Case 1:17-cv-00480 Document 4 Filed 01/28/17 Page 1 of 12 PageID #: 35

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
__________________________________________
)
Hameed Khalid Darweesh, on behalf of himself
)
and all others similarly situated; and,
) Case No. ____________________
)
Haider Sameer Abdulkhaleq Alshawi, on behalf of )
himself and all others similarly situated,
)
)
Petitioners,
) Date: January 28, 2017
)
v.
)
)
DONALD TRUMP; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
)
HOMELAND SECURITY (“DHS”); U.S.
)
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
)
(“CBP”); JOHN KELLY, Secretary of DHS;
)
KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, Acting Commissioner )
of CBP; JAMES T. MADDEN, New York Field
)
Director, CBP,
.
Respondents.
_________________________________________
PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION OR
REPRESENTATIVE HABEAS ACTION

1.

Petitioners Hameed Khalid Darweesh and Haider Sameer Abdulkhaleq Alshawi have

valid entry documents for the United States but are presently detained by Respondents at John F.
Kennedy International Airport (“JFK”) on the basis of an Executive Order issued by President
Donald Trump on January 27, 2017. Mr. Khalid Darweesh is an Iraqi national with a valid
Special Immigrant Visa to enter the United States, based on his work for U.S. contractors and the
U.S. consulate general in Erbil, Iraq. Mr. Abdulkhaleq Alshawi is also an Iraqi national who
arrived in the United States with an approved application to join his legal permanent resident
wife, who entered as a refugee, and their child. Both petitioners assert a fear of returning to their

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countries and, if they are not admitted pursuant to their valid entry documents, seek an
opportunity to pursue asylum, withholding, relief under the convention against torture. Each of
these Petitioners and other members of the proposed class bring this petition for a writ of habeas
corpus or, in the alternative, a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, to prohibit the
policy, pattern, and practice of Respondents detaining class members and prohibiting class
members from entering the United States solely on the basis of the Executive Order when they
arrive at U.S. borders with valid entry documents.
2.

On January 27, 2016, President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order entitled

“Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States,” (“Jan. 27 EO”) that,
inter alia, purports to suspend the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (“USRAP”) (Jan. 27 EO
Sec. 5) and categorically deny admission to the United States for certain individuals from Iraq,
Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen (EO Sec. 3), which are designated as “countries
of concern” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12). See Department of Homeland Security, DHS
Announces Further Travel Restrictions for the Visa Waiver Program, Feb. 18, 2016,
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/02/18/dhs-announces-further-travel-restrictions-visa-waiverprogram (listing Libya, Somalia, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria as countries of concern)
3.

The Executive Order is the sole basis for the Respondents’ custody over Petitioners.

4.

The Executive Order establishes a policy, pattern, practice, and custom of detaining and

deporting both refugees admitted via USRAP and visa holders from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan,
Libya, Somalia, and Yemen who arrive at U.S. borders, notwithstanding that these individuals
have valid entry documents for the United States. The Jan. 27 EO orders the suspension of
USRAP for 120 days and the denial of entry to certain individuals from the designated countries
for 90 days at a minimum.

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5.

Upon arrival in the United States, Petitioners and class members are detained and

questioned by Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) officials. Class members are
subsequently denied entry to the United States, and forced to return to the country from which
their travel originated, regardless of whether they present valid entry documents, their status in
the prior country, and possible claims qualifying them for protection under the immigration laws,
including 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b); United Nations
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), implemented in the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998 (“FARRA”), Pub.L. No. 105-277, div. G, Title XXII, § 2242, 112
Stat. 2681, 2681-822 (1998) (codified as Note to 8 U.S.C. § 1231), and 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(A)(ii).
6.

Such relatively short periods of detention are particularly difficult for putative class

members to challenge independently. Individuals may be forced to board a flight removing them
within mere hours of their arrival in the United States. Denial of entry further reduces each
individual’s capacity to challenge his or her detention because there is no access to counsel and
no access to resources such as translators during the fleeting period of detention before
deportation. Given that such detention is likely to be repeated for thousands of individuals, class
treatment is especially appropriate in this case.
7.

Petitioners and the proposed class, by and through their attorneys, hereby respectfully

move this Court for an order certifying a representative class of Petitioners, pursuant to United
States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115 (2d Cir. 1974). Petitioners ask this Court to certify a
class consisting of all individuals with refugee applications approved by U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services as part of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, holders of valid
immigrant and non-immigrant visas, and other individuals from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya,

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Somalia, and Yemen legally authorized to enter the United States, but who have been or will be
denied entry to the United States on the basis of the January 27, 2017 Executive Order.
8.

