Case 2:16-cv-06886-ODW-KS Document 43 Filed 12/15/16 Page 1 of 20 Page ID #:406

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M.D. SCULLY (SBN: 135853)
mscully@gordonrees.com
JUSTIN D. LEWIS (SBN: 239686)
jlewis@gordonrees.com
GORDON & REES, L.L.P.
101 W. Broadway, suite 2000
San Diego, California 92101
Telephone: (619) 696-6700
Facsimile: (619) 696-7124
Attorneys for defendants
L’ORÈAL USA, INC., and
SOFT SHEEN-CARSON, L.L.C.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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NOTICE OF MOTION

Gordon & Rees LLP
101 W. Broadway Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101

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SHARON MANIER and DOROTHY
RILES,
Plaintiffs,

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vs.
L’ORÈAL USA, INC., and SOFT
SHEEN-CARSON, L.L.C.,
Defendants.

Case no. 16-cv-6886-ODW-KSx
NOTICE OF DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT THEREOF
(F.R.C.P. 12(C))
Date: Jan. 23, 2017
Time: 1:30 p.m.
Judge: Hon. Otis D. Wright II

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT, at 1:30 p.m. on January 23, 2017, before

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Hon. Judge Otis D. Wright II in Courtroom 11 of the United States District Court

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for the Central District of California, located at 312 North Spring Street, Los

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Angeles, California, or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, defendants

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Soft Sheen-Carson, L.L.C., and L’Oreal USA, Inc. (together, “Defendants”), shall

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and hereby do move this Court for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule

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12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to (1) the entire complaint of
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plaintiffs Sharon Mainer and Dorothy Riles, and (2) its cause of action for unjust

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enrichment.

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safety warnings on the exterior packaging of the disputed consumer product render

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implausible the theory underlying each cause of action in the complaint; and (2)

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that the complaint does not and cannot state a cause of action for unjust

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enrichment.

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Gordon & Rees LLP
101 W. Broadway Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101

This motion is made on the following independent grounds: (1) that the

This motion is made following conferences of counsel pursuant to Local
Rule 7-3, which took place on November 16, 2016.

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This motion is and will be based on this notice of motion, the accompanying

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memorandum of points and authorities, the exhibit filed herewith, the pleadings on

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file in this matter, and any arguments presented at the hearing of this motion.

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Dated: December 15, 2016

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GORDON & REES, L.L.P.
By:/s/ Justin D. Lewis
M.D. Scully
Justin D. Lewis
Attorneys for defendants
L’ORÈAL USA, INC., and
SOFT SHEEN-CARSON, L.L.C.

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-2DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Page

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I.

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1

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II.

FACTS............................................................................................................. 1

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III.

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 2

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A.

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1.

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B.

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Gordon & Rees LLP
101 W. Broadway Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101

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Plaintiffs Must Have Pleaded Plausible Claims To Survive This
Motion. .................................................................................................. 2

C.
IV.

The Court Should Consider the Relaxer’s Packaging. ............... 3

Reasonable Consumers Do Not Take the Implausible
Interpretation of the Product’s Packaging Upon Which All of
Plaintiffs’ Claims Ultimately Rely. ...................................................... 4
1.

All of Plaintiffs’ Claims Depend on Reasonable
Consumers Adopting Plaintiffs’ Interpretation of the
Packaging. ................................................................................... 4

2.

Reasonable Consumers Do Not Take Plaintiffs’
Interpretation of the Packaging’s Statements. ............................ 6

There Is No Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment Here. ............... 12

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 13

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

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Arevalo v. Bank of Am. Corp.,
850 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ............................................................... 12

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Gordon & Rees LLP
101 W. Broadway Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101

Page(s)
Cases

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009)............................................................................................... 3
Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc.
783 F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 2015) ............................................................................... 12
Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't,
901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990) ................................................................................. 3
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007)............................................................................................... 3
Bruton v. Gerber Products Co.,
961 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ............................................................... 12
Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc.,
637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................................................................... 2
Chavez v. United States,
683 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2012) ............................................................................... 2
Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc.,
135 Cal. App. 4th 663 (2006) ................................................................................ 5
Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A.,
691 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2012) ............................................................................... 3
Delacruz v. Cytosport, Inc.,
No. 11-3532, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51094 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11,
2012) .................................................................................................................... 10
Ebner v. Fresh, Inc.,
818 F.3d 799 (9th Cir. 2016) ................................................................................. 9
Erickson v. Boston Scientific Corp.,
846 F.Supp.2d 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2011) ................................................................... 2
Freeman v. Time, Inc.,
68 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1995) ................................................................................... 6
Gallagher v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.,
No. 15-cv-03952-HSG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14479 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 5, 2016) .......................................................................................................... 9
Gerlinger v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
311 F. Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ................................................................. 13
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Henderson v. Gruma Corp.,
No. 10-4173, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41077 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11,
2011) .................................................................................................................... 11

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Hill v. Roll Internet. Corp.,
195 Cal. App. 4th 1295 (2011) ............................................................................ 12

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In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,
903 F. Supp. 2d 942 (S.D. Cal. 2012) ................................................................... 5

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Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
105 Cal. App. 4th 496 (2003) ................................................................................ 5

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Lee v. City of Los Angeles,
250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001) ................................................................................. 3

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Gordon & Rees LLP
101 W. Broadway Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101

Girard v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,
316 F.App'x 561 (9th Cir. 2008) ( ......................................................................... 6

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Phillips v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc.,
No. 15-CV-0344-RMW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103481 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 6, 2015)................................................................................................ 12
Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc.,
No. CV 10-1028-GW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164461 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 25, 2012) ...................................................................................................... 11
Reid v. Johnson & Johnson,
780 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2015) ................................................................................. 5
Smith v. Allmax Nutrition, Inc.,
No. 15-CV-0744-SAB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171897 (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 23, 2015)...................................................................................................... 12
Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,
266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001) ................................................................................. 3
Strumlauf v. Starbucks Corp.,
No.16-cv-01306-TEH, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79456 (N.D. Cal.
Jun. 17, 2016)....................................................................................................... 13

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Temple v. Velcro U.S.,
148 Cal. App. 3d 1090 (1983) ............................................................................... 6

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United States v. Corinthian Colls.,
655 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2011) ................................................................................. 3

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Werbel v. Pepsico, Inc.,
No. C-09-04456-SBA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76289 (N.D. Cal.
Jul. 1, 2010) ........................................................................................................... 5
Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co.,
552 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2008) ................................................................................. 5

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Workman v. Plum, Inc.,
141 F. Supp. 3d 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ............................................................... 11
Rules

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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 12 ................................................................................................................... 2

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Regulations

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2-12 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL
Section 12.38 ......................................................................................................... 2

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50A CA. JUR. 3D Products Liability § 95 .................................................................. 6
James M. Wagstaffe et al., FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE
TRIAL
p. 9-126, ¶ 9:339.1 (The Rutter Group 2016) ........................................................ 3

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101 W. Broadway Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101

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Gordon & Rees LLP
101 W. Broadway Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I.

INTRODUCTION

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In this putative class action, the plaintiffs allege that they purchased a

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chemical hair straightening product because they interpreted its packaging or other

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advertising as minimizing or concealing the product’s capacity to cause injury.

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The product is used safely when consumers follow it instructions and heed its

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safety warnings. Those warnings foreclose the plaintiffs’ unreasonable

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interpretation of the collection of marketing statements they challenge. Moreover,

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the unjust enrichment claim fails as a matter of law. As such, judgment on the

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pleadings is proper in the defense’s favor.

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II.

FACTS

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Plaintiffs Sharon Manier and Dorothy Riles (together, “Plaintiffs”) contend

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that defendant Soft Sheen-Carson, L.L.C., and its corporate parent L’Oreal USA,

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Inc. (together, “Defendants”), sold them a chemical hair-relaxing consumer

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product by misrepresenting and concealing the product’s capacity to cause

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personal injuries. The disputed product is called the “Soft Sheen-Carson Amla

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Legend Relaxer” (“Relaxer”). See complaint, ¶ 1.

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More particularly, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants misled them and other

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consumers to believe that the Relaxer’s “key ingredient Amla Oil,” and its lack of

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lye as an ingredient, eliminated or greatly reduced the “safe,” “nourishing”

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product’s capacity to cause personal injuries, “including hair loss and breakage, as

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well as scalp irritation, blisters, and burns.” Complaint, ¶¶ 3-4. Plaintiffs allege

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that they suffered such injuries after using the Relaxer. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.

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Based on these allegations, the complaint asserts the following causes of

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action: (1) violation of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”)

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(Cal. Civil Code, § 1750), (2) violation of California’s False Advertising Law

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(“FAL”) (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500), (3) violation of California’s Unfair

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Competition Law (“UCL”) (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200), (4) violation of
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Illinois’s Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 Ill. Comp.

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Stats. 505/1 et seq.), (5) breach of express warranty, (6) breach of the implied

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warranty of merchantability, (7) unjust enrichment, (8) fraud, and (9) negligence.

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Plaintiffs purport to represent a fifty-state class of “all persons in the United

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States” who purchased the Relaxer “within the relevant statute of limitations

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period.” Complaint, ¶ 55. They allege the warranty, unjust enrichment, fraud, and

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negligence claims on behalf of that putative national class. Id. at ¶¶ 117, 127, 138,

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143, 152. Plaintiff Manier, a California resident, asserts the CLRA, FAL, and

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UCL claims on behalf of a putative subclass comprising all members of the

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purported national class “who purchased the Product in California.” Id. at ¶¶ 56,

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68, 82, 90. Plaintiff Riles, an Illinois domiciliary, asserts the claim for violation of

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the Illinois statute on behalf of an Illinois subclass. Id. at ¶¶ 57, 102.

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III.

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ARGUMENT
A.

Plaintiffs Must Have Pleaded Plausible Claims To Survive This
Motion.

“After the pleadings are closed – but early enough not to delay trial – a party

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may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). In deciding a

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Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court applies the same

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standards applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v.

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General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054, fn. 4 (9th Cir. 2011)

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(“Rule 12(c) is ‘functionally identical’ to Rule 12(b)(6)”); Erickson v. Boston

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Scientific Corp., 846 F.Supp.2d 1085, 1089 (C.D. Cal. 2011); 2-12 MOORE’S

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FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL § 12.38 (“any distinction between [the motions] is

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merely semantic”). This includes the “plausibility” pleading standard. Chavez v.

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United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108-1109 (9th Cir. 2012).

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Under the plausibility pleading standard, a complaint will fail either for a

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lack of a cognizable legal theory, or for insufficient facts pleaded to support an

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otherwise cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d
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696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To survive such a pleading challenge, a complaint’s

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factual “allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

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level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, the

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complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim

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to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

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A claim is plausible on its face only if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that

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allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

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misconduct alleged.” Id. The determination whether a complaint satisfies the

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plausibility standard is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

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101 W. Broadway Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101

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draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

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A court must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint…as

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true and…in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

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250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a court need not blindly accept

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conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable

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inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

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1.

The Court Should Consider the Relaxer’s Packaging.

When a considering a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, a

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court must usually constrain its analysis to the facts alleged in the complaint.

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However, if a complaint relies on the content of a document but fails to attach it as

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an exhibit, a court may consider the document in deciding a pleading challenge.

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See Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1159-1160 (9th Cir. 2012);

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United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011); see James

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M. Wagstaffe et al., FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL p. 9-126, ¶ 9:339.1

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(The Rutter Group 2016) (“Similar to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, in resolving a Rule

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12(c) motion, the court can consider (without converting the motion to a summary

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judgment)…any documents attached to or mentioned in the pleadings…[and]

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documents not attached but integral to the claims”).

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Here, the Court can and should consider Plaintiffs’ theory by reference to the
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Relaxer’s exterior packaging, including the side panel of safety warnings appearing

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on every carton, and not just the particular statements that the complaint highlights

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in isolation. Even though the complaint does not include the packaging as an

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exhibit, its allegations refer repeatedly and indispensably to the packaging’s

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statements. Complaint, ¶ 13 (plaintiff Manier viewed “statements on Product

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packaging”), ¶ 14 (plaintiff Riles, too), ¶ 30 (challenged representations “appear

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directly on packaging for the Amla Relaxer hair relaxer kit”), ¶ 31, ¶ 32, ¶ 33

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(“packaging for the Amla Relaxer contains the following representations…”), ¶ 40

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(“representing on the front of the Product packaging…”), ¶ 41 (retailers’ websites

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used “images of the Product packaging”), ¶ 52 (alleging no “adequate warning or

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instruction on the Product packaging”).

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Accordingly, the complaint incorporates the exterior packaging by reference,

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rendering it appropriate material to consider in ruling on this motion. Defendants

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therefore submit the Relaxer’s exterior packaging as exhibit A, and respectfully

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request that the Court consider it in ruling on this motion.

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B.

Reasonable Consumers Do Not Take the Implausible
Interpretation of the Product’s Packaging Upon Which All of
Plaintiffs’ Claims Ultimately Rely.

The gravamen of the complaint and each of its counts is that various

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statements on the Relaxer’s packaging and elsewhere merged into an implied

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misrepresentation that Amla extract was a predominant ingredient which, in place

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of lye, eliminated or greatly lessened the product’s capacity to cause personal

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injuries. However, the complaint cites no instances of Defendants actually making

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such a representation, and the Relaxer’s safety warnings prevent reasonable

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consumers from interpreting the statements cited in the complaint as Plaintiffs do.

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1.

All of Plaintiffs’ Claims Depend on Reasonable Consumers
Adopting Plaintiffs’ Interpretation of the Packaging.

Each of count of complaint ultimately depends upon whether reasonable
consumers interpret the Relaxer’s packaging in the same way Plaintiffs do.
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To state a claim under the CLRA, FAL, or UCL, the plaintiff must plausibly

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allege that the defendant’s purported misrepresentations are likely to deceive a

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reasonable consumer. See Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th

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Cir. 2008) (explaining that unless the advertisement at issue targets a particularly

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vulnerable group, courts must evaluate claims for false or misleading advertising

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from the perspective of a reasonable consumer); see also Reid v. Johnson &

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Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2015) (“It is true that violations of the UCL,

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FAL, and CLRA are evaluated from the vantage point of a ‘reasonable

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consumer.’”) “A reasonable consumer is ‘the ordinary consumer acting reasonably

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under the circumstances.’” Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152,

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1161-1162 (9th Cir. 2012).

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“Likely to deceive implies more than a mere possibility that the

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advertisement might conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers

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viewing it in an unreasonable manner.” In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer

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Data Sec. Breach Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 942, 967 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Lavie v.

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Procter & Gamble Co., 105 Cal. App. 4th 496, 508 (2003)). Instead, “the phrase

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indicates that the ad is such that it is probable that a significant portion of the

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general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the

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circumstances, could be mislead [sic].” Id. In determining whether a statement is

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misleading under the statute, the primary evidence in a false advertising case is the

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advertising itself. Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 135 Cal. App. 4th 663,

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679 (2006). “[W]here a court can conclude as a matter of law that members of the

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public are not likely to be deceived by the product packaging, dismissal is

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appropriate.” Werbel v. Pepsico, Inc., No. C-09-04456-SBA, 2010 U.S. Dist.

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LEXIS 76289 at *8-*9 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 1, 2010).

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Thus, the complaint’s CLRA, FAL, and UCL claims all rely on Plaintiffs’

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theory that reasonable consumers interpreted the Relaxer’s advertising to mean that

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its ingredients eliminated or greatly lessened its capacity to cause injury. So, too,
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do the claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices

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Act, the two warranty claims, the unjust enrichment claim, and the fraud claim,

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each of which the complaint expressly bases on Defendants’ alleged

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misrepresentations or concealments of the Relaxer’s injurious capacities.

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Complaint, ¶¶ 110-111, ¶ 119, ¶ 121, ¶ 132, ¶ 134, ¶ 140, ¶¶ 146-147; Freeman v.

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Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1995) (common law fraud claim requires

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showing that the advertisement would mislead a reasonable person); Temple v.

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Velcro U.S., 148 Cal. App. 3d 1090, 1094 (1983) (adequate warning bars

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negligence and express and implied warranty claims); 50A CA. JUR. 3D Products

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Liability § 95 (“adequate warning is a proper disclaimer to any express or implied

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warranties”).

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Similarly, the negligence claim also distills to an allegation that Defendants

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negligently misrepresented or failed to warn of the Relaxer’s capacity to injure its

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users. Complaint, ¶ 160 (alleging Defendants “failed to disclose…the risks and

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adverse effects associated with the Product”); id. at ¶ 162 (“Defendants’ false

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representations were recklessly and/or negligently made”); Girard v. Toyota Motor

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Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 316 F.App'x 561, 562 (9th Cir. 2008) (equating “justifiable

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reliance” element of negligent misrepresentation to the “reasonable consumer”

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standard).

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2.

Reasonable Consumers Do Not Take Plaintiffs’
Interpretation of the Packaging’s Statements.

Plaintiffs did not include the packaging with their complaint because it

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refutes the fundamental basis of each of their claims: that Defendants somehow

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led reasonable consumers to believe that the Relaxer’s Amla extract ingredient, in

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place of lye, eliminated or greatly reduced the product’s supposedly concealed

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capacity to cause personal injuries. Yet, not only does the complaint fail to allege

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that Defendants ever made such a representation outright, but the packaging’s

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repeated warnings of the Relaxer’s capacity to cause injury also foreclose the
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possibility that reasonable consumers would interpret the collection of statements

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cited in the complaint in the way that Plaintiffs urge.

Gordon & Rees LLP
101 W. Broadway Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101

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In particular, on both the carton’s front and top panels appears this identical

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advisement: “IMPORTANT – READ & FOLLOW THE SAFETY WARNINGS.”

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That advisement features an arrow referring consumers to the packaging’s side

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panel, which is occupied entirely by this table of detailed warnings about the

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product’s dangers under the heading “IMPORTANT – READ BEFORE

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PURCHASING”:

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-7DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
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101 W. Broadway Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101

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Against Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants represented the Relaxer as “safe”

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and “gentler on…hair and skin as compared to a lye-based relaxer” (complaint, ¶¶

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13-14), in fact the exterior packaging unambiguously described the Relaxer’s

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capacity to “cause serious injury to eyes and skin” and to “damage hair or result in
-8DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Case No. 16-cv-6886-ODW-KSx

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101 W. Broadway Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101

Case 2:16-cv-06886-ODW-KS Document 43 Filed 12/15/16 Page 15 of 20 Page ID #:420

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permanent hair loss.” Relaxer packaging, exhibit A. Far from concealing the

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Relaxer’s caustic character, the packaging warns that the Relaxer “[c]ontains

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alkali” such that users must “[w]ear gloves provided in the kit throughout the

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relaxing process” and “[k]eep [the] relaxer off scalp and other skin areas,” or,

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failing that, “rinse immediately” “[i]n case of contact with skin.” Id. The same

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warning panel advises that the Relaxer is dangerous enough to “cause blindness”

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“[i]n case of contact with eyes.” Id.

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Yet, the complaint theorizes that reasonable consumers interpret the

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packaging and its warnings of “blindness,” “serious injury to…skin,” “damage[d]

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hair,” and “permanent hair loss” to somehow mean that the Relaxer is a “safe,

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nourishing, and gentle” “alternative to lye-based relaxers,” less likely to “cause

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irritation [or] to be harsh on hair and skin.” Complaint, ¶¶ 33-34. However, the

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packaging contains no such representation that the Relaxer is any safer or less

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injurious than other chemical hair-straightening products, and nowhere does the

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complaint cite one. Moreover, the packaging’s repeated warnings of the Relaxer’s

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capacity to cause injuries renders it unreasonable for Plaintiffs or others to give the

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various representations challenged in the complaint the collective interpretation the

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complaint suggests. See Gallagher v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 15-cv-

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03952-HSG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14479 at *11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016)

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(“Defendant explicitly disclosed the facts that Plaintiff complains were

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misrepresented”).

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That is especially true because reasonable users of hair relaxer products

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understand that they work by chemically weakening the structural bonds of hair in

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order to straighten it. See complaint, ¶ 40 (implicitly admitting that consumers of

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hair relaxers understand that such products are not “mild[]” or “gentle[]”); Ebner v.

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Fresh, Inc., 818 F.3d 799, 807 (9th Cir. 2016) (lip balm's mechanism that only

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allowed 75% of product to come out of tube was not deceiving because reasonable

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consumers of lip balm “understand[] the general mechanics of [lip balm
-9DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
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Faced with the tension between their theory and the packaging’s multiple

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disclosures of the Relaxer’s capacity to injure, Plaintiffs might steer the focus to

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their allegations that it was false or misleading to label the product “NO-LYE” or

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as “infused with…AMLA OIL.” Complaint, ¶ 33 (“The Amla Relaxer packaging

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prominently displays the gold droplet of Amla Oil”), ¶ 45 (alleging that “NO-

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LYE” representation is misleading). Those allegations are ineffective to save the

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complaint.

