FILED 150688 10/3/2016 4:13:57 PM tex-13033849 SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, CLERK No. 15-0688 In the Supreme Court of Texas _____________ Jack Pidgeon and Larry Hicks, Petitioners, v. Mayor Sylvester Turner and City of Houston, Respondent. _____________ On Petition for Review from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, Houston, Texas Nos. 14-14-00899-cv, 14-14-00932-cv _____________ PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR REHEARING _____________ Jared R. Woodfill State Bar No. 00788715 Woodfill Law Firm, P.C. River Oaks Green 3131 Eastside, Suite 450 Houston, Texas 77098 (713) 751-3080 jwoodfill@woodfilllaw.com Jonathan M. Saenz Texas Values State Bar No. 24041845 900 Congress Avenue, Suite 220 Austin, Texas 78701 jsaenz@txvalues.org Counsel for Petitioners Table of Contents Table of contents ............................................................................................ 1 Index of authorities ........................................................................................ 2 I. There is no “fundamental right” for married couples to receive taxpayer-funded benefits or subsidies............................................ 5 II. This Court should instruct state courts to narrowly construe Obergefell because the ruling has no basis in the Constitution ................... 7 III. This Court should instruct state courts to narrowly construe Obergefell because it threatens the religious freedom of those who oppose homosexual behavior .............................................................9 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 11 Certificate of service..................................................................................... 12 Certificate of compliance.............................................................................. 13 1 Index of Authorities Cases Barber v. Bryant, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2016 WL 3562647 ............................... 10 Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924) ........................................................... 8 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) ......................................................... 6 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) ................................................. 10 Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) ........................................................ 8 Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996) ........................................................... 8 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) .......................................... passim Parella v. Johnson, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2016 WL 3566861................................7 Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003) ............................................................ 8 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) ......................... 8 Statutes 26 U.S.C. § 24(b) ........................................................................................... 6 26 U.S.C. § 24(c) ............................................................................................5 42 U.S.C. § 238n .......................................................................................... 10 Other Authorities John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920 (1973) .................................................................... 8 Lucas Mlsna, Stem Cell Based Treatments and Novel Considerations for Conscience Clause Legislation, 8 Ind. Health L. Rev. 471, 480 (2011) ............................................................................. 10 2 Richard A. Epstein, The War Against Religious Liberty, available at http://www.hoover.org/research/war-against-religiousliberty (last visited October 3, 2016) .......................................................... 9 3 In the Supreme Court of Texas _____________ Jack Pidgeon and Larry Hicks, Petitioners, v. Mayor Sylvester Turner and City of Houston, Respondent. _____________ On Petition for Review from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, Houston, Texas Nos. 14-14-00899-cv, 14-14-00932-cv _____________ PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR REHEARING _____________ To the Honorable Supreme Court of Texas: Petitioners Jack Pidgeon and Larry Hicks respectfully move for rehearing of this Court’s denial of their petition for review. We do not make this request lightly, and we are grateful for the Court’s attention to the petition and its request for briefing on the merits. But it is urgent that this Court step in and instruct the district court to narrowly construe the ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)—and the urgency has only grown since we filed our brief on the merits. Justice Devine’s dissent, along with recent rulings of federal courts that continue to abuse the judicial power by imposing ideologies that cannot be found anywhere in the Constitution, make it imperative for this Court to grant the petition for review and announce that the 4 courts of this State must construe Obergefell and similar rulings as narrowly as possible. I. There Is No “Fundamental Right” For Married Couples To Receive TaxpayerFunded Benefits Or Subsidies As Justice Devine observed in his dissent, there cannot possibly be a sub- stantive “fundamental right” to spousal employee benefits under the Constitution. See App. A. Both the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s decisions give States discretion to decide the benefits (if any) that they offer to the spouses of state employees—and a State could choose to abolish all spousal employee benefits without running afoul of the Constitution or the Supreme Court’s “substantive due process” doctrine. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Right To Marry, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 2081, 2092 (2005) (“[E]xisting doctrine does not require economic benefits to be provided to married people as such.”). No city employee—whether heterosexual or homosexual—has a “fundamental right” to receive employee benefits for his or her spouse. And it is perfectly constitutional for the government to offer benefits or subsidies to some married couples while withholding those benefits from others. This was done before Obergefell, and it continues to this day. The federal tax code, for example, provides a “child tax credit” to married couples who have children—but only if the child is under the age of 17 and a U.S. citizen or U.S. resident alien. See 26 U.S.C. § 24(c). And the tax credit is phased out for married couples whose joint adjusted gross income exceeds $110,000. See 5 26 U.S.C. § 24(b). So childless married couples are deprived of this subsidy—as are high-income married couples. None of this violates the supposed “right to marry” that the Supreme Court asserted in Obergerfell.1 And married couples who are denied this tax credit have not been “exclude[d] . . . from civil marriage” on the same terms and condition as other couples. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605. Same-sex couples who are denied spousal employee benefits have not been “exclude[d] . . . from civil marriage” either. And Obergefell specifically limited its holding to laws that exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage; it did not purport to invalidate laws that withhold taxpayer subsidies from same-sex couples, or laws that withhold employee benefits from same-sex spouses. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605 (“[T]he State laws challenged by Petitioners in these cases are now held invalid to the extent they exclude samesex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as oppositesex couples.”) (emphasis added). Justice Devine is not the only jurist to recognize that Obergefell does not enshrine a substantive constitutional right to spousal benefits from the government. A federal district court in New York held on June 27, 2016, that Obergefell does not establish a right to immigration benefits for one’s alien spouse: 1 Indeed, this practice is constitutional even though it withholds subsidies from married couples who exercise what the Supreme Court has described as a “fundamental” right— the right to decide “whether to bear or beget a child.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 6 [T]his is not a case concerning the right to marry, or even the right to marry the person of one’s choosing. These rights were already realized by Plaintiff when he married his wife in 2006. Instead, this case is about the right to obtain a visa for an alien spouse. Plaintiff argues that this right stems from an expanded view of the fundamental right to marry, which “necessarily incorporates the right . . . to live together as husband and wife.” Opp’n at 20. . . . Inferences derived from dicta in a near-century old case cannot overcome the consistent voice of today’s courts, which even under a dramatically expanded understanding of fundamental rights have found that there is no such right to immigration benefits for one’s alien spouse. Parella v. Johnson, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2016 WL 3566861, *10 (attached to motion as App. B). This new authority confirms what Justice Devine said: Obergefell establishes a substantive right only to have one’s marriage licensed and recognized by the State, not to obtain any type of government benefits for one’s spouse. II. This Court Should Instruct State Courts To Narrowly Construe Obergefell Because The Ruling Has No Basis In The Constitution The Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell imposes a “right” that cannot be found anywhere in the Constitution. And the Court’s opinion does not even attempt to explain how the language of the fourteenth amendment could support the idea that States must license and recognize marriages between homosexual couples. There is much discussion of “fundamental rights” and “equal dignity,” but those phrases do not appear in the Constitution and cannot be invoked to thwart a State’s duly enacted laws. 7 This does not mean that the Court’s ruling in Obergefell should be defied—but it should be construed as narrowly as possible. Obergefell violates the tenth amendment by intruding on powers reserved to the States, and this Court should not aggravate that unconstitutional intrusion by allowing Obergefell to further undermine the State’s policies. See Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 491–92 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it.”). The need for this Court to narrowly construe Obergefell and clarify state law on same-sex-benefits issues has become even more urgent since we filed our brief on the merits last May. On June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (App. C), and held that a Texas law that protects the safety of abortion patients must give way to a court-created right to abortion that cannot be found anywhere in the Constitution. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920 (1973). The Supreme Court also disregarded the rules of res judicata and refused to enforce a severability clause in the state’s abortion law, even though the Court’s precedents had held emphatically that severability was a matter of state law that binds the federal courts. See Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924) (holding that a state court’s “decision as to the severability of a provision is conclusive upon this Court.”); Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 121 (2003) (“Severab[ility] is of course a matter of state law. See Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996) 8 (per curiam)”). It is clear that the current Supreme Court will continue to use its power to advance the ideology of the sexual revolution until there is a change of membership. And that makes it all the more urgent for this Court to narrowly construe the Obergefell ruling and provide clarity for Texans and Texas courts to avoid disrespect of the Constitution and the rule of law. III. This Court Should Instruct State Courts To Narrowly Construe Obergefell Because It Threatens The Religious Freedom Of Those Who Oppose Homosexual Behavior There have been further developments since we submitted our brief on the merits that highlight the need for this Court to step in and instruct the state judiciary to narrowly construe Obergefell. It is well known that the homosexual-rights movement is not content with the judicial imposition of same-sex marriage in all 50 States; it is also seeking to coerce people of faith who oppose homosexual behavior into participating in same-sex marriage ceremonies. And it has enlisted business corporations to lobby ferociously against any legislative proposal that might protect Christian business owners and employees from being compelled to act in a manner contrary to their sincerely held religious beliefs. See Richard A. Epstein, The War Against Religious Liberty, available at http://www.hoover.org/research/war-againstreligious-liberty (last visited October 3, 2016). Obergefell has emboldened federal judges to go a step beyond even that, by holding that it is unconstitutional for a state to enact a religious-freedom law that would shield Christians and others who oppose same-sex marriage 9 from government penalties for refusing to participate in same-sex marriage ceremonies. On June 30, 2016—52 days after filing the petitioners’ brief on the merits—U.S. District Judge Carlton W. Reeves held that Mississippi violated the Constitution by enacting a law that protects churches, religious organizations, and private citizens from being compelled to participate in samesex weddings. See Barber v. Bryant, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2016 WL 3562647 (attached to motion App. D). Judge Reeves held that the State lacked a rational basis for enacting this law, and held further that the State violated the establishment clause by enacting a law to protect the religious freedom of its residents. Id. at *21–*23, *27–*32. But the notion that a freedom-of-conscience law such as this could violate the Constitution is preposterous. American law has long protected and accommodated the conscientious scruples of individuals and institutions who cannot participate in certain activities on account of their religious beliefs or moral convictions. Those who do not believe in swearing oaths are permitted to affirm. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, ¶ 8; id. art. VI, ¶ 3. Pacifists are exempted from military conscription. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). And opponents of abortion are protected from retaliation or discrimination when they refuse to participate in abortion-related activities. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 238n; see also Lucas Mlsna, Stem Cell Based Treatments and Novel Considerations for Conscience Clause Legislation, 8 Ind. Health L. Rev. 471, 480 (2011). But now it is not enough for same-sex marriage to be made into a constitutional right; we now have federal judges expanding on Obergefell by 10 nullifying conscience-protection laws and declaring that the Constitution requires a regime in which private citizens can be compelled to participate in same-sex marriage ceremonies against their deeply held religious or moral convictions. *** The recent rulings in Bryant and Whole Woman’s Health, and the arguments in Parella and Judge Devine’s dissent from this Court’s denial of the petition, reinforce the need for this Court to save Texas from unchecked ideological rulings from the federal judiciary. We respectfully ask the Court to reconsider its denial of our petition for review, and to grant the petition and hold that Obergefell should be narrowly construed by the courts of this State. Conclusion The petition for rehearing should be granted, the petition for review should be reinstated. Respectfully submitted. Jared R. Woodfill State Bar No. 00788715 Woodfill Law Firm, P.C. River Oaks Green 3131 Eastside, Suite 450 Houston, Texas 77098 (713) 751-3080 jwoodfill@woodfilllaw.com Jonathan M. Saenz Texas Values State Bar No. 24041845 900 Congress Avenue, Suite 220 Austin, Texas 78701 jsaenz@txvalues.org Counsel for Petitioners 11 Certificate of Service I certify that this document was served by certified U.S. mail and e-mail October 3, 2016, upon: Judith L. Ramsey Chief, General Litigation Section Texas Bar No. 16519550 judith.ramsey@houstontx.gov John B. Wallace Senior Assistant City Attorney Texas Bar No. 20769750 john.wallace@houstontx.gov Kathleen Hopkins Alsina Texas Bar No. 09977050 kate.alsina@houstontx.gov Darah Eckert Texas Bar No. 24007141 darah.eckert@houstontx.gov David L. Red Texas Bar No. 16656900 david.red@houstontx.gov City of Houston Legal Department 900 Bagby, 4th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 (832) 393-6491 Counsel for Respondents /s/ Jared R. Woodfill Jared R. Woodfill Counsel for Petitioners 12 Certificate of Compliance I certify that this document contains 1,868 words, excluding the portions described in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1). /s/ Jared R. Woodfill Jared R. Woodfill Counsel for Petitioners 13 APPENDIX Appendix Table of Contents Justice Devine’s Dissent from Denial of the Petition for Review ...........................A Parella v. Johnson, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2016 WL 3566861 ....................................... B Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) ................................. C Barber v. Bryant, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2016 WL 3562647 ........................................ D IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS 444444444444 NO . 15-0688 444444444444 JACK PIDGEON AND LARRY HICKS, PETITIONERS, v. MAYOR SYLVESTER TURNER AND CITY OF HOUSTON, RESPONDENTS 4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444 ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444 JUSTICE DEVINE, dissenting to the denial of the petition for review. Without substantial discussion or analysis, the court of appeals assumed that because the United States Supreme Court declared couples of the same sex have a fundamental right to marry, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires cities to offer the same benefits to same-sex spouses of employees as to opposite-sex spouses. See Parker v. Pidgeon, 477 S.W.3d 353, 354–55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015) (per curiam). I disagree. Marriage is a fundamental right. Spousal benefits are not. Thus, the two issues are distinct, with sharply contrasting standards for review. Because the court of appeals’ decision blurs these distinctions and threatens constitutional standards long etched in our nation’s jurisprudence, I would grant review. I A 2001 amendment to the Houston City Charter prohibits the City from “provid[ing] employment benefits, including health care, to persons other than employees, their legal spouses and dependent children.” Houston, Tex., Charter, art. II, § 22. Because Texas law defined marriage to exist only between persons of the opposite sex, same-sex partners were accordingly not entitled to receive such benefits. In November 2013, however, the City announced it would change course. It began offering benefits such as health insurance to same-sex partners of City employees if they married in a state that recognized same-sex marriage. It did so despite a Texas law expressly prohibiting it from giving effect to a “right or claim to any . . . benefit . . . asserted as a result of a marriage between persons of the same sex.” TEX . FAM . CODE § 6.204(c)(2). Two Houston taxpayers sued the City and its Mayor (collectively, the “City”), seeking temporary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the City from providing benefits to same-sex spouses of City employees married in other states. See Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 179 (Tex. 2001) (“Taxpayers in Texas have standing to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds . . . .”). The City countered with a plea to the jurisdiction. After the trial court denied the City’s plea and granted a temporary injunction, the City filed an interlocutory appeal. TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 51.014(a)(4), (8). While the City’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Obergefell v. Hodges, announcing that “same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States,” and “there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the grounds of its same-sex character.” 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015). Citing Obergefell, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s temporary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. 477 S.W.3d at 354–55. 2 The taxpayers petitioned for review in this Court, urging that Obergefell does not require the City to offer employment benefits to same-sex spouses of City employees and Texas law prohibits the City from doing so. The City responded that this Court lacks jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal and the Constitution requires the City to extend benefits to all spouses of City employees. II Obergefell concerned access to marriage, not an Equal Protection challenge to the allocation of employment benefits. The court of appeals apparently assumed that, if the Supreme Court concluded no government interest justifies recognizing marriage as only between couples of the opposite sex, then no interest justifies offering different benefits to same-sex and opposite-sex spouses of City employees. But, as discussed below, marriage—not spousal employment benefits—is a fundamental right, and laws limiting access to a fundamental right receive stricter scrutiny than laws distributing government benefits. As the majority in Obergefell recognized, “the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change” when fundamental rights are not at stake. 135 S. Ct. at 2605. By assuming the wrong level of scrutiny, the court of appeals removed an important policy decision from the democratic process, preventing the State from pursuing legitimate and important government interests. The court of appeals’ error and the uncertainty it creates vests this Court with jurisdiction, see Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local No. 1338, 273 S.W.3d 659, 667 (Tex. 2008), and I believe we should grant review to correct it. 3 A It is well settled that laws abridging a fundamental right or classifying persons according to “race, alienage, or national origin” receive stricter scrutiny than those that do not. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). Strict scrutiny “is a searching examination,” Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013), demanding that the law be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest,” Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1672 (2015); Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419. Only compelling interests justify such restrictions, and even then there must be a close fit between the restrictions and their goal. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. Strict review gives way to substantial deference when fundamental rights or protected classes are not at stake. In such cases, “courts generally view constitutional challenges with the skepticism due respect for legislative choices demands.” Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 426 (2010) (footnote omitted); see Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 (2001). Legislation is generally “presumed to be valid” if the distinctions made by the statute are “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. These divergent levels of scrutiny serve a purpose: they balance the government’s power to act in the public good against individual liberty and freedom. From the Founding to modern times, it has always been understood that legislatures, rather than courts, decide what policies are in the people’s best interest. In Alexander Hamilton’s words, “[t]he legislature . . . prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated,” whereas the judiciary “may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment.” THE FEDERALIST NO . 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961). These same principles emerge in the 4 “minimum ‘rational-basis review’” applicable to general social and economic legislation. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366. When fundamental rights and protected classes are not at stake, the legislature may identify goals and take rational steps toward them. The court of appeals upset this balance between the judiciary and the legislature by inappropriately applying strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court’s holding in Obergefell hinged on marriage’s status as a fundamental right. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604. This case, however, involves employment benefits, which the City obviously has no constitutional duty to offer to its employees, let alone their spouses. Though the laws in Obergefell denying access to marriage were subject to strict scrutiny, the laws in this case allocating benefits among married couples are not. Indeed, criteria that cannot be used to restrict marriage may still be relevant when allocating benefits. Consider, for example, that the Supreme Court allowed the government to condition continued eligibility for child disability benefits on not marrying someone who did not also qualify for these benefits, even though the government obviously could not bar disabled persons from marriage for failing this requirement. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 58 (1977). Similarly, the Supreme Court allowed Congress to grant continued social security survivor’s benefits to widows who remarried after 60, but terminate the same benefits to divorced persons who remarried after 60. Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 341–42, 350 (1986). This condition was acceptable for allocating benefits, but could not have been used to prevent anyone from marrying. The same distinction applies here. The City, however, emphasizes Obergefell’s holding that states may not “exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.” Obergefell, 5 135 S. Ct. at 2605. But Obergefell concerned same-sex couples’ right to marry—i.e., to enter into marriage—and must be interpreted accordingly. In Texas, both same- and opposite-sex couples must obtain a marriage license from a county clerk. TEX . FAM . CODE § 2.001(a). They must generally be over 18 years of age, id. § 2.101, should provide proof of their age and identity, id. § 2.005(a), and should not be closely related to the intended spouse or be already married to someone else, id. §§ 2.004(b)(5)–(6), .009(a)(5). These are the types of “terms and conditions” that the Supreme Court held states must allow same-sex couples to enter into marriage on. Obergefell did not require that the same benefits be provided to all. Thus, claims by same-sex spouses of City employees to employment benefits do not enjoy the benefit of strict scrutiny. Indeed, in Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court considered whether a law denying special protections to homosexuals had “a rational relation to some legitimate end.” 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). In United States v. Windsor, the Court examined whether federal law defining marriage as between a man and a woman had a “legitimate purpose.” 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). And in Obergefell, when the majority conceded that democracy is normally “the appropriate process for change,” it made an exception only for laws abridging fundamental rights, without suggesting that same-sex couples are a suspect class. 135 S. Ct. at 2605. Admittedly, the Obergefell majority assumed same- and opposite-sex couples would receive the same benefits, reasoning that “[w]ere the Court to stay its hand to allow slower, case-by-case determination of the required availability of specific public benefits to same-sex couples, it still would deny gays and lesbians many rights and responsibilities intertwined with marriage.” Id. at 2606. The Court described the many benefits married couples enjoy, noting that no difference exists 6 “between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to” how the states have “contributed to the fundamental character” of marriage by tying so many rights and responsibilities to it. Id. at 2601. Yet, the fact remains that, at most, the majority merely described the benefits that states confer on married couples and assumed states would extend them to all married couples. Generalized assumptions about state laws do not constitute a legal holding, much less sweep aside wellestablished standards of review. Lest there be any doubt about Obergefell’s limited role when fundamental rights are not at stake, the Supreme Court has repeatedly (even more recently than Obergefell) admonished that [i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [other courts] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 623 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting another source); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). To the extent Obergefell’s wording casts doubt on the traditional deference owed to the democratic process when neither fundamental rights nor suspect classes are involved, we must still follow the Supreme Court’s well-established Equal Protection jurisprudence. B The “[i]nherent differences between men and women” are, as Justice Ginsburg once explained, “cause for celebration.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). The “two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one [sex] is different from a community composed of both.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 7 (1946)). Surely the same is true in marriage, the closest and most intimate of communities in our nation. Yet, by applying strict scrutiny, the court of appeals foreclosed any argument that the State has a legitimate or important interest in celebrating these differences when they occur in marriage. Consider the State’s interest in encouraging procreation. The State may well have believed that offering certain benefits to opposite-sex couples would encourage procreation within marriage. After all, benefits such as health insurance provide financial security as couples decide whether to have a child. An opposite-sex marriage is the only marital relationship where children are raised by their biological parents. In any other relationship, the child must be removed from at least one natural parent, perhaps two, before being adopted by her new parent(s). This does not diminish any child’s inherent dignity, a fact the City presumably recognizes by extending benefits to their employees’ children regardless of the employees’ marital status. But it does explain why the State might choose to direct resources to opposite-sex couples. Conversely, at least five justices of the Supreme Court have reasoned that the government has a compelling interest in ensuring access to contraception. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785–86 (2014) (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2787, 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor). Obviously, any government interest in providing access to contraceptives is linked to opposite-sex couples: they must plan not to get pregnant, whereas same-sex couples must undergo extensive planning and preparation before adopting or using in-vitro fertilization. Again, differences exist between same- and opposite-sex couples, and such differences may explain the State’s allocation of benefits. 8 Admittedly, the State’s policy is not perfect. Not all opposite-sex couples want, or are even capable of, procreation. But if rational-basis review instead of strict scrutiny applies, then the imperfections are not fatal. “The rationality commanded by the Equal Protection Clause does not require States to match [class] distinctions and the legitimate interests they serve with razorlike precision.” Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83–84 (2000) (discussing age discrimination). At times, the State may rely on one characteristic—such as the opposite-sex nature of a marriage—as a proxy for other abilities—such as procreation within marriage—that relate to the State’s interests. See id. at 84 (discussing age as a proxy for other traits). It is enough that there is “a rational reason for the difference” in treatment. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008). The State’s policy is viable even under intermediate scrutiny, which is traditionally reserved for gender-based discrimination. See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–33 (discussing gender discrimination). Such discrimination “violates equal protection unless it serves important governmental objectives and [] the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although sex-based distinctions must rest on more than “overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females,” government may still recognize physical and inherent differences between men and women. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. Chief among the “biological difference[s]” recognized by the Court is the capacity for childbirth. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001). For example, that the mother but not the father must be physically present at their child’s birth justifies different naturalization requirements 9 for children born abroad to an American father as opposed to an American mother. Id. at 64, 66–67. That “[o]nly women may become pregnant” justifies criminalizing a man’s act of having sexual intercourse with an underage female without similarly penalizing women for having intercourse with an underage male. See Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464, 471–73 (1981) (plurality opinion). And that only opposite-sex couples may procreate justifies limiting government incentives and security for childbearing to spouses of the opposite sex from the City’s employees. Some may argue that animus motivated Texas’ law. When the legislature acts only out of “animus toward the class it affects,” the law lacks a legitimate basis and is facially invalid. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 635–36 (striking down provision of Colorado Constitution); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. Yet, for the provision to be facially unconstitutional, there must be “no set of circumstances under which [it] would be valid,” or it must lack any “plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472–73 (2010) (quoting other sources); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008). Here, insofar as the Texas law allocates benefits that were granted to encourage procreation within a family, the law clearly has a legitimate sweep. The constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, struck down in United States v. Windsor, is irrelevant. The Court in Windsor held Congress had no legitimate purpose in withholding federal marital rights and responsibilities from same-sex couples validly married under state law. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–94. But the Court’s reasoning emphasized that Congress could not defy the classification already made by state law, and it did not prohibit states from deciding on their own how to allocate marital benefits. See id. 10 If the government may extend benefits to some disabled persons but disqualify others based on who they marry, Jobst, 434 U.S. at 57–58, or provide survivors’ benefits to some widows who remarry but deny them to others, Bowen, 476 U.S. at 350, then surely the State may limit spousal employment benefits to spouses of the opposite sex. Only these spouses are capable of procreation within their marriage, and the State has an interest in encouraging such procreation. The State’s policy “seeks to foster the opportunity for meaningful parent-child bonds to develop,” and therefore “has a close and substantial bearing on the governmental interest in the actual formation of that bond.” See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 70. By misapplying Obergefell, the court of appeals overlooked this legitimate and important interest. * * * Texas, as it allocates benefits to employees’ spouses, may recognize the differences between same- and opposite-sex spouses. To withhold this decision from the people is to undermine precedent, democracy, and the limited role of courts in our nation. It bears repeating that the Supreme Court in Obergefell embraced “democracy [as] the appropriate process for change, so long as that process does not abridge fundamental rights.” 135 S. Ct. at 2605. I would take the Court at its word. Because the court of appeals did not, I respectfully dissent to the denial of the petition for review. _____________________ John P. Devine Justice Opinion delivered: September 2, 2016 11 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 1 of 29 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ALFRED PARELLA, Plaintiff, -against- 1:15-cv-0863 (LEK/DJS) JEH JOHNSON, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Alfred Parella (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action against various officers and employees of the United States (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging violations of his constitutional rights and of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”). Specifically, Plaintiff challenges orders of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)1 denying petitions that sought to classify his alien wife as an immediate relative and thereby obtain lawful permanent residence for her. Compl. ¶¶ 6-7, 25-33; Dkt. Nos. 1-1 to -3 (“Exhibits 1-3”); see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1154(a)(1)(A)(i). These petitions were denied because 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) removes the right to petition from any “citizen of the United States who has been convicted of a specified offense against a minor, unless the Secretary of Homeland Security, in the Secretary’s sole and unreviewable discretion, determines that the citizen poses no risk to the alien with respect to whom [the] petition . . . is 1 USCIS is a part of the Department of Homeland Security. Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 2 of 29 filed.” See Compl. ¶ 7; Exs. 1-3.2 On October 9, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Dkt. No. 10 (“Motion”); see also Dkt. Nos. 13 (“Opposition”); 14 (“Reply”). For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion is granted. II. BACKGROUND A. Plaintiff’s Criminal History and the Adam Walsh Act The following facts are taken from the Complaint and are assumed to be true for purposes of Defendants’ Motion. Plaintiff is a United States citizen who, in 2000, was convicted by the New York state courts of sexual abuse in the first degree. Compl. ¶ 8; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.65(1) (“A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree when he or she subjects another person to sexual contact . . . [b]y forcible compulsion.”). The victim of this offense was a minor. Compl. ¶ 7; see also Ex. 2 at 2 (noting that Plaintiff was “charged with sexually abusing a 15 year old girl”). In 2006, Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (“AWA”), Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006). In relevant part, the AWA barred United States citizens from petitioning for the classification of an alien as the citizen’s immediate relative when the citizen “has been convicted of a specified offense against a minor, unless the Secretary of Homeland Security, in the Secretary’s sole and unreviewable discretion, determines that the citizen poses no risk to the alien with respect to whom [the] petition . . . is filed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I); see also 42 2 “On a motion to dismiss, the court may consider ‘any written instrument attached to [the complaint] as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.’” Yak v. Bank Brussels Lambert, 252 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991)). 2 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 3 of 29 U.S.C. § 16911(7), (14) (defining the term “specified offense against a minor”).3 Plaintiff’s conviction for sexual abuse in the first degree qualifies under the AWA as a specified offense against a minor. Compl. ¶ 7; see also Exs. 1-3. On February 8, 2007, without notice-and-comment rulemaking, “USCIS issued a policy memorandum adopting a new standard” for making the determination that “the citizen poses no risk to the alien” as required by the AWA. Compl. ¶¶ 37-38; Memorandum from Michael Aytes, Assoc. Dir., USCIS, to Reg’l Dirs. et al. (Feb. 8, 2007) (“Aytes Memo”). Under the Aytes Memo, a citizen seeking approval of a petition who has been convicted of a specified offense against a minor “must submit evidence of rehabilitation and any other relevant evidence that clearly demonstrates, beyond any reasonable doubt, that he or she poses no risk to the safety and well-being of his or her intended beneficiary(ies).” Aytes Memo at 5 (emphasis added); accord Compl. ¶ 39. Pursuant to the Aytes Memo, this demonstration is required even when “none of the intended beneficiaries are children,” in which case the question is “whether the petitioner poses any risk to the safety or well-being of the adult beneficiary.” Aytes Memo at 7; accord Compl. ¶ 39. On September 24, 2008, “USCIS issued another memorandum regarding AWA cases”—again without notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures—“transmit[ting] a Standard Operating Procedure . . . for the adjudication of [petitions] under the [AWA].” Compl. ¶¶ 40, 4445; Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir., USCIS, to Field Leadership (Sept. 24, 2008) (“Neufeld Memo”). The Neufeld Memo states that: The Secretary of Homeland Security has delegated authority to make the “no risk” determination to USCIS. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Delegation No. 0150.1 § II(W) (June 5, 2003); see also 8 C.F.R. § 2.1 (“The Secretary of Homeland Security may, in the Secretary’s discretion, delegate any such authority or function to any official, officer, or employee of the Department of Homeland Security . . . .”). 3 3 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 4 of 29 USCIS interprets the “poses no risk to the beneficiary” provision to mean that the petitioner must pose no risk to the safety or well-being of the beneficiary, including the principal beneficiary and any alien derivative beneficiary. A petitioner who has been convicted of a specified offense against a minor must submit evidence that clearly demonstrates, beyond any reasonable doubt, that he or she poses no risk to the safety and well-being of his or her intended beneficiary(ies). Generally, rehabilitation is paramount to the “poses no risk” determination. Neufeld Memo at 9; Compl. ¶ 43. The Neufeld Memo also notes that, “given the nature and severity of many of the underlying offenses and the intent of the AWA, approval recommendations should be rare.” Neufeld Memo at 2 (emphasis omitted). B. Plaintiff’s Petitions and Administrative Appeal In 2006, Plaintiff married his wife, Olga Parella, who is a foreign national. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 19, 25.4 On February 7, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Alien Relative, or Form I-130, seeking classification of his wife as an immediate relative and a corresponding change in her immigration status. Compl. ¶ 29; Ex. 1 at 4.5 On September 24, 2007, USCIS responded to the petition with a “Request for Evidence and Notice of Intent to Deny” (“RFE/NOID”) based on Plaintiff’s conviction for sexual abuse, and Plaintiff was given 30 days to respond with evidence showing that he poses no risk to his alien spouse. Ex. 1 at 4. Plaintiff submitted a significant amount of evidence in response to the RFE/NOID. See id. at 4-5. Despite this evidence, USCIS denied Plaintiff’s petition, finding that his “evidence does not demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Plaintiff] pose[s] no risk 4 Plaintiff also states that their marriage is “a loving and nurturing relationship” and that his wife was “fully aware of the facts and circumstances of his conviction and freely chose to marry him and live with him.” Compl. ¶¶ 10-11. 5 For this Exhibit, the Court uses the pagination assigned by the Court’s Electronic Court Filing (“ECF”) system. 4 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 5 of 29 to the safety and well-being of [his] beneficiary.” Id. at 4, 9-10; Compl. ¶ 30. On August 2, 2010, Plaintiff again filed a Form I-130 to classify his wife as an immediate relative. Compl. ¶ 31; Ex. 2 at 1. “On July 6, 2011, USCIS requested that [Plaintiff] submit evidence that demonstrates, beyond any reasonable doubt, that [he] pose[s] no risk to the safety and well-being of the beneficiary.” Ex. 2 at 3. Again, Plaintiff submitted evidence in response to this demand. See id. at 3-4. On January 19, 2012, USCIS again concluded, “in its exercise of sole and unreviewable discretion, that [Plaintiff] ha[s] not sufficiently demonstrated that [he] pose[s] no risk to the beneficiary” and accordingly denied his petition. Id. at 4; Compl. ¶ 32. Plaintiff then appealed this determination to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Compl. ¶ 33; Ex. 3. On March 24, 2015, the BIA denied Plaintiff’s appeal, holding that the BIA “lack[s] jurisdiction to review [USCIS’s] risk determination,” since the AWA provides that this “determination lies within the sole and unreviewable discretion of the Secretary.” Ex. 3. C. Procedural History On July 7, 2015, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, seeking relief from the denials of his I-130 petitions. Compl. In the Complaint, Plaintiff sets out six causes of action: (1) application of the AWA against Plaintiff is an unconstitutional ex post facto application of law, (2) the denial of Plaintiff’s petitions violates his right to procedural and substantive due process, (3) the AWA’s petition bar is an unconstitutionally excessive punishment, (4) USCIS’s interpretation of the AWA (pursuant to the Aytes and Neufeld Memos) is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA, (5) USCIS was required to employ notice-and-comment rulemaking in the adoption of the Aytes and Neufeld Memos, and (6) the Aytes and Neufeld Memos exceed USCIS’s statutory authority. Compl. ¶¶ 51-115. 5 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 6 of 29 On October 9, 2015, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim and Plaintiff’s APA claims. Mot.; see also Dkt. No. 10-1 (“Defendants’ Memorandum”) at 5. Defendants contend that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) bars the Court from reviewing these claims, since the statute strips courts of jurisdiction to review any “decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under [the immigration code] to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” Additionally, Defendants moved to dismiss any remaining claims on the ground that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Mot.; Defs.’ Mem. at 10-25. III. LEGAL STANDARD A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “Dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is proper ‘when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.’” Ford v. D.C. 37 Union Local 1549, 579 F.3d 187, 188 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)). When the challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is facial—namely, when it is “based solely on the allegations of the complaint or the complaint and exhibits attached to it”—the Court must accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and draw “all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, No. 15-1072, 2016 WL 2640989, at *6 (2d Cir. May 10, 2016) (quoting Lunney v. United States, 319 F.3d 550, 554 (2d Cir. 2003)). If, however, the jurisdictional challenge is based on factual evidence provided by the defendant, “plaintiffs will need 6 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 7 of 29 to come forward with evidence of their own to controvert that presented by the defendant.” Id. at *7. In such a case, “[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc., 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005). B. Failure to State a Claim To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A court must accept as true the factual allegations contained in a complaint and draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Allaire Corp. v. Okumus, 433 F.3d 248, 249-50 (2d Cir. 2006). A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) only when it appears that there are not “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Plausibility requires “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the alleged misconduct].” Id. at 556. The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Where a court is unable to infer more than the mere possibility of the alleged misconduct based on the pleaded facts, the pleader has not demonstrated that she is entitled to relief and the action is subject to dismissal. See id. at 678-79. 7 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 8 of 29 IV. DISCUSSION A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and “possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The extent of this power is limited where, as here, Congress imposes specific jurisdictional restrictions by statute. Specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under [the immigration code] to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of [asylum].” Defendants in this case argue that this provision precludes review of USCIS’s decisions on Plaintiff’s I-130 petitions, thus barring Plaintiff’s procedural due process and APA claims. Mot.; Defs.’ Mem. at 5. Defendants are partially correct: while the Court cannot hear Plaintiff’s claim that USCIS’s decisions were arbitrary and capricious (and thus in violation of the APA), the Court does have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s constitutional claims and his other APA claims (namely his claims that the Aytes and Neufeld Memos were improperly adopted and exceed statutory authority). The question for each claim in determining whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction is whether or not the claim constitutes a challenge to USCIS’s exercise of discretion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B); see also 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (prohibiting judicial review when “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law”). Any challenge to USCIS’s no risk determination itself is barred because the statute expressly leaves this determination to “the Secretary’s sole and 8 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 9 of 29 unreviewable discretion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985) (finding judicial review under the APA unavailable “when Congress has expressed an intent to preclude judicial review” or when “the statute . . . can be taken to have ‘committed’ the decisionmaking to the agency’s judgment absolutely”). Accordingly, insofar as Plaintiff’s Complaint states any claim that USCIS’s decisions with respect to his particular case were arbitrary and capricious, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear it.6 See Ruiz v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 269, 276 n.5 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[F]actual determinations regarding whether an applicant convicted of an offense against a minor will pose a risk to the alien on whose behalf an I-130 application is filed are committed to the ‘unreviewable discretion’ of the Secretary of Homeland Security.”). This commitment to agency discretion must also bar the Court’s review of whether the adoption of the standards specified in the Aytes and Neufeld Memos was similarly arbitrary and capricious. If the decision as to whether a petitioner poses no risk to an alien beneficiary is left to “the Secretary’s sole and unreviewable discretion,” the Secretary’s choice of guidelines specifying how USCIS is to exercise this discretion also cannot be subject to judicial review. See Struniak v. Lynch, No. 15-CV-1447, 2016 WL 393953, at *8 (E.D. Va. Jan. 29, 2016) (“The weighing of individual pieces of evidence cannot yield a final result if one does not know how much weight is necessary to reach a conclusion. In light of this reality, the Secretary of Homeland Security has established, via the Aytes Memorandum, that discretion should only be exercised in favor of making a ‘no risk’ determination if there is evidence sufficient to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a 6 Plaintiff repeatedly states in his papers that he “does not challenge” USCIS’s “‘no risk’ determination” itself. E.g., Opp’n at 5-7. 9 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 10 of 29 petitioner poses no risk to his beneficiary. . . . Because the burden of proof, like the weighing of evidence, is a necessary component in formulating a discretionary determination, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) withdraws subject matter jurisdiction to review the burden employed.”). As such, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s arbitrary-and-capricious claims. The Court does, however, possess jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s remaining procedural and constitutional claims, including his claims that the standards expressed in the Aytes and Neufeld Memos were ultra vires and were required to undergo notice and comment. These claims do not constitute a challenge to USCIS’s exercise of discretion, but instead challenge the agency’s actions as procedurally or constitutionally unlawful. The Second Circuit recently addressed the distinction between challenges to the Secretary’s exercise of discretion and procedural and constitutional challenges in Mantena v. Johnson, 809 F.3d 721 (2d Cir. 2015), a case concerning the revocation of an employment visa petition. There, the court reiterated that “the Secretary may well not have complete discretion over the procedure for making a decision, even if the substantive decision falls within his discretion.” Id. at 729. In Mantena, the plaintiff challenged the Secretary’s decision on the ground that it failed to comply with the Department’s own regulations. Id. at 728-29. Accordingly, the Circuit found that § 1252(a)(2)(B)’s jurisdictional bar did not apply and that the district court should have reached the merits of the plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at 728-30; accord Kurapati v. U.S. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 775 F.3d 1255, 1261-62 (11th Cir. 2014). While the challenge in Mantena was based on an I-140 petition and a failure to comply with regulations, its reasoning equally applies to an I-130 petition and a challenge based on a failure to comply with statutes (namely, the APA and the AWA itself). 10 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 11 of 29 Defendants also argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, but Mantena similarly forecloses this argument. It makes no difference whether the procedural requirement stems from the agency’s own regulation, a federal statute, or from the Constitution itself: compliance with the law (and especially with the Constitution) is not subject to the agency’s discretion. See Garcia v. Neagle, 660 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1981) (“Where the controlling statute indicates that particular agency action is committed to agency discretion, a court may review the action if there is a claim that the agency has violated constitutional, statutory, regulatory or other restrictions, but may not review agency action where the challenge is only to the decision itself.” (citing Ness Inv. Corp. v. USDA, 512 F.2d 706, 715 (9th Cir. 1975))). Indeed, in Mantena, the district court found subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s procedural due process claim and proceeded to address it on the merits, a path that the Circuit did not disturb. See 809 F.3d at 727; see also Reynolds v. Johnson, 628 F. App’x 497, 498 (9th Cir. 2015) (reversing the district court for finding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s constitutional claim concerning the AWA); Makransky v. Johnson, No. 15-CV-1259, 2016 WL 1254353, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2016) (finding subject matter jurisdiction over a constitutional challenge to the AWA). Additionally, “where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear . . . in part to avoid the ‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.” Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988). For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s arbitrary-and-capricious APA claims, Compl. ¶¶ 8794, are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For Plaintiff’s remaining claims, the Court finds that it does have subject matter jurisdiction and thus proceeds to consider whether Plaintiff 11 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 12 of 29 successfully states a claim for which relief may be granted. B. Failure to State a Claim 1. Ex Post Facto Law The Constitution prohibits the adoption of any ex post facto law, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, a mandate that prevents “retroactive application of penal legislation,” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994). In United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980), the Supreme Court outlined a two-part test for determining whether a statutory provision is civil or criminal in nature, and thus whether the Ex Post Facto Clause applies. “First, we have set out to determine whether Congress, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. Second, where Congress has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention.” Id. at 248-49 (citation omitted); accord Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1274-75 (2d Cir. 1997). Addressing the first prong, the AWA lists titles for the relevant sections as “Immigration Law Reforms to Prevent Sex Offenders from Abusing Children,” and “Barring Convicted Sex Offenders from Having Family-Based Petitions Approved.” Pub. L. No. 109-248, tit. IV, 120 Stat. 587, 622. Nothing in these titles suggests that the provisions in question are intended to be punitive instead of designed to prospectively guard potential immigrants from previously convicted sex offenders. The only nonconclusory allegation on this point provided by Plaintiff is a reference to a speech by Senator Patrick Leahy, in which the Senator argues that the relevant section of the AWA could “harshly and unnecessarily penalize people seeking entry to the United States who have a family member in the country.” 152 Cong. Rec. S8028 (2006) (emphasis added); Compl. ¶ 57. 12 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 13 of 29 Even if Senator Leahy’s individual speech could be said to “indicate[] an intention” of Congress, Ward, 448 U.S. at 248, his language plainly reflected a concern that the AWA would “harshly and unnecessarily penalize” the beneficiary, not the citizen petitioner. As such, Plaintiff has alleged no facts—and the Court can find none—showing that the immigration provision of the AWA was designed to punish people previously convicted of sex crimes, rather than to protect potential immigrants as a forward-looking, civil statute. Turning to the second prong of the Ward test, “[t]he Ex Post Facto Clause does not preclude [Congress] from making reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences.” Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103-04 (2003) (upholding the application of Alaska’s sex offender registration system to offenders convicted prior to the system’s adoption). In determining whether such a regulatory consequence is excessively punitive so as to make the provision penal instead of civil, “[t]he question is whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective.” Id. at 105. In this case, barring persons convicted of sex crimes against children from petitioning for family-based visas is reasonable in light of the statute’s objective, namely protecting potential beneficiaries from harm that could come from establishing residency in the United States with an immigration status that is dependant upon the petitioner. Though Plaintiff includes allegations suggesting that the AWA’s provisions are not very effective at achieving its stated goals, see Compl. ¶ 56, the government is not required to adopt the best or narrowest statute to avoid its classification as penal, see Smith, 538 U.S. at 105 (“The excessiveness inquiry of our ex post facto jurisprudence is not an exercise in determining whether the legislature has made the best choice possible to address the problem it seeks to remedy.”). 13 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 14 of 29 Other courts that have addressed this issue have also concluded that the AWA is a civil provision not subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause. E.g., Makransky, 2016 WL 1254353, at *6; Suhail v. U.S. Attorney Gen., No. 15-CV-1259, 2015 WL 7016340, at *8-9 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2015). Because the provision challenged by Plaintiff is not penal in nature, it is not subject to the prohibition of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 2. Constitutionally Excessive Punishment The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” This text has been interpreted to prohibit punishments that are excessive in relation to the crime, as “it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 291 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits grossly excessive punishment.”). Similar to the Court’s ex post facto analysis above, a statute or other governmental act must be penal in nature—either on its face or because of its effect—in order to invite scrutiny as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1958) (basing Eighth Amendment analysis of a citizenship-stripping statute on a “[d]etermination of whether th[e] statute is a penal law”); see also Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-11 (1993) (analyzing whether forfeiture should be understood as punishment, and thus whether it is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny); Makransky, 2016 WL 1254353, at *6 (employing the same analysis for the AWA). Because the challenged provision of the AWA is not penal in nature, it cannot constitute cruel and unusual punishment that is contrary to the Eighth Amendment. 14 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 15 of 29 3. Due Process In addition to his Eighth Amendment and ex post facto claims, Plaintiff also alleges that both the procedures used and the substance of USCIS’s decision violated his right to due process. Compl. ¶¶ 65-79. As discussed below, even assuming that Plaintiff has a protected interest sufficient to warrant procedural protections, due process was afforded in USCIS’s denials of his I130 petitions. Additionally, the substantive component of the Due Process Clause does not create a fundamental right to the admission of an alien spouse. As such, Plaintiff’s due process claims must be dismissed. a. Procedural Due Process The procedural component of the Due Process Clause prevents the deprivation of a protected interest absent the provision of sufficient procedural protections. Thus, the inquiry into a procedural due process claim is a two-prong test: “(1) whether plaintiffs possessed a protected liberty or property interest, and, if so, (2) what process plaintiffs were due before they could be deprived of that interest.” Adams v. Suozzi, 517 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Sealed v. Sealed, 332 F.3d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 2003)); see also Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126 (1990) (“[T]o determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred, it is necessary to ask what process the State provided, and whether it was constitutionally adequate.”). While Plaintiff must establish both of these prongs in order to successfully state a procedural due process claim, the Court need not reach the question of whether there is a protected liberty interest in the approval of an I-130 petition sufficient to invoke constitutional procedure 15 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 16 of 29 requirements.7 This is because, under the Supreme Court’s procedural due process precedent, sufficient process was provided in this case. “Due process . . . is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation.” Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127. The amount of process that is due is generally determined by balancing three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Examining the Mathews v. Eldridge factors suggests that minimum procedural protections are required in making the discretionary no risk determination under the AWA. Even assuming that the private interest in obtaining legal immigration status for an alien spouse is significant, the other factors weigh heavily against Plaintiff’s position in this case. The risk of erroneous deprivation is effectively zero where, as here, the determination is entirely within the agency’s discretion. Furthermore, the procedures afforded here allowed Plaintiff to submit substantial evidence regarding why he presented no risk to his proposed beneficiary; any additional procedures on this 7 While the Court ultimately decides this case on other grounds, the case Plaintiff uses to support his argument that he has a protected interest in the approval of his I-130 petition is plainly inapplicable here. Plaintiff cites to Ching v. Mayorkas, 725 F.3d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013), in which the Ninth Circuit found a property right in the approval of an I-130 petition only because the petitioner there was “entitled, as a matter of right, to the approval of his petition.” Because Plaintiff is not entitled to approval of his I-130 petition, and in fact is barred from approval in the absence of discretionary relief from the Secretary, the reasoning of Ching cannot support Plaintiff’s claims. Second Circuit case law similarly suggests that there is not a protected interest in this case. See Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1134-36 (2d Cir. 1990). 16 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 17 of 29 point would provide minimum additional value to USCIS’s determination. Finally, the government’s interest in maintaining simple procedures is strong given the entirely discretionary nature of the no risk determination. Also instructive on this point is the Supreme Court’s recent case of Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015). In Din, the Court addressed the denial of a spousal visa application under the Immigration and Nationality Act’s bar against visas for aliens who engaged in “terrorist activity,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B). 135 S. Ct. at 2132. The notice of denial provided no explanation or reasoning other than that the denial was made under § 1182(a)(3)(B). Id. The citizen spouse brought suit, claiming that the lack of explanation for the visa denial violated her right to procedural due process. Id. Although the case led to a significantly fractured Court, the controlling opinion—authored by Justice Kennedy—found that “even assuming [Din] has [a protected liberty] interest, the Government satisfied due process when it notified Din’s husband that his visa was denied under the immigration statute’s terrorism bar.” Id. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). The procedural safeguards in that case were extremely minimal, see id. at 2144 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that “neither spouse here has received any procedural protection”), but the Court nevertheless found that sufficient constitutional process was afforded to Din. Plaintiff claims that the Due Process Clause “requires a petitioner to have a meaningful opportunity to respond to the evidence, to make an argument against a proposed deprivation and to face his accusers.” Compl. ¶ 74.8 Even if Plaintiff were entitled to all of these protections, there are 8 Plaintiff’s additional claim that “procedural due process requires . . . the right to appeal,” Compl. ¶ 73, is simply incorrect, see United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 323 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not establish any right to an appeal . . . .”). Plaintiff is also incorrect in saying that he “is left with no avenue to seek review of the agency’s decisions,” Compl. ¶ 78, as the Court fully reviews Plaintiff’s constitutional and 17 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 18 of 29 no allegations in the Complaint suggesting that they were denied to him.9 Here, Plaintiff submitted a significant quantity of evidence and received written decisions detailing the evidence presented and describing the Secretary’s denial of the discretionary relief sought. See Exs. 1-2. The Complaint fails to allege any specific procedural requests that were denied, any evidence that he was barred from presenting, or any events suggesting that the USCIS agents did not evaluate his petition in a fair and unbiased manner.10 See Compl. ¶¶ 72-76. Conclusory allegations that Plaintiff’s rights were violated, without specific facts showing what procedures were denied to him, cannot formulate a successful Fifth Amendment claim. The only remaining allegation concerning procedural due process reflects Plaintiff’s argument that “the [Aytes and Neufeld] memoranda dictate that the agency is already prejudiced against such petitions and states approval should be ‘rare,’” and that, accordingly, Defendants’ “adoption of a policy of presumptive denial and their elevating the burden of proof . . . violates the Plaintiff’s right to due process.” Compl. ¶¶ 75-76. This allegation has nothing to do with the procedural protections afforded in Plaintiff’s attempt to make a no risk demonstration, but instead challenges the Secretary’s determination of how he will exercise his discretion. Plaintiff cannot repackage his arbitrary-and-capricious claim in a constitutional wrapping, and as such, this claim must be dismissed. remaining APA claims in this opinion. Indeed, Plaintiff’s Opposition only argues that “Plaintiff’s substantive due process rights have been violated.” Opp’n at 13. Because the Complaint does attempt to state a procedural due process claim, however, see Compl. ¶¶ 72-78, the Court addresses this claim here. 9 10 The possible sole exception to this is Plaintiff’s claim that the Aytes and Neufeld Memos themselves biased the reviewing USCIS agents by creating a presumption against a no risk determination. See Compl. ¶¶ 75-76. This argument is further addressed below. 18 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 19 of 29 b. Substantive Due Process In addition to the procedural protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court has also interpreted the Due Process Clause to include a substantive component. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1992) (describing the standard for adjudicating substantive due process claims). This substantive due process “protects individual liberty against ‘certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). In evaluating a substantive due process claim, “the first step is to determine whether the asserted right is ‘fundamental.’” Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2003). “Rights are fundamental when they are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ or ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 460-61 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). If a right is fundamental, strict scrutiny applies and any restriction on the right must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 140; Immediato, 73 F.3d at 460. “Where the claimed right is not fundamental, the governmental regulation need only be reasonably related to a legitimate state objective.” Immediato, 73 F.3d at 461 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303-06 (1993); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). In his Complaint, Plaintiff argues that the AWA—and USCIS’s denial of Plaintiff’s petitions under the AWA—violates his “fundamental right to marry and live with his spouse as husband and 19 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 20 of 29 wife.” Compl. ¶ 71; accord id. ¶ 68. As such, the Court must address whether the right to live in the United States with one’s alien spouse is a fundamental right subject to the substantive due process protections of the Fifth Amendment. At the outset, it is plainly correct that the Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to marry. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (overturning bans on interracial marriages); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (striking down a statute that required court approval in order for persons failing to make child support payments to marry); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (invalidating a regulation that restricted marriage access for prison inmates). The most recent apex of this principle is found in the Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage cases, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), and Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Plaintiff extensively cites these marriage cases in his Complaint and Opposition. See Compl. ¶ 70 & n.1; Opp’n at 17-20. It is important to note, however, that all of these cases reflected one of two fundamental rights: the fundamental right to marry, and the fundamental right to marry the person of one’s choice. The Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell further explains that the fundamental right to marry the person of one’s choosing is derived in part from the right to equal protection under the law, and thus the prevention of discrimination against protected classes should be seen as a core component of the Court’s jurisprudence in this area. See 135 S. Ct. at 2602-04 (explaining how, within the marriage context, “[t]he Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way”); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693-96 (same).11 11 Plaintiff attempts just such an argument in his Opposition. Opp’n at 20 (“[The AWA] is a law that targets a politically disfavored group, sex offenders, not for reasons like government efficiency but rather to impose a ‘disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon’ them.” 20 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 21 of 29 But this is not a case concerning the right to marry, or even the right to marry the person of one’s choosing. These rights were already realized by Plaintiff when he married his wife in 2006. Instead, this case is about the right to obtain a visa for an alien spouse. Plaintiff argues that this right stems from an expanded view of the fundamental right to marry, which “necessarily incorporates the right . . . to live together as husband and wife.” Opp’n at 20. In support of this proposition, Plaintiff points to the Supreme Court’s language in Meyer v. Nebraska, in which the Court listed—without engaging in present-day substantive due process analysis—a number of rights denoted by the liberty interest in the Due Process Clause, including the right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).12 Inferences derived from dicta in a nearcentury old case cannot overcome the consistent voice of today’s courts, which even under a dramatically expanded understanding of fundamental rights have found that there is no such right to immigration benefits for one’s alien spouse. See Morales-Izquierdo v. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 600 F.3d 1076, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding no substantive due process right for U.S. citizens to live with their alien spouses), overruled in part on other grounds by Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Struniak, 2016 WL 393953, at *14-18 (denying a substantive due process claim against the AWA); Burbank v. Johnson, No. 14-CV-292, 2015 WL 4591643, (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693)). Simply put, sex offenders are not a protected class. Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1999); Taylor v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., No. 07-CV-1288, 2009 WL 3522781, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2009). 12 Meyer itself concerned a criminal conviction under “[a]n act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in the state of Nebraska.” 262 U.S. at 396-97. 21 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 22 of 29 at *7-8 (E.D. Wash. July 29, 2015) (same); Cardenas v. United States, No. 12-CV-346, 2013 WL 4495795, at *7 (D. Idaho Aug. 19, 2013) (“[T]here is no constitutional right to reside with one’s spouse in the United States.”); see also Boyal v. Napolitano, No. 09-CV-3263, 2011 WL 864618, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2011) (noting the existence of “clear case law holding that there is no substantive due process right to reside with one’s spouse”). The uniformity of these cases is not surprising, since even if there were a fundamental right to live with one’s spouse when both partners are citizens of the United States, the immigration context of this case significantly alters the constitutional analysis. “In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens,” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976), and “‘over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens,” Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)). “Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953). The expansion of substantive due process into the realm of immigration thus cannot be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” Immediato, 73 F.3d at 460-61 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503), and requiring the government to admit any alien who is married to a U.S. resident is not “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” id. (quoting Palko, 320 U.S. at 325-26). “[J]udicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground” in the field of substantive due process. Collins, 503 U.S. at 125. In light of this principle, the Court will not expand its understanding of the constitutional marriage right in a 22 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 23 of 29 manner that contradicts the traditional sovereign prerogative concerning immigration. As discussed earlier in the ex post facto context, the AWA’s immigration provision is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, namely the prevention of harm to potential immigration beneficiaries by convicted sex offenders. See Immediato, 73 F.3d at 461 (applying rational basis review when the claimed right is not fundamental).13 As such, Plaintiff cannot prevail on his substantive due process claim. 4. APA Claims Plaintiff’s final two claims arise under the APA, which requires notice and comment procedures for the enactment of new rules and prohibits agency action “in excess of statutory . . . authority.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 706(2)(C). The factual predicate for both is the adoption of the Aytes and Neufeld Memos, with Plaintiff complaining that the procedures used in their adoption and the evaluative standards they espouse violate the APA and AWA’s statutory requirements. See Compl. ¶¶ 95-116. Because the Aytes and Neufeld Memos are exempt from the APA’s notice and comment requirements, and fit within the broad discretion afforded to the Secretary under the AWA, Plaintiff’s remaining APA claims must be dismissed. a. Notice and Comment Rulemaking The APA typically requires agencies to propose and adopt new rules using a notice-andcomment rulemaking process, in which a notice of proposed rulemaking is published in the Federal Register and interested persons are allowed to submit their views to the agency before the rule is finally adopted. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c). A key exception to this rulemaking procedure exists, 13 Nowhere in Plaintiff’s papers does he suggest that the AWA does not survive rational basis review. See Compl.; Opp’n. 23 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 24 of 29 however, where the rule in question is “interpretative” (or “interpretive” as it is commonly referred to by the courts). Id. § 553(b)(A). “While the APA does not define interpretative (nor interpretive) rules, courts have developed several general formulations in order to distinguish interpretive rules from those that are ‘substantive’ or ‘legislative,’ which must comply with the notice and comment provisions of the APA.” Sweet v. Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80, 90 (2d Cir. 2000). Legislative rules “grant[] rights, impose[] obligations, or produce[] other significant effects on private interests.” White v. Shalala, 7 F.3d 296, 303 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Perales v. Sullivan, 948 F.3d 1348, 1354 (2d Cir. 1991)). More simply put, “[l]egislative rules have the force of law.” N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 12 (2d Cir. 1995). “Interpretive rules, on the other hand, do not create rights, but merely ‘clarify an existing statute or regulation.’” Id. (quoting White, 7 F.3d at 303). Quoting the D.C. Circuit, another Second Circuit case described four questions used in making this determination: (1) whether in the absence of the rule there would not be an adequate legislative basis for enforcement action or other agency action to confer benefits or ensure the performance of duties, (2) whether the agency has published the rule in the Code of Federal Regulations, (3) whether the agency has explicitly invoked its general legislative authority, or (4) whether the rule effectively amends a prior legislative rule. If the answer to any of these questions is affirmative, we have a legislative, not an interpretive rule. Sweet, 235 F.3d at 91 (quoting Am. Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Heath Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). In this case, the Aytes and Neufeld Memos are properly classified as interpretive rules. The Memos do not create generally applicable law or policy, but instead direct USCIS field agents as to how the agency (and by extension, the Secretary) would like them to exercise its “sole and unreviewable discretion” in making the AWA’s no risk determination. The Memos do not have the 24 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 25 of 29 force of law, see N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 45 F.3d at 12, and the answer to each of the four questions discussed in Sweet suggests an interpretive rule, see 235 F.3d at 91. At least one other court has also found that the Aytes and Neufeld Memos are interpretive for purposes of the APA. See Makransky, 2016 WL 1254353, at *7-8. As such, USCIS was not required to engage in notice and comment rulemaking before adopting the Aytes and Neufeld Memos. b. Ultra Vires Plaintiff also argues that the policies found within the Aytes and Neufeld Memos exceed the statutory authority granted to the Secretary under the AWA, specifically focusing on the adoption of a “beyond any reasonable doubt” standard for the approval of a no risk determination. Compl. ¶¶ 106-12.14 According to Plaintiff, this “‘beyond any reasonable doubt’ standard violates the plain language of the statue and is inconsistent with the law,” in part because normal visa adjudications rely on the lower “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Compl. ¶¶ 106-07. As such, the Court must examine whether the AWA can permit the adoption of this heightened standard for the Secretary’s grant of discretionary relief. While agency interpretations of the statutes they administer are often afforded significant deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 14 Though not reflected in the ultra vires section of his Complaint, Plaintiff also argues that the “presumption of denial” expressed in the Aytes and Neufeld Memos is “found nowhere in the statute” and thus violates the APA. Opp’n at 24-25. The sole case cited by Plaintiff for the proposition that a presumption of denial violates the APA is Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, Department of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1994), in which the Court struck down a regulation that shifted the burden of proof away from the petitioner, who was seeking benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. This case only serves to rebut Plaintiff’s point, since far from prohibiting any presumption of denial, Greenwich Collieries reiterates the APA’s general position that the proponent of an order or petition—in this case, Plaintiff—carries the burden of proof. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (noting that, in hearings, “the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof”). 25 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 26 of 29 842-43 (1984), this respect for an agency’s interpretation depends upon the degree of authority delegated to the agency and the manner in which it adopted the challenged rule, see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (“We hold that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”). Here, however, the Court need not determine whether the Aytes and Neufeld Memos warrant Chevron deference, because the Memos represent a valid exercise of statutory authority even under the limited deference of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995) (finding that an “internal agency guideline, which is akin to an ‘interpretive rule’ that ‘do[es] not require notice and comment,’ is still entitled to some deference” (alteration in original) (quoting Shalala v. Guernesy Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S 87, 99 (1995))). Starting with the language of the statute, the provision in question states that the right to petition for immediate relatives “shall not apply to a citizen of the United States who has been convicted of a specified offense against a minor, unless the Secretary of Homeland Security, in the Secretary’s sole and unreviewable discretion, determines that the citizen poses no risk to the alien with respect to whom a petition . . . is filed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I). It is important to note what interpretation of this section is being challenged. USCIS does not claim that this section creates or requires the use of a “beyond any reasonable doubt” standard. Instead, the Memos explain how USCIS will exercise the Secretary’s discretion when making no risk determinations under the AWA, including by requiring the submission of “evidence that clearly demonstrates, beyond any reasonable doubt, that [the petitioner] poses no risk to the safety and well-being of his or 26 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 27 of 29 her intended beneficiary(ies).” Aytes Memo at 5. Thus, the question is whether USCIS’s interpretation of the statute as permitting the use of this heightened standard before granting discretionary relief is acceptable. Skidmore holds that the degree of deference afforded to an interpretation “depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” 323 U.S. at 140. Given the plain text of the statute, which grants “sole and unreviewable discretion” to the Secretary in making no risk determinations, an interpretation of § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) as allowing the adoption of a beyond any reasonable doubt standard—or any other standard, for that matter—fits the clearest reading of the statute, and certainly survives review under Skidmore. The AWA provides the Secretary with total discretion on how to make the no risk determination. Requiring a heightened showing by petitioners in these circumstances—a position that USCIS has consistently taken and explains in the Aytes and Neufeld Memos—clearly fits the statute’s intent and discretionary scheme. Because requiring petitioners to make the no risk demonstration “beyond any reasonable doubt” is a legitimate exercise of the Secretary’s discretion under the AWA, the agency’s interpretation of that statute is proper and the adoption of the Aytes and Neufeld Memos was not ultra vires. Insofar as the Complaint also alleges that applying the AWA is ultra vires when the petition’s beneficiary is an adult, see Compl. ¶ 113, this argument is clearly belied by the text of the statute. The statute requires a no risk determination for any “alien with respect to whom a petition . . . is filed,” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I), and does not make any distinction between adult and child beneficiaries. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the 27 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 28 of 29 court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. Here, the plain text of the statute requires a no risk determination for every beneficiary, including adults. USCIS’s compliance with the plain text of the statute cannot give rise to an ultra vires APA claim. Though not discussed in his Opposition, Plaintiff’s Complaint also keys in on the language of § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i), claiming that the AWA can only prohibit him from “filing” an I-130 petition, but that once a petition is filed, it cannot be denied on account of his status as a convicted sex offender. Compl. ¶ 114. This argument is obviously unavailing. First, Plaintiff’s interpretation is absurd on its face. Under his view, if a USCIS agent fails to tackle a petitioner before his papers reach their inbox, they would be forced to approve the petition despite the clear intentions of Congress. “Where an examination of the statute as a whole demonstrates that a party’s interpretation would lead to ‘absurd or futile results . . . plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole,’ that interpretation should be rejected.” Yerdon v. Henry, 91 F.3d 370, 376 (2d Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (quoting EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 120 (1988)). Second, Plaintiff’s reading ignores the plain language of § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I), which states that the entire petitioning procedure “shall not apply to a citizen of the United States who has been convicted of a specified offense against a minor” absent discretionary relief from the Secretary. For all of these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the APA for which relief may be granted. IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, it is hereby: ORDERED, that, for the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion (Dkt. No. 10) is 28 Case 1:15-cv-00863-LEK-DJS Document 15 Filed 06/27/16 Page 29 of 29 GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice; and it is further ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on all parties in accordance with the Local Rules. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: June 27, 2016 Albany, New York 29 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2015 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH ET AL. v. HELLERSTEDT, COMMISSIONER, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 15–274. Argued March 2, 2016—Decided June 27, 2016 A “State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion . . . is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 150. But “a statute which, while furthering [a] valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends,” Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 877 (plurality opinion), and “[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right,” id., at 878. In 2013, the Texas Legislature enacted House Bill 2 (H. B. 2), which contains the two provisions challenged here. The “admittingprivileges requirement” provides that a “physician performing or inducing an abortion . . . must, on the date [of service], have active admitting privileges at a hospital . . . located not further than 30 miles from the” abortion facility. The “surgical-center requirement” requires an “abortion facility” to meet the “minimum standards . . . for ambulatory surgical centers” under Texas law. Before the law took effect, a group of Texas abortion providers filed the Abbott case, in which they lost a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the admitting-privileges provision. After the law went into effect, petitioners, another group of abortion providers (including some Abbott plaintiffs), filed this suit, claiming that both the admitting-privileges and the surgical-center provisions violated the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Casey. They sought injunctions preventing enforcement of the admitting-privileges provision as applied to physi- 2 WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT Syllabus cians at one abortion facility in McAllen and one in El Paso and prohibiting enforcement of the surgical-center provision throughout Texas. Based on the parties’ stipulations, expert depositions, and expert and other trial testimony, the District Court made extensive findings, including, but not limited to: as the admitting-privileges requirement began to be enforced, the number of facilities providing abortions dropped in half, from about 40 to about 20; this decrease in geographical distribution means that the number of women of reproductive age living more than 50 miles from a clinic has doubled, the number living more than 100 miles away has increased by 150%, the number living more than 150 miles away by more than 350%, and the number living more than 200 miles away by about 2,800%; the number of facilities would drop to seven or eight if the surgical-center provision took effect, and those remaining facilities would see a significant increase in patient traffic; facilities would remain only in five metropolitan areas; before H. B. 2’s passage, abortion was an extremely safe procedure with very low rates of complications and virtually no deaths; it was also safer than many more common procedures not subject to the same level of regulation; and the cost of compliance with the surgical-center requirement would most likely exceed $1.5 million to $3 million per clinic. The court enjoined enforcement of the provisions, holding that the surgical-center requirement imposed an undue burden on the right of women in Texas to seek previability abortions; that, together with that requirement, the admittingprivileges requirement imposed an undue burden in the Rio Grande Valley, El Paso, and West Texas; and that the provisions together created an “impermissible obstacle as applied to all women seeking a previability abortion.” The Fifth Circuit reversed in significant part. It concluded that res judicata barred the District Court from holding the admittingprivileges requirement unconstitutional statewide and that res judicata also barred the challenge to the surgical-center provision. Reasoning that a law is “constitutional if (1) it does not have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus and (2) it is reasonably related to . . . a legitimate state interest,” the court found that both requirements were rationally related to a compelling state interest in protecting women’s health. Held: 1. Petitioners’ constitutional claims are not barred by res judicata. Pp. 10–18. (a) Res judicata neither bars petitioners’ challenges to the admitting-privileges requirement nor prevents the Court from awarding fa- Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016) 3 Syllabus cial relief. The fact that several petitioners had previously brought the unsuccessful facial challenge in Abbott does not mean that claim preclusion, the relevant aspect of res judicata, applies. Claim preclusion prohibits “successive litigation of the very same claim,” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U. S. 742, 748, but petitioners’ as-applied postenforcement challenge and the Abbott plaintiffs’ facial preenforcement challenge do not present the same claim. Changed circumstances showing that a constitutional harm is concrete may give rise to a new claim. Abbott rested upon facts and evidence presented before enforcement of the admitting-privileges requirement began, when it was unclear how clinics would be affected. This case rests upon later, concrete factual developments that occurred once enforcement started and a significant number of clinics closed. Res judicata also does not preclude facial relief here. In addition to requesting as-applied relief, petitioners asked for other appropriate relief, and their evidence and arguments convinced the District Court of the provision’s unconstitutionality across the board. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) provides that a “final judgment should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings,” and this Court has held that if the arguments and evidence show that a statutory provision is unconstitutional on its face, an injunction prohibiting its enforcement is “proper,” Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 333. Pp. 10–15. (b) Claim preclusion also does not bar petitioners’ challenge to the surgical-center requirement. In concluding that petitioners should have raised this claim in Abbott, the Fifth Circuit did not take account of the fact that the surgical-center provision and the admitting-privileges provision are separate provisions with two different and independent regulatory requirements. Challenges to distinct regulatory requirements are ordinarily treated as distinct claims. Moreover, the surgical-center provision’s implementing regulations had not even been promulgated at the time Abbott was filed, and the relevant factual circumstances changed between the two suits. Pp. 16–18. 2. Both the admitting-privileges and the surgical-center requirements place a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking a previability abortion, constitute an undue burden on abortion access, and thus violate the Constitution. Pp. 19–39. (a) The Fifth Circuit’s standard of review may be read to imply that a district court should not consider the existence or nonexistence of medical benefits when deciding the undue burden question, but Casey requires courts to consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer, see 505 U. S., 4 WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT Syllabus at 887–898. The Fifth Circuit’s test also mistakenly equates the judicial review applicable to the regulation of a constitutionally protected personal liberty with the less strict review applicable to, e.g., economic legislation. And the court’s requirement that legislatures resolve questions of medical uncertainty is inconsistent with this Court’s case law, which has placed considerable weight upon evidence and argument presented in judicial proceedings when determining the constitutionality of laws regulating abortion procedures. See id., at 888–894. Explicit legislative findings must be considered, but there were no such findings in H. B. 2. The District Court applied the correct legal standard here, considering the evidence in the record— including expert evidence—and then weighing the asserted benefits against the burdens. Pp. 19–21. (b) The record contains adequate legal and factual support for the District Court’s conclusion that the admitting-privileges requirement imposes an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to choose. The requirement’s purpose is to help ensure that women have easy access to a hospital should complications arise during an abortion procedure, but the District Court, relying on evidence showing extremely low rates of serious complications before H. B. 2’s passage, found no significant health-related problem for the new law to cure. The State’s record evidence, in contrast, does not show how the new law advanced the State’s legitimate interest in protecting women’s health when compared to the prior law, which required providers to have a “working arrangement” with doctors who had admitting privileges. At the same time, the record evidence indicates that the requirement places a “substantial obstacle” in a woman’s path to abortion. The dramatic drop in the number of clinics means fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased crowding. It also means a significant increase in the distance women of reproductive age live from an abortion clinic. Increased driving distances do not always constitute an “undue burden,” but they are an additional burden, which, when taken together with others caused by the closings, and when viewed in light of the virtual absence of any health benefit, help support the District Court’s “undue burden” conclusion. Pp. 21–28. (c) The surgical-center requirement also provides few, if any, health benefits for women, poses a substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions, and constitutes an “undue burden” on their constitutional right to do so. Before this requirement was enacted, Texas law required abortion facilities to meet a host of health and safety requirements that were policed by inspections and enforced through administrative, civil, and criminal penalties. Record evidence shows that the new provision imposes a number of additional requirements that are generally unnecessary in the abortion clinic context; that it Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016) 5 Syllabus provides no benefit when complications arise in the context of a medical abortion, which would generally occur after a patient has left the facility; that abortions taking place in abortion facilities are safer than common procedures that occur in outside clinics not subject to Texas’ surgical-center requirements; and that Texas has waived no part of the requirement for any abortion clinics as it has done for nearly two-thirds of other covered facilities. This evidence, along with the absence of any contrary evidence, supports the District Court’s conclusions, including its ultimate legal conclusion that requirement is not necessary. At the same time, the record provides adequate evidentiary support for the District Court’s conclusion that the requirement places a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion. The court found that it “strained credulity” to think that the seven or eight abortion facilities would be able to meet the demand. The Fifth Circuit discounted expert witness Dr. Grossman’s testimony that the surgical-center requirement would cause the number of abortions performed by each remaining clinic to increase by a factor of about 5. But an expert may testify in the “form of an opinion” as long as that opinion rests upon “sufficient facts or data” and “reliable principles and methods.” Fed. Rule Evid. 702. Here, Dr. Grossman’s opinion rested upon his participation, together with other university researchers, in research tracking the number of facilities providing abortion services, using information from, among other things, the state health services department and other public sources. The District Court acted within its legal authority in finding his testimony admissible. Common sense also suggests that a physical facility that satisfies a certain physical demand will generally be unable to meet five times that demand without expanding physically or otherwise incurring significant costs. And Texas presented no evidence at trial suggesting that expansion was possible. Finally, the District Court’s finding that a currently licensed abortion facility would have to incur considerable costs to meet the surgical-center requirements supports the conclusion that more surgical centers will not soon fill the gap left by closed facilities. Pp. 28–36. (d) Texas’ three additional arguments are unpersuasive. Pp. 36– 39. 790 F. 3d 563 and 598, reversed and remanded. BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring opinion. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, J., joined.   Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  1  NOTICE:   This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the  preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.   Readers  are  requested   to  notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash  ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other   formal  errors,  in  order  that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.          SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________  No. 15–274   _________________  WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH, ET AL   ., PETITIONERS v.  JOHN HELLERSTEDT, COMMISSIONER, TEXAS  DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES, ET AL   .  ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF  APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  [June 27, 2016]  JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.  In  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.  v.  Casey,  505  U. S.  833,  878  (1992),  a  plurality  of  the  Court  concluded that there “exists” an “undue burden” on a woman’s  right  to  decide  to  have  an  abortion,  and  consequently  a  provision of law is constitutionally invalid, if the “purpose   or effect” of the provision “is to place a substantial obstacle  in  the  path  of  a  woman  seeking  an  abortion  before  the  fetus attains viability.”  (Emphasis added.)  The plurality  added  that  “[u]nnecessary  health  regulations  that  have the  purpose  or  effect  of  presenting  a  substantial  obstacle  to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.”  Ibid.    We  must  here  decide  whether  two  provisions  of  Texas’  House  Bill  2  violate  the  Federal  Constitution  as  interpreted  in  Casey.  The  first  provision,  which  we  shall  call  the “admitting-privileges requirement,” says that  “[a]  physician  performing  or  inducing  an  abortion  . . .  must,  on  the  date  the  abortion  is  performed  or  induced,  have  active  admitting  privileges  at  a  hospital    2    WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court  that . . . is located not further than 30 miles from the  location  at  which  the  abortion  is  performed  or  induced.”  Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §171.0031(a)  (West Cum. Supp. 2015).  This  provision  amended  Texas  law  that  had  previously  required an abortion facility to maintain a written protocol  “for  managing  medical  emergencies  and  the  transfer  of  patients  requiring  further  emergency  care  to  a  hospital.”  38 Tex. Reg. 6546 (2013).   The second provision, which we shall call the “surgicalcenter requirement,” says that   “the minimum standards for an abortion facility must  be equivalent to the minimum standards adopted under  [the  Texas  Health  and  Safety  Code  section]  for  ambulatory  surgical  centers.”    Tex.  Health  &  Safety   Code Ann. §245.010(a).    We  conclude  that  neither  of  these  provisions  confers  medical  benefits  sufficient  to  justify  the  burdens  upon access  that  each  imposes.  Each  places  a  substantial  obstacle  in  the  path  of  women  seeking  a  previability  abortion, each constitutes an undue burden on abortion access,   Casey, supra, at 878 (plurality opinion), and each violates  the Federal Constitution.  Amdt. 14, §1.  I A    In July 2013, the Texas Legislature enacted  House Bill  2 (H. B. 2 or Act).  In September (before the new law took  effect), a group of Texas abortion providers filed an action  in Federal District Court seeking facial invalidation of the  law’s  admitting-privileges  provision.    In  late  October,  the  District  Court  granted  the  injunction.  Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v.  Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 901 (WD Tex. 2013).  But three  days  later,  the  Fifth  Circuit  vacated  the  injunction,      Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  3  thereby  permitting  the  provision  to  take  effect.    Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v.  Abbott, 734 F. 3d 406, 419 (2013).    The  Fifth  Circuit  subsequently  upheld  the  provision,  and  set  forth  its  reasons  in  an  opinion  released  late  the following March.  In that opinion, the Fifth Circuit pointed  to  evidence  introduced  in  the  District  Court  the  previous  October.  It  noted  that  Texas  had  offered  evidence  designed  to  show  that  the  admitting-privileges  requirement  “will  reduce  the  delay  in  treatment  and  decrease  health  risk for abortion patients with critical complications,” and  that it would “ ‘screen out’ untrained or incompetent abortion providers.”  Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v.   Abbott,  748  F. 3d  583,  592  (2014)  (Abbott).  The  opinion  also  explained  that  the  plaintiffs  had not provided sufficient evidence “that abortion practitioners will likely be unable to comply with the privileges  requirement.”  Id., at 598.  The court said that all “of the   major  Texas  cities,  including  Austin,  Corpus  Christi,  Dallas,  El  Paso,  Houston,  and  San  Antonio,”  would  “continue to have multiple clinics where many physicians will  have  or  obtain  hospital  admitting  privileges.”    Ibid. The   Abbott plaintiffs did not file a petition for certiorari in this  Court.   B    On  April  6,  one  week  after  the  Fifth  Circuit’s  decision, petitioners,  a  group  of  abortion  providers  (many  of  whom were  plaintiffs  in  the  previous  lawsuit),  filed  the  present  lawsuit in Federal District Court.  They sought an injunction  preventing  enforcement  of  the  admitting-privileges  provision  as  applied  to  physicians  at  two  abortion  facilities,  one  operated  by  Whole  Woman’s  Health  in  McAllen  and  the  other  operated  by  Nova  Health  Systems  in  El  Paso.  They also sought an injunction prohibiting enforcement  of  the  surgical-center  provision  anywhere  in  Texas.     4    WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court  They  claimed  that  the  admitting-privileges  provision  and  the  surgical-center  provision  violated  the  Constitution’s  Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Casey.    The  District  Court  subsequently  received  stipulations  from the parties and depositions from the parties’ experts.   The court conducted a 4-day bench trial.  It heard, among other  testimony,  the  opinions  from  expert  witnesses  for  both  sides.    On  the  basis  of  the  stipulations,  deposi-  tions,  and  testimony,  that  court  reached  the  following  conclusions:       1.  Of  Texas’  population  of  more  than  25  million  people,  “approximately  5.4  million”  are  “women”  of  “reproductive  age,” living within a geographical area of “nearly 280,000  square  miles.”  Whole Woman’s Health  v.  Lakey,  46  F. Supp. 3d 673, 681 (2014); see App. 244.      2. “In recent years, the number of abortions reported in    Texas  has  stayed  fairly  consistent  at  approximately  15– 16% of the reported pregnancy rate, for a total number of  approximately  60,000–72,000  legal  abortions  performed annually.”  46 F. Supp. 3d, at 681; see App. 238.      3.  Prior  to  the  enactment  of  H. B. 2,  there  were  more   than 40 licensed abortion facilities in Texas, which “number dropped by almost half leading up to and in the wake  of  enforcement  of  the  admitting-privileges  requirement  that  went  into  effect  in  late-October  2013.”    46  F. Supp. 3d, at 681; App. 228–231.      4.  If  the  surgical-center  provision  were  allowed  to  take  effect, the number of abortion facilities, after September 1, 2014, would be reduced further, so that “only seven facilities  and  a  potential  eighth  will  exist  in  Texas.”    46   F. Supp. 3d, at 680; App. 182–183.        Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  5    5.  Abortion  facilities   “will  remain  only  in  Houston,  Austin, San Antonio, and the Dallas/Fort Worth metropolitan region.”  46 F. Supp. 3d, at 681; App. 229–230.  These  include  “one  facility  in  Austin,  two  in  Dallas,  one  in  Fort Worth, two in Houston, and either one or two in San Antonio.”  46 F. Supp. 3d, at 680; App. 229–230.      6.  “Based  on  historical  data  pertaining  to  Texas’s  average  number  of  abortions,  and  assuming  perfectly  equal  distribution  among  the  remaining  seven  or  eight  providers,  this  would  result  in  each  facility  serving  between  7,500  and  10,000  patients  per  year.    Accounting  for  the  seasonal  variations  in  pregnancy  rates  and  a  slightly  unequal  distribution  of  patients  at  each  clinic,  it  is  foreseeable  that  over  1,200  women  per  month  could  be  vying for counseling, appointments, and follow-up visits at some  of these facilities.”  46 F. Supp. 3d, at 682; cf. App. 238.      7.  The  suggestion  “that  these  seven  or  eight  providers could meet the demand of the entire state stretches credulity.”  46 F. Supp. 3d, at 682; see App. 238.      8.  “Between  November  1,  2012  and  May  1,  2014,”  that  is,  before  and  after  enforcement  of  the  admittingprivileges  requirement,  “the  decrease  in  geographical  distribution  of  abortion  facilities”  has  meant  that  the  number of women of reproductive age living more than 50  miles  from  a  clinic  has  doubled  (from  800,000  to  over  1.6  million);  those  living  more  than  100  miles  has  increased  by  150%  (from  400,000  to  1  million);  those  living  more  than  150  miles  has  increased  by  more  than  350%  (from  86,000  to  400,000);  and  those  living  more  than  200  miles  has  increased  by  about  2,800%  (from  10,000  to  290,000).   