Petitioners intend to supplement this motion promptly with briefing and evidentiary

support.
9.

The Second Circuit has recognized that representative habeas actions are appropriate in

certain circumstances. United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1125-26 (2d Cir.
1974). The Sero court allowed the petitioner to represent a class of young adults serving state
sentences for misdemeanors who were challenging the length of those sentences. Id. Because
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not directly applicable to a habeas class
action, the Second Circuit fashioned procedures appropriate for such an action pursuant to the
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299 (1969) (courts may
use “appropriate modes of procedure, by analogy to existing rules or otherwise in conformity
with judicial usage” in the habeas context). Accordingly, the Second Circuit allowed the case to
proceed as “a multi-party proceeding similar to the class action authorized by the Rules of Civil
Procedure.” Sero, 506 F.2d at 1125.
10.

The Second Circuit articulated a number of reasons why it found class action treatment

appropriate in the habeas context, all of which are present in the instant action as well.
11.

First, the challenge brought by the class was “applicable on behalf of the entire class,

uncluttered by subsidiary issues.” Sero, 506 F.2d at 1126.
12.

Second, citing the likelihood that many of the class would be illiterate or lack sufficient

education, as well as the probability that many would not have the assistance of counsel in filing
habeas applications, the Second Circuit found that “more than a few [class members] would
otherwise never receive the relief here sought on their behalf.” Id.

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13.

Third, the Second Circuit found considerations of judicial economy persuasive, as a

representative habeas action would avoid “[t]he considerable expenditure of judicial time and
energy in hearing and deciding numerous individual petitions presenting the identical issue.”1 Id.
14.

Each of these conditions is present in the instant case, which therefore counsels in favor

of this Court recognizing representative habeas action status.
15.

First, this case addresses the narrow question of the legality of class members’ detention,

a question which applies equally to all members of the putative class: all are or will be held in
Respondents’ custody based solely on the Jan. 27 EO.
16.

Second, class members are immigrants, including legal permanent residents and others

with lawful immigration status who have been or will be denied entry to the United States. As a
result, there is a high likelihood that class members detained at a port of entry will have an
unsophisticated command of English. For the same reason, members of the proposed class will
likely have an insufficient understanding of the U.S. judicial system, U.S. immigration laws, or
their right to apply for asylum in the United States. Together, these create a high probability that
the putative class members will lack the ability to obtain the assistance of counsel in challenging
their detention based on the Jan. 27 EO, even if they were able to determine that such detention
were susceptible to legal challenge.
17.

Moreover, the very short nature of detention authorized by the Jan. 27 EO makes the

likelihood of successfully securing counsel and challenging detention even more remote. As
soon as class members are detained, Respondents hold them in secondary screening and seek to
immediately deport them from the United States. Even more than in Sero, this strongly suggests

In this respect, the Second Circuit also mentioned saving the “expense which would be incurred in appointing
counsel for each individual who proceeded on his own.” Sero, 506 F.2d at 1126. Counsel is not appointed for
individuals held in Respondents custody when they are detained at ports of entry. Because of this, there is no cost to
appointing counsel in the first instance, and allowing a representative habeas action does not change that.
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that “more than a few would otherwise never receive the relief here sought on their behalf.” Sero,
506 F.2d at 1126.
18.

Third, the same justifications motivating the Sero court regarding judicial economy are

applicable here: allowing a representative habeas action to proceed would avoid “[t]he
considerable expenditure of judicial time and energy in hearing and deciding numerous
individual petitions presenting the identical issue.” Id.
19.

In sum, as in Sero, the “unusual circumstances” of this case warrant its treatment as a

representative habeas action. Id. at 1125.
20.

The Sero court held that courts should consider an “analogous procedure” to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 23 when certifying a representative habeas action. Id.
21.

Since Sero, the Second Circuit and other circuits have consistently turned to Rule 23

when reviewing the certification of representative habeas actions. See, e.g., Martin v. Strasburg,
689 F.2d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 1982) rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.
253 (1984); see also Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 1975) (reviewing
representative habeas certification according to Rule 23); United States ex. rel. Morgan v.
Sielaff, 546 F.2d 218, 221 (7th Cir. 1975) (same and affirming Bijeol); Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591
F.3d 1105, 1121-26 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying Rule 23 requirements to representative habeas
action); Ali v. Ashcroft 346 F.3d 873, 890 (9th Cir. 2003) (same), vacated on other grounds by
Ali v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 2003); Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 11941202-04 (9th Cir. 1975); Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825, 827 n.2 (10th Cir. 1976) (same).
22.

District courts both within and outside the Second Circuit have certified representative

habeas actions per the requirements of Rule 23. Bertrand v. Sava, 535 F. Supp. 1020, 1024-25
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) rev’d on other grounds, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982); Solomon v. Zenk, 04-CV-

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2214, 2004 WL 2370651 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2004) (noting the Second Circuit has “approved
habeas corpus class actions”); Streicher v. Prescott, 103 F.R.D. 559 (D.D.C. 1984) (applying
Rule 23 to representative habeas action); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 117 (N.D. Ga.
1981) (same); Kazarov v. Achim, 2003 WL 22956006, at *3 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (same); Adderly
v. Wainwright, 58 F.R.D. 389, 400 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (same).
23.

The proposed representative class meets the four prerequisites for class certification

enumerated in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
24.

This Court can certify this representative habeas action consistent with the numerosity

requirement of Rule 23(a)(1). The proposed class is “so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1), and in some cases near impossible.
25.

The Sero court emphasized that the proposed class members in that case, exceeding 500

in number, “far surpass the requirements of numerousness which have been imposed in more
straight-forward civil actions.” 506 F.2d at 1126 (citing Cypress v. Newport News Gen &
Nonsectarian Hosp. Assn., 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967) and Citizens Banking Co. v. Monticello
State Bank, 143 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1944) for proposition that numerosity requirements were
satisfied by classes containing eighteen and forty members, respectively).
26.

Based on statistics compiled by the Department of State from Fiscal Year 2015, about

25,317 individuals from Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Yemen, Iran, Libya, and Somalia typically enter the
United States on non-immigrant, special immigrant, and refugee visas within a given 90 days.2
27.

These numbers far exceed the numerosity requirement for analogous actions under Rule

2

This calculation does not include other immigrant visas for which the U.S. Department of State does not keep
statistics by country. Department of State, Nonimmigrant Visa Issuances by Visa Class and By Nationality FY 2015,
https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/law-and-policy/statistics/non-immigrant-visas.html; Department of State,
Table IX: Special Immigrant Visas Issued Fiscal Year 2015,
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2015AnnualReport/FY15AnnualReportTableIX.pdf; Department of State, FY15 Refugee Admissions Statistics, https://20092017.state.gov/j/prm/releases/statistics/251285.htm.

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23(a)(1), and demonstrate class certification, rather than individual habeas petitions, are the
appropriate mechanism for resolving putative class members’ claims.
28.

The Second Circuit also emphasized in Sero that class certification was supported by the

fact that many of the class members were “unidentifiable at the time the action was
commenced.” Id. This same consideration applies with special force in the context of detention at
ports of entry, given the difficulty of obtaining any information on individuals held at ports of
entry and accessing these individuals at multiple facilities at multiple airports within the often
short time span between detention and forced departure from the United States.
29.

This Court can certify this representative habeas action consistent with the commonality

and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) and (a)(3). All members of the proposed class share
common questions of law and fact.
30.

The claims of the named Petitioners, Mr. Khalid Darweesh and Mr. Abdulkhaleq

Alshawi, are typical of the claims of the class as a whole, as required for traditional class actions
by Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and (3). As in Sero, Petitioners and the proposed class present “clear
and unitary allegation[s],” 506 F.2d at 1127, on behalf of all members of the class, “uncluttered
by subsidiary issues” Id. at 1126.
31.

The facts of Mr. Khalid Darweesh’s situation are common to all class members: he is

currently held at a port of entry despite the fact that the Jan. 27 EO does not provide a lawful
basis for his detention.
32.

The facts of Mr. Abdulkhaleq Alshawi’s situation are also common to all class members:

he is currently held at a port of entry despite the fact that he fact that the Jan. 27 EO does not
provide a lawful basis for his detention.
33.

Petitioners and the proposed class share legal claims and request the same relief: release

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from unlawful detention at port of entry into the United States, pursuant to their lawful entry
documents. Mr. Khalid Darweesh and Mr. Abdulkhaleq Alshawi allege “that the same unlawful
conduct was directed at or affected both the named plaintiff and the class sought to be
represented … irrespective of minor variations in the fact patterns underlying individual claims,”
thus satisfying the typicality requirement. Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 936 (2d Cir. 1993).
34.

This Court can certify this representative habeas action consistent with the adequacy

requirement of Rule 23(a)(4). Mr. Khalid Darweesh and Mr. Abdulkhaleq Alshawi, through
undersigned counsel, “will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(a)(4). Attorneys and law student interns of the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services
Organization, the National Immigration Law Center, the American Civil Liberties Union, the
Iraqi Refugee Assistance Project, and Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP have extensive
experience litigating complex federal civil rights cases and habeas corpus actions, particularly
those involving the Immigration and Naturalization Act, the rights of noncitizens, and
constitutional claims. Counsel will “vigorously prosecute[] the claim on behalf of the other
members” of the class. Sero, 561 F.2d 1127.
35.

This Court can certify this representative habeas action consistent with the requirements

of Rule 23(b)(1). If proposed class members’ habeas petitions were individually adjudicated,
there would be a risk of “inconsistent or varying adjudications” with respect to proposed class
members’ constitutional claims that would subsequently lead to “inconsistent or varying
adjudications” for Respondents. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A). Inconsistent adjudications could
force the Respondents to implement an uneven policy with respect to detention that would vary
from one port of entry to another.
36.

In the alternative, this Court can certify this representative habeas action consistent with

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the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2).
37.

Respondents have “acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class”

by detaining Petitioner and members of the proposed class at U.S. ports of entry, denying them
admission to the United States, and returning them to the countries from which their travels
originated. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Final relief is “appropriate respecting the class as a whole”
to ensure that Petitioner and the proposed class, a group of individuals who are detained at ports
of entry for a short period of time, are subject to a consistent policy. Id.
38.

Petitioner respectfully seeks leave to supplement this motion promptly with a fuller

briefing and evidentiary presentation.

DATED: January 28, 2017
New Haven, Connecticut

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Michael J. Wishnie
Michael J. Wishnie (MW 1952)
Muneer I. Ahmad†
Elora Mukherjee (EM 4011)
Amit Jain, Law Student Intern*
Aaron Korthuis, Law Student Intern*
Natalia Nazarewicz, Law Student Intern*
My Khanh Ngo, Law Student Intern*
Victoria Roeck, Law Student Intern*
Yusuf Saei, Law Student Intern*
Thomas Scott-Railton, Law Student Intern*
The Jerome N. Frank Legal Services
Organization
P.O. Box 209090
New Haven, CT 06520-9090
Phone: (203) 432-4800
Fax: (203) 432-1426
michael.wishnie@yale.edu
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Jennifer Chang Newell†
Cody H. Wofsy†
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
Tel. (415) 343-0770
jnewell@aclu.org
cwofsy@aclu.org

Omar C. Jadwat**
Lee Gelernt (LG-8511)
Cecillia D. Wang (CW-8359)
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIEs
UNION FOUNDATION
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
Tel. (212) 549-2600
ojadwat@aclu.org
lgelernt@aclu.org
cwang@aclu.org
Mark Doss
Rebecca Heller
Julie Kornfeld
Stephen Poellot
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT
URBAN JUSTICE CENTER
40 Rector St, 9th Floor
New York, NY 10006
Tel. (646)-602-5600
mdoss@refugeerights.org
bheller@refugeerights.org
jkornfeld@refugeerights.org
spoellot@refugeerights.org
Karen C. Tumlin†
Nicholas Espíritu†
Melissa S. Keaney†
Esther Sung†
NATIONAL IMMIGRATION
LAW CENTER
3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1600
Los Angeles, CA 90010
Phone: (213) 639-3900
tumlin@nilc.org
espiritu@nilc.org
keaney@nilc.org
sung@nilc.org

Justin B. Cox†
NATIONAL IMMIGRATION
LAW CENTER
1989 College Ave. NE
Atlanta, GA 30317
Phone: (678) 404-9119
cox@nilc.org

Jonathan Polonsky
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
1114 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-7703
Tel. (212) 775 8703
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jpolonsky@kilpatricktownsend.com
**Application for admission forthcoming.
* Motion for law student appearance forthcoming.
† Motion for admission pro hac vice forthcoming.
†† For identification purposes only. This motion has been prepared by a clinic operated by Yale
Law School, but does not purport to present the school’s institutional views, if any.

Counsel for Petitioners

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