property interference and intrusive surveillance, and the lT system will become the Central Record for all authorisations of this nature. Where authorisations for directed surveillance were extent at the time the new system became live, a "ghost?I authorisation Is created on the new system in order to generate a unique reference number, whilst the existing authorisation would remain on whatever legacy system it was originally granted. When the authorisation is subject to its next review, the authorisation and management thereafter is fully migrated to the new system. The authorisation recorded on the old system is then closed down administratively, and cross referenced with the new record. The old records are to be retained in accordance with the requirements of in the North and West Areas, applications for directed surveillance which relate to Divisional operations are processed by Gatekeepers situated within the Divisional intelligence Unit and submitted directly to a Divisional Superintendent. in the East Area the process is different in that all applications relating to Divisional Operations are subject to quality assurance in the CAB before being submitted to a Superintendent. Within the next two months it is the aspiration of the CAB Manager that all applications for Divisional operations will go directly from the applicant to a Divisional Superintendent via a Gatekeeper. The process of quality assurance will take place after the authorisation. This issua is further examined in paragraph 12.8. Applications submitted by the SOD and those which include activities such as monitoring of socral networking sites or open source research, are submitted via a Gatekeeper to the CAB and are processed by the FAO cadre. OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE tr: 12.5 vi. OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE We inspected. directed surveillance authorisations covering the geography of Police Scotland and make the following comments: intelligence cases were generally succinct with little extraneous detail. but there was a lack of consistency of approach to the grading of intelligence which varied from: no grading of intelligence: 5x5x5 grading accompanying each intelligence log; to no grading of intelligence legs but a summary as to the number of logs within each grading, eg. 6 32. 8 E4 etc. in the East Area it was noted that a number of applicants. in place of any intelligence grading. used phrases such as suggests' or intelligence provides'. A consistent approach is likely to enhance the application process and assist applicants and Authorising Moore. The Police Scotland SOP for directed surveillance states at paragraph 4.9.3: ?The applicant must provide a synopsis of the investigation or operation, including a summary of the 5x5x5 grading and or where intelligence emanated from Visor, witness statements etc)?. 080 Guidance Note 76 also provides helpful advice on this matter. in the vast majority of applicationslauthorisatlons examined from West and East Areas. the issues of necessity and proportionality were articulated ccgently and an overview of known collateral intrusion risk properly recorded, but there was evidence from records examined in the North, of a variance in the quality of the submissions relating to the issue of pmporiionality. It was found that better applications addressed the matter in accordance with the Code of Practice and provided Justi?cation in respect of each tactic applied for Operation however others included a disjointed submission, often confusing proportionalityw necessity Operationsuand D). Authorisations were found to be of a high standard across all three Areas, well worded and compliant with 030 Guidance Note 84. Reviews were generally of a good standard, though there was evidence that some applicants repeated much of what was contained in the initial application by way of ?cut and paste?. Unnecessary bureaucracy could be reduced and reviews made more meaningful if applications addressed activity undertaken during the period under review and highlighted any changes since the initial application or renewal..This aspect is of particular signi?cance in longer running authorisations where there are frequent changes concerning named subjects, addresses, vehicles etc In such cases it is important that the Authorising Of?cer is explicit as to the extent of activities authorised. Cancellations were comprehensive and timely but in a number of cases, primarily in the North Area, there was a failure by Authorising Officers to provide a clear directive in respect of retention. recording and disposal arrangements for product obtained as a consequence of surveillance activity. An example of good practice was found in Operation% Many other records inspected included a bland and brief reference to force policy. national guidelines or the of?cer in charge. 080 Guidance Note 109.4 provides relevant direction about the management of product, as does paragraph 9.3 of the Covert Surveillance and Property Interference Code of Practice. This issue was found to be exacerbated by a lack of understanding and consistency of approach by a signi?cant number of staff who currently retain surveillance product. it is recommended that the force undertakes a review of any existing policy and guidance in respect of product management to ensure that all staff have a clear and unequivocal directive in respect of the arrangements and responsibilities for retention, recording and disposal of surveillance product. (Recommendation) Where directed surveillance was utilised there was a high rate of success in achieving the initial operational objectives. OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE