Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 1 of 35 PageID# 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA LINDA SARSOUR; RASHIDA TLAIB; ZAHRA BILLOO; NIHAD AWAD; COREY SAYLOR; DAWUD WALID; BASIM ELKARRA; HUSSAM AYLOUSH; HASSAN SHIBLY; ALIA SALEM; ADAM SOLTANI; IMRAN SIDDIQI; JULIA SHEARSON; NAMIRA ISLAM; KAREN DABDOUB; JOHN DOE NO. 1; JOHN DOE NO. 2; JOHN DOE NO. 3; JOHN DOE NO. 4; JOHN DOE NO. 5; JOHN DOE NO. 6; JOHN DOE NO. 7; JOHN DOE NO. 8; JOHN DOE NO. 9; JOHN DOE NO. 10; JANE DOE NO. 1; and, JANE DOE NO. 2; Plaintiffs, v. DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America; in his official capacity JOHN F. KELLY, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; in his official capacity; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; and, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; Defendants. 1  ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 1:17-cv-00120 Hon. COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF AND JURY DEMAND Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 2 of 35 PageID# 2 COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF Plaintiffs, for themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated, by and through their attorneys, Council on American‐Islamic Relations (“CAIR”), The Law Office of Gadeir Abbas, and Akeel and Valentine, PLC, state as follows: Introduction 1. The vulgar animosity that accounts for the existence of Executive Order entitled “Protecting the Nation from Terrorist Attacks by Foreign Nationals” (hereinafter the “Muslim Exclusion Order”), issued the same day of this action, is plain to see, and the absence of the words Islam or Muslim does nothing to obscure it. 2. In fact, the Executive Order has already gained national and international media attention and nationwide protests, and has been dubbed uniformly as the “Muslim Ban” because its apparent and true purpose and underlying motive—which is to ban Muslims from certain Muslim‐majority countries (Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen) (hereinafter the “Muslim majority countries”)—has been broadcast to the general public by the Trump Administration. 3. Less known is the second and equally central purpose of the Muslim Exclusion Order – to initiate the mass expulsion of immigrant and nonimmigrant Muslims lawfully residing in the United States by denying them the ability to renew their lawful status or receive immigration benefits afforded to them under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”) – based solely on their religious beliefs. 4. Many Muslims lawfully in the United States that are targeted by the Muslim Exclusion Order, including some of the John Doe and John Doe Plaintiffs, will be forced – as a 2    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 3 of 35 PageID# 3 result of the Muslim Exclusion Order – to return to their home countries, where they will likely face persecution, torture and even execution, simply because they are Muslim. 5. The malice that gave rise to the Muslim Exclusion Order first emerged on December 7, 2015, when President Trump issued a campaign promise to implement, if elected, “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.” 6. The Muslim Exclusion Order is the fulfillment of President Trump’s longstanding promise and boasted intent to enact a federal policy that overtly discriminates against Muslims and officially broadcasts a message that the federal government disfavors the religion of Islam, preferring all other religions instead. 7. The Muslim Exclusion Order is both broader in some ways and narrower in others than the policy Defendant Trump proposed on December 7, 2015. The Muslim Exclusion Order is broader insofar as it denies immigration benefits to those who, like some of the immigrant and nonimmigrant Plaintiffs, followed the rules and entered and are now lawfully present in the United States. 8. The Muslim Exclusion Order is also narrower than originally proposed, because it applies only to a subset of Muslims rather than all Muslims. This, however, does not cure the policy of its constitutional infirmity. While the Muslim Exclusion Order does not apply to all Muslims, the policy only applies to Muslims. 9. The text of the Muslim Exclusion Order implements an impermissible religious gerrymander that divides foreign nationals, even those lawfully present inside the United States, into favored and disfavored groups based on their faith. 3    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 4 of 35 PageID# 4 10. Likewise, the Muslim Exclusion Order also divides green card holders, lawfully present inside the United States, into favored and disfavored groups based on their faith. 11. Because the history and text of the Muslim Exclusion Order reveal an illegal purpose and effect, Plaintiffs’ claims must be sustained. Parties 12. Plaintiff Linda Sarsour is an American Muslim residing in Kings County, New York. Plaintiff Sarsour is a Palestinian activist and Executive Director of the Arab American Association of New York. In 2016, she served as spokesperson for Presidential Candidate Senator Bernie Sanders, and was one of three national co‐chairs for the 2017 Women’s March held the day after the inauguration of Donald Trump as President of the United States. Plaintiff Sarsour has appeared in “The Hijabi Monologues” and has her own show, The Linda Sarsour Show. 13. Plaintiff Rashida Tlaib is a Muslim American residing in Wayne County, Michigan. Plaintiff Tlaib is a former Democratic member of the Michigan House of Representatives and an attorney at the Sugar Law Center for Economic and Social Justice. Upon her swearing in on January 1, 2009, Plaintiff Tlaib became the first Muslim‐American woman to serve in the Michigan Legislature, and only the second Muslim woman in history to be elected to any state legislature in America. 14. Plaintiff Zahra Billoo is a Muslim American residing in Santa Clara County, California. Plaintiff Billoo is a civil rights attorney and the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, San Francisco Bay Area (CAIR‐SFBA), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Billoo is frequently seen at mosques and universities facilitating 4    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 5 of 35 PageID# 5 trainings and workshops as a part of CAIR’s grassroots efforts to empower the American Muslim community and build bridges with allies on civil rights issues. 15. Plaintiff Nihad Awad is a Muslim American residing in Washington County, D.C. Plaintiff Awad is National Executive Director and co‐founder of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations (CAIR), the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. As a national leader in the civil rights movement, Plaintiff Awad has led multiple campaigns to defend the rights of Muslims and to help Americans of other faiths better understand Islam. His work includes interfacing with the U.S. government, facilitating interfaith dialogue, speaking at conferences, conducting training and leadership seminars, and appearing in national and international media to discuss Islam and American Muslims. Plaintiff Awad has testified before both Houses of the U.S. Congress on matters involving Muslims in America. In 1997, he served on the White House Civil Rights Advisory Panel to the Commission on Safety and Security. In the 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential elections, Plaintiff Awad was a key figure in creating the Muslim voting bloc. In 2006, he traveled to Iraq on a humanitarian mission to appeal for the release of American journalist Jill Carrol who was kidnapped and later released in Iraq. In September, 2011, Plaintiff Awad traveled to Iran as part of an interfaith delegation to meet with the President of Iran to appeal for the release of two American hikers held by Iran. In 2004, he was named one of National Journal’s more than 100 Most Influential People in the United States whose ideas will help shape the debate over public policy issues for the next decade. In 2009, he was named by a Georgetown University publication as one of the 500 most influential Muslims in the world. And in 2010, Arabian Business ranked him as 39th in the “Arabian Business Power 100” list, its annual listing of the most influential Arabs. 