After  September  2014,  should  the  surgical-center  requirement  go  into  effect,  the  number  of  women  of  reproductive  age  living  significant  distances  from  an  abortion     6    WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court  provider  will  increase  as  follows:  2  million  women  of  reproductive age will live more than 50 miles from an abortion  provider;  1.3  million  will  live  more  than  100  miles  from an abortion provider; 900,000 will live more than 150  miles  from   an  abortion  provider;  and  750,000  more  than  200  miles  from  an  abortion  provider.    46  F. Supp. 3d,  at   681–682; App. 238–242.      9.  The  “two  requirements  erect  a  particularly  high  barrier  for  poor,  rural,  or  disadvantaged  women.”    46  F. Supp. 3d, at 683; cf. App. 363–370.      10.  “The  great  weight  of  evidence  demonstrates  that,  before the act’s passage, abortion in Texas was extremely  safe  with  particularly  low  rates  of  serious  complications  and virtually no deaths occurring on account of the proce    dure.”  46 F. Supp. 3d, at 684; see, e.g., App. 257–259, 538;    see also id., at 200–202, 253–257.      11.  “Abortion,  as  regulated  by  the  State  before  the  enactment of House Bill 2, has been shown to be much safer,  in  terms  of  minor  and  serious  complications,  than  many  common  medical  procedures  not  subject  to  such  intense regulation and scrutiny.”  46 F. Supp. 3d, at 684; see, e.g., App.  223–224  (describing  risks  in  colonoscopies),  254  (discussing  risks  in  vasectomy  and  endometrial  biopsy, among  others),  275–277  (discussing  complication  rate  in  plastic surgery).      12.  “Additionally,  risks  are  not  appreciably  lowered  for  patients  who  undergo  abortions  at  ambulatory  surgical  centers  as  compared  to  nonsurgical-center  facilities.”    46  F. Supp. 3d, at 684; App. 202–206, 257–259.      13.  “[W]omen  will  not  obtain  better  care  or  experience  more  frequent  positive  outcomes  at  an  ambulatory  surgi-     Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  7  cal  center  as  compared  to  a  previously  licensed  facility.”   46 F. Supp. 3d, at 684; App. 202–206.      14.  “[T]here  are  433  licensed  ambulatory  surgical  centers  in  Texas,”  of  which  “336  . . .  are  apparently  either  ‘grandfathered’ or enjo[y] the benefit of a waiver of some or  all” of the surgical-center “requirements.”  46 F. Supp. 3d,   at 680–681; App. 184.       15.  The  “cost  of  coming  into  compliance”  with  the  surgical-center  requirement  “for  existing  clinics  is  significant,”  “undisputedly  approach[ing]  1  million  dollars,”  and  “most  likely  exceed[ing]  1.5  million  dollars,”  with  “[s]ome  . . .  clinics”  unable  to  “comply  due  to  physical  size  limitations  of  their  sites.”    46  F. Supp. 3d,  at  682.    The  “cost  of  acquiring  land  and  constructing  a  new  compliant  clinic  will likely exceed three million dollars.”  Ibid.     On  the  basis  of  these  and  other  related  findings,  the  District  Court  determined  that  the  surgical-center  requirement  “imposes  an  undue  burden  on  the  right  of  women throughout Texas to seek a previability abortion,” and  that  the  “admitting-privileges  requirement,  . . .  in  conjunction  with  the  ambulatory-surgical-center  requirement, imposes an undue burden on the right of women in  the Rio Grande Valley, El Paso, and West Texas to seek a  previability  abortion.”  Id.,  at  687.    The  District  Court  concluded  that  the  “two  provisions”  would  cause  “the  closing  of  almost  all  abortion  clinics  in  Texas  that  were  operating legally in the fall of 2013,” and thereby create a  constitutionally  “impermissible  obstacle  as  applied  to  all  women  seeking  a  previability  abortion”  by  “restricting  access to previously available legal facilities.”    Id., at 687–  688.  On August 29, 2014, the court enjoined the enforcement of the two provisions.  Ibid.    8    WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court  C    On  October  2,  2014,  at  Texas’  request,  the  Court  of  Appeals  stayed  the  District  Court’s  injunction.    Whole   Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F. 3d 285, 305.  Within the  next  two  weeks,  this  Court  vacated  the  Court  of  Appeals’  stay  (in  substantial  part)  thereby  leaving  in  effect  the  District  Court’s  injunction  against  enforcement  of  the  surgical-center  provision  and  its  injunction  against  enforcement  of  the  admitting-privileges  requirement  as  applied  to  the  McAllen  and  El  Paso  clinics.    Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey,  574  U. S.  ___  (2014).    The  Court  of  Appeals then heard Texas’ appeal.   On  June  9,  2015,  the  Court  of  Appeals  reversed  the  District  Court  on  the  merits.  With  minor  exceptions,  it  found  both  provisions  constitutional  and  allowed  them  to  take effect.  Whole Women’s Health v. Cole, 790 F. 3d 563,   567  (per curiam),  modified,  790  F. 3d  598  (CA5  2015).   Because the Court of Appeals’ decision rests upon alternative  grounds  and  fact-related  considerations,  we  set  forth  its  basic  reasoning  in  some  detail.    The  Court  of  Appeals  concluded:    •  The  District  Court  was  wrong  to  hold  the  admittingprivileges  requirement  unconstitutional  because  (except  for  the  clinics  in  McAllen  and  El  Paso)  the  providers  had  not  asked  them  to  do  so,  and  principles  of  res  judicata  barred relief.  Id., at 580–583.  • Because the providers could have brought their constitutional  challenge  to  the  surgical-center  provision  in  their  earlier  lawsuit,  principles  of  res  judicata  also  barred  that  claim.  Id., at 581–583.  •  In  any  event,  a  state  law  “regulating  previability  abor    tion is constitutional if: (1) it does not have the purpose or effect  of  placing  a  substantial  obstacle  in  the  path  of  a  woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus; and (2) it  is  reasonably  related  to  (or  designed  to  further)  a  legiti-     Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  9  mate state interest.”  Id., at 572.  •  “[B]oth  the  admitting  privileges  requirement  and”  the  surgical-center  requirement  “were  rationally  related  to  a  legitimate  state  interest,”  namely,  “rais[ing]  the  standard  and  quality  of  care  for  women  seeking  abortions  and  . . .  protect[ing]  the  health  and  welfare  of  women  seeking  abortions.”  Id., at 584.   •  The  “[p]laintiffs”  failed  “to  proffer  competent  evidence contradicting  the  legislature’s  statement  of  a  legitimate  purpose.”  Id., at 585.  •  “[T]he  district  court   erred  by  substituting  its  own  judgment  [as  to  the  provisions’  effects]  for  that  of  the  legislature, albeit . . . in the name of the undue burden inquiry.”   Id., at 587.   •  Holding  the  provisions  unconstitutional  on  their  face  is improper  because  the  plaintiffs  had  failed  to  show  that  either  of  the  provisions  “imposes  an  undue  burden  on  a large fraction of women.”  Id., at 590.  • The District Court erred in finding that, if the surgicalcenter  requirement  takes  effect,  there  will  be  too  few  abortion  providers  in  Texas  to  meet  the  demand.    That  factual determination was based upon the finding of one of  plaintiffs’  expert  witnesses  (Dr.  Grossman)  that  abortion  providers  in  Texas  “ ‘will  not  be able  to  go  from  providing  approximately 14,000 abortions annually, as they currently  are,  to  providing  the  60,000  to  70,000  abortions  that  are  done  each year  in  Texas  once  all’ ”  of  the  clinics  failing  to  meet  the  surgical-center  requirement  “ ‘are  forced  to   close.’ ”  Id., at 589–590.  But Dr. Grossman’s opinion is (in  the Court of Appeals’ view) “ ‘ipse dixit’ ”; the “ ‘record lacks  any actual evidence regarding the current or future capacity  of  the  eight  clinics’ ”;  and  there  is  no  “evidence  in  the   record that” the providers that currently meet the surgical-  center  requirement  “are  operating  at  full  capacity  or  that  they cannot increase capacity.”  Ibid.      10     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court    For  these  and  related  reasons,  the  Court  of  Appeals  reversed  the  District  Court’s  holding  that  the  admittingprivileges requirement is unconstitutional and its holding  that  the  surgical-center  requirement  is  unconstitutional.   The  Court   of  Appeals  upheld  in  part  the  District  Court’s  more specific holding that the requirements are unconstitutional as applied to the McAllen facility and Dr. Lynn (a doctor at that facility), but it reversed the District Court’s  holding  that  the  surgical-center  requirement  is  unconstitutional as applied to the facility in El Paso.  In respect to this last claim, the Court of Appeals said that women in El  Paso  wishing  to  have  an  abortion  could  use  abortion  providers in nearby New Mexico.  II     Before  turning  to  the  constitutional  question,  we  must  consider  the  Court  of  Appeals’  procedural  grounds  for  holding  that  (but  for  the  challenge  to  the  provisions  of  H. B. 2  as  applied  to  McAllen  and  El  Paso)  petitioners  were barred from bringing their constitutional challenges.  A  Claim Preclusion—Admitting-Privileges Requirement   The Court of Appeals held that there could be no facial  challenge  to  the  admitting-privileges  requirement.    Because  several  of  the  petitioners  here  had  previously  brought  an  unsuccessful  facial  challenge  to  that  requirement  (namely,  Abbott,  748  F. 3d,  at  605;  see  supra,  at  2–  3), the Court of Appeals thought that “the principle of res  judicata” applied.  790 F. 3d, at 581.  The Court of Appeals  also  held  that  res  judicata  prevented  the  District  Court  from granting facial relief to petitioners, concluding that it  was improper to “facially invalidat[e] the admitting privileges  requirement,”  because  to  do  so  would  “gran[t]  more  relief than anyone requested or briefed.”  Id., at 580.  We  hold  that  res  judicata  neither  bars  petitioners’  challenges       Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  11   to  the  admitting-privileges  requirement  nor  prevents  us  from awarding facial relief.    For  one  thing,  to  the  extent  that  the  Court  of  Appeals  concluded that the principle of res judicata bars any facial  challenge  to  the  admitting-privileges  requirement,  see  ibid., the court misconstrued petitioners’ claims.  Petitioners  did  not  bring  a  facial  challenge  to  the  admittingprivileges requirement in this case but instead challenged  that requirement as applied to the clinics in McAllen and  El  Paso.  The  question  is  whether  res  judicata  bars  petitioners’  particular  as-applied  claims.    On  this  point,  the  Court  of  Appeals  concluded  that  res  judicata  was  no  bar,  see 790 F. 3d, at 592, and we agree.   The  doctrine  of  claim  preclusion  (the  here-relevant  aspect  of  res  judicata)  prohibits  “successive  litigation  of  the  very  same  claim”  by  the  same  parties.    New Hampshire  v.  Maine,  532  U. S.  742,  748  (2001).    Petitioners’   postenforcement  as-applied  challenge  is  not  “the  very  same claim” as their preenforcement facial challenge.  The   Restatement of Judgments notes that development of new  material facts can mean that a new case and an otherwise  similar previous case do not present the same claim.    See  Restatement  (Second)  of  Judgments  §24,  Comment  f  (1980)  (“Material  operative  facts  occurring  after  the  decision  of  an  action  with  respect  to  the  same  subject  matter  may in themselves, or taken in conjunction with the antecedent  facts,  comprise  a  transaction  which  may  be  made  the basis of a second action not precluded by the first”); cf.   id.,  §20(2)  (“A  valid  and  final  personal  judgment  for  the  defendant, which rests on the prematurity of the action or  on  the  plaintiff ’s  failure  to  satisfy  a  precondition  to  suit,  does not bar another action by the plaintiff instituted after  the claim has matured, or the precondition has been satisfied”); id., §20, Comment k (discussing relationship of this   rule  with  §24,  Comment  f ).  The  Courts  of  Appeals  have  used  similar  rules  to  determine  the  contours  of  a  new     12     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court  claim  for  purposes  of  preclusion.  See,  e.g., Morgan  v.  Covington, 648 F. 3d 172, 178 (CA3 2011) (“[R]es judicata  does  not  bar  claims  that  are  predicated  on  events  that  postdate  the  filing  of  the  initial  complaint”);  Ellis  v.  CCA of Tenn. LLC,  650  F. 3d  640,  652  (CA7  2011);  Bank of N. Y.  v.   First Millennium, Inc.,  607  F. 3d  905,  919  (CA2  2010);  Smith  v.   Potter,  513  F. 3d  781,  783  (CA7  2008);  Rawe  v.  Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,  462  F. 3d  521,  529  (CA6  2006);  Manning  v.  Auburn,  953  F. 2d  1355,  1360  (CA11  1992).    The  Restatement  adds  that,  where  “important human values—such as the lawfulness of continuing  personal  disability  or  restraint—are  at  stake,  even  a  slight  change  of  circumstances  may  afford  a  sufficient basis for concluding that a second action may be brought.”   §24, Comment f; see Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F. 3d 1120,  1127  (CA8  2015)  (allowing  as-applied  challenge  to  execution  method  to  proceed  notwithstanding  prior  facial  challenge).   We  find  this  approach  persuasive.  Imagine  a  group  of  prisoners  who  claim  that  they  are  being  forced  to  drink  contaminated water.    These prisoners file suit against the  facility where they are incarcerated.  If at first their suit is  dismissed because a court does not believe that the harm  would  be  severe  enough  to  be  unconstitutional,  it  would  make  no  sense  to  prevent  the  same  prisoners  from  bringing  a  later  suit  if  time  and  experience  eventually  showed  that prisoners were dying from contaminated water.  Such   circumstances  would  give  rise  to  a  new  claim  that  the  prisoners’  treatment  violates  the  Constitution.    Factual   developments  may  show  that  constitutional  harm,  which  seemed  too  remote  or  speculative  to  afford  relief  at  the  time  of  an  earlier  suit,  was  in  fact  indisputable.  In  our   view,  such  changed  circumstances  will  give  rise  to  a  new  constitutional  claim.  This  approach  is  sensible,  and  it  is  consistent  with  our  precedent.    See  Abie State Bank  v.   Bryan, 282 U. S. 765, 772 (1931) (where “suit was brought      Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  13   immediately  upon  the  enactment  of  the  law,”  “decision  sustaining  the  law  cannot  be  regarded  as  precluding  a  subsequent suit for the purpose of testing [its] validity . . .  in the lights of the later actual experience”); cf. Lawlor v.  National Screen Service Corp.,  349  U. S.  322,  328  (1955)  (judgment that “precludes recovery on claims arising prior  to  its  entry”  nonetheless  “cannot  be  given  the  effect  of  extinguishing  claims  which  did  not  even  then  exist”);  United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 153      (1938)  (“[T]he  constitutionality  of  a  statute  predicated upon  the  existence  of  a  particular  state  of  facts  may  be  challenged  by  showing  to  the  court  that  those  facts  have  ceased  to  exist”);  Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co.  v.  Walters,  294 U. S. 405, 415 (1935) (“A statute valid as to one set of  facts may be invalid as to another.  A statute  valid when  enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to  which it is applied” (footnote omitted)); Third Nat. Bank of Louisville  v.  Stone  174  U. S.  432,  434  (1899)  (“A  question  cannot  be  held  to  have  been  adjudged  before  an  issue  on  the subject could possibly have arisen”).  JUSTICE  ALITO’s  dissenting  opinion  is  simply  wrong  that  changed  circumstances showing that a challenged law has an unconstitutional effect cannot give rise to a new claim.  See post, at   14–15 (hereinafter the dissent).   Changed  circumstances  of  this  kind  are  why  the  claim  presented  in  Abbott  is  not  the  same  claim  as  petitioners’  claim  here.   The  claims  in  both   Abbott and  the  present  case  involve  “important  human  values.”  Restatement  (Second) of Judgments §24, Comment f.  We are concerned  with  H. B. 2’s  “effect  . . .    on  women  seeking  abortions.”    Post, at  30  (ALITO,  J.,  dissenting).    And  that  effect  has  changed  dramatically  since  petitioners  filed  their  first  lawsuit.  Abbott rested on facts and evidence presented to  the  District  Court  in  October  2013.    748  F. 3d,  at  599,   n. 14  (declining  to  “consider  any  arguments”  based  on  “developments  since  the  conclusion  of  the   bench  trial”).     14     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court  Petitioners’  claim  in  this  case  rests  in  significant  part  upon  later,  concrete  factual  developments.    Those  developments matter.  The Abbott plaintiffs brought their facial  challenge to the admitting-privileges requirement prior to its enforcement—before  many  abortion  clinics  had  closed  and  while  it  was  still  unclear  how  many  clinics  would  be  affected.  Here,  petitioners  bring  an  as-applied  challenge  to the requirement after its enforcement—and after a large  number of clinics have in fact closed.  The postenforcement  consequences  of  H. B. 2  were  unknowable  before  it  went  into effect.  The Abbott court itself recognized that “[l]ater  as-applied  challenges  can  always  deal  with  subsequent,  concrete constitutional issues.”  Id., at 589.  And the Court  of Appeals in this case properly decided that new evidence  presented by petitioners had given rise to a new claim and  that  petitioners’  as-applied  challenges  are  not  precluded.   See  790  F. 3d,  at  591  (“We  now  know  with  certainty  that  the  non-[surgical-center]  abortion  facilities  have  actually  closed  and  physicians  have  been  unable  to  obtain  admitting privileges after diligent effort”).   When  individuals  claim  that  a  particular  statute  will  produce  serious  constitutionally  relevant  adverse  consequences  before  they  have  occurred—and  when  the  courts  doubt  their  likely  occurrence—the  factual  difference  that  those  adverse  consequences  have in fact occurred  can   make all the difference.  Compare the Fifth Circuit’s opinion  in  the  earlier  case,  Abbott, supra,  at  598  (“All  of  the  major  Texas  cities  . . .  continue  to  have  multiple  clinics  where many physicians will have or obtain hospital admitting  privileges”),  with  the  facts  found  in  this  case,  46  F. Supp. 3d,  at  680  (the  two  provisions  will  leave  Texas  with seven or eight clinics).  The challenge brought in this   case and the one in Abbott are not the “very same claim,”  and  the  doctrine  of  claim  preclusion  consequently  does not  bar  a  new  challenge  to  the  constitutionality  of  the  admitting-privileges requirement.  New Hampshire v. Maine,      Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  15   532 U. S., at 748.  That the litigants in Abbott did not seek  review  in  this  Court,  as  the  dissent  suggests  they  should  have  done,  see  post, at  10,  does  not  prevent  them  from  seeking review of new claims that have arisen after Abbott  was  decided.    In  sum,  the  Restatement,  cases  from  the  Courts  of  Appeals,  our  own  precedent,  and  simple  logic  combine to convince us that res judicata does not bar this  claim.    The  Court  of  Appeals  also  concluded  that  the  award  of  facial  relief  was  precluded  by  principles  of  res  judicata.   790  F. 3d,  at  581.    The  court  concluded  that  the  District  Court  should  not  have  “granted  more  relief  than  anyone  requested  or  briefed.”  Id.,  at  580.    But  in  addition  to   asking  for  as-applied  relief,  petitioners  asked  for  “such  other and further relief as the Court may deem just, proper,  and  equitable.”  App.  167.  Their  evidence  and  arguments convinced the District Court that the provision was  unconstitutional  across  the  board.    The  Federal  Rules  of  Civil Procedure state that (with an exception not relevant  here)  a  “final  judgment  should  grant  the  relief  to  which  each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded  that relief in its pleadings.”  Rule 54(c).  And we have held   that, if the arguments and evidence show that a statutory  provision  is  unconstitutional  on  its  face,  an  injunction  prohibiting its enforcement is “proper.”  Citizens United v.   Federal Election Comm’n,  558  U. S.  310,  333  (2010);  see  ibid. (in  “the  exercise  of  its  judicial  responsibility”  it  may  be “necessary . . . for the Court to consider the facial validity”  of  a  statute,  even  though  a  facial  challenge  was  not  brought); cf. Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and    Third-Party Standing, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321, 1339 (2000)  (“[O]nce a case is brought, no general categorical line bars  a court from making broader pronouncements of invalidity  in  properly  ‘as-applied’  cases”).  Nothing  prevents  this  Court  from  awarding  facial  relief  as  the  appropriate  rem  edy for petitioners’ as-applied claims.    16     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court  B  Claim Preclusion—Surgical-Center Requirement   The  Court  of  Appeals  also  held  that  claim  preclusion  barred  petitioners  from  contending  that  the  surgicalcenter requirement is unconstitutional.  790 F. 3d, at 583.    Although  it  recognized  that  petitioners  did  not  bring  this  claim in Abbott, it believed that they should have done so.   The  court  explained  that  petitioners’  constitutional  challenge to the surgical-center requirement and the challenge  to  the  admitting-privileges  requirement  mounted  in  Abbott “arise  from  the  same  ‘transactio[n]  or  series  of  connected  transactions.’  . . .    The  challenges  involve  the  same  parties  and  abortion  facilities;  the  challenges  are  governed  by  the  same  legal  standards;  the  provisions  at  issue  were  enacted  at  the  same  time  as  part  of  the  same  act;  the  provisions  were  motivated  by  a  common  purpose;  the  provisions  are  administered  by  the  same  state  officials;  and  the  challenges  form  a  convenient  trial  unit  because  they  rely  on  a  common  nucleus of operative facts.”  790 F. 3d, at 581.  For  all  these  reasons,  the  Court  of  Appeals  held  petitioners’ challenge to H. B. 2’s surgical-center requirement was  precluded.    The Court of Appeals failed, however, to take account of  meaningful differences.  The surgical-center provision and  the  admitting-privileges  provision  are  separate,  distinct    provisions  of  H. B. 2.  They  set  forth  two  different,  independent  requirements  with  different  enforcement  dates.   This  Court  has  never  suggested  that  challenges  to  two  different  statutory  provisions  that  serve  two  different  functions  must  be  brought  in  a  single  suit.    And  lower  courts  normally  treat  challenges  to  distinct  regulatory  requirements  as  “separate  claims,”  even  when  they  are  part of one overarching “[g]overnment regulatory scheme.”       Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  17   18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and  Procedure  §4408,  p. 52  (2d  ed.  2002,  Supp.  2015);  see    Hamilton’s Bogarts,  Inc.  v.  Michigan,  501  F. 3d  644,  650  (CA6 2007).    That  approach  makes  sense.  The  opposite  approach adopted  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  would  require  treating  every statutory enactment as a single transaction which a  given  party  would  only  be  able  to  challenge  one  time,  in  one  lawsuit,  in  order  to  avoid  the  effects  of  claim  preclusion.  Such  a  rule  would  encourage  a  kitchen-sink  approach  to  any  litigation  challenging  the  validity  of  statutes.  That  outcome  is  less  than  optimal—not  only  for litigants, but for courts.   There are other good reasons why petitioners should not  have  had  to  bring  their  challenge  to  the  surgical-center  provision  at  the  same  time  they  brought  their  first  suit.   The  statute  gave  the  Texas  Department  of  State  Health  Services authority to make rules implementing the surgicalcenter  requirement.  H. B. 2,  §11(a),  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert. 201a.  At the time petitioners filed Abbott, that state   agency  had  not  yet  issued  any  such  rules.  Cf.  EPA  v.  Brown, 431 U. S. 99, 104 (1977) (per curiam); 13B Wright,   supra,  §3532.6,  at  629  (3d  ed.  2008)  (most  courts  will  not  “undertake review before rules have been adopted”); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F. 2d 156,  204 (CADC 1988).    Further, petitioners might well have expected that those  rules  when  issued  would  contain  provisions  grandfathering some then-existing abortion facilities and granting full  or  partial  waivers  to  others.  After  all,  more  than  three  quarters  of  non-abortion-related  surgical  centers  had benefited from that kind of provision.  See 46 F. Supp. 3d,  at  680–681  (336  of  433  existing  Texas  surgical  centers  have  been   grandfathered  or  otherwise  enjoy  a  waiver  of  some  of  the  surgical-center  requirements);  see  also  App.  299–302, 443–447, 468–469.    18     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court    Finally,  the  relevant  factual  circumstances  changed between Abbott and the present lawsuit, as we previously  described.  See supra, at 14–15.    The dissent musters only one counterargument.  According  to  the  dissent,  if  statutory  provisions  “impos[e]  the  same  kind  of  burden  . . .  on  the  same  kind  of  right”  and  have mutually reinforcing effects, “it is evident that” they  are “part of the same transaction” and must be challenged  together.  Post, at 20, 22.  But for the word “evident,” the      dissent  points  to  no  support  for   this  conclusion,  and  we  find it unconvincing.  Statutes are often voluminous, with  many related, yet distinct, provisions.  Plaintiffs, in order  to  preserve  their  claims,  need  not  challenge  each  such  provision  of,  say,  the  USA  PATRIOT  Act,  the  Bipartisan  Campaign  Reform  Act  of  2002,  the  National  Labor  Relations  Act,  the  Clean  Water  Act,  the  Antiterrorism  and   Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, or the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in their first lawsuit.    For all of these reasons, we hold that the petitioners did  not  have  to  bring  their  challenge  to  the  surgical-center  provision  when  they  challenged  the  admitting-privileges      provision in Abbott.  We accordingly hold that the doctrine of  claim  preclusion  does  not  prevent  them  from  bringing  that challenge now.  *    *    *    In  sum,  in  our  view,  none  of  petitioners’  claims  are  barred  by  res  judicata.    For  all  of  the  reasons  described  above,  we  conclude  that  the  Court  of  Appeals’  procedural  ruling was incorrect.  Cf. Brief for Professors Michael Dorf   et al.  as  Amici Curiae  22  (professors  in  civil  procedure  from  Cornell  Law  School,  New  York  University  School  of  Law,  Columbia  Law  School,  University  of  Chicago  Law  School,  and  Duke  University  Law  School)  (maintaining that  “the  panel’s  procedural  ruling”  was  “clearly  incorrect”).  We consequently proceed to consider the merits of  petitioners’ claims.      Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  19   III   Undue Burden—Legal Standard   We begin with the standard, as described in Casey. We   recognize  that  the  “State  has  a  legitimate  interest  in  seeing  to  it  that  abortion,  like  any  other  medical  procedure,  is  performed  under  circumstances  that  insure  maximum safety for the patient.”  Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113,   150  (1973).  But,  we  added,  “a  statute  which,  while  furthering [a] valid state interest, has the effect of placing a  substantial  obstacle  in  the  path  of  a  woman’s  choice  cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate  ends.”     Casey,  505  U. S.,  at  877  (plurality  opinion).   Moreover, “[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the  purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman  seeking  an  abortion  impose  an  undue  burden  on  the right.”  Id., at 878.     The Court of Appeals wrote that a state law is “constitu  tional if: (1) it does not have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking  an  abortion  of  a  nonviable  fetus;  and  (2)  it  is  reasonably  related to (or designed to further) a legitimate state interest.”  790 F. 3d, at 572.  The Court of Appeals went on to  hold  that  “the  district  court  erred  by  substituting  its  own  judgment for that of the legislature” when it conducted its  “undue  burden  inquiry,”  in  part  because  “medical  uncertainty  underlying  a  statute  is  for  resolution  by  legislatures, not the courts.”    Id., at 587 (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 124, 163 (2007)).    The Court of Appeals’ articulation of the relevant standard is incorrect.  The first part of the Court of Appeals’ test  may be read to imply that a district court should not consider  the  existence  or  nonexistence  of  medical  benefits   when considering whether a regulation of abortion constitutes  an  undue  burden.    The  rule  announced  in  Casey,  however,  requires  that  courts  consider  the  burdens  a  law  imposes  on  abortion  access  together  with  the  benefits     20     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court  those  laws  confer.  See  505  U. S.,  at  887–898  (opinion  of  the  Court)   (performing  this  balancing  with  respect  to  a  spousal notification provision); id., at 899–901 (joint opinion of O’Connor, KENNEDY, and Souter, JJ.) (same balancing with respect to a parental notification provision).  And   the second part of the test is wrong to equate the judicial  review  applicable  to  the  regulation  of  a  constitutionally    protected personal liberty with the less strict review applicable where, for example, economic legislation is at issue.   See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S.  483,  491  (1955).    The  Court  of  Appeals’  approach  simply  does  not  match  the  standard  that  this  Court  laid  out  in  Casey,  which asks courts to consider whether  any burden  imposed on abortion access is “undue.”    The  statement  that  legislatures,  and  not  courts,  must  resolve  questions  of  medical  uncertainty  is  also  inconsistent  with  this  Court’s  case  law.    Instead,  the  Court,   when determining the constitutionality of laws regulating  abortion procedures, has placed considerable weight upon  evidence  and  argument  presented  in  judicial  proceedings.   In  Casey,  for  example,  we  relied  heavily  on  the  District  Court’s  factual  findings  and  the  research-based  submissions  of  amici  in  declaring  a  portion  of  the  law  at  issue  unconstitutional.  505  U. S.,  at  888–894  (opinion  of  the  Court)  (discussing  evidence  related  to  the  prevalence  of  spousal  abuse  in  determining  that  a  spousal  notification  provision  erected  an  undue  burden  to  abortion  access).   And,  in  Gonzales  the  Court,  while  pointing  out  that  we  must  review  legislative  “factfinding  under  a  deferential  standard,”  added  that  we  must  not  “place  dispositive  weight”  on  those  “findings.”  550  U. S.,  at  165.  Gonzales  went on to point out that the “Court retains an independent constitutional duty to review factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake.”  Ibid. (emphasis added).   Although  there  we  upheld  a  statute  regulating  abortion, we did not do so solely on the basis of legislative findings      Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  21   explicitly  set  forth  in  the  statute,  noting  that  “evidence  presented  in  the  District  Courts  contradicts”   some  of  the  legislative  findings.  Id.,  at  166.  In  these  circumstances,   we  said,  “[u]ncritical  deference  to  Congress’  factual  findings . . . is inappropriate.”  Ibid.    Unlike  in  Gonzales,  the  relevant  statute  here  does  not  set  forth  any  legislative  findings.  Rather,  one  is  left  to   infer that the legislature sought to further a constitutionally  acceptable  objective  (namely,  protecting  women’s  health).  Id., at 149–150.  For a district court to give significant  weight  to  evidence  in  the  judicial  record  in  these  circumstances is consistent with this Court’s case law.  As   we shall describe, the District Court did so here.  It did not  simply substitute its own judgment for that of the legislature.  It  considered  the  evidence  in  the  record—including  expert  evidence,  presented  in  stipulations,  depositions,  and  testimony.  It  then  weighed  the  asserted  benefits against  the  burdens.    We  hold  that,  in  so  doing,  the  District Court applied the correct legal standard.   IV  Undue Burden—Admitting-Privileges Requirement   Turning to the lower courts’ evaluation of the evidence,  we  first  consider  the  admitting-privileges  requirement.     Before  the  enactment  of  H. B. 2,  doctors  who  provided  abortions  were  required  to  “have  admitting  privileges  or  have a working arrangement with a physician(s) who has  admitting privileges at a local hospital in order to ensure  the  necessary  back  up  for  medical  complications.”    Tex.  Admin.  Code,  tit.  25,  §139.56  (2009)  (emphasis  added).   The new law changed this requirement by requiring that a  “physician  performing  or  inducing  an  abortion  . . .  must,  on  the  date  the  abortion  is  performed  or  induced,  have active admitting privileges at a hospital that . . . is located  not  further  than  30  miles  from  the  location  at  which  the  abortion  is  performed  or  induced.”    Tex.  Health  &  Safety     22     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court  Code Ann. §171.0031(a).  The District Court held that the   legislative  change  imposed  an  “undue  burden”  on  a  woman’s right to have an abortion.  We conclude that there is   adequate legal and factual support for the District Court’s  conclusion.    The  purpose  of  the  admitting-privileges  requirement  is  to help ensure that women have easy access to a hospital  should  complications  arise  during  an  abortion  procedure.   Brief for Respondents 32–37.  But the District Court found  that it brought about no such health-related benefit.  The  court  found  that  “[t]he  great  weight  of  evidence  demonstrates  that,  before  the  act’s  passage,  abortion  in  Texas  was  extremely  safe  with  particularly  low  rates  of  serious  complications  and  virtually  no  deaths  occurring  on  account  of  the  procedure.”    46  F. Supp. 3d,  at  684.    Thus,  there  was  no  significant  health-related  problem  that  the  new law helped to cure.   The evidence upon which the court based this conclusion  included, among other things:    •  A  collection  of  at  least  five  peer-reviewed  studies  on  abortion complications in the first trimester, showing that  the  highest  rate  of  major  complications—including  those  complications requiring hospital admission—was less than  one-quarter of 1%.  See App. 269–270.  • Figures in three peer-reviewed studies showing that the  highest complication rate found for the much rarer second  trimester abortion was less than one-half of 1% (0.45% or  about 1 out of about 200).  Id., at 270.  • Expert testimony to the effect that complications rarely  require hospital admission, much less immediate transfer  to  a  hospital  from  an  outpatient  clinic.  Id.,  at  266–267   (citing a study of complications occurring within six weeks  after  54,911  abortions  that  had  been  paid  for  by  the  feefor-service  California  Medicaid  Program  finding  that  the incidence  of  complications  was  2.1%,  the  incidence  of      Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  23   complications  requiring  hospital  admission  was  0.23%,  and  that  of  the  54,911  abortion  patients  included  in  the  study, only 15 required immediate transfer to the hospital  on the day of the abortion).  •  Expert  testimony  stating  that  “it  is  extremely  unlikely  that a patient will experience a serious complication at the  clinic  that  requires  emergent  hospitalization”  and  “in  the  rare case in which [one does], the quality of care that the  patient  receives  is  not  affected  by  whether   the  abortion  provider has admitting privileges at the hospital.”  Id., at   381.  •  Expert  testimony  stating  that  in  respect  to  surgical  abortion  patients  who  do  suffer  complications  requiring  hospitalization,  most  of  these  complications  occur  in  the  days  after  the  abortion,  not  on  the  spot.    See  id.,  at  382;  see also id., at 267.    • Expert testimony stating that a delay before the onset of  complications  is  also  expected  for  medical  abortions,  as  “abortifacient  drugs  take  time  to  exert  their  effects,  and  thus  the  abortion  itself  almost  always  occurs  after  the  patient has left the abortion facility.”  Id., at 278.  • Some experts added that, if a patient needs a hospital in  the day or week following her abortion, she will likely seek  medical  attention  at  the  hospital  nearest  her  home.  See,   e.g., id., at 153.      We  have  found  nothing  in  Texas’  record  evidence  that  shows  that,  compared  to  prior  law  (which  required  a  “working  arrangement”  with  a  doctor  with  admitting  privileges), the new law advanced Texas’ legitimate interest in protecting women’s health.    We  add  that,  when  directly  asked  at  oral  argument  whether Texas knew of a single instance in which the new  requirement  would  have  helped  even  one  woman  obtain  better  treatment,  Texas  admitted  that  there  was  no  evidence in the record of such a case.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 47.     24     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court  This  answer  is  consistent  with  the  findings  of  the  other  Federal  District  Courts  that  have  considered  the  health   benefits of other States’ similar admitting-privileges laws.   See  Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc.  v.  Van Hollen,  94   F. Supp. 3d  949,  953  (WD  Wis.  2015),  aff ’d  sub nom.  Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F. 3d 908      (CA7  2015);  Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc.  v.   Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1378 (MD Ala. 2014).    At the same time, the record evidence indicates that the  admitting-privileges  requirement  places  a  “substantial  obstacle  in  the  path  of  a  woman’s  choice.”    Casey,  505  U. S., at 877 (plurality opinion).  The District Court found,   as of the time the admitting-privileges requirement began  to be enforced, the number of facilities providing abortions  dropped  in  half,  from  about  40  to  about  20.  46   F. Supp. 3d,  at  681.    Eight  abortion  clinics  closed  in  the  months leading up to the requirement’s effective date.  See  App. 229–230; cf. Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation  of America et al. as Amici Curiae 14 (noting that abortion facilities  in  Waco,  San  Angelo,  and  Midland  no  longer  operate  because  Planned  Parenthood  is  “unable  to  find  local physicians in those communities with privileges who  are  willing  to  provide  abortions  due  to  the  size  of  those  communities  and  the  hostility  that  abortion  providers  face”).  Eleven  more  closed  on  the  day  the  admittingprivileges requirement took effect.  See App. 229–230; Tr.   of Oral Arg. 58.    Other  evidence  helps  to  explain  why  the  new  requirement  led  to  the  closure  of  clinics.  We  read  that  other   evidence in light of a brief filed in this Court by the Society  of  Hospital  Medicine.    That  brief  describes  the  undisputed  general  fact  that  “hospitals  often  condition  admitting privileges on reaching a certain number of admissions  per year.”  Brief for Society of Hospital Medicine et al. as   Amici Curiae  11.  Returning  to  the  District  Court  record,  we  note  that,  in  direct  testimony,  the  president  of  Nova       Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  25   Health  Systems,  implicitly  relying  on  this  general  fact,  pointed out that it would be difficult for doctors regularly  performing abortions at the El Paso clinic to obtain admitting  privileges  at  nearby  hospitals  because  “[d]uring  the  past  10  years,  over  17,000  abortion  procedures  were  per  formed at the El Paso clinic [and n]ot a single one of those  patients had to be transferred to a hospital for emergency  treatment, much less admitted to the hospital.”  App. 730.   In a word, doctors would be unable to maintain admitting  privileges or obtain those privileges for the future, because the  fact  that  abortions  are  so  safe  meant  that  providers  were unlikely to have any patients to admit. Other amicus briefs filed here set forth without dispute  other  common  prerequisites  to  obtaining  admitting  privileges that have nothing to do with ability to perform medical  procedures.  See  Brief  for  Medical  Staff  Professionals  as Amici Curiae 20–25 (listing, for example, requirements  that an applicant has treated a high number of patients in  the  hospital  setting  in  the  past  year,  clinical  data  requirements, residency requirements, and other discretionary factors); see also Brief for American College of Obstetricians  and  Gynecologists  et al.  as  Amici Curiae  16   (ACOG  Brief)  (“[S]ome  academic   hospitals  will  only  allow  medical  staff  membership  for  clinicians  who  also  . . .  accept  faculty  appointments”).    Again,  returning  to  the  District  Court  record,  we  note  that  Dr.  Lynn  of  the McAllen clinic, a veteran obstetrics and gynecology doctor    who estimates that he has delivered over 15,000 babies in  his 38 years in practice was unable to get admitting privileges  at  any  of  the  seven  hospitals  within  30  miles  of  his  clinic.  App. 390–394.  He was refused admitting privileges  at  a  nearby  hospital  for  reasons,  as  the  hospital  wrote,  “not  based on  clinical competence  considerations.”   Id.,  at   393–394  (emphasis  deleted).  The  admitting-privileges  requirement  does  not  serve  any  relevant  credentialing  function.    26     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court    In our view, the record contains sufficient evidence that   the  admitting-privileges  requirement  led  to  the  closure of  half  of  Texas’  clinics,  or  thereabouts.  Those  closures   meant  fewer  doctors,  longer  waiting  times,  and  increased  crowding.    Record evidence also supports the finding that  after  the  admitting-privileges  provision  went  into  effect,  the  “number  of  women  of  reproductive  age  living  in  a  county . . . more than 150 miles from a provider increased  from approximately 86,000 to 400,000 . . . and the number  of  women  living  in  a  county  more  than  200  miles  from   a  provider  from  approximately  10,000  to  290,000.”    46   F. Supp.  3d,  at  681.  We  recognize  that  increased  driving  distances  do  not  always  constitute  an  “undue  burden.”   See  Casey,  505  U. S.,  at  885–887  (joint  opinion  of  O’Connor,  KENNEDY,  and  Souter,  JJ.).  But  here,  those  increases  are  but  one  additional  burden,  which,  when   taken  together  with  others  that  the  closings  brought  about,  and  when  viewed  in  light  of  the  virtual  absence  of  any  health  benefit,  lead  us  to  conclude  that  the  record  adequately  supports  the  District  Court’s  “undue  burden”  conclusion.  Cf.  id.,  at  895  (opinion  of  the  Court)  (finding  burden  “undue”  when  requirement  places  “substantial  obstacle  to  a  woman’s  choice”  in  “a  large  fraction  of  the  cases in which” it “is relevant”).   The  dissent’s  only  argument  why  these  clinic  closures,  as  well  as  the  ones  discussed  in  Part  V,  infra,  may  not have  imposed  an  undue  burden  is  this:  Although  “H. B. 2  caused  the  closure  of  some  clinics,”  post, at  26  (emphasis  added), other clinics may have closed for other reasons (so  we should not “actually count” the burdens resulting from  those  closures  against  H. B. 2),  post,  at  30–31.    But  peti  tioners satisfied their burden to present evidence of causation  by  presenting  direct  testimony  as  well  as  plausible inferences  to  be  drawn  from  the  timing  of  the  clinic  closures.   App. 182–183, 228–231.  The District Court credited  that  evidence  and  concluded  from  it  that  H. B. 2  in  fact      Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  27   led to the clinic closures.  46 F. Supp. 3d, at 680–681.  The  dissent’s  speculation  that  perhaps  other  evidence,  not      presented at trial or credited by the District Court, might have shown that some clinics closed for unrelated reasons  does  not  provide  sufficient  ground  to  disturb   the  District  Court’s factual finding on that issue.   In the same breath, the dissent suggests that one bene  fit  of  H. B. 2’s  requirements  would  be  that  they  might  “force  unsafe  facilities  to  shut  down.”    Post,  at  26.  To  support  that  assertion,  the  dissent  points  to  the  Kermit  Gosnell  scandal.    Gosnell,  a  physician  in  Pennsylvania,  was  convicted  of  first-degree  murder  and  manslaughter.   He  “staffed  his  facility  with  unlicensed  and  indifferent  workers,  and  then  let  them  practice  medicine  unsupervised”  and  had  “[d]irty  facilities;  unsanitary  instruments;  an  absence  of  functioning  monitoring  and  resuscitation  equipment; the use of cheap, but dangerous, drugs; illegal  procedures;  and  inadequate  emergency  access  for  when  things  inevitably  went  wrong.”  Report  of  Grand  Jury  in  No.  0009901–2008  (1st  Jud.  Dist.  Pa.,  Jan.  14,  2011),  p. 24,  online  at  http://www.phila.gov/districtattorney/  pdfs/grandjurywomensmedical.pdf  (as  last  visited  June  27,  2016).  Gosnell’s  behavior  was  terribly  wrong.   But  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  an  extra  layer  of  regulation  would  have  affected  that  behavior.    Determined wrongdoers, already ignoring existing statutes and  safety measures, are unlikely to be convinced to adopt safe  practices  by  a  new  overlay  of  regulations.    Regardless,  Gosnell’s  deplorable  crimes  could  escape  detection  only  because  his  facility  went  uninspected  for  more  than  15   years.  Id.,  at  20.  Pre-existing  Texas  law  already  contained  numerous  detailed  regulations  covering  abortion  facilities,  including  a  requirement  that  facilities  be  inspected  at  least  annually.    See  infra,  at  28  (describing   those regulations).  The record contains nothing to suggest  that  H. B. 2  would  be  more  effective  than  pre-existing    28     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court  Texas  law  at  deterring  wrongdoers  like  Gosnell  from   criminal behavior.  V  Undue Burden—Surgical-Center Requirement   The second challenged provision of Texas’ new law sets  forth the surgical-center requirement.  Prior to enactment  of  the  new  requirement,  Texas  law  required  abortion  facilities to meet a host of health and safety requirements.   Under  those  pre-existing  laws,  facilities  were  subject  to  annual  reporting  and  recordkeeping  requirements,  see  Tex. Admin. Code, tit. 25, §§139.4, 139.5, 139.55, 139.58; a  quality  assurance  program,  see  §139.8;  personnel  policies  and  staffing  requirements,  see  §§139.43,  139.46;  physical  and  environmental  requirements,  see  §139.48;  infection  control  standards,  see  §139.49;  disclosure  requirements,  see  §139.50;  patient-rights  standards,  see  §139.51;  and  medical-  and  clinical-services  standards,  see  §139.53,  including  anesthesia  standards,  see  §139.59.  These  requirements are policed by random and announced inspections, at least annually, see §§139.23, 139.31; Tex. Health  &  Safety  Code  Ann.  §245.006(a)  (West  2010),  as  well  as  administrative  penalties,  injunctions,  civil  penalties, and  criminal  penalties  for  certain  violations,  see  Tex.  Admin.  Code,  tit.  25,  §139.33;  Tex.  Health  &  Safety  Code  Ann.  §245.011  (criminal  penalties  for  certain  reporting  violations).    H. B. 2 added the requirement that an “abortion facility”    meet the “minimum standards . . . for ambulatory surgical  centers” under Texas law.  §245.010(a) (West Cum. Supp.  2015).  The  surgical-center  regulations  include,  among other things, detailed specifications relating to the size of  the nursing staff, building dimensions, and other building requirements.    The  nursing  staff  must  comprise  at  least  “an  adequate  number  of  [registered  nurses]  on  duty  to meet  the  following  minimum  staff  requirements:  director       Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  29   of the department (or designee), and supervisory and staff  personnel  for  each  service  area  to  assure  the  immediate  availability  of  [a  registered  nurse]  for  emergency  care  or for  any  patient  when  needed,”  Tex.  Admin.  Code,  tit.  25,  §135.15(a)(3)  (2016),  as  well  as  “a  second  individual  on  duty  on  the  premises  who  is  trained  and  currently  certified  in  basic  cardiac  life  support  until  all  patients  have  been  discharged  from  the  facility”  for  facilities  that  provide  moderate  sedation,  such  as  most  abortion  facilities,   §135.15(b)(2)(A).    Facilities  must  include  a  full  surgical  suite with an operating room that has “a clear floor area of  at  least  240  square  feet”  in  which  “[t]he  minimum  clear dimension between built-in cabinets, counters, and shelves  shall  be  14  feet.”  §135.52(d)(15)(A).    There  must  be  a   preoperative  patient  holding  room  and  a  postoperative  recovery  suite.    The  former  “shall  be  provided  and  arranged in a one-way traffic pattern so that patients entering from outside the surgical suite can change, gown, and  move  directly  into  the  restricted  corridor  of  the  surgical  suite,” §135.52(d)(10)(A), and the latter “shall be arranged  to  provide  a  one-way  traffic  pattern  from  the  restricted  surgical  corridor  to  the  postoperative  recovery  suite,  and  then  to  the  extended  observation  rooms  or  discharge,”  §135.52(d)(9)(A).  Surgical  centers  must  meet  numerous other  spatial  requirements,  see  generally  §135.52,  including specific corridor widths, §135.52(e)(1)(B)(iii).  Surgical  centers  must  also  have  an  advanced  heating,  ventilation,  and  air  conditioning  system,  §135.52(g)(5),  and  must satisfy  particular  piping  system  and  plumbing  requirements, §135.52(h).  Dozens of other sections list additional  requirements that apply to surgical centers.  See generally  §§135.1–135.56.    There is considerable evidence in the record supporting  the  District  Court’s  findings  indicating  that  the  statutory  provision requiring all abortion facilities to meet all surgical  center  standards  does  not  benefit  patients  and  is  not    30     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court  necessary.  The  District  Court  found  that  “risks  are  not   appreciably lowered for patients who undergo abortions at  ambulatory  surgical  centers  as  compared  to  nonsurgicalcenter facilities.”  46 F. Supp. 3d, at 684.  The court added    that women “will not obtain better care or experience more  frequent  positive  outcomes  at  an  ambulatory  surgical  center as compared to a previously licensed facility.”    Ibid.   And these findings are well supported.   The  record  makes  clear  that  the  surgical-center  requirement provides no benefit when complications arise in  the  context  of  an  abortion  produced  through  medication.  That  is  because,  in  such  a  case,  complications  would  almost always arise only after the patient has left the facility.  See supra, at 23; App. 278.  The record also contains   evidence  indicating  that  abortions  taking  place  in  an  abortion  facility  are  safe—indeed,  safer  than  numerous  procedures that take place outside hospitals and to which  Texas  does  not  apply  its  surgical-center  requirements.   See, e.g., id., at 223–224, 254, 275–279.  The total number  of  deaths  in  Texas  from  abortions  was  five  in  the  period  from 2001 to 2012, or about one every two years (that is to  say, one out of about 120,000 to 144,000 abortions).  Id., at  272.  Nationwide,  childbirth  is  14  times  more  likely  than  abortion  to  result  in  death,  ibid.,  but  Texas  law  allows  a   midwife  to  oversee  childbirth  in  the  patient’s  own  home.   Colonoscopy, a procedure that typically takes place outside  a hospital (or surgical center) setting, has a mortality rate  10  times  higher  than  an  abortion.    Id.,  at  276–277;  see  ACOG Brief 15 (the mortality rate for liposuction, another  outpatient procedure, is 28 times higher than the mortality  rate  for  abortion).    Medical  treatment  after  an  incomplete  miscarriage  often  involves  a  procedure  identical  to  that involved in a nonmedical abortion, but it often takes   place  outside  a  hospital  or  surgical  center.    App.  254;  see ACOG Brief 14 (same).  And Texas partly or wholly grandfathers  (or  waives  in  whole  or  in  part  the  surgical-center      Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  31   requirement for) about two-thirds of the facilities to which  the surgical-center standards apply.  But it neither grandfathers  nor  provides  waivers  for  any  of  the  facilities  that  perform  abortions.  46  F. Supp. 3d,  at  680–681;  see  App.  184.  These  facts  indicate  that  the  surgical-center  provision  imposes  “a  requirement  that  simply  is  not  based  on  differences”  between  abortion  and  other  surgical  procedures “that are reasonably related to” preserving women’s  health,  the  asserted  “purpos[e]  of  the  Act  in  which  it  is  found.”  Doe, 410 U. S., at 194 (quoting Morey v. Doud, 354   U. S. 457, 465 (1957); internal quotation marks omitted).   Moreover,  many  surgical-center  requirements  are  inappropriate  as  applied  to  surgical  abortions.    Requiring scrub  facilities;  maintaining  a  one-way  traffic  pattern  through  the  facility;  having  ceiling,  wall,  and  floor  finishes; separating soiled utility and sterilization rooms; and  regulating  air  pressure,  filtration,  and  humidity  control  can  help  reduce  infection  where  doctors  conduct  procedures  that  penetrate  the  skin.    App.  304.  But  abortions  typically involve either the administration of medicines or  procedures  performed  through  the  natural  opening  of  the  birth canal, which is itself not sterile.  See id., at 302–303.    Nor  do  provisions  designed  to  safeguard  heavily  sedated  patients (unable to help themselves) during fire emergencies,  see  Tex.  Admin.  Code,  tit.  25,  §135.41;  App.  304,  provide any help to abortion patients, as abortion facilities do  not  use  general  anesthesia  or  deep  sedation,  id.,  at  304–305.  Further,  since  the  few  instances  in  which  serious  complications  do  arise  following  an  abortion  almost  always require hospitalization, not treatment at a surgical   center,  id.,  at  255–256,  surgical-center  standards  will  not  help in those instances either.    The  upshot  is  that  this  record  evidence,  along  with  the  absence  of  any  evidence  to  the  contrary,  provides  ample  support for the District Court’s conclusion that “[m]any of  the  building  standards  mandated  by  the  act  and  its  im-   32     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court  plementing  rules  have  such  a  tangential  relationship  to  patient  safety  in  the  context  of  abortion  as  to  be  nearly  arbitrary.”  46 F. Supp. 3d, at 684.  That conclusion, along    with  the  supporting  evidence,  provides  sufficient  support  for  the  more  general  conclusion  that  the  surgical-center  requirement  “will  not  [provide]  better  care  or  . . .  more  frequent  positive  outcomes.”  Ibid.   The  record  evidence   thus  supports  the  ultimate  legal  conclusion  that  the  surgical-center requirement is not necessary.    At the same time, the record provides adequate evidentiary  support  for  the  District  Court’s  conclusion  that  the  surgical-center  requirement  places  a  substantial  obstacle  in  the  path  of  women  seeking  an  abortion.    The  parties  stipulated  that  the  requirement  would  further  reduce  the number  of  abortion  facilities  available  to  seven  or  eight  facilities,  located  in  Houston,  Austin,  San  Antonio,  and  Dallas/Fort  Worth.  See  App.  182–183.  In  the  District  Court’s  view,  the  proposition  that  these  “seven  or  eight  providers  could  meet  the  demand  of  the  entire  State  stretches credulity.”  46 F. Supp. 3d, at 682.   We take this  statement  as  a  finding  that  these  few  facilities  could  not  “meet” that “demand.”     The Court of Appeals held that this finding was “clearly  erroneous.”    790  F. 3d,  at  590.    It  wrote  that  the  finding  rested upon the “ ‘ipse dixit’ ” of one expert, Dr. Grossman,  and  that  there  was  no  evidence  that  the  current  surgical  centers (i.e., the seven or eight) are operating at full capacity or could not increase capacity.    Ibid.  Unlike the Court  of  Appeals,  however,  we  hold  that  the  record  provides  adequate support for the District Court’s finding.    For one thing, the record contains charts and oral testimony  by  Dr.  Grossman,  who  said  that,  as  a  result  of  the  surgical-center requirement, the number of abortions that  the clinics would have to provide would rise from “ ‘14,000  abortions  annually’ ”  to  “ ‘60,000  to  70,000’ ”—an  increase  by  a  factor  of  about  five.  Id.,  at  589–590.  The  District      Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  33   Court credited Dr. Grossman as an expert witness.  See 46    (finding  F. Supp. 3d,  at  678–679,  n. 1;  id.,  at  681,  n. 4  “indicia of reliability” in Dr. Grossman’s conclusions).  The   Federal Rules of Evidence state that an expert may testify  in  the  “form  of  an  opinion”  as  long  as  that  opinion  rests  upon “sufficient facts or data” and “reliable principles and  methods.”  Rule 702.  In this case Dr. Grossman’s opinion  rested upon his participation, along with other university  researchers, in research that tracked “the number of open  facilities  providing  abortion  care  in  the  state  by  . . .  requesting information from the Texas Department of State  Health  Services  . . .  [,  t]hrough  interviews  with  clinic  staff[,] and review of publicly available information.”  App.  227.  The District Court acted within its legal authority in  determining  that  Dr.  Grossman’s  testimony  was  admissible.  See Fed. Rule Evid. 702; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,  509  U. S.  579,  589  (1993)  (“[U]nder  the  Rules  the  trial  judge  must  ensure  that  any  and all [expert] evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable”);  29  C.  Wright  &  V.  Gold,  Federal  Practice  and  Procedure:  Evidence  §6266,  p.  302  (2016)  (“Rule  702  impose[s]  on  the  trial  judge  additional  responsibility  to  determine  whether  that  [expert]  testimony  is  likely  to  promote accurate factfinding”).    For  another  thing,  common  sense  suggests  that,  more  often  than  not,  a  physical  facility  that  satisfies  a  certain  physical  demand  will  not  be  able  to  meet  five  times  that  demand without expanding or otherwise incurring significant  costs.    Suppose  that  we  know  only  that  a  certain  grocery  store  serves  200  customers  per  week,  that  a  certain  apartment  building  provides  apartments  for  200  families,  that  a  certain  train  station  welcomes  200  trains  per day.  While it is conceivable that the store, the apartment  building,  or  the  train  station  could  just  as  easily  provide  for  1,000  customers,  families,  or  trains  at  no  significant  additional  cost,  crowding,  or  delay,  most  of  us     34     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court  would find this possibility highly improbable.  The dissent   takes  issue  with  this  general,  intuitive  point  by  arguing  that  many  places  operate  below  capacity  and  that  in  any  event,  facilities  could  simply  hire  additional  providers.   See  post,  at  32.    We  disagree  that,  according  to  common  sense,  medical  facilities,  well  known  for  their  wait  times,  operate below capacity as a general matter.  And the fact   that so many facilities were forced to close by the admittingprivileges  requirement  means  that  hiring  more  physicians would not be quite as simple as the dissent suggests.   Courts  are  free  to  base  their  findings  on  commonsense  inferences drawn from the evidence.  And that is what the   District Court did here.    The  dissent  now  seeks  to  discredit  Dr.  Grossman  by  pointing out that a preliminary prediction he made in his  testimony  in  Abbott  about  the  effect  of  the  admittingprivileges requirement on capacity was not borne out after  that  provision  went  into  effect.  See  post,  at  31,  n. 22.    If   every  expert  who  overestimated  or  underestimated  any  figure could not be credited, courts would struggle to find  expert  assistance.  Moreover,  making  a  hypothesis—and  then  attempting  to  verify  that  hypothesis  with  further  studies,  as  Dr.  Grossman  did—is  not  irresponsible.    It  is   an essential element of the scientific method.  The District    Court’s  decision  to  credit  Dr.  Grossman’s  testimony  was  sound,  particularly  given  that  Texas  provided  no  credible experts to rebut it.  See 46 F. Supp. 3d, at 680, n. 3 (declining  to  credit  Texas’  expert  witnesses,  in  part  because  Vincent  Rue,  a  nonphysician  consultant  for  Texas,  had  exercised “considerable editorial and discretionary control  over the contents of the experts’ reports”).    Texas suggests that the seven or eight remaining clinics  could  expand  sufficiently  to  provide  abortions  for  the  60,000  to  72,000  Texas  women  who  sought  them  each   year.  Because  petitioners  had  satisfied  their  burden,  the  obligation  was  on  Texas,  if  it  could,  to  present  evidence       Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  35   rebutting that issue to the District Court.  Texas admitted   that  it  presented  no  such  evidence.    Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  46.   Instead,  Texas  argued  before  this  Court  that  one  new  clinic now serves 9,000 women annually.  Ibid.  In addition  to  being  outside  the  record,  that  example  is  not  representative.  The  clinic  to  which  Texas  referred  apparently cost $26 million to construct—a fact that even more clearly  demonstrates that requiring seven or eight clinics to serve  five  times  their  usual  number  of  patients  does  indeed  represent  an  undue  burden  on  abortion  access.  See  Planned Parenthood Debuts New Building: Its $26 Million  Center in Houston is Largest of Its Kind in U. S., Houston   Chronicle, May 21, 2010, p. B1.   Attempting  to  provide  the  evidence  that  Texas  did  not,  the dissent points to an exhibit submitted in Abbott showing that three Texas surgical centers, two in Dallas as well  as the $26-million facility in Houston, are each capable of  serving an average of 7,000 patients per year.  See post, at  33–35.  That  “average”  is  misleading.    In  addition  to  including the Houston clinic, which does not represent most  facilities, it is underinclusive.  It ignores the evidence as to  the Whole Woman’s Health surgical-center facility in San  Antonio,  the  capacity  of  which  is  described  as  “severely  limited.”  The  exhibit  does  nothing  to  rebut  the  commonsense inference that the dramatic decline in the number of available facilities will cause a shortfall in capacity  should H. B. 2 go into effect.  And facilities that were still   operating  after  the  effective  date  of  the  admittingprivileges  provision  were  not  able  to  accommodate  increased  demand.  See  App.  238;  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  30–31;  Brief  for  National  Abortion  Federation  et  al.  as  Amici Curiae  17–20  (citing  clinics’  experiences  since  the   admitting-privileges  requirement  went  into  effect  of  3week wait times, staff burnout, and waiting rooms so full,  patients had to sit on the floor or wait outside).    More fundamentally, in the face of no threat to women’s     36     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court  health, Texas seeks to force women to travel long distances  to  get  abortions  in  crammed-to-capacity  superfacilities.   Patients  seeking  these  services  are  less  likely  to  get  the  kind of individualized attention, serious conversation, and  emotional support that doctors at less taxed facilities may  have  offered.  Healthcare  facilities  and  medical  professionals  are  not  fungible  commodities.    Surgical  centers attempting  to  accommodate  sudden,  vastly  increased  demand, see 46 F. Supp. 3d, at 682, may find that quality  of care declines.  Another commonsense inference that the   District Court made is that these effects would be harmful  to, not supportive of, women’s health.  See id., at 682–683.    Finally,  the  District   Court  found  that  the  costs  that  a  currently licensed abortion facility would have to incur to  meet  the  surgical-center  requirements  were  considerable,  ranging  from  $1  million  per  facility  (for  facilities  with  adequate space) to $3 million per facility (where additional  land must be purchased).  Id., at 682.  This evidence supports  the  conclusion  that  more  surgical  centers  will  not  soon fill the gap when licensed facilities are forced to close.    We  agree  with  the   District  Court  that   the  surgicalcenter  requirement,  like  the  admitting-privileges  requirement,  provides  few,  if  any,  health  benefits   for  women,  poses  a  substantial  obstacle  to  women  seeking  abortions,  and constitutes an “undue burden” on their constitutional  right to do so.  VI    We  consider  three  additional  arguments  that  Texas  makes and deem none persuasive.    First,  Texas  argues  that  facial  invalidation  of  both  challenged provisions is precluded by H. B. 2’s severability  clause.  See Brief for Respondents 50–52.  The severability clause  says  that  “every  provision,  section,  subsection,  sentence,  clause,  phrase,  or  word  in  this  Act,  and  every application of the provision in this Act, are severable from      Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  37   each other.”  H. B. 2, §10(b), App. to Pet. for Cert. 200a.  It  further  provides  that  if  “any  application  of  any  provision  in  this  Act  to  any  person,  group  of  persons,  or  circumstances  is  found  by  a  court  to  be  invalid,  the  remaining  applications  of  that  provision  to  all  other  persons  and  circumstances  shall  be  severed  and  may  not  be  affected.”   Ibid.    That  language,  Texas  argues,  means  that  facial  invalidation  of  parts  of  the  statute  is  not  an  option;  instead,  it  says,  the  severability  clause  mandates  a  more  narrowly  tailored  judicial  remedy.    But  the  challenged  provisions of H. B. 2 close most of the abortion facilities in  Texas  and  place  added  stress  on  those  facilities  able  to  remain open.  They vastly increase the obstacles confronting  women  seeking  abortions  in  Texas  without  providing  any benefit to women’s health capable of withstanding any  meaningful scrutiny.  The provisions are unconstitutional  on their face: Including a severability provision in the law  does not change that conclusion.    Severability  clauses,  it  is  true,  do  express  the  enacting legislature’s preference for a narrow judicial remedy.  As a   general matter, we attempt to honor that preference.  But   our cases have never required us to proceed application by  conceivable  application  when  confronted  with  a  facially unconstitutional  statutory  provision.    “We  have  held  that   a  severability  clause  is  an  aid  merely;  not  an   inexorable  command.”  Reno  v.  American Civil Liberties Union,  521   U. S. 844, 884–885, n. 49 (1997) (internal quotation marks  omitted).  Indeed,  if  a  severability  clause  could  impose  such a requirement on courts, legislatures would easily be  able to insulate unconstitutional statutes from most facial   review.  See ibid. (“It would certainly be dangerous if the  legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and  say  who  could  be  rightfully  detained,  and  who  should  be  set  at  large.  This  would,  to  some  extent,  substitute  the  judicial for the legislative department of the government”    38     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court  (internal quotation marks omitted)).  A severability clause is not grounds for a court to “devise a judicial remedy that  .  .  .  entail[s]  quintessentially  legislative  work.”    Ayotte  v.   Planned Parenthood of Northern New Eng., 546 U. S. 320,   329  (2006).   Such  an  approach  would  inflict  enormous costs on both courts and litigants, who would be required  to proceed in this manner whenever a single application of  a law might be valid.  We reject Texas’ invitation to pave  the  way  for  legislatures  to  immunize  their  statutes  from  facial review.     Texas similarly argues that instead of finding the entire  surgical-center  provision  unconstitutional,  we  should  invalidate  (as  applied  to  abortion  clinics)  only  those  specific surgical-center regulations that unduly burden the provision  of  abortions,  while  leaving  in  place  other  surgicalcenter  regulations  (for  example,  the  reader  could  pick any  of  the  various  examples  provided  by  the  dissent,  see   post, at 42–43).  See Brief for Respondents 52–53.  As we   have  explained,  Texas’  attempt  to  broadly  draft  a  requirement  to  sever  “applications”  does  not  require  us  to  proceed  in  piecemeal  fashion  when  we  have  found  the  statutory provisions at issue facially unconstitutional.    Nor is that approach to the regulations even required by     H. B. 2  itself.    The  statute  was  meant  to  require  abortion  facilities  to  meet  the  integrated  surgical-center  standards—not  some  subset  thereof.    The  severability  clause refers to severing applications of words and phrases in the Act,  such  as  the  surgical-center  requirement  as  a  whole.   See H. B. 2, §4, App. to Pet. for Cert. 194a.  It does not say  that  courts  should  go  through  the  individual  components  of the different, surgical-center statute, let alone the individual  regulations  governing  surgical  centers  to  see  whether those requirements are severable from each other  as applied to abortion facilities.  Facilities subject to some  subset  of  those  regulations  do  not  qualify  as  surgical   centers.  And  the  risk  of  harm  caused  by  inconsistent      Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    Opinion of the Court  39   application of only a fraction of interconnected regulations  counsels against doing so.    Second,  Texas  claims  that  the  provisions  at  issue  here  do  not  impose  a  substantial  obstacle  because  the  women affected  by   those  laws  are  not  a  “large  fraction”  of  Texan  women  “of reproductive  age,”  which  Texas  reads  Casey  to  have  required.  See  Brief  for  Respondents  45,  48.    But  Casey  used  the  language  “large  fraction”  to  refer  to  “a  large  fraction  of  cases  in  which  [the  provision  at  issue]  is  relevant,”  a  class  narrower  than  “all  women,”  “pregnant  women,”  or  even  “the  class  of  women seeking abortions  identified by the State.”  505 U. S., at 894–895 (opinion of  the Court) (emphasis added).  Here, as in Casey, the relevant  denominator  is  “those  [women]  for  whom  [the  provision]  is  an  actual  rather  than  an  irrelevant  restriction.”    Id., at 895.     Third, Texas looks for support to Simopoulos v. Virginia,    462 U. S. 506 (1983), a case in which this Court upheld a  surgical-center requirement as applied to second-trimester  abortions.  This  case,  however,  unlike  Simopoulos, involves restrictions applicable to all abortions, not simply to  those  that  take  place  during  the  second  trimester.    Most   abortions  in  Texas  occur  in  the  first  trimester,  not  the  second.  App. 236.  More importantly, in Casey we discarded the trimester framework, and we now use “viability” as  the  relevant  point  at  which  a  State  may  begin  limiting  women’s  access  to  abortion  for  reasons  unrelated  to  ma  ternal  health.  505  U. S.,  at  878   (plurality  opinion).    Because  the  second  trimester  includes  time  that  is  both   previability  and  postviability,  Simopoulos  cannot  provide   clear  guidance.  Further,  the  Court  in  Simopoulos found  that  the  petitioner  in  that  case,  unlike  petitioners  here,  had  waived  any  argument  that  the  regulation  did  not  significantly  help  protect  women’s  health.  462  U. S.,  at  517.    40     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     Opinion of the Court  *    *    *    For these reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals    is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  It is so ordered.   Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016) 1 GINSBURG, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 15–274 _________________ WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JOHN HELLERSTEDT, COMMISSIONER, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT [June 27, 2016] JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring. The Texas law called H. B. 2 inevitably will reduce the number of clinics and doctors allowed to provide abortion services. Texas argues that H. B. 2’s restrictions are constitutional because they protect the health of women who experience complications from abortions. In truth, “complications from an abortion are both rare and rarely dangerous.” Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F. 3d 908, 912 (CA7 2015). See Brief for American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al. as Amici Curiae 6–10 (collecting studies and concluding “[a]bortion is one of the safest medical procedures performed in the United States”); Brief for Social Science Researchers as Amici Curiae 5–9 (compiling studies that show “[c]omplication rates from abortion are very low”). Many medical procedures, including childbirth, are far more dangerous to patients, yet are not subject to ambulatorysurgical-center or hospital admitting-privileges requirements. See ante, at 31; Planned Parenthood of Wis., 806 F. 3d, at 921–922. See also Brief for Social Science Researchers 9–11 (comparing statistics on risks for abortion with tonsillectomy, colonoscopy, and in-office dental surgery); Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 7 (all District Courts to consider admitting- 2 WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT GINSBURG, J., concurring privileges requirements found abortion “is at least as safe as other medical procedures routinely performed in outpatient settings”). Given those realities, it is beyond rational belief that H. B. 2 could genuinely protect the health of women, and certain that the law “would simply make it more difficult for them to obtain abortions.” Planned Parenthood of Wis., 806 F. 3d, at 910. When a State severely limits access to safe and legal procedures, women in desperate circumstances may resort to unlicensed rogue practitioners, faute de mieux, at great risk to their health and safety. See Brief for Ten Pennsylvania Abortion Care Providers as Amici Curiae 17–22. So long as this Court adheres to Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992), Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers laws like H. B. 2 that “do little or nothing for health, but rather strew impediments to abortion,” Planned Parenthood of Wis., 806 F. 3d, at 921, cannot survive judicial inspection. Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016) 1 THOMAS, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 15–274 _________________ WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JOHN HELLERSTEDT, COMMISSIONER, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT [June 27, 2016] JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting. Today the Court strikes down two state statutory provisions in all of their applications, at the behest of abortion clinics and doctors. That decision exemplifies the Court’s troubling tendency “to bend the rules when any effort to limit abortion, or even to speak in opposition to abortion, is at issue.” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U. S. 914, 954 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). As JUSTICE ALITO observes, see post (dissenting opinion), today’s decision creates an abortion exception to ordinary rules of res judicata, ignores compelling evidence that Texas’ law imposes no unconstitutional burden, and disregards basic principles of the severability doctrine. I write separately to emphasize how today’s decision perpetuates the Court’s habit of applying different rules to different constitutional rights— especially the putative right to abortion. To begin, the very existence of this suit is a jurisprudential oddity. Ordinarily, plaintiffs cannot file suits to vindicate the constitutional rights of others. But the Court employs a different approach to rights that it favors. So in this case and many others, the Court has erroneously allowed doctors and clinics to vicariously vindicate the putative constitutional right of women seeking abortions. This case also underscores the Court’s increasingly 2 WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT THOMAS, J., dissenting common practice of invoking a given level of scrutiny— here, the abortion-specific undue burden standard—while applying a different standard of review entirely. Whatever scrutiny the majority applies to Texas’ law, it bears little resemblance to the undue-burden test the Court articulated in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992), and its successors. Instead, the majority eviscerates important features of that test to return to a regime like the one that Casey repudiated. Ultimately, this case shows why the Court never should have bent the rules for favored rights in the first place. Our law is now so riddled with special exceptions for special rights that our decisions deliver neither predictability nor the promise of a judiciary bound by the rule of law. I This suit is possible only because the Court has allowed abortion clinics and physicians to invoke a putative constitutional right that does not belong to them—a woman’s right to abortion. The Court’s third-party standing jurisprudence is no model of clarity. See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U. S. 125, 135 (2004) (THOMAS, J., concurring). Driving this doctrinal confusion, the Court has shown a particular willingness to undercut restrictions on third-party standing when the right to abortion is at stake. And this case reveals a deeper flaw in straying from our normal rules: when the wrong party litigates a case, we end up resolving disputes that make for bad law. For most of our Nation’s history, plaintiffs could not challenge a statute by asserting someone else’s constitutional rights. See ibid. This Court would “not listen to an objection made to the constitutionality of an act by a party whose rights it does not affect and who has therefore no interest in defeating it.” Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114, 118 (1900) (internal quotation marks omitted). And Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016) 3 THOMAS, J., dissenting for good reason: “[C]ourts are not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation’s laws.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 610–611 (1973). In the 20th century, the Court began relaxing that rule. But even as the Court started to recognize exceptions for certain types of challenges, it stressed the strict limits of those exceptions. A plaintiff could assert a third party’s rights, the Court said, but only if the plaintiff had a “close relation to the third party” and the third party faced a formidable “hindrance” to asserting his own rights. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 411 (1991); accord, Kowalski, supra, at 130–133 (similar). Those limits broke down, however, because the Court has been “quite forgiving” in applying these standards to certain claims. Id., at 130. Some constitutional rights remained “personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 174 (1969) (Fourth Amendment rights are purely personal); see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 140, n. 8 (1978) (so is the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). But the Court has abandoned such limitations on other rights, producing serious anomalies across similar factual scenarios. Lawyers cannot vicariously assert potential clients’ Sixth Amendment rights because they lack any current, close relationship. Kowalski, supra, at 130–131. Yet litigants can assert potential jurors’ rights against race or sex discrimination in jury selection even when the litigants have never met potential jurors and do not share their race or sex. Powers, supra, at 410–416; J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U. S. 127, 129 (1994). And vendors can sue to invalidate state regulations implicating potential customers’ equal protection rights against sex discrimination. Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 194–197 (1976) (striking down sex-based age restrictions on purchasing beer). 4 WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT THOMAS, J., dissenting Above all, the Court has been especially forgiving of third-party standing criteria for one particular category of cases: those involving the purported substantive due process right of a woman to abort her unborn child. In Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106 (1976), a plurality of this Court fashioned a blanket rule allowing third-party standing in abortion cases. Id., at 118. “[I]t generally is appropriate,” said the Court, “to allow a physician to assert the rights of women patients as against governmental interference with the abortion decision.” Ibid. Yet the plurality conceded that the traditional criteria for an exception to the third-party standing rule were not met. There are no “insurmountable” obstacles stopping women seeking abortions from asserting their own rights, the plurality admitted. Nor are there jurisdictional barriers. Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), held that women seeking abortions fell into the mootness exception for cases “ ‘capable of repetition, yet seeking review,’ ” enabling them to sue after they terminated their pregnancies without showing that they intended to become pregnant and seek an abortion again. Id., at 125. Yet, since Singleton, the Court has unquestioningly accepted doctors’ and clinics’ vicarious assertion of the constitutional rights of hypothetical patients, even as women seeking abortions have successfully and repeatedly asserted their own rights before this Court.1 —————— 1 Compare, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 124 (2007), and Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U. S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 851 (1992) (assuming that physicians and clinics can vicariously assert women’s right to abortion), with, e.g., Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U. S. 137, 139 (1996) (per curiam); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U. S. 417, 429 (1990); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 400 (1981); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U. S. 358, 361 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 303 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 137– 138 (1976); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U. S. 519, 519 (1977) (per curiam); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438, 441–442 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 467 (1977) (women seeking abortions have capably asserted their own Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016) 5 THOMAS, J., dissenting Here too, the Court does not question whether doctors and clinics should be allowed to sue on behalf of Texas women seeking abortions as a matter of course. They should not. The central question under the Court’s abortion precedents is whether there is an undue burden on a woman’s access to abortion. See Casey, 505 U. S., at 877 (plurality opinion); see Part II, infra. But the Court’s permissive approach to third-party standing encourages litigation that deprives us of the information needed to resolve that issue. Our precedents encourage abortion providers to sue—and our cases then relieve them of any obligation to prove what burdens women actually face. I find it astonishing that the majority can discover an “undue burden” on women’s access to abortion for “those [women] for whom [Texas’ law] is an actual rather than an irrelevant restriction,” ante, at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted), without identifying how many women fit this description; their proximity to open clinics; or their preferences as to where they obtain abortions, and from whom. “[C]ommonsense inference[s]” that such a burden exists, ante, at 36, are no substitute for actual evidence. There should be no surer sign that our jurisprudence has gone off the rails than this: After creating a constitutional right to abortion because it “involve[s] the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,” Casey, supra, at 851 (majority opinion), the Court has created special rules that cede its enforcement to others. II Today’s opinion also reimagines the undue-burden standard used to assess the constitutionality of abortion restrictions. Nearly 25 years ago, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, a plurality of —————— rights, as plaintiffs). 6 WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT THOMAS, J., dissenting this Court invented the “undue burden” standard as a special test for gauging the permissibility of abortion restrictions. Casey held that a law is unconstitutional if it imposes an “undue burden” on a woman’s ability to choose to have an abortion, meaning that it “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.” Id., at 877. Casey thus instructed courts to look to whether a law substantially impedes women’s access to abortion, and whether it is reasonably related to legitimate state interests. As the Court explained, “[w]here it has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power” to regulate aspects of abortion procedures, “all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn.” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 124, 158 (2007). I remain fundamentally opposed to the Court’s abortion jurisprudence. E.g., id., at 168–169 (THOMAS, J., concurring); Stenberg, 530 U. S., at 980, 982 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Even taking Casey as the baseline, however, the majority radically rewrites the undue-burden test in three ways. First, today’s decision requires courts to “consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer.” Ante, at 19. Second, today’s opinion tells the courts that, when the law’s justifications are medically uncertain, they need not defer to the legislature, and must instead assess medical justifications for abortion restrictions by scrutinizing the record themselves. Ibid. Finally, even if a law imposes no “substantial obstacle” to women’s access to abortions, the law now must have more than a “reasonabl[e] relat[ion] to . . . a legitimate state interest.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). These precepts are nowhere to be found in Casey or its successors, and transform the undue-burden test to something much more akin to strict scrutiny. Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016) 7 THOMAS, J., dissenting First, the majority’s free-form balancing test is contrary to Casey. When assessing Pennsylvania’s recordkeeping requirements for abortion providers, for instance, Casey did not weigh its benefits and burdens. Rather, Casey held that the law had a legitimate purpose because data collection advances medical research, “so it cannot be said that the requirements serve no purpose other than to make abortions more difficult.” 505 U. S., at 901 ( joint opinion of O’Connor, KENNEDY, and Souter, JJ.). The opinion then asked whether the recordkeeping requirements imposed a “substantial obstacle,” and found none. Ibid. Contrary to the majority’s statements, see ante, at 19, Casey did not balance the benefits and burdens of Pennsylvania’s spousal and parental notification provisions, either. Pennsylvania’s spousal notification requirement, the plurality said, imposed an undue burden because findings established that the requirement would “likely . . . prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an abortion”—not because these burdens outweighed its benefits. 505 U. S., at 893 (majority opinion); see id., at 887–894. And Casey summarily upheld parental notification provisions because even pre-Casey decisions had done so. Id., at 899–900 (joint opinion). Decisions in Casey’s wake further refute the majority’s benefits-and-burdens balancing test. The Court in Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U. S. 968 (1997) (per curiam), had no difficulty upholding a Montana law authorizing only physicians to perform abortions—even though no legislative findings supported the law, and the challengers claimed that “all health evidence contradict[ed] the claim that there is any health basis for the law.” Id., at 973 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mazurek also deemed objections to the law’s lack of benefits “squarely foreclosed by Casey itself.” Ibid. Instead, the Court explained, “ ‘the Constitution gives the States broad latitude to decide that particular functions may be performed only by licensed 8 WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT THOMAS, J., dissenting professionals, even if an objective assessment might suggest that those same tasks could be performed by others.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Casey, supra, at 885; emphasis in original); see Gonzales, supra, at 164 (relying on Mazurek). Second, by rejecting the notion that “legislatures, and not courts, must resolve questions of medical uncertainty,” ante, at 20, the majority discards another core element of the Casey framework. Before today, this Court had “given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.” Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 163. This Court emphasized that this “traditional rule” of deference “is consistent with Casey.” Ibid. This Court underscored that legislatures should not be hamstrung “if some part of the medical community were disinclined to follow the proscription.” Id., at 166. And this Court concluded that “[c]onsiderations of marginal safety, including the balance of risks, are within the legislative competence when the regulation is rational and in pursuit of legitimate ends.” Ibid.; see Stenberg, supra, at 971 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (“the right of the legislature to resolve matters on which physicians disagreed” is “establish[ed] beyond doubt”). This Court could not have been clearer: Whenever medical justifications for an abortion restriction are debatable, that “provides a sufficient basis to conclude in [a] facial attack that the [law] does not impose an undue burden.” Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 164. Otherwise, legislatures would face “too exacting” a standard. Id., at 166. Today, however, the majority refuses to leave disputed medical science to the legislature because past cases “placed considerable weight upon the evidence and argument presented in judicial proceedings.” Ante, at 20. But while Casey relied on record evidence to uphold Pennsylvania’s spousal-notification requirement, that requirement had nothing to do with debated medical science. 505 U. S., at 888–894 (majority opinion). And while Gonzales ob- Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016) 9 THOMAS, J., dissenting served that courts need not blindly accept all legislative findings, see ante, at 20, that does not help the majority. Gonzales refused to accept Congress’ finding of “a medical consensus that the prohibited procedure is never medically necessary” because the procedure’s necessity was debated within the medical community. 550 U. S., at 165–166. Having identified medical uncertainty, Gonzales explained how courts should resolve conflicting positions: by respecting the legislature’s judgment. See id., at 164. Finally, the majority overrules another central aspect of Casey by requiring laws to have more than a rational basis even if they do not substantially impede access to abortion. Ante, at 19–20. “Where [the State] has a rational basis to act and it does not impose an undue burden,” this Court previously held, “the State may use its regulatory power” to impose regulations “in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn.” Gonzales, supra, at 158 (emphasis added); see Casey, supra, at 878 (plurality opinion) (similar). No longer. Though the majority declines to say how substantial a State’s interest must be, ante, at 20, one thing is clear: The State’s burden has been ratcheted to a level that has not applied for a quarter century. Today’s opinion does resemble Casey in one respect: After disregarding significant aspects of the Court’s prior jurisprudence, the majority applies the undue-burden standard in a way that will surely mystify lower courts for years to come. As in Casey, today’s opinion “simply . . . highlight[s] certain facts in the record that apparently strike the . . . Justices as particularly significant in establishing (or refuting) the existence of an undue burden.” 505 U. S., at 991 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); see ante, at 23–24, 31–34. As in Casey, “the opinion then simply announces that the provision either does or does not impose a ‘substantial 10 WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT THOMAS, J., dissenting obstacle’ or an ‘undue burden.’ ” 505 U. S., at 991 (opinion of Scalia, J); see ante, at 26, 36. And still “[w]e do not know whether the same conclusions could have been reached on a different record, or in what respects the record would have had to differ before an opposite conclusion would have been appropriate.” 505 U. S., at 991 (opinion of Scalia, J.); cf. ante, at 26, 31–32. All we know is that an undue burden now has little to do with whether the law, in a “real sense, deprive[s] women of the ultimate decision,” Casey, supra, at 875, and more to do with the loss of “individualized attention, serious conversation, and emotional support,” ante, at 36. The majority’s undue-burden test looks far less like our post-Casey precedents and far more like the strict-scrutiny standard that Casey rejected, under which only the most compelling rationales justified restrictions on abortion. See Casey, supra, at 871, 874–875 (plurality opinion). One searches the majority opinion in vain for any acknowledgment of the “premise central” to Casey’s rejection of strict scrutiny: “that the government has a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life” from conception, not just in regulating medical procedures. Gonzales, supra, at 145 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Casey, supra, at 846 (majority opinion), 871 (plurality opinion). Meanwhile, the majority’s undueburden balancing approach risks ruling out even minor, previously valid infringements on access to abortion. Moreover, by second-guessing medical evidence and making its own assessments of “quality of care” issues, ante, at 23–24, 30–31, 36, the majority reappoints this Court as “the country’s ex officio medical board with powers to disapprove medical and operative practices and standards throughout the United States.” Gonzales, supra, at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the majority seriously burdens States, which must guess at how much more compelling their interests must be to pass muster Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016) 11 THOMAS, J., dissenting and what “commonsense inferences” of an undue burden this Court will identify next. III The majority’s furtive reconfiguration of the standard of scrutiny applicable to abortion restrictions also points to a deeper problem. The undue-burden standard is just one variant of the Court’s tiers-of-scrutiny approach to constitutional adjudication. And the label the Court affixes to its level of scrutiny in assessing whether the government can restrict a given right—be it “rational basis,” intermediate, strict, or something else—is increasingly a meaningless formalism. As the Court applies whatever standard it likes to any given case, nothing but empty words separates our constitutional decisions from judicial fiat. Though the tiers of scrutiny have become a ubiquitous feature of constitutional law, they are of recent vintage. Only in the 1960’s did the Court begin in earnest to speak of “strict scrutiny” versus reviewing legislation for mere rationality, and to develop the contours of these tests. See Fallon, Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1267, 1274, 1284–1285 (2007). In short order, the Court adopted strict scrutiny as the standard for reviewing everything from race-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause to restrictions on constitutionally protected speech. Id., at 1275–1283. Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, then applied strict scrutiny to a purportedly “fundamental” substantive due process right for the first time. Id., at 162– 164; see Fallon, supra, at 1283; accord, Casey, supra, at 871 (plurality opinion) (noting that post-Roe cases interpreted Roe to demand “strict scrutiny”). Then the tiers of scrutiny proliferated into ever more gradations. See, e.g., Craig, 429 U. S., at 197–198 (intermediate scrutiny for sex-based classifications); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (“a more searching form of rational basis review” applies to 12 WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT THOMAS, J., dissenting laws reflecting “a desire to harm a politically unpopular group”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (applying “ ‘closest scrutiny’ ” to campaign-finance contribution limits). Casey’s undue-burden test added yet another right-specific test on the spectrum between rational-basis and strict-scrutiny review. The illegitimacy of using “made-up tests” to “displace longstanding national traditions as the primary determinant of what the Constitution means” has long been apparent. United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 570 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Constitution does not prescribe tiers of scrutiny. The three basic tiers— “rational basis,” intermediate, and strict scrutiny—“are no more scientific than their names suggest, and a further element of randomness is added by the fact that it is largely up to us which test will be applied in each case.” Id., at 567; see also Craig, supra, at 217–221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But the problem now goes beyond that. If our recent cases illustrate anything, it is how easily the Court tinkers with levels of scrutiny to achieve its desired result. This Term, it is easier for a State to survive strict scrutiny despite discriminating on the basis of race in college admissions than it is for the same State to regulate how abortion doctors and clinics operate under the putatively less stringent undue-burden test. All the State apparently needs to show to survive strict scrutiny is a list of aspirational educational goals (such as the “cultivat[ion of] a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry”) and a “reasoned, principled explanation” for why it is pursuing them—then this Court defers. Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, ante, at 7, 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet the same State gets no deference under the undue-burden test, despite producing evidence that abortion safety, one rationale for Texas’ law, is medically debated. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016) 13 THOMAS, J., dissenting 3d 673, 684 (WD Tex. 2014) (noting conflict in expert testimony about abortion safety). Likewise, it is now easier for the government to restrict judicial candidates’ campaign speech than for the Government to define marriage—even though the former is subject to strict scrutiny and the latter was supposedly subject to some form of rational-basis review. Compare Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2015) (slip op., at 8–9), with United States v. Windsor, 570 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 20). These more recent decisions reflect the Court’s tendency to relax purportedly higher standards of review for lesspreferred rights. E.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 421 (2000) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (“The Court makes no effort to justify its deviation from the tests we traditionally employ in free speech cases” to review caps on political contributions). Meanwhile, the Court selectively applies rational-basis review— under which the question is supposed to be whether “any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify” the law, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 426 (1961)— with formidable toughness. E.g., Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (at least in equal protection cases, the Court is “most likely” to find no rational basis for a law if “the challenged legislation inhibits personal relationships”); see id., at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (faulting the Court for applying “an unheard-of form of rational-basis review”). These labels now mean little. Whatever the Court claims to be doing, in practice it is treating its “doctrine referring to tiers of scrutiny as guidelines informing our approach to the case at hand, not tests to be mechanically applied.” Williams-Yulee, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 1) (BREYER, J., concurring). The Court should abandon the pretense that anything other than policy preferences underlies its balancing of constitutional rights and inter- 14 WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT THOMAS, J., dissenting ests in any given case. IV It is tempting to identify the Court’s invention of a constitutional right to abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, as the tipping point that transformed third-party standing doctrine and the tiers of scrutiny into an unworkable morass of special exceptions and arbitrary applications. But those roots run deeper, to the very notion that some constitutional rights demand preferential treatment. During the Lochner era, the Court considered the right to contract and other economic liberties to be fundamental requirements of due process of law. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905). The Court in 1937 repudiated Lochner’s foundations. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 386–387, 400 (1937). But the Court then created a new taxonomy of preferred rights. In 1938, seven Justices heard a constitutional challenge to a federal ban on shipping adulterated milk in interstate commerce. Without economic substantive due process, the ban clearly invaded no constitutional right. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152–153 (1938). Within Justice Stone’s opinion for the Court, however, was a footnote that just three other Justices joined—the famous Carolene Products Footnote 4. See ibid., n. 4; Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1097 (1982). The footnote’s first paragraph suggested that the presumption of constitutionality that ordinarily attaches to legislation might be “narrower . . . when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution.” 304 U. S., at 152–153, n. 4. Its second paragraph appeared to question “whether legislation which restricts those political processes, which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016) 15 THOMAS, J., dissenting subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the [14th] Amendment than are most other types of legislation.” Ibid. And its third and most familiar paragraph raised the question “whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.” Ibid. Though the footnote was pure dicta, the Court seized upon it to justify its special treatment of certain personal liberties like the First Amendment and the right against discrimination on the basis of race—but also rights not enumerated in the Constitution.2 As the Court identified which rights deserved special protection, it developed the tiers of scrutiny as part of its equal protection (and, later, due process) jurisprudence as a way to demand extra justifications for encroachments on these rights. See Fallon, 54 UCLA L. Rev., at 1270–1273, 1281–1285. And, having created a new category of fundamental rights, the Court loosened the reins to recognize even putative rights like abortion, see Roe, 410 U. S., at 162–164, which hardly implicate “discrete and insular minorities.” The Court also seized upon the rationale of the Carolene Products footnote to justify exceptions to third-party standing doctrine. The Court suggested that it was tilting the analysis to favor rights involving actual or perceived minorities—then seemingly counted the right to contra—————— 2 See Fallon, Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1267, 1278– 1291 (2007); see also Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote and the Preferred Position of Individual Rights: Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely vs. Harlan Fiske Stone, 12 Const. Commentary 277, 277–278, 288–300 (1995); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 544 (1942) (Stone, C. J., concurring) (citing the Carolene Products footnote to suggest that the presumption of constitutionality did not fully apply to encroachments on the unenumerated personal liberty to procreate). 16 WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT THOMAS, J., dissenting ception as such a right. According to the Court, what matters is the “relationship between one who acted to protect the rights of a minority and the minority itself ”— which, the Court suggested, includes the relationship “between an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 445 (1972) (citing Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 Yale L. J. 599, 631 (1962)). Eighty years on, the Court has come full circle. The Court has simultaneously transformed judicially created rights like the right to abortion into preferred constitutional rights, while disfavoring many of the rights actually enumerated in the Constitution. But our Constitution renounces the notion that some constitutional rights are more equal than others. A plaintiff either possesses the constitutional right he is asserting, or not—and if not, the judiciary has no business creating ad hoc exceptions so that others can assert rights that seem especially important to vindicate. A law either infringes a constitutional right, or not; there is no room for the judiciary to invent tolerable degrees of encroachment. Unless the Court abides by one set of rules to adjudicate constitutional rights, it will continue reducing constitutional law to policy-driven value judgments until the last shreds of its legitimacy disappear. * * * Today’s decision will prompt some to claim victory, just as it will stiffen opponents’ will to object. But the entire Nation has lost something essential. The majority’s embrace of a jurisprudence of rights-specific exceptions and balancing tests is “a regrettable concession of defeat—an acknowledgement that we have passed the point where ‘law,’ properly speaking, has any further application.” Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1182 (1989). I respectfully dissent.   Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)        ALITO, J., dissenting  1  SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________  No. 15–274   _________________  WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH, ET AL   ., PETITIONERS v.  JOHN HELLERSTEDT, COMMISSIONER, TEXAS  DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES, ET AL   .  ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF  APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  [June 27, 2016]  JUSTICE  ALITO,  with  whom  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE  and   JUSTICE THOMAS  join, dissenting.    The  constitutionality  of  laws  regulating  abortion  is  one  of the most controversial issues in American law, but this  case  does  not  require  us  to  delve  into  that  contentious  dispute.  Instead,  the  dispositive  issue  here  concerns  a  workaday  question  that  can  arise  in  any  case  no  matter  the subject, namely, whether the present case is barred by  res  judicata.    As  a  court  of  law,  we  have  an  obligation  to  apply such rules in a neutral fashion in all cases, regard­ less  of  the  subject  of  the  suit.    If  anything,  when  a  case  involves  a  controversial  issue,  we  should  be  especially  careful to be scrupulously neutral in applying such rules.   The  Court  has  not  done  so  here.    On  the  contrary,  de­ termined  to  strike  down  two  provisions  of   a  new  Texas  abortion  statute  in  all  of  their  applications,  the  Court  simply disregards basic rules that apply in all other cases.   Here is the worst example.  Shortly after Texas enacted  House Bill 2 (H. B. 2) in 2013, the petitioners in this case  brought  suit,  claiming,  among  other  things,  that  a  provi­ sion  of  the  new  law  requiring  a  physician  performing  an  abortion to have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital  is  “facially”  unconstitutional  and  thus  totally  unenforce­  able.  Petitioners had a fair opportunity to make their case,        2    WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  but  they  lost  on  the  merits  in  the  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Fifth   Circuit,  and  they  chose  not  to  peti­ tion  this  Court  for  review.    The  judgment   against  them   became  final.  Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891 (WD Tex.      2013), aff ’d in part and rev’d in part, 748 F. 3d 583 (CA5   2014) (Abbott).    Under the rules that apply in regular cases, petitioners  could not relitigate the exact same claim in a second suit.   As  we  have  said,  “a  losing  litigant  deserves  no  rematch  after  a  defeat  fairly  suffered,  in  adversarial  proceedings, on  an  issue  identical  in  substance  to  the  one  he  subse­ quently seeks to raise.”  Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v.  Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 107 (1991).   In this abortion case, however, that rule is disregarded.   The  Court  awards  a  victory  to  petitioners  on  the  very  claim that they unsuccessfully pressed in the earlier case.   The Court does this even though petitioners, undoubtedly  realizing  that  a  rematch  would  not  be  allowed,  did  not  presume  to  include  such  a  claim  in  their  complaint.    The   Court  favors  petitioners  with  a  victory  that  they  did  not  have the audacity to seek.    Here  is  one  more  example:  the  Court’s  treatment  of  H. B.  2’s  “severability  clause.”    When  part  of  a  statute  is  held  to  be  unconstitutional,  the  question  arises  whether  other  parts  of  the  statute  must  also  go.    If  a   statute  says  that  provisions  found  to  be  unconstitutional  can  be  sev­ ered  from  the  rest  of  the  statute,  the  valid  provisions  are  allowed  to  stand.  