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Gordon & Rees LLP
101 W. Broadway Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101

dispensers]”).

Plaintiffs’ theory is not that the relaxing agent actually contains lye, or

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sodium hydroxide. The complaint contains no allegation that it does, but only an

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insufficient allegation that the matter is “unclear.” Complaint, ¶ 46. Though they

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contend that the relaxing agent’s ingredient, lithium hydroxide, is as “dangerous

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and caustic” as lye (complaint, ¶ 39), they do not and cannot contend that

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Defendants misrepresented or concealed the presence of that ingredient. Id. at ¶

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44 (admitting Defendants disclosed presence of lithium hydroxide); see Delacruz

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v. Cytosport, Inc., No. 11-3532, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51094, at *18-*19, *33

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(N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2012) (dismissing claim that “0g Trans Fat” was rendered

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misleading by product’s containing certain other fats and oils which plaintiff did

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not allege to be transfats). No reasonable consumer would gather than the product

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is not “caustic” when faced with exterior packaging containing warnings like

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“[c]ontains alkali,” “[w]ear gloves,” “[c]an cause blindness,” “serious injury

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to…skin,” and “permanent hair loss.” Relaxer packaging, exhibit A.

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Nor is it Plaintiffs’ theory that the product does not contain Amla extract.

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The complaint admits that it does. Complaint, ¶ 5. Still, the complaint protests

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that “the Product contains hardly any Amla Oil” (id.), as though Plaintiffs might

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resort to the theory that Defendants misled consumers about the product’s quantity

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of Amla extract. See complaint, ¶ 31 (“packaging prominently displays the gold

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droplet of Amla Oil”). Yet, the complaint does not allege that Defendants ever
-10DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Case No. 16-cv-6886-ODW-KSx

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101 W. Broadway Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101

Case 2:16-cv-06886-ODW-KS Document 43 Filed 12/15/16 Page 17 of 20 Page ID #:422

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misrepresented the quantity of Amla extract. The packaging does not contain any

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representations regarding the quantity of Amla extract or what relative proportion

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of it comprises the product. Relaxer packaging, exhibit A.

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Instead, reasonable consumers would not conclude that the Relaxer contains

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any particular quantum of Amla extract, but only that it contains some, as Plaintiffs

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admit it does. Complaint, ¶ 5. Reasonable consumers know that the presence of

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an ingredient on a product’s label does not signify that the ingredient predominates

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the product’s composition. Workman v. Plum, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1036

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(N.D. Cal. 2015) (“The products at issue do not display any affirmative

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misrepresentations. They merely show pictures of featured ingredients contained in

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the puree pouch and fruit bars. No reasonable consumer would expect the size of

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the flavors pictured on the label to directly correlate with the predominance of the

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pictured ingredient in the puree blend.”); Henderson v. Gruma Corp., No. 10-4173,

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2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41077 at *33-34 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011) (dismissing

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with prejudice “Plaintiffs’ claims associated with the phrase ‘With Garden

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Vegetables’” because the product at issue there did “in fact contain vegetables that

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can be grown in a garden…The labeling statement does not claim a specific

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amount of vegetables in the product, but rather speaks to their presence in the

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product, which is not misleading [as a matter of law].”); Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc.,

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No. CV 10-1028-GW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164461 at *2-*3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25,

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2012) (no reasonable consumer would read “packaging [that] boasts that the

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crackers are made with real vegetables and depicts vegetables” to mean that the

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crackers are “contain[] a significant amount of vegetables.”) (emphasis in original).

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In either event, the “NO-LYE” and “AMLA OIL” statements are not

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separately viable theories of Plaintiffs’ case, but rather, they are inextricable

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components of Plaintiffs’ overarching theory that, despite the packaging’s candid

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safety warnings, Defendants somehow concealed or misrepresented the product’s

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injurious capacities. In other words, Plaintiffs allege that they interpreted “NO-11DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Case No. 16-cv-6886-ODW-KSx

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LYE” and the product’s use of Amla extract as an ingredient to mean that the

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product was “safe, nourishing, and gentle.” Id. at ¶ 33. Yet, reasonable consumers

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would not interpret “NO-LYE” or “infused with…AMLA OIL” that way in

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context with the exterior packaging’s repeated disclosures of the product’s

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capacities to injure. Relaxer packaging, exhibit A.

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unreasonable interpretation of the collection of statements upon which they base

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their complaint, judgment on the pleadings is warranted in Defendants’ favor.

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Gordon & Rees LLP
101 W. Broadway Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101

In sum, because the packaging and its candid warnings preclude Plaintiffs’

C.

There Is No Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment Here.

Plaintiffs assert a purported claim for unjust enrichment as their seventh

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cause of action. Complaint, ¶¶ 137-141. Courts have held on multiple occasions

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that, under California law, unjust enrichment does not exist as a separate cause of

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action. See, e.g., Bruton v. Gerber Products Co., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1099

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(N.D. Cal. 2013) (“there is no distinct cause of action for unjust enrichment under

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California law.”); Arevalo v. Bank of Am. Corp., 850 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1028 (N.D.

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Cal. 2011); Hill v. Roll Internet. Corp., 195 Cal. App. 4th 1295, 1307 (2011)

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(“Unjust enrichment is not a cause of action, just a restitution claim.”).

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Defendants anticipate that Plaintiffs will urge the Court to construe the

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unjust enrichment cause of action as a quasi-contract claim seeking restitution. See

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Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc. 783 F.3d 753, 762 (9th Cir. 2015). However,

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“there cannot be a claim based on quasi-contract where there exists between the

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parties a valid express contract covering the same subject matter.” Smith v. Allmax

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Nutrition, Inc., No. 15-CV-0744-SAB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171897 at *9 (E.D.

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Cal. Dec. 23, 2015) (dismissing cause of action for unjust enrichment where

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plaintiff also claimed breach of express warranty); see also Phillips v. P.F. Chang's

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China Bistro, Inc., No. 15-CV-0344-RMW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103481 at *9

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(N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2015) (“It is well settled that an action based on an implied-in-

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fact or quasi-contract cannot lie where there exists between the parties a valid
-12DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Case No. 16-cv-6886-ODW-KSx

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express contract covering the same subject matter.”); Gerlinger v. Amazon.com,

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Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 838, 856 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

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action for breach of an express warranty. Complaint, ¶¶ 116-125. Thus, no quasi-

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contract claim may stand, and the unjust enrichment claim fails as a matter of law.

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Strumlauf v. Starbucks Corp., No.16-cv-01306-TEH, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

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79456 at *14 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 17, 2016) (no unjust enrichment claim, construed as

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quasi-contract theory, available where complaint alleged express warranty).

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IV.

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Gordon & Rees LLP
101 W. Broadway Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101

Here, Plaintiffs allege an express contract by asserting their fifth cause of

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court

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grant this motion in its entirety.

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Dated: December 15, 2016

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GORDON & REES, L.L.P.
By: /s/ Justin D. Lewis
M.D. Scully
Justin D. Lewis
Attorneys for defendants
L’ORÈAL USA, INC., and
SOFT SHEEN-CARSON, L.L.C.

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-13DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Case No. 16-cv-6886-ODW-KSx

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Gordon & Rees LLP
101 W. Broadway Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I am a resident of the state of California, over the age of eighteen years, and

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not a party to the within action. My business address is: Gordon & Rees, L.L.P.,

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101 W. Broadway, Suite 2000, San Diego, California 92101. On December 15,

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2016, I served the foregoing document entitled: NOTICE OF DEFENDANTS’

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MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; MEMORANDUM OF

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF (F.R.C.P. 12(C)) by

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electronic service through the CM/ECF System which automatically generates of

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Notice of Electronic Filing (“NEF”) and is sent by e-mail to all CM/ECF Users

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who have appeared in the case in this Court. Service with this NEF will constitute

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service pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of
America that the above is true and correct.
Executed on December 15, 2016 at San Diego, California.

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/s/ Justin D. Lewis
Justin D. Lewis

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1126593/30820403v.1

-14DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Case No. 16-cv-6886-ODW-KSx