5    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 6 of 35 PageID# 6 16. Plaintiff Corey Saylor is a Muslim American residing in Fairfax County, Virginia. Plaintiff Saylor is Director of the Department to Monitor and Combat Islamophobia at the Council on American‐Islamic Relations (CAIR), the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Saylor is an expert on political communications, legislative advocacy, media relations and anti‐ Islam prejudice in the United States. He is a regular voice on U.S. and international news outlets. Plaintiff Saylor has also run successful advocacy campaigns against corporate giants such as Burger King and Bell Helicopter‐Boeing when their actions or advertisements negatively impacted the American Muslim community. 17. Plaintiff Dawud Walid is a Muslim American residing in Wayne County, Michigan. Plaintiff Walid is the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Michigan (CAIR‐MI), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Walid has been interviewed and quoted in approximately 150 media outlets and has lectured at over 50 institutions of higher learning about Islam, interfaith dialogue and social justice. Plaintiff Walid served in the United States Navy under honorable conditions earning two United States Navy & Marine Corp Achievement medals while deployed abroad. He has also received awards of recognition from the city councils of Detroit and Hamtramck and from the Mayor of Lansing as well as a number of other religious and community organizations. 18. Plaintiff Basim Elkarra is a Muslim American residing in Sacramento County, California. Plaintiff Elkarra is the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Sacramento Valley (CAIR‐SAC), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff 6    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 7 of 35 PageID# 7 Elkarra is a former board member of the Sacramento chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, and serves on the Executive Board of the California Democratic Party. He also serves on the City of Sacramento Community Police Commission. In 2011, the United States Embassy in London sent Plaintiff Elkarra to England to meet young British Muslims as part of a strategy to promote civic engagement. 19. Plaintiff Hussam Ayloush is a Muslim American residing in Riverside County, California. Plaintiff Ayloush is the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Los Angeles (CAIR‐LA), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist and community organizer. Ayloush is a fourth‐term elected Delegate to the California Democratic Party (CDP). He also serves on the board of the Muslim American Homeland Security Congress (MAHSC). 20. Plaintiff Hassan Shibly is a Muslim American residing in Hillsborough County, Florida. Plaintiff Shibly is the Chief Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Florida (CAIR‐FL), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Shibly met with President Barack Obama and several high‐ranking government officials regarding Islam and civil rights issues facing Muslims. He also often serves as a consultant on Islam for, among other private entities, law enforcement and other government agencies. 21. Plaintiff Alia Salem is a Muslim American residing in Dallas County, Texas. Plaintiff Salem is the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Dallas/Fort Worth (CAIR‐DFW), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist working for social 7    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 8 of 35 PageID# 8 justice, understanding and empowerment in her community. Plaintiff Salem’s work with CAIR‐DFW has been featured on local, national and international media outlets. 22. Plaintiff Adam Soltani is a Muslim American residing in Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. Plaintiff Soltani is the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Oklahoma (CAIR‐OK), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Soltani currently serves as the chair of the Oklahoma Conference of Churches’ Religions United Committee and planning committee member for OKC’s Jewish‐Muslim Film Institute. He is also a former member of the Oklahoma Democratic Party Religious Education Committee, former board member of the Interfaith Alliance of Oklahoma, and a former member of Islamic Society of Greater Oklahoma City Executive Committee. 23. Plaintiff Imran Siddiqi is a Muslim American residing in Maricopa County, Arizona. Plaintiff Siddiqi is the Executive Director of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Oklahoma (CAIR‐AZ), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization. Plaintiff Siddiqi is a writer and prominent civil rights activist. He has written extensively on the subject of Islamophobia, Middle East Affairs, and issues affecting American Muslims. 24. Plaintiff Julia Shearson is a Muslim American residing in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Plaintiff Shearson is the Executive Director of the Cleveland chapter of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Ohio (CAIR‐OH), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. She has delivered hundreds of lectures and trainings on Islam and Muslims, civil and human rights, diversity, Islamophobia, and immigration justice. She was recently honored together with 8    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 9 of 35 PageID# 9 22 area women for her leadership, activism, and community service in an art exhibit entitled “Reflections: The Many Facets of Stephanie Tubbs Jones” installed at Cleveland Hopkins Airport in memory of the late Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs Jones. Before joining CAIR‐ OH, Shearson served in the field of education for over 10 years, teaching at Ohio University, Jewish Vocational Services in Boston and at the Summer School and Division of Continuing Education at Harvard University. 25. Plaintiff Namira Islam is a Muslim American residing in Oakland County, Michigan. Plaintiff Islam is the Co‐Founder and Executive Director of the Muslim Anti‐ Racism Collaborative (MuslimARC), a faith‐based human rights education organization which focuses on racial justice. Plaintiff Islam has worked in the areas of prisoner rights, and on international law and war crimes at the United Nations in The Hague, Netherlands. 26. Plaintiff Karen Dabdoub is a Muslim American residing in Hamilton County, Ohio. Plaintiff Dabdoub is the Executive Director of the Cincinnati chapter of the Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Ohio (CAIR‐OH), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and civil liberties advocacy organization, and a prominent civil rights activist. Plaintiff Dabdoub has served the community since 2006 as a commissioner with the Cincinnati Human Relations Commission and was the president of CHRC from 2009 ‐ 2011. She is a founding member of Muslim Mothers Against Violence, a local group founded in 2005 by Muslim women to take a stand against violence, abroad and at home. She has been a member of the Martin Luther King Coalition of Cincinnati since 2006. She is a former member of the FBI Multi‐Cultural Advisory Council and the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights Community Advisory Committee. She was a member of Friends of Open House – Cincinnati Chapter, an international organization that worked to bring about peace and understanding 9    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 10 of 35 PageID# 10 between Palestinians and Israelis. Plaintiff Dabdoub appears in the documentary “A Visit to a Mosque in America,” an educational documentary, filmed locally, that has received national recognition and commendation. 27. Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 is a lawful permanent resident and a Muslim of Syrian national origin residing in Oakland County, Michigan. He is the Imam, or religious Muslim leader, of a religious congregation. In the event that Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 exits the United States, he will be prevented from returning to his home and to his congregation despite his lawful permanent resident status, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, and based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Syrian national origin. Accordingly, Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 is no longer able to travel outside the United States. Moreover, Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 will be denied citizenship in the United States, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Syrian national origin. 28. Plaintiff John Doe No. 2 is a student and a Muslim of Somali national origin residing in the United States. He is an F‐1/Student visa holder. In the event that Plaintiff John Doe No. 2 exits the United States, he will be prevented from returning to his home and continuing his education despite his lawful student visa status, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, and based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Somali national origin. Accordingly, Plaintiff John Doe No. 2 is no longer able to travel outside the United States. Moreover, Plaintiff John Doe No. 2 will not be allowed to pursue a path to citizenship in the United States, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, also based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Somali national origin. 29. Plaintiff John Doe No. 3 is a student and a Muslim of Yemeni national origin residing in Wayne County, Michigan. He is an F‐1/Student visa holder. In the event that 10    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 11 of 35 PageID# 11 Plaintiff John Doe No. 3 exits the United States, he will be prevented from returning to his home and continuing his education despite his lawful student visa status, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, and based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Yemeni national origin. Accordingly, Plaintiff John Doe No. 3 is no longer able to travel outside the United States. Moreover, Plaintiff John Doe No. 3 will not be allowed to pursue a path to citizenship in the United States, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, also based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Yemeni national origin. 30. Plaintiff John Doe No. 4 is an asylee and a Muslim of Syrian national origin, residing in Cook County, Illinois. Plaintiff John Doe No. 4 fled for fear of his life and safety from Syria. He will be eligible for lawful permanent residency in the United States, however will be prevented from obtaining lawful permanent residency based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Syrian national origin. In the event that Plaintiff John Doe No. 4 exits the United States, he will be prevented from returning to the United States despite his lawful status, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, also based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Syrian national origin. Moreover, Plaintiff John Doe No. 4 will no longer be eligible to renew his work authorization in the United States. In the event Plaintiff John Doe No. 4 is denied reentry in the United States were he to travel outside of the United States, he will be forced to return to Syria where he is likely to be tortured or even executed. 31. Plaintiff John Doe No. 5 is a lawful permanent resident and a Muslim of Sudanese national origin residing in Albany County, New York. He is eligible for and filed for citizenship in the United States. His application has been pending, however will be denied, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Sudanese national origin. Moreover, Plaintiff John Doe No. 5 filed a marriage petition for 11    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 12 of 35 PageID# 12 his wife, which has already been pending for fourteen months. His wife has Sudanese citizenship through her parents although she has never lived in Sudan. Pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, his wife will be denied a visa to enter the United States to be reunited with her husband based solely on his and his wife’s religious status as Muslims and their Sudanese national origin. Moreover, in the event that Plaintiff John Doe No. 5 exits the United States, he will be prevented from returning to his home in the United States. Accordingly, Plaintiff John Doe No. 5 is also no longer able to travel outside the United States to be reunited with his wife. 32. Plaintiff John Doe No. 6 is a Muslim American residing in Albany County, New York. Plaintiff John Doe No. 6 filed a marriage petition for his wife, who is currently pregnant with their baby. His application for her, however will be denied, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, based solely on his wife’s religious status as a Muslim and her Sudanese national origin. Pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, John Doe No. 6 will be prevented from reunited with his wife and baby based solely on her religious status as a Muslim and her Sudanese national origin. 33. Plaintiff John Doe No. 7 is a lawful permanent resident and a Muslim of Syrian national origin residing in Broward County, Florida. He will be eligible for citizenship in the United States, his application will be denied, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Syrian national origin. Moreover, Plaintiff John Doe No. 7 is married to a United States Citizen. In the event that Plaintiff John Doe No. 7 exits the United States, he will be prevented from returning to his home and to his wife in the United States. Accordingly, Plaintiff John Doe No. 7 is also no longer able to travel outside the United States to be reunited with his wife or his family. 12    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 13 of 35 PageID# 13 34. Plaintiff John Doe No. 8 is a lawful permanent resident and a Muslim of Sudanese national origin residing in Phillips County, Missouri. He will be eligible for citizenship in the United States, however his application will be denied, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Sudanese national origin. Moreover, Plaintiff John Doe No. 8 filed a marriage petition for his wife, which has already been pending for nearly a year. Pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, his wife, a Sudanese national, will be denied a visa to enter the United States to be reunited with her husband based solely on his and his wife’s religious status as Muslims and their Sudanese national origin. Moreover, in the event that Plaintiff John Doe No. 8 exits the United States, he will be prevented from returning to his home in the United States. Accordingly, Plaintiff John Doe No. 8 is also no longer able to travel outside the United States to be reunited with his wife. 35. Plaintiff John Doe No. 9 is a lawful permanent resident and a Muslim of Syrian national origin residing in the United States. He will be eligible for citizenship in the United States, however his application will be denied, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, based solely on his religious status as a Muslim and his Syrian national origin. In the event that Plaintiff John Doe No. 9 exits the United States, he will be prevented from returning to his home in the United States. Moreover, Plaintiff John Doe No. 9 is one of few critical care physicians servicing an underserviced area in the United States. In the event he is prevented from returning to the United States, the area he serves will be lacking an essential physician to provide critical care to a substantial population in the United States. 13    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 14 of 35 PageID# 14 36. Plaintiff John Doe No. 10 is a Muslim American and a dual national, both a United States citizen and Syrian national. In the event that Plaintiff John Doe No. 10 exits the United States, he will be prevented from returning to his home in the United States. 37. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 1 is an asylee and a Muslim of Syrian national origin, residing in Wayne County, Michigan. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 1 fled for fear of her life and safety from Syria. She is eligible for and filed for lawful permanent residency in the United States. Her application remains pending, however will be denied, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, based solely on her religious status as a Muslim and her Syrian national origin. In the event that Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 1 exits the United States, she will be prevented from returning to the United States despite her lawful status, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, also based solely on her religious status as a Muslim and her Syrian national origin. Moreover, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 1 will no longer be eligible to renew her work authorization in the United States also based solely on her religious status as a Muslim and her Syrian national origin. In the event Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 1 is denied reentry in the United States were she to travel outside of the United States, she will be forced to return to Syria where she is likely to be tortured or even executed. 38. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 is an asylee and a Muslim of Syrian national origin, residing in Cook County, Illinois. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 fled for fear of her life and safety from Syria. She will be eligible for lawful permanent residency in the United States, however will be prevented from obtaining lawful permanent residency based solely on her religious status as a Muslim and her Syrian national origin. In the event that Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 exits the United States, she will be prevented from returning to the United States despite her lawful status, pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, also based solely on her religious 14    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 15 of 35 PageID# 15 status as a Muslim and her Syrian national origin. Moreover, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 will no longer be eligible to renew her work authorization in the United States. In the event Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 is denied reentry in the United States were she to travel outside of the United States, she will be forced to return to Syria where she is likely to be tortured or even executed. 39. Defendant Donald J. Trump is the current President of the United States of America. Defendant Trump issued the Muslim Exclusion Order, which is the subject of this action. Defendant Trump is being sued in his official capacity, only. 40. Defendant John F. Kelly is the current Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Defendant Kelly is responsible for implementing the Muslim Exclusion Order, which is the subject of this action. Defendant Kelly is being sued in his official capacity, only. 41. Defendant U.S. Department of State is responsible for issuing visas and implementing the Muslim Exclusion Order. The Secretary of the U.S. Department of State position is currently vacant. 42. Defendant Director of National Intelligence is responsible for implementing the Muslim Exclusion Order. The Director of National Intelligence position is currently vacant. Defendant Director of National Intelligence is being sued in his official capacity, only. Jurisdiction and Venue 43. Under U.S. Const. Art. III §2, this Court has jurisdiction because the rights sought to be protected herein are secured by the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 5 U.S.C. § 702, 5 U.S.C. § 706, the United States Constitution, and federal common law. 15    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 16 of 35 PageID# 16 44. This action seeks damages pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4) and 28 U.S.C. § 45. This action also seeks declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment 1357. Act, 28 U.S.C. § § 2201‐02, Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and pursuant to the general, legal, and equitable powers of this Court. 46. A substantial part of the unlawful acts alleged herein were committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 47. Venue is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 1391(e) as to the Defendants because Defendants are officers or employees of the United States sued in their official capacity and because this judicial district is where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred. Factual Background President Trump’s Unconstitutional Executive Order Banning Muslims from Entering the United States and Initiating Mass Expulsion of Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Muslims Lawfully Residing Within the United States 48. The Muslim Exclusion Order is the as‐promised outcome of Defendant Trump’s hateful, year‐long campaign which was fueled, in significant part, by a desire to stigmatize Islam and Muslims. 49. Defendant Trump has often repeated his bigoted views on Islam and Muslims in a variety of contexts—in print, on television, and via official campaign statements. The Muslim Exclusion Order is the legal manifestation of those bigoted views. 50. Defendant Trump’s views on Islam are unequivocal. On or about March 10, 2016, in an interview aired on CNN, President Trump declared that he thinks “Islam hates us.” 16    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 17 of 35 PageID# 17 51. His statements regarding Islam and Muslims give rise to the inference that the Muslim Exclusion Order is motivated by a bare desire to inflict harm on this faith and those that belong to it. 52. In addition to President Trump’s statements regarding Islam and Muslims, the history of the Muslim Exclusion Order reveals its unlawful, discriminatory purpose. On December 7, 2015, while campaigning, President Trump called for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.” 53. Defendant Trump’s rationale for this proposal included sweeping condemnations of Islam, the second largest religion in the world with over 1.6 billion people. His condemnation incorrectly surmised that Islam’s religious traditions, which he referred to as “Sharia”, “authoriz[e] such atrocities as murder against non‐believers who won’t convert, beheadings and more unthinkable acts that pose great harm to Americans, especially women.” 54. Subsequent to his nomination as the Republican candidate for the presidency, Defendant Trump began using facially neutral language to describe his anti‐Muslim policy. This neutral language suggested that a Trump administration would stop immigration “from any nation that has been compromised by terrorism.” 55. On or about July 24, 2016, however, Defendant Trump disclosed that the neutral language was simply a veneer intended to subdue the public controversy generated by his discriminatory plan. To that end, in an interview on NBC, Defendant Trump stated the following: “People were so upset when I used the word Muslim. Oh, you can’t use the word Muslim…And I’m OK with that, because I’m talking territory instead of Muslim.” 17    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 18 of 35 PageID# 18 56. In fact, On January 27, 2017, hours before signing the Muslim Ban, President Trump explained that his order was “going to help [persecuted Christians]”. His answer made clear that President Trump’s intention in crafting the Muslim Ban was to treat foreign nationals in the seven identified countries differently based on their faith. 57. On January 28, 2017, in an interview, Rudy Giuliani explained that after then‐ candidate Donald Trump announced his Muslim Ban—which explicitly prohibited Muslims from obtaining entry into the United States—Giuliani was asked to “show [Donald Trump] the right way to do [Muslim Ban] legally.” Giuliani then formed a commission to find a way to accomplish the Muslim Ban’s scope without mentioning Islam or Muslims. 58. Since the signing of the Muslim Exclusion Ban just two days ago, five district courts around the country issued stays. 59. On January 28, 2017, Judge Brinkema in the Eastern District of Virginia issued a Temporary Restraining Order that forbade Defendants “from removing petitioners— lawful permanent residents at Dulles International Airport—for a period of 7 days from the issuance of that Order, attached an exhibit. 60. On the same day, the United States District Court of the Western District of Washington granted an emergency stay of removal that prohibits Defendants “from removing John Doe I and Joe Doe II from the United States.” That Order is also attached as an exhibit. 61. Again on the same day, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted an emergency stay of removal, finding that the petitioners “have a strong likelihood of success in establishing that the removal of the petitioner and others 18    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 19 of 35 PageID# 19 similarly situated violates their rights to Due Process and Equal Protection.” That Order is also attached as an exhibit. 62. On January 29, 2017, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted a Temporary Restraining Order against parts of the Muslim Ban, finding that the petitioners had established a “strong likelihood of success in establishing that the detention and/or removal of the petitioners and others similarly situated would violate their rights to Due Process and Equal Protection.” That Order is also attached as an exhibit. 63. That same day, the United States District Court for the Central District of California prohibited the defendants “from barring Petitioner’s return to the United States” because he had “demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in establishing that removal violates the Establishment Clause” as well as other constitutional and statutory provisions. That Order is also attached as an exhibit. 64. While the Muslim Exclusion Order states that it suspends entry into the United States immigrants and nonimmigrants from the Muslim‐majority countries for 90 days, at the conclusion of the first 60 days, the Secretary of Homeland Security and Secretary of State will submit a list of countries for a permanent ban on entry. 65. The language of the Muslim Exclusion Order corroborates President Trump’s admission that the facially neutral language is simply a pretext. The Order does not exclude persons based on where they are from but on what religion they belong to. Paragraph F suspends all grounds for persecution and allows only one: “religious‐based persecution.” However, religious‐based persecution can only be claimed by individuals who are not 19    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 20 of 35 PageID# 20 Muslim. Thus, the Muslim Exclusion Order constitutes a religious gerrymander—drawing distinctions that exclude the disfavored group—Muslims—while leaving others untouched. 66. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm and psychological consequences since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants’ condemnation of their religion and the endorsement of all religions over their own. Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009). COUNT I VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (Establishment Clause) (On behalf of all Plaintiffs) 67. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein. 68. Defendants’ unique application of the Muslim Exclusion Order to Muslims, insofar as it (1) suspends entry of Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from the Muslim‐majority countries from entering the United States, (2) prohibits Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from the Muslim‐ majority countries and who reside lawfully in the United States from engaging in international travel and reentering the United States, (3) prohibits Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from the Muslim‐majority countries and who reside lawfully in the United States from renewing their lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status, (4) prohibits Muslim immigrants and Muslim nonimmigrants originating from same the Muslim‐majority countries from applying for any immigration benefit, including immigration benefits afforded under the INA and international human rights laws such as 20    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 21 of 35 PageID# 21 political asylum, (5) allows an exception only to non‐United States Citizens (“non‐USCs”) originating from the Muslim‐majority countries who are not Muslim to claim religious persecution and gain entry into the United States, and (6) denying a religious persecution exception to non‐USCs originating from the Muslim‐majority countries who are Muslim in order to gain entry into the United States, treats Islam on less than equal terms with other religious and non‐religious groups, thereby creating a denominational preference against Islam as a religion. 69. Defendants have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries their right to be free from religious discrimination in violation of the Establishment Clause to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by signing a Muslim Exclusion Order whose purpose and effect is to discriminate on the basis of religion. 70. President Trump’s Muslim Exclusion Order imposes upon Islam—the religion to which all of the Plaintiffs belong—the stigma of government disfavor. This condemnation, which has been cast to the general public pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, signals to Plaintiffs’ fellow citizens that their faith is uniquely threatening and dangerous insofar as it is the only religion singled out for disfavored treatment. 71. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm and psychological consequences since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants’ condemnation of their religion and the endorsement of all religions over their own. Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009). 21    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 22 of 35 PageID# 22 72. Defendants’ unlawful actions caused Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims harm, and accordingly they are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees in this action. 73. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief, and the issuance of a preliminary and permanent injunction in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court grant declaratory and injunctive relief in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below, plus all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in this action. 74. COUNT II VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (Free Exercise) (On behalf of the John Doe and Jane Doe Plaintiffs) The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein. 75. Defendants’ unique application of the Muslim Exclusion Order to Muslims, insofar as it prohibits the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries, (1) who are lawfully residing in the United States from engaging in international travel and subsequently reentering the United States in order to return to their homes, (2) who are lawfully residing in the United States from renewing their lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status, and (3) who are either lawfully residing inside the United States or outside the United States from applying for immigration benefits afforded under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”) 22    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 23 of 35 PageID# 23 and international human rights laws such as political asylum, has deprived and continues to deprive them their right to free exercise of religion as secured by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, by discriminating against them based on their religious beliefs and by substantially burdening their right to freely exercise their religious faith. 76. Defendants’ above‐described unlawful actions directly infringe upon or substantially burden the First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the United States Constitution of the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries by discriminating against them based on their religious beliefs and by substantially burdening their right to freely exercise their religious faith. 77. Defendants’ above‐described unlawful actions that mandate or permit the above‐described treatment of the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries, constitute a substantial burden on their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion, an adverse action against them motivated by their religious beliefs and practices, and an action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment. 78. Defendants’ above‐described unlawful actions that mandate or permit the above‐described treatment of the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries would deter an individual of ordinary firmness from openly exercising his/her right to practice his/her religion and may cause that individual to abandon his faith. 79. Defendants’ actions also not narrowly tailored insofar as they are entirely and demonstrably ineffectual and obvious alternatives exist. 23    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 24 of 35 PageID# 24 80. Imposition of such a burden is not in furtherance of a compelling government interest nor is it the least restrictive means of furthering any governmental interest, compelling or otherwise. 81. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm and psychological consequences since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants’ condemnation of their religion and the endorsement of all religions over their own. Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009). 82. Defendants’ unlawful actions caused the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries, and accordingly they are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees in this action. 83. The John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief, and the issuance of a preliminary and permanent injunction in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court grant declaratory and injunctive relief in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below, plus all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in this action. 24    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 25 of 35 PageID# 25 COUNT III VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 702) (Equal Protection) 84. (On behalf of the John Doe and Jane Doe Plaintiffs) The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein. 85. Defendants’ unique application of the Muslim Exclusion Order to Muslims, insofar as it prohibits the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries, (1) who are residing lawfully in the United States from engaging in international travel and subsequently reentering the United States in order to return to their homes, (2) who are residing lawfully in the United States from renewing their lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status, and (3) who are either residing lawfully inside the United States or outside the United States from applying for immigration benefits afforded under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”) and international human rights laws such as political asylum, without a constitutionally adequate legal mechanism, are discriminatory and constitute an action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment. 86. By preventing the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries lawfully residing in the United States from engaging in international travel and returning home in the United States, and/or applying for immigration benefits afforded to them under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”) and international human rights law such as political asylum, Defendants have treated them like second‐class citizens. 25    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 26 of 35 PageID# 26 87. Moreover, non‐USCs originating from the Muslim‐majority countries who seek lawful entry into the United States or that leave the country and claim religious persecution upon their return, and who are not Muslim, will be permitted to enter the United States pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order. 88. On the other hand, non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries who seek lawful entry into the United States or that leave the country and claim religious persecution upon their return, and who are Muslim will not be permitted to enter the United States pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order. 89. Defendants’ above‐described actions are motivated by the religious status of the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries and on the basis of their constitutionally‐protected free exercise of religion. 90. Defendants’ actions lack a compelling interest insofar as their true purpose is to ban Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries from entering the United States and to initiate the mass expulsion of non‐USC Muslims lawfully residing in the United States by denying them the ability to renew their lawful status or receive immigration benefits afforded to them under the INA based solely on their religious beliefs. 91. Defendants’ above‐described actions have a discriminatory effect upon and disparately impact the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries, and not non‐USCs of other faiths originating from the same Muslim‐majority countries. 92. Defendants’ actions also not narrowly tailored insofar as they are entirely and demonstrably ineffectual and obvious alternatives exist. 26    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 27 of 35 PageID# 27 93. Defendants’ above‐described actions do not serve a compelling state interest or a legitimate or public purpose, nor are they the least restrictive means or narrowly tailored to achieve any such interest. 94. Plaintiffs have suffered a concrete harm and psychological consequences as a result of the Defendants’ condemnation of their religion and the endorsement of all religions over their own. Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009). 95. Defendants’ unlawful actions caused the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries harm, and accordingly they are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees in this action. 96. The John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief, and the issuance of a preliminary and permanent injunction in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court grant declaratory and injunctive relief in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below, plus all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in this action. 27    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 28 of 35 PageID# 28 COUNT IV UNLAWFUL AGENCY ACTION IN VIOLATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 702) (On behalf of all Plaintiffs) 97. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein. 98. Defendants’ unique application of the Muslim Exclusion Order to Muslims, insofar as it (1) suspends entry of non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries from entering the United States, (2) prohibits non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries lawfully residing in the United States from engaging in international travel and reentering the United States, (3) prohibits non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries lawfully residing in the United States from renewing their lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status, (4) prohibits non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries from applying for any immigration benefit, including immigration benefits afforded under the INA and international human rights laws such as political asylum, (5) allows an exception only to non‐USCs originating from the Muslim‐majority countries who are not Muslim to claim religious persecution and gain entry into the United States, and (6) denying a religious persecution exception to non‐USCs originating from the Muslim‐majority countries who are Muslim in order to gain entry into the United States, treats Islam on less than equal terms with other religious and non‐religious groups, should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706. 99. Defendants’ actions as described above are arbitrary and capricious, shock the conscience, violate the decencies of civilized conduct, are so brutal and offensive that they do not comport with the traditional ideas of fair play and decency, lack even a rational 28    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 29 of 35 PageID# 29 relationship to any legitimate government interest, and have substantially burdened and unduly deprived Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims their constitutionally protected rights, including their right to be free from discrimination on the basis of religion, the right to be free from condemnation by the government on the basis of their religion, the right to be free from being singled out by the government for disfavored treatment on the basis of their religion, liberty interests in engaging in international travel and returning home in the United States, their international human rights, their right to free exercise of religion, their rights to freedom from false stigmatization and nonattainder, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706. 100. Defendants’ above‐described unlawful actions that mandate or permit the above‐described treatment of the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries, constitute a substantial burden on their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion, an adverse action against them motivated by their religious beliefs and practices, and an action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706. 101. Defendants’ above‐described unlawful actions that mandate or permit the above‐described treatment of the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries would deter an individual of ordinary firmness from openly exercising his/her right to practice his/her religion and may cause that individual to abandon his faith, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706. 29    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 30 of 35 PageID# 30 102. By preventing the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and other similarly situated non‐USC Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries lawfully residing in the United States from engaging in international travel and returning home in the United States, and/or applying for immigration benefits afforded under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”) and international human rights laws such as political asylum, Defendants have treated them like second‐class citizens, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706. 103. Moreover, non‐USCs originating from the Muslim‐majority countries who seek lawful entry into the United States or that leave the country and claim religious persecution upon their return, and who are not Muslim, will be permitted to enter the United States pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706. 