H. B.  2  contains  what  must  surely  be  the  most  emphatic  severability  clause  ever  written.  This  clause says that every single word of the statute and every  possible  application  of  its  provisions  is  severable.    But  despite this language, the Court holds that no part of the  challenged  provisions  and  no  application  of  any  part  of  them  can  be  saved.    Provisions  that  are  indisputably  constitutional—for example, provisions that require facili­   Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    ALITO, J., dissenting      3  ties  performing  abortions  to  follow  basic  fire  safety measures—are stricken from the books.  There is no possi­ ble justification for this collateral damage.   The Court’s patent refusal to apply well­established law  in a neutral way is indefensible and will undermine public  confidence in the Court as a fair and neutral arbiter.  I    Res  judicata—or,  to  use  the  more  modern  terminology,  “claim  preclusion”—is  a  bedrock  principle  of  our  legal  system.  As  we  said  many  years  ago,  “[p]ublic  policy  dic­ tates  that  there  be  an  end  of  litigation[,]  that  those  who  have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the  contest,  and  that  matters  once  tried  shall  be  considered  forever  settled  as  between  the  parties.”    Baldwin  v.  Iowa State Traveling Men’s Assn.,  283  U. S.  522,  525  (1931).    This  doctrine  “is  central  to  the  purpose  for  which  civil  courts  have  been  established,  the  conclusive  resolution  of  disputes within their jurisdictions. . . . To preclude parties  from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair  opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the  expense  and  vexation  attending  multiple  lawsuits,  con­ serves  judicial  resources,  and  fosters  reliance  on  judicial  action  by  minimizing  the  possibility  of  inconsistent  deci­ sions.”    Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147, 153–154  (1979).  These  are  “vital  public  interests”  that  should  be  “ ‘cordially regarded and enforced.’ ”  Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U. S. 394, 401 (1981).    The basic rule of preclusion is well known and has been  frequently stated in our opinions.  Litigation of a “cause of action”  or  “claim”  is  barred  if  (1)  the  same  (or  a  closely  related)  party  (2)  brought  a  prior  suit  asserting  the  same  cause of action or claim, (3) the prior case was adjudicated  by a court of competent jurisdiction and (4) was decided on  the merits, (5) a final judgment was entered, and (6) there  is  no  ground,  such  as  fraud,  to  invalidate  the  prior  judg­ 4    WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  ment.  See Montana, supra, at 153; Commissioner v. Sun  nen, 333 U. S. 591, 597 (1948); Cromwell v. County of Sac,  94 U. S. 351, 352–353 (1877).  A    I turn first to the application of this rule to petitioners’  claim  that  H. B.  2’s  admitting  privileges  requirement  is  facially unconstitutional.   Here, all the elements set out above are easily satisfied  based  on  Abbott,  the  2013  case  to  which  I  previously  re­ ferred.  That case (1) was brought by a group of plaintiffs  that  included  petitioners  in  the  present  case,  (2)  asserted  the  same  cause  of  action  or  claim,  namely,  a  facial  chal­ lenge  to  the  constitutionality  of  H. B.  2’s  admitting  privi­ leges requirement, (3) was adjudicated by courts of compe­ tent  jurisdiction,  (4)  was  decided  on  the  merits,  (5)  resulted in the entry of a final judgment against petition­ ers, and (6) was not otherwise subject to invalidation.  All  of  this  is  clear,  and  that  is  undoubtedly  why  petitioners’  attorneys  did  not  even  include  a  facial  attack  on  the  ad­ mitting  privileges  requirement  in  their  complaint  in  this   case.  To  have  done  so  would  have  risked  sanctions  for  misconduct.  See Robinson v. National Cash Register Co.,  808 F. 2d 1119, 1131 (CA5 1987) (a party’s “persistence in   litigating  [a  claim]  when  res  judicata  clearly  barred  the  suit  violated  rule  11”);  McLaughlin v. Bradlee,  602  F. Supp.  1412,  1417  (DC  1985)  (“It  is  especially  appropri­ ate  to  impose  sanctions  in  situations  where  the  doctrines  of  res judicata  and  collateral  estoppel  plainly  preclude  relitigation of the suit”).    Of  the  elements  set  out  above,  the  Court  disputes  only  one.  The  Court  concludes  that  petitioners’  prior  facial  attack  on  the  admitting  privileges  requirement  and  their  current facial attack on that same requirement are some­ how not the same cause of action or claim.  But that con­   clusion is unsupported by authority and plainly wrong.     Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    ALITO, J., dissenting      5  B    Although  the  scope  of  a  cause  of  action  or  claim  for  purposes  of  res  judicata  is  hardly  a  new  question,  courts and  scholars  have  struggled  to  settle  upon  a  definition.1    But the outcome of the present case does not depend upon the  selection  of  the  proper  definition  from  among  those  adopted  or  recommended  over  the  years  because  the  ma­ jority’s holding is not supported by any of them.  In  Baltimore S. S. Co.  v.  Phillips,  274  U. S.  316  (1927),  we defined a cause of action as an “actionable wrong.”  Id.,  at 321; see also ibid. (“A cause of action does not consist of  facts,  but  of  the  unlawful  violation  of  a  right  which  the  facts  show”).    On  this  understanding,  the  two  claims  at  issue here are indisputably the same.    The same result is dictated by the rule recommended by  the American Law Institute (ALI) in the first Restatement  of  Judgments,  issued  in  1942.  Section  61  of  the  first  Re­ statement explains when a claim asserted by a plaintiff in  a  second  suit  is  the  same  for  preclusion  purposes  as  a  claim  that  the  plaintiff  unsuccessfully  litigated  in  a  prior  case.  Under  that  provision,  “the  plaintiff  is  precluded  from  subsequently  maintaining  a  second  action  based upon  the  same  transaction,  if  the  evidence  needed  to  sustain  the  second  action  would  have  sustained  the  first  action.”  Restatement  of  Judgments  §61.  There  is  no  doubt that this rule is satisfied here.    The  second  Restatement  of  Judgments,  issued  by  the  ALI in 1982, adopted a new approach for determining the  scope  of  a  cause  of  action  or  claim.  In  Nevada  v.  United States,  463  U. S.  110  (1983),  we  noted  that  the  two  Re­ statements  differ  in  this  regard,  but  we  had  no  need   to  determine  which  was  correct.    Id.,  at  130–131,  and  n. 12.    ——————  1 See, e.g., Note, Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L.  Rev.  818,  824  (1952);  Cleary,  Res  Judicata  Reexamined,  57  Yale  L. J.  339, 339–340 (1948).  6    WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  Here,  the  majority  simply  assumes  that  we  should  follow  the  second  Restatement  even  though  that  Restatement— on the Court’s reading, at least—leads to a conclusion that  differs  from  the  conclusion  clearly  dictated  by  the  first  Restatement.    If the second Restatement actually supported the major­   ity’s  holding,  the  Court  would  surely  be  obligated  to  ex­ plain  why  it  chose  to  follow  the  second  Restatement’s  approach.  But  here,  as  in  Nevada,  supra,  at  130–131,   application  of  the  rule  set  out  in  the  second  Restatement does not change the result.  While the Court relies almost  entirely  on  a  comment  to  one  section  of  the  second  Re­ statement,  the  Court  ignores  the  fact  that  a  straightfor­ ward  application  of  the  provisions  of  that  Restatement  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  petitioners’  two  facial  chal­ lenges  to  the  admitting  privileges  requirement  constitute  a single claim.   Section  19  of  the  second  Restatement  sets  out  the  gen­ eral  claim­preclusion  rule  that  applies  in  a  case  like  the  one  before  us:  “A  valid  and  final  personal  judgment  ren­ dered in favor of the defendant bars another action by the  plaintiff  on  the  same  claim.”    Section  24(1)  then  explains  the  scope  of  the  “claim”  that  is  extinguished:  It  “includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant  with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series  of  connected  transactions,  out  of  which  the  action  arose.”   Section 24’s Comment b, in turn, fleshes out the key term  “transaction,”  which  it  defines  as  “a  natural  grouping  or  common nucleus of operative facts.”  Whether a collection  of events constitutes a single transaction is said to depend on “their relatedness in time, space, origin, or motivation, and whether, taken together, they form a convenient unit for trial purposes.”  Ibid.   Both the claim asserted in petitioners’ first suit and the  claim now revived by the Court involve the same “nucleus  of  operative  facts.”  Indeed,  they  involve  the  very  same    Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)        ALITO, J., dissenting  7  “operative  facts,”  namely,  the  enactment  of  the  admitting  privileges  requirement,  which,  according  to  the  theory  underlying  petitioners’  facial  claims,  would  inevitably  have the effect of causing abortion clinics to close.  This is  what petitioners needed to show—and what they attempted         to  show  in  their  first  facial  attack:  not  that  the  admit­  ting  privileges  requirement  had  already imposed  a  sub­ stantial  burden  on  the  right  of  Texas  women  to  obtain  abortions,  but  only  that  it  would have  that  effect  once  clinics were able to assess whether they could practicably  comply.   The  Court’s  decision  in  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.  v.  Casey,  505  U. S.  833  (1992),  makes  that  clear.  Casey held that Pennsylvania’s spousal notification  requirement  was  facially  unconstitutional  even  though  that  provision  had  been  enjoined  prior  to  enforcement.   See id., at 845.  And the Court struck down the provision   because  it  “will  impose  a  substantial  obstacle.”    Id.,  at   893–894  (emphasis  added).  See  also  id.,  at  893  (“The spousal notification requirement is thus likely to prevent a  significant number of women from obtaining an abortion”  (emphasis  added));  id.,  at  894  (Women  “are likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion” (emphasis added)).    Consistent  with  this   understanding,  what  petitioners  tried  to  show  in  their  first  case  was  that  the  admitting  privileges requirement would cause clinics to close.  They claimed that their evidence showed that “at least one­third   of  the  State’s  licensed  providers  would stop  providing abortions  once  the  privileges  requirement  took  effect.”2    ——————  2 Brief  for  Plaintiffs­Appellees  in  Abbott,  No.  13–51008  (CA5),  p.  5  (emphasis  added);  see  also   id.,  at  23–24  (“[T]he  evidence  established  that as a result of the admitting privileges requirement, approximately  one­third of the licensed abortion providers in Texas would stop provid­ ing  abortions. . . .  As  a  result,  one  in  three  women  in  Texas   would be     [T]he  immediate,  wide­ unable  to  access  desired  abortion  services. . . .  spread  reduction  of  services  caused  by  the  admitting  privileges  re­ 8    WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  Agreeing  with  petitioners,  the  District  Court  enjoined  enforcement of the requirement on the ground that “there   will be  abortion  clinics that will close.”     Abbott,  951  F. Supp. 2d,  at  900  (emphasis  added).    The  Fifth  Circuit  found that petitioners’ evidence of likely effect was insuffi­ cient,  stating  that  petitioners  failed  to  prove  that  “any   woman will lack reasonable access to a clinic within Texas.”   Abbott,  748  F. 3d,  at  598  (some  emphasis  added;  some  emphasis  deleted).  The  correctness  of  that  holding  is  irrelevant for present purposes.  What matters is that the  “operative fact” in the prior case was the enactment of the  admitting privileges requirement, and that is precisely the  same operative fact underlying petitioners’ facial attack in  the case now before us.3   C    In  light  of  this  body  of  authority,  how  can  the  Court  maintain that the first and second facial claims are really   ——————  quirement  would produce  a  shortfall  in  the  capacity  of  providers  to  serve all of the women seeking abortions” (emphasis added)).  3 Even  if  the  “operative  facts”  were  actual  clinic  closures,  the  claims  in the two cases would still be the same.  The Court suggests that many  clinics closed between the time of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in the first   case and the time of the District Court’s decision in the present case by  comparing what the Court of Appeals said in Abbott about the effect of   the  admitting  privileges  requirement  alone,  748  F. 3d,  at  598  (“All  of  the major Texas cities . . . continue to have multiple clinics where many  physicians  will  have  or  obtain  hospital  admitting  privileges”),  with  what  the  District  Court  said  in  this  case  about  the  combined  effect   of  the  admitting  privileges  requirement  and  the  ambulatory  surgical  center requirement, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 680 (WD Tex. 2014) (Were the  surgical  center  requirement  to  take  effect  on  September  1,  2014,  only  seven  or  eight  clinics  would  remain  open).   See  ante,  at  14–15.    Obvi­ ously,  this  comparison  does  not  show  that  the  effect  of  the  admitting  privileges  requirement  alone  was  greater  at  the  time  of  the  District  Court’s decision in this second case.   Simply put, the Court presents no  new  clinic  closures  allegedly  caused  by  the  admitting  privileges  re­ quirement  beyond  those  already  accounted  for  in  Abbott,  as  I  discuss,     infra, at 15–17, and accompanying notes.    Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)        ALITO, J., dissenting  9  two  different  claims?  The  Court’s  first  argument  is  that  petitioners  did  not  bring  two  facial  claims  because  their  complaint in the present case sought only as­applied relief  and it was the District Court, not petitioners, who injected  the issue of facial relief into the case.  Ante, at 11.  (After the  District  Court  gave  them  statewide  relief,  petitioners  happily accepted the gift and now present their challenge  as a facial one.  See Reply Brief 24–25 (“[F]acial invalida­ tion is the only way to ensure that the Texas requirements  do  not  extinguish  women’s  liberty”).)    The  thrust  of  the  Court’s argument is that a trial judge can circumvent the  rules of claim preclusion by granting a plaintiff relief on a  claim  that  the  plaintiff  is  barred  from  relitigating.    Not  surprisingly,  the  Court  musters  no  authority  for  this  proposition, which would undermine the interests that the  doctrine  of  claim  preclusion  is  designed  to  serve.  A  “fun­ damental  precept  of  common­law  adjudication  is  that  an  issue once determined by a competent court is conclusive.”   Arizona  v.  California,  460  U. S.  605,  619  (1983).    This  interest  in  finality  is  equally  offended  regardless  of  whether the precluded claim is included in a complaint or  inserted into the case by a judge.4     Another  argument  tossed  off  by  the  Court  is  that  the  judgment  on  the  admitting  privileges  claim  in  the  first  case  does  not  have  preclusive  effect  because  it  was  based  on  “ ‘the  prematurity  of  the  action.’ ”    See  ante,  at  11–12   (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments §20(2)).  But  this  argument  grossly  mischaracterizes  the  basis  for  the  judgment  in  the  first  case.    The  Court  of  Appeals  did  not  hold that the facial challenge was premature.  It held that  the  evidence  petitioners  offered  was  insufficient.  See  ——————  4 I  need  not  quibble  with  the  Court’s  authorities  stating  that  facial  relief can sometimes be appropriate even where a plaintiff has requested     only  as­applied  relief.    Ante,  at  15.    Assuming  that  this  is  generally  proper,  it  does  not  follow  that  this  may  be  done  where  the  plaintiff  is  precluded by res judicata from bringing a facial claim.      10     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  Abbott,  748  F. 3d,  at  598–599;  see  also  n. 9,  infra.  Peti­ tioners could have sought review in this Court, but elected  not to do so.    This brings me to the Court’s main argument—that the  second  facial  challenge  is  a  different  claim  because  of  “changed  circumstances.”    What  the  Court  means  by  this is that petitioners now have better evidence than they did  at the time of the first case with respect to the number of  clinics that would have to close as a result of the admitting  privileges  requirement.    This  argument  is  contrary  to  a  cardinal  rule  of  res  judicata,  namely,  that  a  plaintiff  who loses in a first case cannot later bring the same case sim­  ply  because  it  has  now  gathered  better  evidence.    Claim   preclusion  does  not  contain  a  “better  evidence”  exception.     See,  e.g., Torres v.  Shalala,  48  F. 3d  887,  894  (CA5  1995)  (“If  simply  submitting  new  evidence  rendered  a  prior  decision  factually  distinct,  res judicata  would  cease  to   exist”); Geiger v.  Foley Hoag LLP Retirement Plan,  521  F. 3d 60, 66 (CA1 2008) (Claim preclusion “applies even if the litigant is prepared to present different evidence . . . in  the second action”); Saylor v. United States, 315 F. 3d 664,  668  (CA6  2003)  (“The  fact  that  . . .  new  evidence  might  change the outcome of the case does not affect application  of  claim  preclusion  doctrine”); International Union of Operating Engineers-Employers Constr. Industry Pension, Welfare and Training Trust Funds v. Karr, 994 F. 2d 1426,   1430  (CA9  1993)  (“The  fact  that  some  different  evidence  may  be  presented  in  this  action  . . .  ,  however,  does  not  defeat  the  bar  of  res  judicata”);  Restatement  (Second)  of  Judgments §25, Comment b (“A mere shift in the evidence  offered to support a ground held unproved in a prior action  will  not  suffice  to  make  a  new  claim  avoiding  the  preclu­ sive effect of the judgment”); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper,  Federal  Practice  and  Procedure  §4403,  p. 33  (2d  ed.  2002)  (Wright  &  Miller)  (Res  judicata  “ordinarily  ap­ plies  despite  the  availability  of  new  evidence”);  Restate­   Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)        ALITO, J., dissenting  11   ment of Judgments §1, Comment b (The ordinary rules of claim preclusion apply “although  the party against whom  a  judgment  is  rendered  is  later  in  a  position  to  produce  better evidence so that he would be successful in a second  action”).   In an effort to get around this hornbook rule, the Court  cites a potpourri of our decisions that have no bearing on  the question at issue.  Some are not even about res judicata.5    And  the  cases  that  do  concern  res  judicata,   Abie State Bank  v.  Bryan,  282  U. S.  765,  772  (1931),  Lawlor  v.  Na  tional Screen Service Corp., 349 U. S. 322, 328 (1955), and  Third Nat. Bank of Louisville v. Stone, 174 U. S. 432, 434   (1899), endorse the unremarkable proposition that a prior  judgment  does  not  preclude  new  claims  based  on  acts  occurring  after  the  time  of  the  first  judgment.6   But  peti­ tioners’  second  facial  challenge  is  not  based  on  new  acts  postdating  the first suit.  Rather, it is based on the same  underlying  act,  the  enactment  of  H. B.  2,  which  allegedly  posed an undue burden.    I come now to the authority on which the Court chiefly  relies, Comment f to §24 of the second Restatement.  This  is how it reads:  “Material  operative  facts  occurring  after  the  decision  of  an  action  with  respect  to  the  same  subject  matter   ——————  5 See  ante,  at  13  (citing  United States  v.  Carolene Products Co.,  304    U. S. 144, 153 (1938), and Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Walters, 294  U. S. 405, 415 (1935)).  6 The  Court’s  contaminated­water  hypothetical,  see  ante,  at  12–13,  may  involve  such  a  situation.    If  after  their  loss  in  the  first  suit,  the   same prisoners continued to drink the water, they would not be barred  from suing to recover for subsequent injuries suffered as a result.  But   if  the  Court  simply  means  that  the  passage  of  time  would  allow  the  prisoners  to  present  better  evidence  in  support  of  the  same  claim,  the  successive  suit  would  be  barred  for  the  reasons  I  have  given.    In  that   event,  their   recourse  would  be  to  move  for  relief  from  the  judgment.   See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §73.  .  12     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  may  in  themselves,  or  taken  in  conjunction  with  the  antecedent facts, comprise a transaction which may be  made the basis of a second action not precluded by the  first.  See  Illustrations  10–12.  Where  important  hu­ man  values—such  as  the  lawfulness  of  a  continuing  personal  disability  or  restraint—are  at  stake,  even  a slight change of circumstances may afford a sufficient  basis  for  concluding  that  a  second  action  may  be brought.”  (Emphasis added.)    As  the  word  I  have  highlighted—“may”—should  make  clear, this comment does not say that “[m]aterial operative  facts  occurring  after  the  decision  of  an  action”  always  or  even  usually  form  “the  basis  of  a  second  action  not  pre­ cluded by the first.”  Rather, the comment takes the view      that this “may” be so.  Accord, ante, at 11 (“[D]evelopment  of  new  material  facts  can  mean  that  a  new  case  and  an  otherwise  similar  previous  case  do  not  present  the  same claim” (emphasis added)).  The question, then, is when the  development  of  new  material  facts  should  lead  to  this  conclusion.  And there are strong reasons to conclude this  should be a very narrow exception indeed.  Otherwise, this  statement,  relegated  to  a  mere  comment,  would  revolu­ tionize  the  rules  of  claim  preclusion—by  permitting  a  party  to  relitigate  a  lost  claim  whenever  it  obtains  better  evidence.  Comment f was surely not meant to upend this fundamental rule.     What  the  comment  undoubtedly  means  is  far  more  modest—only  that  in  a  few,  limited  circumstances  the  development  of  new  material  facts  should  (in  the  opinion  of  the  ALI)  permit  relitigation.  What  are  these  circum­ stances?  Section  24  includes  three  illustrative  examples  in the form of hypothetical cases, and none resembles the  present case.   In  the  first  hypothetical  case,  the  subsequent  suit  is  based on new events that provide a basis for relief under a    Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    ALITO, J., dissenting      13   different legal theory.  Restatement (Second) of Judgments   §24, Illustration 10.    In  the  second  case,  a  father  who  lost  a  prior  child  cus­ tody case brings a second action challenging his wife’s fit­  ness as a mother based on “subsequent experience,” which  I  take  to  mean  subsequent  conduct  by  the  mother.    Id.,  Illustration  11.    This  illustration  is  expressly  linked  to  a  determination of a person’s “status”—and not even status  in  general,  but  a  particular  status,  fitness  as  a  parent,  that  the  law  recognizes  as  changeable.    See  Reporter’s Note, id., §24, Comment f (Illustration 11 “exemplifies the  effect  of  changed  circumstances  in  an  action  relating  to  status”).    In  the  final  example,  the  government  loses  a  civil  anti­ trust  conspiracy  case  but  then  brings  a  second  civil  anti­ trust  conspiracy  case  based  on  new  conspiratorial  acts.   The  illustration  does  not  suggest  that  the  legality  of  acts  predating  the  end  of  the  first  case  is  actionable  in  the  second  case,  only  that  the  subsequent  acts  give  rise  to  a  new  claim and  that  proof  of  earlier  acts  may  be  admitted  as  evidence  to  explain  the  significance  of  the  later  acts.   Id., Illustration 12.    The present claim is not similar to any of these illustra­ tions.  It  does  not  involve  a  claim  based  on  postjudgment  acts and a new legal theory.  It does not ask us to adjudi­ cate a person’s status.  And it does not involve a continu­ ing course of conduct to be proved by the State’s new acts.    The  final  illustration  actually  undermines  the  Court’s  holding.  The  Reporter’s  Note  links  this  illustration  to  a Fifth  Circuit  case,  Exhibitors Poster Exchange, Inc. v.  National Screen Service Corp.,  421  F.  2d  1313  (1970).    In   that  case,  the  court  distinguished  between  truly  postjudgment  acts  and  “acts  which  have  been  completed  [prior  to  the  previous  judgment]  except  for  their  conse­ quences.”  Id., at 1318.  Only postjudgment acts—and not postjudgment  consequences—the  Fifth  Circuit  held,  can   14     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  give rise to a new cause of action.  See ibid.7     Here, the Court does not rely on any new acts performed  by  the  State  of  Texas  after  the  end  of  the  first  case.    In­ stead,  the  Court  relies  solely  on  what  it  takes  to  be  new  consequences,  the  closing  of  additional  clinics,  that  are  said to have resulted from the enactment of H. B. 2.   D    For  these  reasons,  what  the  Court  has  done  here  is  to   create  an  entirely  new  exception  to  the  rule  that  a  losing  plaintiff  cannot  relitigate  a  claim  just  because  it  now  has  new  and  better  evidence.    As  best  I  can  tell,  the  Court’s   new rule must be something like this: If a plaintiff initially  loses  because  it  failed  to  provide  adequate  proof  that  a  challenged law will have an unconstitutional effect and if  subsequent developments tend to show that the law will in  fact  have  those  effects,  the  plaintiff  may  relitigate  the  same  claim.    Such  a  rule  would  be  unprecedented,  and  I  am unsure of its wisdom, but I am certain of this: There is   no possible justification for such a rule unless the plaintiff,  at  the  time  of  the  first  case,  could  not  have  reasonably  shown  what  the  effects  of  the  law  would  be.    And  that  is   not the situation in this case.  1    The Court does not contend that petitioners, at the time   ——————  7 See  also   Sutliffe  v.  Epping School Dist.,  584  F.  3d  314,  328  (CA1  2009) (“[W]hen a defendant is accused of . . . acts which though occur­ ring  over  a  period  of  time  were  substantially  of  the  same  sort   and  similarly  motivated,  fairness  to  the  defendant  as  well  as  the  public  convenience  may  require  that  they  be  dealt  with  in  the  same  action,  and  the  events  are  said  to  constitute  but  one  transaction”  (internal  quotation marks omitted)); Monahan v. New   York City Dept. of Corrections,  214  F.  3d  275,  289  (CA2  2000)  (“Plaintiffs’  assertion  of  new   incidents  arising  from  the  application  of  the  challenged  policy  is  also  insufficient to bar the application of res judicata”); Huck v. Dawson, 106   F.  3d  45,  49  (CA3  1997)  (applying  res  judicata  where  “the  same  facts  that resulted in the earlier judgment have caused continued damage”).    Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)        ALITO, J., dissenting  15   of  the  first  case,  could  not  have  gathered  and  provided  evidence  that  was  sufficient  to  show  that  the  admitting    privileges requirement would cause a sufficient number of  clinic closures.  Instead, the Court attempts to argue that  petitioners could not have shown at that time that a suffi­ cient  number  of  clinics  had already closed.  As  I  have  explained,  that  is  not  what  petitioners  need  to  show  or  what they attempted to prove.    Moreover,  the  Court  is  also  wrong  in  its  understanding  of  petitioners’  proof  in  the  first  case.    In  support  of  its  holding  that  the  admitting  privileges  requirement  now   “places  a  ‘substantial  obstacle  in  the  path  of  a  woman’s  choice,’ ”  the  Court  relies  on  two  facts:  “Eight  abortion  clinics  closed  in  the  months  leading  up  to  the  require­ ment’s effective date” and “[e]leven more closed on the day  the admitting­privileges requirement took effect.”  Ante, at   24.  But  petitioners  put  on  evidence  addressing  exactly  this issue in their first trial.  They apparently surveyed 27  of  the  36  abortion  clinics  they  identified  in  the  State,  including  all  24  of  the  clinics  owned  by  them  or  their  coplaintiffs,  to  find  out  what  impact  the  requirement  would  have  on  clinic  operations.  See  Appendix,  infra  (App.  K  to  Emergency  Application  To  Vacate  Stay  in   Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs.  v.  Abbott,  O.  T.  2013,  No.  13A452,  Plaintiffs’  Trial  Exh.   46).   That  survey  claimed  to  show  that  the  admitting  privi­ leges  requirement  would  cause  15  clinics  to  close.8    See   ibid.  The Fifth Circuit had that evidence before it, and did  not refuse to consider it.9  If that evidence was sufficient to  ——————  8 As I explain, infra, at 29, and n. 18, some of the closures presumably  included in the Court’s count of 19 were not attributed to H. B. 2 at the      first trial, even by petitioners.  9 The Abbott panel’s refusal to consider “developments since the con­ clusion of the bench trial,” 748 F. 3d, at 599, n. 14, was not addressed to      the evidence of 15 closures presented at trial.  The Court of Appeals in   16     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  show that the admitting privileges rule created an unlaw­ ful impediment to abortion access (and the District  Court  indeed thought it sufficient), then the decision of the Fifth  Circuit  in  the  first  case  was  wrong  as  a  matter  of  law.   Petitioners  could  have  asked  us  to  review  that  decision,   but  they  chose  not  to  do  so.    A  tactical  decision  of  that   nature has consequences.  While it does not mean that the  ——————  fact credited that evidence by assuming “some clinics may be required    to  shut  their  doors,”  but  it  nevertheless  concluded  that  “there  is  no  showing  whatsoever  that  any woman  will  lack  reasonable  access  to  a   clinic within Texas.”    Id., at 598.  The Abbott decision therefore accepted     the  factual  premise  common  to  these  two  actions—namely,  that  the  admitting  privileges  requirement  would  cause  some  clinics  to  close— but  it  concluded  that  petitioners  had  not  proved  a  burden  on  access  regardless.  In rejecting Abbott’s conclusion, the Court seems to believe   that Abbott also must have refused to accept the factual premise.  See  ante, at 13–15.   Instead, Abbott’s footnote 14 appears to have addressed the following  post­trial  developments:  (1)  the  permanent  closure  of  the  Lubbock  clinic, Brief for Plaintiffs­Appellees in Abbott (CA5), at 5, n. 3 (accounted    for  among  the  15  anticipated  closures,  see  Appendix,  infra);  (2)  the  resumption of  abortion  services  in  Fort  Worth,  Brief  for  Plaintiffs­ Appellees,  at  5,  n.  3;  (3)  the  acquisition of  admitting   privileges  by  an   Austin abortion provider, id., at 6, n. 4; (4) the acquisition of privileges  by physicians in Dallas and San Antonio, see Letter from J. Crepps to  L. Cayce, Clerk of Court in Abbott (CA5, Jan. 3, 2014); (5) the acquisi  tion of privileges by physicians in El Paso and Killeen, see Letter from  J.  Crepps  to   L.  Cayce,  Clerk  of  Court  in  Abbott  (CA5,  Mar.  21,  2014);  and  (6)  the  enforcement  of  the  requirement  against  one  Houston  provider  who  lacked  privileges,  see  ibid.  (citing  Texas  Medical  Board  press  release).    In  the  five  months  between  the  admitting  privileges  requirement taking effect and the Fifth Circuit’s Abbott decision, then,    the  parties  had  ample  time  to  inform  that  court  of  post­trial  develop­ ments—and  petitioners  never  identified  the  15  closures  as  new  (be­ cause  the  closures  were  already  accounted  for  in  their  trial  evidence).   In fact, the actual new developments largely favored the State’s case: In  that  time,  physicians  in  Austin,  Dallas,  El  Paso,  Fort  Worth,  Killeen,  and San Antonio were able to come into compliance, while only one in  Houston was not, and one clinic (already identified at trial as expected  to  close)  closed  permanently.    So  Abbott’s  decision  to  ignore  post­trial  developments quite likely favored petitioners.    Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    ALITO, J., dissenting      17   admitting  privileges  requirement  is  immune  to  a  facial  challenge,  it  does  mean  that  these  petitioners  and  the  other  plaintiffs  in  the  first  case  cannot  mount  such  a  claim.  2    Even if the Court thinks that petitioners’ evidence in the  first  case  was  insufficient,  the  Court  does  not  claim  that   petitioners,  with  reasonable  effort,  could  not  have  gath­ ered sufficient evidence to show with some degree of accu­ racy  what  the  effects  of  the  admitting  privileges  require­ ment  would  be.  As  I  have  just  explained,  in  their  first  trial petitioners introduced a survey of 27 abortion clinics  indicating  that  15  would  close  because  of  the  admitting privileges requirement.  The Court does not identify what  additional evidence petitioners needed but were unable to  gather.  There is simply no reason why petitioners should  be allowed to relitigate their facial claim.  E    So  far,  I  have  discussed  only  the  first  of  the  two  sen­ tences  in  Comment  f,  but  the  Court  also  relies  on  the   second  sentence.    I  reiterate  what  that  second  sentence  says:  “Where important human values—such as the lawful­ ness of a continuing personal disability or restraint— are  at  stake,  even  a  slight  change  of  circumstances  may afford a sufficient basis for concluding that a sec­ ond action may be brought.”  Restatement (Second) of Judgments §24, Comment f.    The second Restatement offers no judicial support what­ soever for this suggestion, and thus the comment “must be regarded  as  a  proposal  for  change  rather  than  a  restate­ ment  of  existing  doctrine,  since  the  commentary  refers  to  not a single case, of this or any other United States court.”  United States v. Stuart, 489 U. S. 353, 375 (1989) (Scalia,    18     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  J.,  concurring  in  judgment).    The  sentence  also  sits  in  considerable  tension   with  our  decisions  stating  that  res  judicata must be applied uniformly and without regard to  what  a  court  may  think  is  just  in  a  particular  case.    See,     e.g., Moitie, 452 U. S., at 401 (“The doctrine of res judicata  serves vital public interests beyond any individual judge’s  ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular case”).   Not only did this sentence seemingly come out of nowhere,  but it appears that no subsequent court has relied on this  sentence  as  a  ground  for  decision.    And  while  a  few  deci­ sions  have  cited  the  “important  human  values”  language,  those  cases  invariably  involve  the  relitigation  of  personal  status determinations, as discussed in Comment f ’s Illus­ tration 11.  See, e.g., People ex rel.  Leonard HH. v. Nixon,  148  App. Div. 2d  75,  79–80,  543  N. Y. S. 2d  998,  1001  (1989)  (“[B]y  its  very  nature,  litigation  concerning  the  status of a person’s mental capacity does not lend itself to  strict application of res judicata on a transactional analy­ sis basis”).10   *    *    *    In  sum,  the  Court’s  holding  that  petitioners’  second  facial challenge to the admitting privileges requirement is  not barred by claim preclusion is not supported by any of  ——————  10 See also   In re Marriage of Shaddle, 317  Ill. App.  3d 428, 430–432,  740  N. E.  2d  525,  528–529  (2000)  (child  custody); In re Hope M.,  1998   ME  170,  ¶5,  714  A. 2d  152,  154  (termination  of  parental  rights); In re Connors, 255  Ill. App. 3d  781, 784–785, 627  N. E. 2d  1171, 1173–1174  (1994)  (civil  commitment); Kent V. v.   State,  233  P. 3d  597,  601,  and  n.   12  (Alaska  2010)  (applying  Comment   f to  termination  of  parental   rights);  In re Juvenile Appeal (83–DE),  190  Conn.  310,  318–319,  460   A. 2d  1277,  1282  (1983)  (same);  In re Strozzi,  112  N. M.  270,  274,  814   P. 2d  138,  142  (App.  1991)  (guardianship  and  conservatorship);  Andrulonis v.  Andrulonis,  193  Md.  App.  601,  617,  998  A. 2d  898,  908  (2010)  (modification  of  alimony); In re Marriage of Pedersen,  237  Ill.  App. 3d 952, 957, 605 N. E. 2d 629, 633 (1992) (same); Friederwitzer v.  Friederwitzer, 55 N. Y. 2d 89, 94–95, 432 N. E. 2d 765, 768 (1982) (child    custody).     Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    ALITO, J., dissenting      19   our cases or any body of lower court precedent; is contrary  to  the  bedrock  rule  that  a  party  cannot  relitigate  a  claim  simply  because  the  party  has  obtained  new  and  better  evidence;  is  contrary  to  the  first  Restatement  of  Judg­ ments  and  the  actual  rules  of  the  second  Restatement  of  Judgment;  and  is  purportedly  based  largely  on  a  single  comment  in  the  second  Restatement,  but  does  not  even  represent a sensible reading of that comment.  In a regu­ lar  case,  an  attempt  by  petitioners  to  relitigate  their  pre­ viously  unsuccessful  facial  challenge  to  the  admitting  privileges  requirement  would  have  been  rejected  out  of  hand—indeed,  might  have  resulted  in  the  imposition  of  sanctions  under  Federal  Rule  of  Civil  Procedure  11.    No   court would even think of reviving such a claim on its own.   But  in  this  abortion  case,  ordinary  rules  of  law—and  fairness—are suspended.  II  A    I now turn to the application of principles of claim pre­ clusion  to  a  claim  that  petitioners  did  include  in  their  second  complaint,  namely,  their  facial  challenge  to  the  requirement  in  H. B.  2  that  abortion  clinics  comply  with  the rules that govern ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs).   As we have said many times, the doctrine of claim preclu­ sion  not  only  bars  the  relitigation  of  previously  litigated  claims; it can also bar claims that are closely related to the  claims unsuccessfully litigated in a prior case.  See Moitie,  supra, at 398; Montana, 440 U. S., at 153.    As  just  discussed,  the  Court’s  holding  on  the  admitting  privileges  issue  is  based  largely  on  a  comment  to  §24  of  the  second  Restatement,  and  therefore  one  might  think  that consistency would dictate an examination of what §24  has  to  say  on  the  question  whether  the  ASC  challenge  should  be  barred.    But  consistency  is  not  the  Court’s  watchword here.  20     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting    Section  24  sets  out  the  general  rule  regarding  the  “ ‘[s]plitting’ ”  of  claims.  This  is  the  rule  that  determines  when  the  barring  of  a  claim  that  was  previously  litigated  unsuccessfully also extinguishes a claim that the plaintiff  could  have  but  did  not  bring  in  the  first  case.    Section  24(1) states that the new claim is barred if it is “any part  of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out  of which the action arose.”    Here,  it  is  evident  that  petitioners’  challenges  to  the  admitting  privileges  requirement  and  the  ASC  require­ ment are part of the same transaction or series of connected  transactions.    If,  as  I  believe,  the  “transaction”  is  the  enactment of H. B. 2, then the two facial claims are part of  the  very  same  transaction.  And  the  same  is  true  even  if  the likely or actual effects of the two provisions constitute  the  relevant  transactions.  Petitioners  argue  that  the  admitting  privileges  requirement  and  the  ASC  require­ ments  combined  have  the  effect  of  unconstitutionally  restricting  access  to  abortions.   Their  brief  repeatedly  refers  to  the  collective  effect  of  the  “requirements.”    Brief  for Petitioners 40, 41, 42, 43, 44.  They describe the admit­ ting privileges and ASC requirements as delivering a “one­ two punch.”  Id., at 40.  They make no effort whatsoever to  separate the effects of the two provisions.  B    The Court nevertheless holds that there are two “mean­ ingful  differences”  that  justify  a  departure  from  the  gen­ eral  rule  against  splitting  claims.  Ante,  at  16.    Neither  has merit.  1    First, pointing to a statement in a pocket part to a trea­ tise, the Court says that “courts normally treat challenges  to  distinct  regulatory  requirements  as  ‘separate  claims,’   even when they are part of one overarching ‘[g]overnment    Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    ALITO, J., dissenting      21   regulatory scheme.’ ”  Ante, at 16–17 (quoting 18 Wright &  Miller §4408, at 54 (2d ed. 2002, Supp. 2016)).  As support for  this  statement,  the  treatise  cites  one  case,  Hamilton’s Bogarts, Inc. v. Michigan, 501 F. 3d 644, 650 (CA6 2007).   Even  if  these  authorities  supported  the  rule  invoked  by  the  Court  (and  the  Court  points  to  no  other  authorities),  they  would  hardly  be  sufficient  to  show  that  “courts  nor­     mally” proceed in accordance with the Court’s rule.  But in  fact  neither  the  treatise  nor  the  Sixth  Circuit  decision   actually supports the Court’s rule.    What the treatise says is the following:  “Government  regulatory schemes  provide  regular  ex­ amples of circumstances in which regulation of a sin­ gle business by many different provisions should lead  to  recognition  of  separate  claims  when  the  business  challenges different regulations.”  18 Wright & Miller  §4408, at 54 (emphasis added).  Thus,  the  treatise  expresses  a  view  about  what  the  law    “should” be; it does not purport to state what courts “nor­ mally”  do.  And  the  recommendation  of  the  treatise  au­ thors  concerns  different  provisions  of  a  “regulatory  scheme,” which often embodies an accumulation of legisla­ tive  enactments.  Petitioners  challenge  two  provisions  of  one law, not just two provisions of a regulatory scheme.    The Sixth Circuit decision is even further afield.  In that   case,  the  plaintiff  had  previously  lost  a  case  challenging one rule of a state liquor control commission.  501 F. 3d, at   649–650.  On  the  question  whether  the  final  judgment  in  that  case  barred  a  subsequent  claim  attacking  another  rule,  the  court  held  that  the  latter  claim  was  “likely”  not  barred  because,  “although  [the  first  rule]  was  challenged  in  the  first  lawsuit,  [the  other  rule]  was  not,”  and  “[t]he  state has not argued or made any showing that [the party]  should  also  have  challenged  [the  other  rule]  at  the  time.”    Id.,  at  650.    To  say  that  these  authorities  provide   22     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  meager  support  for  the  Court’s  reasoning  would  be  an  exaggeration.    Beyond these paltry authorities, the Court adds only the argument  that  we  should  not  “encourage  a  kitchen­sink approach  to  any  litigation  challenging  the  validity  of  statutes.”  Ante, at 17.  I agree—but that is not the situa­ tion  in  this  case.  The  two  claims  here  are  very  closely   related.  They  are  two  parts  of  the  same  bill.    They  both impose  new  requirements  on  abortion  clinics.    They  are  justified by the State on the same ground, protection of the  safety  of  women  seeking  abortions.  They  are  both  chal­ lenged  as  imposing  the  same  kind  of  burden  (impaired  access  to  clinics)  on  the  same  kind  of  right  (the  right  to  abortion,  as  announced  in  Roe  v.  Wade,  410  U. S.  113  (1973), and Casey, 505 U. S. 833).  And petitioners attack  the two provisions as a package.    According to petitioners,  the two provisions were both enacted for the same illegit­ imate purpose—to close down Texas abortion clinics.  See  Brief for Petitioners 35–36.  And as noted, petitioners rely  on the combined effect of the two requirements.  Petition­ ers  have  made  little  effort  to  identify  the  clinics  that  closed  as  a  result  of  each  requirement  but  instead  aggre­ gate the two requirements’ effects.    For  these  reasons,  the  two  challenges  “form  a  conven­ ient  trial  unit.”  Restatement  (Second)  of  Judgments  §24(2).  In fact, for a trial court to accurately identify the  effect  of  each  provision  it  would  also  need  to  identify  the  effect of the other provision.  Cf. infra, at 30.   2    Second,  the  Court  claims  that,  at  the  time  when  peti­ tioners  filed  their  complaint  in  the  first  case,  they  could  not  have  known  whether  future  rules  implementing  the  surgical  center  requirement  would  provide  an  exemption  for existing abortion clinics.  Ante, at 17.  This argument is   deeply flawed.    Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    ALITO, J., dissenting      23     “Where  the  inevitability  of  the  operation  of  a  statute  against certain individuals is patent, it is irrelevant to the  existence  of  a  justiciable  controversy  that  there  will  be  a  time  delay  before  the  disputed  provisions  will  come  into  effect.”  Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S.  102,  143  (1974).  And  here,  there  was  never  any  real  chance  that  the  Texas  Department  of  State  Health  Ser­ vices  would  exempt  existing  abortion  clinics  from  all  the ASC  requirements.  As  the  Court  of  Appeals  wrote,  “it  is  abundantly  clear  from  H. B.  2  that  all  abortion  facilities  must meet the standards already promulgated for ASCs.”     Whole Woman’s Health v.  Cole,  790  F. 3d  563,  583  (2015)  (per curiam) (case below).  See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.  §245.010(a)  (West  Cum.  Supp.  2015)  (Rules  imple­ menting H. B. 2 “must contain minimum standards . . . for  an  abortion  facility  [that  are]  equivalent  to  the  minimum  standards  . . .  for  ambulatory  surgical  centers”).    There  is  no apparent basis for the argument that H. B. 2 permitted  the state health department to grant blanket exemptions.    Whether there was any real likelihood that clinics would  be  exempted  from  particular  ASC  requirements  is  irrele­ vant because both petitioners and the Court view the ASC  requirements as an indivisible whole.  Petitioners told the  Fifth  Circuit  in  unequivocal  terms  that  they  were  “chal­ leng[ing]  H. B.  2  broadly,  with  no  effort  whatsoever  to  parse  out  specific  aspects  of  the  ASC  requirement  that  they  f[ou]nd  onerous  or  otherwise  infirm.”    790  F. 3d,  at  582.  Similarly, the majority views all the ASC provisions  as an indivisible whole.  See ante, at 38 (“The statute was  meant to require abortion facilities to meet the integrated  surgical­center standards—not some subset thereof ”).  On  this view, petitioners had no reason to wait to see whether  the  Department  of  State  Health  Services  might  exempt  them  from  some  of  the  ASC  rules.    Even  if  exemptions  from some of the ASC rules had been granted, petitioners  and the majority would still maintain that the provision of  24     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  H. B. 2 making the ASC rules applicable to abortion facili­ ties  is  facially  unconstitutional.    Thus,  exemption  from some of the ASC requirements would be entirely inconse­ quential.    The  Court  has  no  response  to  this  point.  See  ante, at 17.    For these reasons, petitioners’ facial attack on the ASC  requirements,  like  their  facial  attack  on  the  admitting  privileges rule, is precluded.  III     Even  if  res  judicata  did  not  bar  either  facial  claim,  a  sweeping, statewide injunction against the enforcement of  the admitting privileges and ASC requirements would still  be unjustified.  Petitioners in this case are abortion clinics   and  physicians  who  perform  abortions.   If  they  were  sim­  ply asserting a constitutional right to conduct a business or  to practice a profession without unnecessary state regula­ tion,  they  would  have  little  chance  of  success.    See,  e.g., Williamson  v.  Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.,  348  U. S.    483  (1955).  Under  our  abortion  cases,  however,  they  are  per­ mitted  to  rely  on  the  right  of  the  abortion  patients  they   serve.  See  Doe  v.  Bolton,  410  U. S.    179,  188  (1973);  but      see ante, at 2–5 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).    Thus,  what  matters  for  present  purposes  is  not  the  effect of the H. B. 2 provisions on petitioners but the effect  on their patients.  Under our cases, petitioners must show  that  the  admitting  privileges  and  ASC  requirements  impose  an  “undue  burden”  on  women  seeking  abortions.    Gonzales  v.   Carhart,  550  U. S.  124,  146  (2007).    And  in   order to obtain the sweeping relief they seek—facial inval­ idation  of  those  provisions—they  must  show,  at  a  mini­ mum,  that  these  provisions  have  an  unconstitutional  impact  on  at  least  a  “large  fraction”  of  Texas  women  of  reproductive  age.11     Id.,  at  167–168.    Such   a  situation   ——————  11 The  proper  standard  for  facial  challenges  is  unsettled  in  the  abor­   Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)        ALITO, J., dissenting  25   could  result  if  the  clinics  able  to  comply  with  the  new  requirements  either  lacked  the  requisite  overall  capacity  or  were  located  too  far  away  to  serve  a  “large  fraction”  of  the women in question.    Petitioners did not make that showing.  Instead of offer­ ing  direct  evidence,  they  relied  on  two  crude  inferences.   First,  they  pointed  to  the  number  of  abortion  clinics  that  closed after the enactment of H. B. 2, and asked that it be   inferred  that  all  these  closures   resulted  from  the  two  challenged  provisions.  See  Brief  for  Petitioners  23–24.   They  made  little  effort  to  show  why  particular  clinics  closed.  Second,  they  pointed  to  the  number  of  abortions  performed annually at ASCs before H. B. 2 took effect and,  because this figure is well below the total number of abor­ tions performed each year in the State, they asked that it  be inferred that ASC­compliant clinics could not meet the  demands of women in the State.  See App. 237–238.  Peti­ ——————  tion  context.  See  Gonzales,  550  U. S.,  at  167–168  (comparing   Ohio v.  Akron Center for Reproductive Health,  497  U. S.  502,  514  (1990)  (“[B]ecause  appellees  are  making  a  facial  challenge  to  a  statute,  they  must  show  that  no  set  of  circumstances  exists  under  which  the  Act   would  be  valid”  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted)),  with  Casey,  505  U. S.,  at  895  (opinion  of  the  Court)  (indicating  a  spousal­notification  statute would impose an undue burden “in a large fraction of the cases    in  which  [it]  is  relevant”  and  holding  the  statutory  provision  facially  invalid)).  Like  the  Court  in  Gonzales,  supra,  at  167–168,  I  do  not   decide the question, and use the more plaintiff­friendly “large fraction”  formulation only because petitioners cannot meet even that test.    The Court, by contrast, applies the “large fraction” standard without  even acknowledging the open question.    Ante, at 39.  In a similar vein,   it holds that the fraction’s “relevant denominator is ‘those [women] for  whom  [the  provision]  is  an  actual  rather  than  an  irrelevant  re­   striction.’ ”  Ibid. (quoting Casey, 505 U. S., at 895).  I must confess that   I  do  not  understand  this  holding.    The  purpose  of  the  large­fraction  analysis,  presumably,  is  to  compare  the  number  of  women   actually burdened  with  the  number  potentially burdened.    Under  the  Court’s  holding,  we  are  supposed  to  use  the  same  figure  (women  actually  burdened)  as  both  the  numerator  and  the  denominator.    By  my  math,  that fraction is always “1,” which is pretty large as fractions go.  26     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  tioners failed to provide any evidence of the actual capac­  ity  of  the  facilities  that  would  be  available  to  perform  abortions  in  compliance  with  the  new  law—even  though  they provided this type of evidence in their first case to the  District  Court  at  trial  and  then  to  this  Court  in  their  application for interim injunctive relief.  Appendix, infra.  A    I do not dispute the fact that H. B. 2 caused the closure  of  some  clinics.  Indeed,  it  seems  clear  that  H. B.  2  was  intended  to  force  unsafe  facilities  to  shut  down.    The  law  was  one  of  many  enacted  by  States  in  the  wake  of  the  Kermit Gosnell scandal, in which a physician who ran an  abortion clinic in Philadelphia was convicted for the first­ degree  murder  of  three  infants  who  were  born  alive  and  for  the  manslaughter  of  a  patient.    Gosnell  had  not  been   actively  supervised  by  state  or  local  authorities  or  by  his  peers,  and  the  Philadelphia  grand  jury  that  investigated  the  case  recommended  that  the  Commonwealth  adopt  a  law  requiring  abortion  clinics  to  comply  with  the  same  regulations  as  ASCs.12   If  Pennsylvania  had  had  such  a requirement  in  force,  the  Gosnell  facility  may  have  been  shut down before his crimes.  And if there were any simi­ larly  unsafe  facilities  in  Texas,  H.  B.  2  was  clearly  in­  tended to put them out of business.13   ——————  12 Report of Grand Jury in No. 0009901–2008 (1st Jud. Dist. Pa., Jan.  14,  2011),  p.  248–249,    online  at  http://www.phila.gov/districtattorney/ pdfs/grandjurywomensmedical.pdf (all Internet materials as last visited  June 24, 2016).  13 See  House  Research  Org.,  Laubenberg  et al.,  Bill  Analysis  10  (July  9,  2013),  online  at  http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/pdf/ba832/ hb0002.pdf  (“Higher  standards  could  prevent  the  occurrence  of  a   situation  in  Texas  like  the  one  recently  exposed  in  Philadelphia,  in  which Dr. Kermit Gosnell was convicted of murder after killing babies  who  were  born  alive.    A  patient  also  died  at  that  substandard  clinic”).   The Court attempts to distinguish the Gosnell horror story by pointing        Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    ALITO, J., dissenting      27     While  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  H.  B.  2  caused  some  clinics  to  cease  operation,  the  absence  of  proof  regarding  the  reasons  for  particular  closures  is  a  problem  because  some  clinics  have  or  may  have  closed  for  at  least  four  reasons  other  than  the  two  H. B.  2  requirements  at  issue  here.  These are:  1.  H. B. 2’s restriction on medication abortion.    In   their first case, petitioners challenged the provision of  H. B.  2  that  regulates  medication  abortion,  but  that  part  of  the  statute  was  upheld  by  the  Fifth  Circuit  and  not  relitigated  in  this  case.    The  record  in  this  case  indicates  that  in  the  first  six  months  after  this   restriction took effect, the number of medication abor­ tions  dropped  by  6,957  (compared  to  the  same  period  the previous year).  App. 236. 2.  Withdrawal of  Texas family planning funds.    In   2011, Texas passed a law preventing family planning  grants  to  providers  that  perform  abortions  and  their  affiliates.  In the first case, petitioners’ expert admit­ ted that some clinics closed “as a result of the defund­ ing,”14  and  as  discussed  below,  this  withdrawal  ap­ pears  specifically  to  have  caused  multiple  clinic  closures in West Texas.  See infra, at 29, and n. 18.  3.  The nationwide decline in abortion demand.  Peti­ tioners’  expert  testimony  relies15  on  a  study  from  the  Guttmacher Institute which concludes that “ ‘[t]he na­ tional  abortion  rate  has  resumed  its  decline,  and  no evidence was found that the overall drop in abortion incidence was related to the decrease in providers or to ——————  to  differences  between  Pennsylvania  and  Texas  law.    See  ante,  at  27– 28.  But Texas did not need to be in Pennsylvania’s precise position for  the  legislature  to  rationally  conclude  that  a  similar  law  would  be   helpful.  14 Rebuttal  Decl.  of  Dr.  Joseph  E.  Potter,  Doc.  76–2,  p.  12,  ¶32,  in   Abbott (WD Tex., Oct. 18, 2013) (Potter Rebuttal Decl.).  15 See App. 234, 237, 253.   28     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  restrictions implemented between 2008 and 2011.’ ”   App.  1117  (direct  testimony  of  Dr.  Peter  Uhlenberg)  (quoting  R.  Jones  &  J.  Jerman,  Abortion  Incidence  and  Service  Availability  In  the  United  States,  2011,  46 Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health 3  (2014); emphasis in testimony).  Consistent with that  trend, “[t]he number of abortions to residents of Texas  declined  by  4,956  between  2010  and  2011  and  by  3,905 between 2011 and 2012.”  App. 1118. 4.  Physician retirement (or other localized factors).   Like everyone else, most physicians eventually retire,  and the retirement of a physician who performs abor­ tions can cause the closing of a clinic or a reduction in  the  number  of  abortions  that  a  clinic  can  perform.   When this happens, the closure of the clinic or the re­ duction in capacity cannot be attributed to H. B. 2 un­ less it is shown that the retirement was caused by the  admitting  privileges  or  surgical  center  requirements  as opposed to age or some other factor.     At least nine Texas clinics may have ceased performing  abortions  (or  reduced  capacity)  for  one  or  more  of  the  reasons  having  nothing  to  do  with  the  provisions  chal­ lenged  here.  For  example,  in  their  first  case,  petitioners  alleged  that  the  medication­abortion  restriction  would  cause  at  least  three  medication­only  abortion  clinics  to  cease  performing  abortions,16  and  they  predicted  that  “[o]ther  facilities  that  offer  both  surgical  and  medication  abortion  will  be  unable  to  offer  medication  abortion,”17   presumably  reducing  their  capacity.    It  also  appears  that  several  clinics  (including  most  of  the  clinics  operating  in  West Texas, apart from El Paso) closed in response to the  ——————  16 Complaint and Application for Preliminary and Permanent Injunc­ tion in Abbott (WD Tex.), ¶¶10, 11 (listing one clinic in Stafford and two  in San Antonio).  17  Id., ¶88.    Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)        ALITO, J., dissenting  29   unrelated law restricting the provision of family planning  funds.18  And there is reason to question whether at least two  closures  (one  in  Corpus  Christi  and  one  in  Houston)  may have been prompted by physician retirements.19     Neither  petitioners  nor  the  District  Court  properly  addressed these complexities in assessing causation—and for no good reason.  The total number of abortion clinics in  the  State  was  not  large.    Petitioners  could  have  put  on  evidence (as they did for 27 individual clinics in their first  case, see Appendix, infra) about the challenged provisions’  role  in  causing  the  closure  of  each  clinic,20  and  the  court  could have made a factual finding as to the cause of each  ——————  18 In  the  first  case,  petitioners  apparently  did  not  even  believe  that  the  abortion  clinics  in  Abilene,  Bryan,  Midland,  and  San  Angelo  were  made to close because of H. B. 2.  In that case, petitioners submitted a  list  of  15  clinics  they  believed  would  close  (or  have  severely  limited  capacity)  because  of  the  admitting  privileges  requirement—and  those  four West Texas clinics are not on the list.  See Appendix, infra.  And at   trial,  a  Planned  Parenthood  executive  specifically  testified  that  the  Midland  clinic  closed  because  of  the  funding  cuts  and  because  the  clinic’s medical director retired.  See 1 Tr.  91, 93, in Abbott (WD Tex., Oct.  21,  2013).    Petitioners’  list  and  Planned  Parenthood’s  testimony  both fit with petitioners’ expert’s admission in the first case that some   clinics closed “as a result of the defunding.”  Potter Rebuttal Decl. ¶32.  19 See  Stoelje,  Abortion  Clinic  Closes  in  Corpus  Christi,  San  Antonio  Express­News (June 10, 2014), online at http://www.mysanantonio.com/ news/local/ article/Abortion­clinic­closes­in­Corpus­Christi­5543125.php  (provider  “retiring  for  medical  reasons”);  1  Plaintiffs’  Exh.  18,  p. 2,  in   Whole Woman’s Health v.  Lakey,  No.  1:14–cv–284  (WD  Tex.,  admitted   into  evidence  Aug.  4,  2014)  (e­mail  stating  Houston  clinic  owner  “is  retiring his practice”).  Petitioners should have been required to put on  proof  about  the  reason  for  the  closure  of  particular  clinics.    I  cite  the   extrarecord  Corpus  Christi  story  only  to  highlight  the  need  for  such  proof.  20 This  kind  of  evidence  was  readily  available;  in  fact,  petitioners  deposed  at  least  one  nonparty  clinic  owner  about  the  burden  posed  by  H. B. 2.  See App. 1474.  And recall that in their first case, petitioners    put  on  evidence  purporting  to  show  how  the  admitting  privileges  requirement would (or would not) affect 27 clinics.  See Appendix, infra  (petitioners’ chart of clinics).  30     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  closure.    Precise  findings  are  important  because  the  key  issue  here  is  not  the  number  or  percentage  of  clinics  affected,  but the effect of the closures on women seeking abortions,  i.e.,  on  the  capacity  and  geographic  distribution  of  clinics  used by those women.  To the extent that clinics closed (or  experienced  a  reduction  in  capacity)  for  any  reason  unre­ lated  to  the  challenged  provisions  of  H. B.  2,  the  corre­ sponding  burden  on  abortion  access  may  not  be  factored into the access analysis.  Because there was ample reason  to  believe  that  some  closures  were  caused  by  these  other  factors,   the  District  Court’s  failure  to  ascertain  the  rea­ sons for clinic closures means that, on the record before us,   there  is  no  way  to  tell  which  closures  actually  count.   Petitioners—who, as plaintiffs, bore the burden of proof— cannot  simply  point  to  temporal  correlation  and  call  it  causation.  B    Even  if  the  District  Court  had  properly  filtered  out  immaterial  closures,  its  analysis  would  have  been  incom­ plete  for  a  second  reason.    Petitioners  offered  scant  evi­ dence on the capacity of the clinics that are able to comply  with  the  admitting  privileges  and  ASC  requirements,  or  on  those  clinics’  geographic  distribution.  Reviewing  the  evidence  in  the  record,  it  is  far  from  clear  that  there  has  been a material impact on access to abortion.    On clinic capacity, the Court relies on petitioners’ expert  Dr.  Grossman,  who  compared  the  number  of  abortions  performed at Texas ASCs before the enactment of H. B. 2  (about 14,000 per year) with the total number of abortions  per  year  in  the  State  (between  60,000–70,000  per  year).    Ante, at 32–33.21  Applying what the Court terms “common  ——————  21 In the first case, petitioners submitted a report that Dr. Grossman  coauthored  with  their  testifying   expert,  Dr.  Potter.    1  Tr.  38  in  Lakey (Aug. 4, 2014) (Lakey Tr.).  That report predicted that “the shortfall in     Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)        ALITO, J., dissenting  31   sense,”  the  Court  infers  that  the  ASCs  that  performed  abortions  at  the  time  of  H. B.  2’s  enactment  lacked  the   capacity to  perform all the abortions sought by   women in  Texas.    The  Court’s  inference  has  obvious  limitations.    First,  it   is  not  unassailable  “common  sense”  to  hold  that  current   utilization equals capacity; if all we know about a grocery  store  is  that  it  currently  serves  200  customers  per  week,  ante, at 33, that fact alone does not tell us whether it is an   ——————  capacity  due  to  the  admitting  privileges  requirement  will  prevent  at  least  22,286  women”  from  accessing  abortion.    Decl.  of  Dr.  Joseph   E.  Potter, Doc. 9–8, p. 4, in Abbott (WD Tex., Oct. 1, 2013).  The methodol­   ogy  used  was  questionable.    See  Potter  Rebuttal  Decl.  ¶18.    As  Dr.  Potter admitted: “There’s no science there.  It’s just evidence.”  2 Tr. 23  in  Abbott  (WD  Tex.,  Oct.  22,  2013).    And  in  this  case,  in  fact,  Dr.  Grossman  admitted  that  their  prediction  turned  out  to  be  wildly  inaccurate.  Specifically,  he  provided  a  new  figure  (approximately  9,200) that was less than half of his earlier prediction.  1 Lakey Tr. 41.   And he then admitted that he had not proven any causal link between     the admitting privileges requirement and that smaller decline.  Id., at   54 (quoting Grossman et al., Change in Abortion Services After Imple­ mentation  of  a  Restrictive  Law  in  Texas,   90   Contraception   496,  500  (2014)).    Dr.   Grossman’s  testimony  in  this  case,  furthermore,  suggested  that   H. B.  2’s  restriction  on  medication  abortion  (whose  impact  on  clinics  cannot  be  attributed  to  the  provisions  challenged  in  this  case)  was  a  major  cause  in  the  decline  in  the  abortion  rate.    After  the  medication   abortion  restriction  and  admitting  privileges  requirement  took  effect,  over  the  next  six  months  the  number  of  medication  abortions  dropped  by  6,957  compared  to  the  same  period  in  the  previous  year.    See  App. 236.  The  corresponding  number  of  surgical  abortions  rose  by  2,343.    See ibid.  If that net decline of 4,614 in six months is doubled to approx­     imate  the  annual  trend  (which  is  apparently  the  methodology  Dr.  Grossman  used  to  arrive  at  his  9,200  figure,  see  90  Contraception,   supra,  at  500),  then  the  year’s  drop  of  9,228  abortions  seems  to  be  entirely  the  product  of  the  medication  abortion  restriction.    Taken   together, these figures make it difficult to conclude that the admitting  privileges requirement actually depressed the abortion rate at all.    In light of all this, it is unclear why the Court takes Dr. Grossman’s  testimony at face value.   32     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  overcrowded  minimart  or  a  practically  empty  supermar­ ket.  Faced with increased demand, ASCs could potentially  increase  the  number  of  abortions  performed  without  pro­ hibitively  expensive  changes.  Among  other  things,  they  might  hire  more  physicians  who  perform  abortions,22   utilize  their  facilities  more  intensively  or  efficiently,  or  shift  the  mix  of  services  provided.  Second,  what  matters   for present purposes is not the capacity of just those ASCs  that performed abortions prior to the enactment of H. B. 2    but  the  capacity  of  those  that  would  be  available  to  per­ form abortions after the statute took effect.  And since the  enactment  of  H. B.  2,  the  number  of  ASCs  performing  abortions has increased by 50%—from six in 2012 to nine  today.23     The most serious problem with the Court’s reasoning is  that  its  conclusion  is  belied  by  petitioners’  own  submis­ sions  to  this  Court.  In  the  first  case,  when  petitioners  asked  this  Court  to  vacate  the  Fifth  Circuit’s  stay  of  the  District  Court’s  injunction  of  the  admitting  privileges  ——————  22 The  Court  asserts  that  the  admitting  privileges  requirement  is  a  bottleneck on capacity, ante, at 34, but it musters no evidence and does   not even dispute petitioners’ own evidence that the admitting privileges  requirement  may  have  had  zero impact  on  the  Texas  abortion  rate,  n.   21, supra.  23 See Brief for Petitioners 23–24 (six centers in 2012, compared with     nine  today).  Two  of  the  three  new  surgical  centers  opened  since  this  case  was  filed  are  operated  by  Planned  Parenthood  (which  now  owns  five of the nine surgical centers in the State).  See App. 182–183, 1436.   Planned  Parenthood  is  obviously  able  to  comply  with  the  challenged  H. B.  2  requirements.    The  president  of  petitioner  Whole  Woman’s  Health,  a  much  smaller  entity,  has  complained  that  Planned       Parenthood “ ‘put[s] local independent businesses in a tough situation.’ ”       Simon, Planned Parenthood Hits Suburbia, Wall Street Journal Online  (June  23,  2008)  (cited  in  Brief  for  CitizenLink  et al.  as  Amici Curiae  15–16, and n. 23).  But as noted, petitioners in this case are not assert­ ing  their  own  rights  but  those  of  women  who  wish  to  obtain  an  abor­ tion, see supra, at 24, and thus the effect of the H. B. 2 requirements on  petitioners’ business and professional interests are not relevant.     Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)        ALITO, J., dissenting  33   requirement  pending  appeal,  they  submitted  a  chart  previously provided in the District Court that detailed the  capacity  of  abortion  clinics  after  the  admitting  privileges  requirement was to take effect.24  This chart is included as   an Appendix to this opinion.25  Three of the facilities listed  on the chart were ASCs, and their capacity was shown as  follows:   Southwestern  Women’s  Surgery  Center  in  Dallas  was said to have the capacity for 5,720 abortions a  year (110 per week);   Planned  Parenthood  Surgical  Health  Services  Cen­ ter in Dallas was said to have the capacity for 6,240  abortions a year (120 per week); and  ——————  24 See  Appendix,  infra.  The  Court  apparently  brushes  off  this  evi­ dence  as  “outside  the  record,”   ante,  at  35,  but  it  was   filed  with  this  Court  by  the  same  petitioners  in  litigation  closely  related  to  this  case.   And  “we  may  properly  take  judicial  notice  of  the  record  in  that  litiga­ tion between the same  parties who are now before us.”    Shuttlesworth  v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147, 157 (1969); see also, e.g., United States  v.  Pink,  315  U. S.  203,  216  (1942);  Freshman v. Atkins,  269  U. S.  121,   124 (1925).  25 The chart lists the 36 abortion clinics apparently open at the time  of  trial,  and  identifies  the  “Capacity  after  Privileges  Requirement”  for  27  of  those  clinics.    Of  those  27  clinics,  24  were  owned by  plaintiffs  in  the  first  case,  and  3  (Coastal  Birth  Control  Center,  Hill  Top  Women’s  Reproductive   Health  Services,  and  Harlingen  Reproductive  Services)  were owned by nonparties.  It is unclear why petitioners’ chart did not  include  capacity  figures  for  the  other  nine  clinics  (also  owned  by   non­parties).  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), petition­ ers  should  have  been  able  to  depose  representatives  of  those  clinics  to  determine those clinics’ capacity and their physicians’ access to admit­ ting privileges.  In the present case, petitioners in fact deposed at least  one such nonparty clinic owner, whose testimony revealed that he was  able  to  comply  with  the  admitting   privileges  requirement.    See  App. 1474  (testimony  of  El  Paso  abortion   clinic  owner,  confirming  that  he  possesses  admitting  privileges  “at  every  hospital  in  El  Paso”  (filed  under seal)).  The chart states that 14 of those clinics would not be able  to  perform  abortions  if  the  requirement  took  effect,  and  that  another  clinic would have “severely limited” capacity.  See Appendix, infra.  34     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  Planned  Parenthood  Center  for  Choice  in  Houston  was said to have the capacity for 9,100 abortions a  year (175 per week).26  See Appendix, infra.    The  average  capacity  of  these  three  ASCs  was  7,020  abortions  per  year.27    If  the  nine  ASCs  now  performing  abortions  in  Texas  have  the  same  average  capacity,  they  have a total capacity of 63,180.  Add in the assumed capac­ ity for two other clinics that are operating pursuant to the  judgment  of  the  Fifth  Circuit  (over  3,100  abortions  per year),28 and the total for the State is 66,280 abortions per  year.  That  is  comparable  to  the  68,298  total  abortions  performed  in  Texas  in  2012,  the  year  before  H. B.  2  was  enacted, App. 236,29 and well in excess of the abortion rate  ——————  26 The Court nakedly asserts that this clinic “does not represent most  facilities.”    Ante,  at  35.    Given  that  in  this  case  petitioners  did  not  introduce  evidence  on  “most  facilities,”  I  have  no  idea  how  the  Court  arrives at this conclusion.   27 The Court chides me, ante, at 35, for omitting the Whole Woman’s Health ASC in San Antonio from this average.  As of the Abbott trial in  2013, that ASC’s capacity was (allegedly) to be “severely limited” by the  admitting privileges requirement.  See Appendix, infra (listing “Capacity   after  Privileges  Requirement”).    But  that  facility  came  into  compli­  ance  with  that  requirement  a  few  months  later,  see  Letter  from  J.  Crepps to L. Cayce, Clerk of Court in Abbott (CA5, Jan. 3, 2014), so its   precompliance capacity is irrelevant here.  28 Petitioner Whole Woman’s Health performed over 14,000 abortions  over 10 years in McAllen.  App. 128.  Petitioner Nova Health Systems     performed over 17,000 abortions over 10 years in El Paso.  Id., at 129.    (And  as  I  explain  at  n.  33,  infra,  either  Nova  Health  Systems  or  an­  other  abortion  provider  will  be  open  in  the  El  Paso  area  however  this  case is decided.)  29 This conclusion is consistent with public health statistics offered by     petitioners.  These  statistics  suggest  that  ASCs  have  a  much  higher  capacity  than  other  abortion  facilities.    In  2012,  there  were  14,361   abortions performed by six surgical centers, meaning there were 2,394     abortions  per   center.    See  Brief  for  Petitioners  23;  App.  236.    In  2012,   there were approximately 35 other abortion clinics operating in Texas,   see  id.,  at  228  (41  total  clinics  as  of  Nov.  1,  2012),  which  performed  53,937  abortions,  id.,  at  236  (68,298  total  minus  14,361  performed  in  surgical  centers).    On  average,  those  other  clinics  each  performed     Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)        ALITO, J., dissenting  35   one  would  expect—59,070—if  subtracting   the  apparent  impact  of  the  medication  abortion  restriction,  see  n. 21,   supra.    To be clear, I do not vouch for the accuracy of this calcu­ lation.  It  might  be  too  high  or  too  low.    The  important point  is  that  petitioners  put  on  evidence  of  actual  clinic  capacity  in  their  earlier  case,  and  there  is  no  apparent  reason  why  they  could  not  have  done  the  same  here.    Indeed,  the  Court  asserts  that,  after  the  admitting  privi­ leges  requirement  took  effect,  clinics  “were  not  able  to  accommodate increased demand,” ante, at 35, but petition­ ers’  own  evidence  suggested  that  the  requirement  had  no effect on capacity, see n. 21, supra.  On this point, like the  question  of  the  reason  for  clinic  closures,  petitioners  did  not discharge their burden, and the District Court did not  engage in the type of analysis that should have been con­ ducted before enjoining an important state law.    So  much  for  capacity.  The  other30  potential  obstacle  to abortion  access  is  the  distribution  of  facilities  throughout  the State.  This might occur if the two challenged H. B. 2  requirements,  by  causing  the  closure  of  clinics  in  some  rural areas, led to a situation in which a “large fraction”31   of  women  of  reproductive  age  live  too  far  away  from  any  open  clinic.  Based  on  the  Court’s  holding  in  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, it    appears  that  the  need  to  travel  up  to  150  miles  is  not  an  undue burden,32 and the evidence in this case shows that  ——————  53,937÷35=1,541  abortions   per  year.    So  surgical  centers  in  2012  performed  55%  more  abortions  per  facility  (2,394  abortions)  than  the  average (1,541) for other clinics.  30 The Court also gives weight to supposed reductions in “individual­ ized  attention,  serious  conversation,  and  emotional   support”  in  its  undue­burden  analysis.    Ante,  at  36.  But  those  “facts”  are  not  in  the  record, so I have no way of addressing them.  31 See n. 11, supra.  32 The District Court in Casey found that 42% of Pennsylvania women  “must  travel  for  at  least  one  hour,  and  sometimes  longer  than  three  36     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  if the only clinics in the State were those that would have  remained open if the judgment of the Fifth Circuit had not  been  enjoined,  roughly  95%  of  the  women  of  reproductive  age  in  the  State  would  live  within  150  miles  of  an  open  facility  (or  lived  outside  that  range  before  H. B.  2).33    Because the record does not show why particular facilities closed, the real figure may be even higher than 95%.    We  should  decline  to  hold  that  these  statistics  justify  the  facial  invalidation  of  the  H. B.  2  requirements.    The  ——————  hours,  to  obtain  an  abortion  from  the  nearest provider.”    744  F. Supp.   1323,  1352  (ED  Pa.  1990),  aff’d  in  part,  rev’d  in  part,  947  F. 2d  682   (CA3  1991),  aff’d  in  part,  rev’d  in  part,  505  U. S.  833  (1992).    In  that   case, this Court recognized that the challenged 24­hour waiting period    would require some women to make that trip twice, and yet upheld the  law regardless.  See id., at 886–887.  33 Petitioners’ expert testified that 82.5% of Texas women of reproduc­ tive  age  live  within  150  miles  of  a  Texas  surgical  center  that  provides  abortions.    See  App.  242  (930,000  women  living  more  than  150  miles  away),  244  (5,326,162  women  total).    The  State’s  expert  further  testi­ fied,  without  contradiction,  that  an  additional  6.2%  live  within  150   miles of the McAllen facility, and another 3.3% within 150 miles of an  El  Paso­area  facility.    Id.,  at  921–922.    (If  the  Court  did  not  award  statewide  relief,  I  assume   it  would  instead  either  conclude  that  the  availability of abortion on the New Mexico side of the El Paso metropol­ itan area satisfies the Constitution, or it would  award as­applied relief  allowing  petitioner  Nova  Health  Systems  to  remain  open  in  El  Paso.   Either  way,  the  3.3%  figure  would  remain  the  same,  because  Nova’s   clinic and the New Mexico facility are so close to each other.  See id., at   913, 916, 921 (only six women of reproductive age live within 150 miles  of  Nova’s  clinic  but  not  New  Mexico   clinic).)    Together,  these  percent­ ages add up to 92.0% of Texas women of reproductive age.  Separately,  the  State’s  expert  also  testified  that  2.9%  of  women  of  reproductive   age  lived  more  than  150  miles  from  an  abortion  clinic  before H. B. 2 took effect.  Id., at 916.      So, at most, H. B. 2 affects no more than (100%­2.9%)­92.0%=5.1% of women of reproductive age.  Also recall that many rural clinic closures    appear to have been caused by other developments—indeed, petitioners  seemed to believe that themselves—and have certainly not been shown  to  be  caused  by  the  provisions  challenged  here.    See supra,  at  29,  and   n. 18.  So the true impact is almost certainly smaller than 5.1%.    Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    ALITO, J., dissenting      37   possibility  that  the  admitting  privileges  requirement  might have  caused  a  closure  in  Lubbock  is  no  reason  to  issue  a  facial  injunction  exempting  Houston  clinics  from  that  requirement.  I  do  not  dismiss  the  situation  of  those  women  who  would  no  longer  live  within  150  miles  of  a    2.    But   under  current  doctrine   clinic  as  a  result  of  H. B.  such  localized  problems  can  be  addressed  by  narrow  as­ applied challenges.   IV    Even  if  the  Court  were  right  to  hold  that  res  judicata  does not bar this suit  and that  H. B. 2 imposes an undue  burden  on  abortion  access—it  is,  in  fact,  wrong  on  both  counts—it  is  still  wrong  to  conclude  that  the  admitting  privileges and surgical center provisions must be enjoined  in  their  entirety.  H. B.  2  has  an  extraordinarily  broad  severability clause that must be considered before enjoin­ ing any portion or application of the law.  Both challenged provisions  should  survive  in  substantial  part  if  the  Court  faithfully applies that clause.  Regrettably, it enjoins both  in  full,  heedless  of  the  (controlling)  intent  of  the  state  legislature.   Cf.  Leavitt  v.  Jane L.,  518  U. S.  137,  139   (1996)  (per curiam)  (“Severability  is  of  course  a  matter  of state law”).  A    Applying  H. B.  2’s  severability  clause  to  the  admitting  privileges  requirement  is  easy.    Simply  put,  the  require­ ment must be upheld in every city in which its application  does  not  pose  an  undue  burden.    It  surely  does  not  pose that  burden  anywhere  in  the  eastern  half  of  the  State,  where most Texans live and where virtually no woman of reproductive  age  lives  more  than  150  miles  from  an  open  clinic.  See  App.  242,  244  (petitioners’  expert  testimony that 82.5% of Texas women of reproductive age live within  150  miles  of  open  clinics  in  Austin,  Dallas,  Fort  Worth,   38     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  Houston,  and  San  Antonio).    (Unfortunately,  the  Court  does  not  address  the  State’s  argument  to  this  effect.  See  Brief for Respondents 51.)  And petitioners would need to show  that  the  requirement  caused  specific  West  Texas clinics to close (but see supra, at 29, and n. 18) before they  could be entitled to an injunction tailored to address those  closures.   B    Applying severability to the surgical center requirement  calls  for  the  identification  of  the  particular  provisions  of  the  ASC  regulations  that  result  in  the  imposition  of  an  undue  burden.  These  regulations  are  lengthy  and  de­ tailed,  and  while  compliance  with  some  might  be  expen­ sive, compliance with many others would not.  And many   serve  important  health  and  safety  purposes.    Thus,  the  surgical  center  requirements  cannot  be  judged  as  a  pack­ age.  But the District Court nevertheless held that all the   surgical  center  requirements  are  unconstitutional  in  all  cases, and the Court sustains this holding on grounds that  are hard to take seriously.   When  the  Texas  Legislature  passed  H. B.  2,  it  left  no  doubt  about  its  intent  on  the  question  of  severability.  It   included  a  provision  mandating  the  greatest  degree  of  severability  possible.  The  full  provision  is  reproduced below,34 but it is enough to note that under this provision   ——————  34 The severability provision states:   “(a) If some or all of the provisions of this Act are ever temporarily or  permanently  restrained  or  enjoined  by  judicial  order,  all  other  provi­ sions  of  Texas  law  regulating  or  restricting  abortion  shall  be  enforced  as  though  the  restrained  or  enjoined  provisions  had  not  been  adopted;  provided,  however,  that  whenever  the  temporary  or  permanent  re­ straining order or injunction is stayed or dissolved, or otherwise ceases  to have effect, the provisions shall have full force and effect.  “(b)  Mindful  of  Leavitt  v.  Jane  L.,  518  U.  S.  137  (1996),  in  which  in  the context of determining the severability of a state statute regulating  abortion  the   United  States  Supreme  Court  held  that  an  explicit  state­   Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)        ALITO, J., dissenting  39   “every  provision,  section,  subsection,  sentence,  clause,  phrase,  or  word  in  this  Act,  and  every  application  of  the  provisions  in  this  Act,  are  severable  from  each  other.”   H. B.  2,  §10(b),  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  200a.   And  to  drive  home the point about the severability of applications of the  law, the provision adds:  “If any application of any provision in this Act to any  person, group of persons, or circumstances is found by  a  court  to  be  invalid,  the  remaining  applications  of  that provision to all other persons and circumstances  shall  be  severed  and  may  not  be  affected.    All  consti­ tutionally  valid  applications  of  this  Act  shall  be  sev­ ——————  ment of legislative intent is controlling, it is the intent of the legislature  that  every  provision,  section,  subsection,  sentence,  clause,  phrase,  or  word in this Act, and every application of the provisions in this Act, are  severable  from  each  other.  If  any  application  of  any  provision  in  this  Act  to  any  person,  group  of  persons,  or  circumstances  is  found  by  a  court  to  be  invalid,  the  remaining  applications  of  that  provision  to  all  other  persons  and  circumstances  shall  be  severed  and  may  not   be  affected.  All  constitutionally  valid  applications  of  this  Act  shall  be  severed  from  any  applications  that  a  court  finds  to  be  invalid,  leaving  the valid applications in force, because it is the legislature’s intent and  priority that the valid applications be allowed to stand alone.  Even if a  reviewing court finds a provision of this Act to impose an undue burden  in a large or substantial fraction of relevant cases, the applications that  do  not  present  an  undue  burden  shall  be  severed  from  the  remaining  provisions  and  shall  remain  in  force,  and  shall  be  treated  as  if  the  legislature  had  enacted  a   statute  limited  to  the  persons,  group  of  persons,  or  circumstances  for  which  the  statute’s   application  does  not  present  an  undue  burden.    The  legislature  further  declares  that  it  would  have  passed  this  Act,  and  each  provision,  section,  subsection,  sentence, clause, phrase, or word, and all constitutional applications of      this Act, irrespective of the fact that any provision, section, subsection,  sentence, clause, phrase, or word, or applications of this Act, were to be     declared unconstitutional or to represent an undue burden.  “(c) [omitted—applies to late­term abortion ban only]  “(d) If any provision of this Act is found by any court to be unconstitu­   tionally  vague,  then  the  applications  of  that  provision  that  do  not  present constitutional vagueness problems shall be severed and remain  in force.”  H. B. 2, §10, App. to Pet. for Cert. 199a–201a.   40     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  ered from any applications that a court finds to be in­ valid,  leaving  the  valid  applications  in  force,  because  it is the legislature’s intent and priority that the valid  applications be allowed to stand alone.”  Ibid.    This  provision  indisputably  requires  that  all  surgical  center regulations that are not themselves unconstitutional       be  left  standing.  Requiring  an  abortion  facility  to  com­  ply  with  any  provision  of  the  regulations  applicable  to  surgical centers is an “application of the provision” of H. B.  2  that  requires  abortion  clinics  to  meet  surgical  center  standards.    Therefore,  if  some  such  applications  are  un­ constitutional, the severability clause plainly requires that  those  applications  be  severed  and  that  the  rest  be  left  intact.     How  can  the  Court  possibly  escape  this  painfully  obvi­ ous  conclusion?    Its  main  argument  is  that  it  need  not  honor the severability provision because doing so would be  too  burdensome.  See  ante,  at  38.    This  is  a  remarkable  argument.    Under the Supremacy Clause, federal courts may strike  down  state  laws  that  violate  the  Constitution  or  conflict  with  federal  statutes,  Art.  VI,  cl.  2,  but  in  exercising  this  power, federal courts must take great care.  The power to invalidate  a  state  law  implicates  sensitive  federal­state  relations.  Federal  courts  have  no  authority  to  carpet­ bomb  state  laws,  knocking  out  provisions  that  are  per­  fectly consistent with federal law, just because it would be  too  much  bother  to  separate  them  from  unconstitutional  provisions.   In  any  event,  it  should  not  have  been  hard  in  this  case  for the District Court to separate any bad provisions from  the good.  Petitioners should have identified the particular  provisions that would entail what they regard as an undue  expense,  and  the  District  Court  could  have  then  concen­ trated its analysis on those provisions.  In fact, petitioners    Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    ALITO, J., dissenting      41   did do this in their trial brief, Doc. 185, p. 8 in Lakey (Aug.  12,  2014)  (“It  is  the  construction  and  nursing  require­ ments  that  form  the  basis  of  Plaintiffs’  challenge”),  but  they changed their position once the District Court awarded    blanket  relief,  see  790  F. 3d,  at  582  (petitioners  told  the  Fifth Circuit that they “challenge H. B. 2 broadly, with no  effort whatsoever to parse out specific aspects of the ASC requirement  that  they   find  onerous  or  otherwise  infirm”).   In  its  own  review  of  the  ASC  requirement,  in  fact,  the  Court follows petitioners’ original playbook and focuses on  the  construction  and  nursing  requirements  as  well.    See   ante, at 28–29 (detailed walkthrough of Tex. Admin. Code,    tit. 25, §§135.15 (2016) (nursing), 135.52 (construction)).  I  do  not  see  how  it  “would  inflict  enormous  costs  on  both  courts  and  litigants,”  ante,  at  38,  to  single  out  the  ASC  regulations  that  this  Court  and  petitioners  have  both  targeted as the core of the challenge.    By forgoing severability, the Court strikes down numer­ ous  provisions  that  could  not  plausibly  impose  an  undue  burden.  For  example,  surgical  center  patients  must  “be  treated  with  respect,  consideration,  and  dignity.”    Tex.   Admin.  Code,  tit.  25,  §135.5(a).    That’s  now  enjoined.   Patients may not be given misleading “advertising regard­ ing  the  competence  and/or  capabilities  of  the  organiza­ tion.”  §135.5(g).  Enjoined.    Centers  must  maintain  fire  alarm  and  emergency  communications  systems,  §§135.41(d),  135.42(e),  and  eliminate  “[h]azards  that  might  lead  to  slipping,  falling,  electrical  shock,  burns,  poisoning,  or  other  trauma,”  §135.10(b).  Enjoined  and enjoined.  When a center is being remodeled while still in  use,  “[t]emporary  sound  barriers  shall  be  provided  where  intense,  prolonged  construction  noises  will  disturb  pa­ tients  or  staff  in  the  occupied  portions  of  the  building.”   §135.51(b)(3)(B)(vi).  Enjoined.  Centers must develop and  enforce  policies  concerning  teaching  and  publishing  by  staff.  §§135.16(a),  (c).    Enjoined.    They  must  obtain  in­ 42     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT         ALITO, J., dissenting  formed  consent  before  doing  research  on  patients.   §135.17(e).  Enjoined.  And each center “shall develop, im­ plement[,] and maintain an effective, ongoing, organization­ wide,  data  driven  patient  safety  program.”    §135.27(b).   Also  enjoined.    These  are  but  a  few  of  the  innocuous  re­ quirements that the Court invalidates with nary a wave of  the hand.    Any  responsible  application  of  the  H. B.  2  severability  provision would leave much of the law intact.  At a mini­ mum, both of the requirements challenged here should be  held  constitutional  as  applied  to  clinics  in  any  Texas  city  that  will  have  a  surgical  center  providing  abortions  (i.e.,  those  areas  in  which  there  cannot  possibly  have  been  an  undue burden on abortion access).  Moreover, as even the  District  Court  found,  the  surgical  center  requirement  is  clearly  constitutional  as  to  new  abortion  facilities  and  facilities  already  licensed  as  surgical  centers.    Whole Woman’s Health v.  Lakey,  46  F. Supp.  3d  673,  676  (WD  Tex.  2014).  And  we  should  uphold  every  application  of  every  surgical  center  regulation  that  does  not  pose  an  undue burden—at the very least, all of the regulations as to which petitioners have never made a specific complaint  supported  by  specific  evidence.    The  Court’s  wholesale  refusal  to  engage  in  the  required  severability  analysis  here revives the “antagonistic ‘canon of construction under  which in cases involving abortion, a permissible reading of  a  statute  is  to  be  avoided  at  all  costs.’ ”  Gonzales,  550   U. S.,  at  153–154  (quoting  Stenberg  v.  Carhart,  530  U. S.  914,  977  (2000)  (KENNEDY,   J.,  dissenting);  some  internal  quotation marks omitted).    If the Court is unwilling to undertake the careful sever­ ability analysis required, that is no reason to strike down  all  applications  of  the  challenged  provisions.    The  proper course would be to remand to the lower courts for a remedy  tailored  to  the  specific  facts  shown  in  this  case,  to  “try  to  limit  the  solution  to  the  problem.”    Ayotte  v.  Planned   Cite as:   579 U. S. ____ (2016)    ALITO, J., dissenting      43   Parenthood of Northern New Eng.,  546  U. S.  320,  328  (2006).  V    When  we  decide  cases  on  particularly  controversial    issues, we should take special care to apply settled proce­ dural rules in a neutral manner.  The Court has not done  that here.    I therefore respectfully dissent.      44     WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. HELLERSTEDT     ALITO, J., dissenting  LITO, J.    Appendix to opinion of A APPENDIX   App. K to Emergency Application To Vacate Stay in O. T.  2013, No. 13A452, Plaintiffs’ Trial Exh. 46       Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 1 of 60 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI NORTHERN DIVISION RIMS BARBER; CAROL BURNETT; JOAN BAILEY; KATHERINE ELIZABETH DAY; ANTHONY LAINE BOYETTE; DON FORTENBERRY; SUSAN GLISSON; DERRICK JOHNSON; DOROTHY C. TRIPLETT; RENICK TAYLOR; BRANDIILYNE MANGUMDEAR; SUSAN MANGUM; JOSHUA GENERATION METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY CHURCH; CAMPAIGN FOR SOUTHERN EQUALITY; and SUSAN HROSTOWSKI PLAINTIFFS CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-417-CWR-LRA consolidated with CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-442-CWR-LRA V. PHIL BRYANT, Governor; JIM HOOD, Attorney General; JOHN DAVIS, Executive Director of the Mississippi Department of Human Services; and JUDY MOULDER, State Registrar of Vital Records DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The plaintiffs filed these suits to enjoin a new state law, “House Bill 1523,” before it goes into effect on July 1, 2016. They contend that the law violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Attorney General’s Office has entered its appearance to defend HB 1523. The parties briefed the relevant issues and presented evidence and argument at a joint hearing on June 23 and 24, 2016. The United States Supreme Court has spoken clearly on the constitutional principles at stake. Under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, a state “may not aid, foster, or Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 2 of 60 promote one religion or religious theory against another.” Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). “When the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government’s ostensible object is to take sides.” McCreary Cnty., Kentucky v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (citation omitted). Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, meanwhile, a state may not deprive lesbian and gay citizens of “the protection of general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private settings.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 630 (1996). HB 1523 grants special rights to citizens who hold one of three “sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions” reflecting disapproval of lesbian, gay, transgender, and unmarried persons. Miss. Laws 2016, HB 1523 § 2 (eff. July 1, 2016). That violates both the guarantee of religious neutrality and the promise of equal protection of the laws. The Establishment Clause is violated because persons who hold contrary religious beliefs are unprotected – the State has put its thumb on the scale to favor some religious beliefs over others. Showing such favor tells “nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and . . . adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.” Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). And the Equal Protection Clause is violated by HB 1523’s authorization of arbitrary discrimination against lesbian, gay, transgender, and unmarried persons. “It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. The plaintiffs’ motions are granted and HB 1523 is preliminarily enjoined. 2 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 3 of 60 I. The Parties A. Plaintiffs The plaintiffs in this matter are 13 individuals and two organizations – Joshua Generation Metropolitan Community Church (JGMCC) and the Campaign for Southern Equality (CSE). All of the individual plaintiffs are residents, citizens, and taxpayers of Mississippi who disagree with the beliefs protected by HB 1523. They fall into three broad and sometimes overlapping categories: (1) clergy and other religious officials whose religious beliefs are not reflected in HB 1523; (2) members of groups targeted by HB 1523; and (3) other citizens who, based on their religious or moral convictions, do not hold the beliefs HB 1523 protects. The first group includes Rev. Dr. Rims Barber, Rev. Carol Burnett, Rev. Don Fortenberry, Brandiilyne Mangum-Dear, Susan Mangum, and Rev. Dr. Susan Hrostowski. Rev. Dr. Barber is an ordained minister in the Presbyterian church. Rev. Burnett is an ordained United Methodist minister. Rev. Fortenberry is an ordained United Methodist minister and the retired chaplain of Millsaps College. Mangum-Dear is the pastor at JGMCC, while Mangum is the director of worship at that church. Rev. Dr. Hrostowski is the vicar of St. Elizabeth’s Episcopal Church in Collins, Mississippi, as well as an employee of the University of Southern Mississippi. Katherine Elizabeth Day, Anthony (Tony) Laine Boyette, Dr. Susan Glisson, and Renick Taylor comprise the second group of plaintiffs.1 Day is a transgender woman; Boyette is a transgender man. Dr. Glisson, an employee of the University of Mississippi, is unmarried and in a long-term sexual romantic relationship with an unmarried man. Taylor is a gay man who is engaged to his male partner. The couple plans to marry in the summer of 2017. The third group of individual plaintiffs includes Joan Bailey, Derrick Johnson, and Dorothy Triplett. Bailey is a retired therapist whose practice was primarily devoted to lesbians. 1 Mangum-Dear, Mangum, and Rev. Dr. Hrostowski also fall into this group. 3 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 4 of 60 Johnson is the Executive Director of the Mississippi State Conference of the NAACP, and Triplett is a retired government employee and a longtime activist. JGMCC is a ministry in Forrest County, Mississippi, whose members fall into all three categories. It “welcomes all people regardless of age, race, sexual orientation, gender identity, or social status.” Docket No. 1, ¶ 16, in Cause No. 3:16-CV-417 [hereinafter Barber]. In particular, the church sponsors “a community service ministry that promotes LGBT+ equality.” Id. Approximately 90% of its members in Forrest County identify as LGBT. Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 168, Barber v. Bryant, No. 3:16-CV-417 (S.D. Miss. June 23, 2016) [hereinafter Tr. of June 23]. There are over 400 Metropolitan Community Churches worldwide. Id. CSE is a non-profit organization that works “across the South to promote the full humanity and equality of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people in American life.” Docket No. 2-2, at 2, in Cause No. 3:16-CV-442 [hereinafter CSE IV]. It is based in North Carolina but has worked in Mississippi since 2012. Id. CSE claims to advocate for Mississippians in all three categories of plaintiffs. Id. at 4. B. Defendants Governor Phil Bryant is sued in his official capacity as the chief executive of the State of Mississippi. State law charges him with the responsibility to “see that the laws are faithfully executed.” Miss. Code Ann. § 7-1-5(c). Attorney General Jim Hood is also sued in his official capacity. Among his powers and duties, he is required to “intervene and argue the constitutionality of any statute when notified of a challenge.” Id. § 7-5-1; see In the Interest of R.G., 632 So. 2d 953, 955 (Miss. 1994). 4 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 5 of 60 John Davis is the Executive Director of the Mississippi Department of Human Services. Under Mississippi Code § 43-1-2(5), he is tasked with implementing state laws protecting children. One of the offices under his purview, the Division of Family and Children’s Services, is “responsible for the development, execution and provisions of services” regarding foster care, adoption, licensure, and other social services. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-1-51.2 Judy Moulder is the Mississippi State Registrar of Vital Records. She is responsible for “carry[ing] into effect the provisions of law relating to registration of marriages.” Id. § 51-57-43. HB 1523 requires Moulder to collect and record recusal notices from persons authorized to issue marriage licenses who wish to not issue marriage licenses to certain couples due to a belief enumerated in HB 1523. HB 1523 § 3(8)(a). II. Factual and Procedural History A. Same-Sex Marriage Because HB 1523 is a direct response to the Supreme Court’s 2015 same-sex marriage ruling, it is necessary to discuss the background of that ruling. This country had long debated whether lesbian and gay couples could join the institution of civil marriage. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, Here Comes the Groom, The New Republic, Aug. 27, 1989. The debate played itself out on the local, state, and national levels via constitutional amendments, legislative enactments, ballot initiatives, and propositions. In its most optimistic retelling, “[i]ndividuals on both sides of the issue passionately, but respectfully, attempted to persuade their fellow citizens to accept their views.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2627 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see David Carter, Stonewall: The Riots that Sparked the Gay Revolution 109-10, 183-84 (2004) (describing the 1966 2 During the 2016 legislative session, Mississippi’s lawmakers created the Department of Child Protective Services, a standalone agency independent of the Department of Human Services. See 2016 Miss. Laws, SB 2179. The new department was created upon passage, but the bill allows a transition period of up to two years. Id. 5 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 6 of 60 Compton’s Cafeteria riots by transgender citizens in San Francisco, and the famous 1969 Stonewall riots in New York City). Less charitably, but also true, is the reality that every time lesbian and gay citizens moved one step closer to legal equality, voters and their representatives passed new laws to preserve the status quo. In the 1990s, for example, Hawaii’s same-sex marriage lawsuit inspired the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and a wave of state-level “mini-DOMAs.” Campaign for Southern Equality v. Bryant, 64 F. Supp. 3d 906, 915 (S.D. Miss. 2014) [hereinafter CSE I]. Mississippi’s politicians joined the movement by issuing an executive order and passing a law banning same-sex marriage. Id. It was not until 2013 that DOMA was struck down in part. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). Mississippi’s mini-DOMA lasted until 2015. CSE I, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 906. In the early 2000s, Lawrence v. Texas and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, cases that found in favor of lesbian and gay privacy and marriage rights, respectively, resulted in a wave of state constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage. CSE I, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 915. Mississippians approved such a constitutional amendment by the largest margin in the nation. Id.; see Michael Foust, ‘Gay Marriage’ a Loser: Amendments Pass in all 11 States, Baptist Press, Nov. 3, 2004. The lawfulness of same-sex marriage was finally resolved in 2015. The Supreme Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges that same-sex couples must be allowed to join in civil marriage “on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.” 135 S. Ct. at 2605. The decision applies to every governmental agency and agent in the country. “The majority of the United States Supreme Court dictates the law of the land, and lower courts are bound to follow it.” 6 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 7 of 60 Campaign for Southern Equality v. Mississippi Dep’t of Human Servs., --- F.3d ---, 2016 WL 1306202, at *14 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 31, 2016) [hereinafter CSE III]. Many celebrated the ruling as overdue. Others felt like change was happening too quickly.3 And some citizens were concerned enough to advocate new laws “to insulate state officials from legal risk if they do not obey the decision based on a religious objection.”4 Lyle Denniston, A Plea to Resist the Court on Same-Sex Marriage, SCOTUSblog, July 9, 2015. The Supreme Court’s decision had taken pains to reaffirm religious rights. Its commitment to the free exercise of religion is important and must be quoted in full. Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered. . . . In turn, those who believe allowing samesex marriage is proper or indeed essential, whether as a matter of religious conviction or secular belief, may engage those who disagree with their view in an open and searching debate. The Constitution, however, does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607. “As the Obergefell majority makes clear, the First Amendment must protect the rights of [religious] individuals, even when they are agents of government, to voice their personal objections – this, too, is an essential part of the conversation – but the doctrine of equal dignity prohibits them from acting on those objections, particularly in their official capacities, in a way that demeans or subordinates LGBT individuals . . . .” Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: 3 It is fair to say that same-sex marriage rights went “from unthinkable to the law of the land in just a couple of decades.” Nate Silver, Change Doesn’t Usually Come This Fast, FiveThirtyEight, June 26, 2015. 4 Sadly, this was predicted years ago. In 1999, four members of Congress expressed concern that religious freedom legislation “would not simply act as a shield to protect religious liberty, but could also be used by some as a sword to attack the rights of many Americans, including unmarried couples, single parents, lesbians and gays.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-219, at 41 (1999), available at 1999 WL 462644. 7 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 8 of 60 Speaking Its Name, 129 Harv. L. Rev. F. 16 (Nov. 10, 2015). Obergefell’s author, Justice Kennedy, had also reaffirmed this principle in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores. “[N]o person may be restricted or demeaned by government in exercising his or her religion. Yet neither may that same exercise unduly restrict other persons . . . in protecting their own interests.” 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2786-87 (2014) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In the immediate wake of Obergefell, the Fifth Circuit issued a published opinion declaring that “Obergefell, in both its Fourteenth and First Amendment iterations, is the law of the land and, consequently, the law of this circuit and should not be taken lightly by actors within the jurisdiction of this court.” Campaign for Southern Equality v. Bryant, 791 F.3d 625, 627 (5th Cir. 2015) [hereinafter CSE II]. The court issued the mandate forthwith. Id. A few hours later, with this mandate in hand, this Court issued a Permanent Injunction and a Final Judgment enjoining enforcement of Mississippi’s statutory and constitutional samesex marriage ban. The Attorney General’s Office soon advised Circuit Clerks to issue marriage licenses “to same-sex couples on the same terms and conditions accorded to couples of the opposite sex.” In re Steve Womack, 2015 WL 4920123, at *1 (Miss. A.G. July 17, 2015). In physics, every action has its equal and opposite reaction. In politics, every action has its predictable overreaction. Politicians reacted to the Hawaiian proceedings with DOMA and mini-DOMAs. Lawrence and Goodridge birthed the state constitutional amendments. And now Obergefell has led to HB 1523. The next chapter of this back-and-forth has begun. B. House Bill 1523 Mississippi’s highest elected officials were displeased with Obergefell. Governor Bryant stated that Obergefell “usurped [states’] right to self-governance and has mandated that states must comply with federal marriage standards—standards that are out of step with the wishes of 8 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 9 of 60 many in the United States and that are certainly out of step with the majority of Mississippians.”5 Governor Phil Bryant, Governor Bryant Issues Statement on Supreme Court Obergefell Decision, June 26, 2015. 6 Legislative leaders felt similarly. Lieutenant Governor Tate Reeves, who presides over the State Senate, called the decision an “overreach of the federal government.” Geoff Pender, Lawmaker: State Could Stop Marriage Licenses Altogether, The Clarion-Ledger, June 26, 2015.7 Speaker of the House Philip Gunn said Obergefell was “in direct conflict with God’s design for marriage as set forth in the Bible. The threat of this decision to religious liberty is very clear.” Id.8 Representative Andy Gipson, Chairman of the House Judiciary B Committee, pledged to study whether Mississippi should stop issuing marriage licenses altogether. Id.9 5 Governor Bryant’s statement is only partially true. While states have mostly been permitted to regulate marriage within their borders, the Supreme Court has stepped in to ensure that “self-governance” complies with equal protection. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“Marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and survival. To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes . . . is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.”). 6 The Governor’s remarks sounded familiar. In the mid-1950s, Governor J.P. Coleman said that Brown v. Board of Education “represents an unwarranted invasion of the rights and powers of the states.” Charles C. Bolton, William F. Winter and the New Mississippi: A Biography 97 (2013). In 1962, before a joint session of the Mississippi Legislature – and to a “hero’s reception” – Governor Ross Barnett was lauded for invoking states’ rights during the battle to integrate the University of Mississippi. Charles W. Eagles, The Price of Defiance: James Meredith and the Integration of Ole Miss 290-91 (2009) [hereinafter Price of Defiance]. 7 The State has objected to the Court’s use of newspaper articles. In an Establishment Clause challenge, however, a District Court errs when it takes “insufficient account of the context in which the statute was enacted and the reasons for its passage.” Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 715 (2010). The Fifth Circuit agrees: “context is critical in assessing neutrality” in this area of the law. Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 462, 473 (5th Cir. 2001). 8 Using God as a justification for discrimination is nothing new. It was Governor Barnett who proclaimed that “[t]he Good Lord was the original segregationist. He made us white, and he intended that we stay that way.” Price of Defiance at 282. Warping the image of God was not reserved to Mississippi politicians. In testimony before Congress during the debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a Maryland businessman testified before a Senate committee that “God himself was the greatest segregationist of all time as is evident when he placed the Caucasians in Europe, the black people in Africa, the yellow people in the Orient and so forth.” Linda C. McClain, The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and “Legislating Morality”: On Conscience, Prejudice, and Whether “Stateways” Can Change “Folkways”, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 891, 917 (2015). He continued, “Christ himself never lived an integrated life, and . . . when he chose His close associates, they were all white. This doesn’t mean that He didn’t love all His creatures, but it does indicate that He didn’t think we had to have all this togetherness in order to go to heaven.” Id. 9 The suggestion was (again) familiar. A few months after the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, Mississippians – those who were permitted to vote, that is – “voted two to one approving a constitutional amendment abolishing the state schools system if it integrated.” Dennis J. Mitchell, A New History of Mississippi 404 (2014). 9 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 10 of 60 The angst was not limited to the executive and legislative branches. Two Justices of the Mississippi Supreme Court also expressed their disgust with Obergefell. In 2014, a lesbian had petitioned that body for the right to divorce her wife in a Mississippi court. Czekala-Chatham v. State ex rel. Hood, --- So. 3d ---, 2015 WL 10985118 (Miss. Nov. 5, 2015). While her case was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court handed-down Obergefell. Although a majority of the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that Obergefell resolved her case in her favor, Justices Dickinson and Coleman argued that the Obergefell Court had legislated from the bench and overstepped its authority. Id. at *3 (Dickinson, J., dissenting). They opined that “state courts are not required to recognize as legitimate legal authority a Supreme Court decision that is in no way a constitutional interpretation,” and claimed “a duty to examine those decisions to make sure they indeed are constitutional interpretations, rather than . . . an exercise in judicial will.” Id. at *4, *6.10 Obergefell was “[w]orthy only to be disobeyed,” they said. Id. at *5. Mississippi’s legislators formally responded to Obergefell in the next legislative session.11 Speaker Gunn drafted and introduced HB 1523, the “Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act.”12 The bill overwhelmingly passed both chambers, and the Governor signed it into law on April 5, 2016. It goes into effect on July 1. HB 1523’s meaning is contested. A layperson reading about the bill might conclude that it gives a green light to discrimination and prevents accountability for discriminatory acts. 10 But see James v. City of Boise, Idaho, 136 S. Ct. 685, 686 (2016) (per curiam) (“The Idaho Supreme Court, like any other state or federal court, is bound by this Court’s interpretation of federal law. The state court erred in concluding otherwise.”). 11 This had happened before in the religious liberty context. In 1994, “[o]n a wave of public sentiment and indignation over the treatment of a Principal . . . who allowed students to begin each school day with a prayer over the intercom, the Mississippi legislature passed the School Prayer Statute at issue here.” Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1996). The statute was unconstitutional. Id. 12 “‘After the Supreme Court decision in Obergefell (v. Hodges), it became apparent that there would be a head-on collision between religious convictions about gay marriage and the right to gay marriage created by the decision,’ [Speaker] Gunn said.” Adam Ganucheau, Mississippi’s ‘Religious Freedom’ Law Drafted Out of State, Mississippi Today, May 17, 2016. One commentator concluded that “HB 1523 was hatched” after the issuance of this Court’s Permanent Injunction. Sid Salter, Constitutional Ship has Sailed on Same-Sex Marriage, The Clarion-Ledger, May 8, 2016. “Clearly, House Bill 1523 seeks to work around the federal Obergefell decision at the state level.” Id. 10 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 11 of 60 Arielle Dreher, Hundreds Rally to Repeal HB 1523, State Faces Deadline Today Before Lawsuit, Jackson Free Press, May 2, 2016 (quoting Chad Griffin, President of the Human Rights Campaign, as saying, “it’s sweeping and allows almost any individual or organization to justify discrimination against LGBT people, against single mothers and against unwed couples.”). Someone else reading the same article might conclude that HB 1523 simply “reinforces” the First Amendment. Id. (quoting Speaker Gunn as saying the gay community “can do the same things that they could before”). So any discussion should begin with the plain text of the bill. HB 1523 enumerates three “sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions” entitled to special legal protection. They are, (a) Marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one man and one woman; (b) Sexual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage; and (c) Male (man) or female (woman) refer to an individual’s immutable biological sex as objectively determined by anatomy and genetics at time of birth. HB 1523 § 2. These will be referred to as the “§ 2” beliefs. The bill then says that the State of Mississippi will not “discriminate” against persons who act pursuant to a § 2 belief. Id. §§ 3-4.13 For example, if a small business owner declines to provide goods or services for a same-sex wedding because it would violate his or her § 2 beliefs, HB 1523 allows the business to decline without fear of State “discrimination.” “Discrimination” is defined broadly. It covers consequences in the realm of taxation, employment, benefits, court proceedings, licenses, financial grants, and so on. In other words, the State of Mississippi will not tax you, penalize you, fire you, deny you a contract, withhold a diploma or license, modify a custody agreement, or retaliate against you, among many other 13 HB 1523 § 9(2)-(3) defines “State government” to include private persons, corporations, and other legal entities. 11 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 12 of 60 enumerated things, for your § 2 beliefs. Id.14 An organization or person who acts on a § 2 belief is essentially immune from State punishment.15 The Governor’s signing statement recognized that consequences under federal law are unchanged. States “lack authority to nullify a federal right or cause of action they believe is inconsistent with their local policies.” Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 736 (2009). Parts of the law provide fodder for both its opponents and its proponents. One section of HB 1523 guarantees that the State will not take adverse action against a religious organization that declines to solemnize a wedding because of a § 2 belief. Id. § 3. There is nothing new or controversial about that section. Religious organizations already have that right under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Citizens also enjoy substantial religious rights under existing state law. The Mississippi Constitution ensures that “the free enjoyment of all religious sentiments and the different modes of worship shall be held sacred,” and “no preference shall be given by law to any religious sect or mode of worship.”16 Miss. Const., § 18. In addition, a 2014 law called the “Mississippi Religious Freedom Restoration Act” (RFRA) states that the government “may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: (i) Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (ii) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-61-1(5)(b) (emphasis added). HB 1523 does not change either of these laws.17 14 This is more expansive than other anti-discrimination laws, such as Title VII or Title IX. The broad immunity provision may violate the Mississippi Constitution, which provides that “every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.” Miss. Const. § 24. 16 Despite the inclusive language just quoted, § 18 of the Mississippi Constitution then says that “[t]he rights hereby secured shall not be construed . . . to exclude the Holy Bible from use in any public school.” 17 Mississippi’s RFRA is also part of the political back-and-forth on LGBT rights. “State-based RFRAs were passed to preemptively provide religious exemptions to people in advance of a Supreme Court ruling on gay marriage, [Professor Doug] NeJaime said.” Alana Semuels, Should Adoption Agencies Be Allowed to Discriminate Against 15 12 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 13 of 60 We return to HB 1523. Several parts of the bill are unclear. One says the State will not take action against foster or adoptive parents who intend to raise a foster or adoptive child in accordance with § 2 beliefs. HB 1523 § 3(3). It is not obvious how the State would respond if the child in urgent need of placement was a 14-year-old lesbian. Another section discusses a professional’s right to refuse to participate in “psychological, counseling, or fertility services” because of a § 2 belief. Id. § 3(4). But some professions’ ethical rules prohibit “engag[ing] in discrimination against prospective or current clients . . . based on . . . gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, [and] marital/ partnership status,” to name a few categories. American Counseling Association, Code of Ethics § C.5 (2014). Under HB 1523, though, a public university’s faculty must confer a degree upon, and the State must license, a person who refuses to abide by her chosen profession’s Code of Ethics.18 Section 3(8)(a) of the law, in contrast, is crystal clear. It says that a government employee with authority to issue marriage licenses may recuse herself from that duty if it would violate one of her § 2 beliefs. HB 1523 § 3(8)(a). The employee must provide prior written notice to the State Registrar of Vital Records and be prepared to “take all necessary steps to ensure that the authorization and licensing of any legally valid marriage is not impeded or delayed as a result of any recusal.” Id. The State’s attorneys agree that this section “effectively amends Mississippi County Circuit Clerks’ Office’s marriage licensing obligations under state law by specifying conditions under which a clerk’s employee may recuse himself or herself from authorizing or licensing marriages.” Docket No. 41, at 6, in Cause No. 3:14-CV-818. Gay Parents?, The Atlantic, Sept. 23, 2015. Mississippi’s RFRA fits this timeline perfectly. In summer 2013, the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Windsor foreshadowed an imminent victory for same-sex marriage. A few months later, Mississippi’s elected officials enacted the State RFRA. 18 Relatedly, in other states, citizens have successfully sued so-called “gay conversion” therapists for consumer fraud and professional malpractice. See Olga Khazan, The End of Gay Conversion Therapy, The Atlantic, June 26, 2015. HB 1523 § 4 would bar a Mississippi court from enforcing such a verdict. 13 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 14 of 60 The significance of this section is in the eye of the beholder. The plaintiffs argue that it facilitates discrimination against LGBT Mississippians by encouraging clerks to opt-out of serving same-sex couples. HB 1523’s defenders respond that the bill protects against discrimination by ensuring that clerks do not have to violate their religious beliefs. When Senator Jenifer Branning shepherded the bill through the Senate floor debate, she argued that the legislation actually lifts a burden imposed by Obergefell.19 H.B. 1523, Debate on the Floor of the Mississippi Senate, at 7:02 (Mar. 31, 2016) (statement of Sen. Jenifer Branning) [hereinafter Senate Floor Debate]. In her view, HB 1523 is “balancing” legislation allowing those who oppose same-sex marriage to continue to perform their jobs with a “clear conscience,” while protecting the rights of same-sex couples to receive a marriage license from another clerk. Id. at 26:55, 32:27.20 C. These Suits On June 3, 2016, Rev. Dr. Barber, Rev. Burnett, Bailey, Day, Boyette, Rev. Fortenberry, Dr. Glisson, Johnson, Triplett, Taylor, Mangum-Dear, Mangum, and JGMCC filed the first suit encompassed by this Order. See Docket No. 1, in Barber. They asserted Establishment and Equal Protection claims against Governor Bryant, General Hood, Executive Director Davis, and Registrar Moulder. Id. They requested a declaratory judgment that HB 1523 is unconstitutional on its face, as well as preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining its enforcement. 19 Mississippi does not have formal legislative history; however, the Mississippi College School of Law’s Legislative History Project archives the floor debate for bills that pass. The HB 1523 videos are available at http://law.mc.edu/legislature/bill_details.php?id=4621&session=2016. Unofficial transcripts were also introduced into evidence. See Docket No. 33-14, in CSE IV. 20 These arguments are apparently increasingly common. See Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 Yale L.J. 2516, 2560-61 (2015) (arguing that proponents of traditional morality “now emphasize different justifications for excluding same-sex couples from marriage -- for example, that marriage is about biological procreation or that preserving ‘traditional marriage’ protects religious liberty. At the same time, in anticipation of the possibility of defeat, they argue for exemptions from laws that recognize same-sex marriage. In so doing, they shift from speaking as a majority enforcing customary morality to speaking as a minority seeking exemptions based on religious identity.”). 14 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 15 of 60 CSE and Rev. Dr. Hrostowski sued the same defendants on June 10, 2016. See Docket No. 1, in CSE IV. They asserted an Establishment Clause claim and sought the same relief as the Barber plaintiffs. Id. The various plaintiffs conferred and moved to consolidate. The State was prepared to argue Barber, but objected to consolidation to avoid an abbreviated briefing schedule and a hearing in CSE IV. See Docket No. 22, in Barber. During a status conference, the Court heard the parties’ positions and granted the State its requested response deadline. The Court also delayed the motion hearing – which was converted into a joint hearing – by two days. The State renewed its objection to the consolidated hearing and was overruled. These reasons follow. The State essentially argued that there were too many HB 1523-related lawsuits – there are four – to fully prepare for a hearing in CSE IV. It entered into the record a Mississippi Today article in which General Hood said, “‘I and over half of our lawyers in the Civil Litigation Division are working overtime and weekends attempting to prepare for the hearings.’” Docket No. 22-2, in Barber. General Hood added that budget cuts prevented him from hiring an expert to prepare “for the highly specialized area of the law seldom litigated in Mississippi -- the Establishment Clause.” Id. (ellipses omitted). The first hurdle for the State is the substantial overlap in subject matter between Barber and CSE IV. The similar briefing suggests that little additional work was required to defend CSE IV. Barber, in fact, has a greater number of substantive claims than CSE IV. Having prepared for the more comprehensive hearing, it is difficult for the State to object to the narrower one. The second, more significant problem with the State’s argument is the utter predictability of these lawsuits. The media started reporting the likelihood of litigation on April 5, the day the Governor signed HB 1523 into law. See, e.g., Arielle Dreher, ‘Total Infringement’: Governor 15 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 16 of 60 Signs HB 1523 Over Protests of Business Leaders, Citizens, Jackson Free Press, Apr. 5, 2016 (“‘You will see several lawsuits filed before it becomes law if the governor signs it,’” one attorney said); Caray Grace, Local Residents and City Leaders React to House Bill 1523, WLOX, Apr. 5, 2016 (“‘the lawyers were already starting to draft up lawsuits so that as soon as he signed it, they could start filing them,’ said [Molly] Kester.”). General Hood apparently knew these lawsuits were coming as early as April 5, when he said he would make “case-by-case” decisions on whether to defend the lawsuits, and warned that the bill doesn’t override federal or constitutional rights. Legal Pressure May Be Ahead for Mississippi Law Denying Service to Gays, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 5, 2016. The media even telegraphed the exact Establishment Clause arguments the plaintiffs eventually asserted. In early April, the press reported that 10 law professors from across the country released a memorandum outlining several ways in which HB 1523 violates the Establishment Clause. See Sierra Mannie, Will Mississippi’s “Religious Freedom” Act Impact Children in Public and Private Schools?, The Hechinger Report, Apr. 8, 2016. In May, Jackson attorney Will Manuel, a partner at Bradley LLP, said, “‘[b]y only endorsing certain religious thought, I believe it is in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment which prohibits government from establishing or only protecting one religion. That should be a fairly clear cut constitutional challenge.” Ted Carter, Feds Unlikely to Ignore Mississippi’s HB1523, Lawyers Say, Mississippi Business Journal, May 26, 2016; see also Arielle Dreher, HB 1523: Bad for the Business Sector, Jackson Free Press, June 8, 2016 (noting other legal concerns). Perhaps the State’s best argument against a hearing in CSE IV was that it would be unprepared to cross-examine religion experts because it did not have time to find its own 16 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 17 of 60 expert.21 Its objection fell flat when its attorneys filed the article in which General Hood said that budget cuts caused the lack of expert assistance.22 If budget cuts explain the State’s lack of expert assistance, no extension of time could have helped it prepare for a hearing. For these reasons, the hearings were consolidated. Now, having considered the evidence and heard oral argument, the motions for preliminary injunction have been consolidated into this Order. The cases remain their separate identities pending further motion practice. That brings us to the State’s initial legal arguments. III. Threshold Questions A. Standing The State first challenges the plaintiffs’ capacity to bring these suits. The United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to actual cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968). As the party seeking to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction, the plaintiffs must demonstrate all three elements of standing: (1) an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized as well as imminent or actual; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct; and 21 The Court has sought to understand what kind and amount of evidence would show a forbidden religious preference. In this case, it finds the plain language of HB 1523 and basic knowledge of local religious beliefs to be sufficient. Today’s outcome is informed by but does not turn on the expert testimony heard in CSE IV. 22 It also weakens the State’s objection to the Court’s use of newspaper articles. 17 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 18 of 60 (3) that a favorable decision is likely to redress the injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). In a standing analysis, the court “must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1975). Standing is not handed out in gross. CSE III, 2016 WL 1306202, at *2. A case with multiple plaintiffs can move forward as long as one plaintiff has standing as to each claim. CSE I, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 916. 1. Injury in Fact To establish an injury in fact, the plaintiffs must show “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quotation marks and citation omitted). An injury is particularized if it “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id. at 560 n.1. An injury is concrete when it is “real, not abstract.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1556 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Intangible injuries can satisfy the concreteness requirement. Id. at 9. A plaintiff must demonstrate “that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (quotation marks and citations omitted). a. Equal Protection Injuries The Barber plaintiffs in category two – i.e., the LGBT plaintiffs and Dr. Glisson – allege that HB 1523 violates their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 Claims under the Equal Protection Clause can include both tangible and intangible injuries. As noted in Heckler v. Matthews, 23 In discussing the Equal Protection claim, references to LGBT citizens should also be read to include unmarriedbut-sexually-active citizens. The latter group may have been a collateral consequence of HB 1523. 18 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 19 of 60 discrimination itself, by perpetuating archaic and stereotypic notions or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as innately inferior and therefore as less worthy participants in the political community, can cause serious noneconomic injuries to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment solely because of their membership in a disfavored group. 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Stigmatic injury stemming from discriminatory treatment is sufficient to satisfy standing’s injury requirement if the plaintiff identifies some concrete interest with respect to which he or she is personally subject to discriminatory treatment and that interest independently satisfies the causation requirement of standing doctrine.” CSE I, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 917 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The State first challenges standing on the basis that the plaintiffs’ injuries are speculative and not imminent, arguing that the plaintiffs have not alleged the denial of any right or benefit as a result of HB 1523. It points to Clapper v. Amnesty International, USA, which held that “[a]lthough imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.” 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This language, however, supports that the plaintiffs do have imminent injuries. If it goes into effect on July 1, plaintiffs say, HB 1523 will subject them to a wide range of arbitrary denials of service at the hands of public employees and private businesses. The plaintiffs also say that HB 1523 will limit the protections LGBT persons currently have under state, county, city, and public school anti-discrimination policies. In the City of Jackson, for example, a municipal ordinance provides protection from discrimination on the basis of religion, sexual orientation, and gender identity, among other characteristics. Docket No. 32-17, in Barber. This ordinance protects several of the plaintiffs. Id. The plaintiffs then point to 19 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 20 of 60 University of Southern Mississippi’s (USM) anti-discrimination policy, which guarantees equal access to “educational, programmatic and employment opportunities without regard to” religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity. Docket No. 32-18, in Barber. If HB 1523 goes into effect, USM’s policy cannot be fully enforced. USM employees who invoke a § 2 belief will enjoy enhanced protection to decline to serve others on the basis of sexual orientation, and USM will not be able to discipline those employees who violate its internal anti-discrimination policy.24 In this context, the imminent injury to the plaintiffs, other LGBT persons, and unmarried persons is exactly the same as the injury recognized by the Supreme Court in Romer. In striking down an amendment to Colorado’s constitution, the Court found that: Amendment 2 bars homosexuals from securing protection against the injuries that these public accommodations laws address. That in itself is a severe consequence, but there is more. Amendment 2, in addition, nullifies specific legal protections for this targeted class in all transactions . . . . Not confined to the private sphere, Amendment 2 also operates to repeal and forbid laws or policies providing specific protection for gays or lesbians from discrimination by every level of Colorado government. 517 U.S. at 629. A closer analogue is difficult to imagine. As in Romer, HB 1523 “withdraws from homosexuals, [transgender, and unmarried-but-sexually-active persons,] but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids the reinstatement of these laws and policies.” Id. at 627. If individuals had standing to file Romer before Amendment 2 went into effect, these plaintiffs may certainly do the same. The State’s argument overlooks the fundamental injurious nature of HB 1523 – the establishment of a broad-based system by which LGBT persons and unmarried persons can be subjected to differential treatment based solely on their status. This type of differential treatment 24 Imagine that two USM students, who are a gay couple, walk into the cafeteria but are refused service because of the worker’s religious views. Could that employee be disciplined for refusing service? It is not clear what remedy they would have to remove the sting of humiliation. 20 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 21 of 60 is the hallmark of what is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979) (“The [Equal Protection] Clause announces a fundamental principle: the State must govern impartially.”). To put it plainly, the plaintiffs’ injuries are “certainly impending” today, and without Court intervention, the plaintiffs will suffer actual injuries. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147. The State then argues that the plaintiffs lack standing because they are not the “objects” of HB 1523. The argument comes from Lujan’s statement that “standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the” government’s action or inaction at issue. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. The true objects of the law, the State claims, are those persons who want to freely exercise a § 2 belief. Docket No. 30, at 18, in Barber. The Court is not persuaded. A robust record shows that HB 1523 was intended to benefit some citizens at the expense of LGBT and unmarried citizens. At oral argument, the State admitted that HB 1523 was passed in direct response to Obergefell, stating, “after Obergefell, citizens who hold the beliefs that are protected by 1523 were effectively told by the U.S. Supreme Court, Your beliefs are garbage.” Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 324, Barber v. Bryant, No. 3:16-CV-417 (S.D. Miss. June 24, 2016) [hereinafter Tr. of June 24]. It is therefore difficult to accept the State’s implausible assertion that HB 1523 was intended to protect certain religious liberties and simultaneously ignore that the bill was passed because same-sex marriage was legalized last summer. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 626. Members of the LGBT community and persons like Dr. Glisson will suffer a concrete and particular injury as a result of HB 1523. Part of the injury is stigmatic, see CSE I, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 917, but that stigmatic injury is linked to the tangible rights that will be taken away 21 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 22 of 60 on July 1, including the tangible rights Obergefell extended. There are almost endless explanations for how HB 1523 condones discrimination against the LGBT community, but in its simplest terms it denies LGBT citizens equal protection under the law. Thus, those plaintiffs who are members of the LGBT community, as well as Dr. Glisson, have demonstrated an injury in fact sufficient to bring their Equal Protection claim. b. Establishment Clause Injuries All plaintiffs have asserted Establishment Clause claims. In Establishment Clause actions, the injury in fact requirement may vary from other types of cases. See Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188, 194 (5th Cir. 2006). “The concept of injury for standing purposes is particularly elusive in Establishment Clause cases.” Id. Plaintiffs can demonstrate “standing based on the direct harm of what is claimed to be an establishment of religion” or “on the ground that they have incurred a cost or been denied a benefit on account of their religion.” Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 129-30 (2011). Courts also recognize that taxpayers have standing to challenge direct government expenditures that violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 138-39; see Flast, 392 U.S. at 106. The Supreme Court has found standing in a wide variety of Establishment Clause cases “even though nothing was affected but the religious or irreligious sentiments of the plaintiffs.” Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (collecting cases). In Croft v. Governor of Texas, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a citizen had standing to challenge a public school’s daily moment of silence because his children were enrolled in the school and were required to observe the moment of silence. 562 F.3d 735, 746 (5th Cir. 2009) 22 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 23 of 60 [hereinafter Croft I]. This injury was sufficient because the plaintiff and his family demonstrated that they were exposed to and injured by the mandatory moment of silence. Id. at 746-47.25 In our case, the State contends that the plaintiffs’ alleged non-economic injuries are insufficiently particular and concrete. It cites Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, which found that: [the plaintiffs] fail to identify any personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by the observation of conduct with which one disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under Art. III, even though that disagreement is phrased in constitutional terms. 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982). In Valley Forge, an organization and four of its employees who lived in the Washington D.C. area challenged the constitutionality of a land conveyance from a government agency to a religious-affiliated education program in Pennsylvania. Id. at 468-69. The plaintiffs had learned of the land conveyance from a press release. Id. at 469. They merely observed the alleged constitutional violation from out-of-state. The facts in the present case are quite different. Here, the plaintiffs are 13 individuals who reside in Mississippi, a Mississippi church, and an advocacy organization with members in Mississippi. The plaintiffs may have become aware of HB 1523 from news, friends, or social media, but regardless of how they learned of the legislation, it is set to become the law of their state on July 1. It will undeniably impact their lives. The enactment of HB 1523 is much more than a “psychological consequence” with which they disagree, it is allegedly an endorsement and elevation by their state government of specific religious beliefs over theirs and all others. 25 The Fifth Circuit distinguished Croft from Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, where it had declined to find standing in a case challenging prayers at school board meetings because the plaintiffs had never attended a school board meeting. 23 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 24 of 60 A more applicable case is Catholic League. There, the plaintiffs included a Catholic civil rights organization and devout Catholics who lived in San Francisco. 624 F.3d at 1048. They sued over a municipal resolution that expressly denounced Catholicism and the Catholic Church’s beliefs on same-sex couples. Id. at 1047. The appellate court found that they had standing to bring such a case against their local government. Similarly, today’s individual plaintiffs have attested that they are citizens and residents of Mississippi, they disagree with the religious beliefs elevated by HB 1523, HB 1523 conveys the State’s disapproval and diminution of their own deeply held religious beliefs, HB 1523 sends a message that they are not welcome in their political community, and HB 1523 sends a message that the state government is unwilling to protect them. See, e.g., Docket Nos. 32-2; 32-3; 32-5 (all in Barber). Plaintiff Taylor, for example, is “a sixth-generation Mississippian” and “former Navy combat veteran.” Docket No. 32-8, in Barber. He is also a gay man engaged to be married next year. Id. Taylor thinks HB 1523 is hostile toward his religious values and targets LGBT persons. Id. Dr. Glisson describes herself as “a member of the Southern Baptist Church co-founded by my grandparents” who has “studied and reflected upon my faith choice almost all my life.” Docket No. 32-6, in Barber. “I am convinced that the heart of the Gospel is unconditional love. To condemn the presence of God in another human being, especially using faith claims or scripture to do so, is wrong and violates all of the tenets of my Christian faith.” Id. Dorothy Triplett explained her religious objections in detail. “I am a Christian, and nowhere in scripture does Jesus the Christ condemn homosexuality,” she said. Docket No. 32-9, in Barber. “He instructed us to love our neighbors as ourselves. In St. Paul’s Letter to the 24 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 25 of 60 Galatians 3:28: New Revised Standard Version (NRSV): ‘There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male or female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus.’” Id. Based on their allegations and testimony, each individual plaintiff has adequately alleged cognizable injuries under the Establishment Clause. The “sufficiently concrete injur[ies]” here are the psychological consequences stemming from the plaintiffs’ “exclusion or denigration on a religious basis within the political community.” Catholic League, 624 F.3d at 1052; see Awad, 670 F.3d at 1123. Their injuries are also imminent. HB 1523 is set to become law on July 1. “There is no need for [the plaintiffs] to wait for actual implementation of the statute and actual violations of [their] rights under the First Amendment where the statute” violates the Establishment Clause. Ingebretson v. Jackson Public Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1996). 2. Causation The State next argues that the plaintiffs have not shown that their injuries have a causal connection to the defendants’ conduct. It cites Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of Louisiana for the proposition that an injury cannot be the result of a third party’s independent action, and instead must be traceable to the named parties. 252 F.3d 781, 788 (5th Cir. 2001). The contention here is that any injuries will be caused by third parties – like a clerk who refuses to promptly issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple – and therefore that the plaintiffs should sue those third parties. The argument is unpersuasive. On July 1, the plaintiffs will be injured by the statesponsored endorsement of a set of religious beliefs over all others. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302; Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1304 (W.D. Okla. 2010). Regardless of any third- 25 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 26 of 60 party conduct, the bill creates a statewide two-tiered system that elevates heterosexual citizens and demeans LGBT citizens. The plaintiffs’ injuries are therefore caused by the State – and specifically caused by the Governor who signed HB 1523 bill into law – and will at a minimum be enforced by officials like Davis and Moulder. In addition, in similar cases under the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses, the Supreme Court has found a state’s governor to be a proper defendant for the causal connection requirement of standing. E.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Romer, 517 U.S. at 620. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have demonstrated that there is a causal connection between their injuries and the defendants’ conduct. 3. Redressability The final prong of standing requires the plaintiffs to demonstrate that a favorable judicial decision will redress their grievances. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. The State argues that “Plaintiffs would still be facing their same alleged injury tomorrow if the Court preliminary enjoins the named Defendants today.” Docket No. 30, at 24, in Barber. It fails to support this claim with any further argument or facts. “[W]hen the right invoked is that of equal treatment, the appropriate remedy is a mandate of equal treatment, a result that can be accomplished by withdrawal of benefits from the favored class as well as by extension of benefits to the excluded class.” Heckler, 465 U.S. at 740 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “By declaring the [statute] unconstitutional, the official act of the government becomes null and void.” Catholic League, 624 F.3d at 1053. Here, the harm done by HB 1523 would be halted if the statute is enjoined. Nothing in the plaintiffs’ briefs, oral argument, or testimony indicates that they expect a favorable ruling to change the hearts and minds of Mississippians opposed to same-sex marriage, transgender 26 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 27 of 60 equality, or sex before marriage. They simply ask the Court to enjoin the enforcement of a state law that both permits arbitrary discrimination based on those characteristics and endorses the majority’s favored religious beliefs. That is squarely within the Court’s ability. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1119 (10th Cir. 2012). “Even more important, a declaratory judgment would communicate to the people of the plaintiffs’ community that their government is constitutionally prohibited from condemning the plaintiffs’ religion, and that any such condemnation is itself to be condemned.” Catholic League, 624 F.3d at 1053. The Court concludes that the individual plaintiffs have standing to bring these claims. 4. Associational Standing In some instances, organizations may bring suit on behalf of their members. To establish associational standing, the organization must show that: (1) its members would have standing to sue on their own behalf; (2) the interests it seeks to safeguard are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the requested relief necessitate the participation of individual members. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n., 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). JGMCC seeks associational standing as a church with many LGBT members and a community service ministry that promotes LGBT+ equality. Because members of the church have standing to bring suit on their own behalf – at least two of its members are individual plaintiffs – the first element of associational standing is satisfied. Ensuring that its members are not discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, or religion is undoubtedly germane to its purpose. And JGMCC’s facial challenge does not require the participation of individual members. JGMCC has associational standing. 27 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 28 of 60 The same is true for CSE. That organization also has a member participating in this lawsuit, is aligned with the arguments and relief sought in this suit, and need not have additional members to assert its particular cause of action. It has associational standing. Accord CSE I, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 918; CSE III, 2016 WL 1306202, at *11. B. Ex Parte Young The next issue is whether these defendants are properly named in this suit. 1. Legal Standard Under the Eleventh Amendment, citizens cannot sue a state in federal court. U.S. Const. amend. XI; see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 699 (1978). In Ex parte Young, however, the Supreme Court carved out a narrow exception to this rule. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The resulting Ex parte Young “fiction” holds that “because a sovereign state cannot commit an unconstitutional act, a state official enforcing an unconstitutional act is not acting for the sovereign state and therefore is not protected by the Eleventh Amendment.” Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 411 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc). When a plaintiff sues a state official in his official capacity for constitutional violations, the plaintiff is not filing suit against the individual, but instead the official’s office, and can proceed with the constitutional claims. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989). The Ex parte Young fiction requires that the state officer have “some connection with the enforcement of the act” or be “specially charged with the duty to enforce the statute,” and also that the official indicate a willingness to enforce it. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157, 158. The officer’s authority to enforce the act does not have to be found in the challenged statute itself; it is sufficient if it falls within the official’s general duties to enforce related state laws. 28 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 29 of 60 “In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Comm’n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). 2. Discussion All four defendants – the Governor, the Attorney General, the Executive Director of the Department of Human Services, and the Registrar of Vital Records – are state officials sued in their official capacities. These suits are effectively brought against their various offices. All four defendants also have a connection to the enforcement of HB 1523. Although Governor Bryant is the chief executive of the State, Ex parte Young does not permit a suit against a governor solely on the theory that he is “charged with the execution of all of its laws.” Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157. A more specific causal connection is required. Id. That connection is satisfied here. The Governor is the manager and supervisor of his staff, so he is personally required to enforce HB 1523’s terms prohibiting adverse action against any of his employees who exercise a § 2 belief. Since the Governor has also indicated his willingness to enforce HB 1523 to the full extent of his authority, he is a proper defendant. See CB Condez, Mississippi Governor: Christians Would Line up for Crucifixion Before Abandoning Faith, The Christian Times, June 2, 2016 (“‘[HB 1523’s critics] don’t know that if it takes crucifixion, we will stand in line before abandoning our faith and our belief in our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ,’ [Governor Bryant] said.”).26 26 The Governor’s remarks are reminiscent of what Circuit Judge Tom P. Brady, later Mississippi Supreme Court Justice Brady, warned in his infamous Black Monday Speech. Judge Brady called on others to disobey Brown v. Board of Education by saying, “We have, through our forefathers, died before for our sacred principles. We can, if necessary, die again.” Stephen J. Whitfield, A Death in the Delta: The Story of Emmett Till 10 (1988). 29 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 30 of 60 In Establishment and Equal Protection Clause cases in particular, governors are often properly included as named defendants. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 620 (Gov. Roy Romer); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (Gov. Edwin W. Edwards); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38 (Gov. George C. Wallace); Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2010) (Gov. Rick Perry, as the sole defendant) [hereinafter Croft II]; Croft I, 562 F.3d at 735 (same). General Hood is the state’s chief law enforcement officer, but his general duty to represent the state in litigation is inadequate to invoke the Ex parte Young exception. Like the Governor, though, HB 1523 prohibits General Hood from taking any action against one of his employees who acts in accordance with a § 2 belief. The Attorney General’s Office employs hundreds of people across Mississippi, so he may very well be confronted with an HB 1523 issue. Executive Director Davis, until authority is formally transferred to the new Department of Child Protective Services, is responsible for administering a variety of social programs. See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-1-51. HB 1523 has at least two sections that fall under his purview. See HB 1523 § 3(2)-(3). Under HB 1523, for example, DHS cannot take action against a foster or adoptive parent who violates DHS policies based on a § 2 belief. Davis’s attorneys have given every impression that he will fully enforce his duties under HB 1523. As discussed above, Registrar Moulder is responsible for executing state laws concerning registration of marriages. See Miss. Code Ann. § 51-57-43. HB 1523 adds a new responsibility to her existing obligations: she must record the recusal of any circuit clerk who refuses to issue a marriage license because of a § 2 belief. HB 1523 § 3(8)(a). Thus, she has a connection with HB 1523’s enforcement. Her counsel has also indicated her intent to comply with her new duties. 30 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 31 of 60 Lastly, the plaintiffs’ requested relief also satisfies the Eleventh Amendment and Ex parte Young. In both cases, they have requested declaratory and prospective injunctive relief that would enjoin the enforcement of HB 1523 and prevent state officials from acting contrary to well-established precedent. Courts frequently grant this type of relief against state officials in constitutional litigation. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 620; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38. Accordingly, the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment applies and these suits may proceed to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against these defendants. IV. Motion for Preliminary Injunction A. Legal Standard To receive a preliminary injunction, the movant must show “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any harm that the injunction might cause to the defendant; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, Miss., 697 F.3d 279, 288 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “Each of these factors presents a mixed question of fact and law.” Id. (citation omitted). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy. It should only be granted if the movant has clearly carried the burden of persuasion on all four . . . prerequisites.” Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is always to prevent irreparable injury so as to preserve the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits. It often happens that this purpose is furthered by preservation of the status quo, but not always.” Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1974). 31 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 32 of 60 B. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits The movant’s likelihood of success is determined by substantive law. Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047, 1051 (5th Cir. 1997). “To successfully mount a facial challenge, the plaintiffs must show that there is no set of circumstances under which [HB 1523] is constitutional. If the plaintiffs successfully show [it] to be unconstitutional in every application, then that provision will be struck down as invalid.” Croft II, 624 F.3d at 164. 1. The Equal Protection Clause Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause of this Amendment means that “all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (citation omitted). The primary intent of the Equal Protection Clause was to require states to provide the same treatment for whites and freed slaves concerning personhood and citizenship rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.27 The Equal Protection Clause is no longer limited to racial classifications. That is not because racial discrimination and racial inequality have ceased to exist. Rather, as discrimination against groups becomes more prominent and understood, we turn to the Equal Protection clause to attempt to level the playing field. Compare Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (denying women equal protection of the laws) with United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) 27 United States Senator Jacob Howard introduced the Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate. “This abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another,” he said. “It prohibits the hanging of a black man for a crime for which the white man is not to be hanged. It protects the black man in his fundamental rights as a citizen with the same shield which it throws over the white man. Is it not time, Mr. President, that we extend to the black man . . . the equal protection of law?” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). 32 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 33 of 60 (recognizing that women are entitled to equal protection of the laws). “A prime part of the history of our Constitution . . . is the story of the extension of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or excluded.” Virginia, 518 U.S. at 557; see Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1161, 1163 (1988) (“The Equal Protection Clause . . . has been understood as an attempt to protect disadvantaged groups from discriminatory practices, however deeply engrained and longstanding.”). One hundred and fifty years after its passage, the Fourteenth Amendment remains necessary to ensure that all Americans receive equal protection of the laws. Sexual orientation is a relatively recent addition to the equal protection canon. In 1996, the Supreme Court made it clear that arbitrary discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation violates the Equal Protection Clause. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. Seven years later, the Court held that the Constitution protects LGBT adults from government intrusion into their private relationships. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). “After Romer and Lawrence, federal courts began to conclude that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation that is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest violates the Equal Protection Clause.” Gill v. Delvin, 867 F. Supp. 2d 849, 856 (N.D. Tex. 2012). Now, Obergefell makes clear that LGBT citizens have “equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.” 135 S. Ct. at 2608. a. Animus “The Constitution’s guarantee of equality must at the very least mean that a bare [legislative] desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot justify disparate treatment of 33 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 34 of 60 that group.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (citation omitted). Laws motivated by “an improper animus” toward such a group require special scrutiny. Id. When examining animus arguments, courts look at “the design, purpose, and effect” of the challenged laws. Id. at 2689; see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 627-28. The Windsor Court, for example, considered DOMA’s title, one House Report from the bill’s legislative history, and the law’s “operation in practice.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693-94. From these it found that DOMA has a “principal purpose . . . to impose inequality,” places same-sex couples in second-tier relationships, “demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects,” and “humiliates tens of thousand of children now being raised by same-sex couples.” Id. at 2694. The Court concluded that “the history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages . . . was more than an incidental effect of the federal statute. It was its essence.” Id. at 2693. Animus was also a critical part of the Court’s analysis in Romer, where plaintiffs brought a pre-enforcement facial challenge to Amendment 2 of the Colorado Constitution. 517 U.S. at 623. “[T]he impetus for the amendment and the contentious campaign that preceded its adoption came in large part from [anti-discrimination] ordinances that had been passed in various Colorado municipalities.” Id. Voters approved Amendment 2 to invalidate those ordinances and preclude “all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the status of persons based on the homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.” Id. at 620. In striking down Amendment 2 as an unconstitutional act of majority animus against a minority group, the Supreme Court wrote that “[a] state cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.” Id. at 635. 34 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 35 of 60 The State argues that the plaintiffs have failed to show that the motivation behind the passage of HB 1523 was driven by “animus,” “irrational prejudice,” or “desire to harm” anyone. Docket No. 30, at 36, in Barber. Certainly, discerning the actual motivation behind a bill can be treacherous. But Romer and Windsor are instructive. This Court need only apply Romer and Windsor to ascertain that the design, purpose, and effect of HB 1523 is to single out LGBT and unmarried citizens for unequal treatment under the law. 1. Design and Purpose The State says the primary motivating factor behind HB 1523 was to address the denigration and disfavor religious persons felt in the wake of Obergefell. Tr. of June 24 at 324, 327. The sponsors of the bill presented it to their respective chambers as post-Obergefell legislation.28 A number of news articles confirmed the same.29 HB 1523’s title, the “Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act,” obviously implies that the purpose of the legislation was to halt governmental discrimination. The legislative debate fleshes out the intended meaning of that title. Senator Willie Simmons asked whether the government was discriminating against religious citizens. Senate Floor Debate at 28:44. Senator Branning responded, “it potentially could.” Id. at 28:44. Later, 28 Representative Gipson said HB 1523 would merely “add an additional layer of protection that currently does not exist in the post-Obergefell” world. H.B. 1523, Debate on the Floor of the Mississippi House of Representatives, at 6:24 (Feb. 19, 2016) (statement of Rep. Andy Gipson). Senator Branning introduced HB 1523 as “post-Obergefell balancing legislation . . . presenting a solution to the crossroads we find ourselves in today as a result of Obergefell v. Hodges.” Senate Floor Debate at 2:16, 32:20. She later added that although Mississippians may have religious beliefs against gambling, the death penalty, alcohol, and payday loan interest rates, HB 1523 is “very specific to same-sex marriage.” Id. at 37:20. 29 As Speaker Gunn said shortly after the decision was handed-down, “I don’t care what the Supreme Court says. Marriage will always be between one man and one woman in holy matrimony.” Emily Wagster Pettus, House Speaker Protested by Flag Supporters at Neshoba, Hattiesburg American, July 30, 2015. Representative Andy Gipson agreed. “What the Supreme Court’s decision does not and cannot change is the firmly held conviction of faith of myself and most Mississippians. We still believe that marriage is defined by God as the union of one man and one woman.” Pender, supra. Representative Gipson is correct: the Supreme Court cannot change his beliefs, nor does it intend to. 35 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 36 of 60 though, she wholeheartedly agreed with one of her colleagues that the government does not want to protect people of faith, and that it is time for people of faith to say, ‘enough is enough.’ Id. at 50:30. She agreed that the bill would ensure that LGBT citizens would not be able to sue a baker, florist, or other business for declining to serve them. Id. at 53:36. She agreed that the intent of the bill was to “level the playing field,” ensure that certain groups had equal rights but not “special rights,” and not “reverse discriminate against people.” Id. at 54:15 (quoting Sen. Filingane). The Senate debate also revealed another purpose of HB 1523. Senator Simmons asked if a Baptist college’s refusal to employ lesbian and gay citizens was a form of discrimination. Id. at 31:29. Senator Branning responded, “if this bill passed, it would not be.” Id. at 31:29. The title, text, and history of HB 1523 indicate that the bill was the State’s attempt to put LGBT citizens back in their place after Obergefell. The majority of Mississippians were granted special rights to not serve LGBT citizens, and were immunized from the consequences of their actions. LGBT Mississippians, in turn, were “put in a solitary class with respect to transactions and relations in both the private and governmental spheres” to symbolize their second-class status. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627. As in Romer, Windsor, and Obergefell, this “status-based enactment” deprived LGBT citizens of equal treatment and equal dignity under the law. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 2. Effect Next up is the impact HB 1523 will have on LGBT Mississippians. Although the bill is far-reaching and could have consequences in many areas of daily life, Romer suggests that this Court should devote attention to HB 1523’s effect on existing anti-discrimination laws and policies. The Court turns to that narrow issue now. 36 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 37 of 60 As a state law, HB 1523 would preempt, or invalidate, all city, county, and public school ordinances and policies that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. See HB 1523 § 8(2)-(3). The same was true in Romer. The plaintiffs submitted two policies that HB 1523 would invalidate in part: the City of Jackson’s recent anti-discrimination ordinance and USM’s anti-discrimination policy. Docket Nos. 32-17 and 32-18, in Barber. Both protect citizens from sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination in a variety of contexts. HB 1523 would have a chilling effect on Jacksonians and members of the USM community who seek the protection of their anti-discrimination policies. If HB 1523 goes into effect, neither the City of Jackson nor USM could discipline or take adverse action against anyone who violated their policies on the basis of a § 2 belief. The State attempts to distance HB 1523 from Amendment 2 in Romer by arguing that HB 1523 does not “expressly prohibit[] any law meant to protect gay or lesbian citizens from discrimination.” Docket No. 30, at 40, in Barber. Sentences later, though, the State identifies the problem with its argument: “H.B. 1523 would invalidate local ordinances only to the extent those ordinances do not provide the same level of protection for religious freedom and free exercise as provided by H.B. 1523.” Id. at 41. But no other local ordinance or policy purports to do what HB 1523 does. The State has not pointed to any existing anti-discrimination ordinance or policy that would survive HB 1523’s preemptive reach. In a last-gasp attempt to distinguish HB 1523 from Amendment 2, the State then contends that HB 1523 “is actually strikingly similar” to Jackson and USM’s policies because they all prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion. Id. at 40-41. The argument ignores the critical difference: Jackson and USM’s anti-discrimination policies provide equal protection 37 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 38 of 60 regardless of religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity. HB 1523 draws a stark line, with LGBT and unmarried-but-sexually-active citizens on one side, and everyone else on the other. As in Romer and Windsor, the effect of HB 1523 would demean LGBT citizens, remove their existing legal protections, and more broadly deprive them their right to equal treatment under the law. b. Scrutiny This brings the Court to whether the government has a legitimate basis for HB 1523. While most laws classify and make distinctions, all laws do not violate equal protection. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631. The Supreme Court has attempted to reconcile this dilemma by holding that “if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.” Id. (citation omitted). “When social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows States wide latitude, and the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (citation omitted). “But we would not be faithful to our obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment if we apply so deferential a standard to every classification. . . . Thus we have treated as presumptively invidious those classifications that disadvantage a suspect class, or that impinge upon the exercise of a fundamental right.” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit “has recognized sexual orientation as a suspect classification or protected group; nevertheless, a state violates the Equal Protection Clause if it disadvantages homosexuals for reasons lacking any rational relationship to legitimate 38 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 39 of 60 governmental aims.”30 Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 530-31 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation and brackets omitted). “Rational basis review places the burden of persuasion on the party challenging a law, who must disprove every conceivable basis which might support it.” Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “So the party urging the absence of any rational basis takes up a heavy load.” Id. This means the government usually prevails. Even under this generous standard, HB 1523 fails. The State contends that HB 1523 furthers its “legitimate governmental interest in protecting religious beliefs and expression and preventing citizens from being forced to act against those beliefs by their government.” Docket No. 30, at 37-38, in Barber. This is a legitimate governmental interest, but not one with any rational relationship to HB 1523. The Supreme Court “has long recognized that the government may accommodate religious practices without violating the Establishment Clause.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005) (citations and ellipses omitted). The First Amendment, the Mississippi Constitution, and Mississippi’s RFRA all protect Mississippi’s citizens’ religious exercise – and in a broader way than HB 1523. Mississippi’s RFRA in particular states that the government “may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: (i) Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (ii) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Miss. Code Ann. 30 In CSE I, this Court discussed the doctrinal instability on the proper standard of review. 64 F. Supp. 3d at 928. “The circuit courts of appeal are divided on which level of review to apply to sexual orientation classifications. In the Second Circuit, homosexuals compose a quasi-suspect class that is subject to heightened scrutiny. In this circuit, sexual orientation classifications are subject to rational basis review.” Id. (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). Then as now, the Court questions whether sexual orientation should be afforded rational basis review. Id. (“If this court had the authority, it would apply intermediate scrutiny to government sexual orientation classifications.”). Obergefell did not resolve the dispute. When Judge Jordan examined Obergefell earlier this year, however, he concluded that “the [Supreme] Court applied something greater than rational-basis review.” CSE III, 2016 WL 1306202, at *13. As this Court is bound by Fifth Circuit precedent, it will consider HB 1523 under rational basis review. 39 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 40 of 60 § 11-61-1(5)(b) (emphasis added). Its plain language provides substantial protection from governmental discrimination on the basis of religious exercise. Mississippi’s RFRA grants all people the right to seek relief from governmental interference in their religious exercise, not just those who hold certain beliefs. This critical distinction between RFRA and HB 1523 cannot be overlooked. Although states are permitted to have more than one law intended to further the same legitimate interest, HB 1523 does not advance the interest the State says it does. Under the guise of providing additional protection for religious exercise, it creates a vehicle for state-sanctioned discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. It is not rationally related to a legitimate end. The State then claims that HB 1523 “is about the people of conscience who need the protection of H.B. 1523, and does not ‘target’ Plaintiffs.”31 Docket No. 30, at 3, in Barber. The argument is unsupported by the record. It is also inconceivable that a discriminatory law can stand merely because creative legislative drafting limited the number of times it mentioned the targeted group. The Court cannot imagine upholding a statute that favored men simply because the statute did not mention women. The State next focuses on marriage licenses. It contends that because HB 1523 does not allow the denial, delay, or impediment of marriage licenses, that licenses are issued on the same terms as opposite-sex couples. Thus, the State argues, there is no differential treatment that would constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 6. The only way a same-sex couple could be treated differently, it says, is if the issuance of their marriage license was “impeded or delayed as a result of any recusal.” Id. 31 Rather than protect its citizens from “government discrimination,” HB 1523 could actually subject more citizens to federal civil rights lawsuits. Persons feeling emboldened by HB 1523 may not understand that the law provides immunity only from State sanctions. 40 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 41 of 60 To the contrary, the recusal provision itself deprives LGBT citizens of governmental protection from separate treatment. “A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. There cannot be one set of employees to serve the preferred couples and another who is ‘willing’ to serve LGBT citizens with a “clear conscience,” as Senator Branning put it. Such treatment viscerally confronts same-sex couples with the same message of inferiority and second-class citizenship that was rejected in Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, CSE I, Obergefell, and CSE II. On this point, it is important to note that HB 1523’s supposed protection against any delayed service applies only to marriage licenses and some health care issues. Tr. of June 24 at 339. The other areas of permissible discrimination – counseling, fertility services, etc. – do not place any duty on the recusing individual to ensure that LGBT citizens receive services.32 The State is correct that no one can predict how many LGBT citizens may be denied service under HB 1523. But it cannot be disputed that the broad language of the bill “identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. Thus, the State cannot prevail on its argument that HB 1523’s plain language does not create a separate system designed to diminish the rights of LGBT citizens. The deprivation of equal protection of the laws is HB 1523’s very essence. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. It violates the Fourteenth Amendment. 32 There is an almost endless parade of horribles that could accompany the implementation of HB 1523. Although the Court cannot imagine every resulting factual scenario, HB 1523’s broad language “identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. 41 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 42 of 60 2. The Establishment Clause a. General Principles The First Amendment begins with the words, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. I. “The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment are not the most precisely drawn portions of the Constitution.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). The Supreme Court has “struggled” to chart a path respecting both of them. Id. It is a thankless task. Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that each Clause is “cast in absolute terms” and would “clash with the other” if taken to its logical conclusion. Id. at 668-69; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984). The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that states may establish religion because the text of the Establishment Clause only references Congress. See Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). In truth, “[t]he very language of the Establishment Clause represented a significant departure from early drafts that merely prohibited a single national religion, and the final language instead extended [the] prohibition to state support for religion in general.” McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 878 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Another popular misconception holds that the Establishment Clause is in error since the Constitution does not contain the phrase “separation of Church and State.” Adherents of this belief have read the text correctly but missed its meaning. “There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the philosophy that Church and State should be separated.” Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952). 42 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 43 of 60 Nor was the Establishment Clause forced upon the sovereign states by an overreaching federal government. Far from being a federal mandate, the Clause “was the democratic response of the American community to the particular needs of a young and growing nation, unique in the composition of its people.” McCollum v. Bd. of Ed. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, Champaign Cnty., Ill., 333 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In any event, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “there is room for play in the joints” between the two Clauses. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). It has sought to “chart a course that preserve[s] the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies while avoiding any semblance of established religion.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 672. b. Historical Context America as a whole is “a rich mosaic of religious faiths.” Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1849 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting). Here, 80% of Mississippians identify as Christians.33 Tr. of June 24 at 250. Given the pervasiveness of Christianity here, some Mississippians might consider it fitting to have explicitly Christian laws and policies. They also might think that the Establishment Clause is a technicality that lets atheists and members of minority religions thwart their majority (Christian) rule.34 The public may be surprised to know the true origins of the Establishment Clause. As chronicled by the Supreme Court, history reveals that the Clause was not originally intended to protect atheists and members of minority faiths. It was written to protect Christians from other Christians. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 52 & n.36. Only later were other faith groups protected. 33 A full 30% of Mississippians are white evangelical Christians. Tr. of June 24 at 250. The feeling is understandable. Headlines trumpet perceived anti-Christian conduct, inflaming passions. See, e.g., Kate Royals, Brandon Band Reportedly Not Allowed to Perform Christian Hymn, The Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 22, 2015. But, of course, “[t]he First Amendment is not a majority rule.” Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1822. 34 43 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 44 of 60 The story behind this begins with the colonists.35 “It is a matter of history that [the] practice of establishing governmentally composed prayers for religious services was one of the reasons which caused many of our early colonists to leave England and seek religious freedom in America.” Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962). For decades at a time in 16th- and 17thcentury England, Christian sects fought each other to control the Book of Common Prayer, in order to amend it and advance their particular beliefs. Id. at 425-27. The fighting was disruptive and deadly. Id. at 426. Those in power occasionally executed their opponents. Id. at 427 n.8. Some of the persecuted fled to America. Id. at 425. The Puritans, for example, were originally a religious minority in England that “rejected the power of the civil government to prescribe ecclesiastical rules.” C. Scott Pryor & Glenn M. Hoshauer, Puritan Revolution and the Law of Contracts, 11 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 291, 309 (2005). They specifically opposed the monarch’s “requirement that clergy wear particular vestments while celebrating the liturgy.” Id. at 308 n.94 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Today it is inconceivable that the government could require clergy to wear particular clothing.36 But the Puritans were disparaged for their opposition and other beliefs. Id. at 309. Thousands left. In the New World, several colonies established their particular Christian beliefs as their official religion. Engel, 370 U.S. at 427-28; see also McCollum, 333 U.S. at 214 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). That again proved unsatisfactory. 35 “History provides enlightenment; it appraises courts of the subtleties and complexities of problems before them.” Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1532 (11th Cir. 1983). 36 In seeing the Establishment Clause as a sword wielded against the majority, we forget that the Establishment Clause is actually a shield protecting religion from governmental meddling. Who wants the government dictating their priest, rabbi, or imam’s clothing? It’s difficult to imagine a greater violation of American law and custom. See, e.g., McCollum, 333 U.S. at 232 (“If nowhere else, in the relation between Church and State, ‘good fences make good neighbors.’”) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Engel, 370 U.S. at 430 (“the people’s religions must not be subjected to the pressures of government”); Engel, 370 U.S. at 431 (“[The Establishment Clause’s] first and most immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion.”); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589-90 (1992). 44 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 45 of 60 For one, state-established religion was perceived as a British custom – not something independent, revolutionary Americans would want to retain. Engel, 370 U.S. at 427-28. Baptists especially “chafed under any form of establishment.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 & n.19 (1982). They argued that if the British had no right to tax Americans, then it was also unjust for them to be taxed to support an official religion they denied. Id. And then there was the division-of-power problem. In Virginia, the established Episcopal Church became a minority when the Presbyterians, Lutherans, Quakers, and Baptists banded together “into an effective political force.” Engel, 370 U.S. at 428. Faced with the prospect of losing power, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson persuaded the Virginia Assembly to pass its famous “Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty.” Everson, 330 U.S. at 12.37 By the time the Constitution was adopted, therefore, there was a widespread awareness among many Americans of the dangers of a union of Church and State. These people knew, some of them from bitter personal experience, that one of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way lay in the Government’s placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one particular form of religious services. They knew the anguish, hardship and bitter strife that could come when zealous religious groups struggled with one another to obtain the Government's stamp of approval from each King, Queen, or Protector that came to temporary power. . . . The First Amendment was added to the Constitution to stand as a guarantee that neither the power nor the prestige of the . . . Government would be used to control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the American people can say—that the people’s religions must not be subjected to the pressures of government for change each time a new political administration is elected to office. Engel, 370 U.S. at 429-30; see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591-92 (1992) (“in the hands of government what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce”). 37 “Madison’s vision—freedom for all religion being guaranteed by free competition between religions—naturally assumed that every denomination would be equally at liberty to exercise and propagate its beliefs. But such equality would be impossible in an atmosphere of official denominational preference.” Larson, 456 U.S. at 245. 45 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 46 of 60 This history involved disputes between Christians. Americans were weary of the British and then Colonial back-and-forth between Catholics and Protestants, Episcopalians and Presbyterians, and so on. It was better to have a neutral government than to constantly struggle for power – or live under the yoke of a rival sect for decades at a time. “[T]he Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings.” Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The essential insight from history is that the First Amendment was originally enacted to prohibit a state from creating second-class Christians. And while the law has expanded to protect persons of other faiths, or no faith at all, the core principle of government neutrality between religious sects has remained constant through the centuries.38, 39 38 In 1833, Justice Joseph Story wrote that “[t]he real object of the amendment was, not to countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among christian sects.” Wallace, 472 U.S. at 52 n.36 (quoting 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1877, at 594 (1851)). (Despite the 1851 date, the Commentaries were first published in 1833.) In 1870, “Judge Alphonso Taft, father of the revered Chief Justice, . . . stated the ideal of our people as to religious freedom as one of ‘absolute equality before the law, of all religious opinions and sects.’” Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214-15 (1963). In 1871, the Court found that American “law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.” Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871). In 1890, the Court held that the First Amendment was intended “to prohibit legislation for the support of any religious tenets.” Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890), abrogated by Romer, 517 U.S. at 620. In 1952, the Court wrote that Americans “sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group. . . . The government must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects.” Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-14. In 1968, the Court held that a state could not “aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another,” and that the First Amendment “forbids . . . the preference of a religious doctrine.” Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104, 106 (emphasis added). That case in particular concluded that Arkansas and Mississippi’s “antievolution” statutes violated the Establishment Clause by giving preference to “a particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious group.” Id. at 101, 103 & n.11. In 1971, the Court found that “as a general matter it is surely true that the Establishment Clause prohibits government from abandoning secular purposes in order to put an imprimatur on one religion, or on religion as such, or to favor the adherents of any sect or religious organization.” Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971) (upholding religious exemption law where “no particular sectarian affiliation or theological position is required.”). In 1982, the Court wrote that “[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” Larson, 456 U.S. at 244. In 1985, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote that the Establishment Clause “preclude[s] government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.” Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In 1987, the Court invalidated a Louisiana law giving “preference to those religious groups which have as one of their tenets the creation of humankind by a divine creator.” Edwards, 482 U.S. at 593. 46 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 47 of 60 c. HB 1523 The question now is whether, in light of history and precedent, HB 1523 violates the Establishment Clause. The Court concludes that it does in at least two ways. i. HB 1523 Establishes Preferred Religious Beliefs First, HB 1523 establishes an official preference for certain religious beliefs over others. In 1989, the Court said it had “come to understand the Establishment Clause to mean that government may not promote or affiliate itself with any religious doctrine or organization.” Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989), abrogated by Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1811. “Whatever else the Establishment Clause may mean . . . , it certainly means at the very least that government may not demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or creed.” Id. at 605. Also in 1989, the Court wrote that it was “settled jurisprudence that the Establishment Clause prohibits government from . . . [placing] an imprimatur on one religion, or on religion as such, or to favor the adherents of any sect or religious organization.” Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In 1992, the Court held that “the central meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment . . . is that all creeds must be tolerated and none favored.” Lee, 505 U.S. at 590. In 1994, the Court reaffirmed that “proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of neutrality toward religion, favoring neither one religion over others nor religious adherents collectively over nonadherents.” Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Kiryas Joel struck down a New York statute that delegated state authority “to a group defined by its character as a religious community, in a legal and historical context that gives no assurance that governmental power has been or will be exercised neutrally.” Id. In 1995, the Court held that the Establishment Clause is satisfied “when the government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995). In 2005, the Court wrote that there is “[m]anifesting a purpose to favor one faith over another, or adherence to religion generally, clashes with the understanding, reached after decades of religious war, that liberty and social stability demand a religious tolerance that respects the religious views of all citizens.” McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860 (quotation marks, citations, and ellipses omitted). In 2010, the Court justified a cross on public property in part by noting that its placement “was not an attempt to set the imprimatur of the state on a particular creed.” Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 715 (2010). All in all, “[i]t is firmly established that the government violates the establishment clause if it discriminates among religious groups.” Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law § 12.2.2 (5th ed. 2015). 39 The Arkansas law struck down in Epperson was adapted from a Tennessee law that had already been repealed. One commenter had this to say about the Tennessee law: Much wonder has been expressed both in this country and in Europe as to the factors which made such legislation possible. These factors were three in number: (1) an aggressive campaign by a militant minority of religious zealots of the “Fundamentalist” faith; (2) lack of knowledge of modern scientific and religious thought in the rural districts which control Tennessee politically; (3) political cowardice and demagogy. William Waller, The Constitutionality of the Tennessee Anti-Evolution Act, 35 Yale L.J. 191 (1925). 47 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 48 of 60 Under applicable precedent, “when it is claimed that a denominational preference exists, the initial inquiry is whether the law facially differentiates among religions” or “differentiate[s] among sects.” Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989) (citation omitted). “We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). In an Establishment Clause challenge, though, a court must also take consider “the context in which the statute was enacted and the reasons for its passage.” Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 715 (2010); Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 462, 473 (5th Cir. 2001). Section 2 of HB 1523 begins, “[t]he sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions protected by this act are the belief or conviction that: . . . .” HB 1523 § 2. It then enumerates three beliefs entitled to protection. In the remainder of the bill, every protection from discrimination is explicitly tied to the § 2 beliefs. On its face, HB 1523 constitutes an official preference for certain religious tenets. If three specific beliefs are “protected by this act,” it follows that every other religious belief a citizen holds is not protected by the act. Christian Mississippians with religious beliefs contrary to § 2 become second-class Christians. Their exclusion from HB 1523 sends a message “that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members.” McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860. The same is true for members of other faith groups who do not subscribe to the § 2 beliefs. The State suggests that the bill is neutral because it does not name a denomination. The argument is foreclosed by Larson, which struck down a Minnesota statute that had made 48 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 49 of 60 “explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations” without identifying any denomination by name. 456 U.S. at 246 n.23. For Reverends Barber, Burnett, Fortenberry, and Hrostowski (who are Presbyterian, United Methodist, United Methodist, and Episcopalian, respectively), their religious values cause them to believe that same-sex couples may marry in a Christian ceremony blessed by God. They also believe that same-sex couples may consummate that marriage as any other. As Rev. Dr. Hrostowski testified, “sex is a gift from God, and it is precious and wonderful and should be treated as such,” but § 2’s definition of sex is “incomplete because now holy matrimony is available to again both straight and gay couples.” Tr. of June 23 at 126. The Reverends, however, are not entitled to any of the protections of HB 1523. The bill instead shows the State’s favor for the exact opposite beliefs by giving special privileges to citizens who hold § 2 beliefs. In so doing the State indicates that the Reverends hold disfavored, minority beliefs, while citizens who hold § 2 beliefs are preferred members of the majority entitled to a broad array of special legal immunities. See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860.40 The First Amendment prohibits states from putting their thumb on the scales in this way. Laws must make religious rights and protections available “on an equal basis to both the Quaker and the Roman Catholic.” Larson, 456 U.S. at 245, 246 n.23. “[L]egislators—and voter—are required to accord to their own religions the very same treatment given to small, new, or unpopular denominations.” Id. at 245, 246 n.23. But HB 1523 favors Southern Baptist over 40 One of the more unique conflicts between religious belief and § 2 was elicited during Rabbi Jeremy Simons’ testimony. He explained that as early as 1800 years ago, Judaism recognized “four distinct genders that are possible, male, female, then a category called tumtum, which is someone whose gender is essentially ambiguous, unable to be ascertained and then androgenous, someone who displays both sex characteristics.” Tr. of June 23 at 105. Rabbi Simons said that rabbis in that era “truly struggle[d] with it, in what to do in these cases where it is ambiguous. But what you don’t see is them condemning the child or saying that this child cannot be a part of the community or is any less human or holy than anyone else.” Id. 49 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 50 of 60 Unitarian doctrine, Catholic over Episcopalian doctrine, and Orthodox Judaism over Reform Judaism doctrine, to list just a few examples.41 Some Jewish and Muslim citizens may sincerely believe that their faith prevents them from participating in, recognizing, or aiding an interfaith marriage. See, e.g., Alex B. Leeman, Interfaith Marriage in Islam: An Examination of the Legal Theory Behind the Traditional and Reformist Positions, 84 Ind. L.J. 743, 755-56 (2009) (relaying that under “classical Shari’a regulations: a Muslim man may marry a Christian or Jewish woman but no other unbeliever; a Muslim woman may not marry a non-Muslim under any circumstances. . . . Some Muslim clerics . . . have discouraged interfaith unions altogether.”); Zvi H. Triger, The Gendered Racial Formation: Foreign Men, “Our” Women, and the Law, 30 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 479, 520 (2009) (“Interfaith marriage is not simply prohibited by Judaism; it is also not recognized (if performed elsewhere) due to its categorization as an inherently meaningless act. . . . Although Israeli law does not allow interfaith marriages regardless of the sex of the Jewish partner, Israeli culture[] disproportionately scorns Jewish women who cohabit with or marry non-Jewish men.”). Why should a clerk with such a religious belief not be allowed to recuse from issuing a marriage license to an interfaith couple, while her coworkers have the full protections of HB 1523? 41 See Southern Baptist Convention, Position Statements (“We affirm God’s plan for marriage and sexual intimacy – one man, and one woman, for life. Homosexuality is not a ‘valid alternative lifestyle.’”); Unitarian Universalist Association, Marriage Equality (“UU congregations and clergy have long recognized and celebrated same-sex marriages within our faith tradition.”); U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Issues and Action, Same Sex Unions, Backgrounder on Supreme Court Marriage Cases (“The USCCB supports upholding the right of states to maintain and recognize the true meaning of marriage in law as the union of one man and one woman.”); Docket No. 2-1, at 11-13, in CSE IV (letter from the Bishop of The Episcopal Church in Mississippi permitting same-sex religious marriage as of June 3, 2016); Tr. of June 23 at 97-110 (expert testimony on views of same-sex marriage and transgender persons among Jewish denominations); Seth Lipsky, U.S. Gay Marriage Ruling Puts Orthodox Jews on Collision Course With American Law, Haaretz, June 28, 2015; see generally Docket No. 2-2, at 7, in CSE IV (resolution of the United Church of Christ supporting same-sex religious marriage); Brief for President of the House of Deputies of the Episcopal Church, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574); Brief for Major Religious Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574). To be clear, Rabbi Simons’ testimony indicated that the term “Orthodox” encompasses a variety of different sects of Judaism, some of which may permit same-sex marriage. Tr. of June 23 at 108-09. Most Jews in Mississippi belong to the Reform denomination and support same-sex marriage, he said. Id. at 96. 50 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 51 of 60 The State argues that there is no religious preference because some members of all religious traditions are opposed to same-sex marriage. That is, because some Unitarians, some Episcopalians, and some Reform Jews oppose same-sex marriage, HB 1523 is neutral between religious sects. See Docket No. 38-2, at 2, in Barber. Every group has its iconoclasts. The larger the group, the more likely it will have someone who believes the sun revolves around the Earth, a doctor who thinks smoking unproblematic, or a Unitarian opposed to same-sex religious marriage. But most people in a group share most of that group’s beliefs. That is the point of being in a group. And in the HB 1523 context, the State has favored certain doctrines, regardless of how many individuals deviate from official doctrine on an issue.42 The State’s we-prefer-some-members-of-all-religions argument also fails to understand another function of the Establishment Clause. “Intrafaith differences . . . are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed,” the Supreme Court once wrote, in its typical understated fashion. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981); see Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015). It is precisely because those internal disputes are common – and contentious – that the framers long ago decided that the government should stay out of those battles, for the benefit of both sides. See, e.g., Sarah McCammon, Conservative Christians Grapple With Whether ‘Religious Freedom’ Includes Muslims, National Public Radio, June 29, 2016 (describing one ongoing internal debate). Rev. Burnett’s testimony illustrates the problem nicely. She said her church, the United Methodist Church, opposes same-sex religious marriage but is in the process of reconsidering its 42 The Supreme Court has rejected this kind of sophistry: “the Establishment Clause forbids subtle departures from neutrality, religious gerrymanders, as well as obvious abuses.” Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971). Courts are expected to look beyond superficial explanations. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam); see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585-86 (1987) (invalidating Louisiana statute under the Establishment Clause although the statute’s “stated purpose” was “to protect academic freedom”). 51 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 52 of 60 position. Tr. of June 23 at 158. Rev. Burnett objected to what she perceived as the State of Mississippi’s attempt to weigh in on that doctrinal debate via HB 1523. Id. at 159. Governor Bryant is also a member of the United Methodist Church. See David Brandt, Mississippi Church a Window into National Gay Rights Debate, Assoc. Press, Apr. 12, 2016. There are same-sex couples in his congregation. Id. HB 1523 violates the Establishment Clause because it chooses sides in this internal debate. In so doing it says persons like Gov. Bryant are favored and persons like Rev. Burnett are disfavored. So the fact that some members of all religions oppose same-sex marriage does not mean the State is being neutral. It means the State is inserting itself into any number of intrafaith doctrinal disputes, tipping the scales toward some believers and away from others. That is something it cannot do. “[T]he people’s religions must not be subjected to the pressures of government.” Engel, 370 U.S. at 430. The State then argues that HB 1523 is defensible as supporting moral values, not religious beliefs. As the testimony in this case showed, however, religious beliefs are inextricably intertwined with moral values. Plus, the Free Exercise Clause only protects “beliefs rooted in religion.” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713 (citations omitted and emphasis added). So the State cannot simultaneously contend that HB 1523 is a reasonable accommodation of religious exercise and that it protects only moral beliefs. If HB 1523 was passed to encourage exclusively moral values, it was not passed to further the free exercise of religion. Because § 2 “clearly grants denominational preferences of the sort consistently and firmly deprecated in [Supreme Court] precedents,” the law must be treated as “suspect” and subject to strict scrutiny. Larson, 456 U.S. at 246-47. That means § 2 “must be invalidated unless it is justified by a compelling governmental interest, and unless it is closely fitted to further that 52 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 53 of 60 interest.” Id. The Lemon test need not be applied. Id. at 252 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)); see also Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 695; Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987).43 “For an interest to be sufficiently compelling to justify a law that discriminates among religions, the interest must address an identified problem that the discrimination seeks to remedy. [The government] must identify an actual concrete problem – mere speculation of harm does not constitute a compelling state interest.” Awad, 670 F.3d at 1129 (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). As mentioned, the State says HB 1523 is justified by a compelling government interest in accommodating the free exercise of religion. The underlying premise of this interest is that members of some religious sects believe that any act which brings them into contact with samesex marriage or same-sex relationships makes the believer complicit in the same-sex couples’ sin, in violation of the believer’s own exercise of religion. See Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 Yale L.J. 2516, 2522-23 & n.23 (2015). The idea is that baking a cake for a same-sex wedding “makes a baker complicit in a same-sex relationship to which he objects.” Id. at 2519. The problem is that the State has not identified any actual, concrete problem of free exercise violations. Its defense speaks in generalities, but “Supreme Court case law instructs that overly general statements of abstract principles do not satisfy the government’s burden to articulate a compelling interest.” Awad, 670 F.3d at 1130 (collecting cases). Mississippi has run 43 The Court need not consider the bill’s “secular purpose.” See Doe, 240 F.3d at 468; Chemerinsky § 12.2.2 (noting similarities between neutrality analysis and elements of the Lemon test). If it did, however, it would conclude that HB 1523 “was not motivated by any clearly secular purpose – indeed, the statute had no secular purpose,” for the reasons listed in Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56. See also Edwards, 482 U.S. at 592. 53 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 54 of 60 into the same hurdle Oklahoma did in Awad: its attorneys have not identified “even a single instance” where Obergefell has led to a free exercise problem in Mississippi. Id. In this case, moreover, it is difficult to see the compelling government interest in favoring three enumerated religious beliefs over others. “[T]he goal of basic ‘fairness’ is hardly furthered by the Act’s discriminatory preference” for one set of beliefs. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 588. It is not within our tradition to respect one clerk’s religious objection to issuing a same-sex marriage license, but refuse another clerk’s religious objection to issuing a marriage license to a formerlydivorced person. The government is not in a position to referee the validity of Leviticus 18:22 (“Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination.”) versus Leviticus 21:14 (“A widow, or a divorced woman, or profane, or an harlot, these shall he not take.”).44, 45 Even if HB 1523 had encouraged the free exercise of all religions, it does not actually contribute anything toward that interest. Again, as discussed above, a clerk with a religious objection to same-sex marriage may invoke existing constitutional and statutory defenses without HB 1523. E.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 140 (1987). The State has not identified a purpose behind HB 1523 “that was not fully served by” prior laws. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 59. Finally, the State claims that HB 1523 is akin to a federal statute permitting persons to opt-out of performing abortions. The comparison is inapt. For one, that statute is neutral to the extent it prohibits retaliation against doctors who decline to provide abortions as well as doctors 44 All quotes from and citations to the Bible are drawn from the King James Version. We do not single out religious beliefs in this way. No state law explicitly allows persons to decline to serve a payday lender based on a religious belief that payday lending violates Deuteronomy 23:19. No state law explicitly allows recusals because of a belief that wearing “a garment mingled of linen and wool[]” is forbidden. Leviticus 19:19. If a marriage license was withheld for “foolish talking” or “jesting,” see Ephesians 5:4, we would undoubtedly have many fewer marriages. 45 54 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 55 of 60 who choose to provide abortions. See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)-(e). HB 1523 is not so even-handed. Tr. of June 24 at 327. It is true that part of the abortion statute permits individuals or entities to opt-out of performing all abortions. Id. § 300a-7(b). That still is not analogous to HB 1523. If doctors can opt-out of all abortions, the apples-to-apples comparison would let clerks opt-out of issuing all marriage licenses. A clerk who transfers from the marriage licensing division to the court filings division, for example, would be honoring her religious beliefs by declining to be involved in a same-sex marriage, but would not be picking and choosing which persons to serve. The Court now turns to why that kind of selective service is unlawful. ii. HB 1523’s Accommodations Injure Other Citizens HB 1523 also violates the First Amendment because its broad religious exemption comes at the expense of other citizens. Supreme Court precedent has repeatedly upheld “legislative exemptions [for religion] that did not, or would not, impose substantial burdens on nonbeneficiaries while allowing others to act according to their religious beliefs.” Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) (collecting cases). A religious accommodation which does no harm to others is much more likely to survive a legal challenge than one which does. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor is a good example of this principle at work. In that case, a Connecticut statute gave workers an “absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath.” 472 U.S. 703, 704-05 (1985). Donald Thornton invoked the statute and chose not to work on Sundays. The resulting conflict with his employer led Thornton to quit. Litigation ensued. The Supreme Court invalidated the Connecticut law. The statute violated the Establishment Clause by requiring that “religious concerns automatically control over all secular 55 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 56 of 60 interests at the workplace.” Id. at 709. The statute did not take into account “the imposition of significant burdens on other employees required to work in place of the Sabbath observers.” Id. at 710. “Other employees who have strong and legitimate, but non-religious, reasons for wanting a weekend day off have no rights under the statute,” the Court found, and it was wrong to make them “take a back seat to the Sabbath observer.” Id. at 710 n.9. Because “[t]he statute has a primary effect that impermissibly advances a particular religious practice,” it violated the First Amendment. Id. at 710. HB 1523 fails this standard. The bill gives persons with § 2 beliefs an absolute right to refuse service to LGBT citizens without regard for the impact on their employer, coworkers, or those being denied service. Like Caldor, it contains “no exception [for] when honoring the dictates of [religious] observers would cause the employer substantial economic burdens or when the employer’s compliance would require the imposition of significant burdens on other employees required to work in place of the [religious] observers.” Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709-10. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby confirms this ‘do no harm’ principle. In that case, the Court relieved three closely-held corporations from federal contraceptive regulations which substantially burdened the corporate owners’ religious beliefs. 134 S. Ct. at 2759. At first blush that sounds analogous to HB 1523: if the corporate owners could opt-out of the federal regulation, why can’t clerks opt-out of serving same-sex couples? The difference is that the Hobby Lobby Court found that the religious accommodation in question would have “precisely zero” effect on women seeking contraceptive coverage, and emphasized that corporations do not “have free rein to take steps that impose disadvantages on others.” Id. at 2760 (quotations marks, citation, and ellipses omitted). The critical lesson is that religious accommodations must be 56 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 57 of 60 considered in the context of their impact on others. See also Bullock, 489 U.S. at 14 (striking down Texas law requiring non-religious periodicals to subsidize religious periodicals). Unlike Hobby Lobby, HB 1523 disadvantages recusing employees’ coworkers and results in LGBT citizens being personally and immediately confronted with a denial of service. The bill cannot withstand the Caldor line of cases. As Judge Learned Hand once said, “[t]he First Amendment gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his own religious necessities.” Caldor, 472 U.S. at 710 (quotation marks, citation, and ellipses omitted). For these reasons, the plaintiffs are substantially likely to succeed on their claim that HB 1523 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.46, 47 C. Irreparable Harm The plaintiffs are then required to demonstrate “a substantial threat of irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted.” Opulent Life Church, 697 F.3d at 288. They must show “a significant threat of injury from the impending action, that the injury is imminent, and that money damages would not fully repair the harm.” Humana, Inc. v. Jacobson, 804 F.2d 1390, 1394 (5th Cir. 1986). “An injury is irreparable only if it cannot be undone through monetary remedies.” Deerfield Med. Ctr. v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338 (5th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted). 46 A point of clarification is in order. The Establishment Clause claim brought by all of the plaintiffs is substantially likely to succeed in declaring § 2 of the bill unconstitutional. The Barber plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Clause claim is also substantially likely to secure that result as to § 2, but may in fact enjoin the entire bill, as in Romer. The question is moot at this juncture because an injunction as to § 2 renders every other section inoperable as a matter of law. The result is that the HB 1523 is entirely “immobilized.” Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2632 n.1 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 47 In Establishment Clause cases, a finding of substantial likelihood of success on the merits has led the Fifth Circuit to suggest that the final three factors of preliminary injunctive relief require only cursory review. See Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, the Court will proceed to the conclusion of the formal legal analysis. 57 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 58 of 60 The plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that HB 1523 represents an imminent and “substantial threat to [their] First Amendment rights. Loss of First Amendment freedoms, even for minimal periods of time, constitute irreparable injury.” Ingebretsen, 88 F.3d at 280 (citations omitted). This applies with equal force to the Equal Protection claim, since the plaintiffs are substantially likely to be irreparably harmed by the unequal treatment HB 1523 sets out for them. CSE I, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 950. As a result, this element is satisfied. Accord Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1993). D. Balance of Hardships Here, the plaintiffs must show that the injuries they will suffer if HB 1523 goes into effect outweigh any harm that an injunction may do to the State. If a court has found irreparable harm, a party opposing injunctive relief will “need to present powerful evidence of harm to its interests” to prevent the scales from weighing in the movant’s favor. Opulent Life Church, 697 F.3d at 297. On the other hand, “the injunction usually will be refused if the balance tips in favor of defendant.” 11A Charles A. Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2948.2 (3d ed.). The State contends that granting an injunction will result in the “irreparable harm of denying the public interest in the enforcement of its laws.” Docket No. 28, at 34, in CSE IV (quotation marks and citation omitted). This argument will be taken up with the public interest factor. The State also says that enjoining HB 1523 would impose a hardship on conscientious objectors who are presently being denied the free exercise of their religion. Even setting aside the State’s lack of support for this contention, the Fifth Circuit has not looked favorably upon this argument in similar Establishment Clause litigation. An injunction that enjoins HB 1523 will 58 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 59 of 60 preserve the status quo, so it “would not affect [citizens’] existing rights to the free exercise of religion and free speech. Therefore, [citizens] continue to have exactly the same constitutional right to pray as they had before the statute was enjoined.” Ingebretsen, 88 F.3d at 280. Since Ingebretsen was decided, moreover, Mississippi has exacted its own RFRA to provide additional protection to religious Mississippians. The Court concludes that the plaintiffs’ constitutional injuries outweigh any injury the State suffers from an injunction that preserves the status quo. E. Public Interest Lastly, the plaintiffs must show that a preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest. “Focusing on this factor is another way of inquiring whether there are policy considerations that bear on whether the order should issue.” Wright et al. § 2948.4. The State argues that the public interest is served by enforcing its democratically adopted laws. The government certainly has a powerful interest in enforcing its laws. That interest, though, yields when a particular law violates the Constitution. In such situations “the public interest is not disserved by an injunction preventing its implementation.” Opulent Life Church, 697 F.3d at 298 (citations omitted); accord Ingebretsen, 88 F.3d at 280. In this case, it is also relevant that Mississippi has been subjected to widespread condemnation and an economic boycott as a result of HB 1523’s passage. See, Docket Nos. 3211 (letter to Mississippi’s leaders from nearly 80 CEOs urging HB 1523’s repeal as “bad for our employees and bad for business”); 32-12 (statement of Mississippi Manufacturers Association opposing HB 1523); 32-13 (statement of Mississippi Economic Council opposing HB 1523); 3219 (newspaper article indicating opposition to HB 1523 from nearly every Mayor on the Mississippi Gulf Coast); 32-20 (statement of the Gulf Coast Business Council describing “the 59 Case 3:16-cv-00417-CWR-LRA Document 39 Filed 06/30/16 Page 60 of 60 growing list of negative impacts” of HB 1523 on the State economy), all in Barber; see also Sherry Lucas, MS Theater Groups Worry About HB 1523 Fallout, The Clarion-Ledger, June 13, 2016 (reporting that copyright holders are presently prohibiting Mississippians from performing West Side Story, Footloose, Wicked, Godspell, and Pippin). The public interest is served by bringing this boycott to an end. F. Other Considerations The plaintiffs have made other First Amendment arguments and noted a preemption theory concerning 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In light of the substantive claims addressed above, and appreciating “the haste that is often necessary” in preliminary injunction proceedings, the Court declines to take up those other theories of relief at this time. Monumental Task Comm., Inc v. Foxx, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2016 WL 311822, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2016). V. Conclusion Religious freedom was one of the building blocks of this great nation, and after the nation was torn apart, the guarantee of equal protection under law was used to stitch it back together. But HB 1523 does not honor that tradition of religion freedom, nor does it respect the equal dignity of all of Mississippi’s citizens. It must be enjoined. The motions are granted. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants; their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and any other persons who are in active concert or participation with the defendants or their officers, agents, servants, employees, or attorneys; are hereby preliminarily enjoined from enacting or enforcing HB 1523. SO ORDERED, this the 30th day of June, 2016. s/ Carlton W. Reeves UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 60