104. On the other hand, non‐USCs originating from the Muslim‐majority countries who seek lawful entry into the United States or that leave the country and claim religious persecution upon their return, and who are Muslim, will not be permitted to enter the United States pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706. 105. Defendants’ above‐described conduct was prompted or substantially caused by Plaintiffs’ and such other similarly situated Muslims’ religious identity on the basis of their constitutionally‐protected free exercise of religion, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706. 106. Defendants have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims their right to be free from religious discrimination in violation of the 30    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 31 of 35 PageID# 31 Establishment Clause to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by issuing a Muslim Exclusion Order whose purpose and effect is to discriminate on the basis of religion, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706. 107. President Trump’s Muslim Exclusion Order imposes upon Islam—the religion to which all of the Plaintiffs belong—the stigma of government disfavor. This condemnation, which has been broadcast to the general public pursuant to the Muslim Exclusion Order, signals to Plaintiffs’ fellow citizens that their faith is uniquely threatening and dangerous insofar as it is the only religion singled out for disfavored treatment, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706. 108. Defendants’ actions also not narrowly tailored insofar as they are entirely and demonstrably ineffectual and obvious alternatives exist, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706. 109. Defendants’ actions lack a compelling interest insofar as their true purpose is to ban Muslims originating from these Muslim‐majority countries from entering the United States and to initiate the mass expulsion of non‐USC Muslims lawfully residing in the United States by denying them the ability to renew their lawful status or receive immigration benefits afforded to them under the INA based solely on their religious beliefs, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706. 110. Imposition of such a burden is not in furtherance of a compelling government interest nor is it the least restrictive means of furthering any governmental interest, compelling or otherwise, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706. 111. Defendants’ above‐described actions have a discriminatory effect upon and have disparately impacted the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs and similarly situated non‐USC 31    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 32 of 35 PageID# 32 Muslims originating from the Muslim‐majority countries, and not non‐USCs of other faiths, and should be set aside as unlawful pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706. 112. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer an ongoing concrete harm and psychological consequences since the initial announcement of the “Muslim Ban” as a result of the Defendants’ condemnation of their religion and the endorsement of all religions over their own. Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009). 113. Defendants’ unlawful actions caused Plaintiffs and similarly situated Muslims harm, and accordingly they are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees in this action. 114. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief, and the issuance of a preliminary and permanent injunction in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court grant declaratory and injunctive relief in the form described in the Prayer for Relief below, plus all such other relief this Court deems just and proper including costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in this action. Prayer for Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully requests: 1. A speedy hearing of this action under Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 2. A declaratory judgment that Defendants’ policies, practices, and customs violate the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 32    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 33 of 35 PageID# 33 3. An injunction that requires Defendants to remedy the constitutional violations identified above, including prohibiting Defendants from engaging in the following: (1) suspending entry of individuals with dual nationality, including American citizens, whose second nationality is from the Muslim‐majority countries, from entering the United States, pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the Muslim Exclusion Order; (2) suspending entry of non‐USCs originating from the Muslim‐ majority countries from entering the United States, pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the Muslim Exclusion Order; (3) prohibiting non‐USCs originating from the Muslim‐majority countries and who lawfully reside in the United States from engaging in international travel and reentering the United States, pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the Muslim Exclusion Order; (4) prohibiting non‐USCs originating from the Muslim‐majority countries and who lawfully reside in the United States from renewing their lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status, pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the Muslim Exclusion Order; (5) prohibiting non‐USCs originating from these Muslims countries from applying for any immigration benefit, including political asylum, under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”), pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the Muslim Exclusion Order; (6) allowing an exception only to non‐USCs who are not Muslim to claim religious persecution and gain entry into the United States, pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the Muslim Exclusion Order; and (7) denying an exception to non‐USCs who are Muslim in order to gain entry into the United States, pursuant to the unconstitutional terms specified in the Muslim Exclusion Order; 4. A trial by jury; 33    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 34 of 35 PageID# 34 5. An award of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses of all litigation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412; and, 6. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. JURY DEMAND NOW COME Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned counsel, and hereby demand trial by jury of the above‐referenced causes of action. Respectfully submitted, THE LAW OFFICE OF GADEIR ABBAS BY: /s/ Gadeir Abbas GADEIR I. ABBAS Attorney for Plaintiff 1155 F Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, D.C. 20004 Telephone: (720) 251‐0425 Fax: (720) 251‐0425 Email: gadeir.abbas@gmail.com Licensed in Virginia, not in D.C. Practice limited to federal matters COUNCIL ON AMERICAN‐ISLAMIC RELATIONS BY: /s/ Lena Masri LENA F. MASRI (P73461) Attorney for Plaintiff National Litigation Director 353 New Jersey Ave, SE Washington, DC 20003 Phone: (202) 488‐8787 34    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 35 of 35 PageID# 35 AKEEL & VALENTINE, PLLC BY: /s/ Shereef Akeel SHEREEF H. AKEEL (P54345) Attorney for Plaintiffs 888 W. Big Beaver Rd., Ste. 910 Troy, MI 48084 Phone: (248) 269‐9595 shereef@akeelvalentine.com Dated: January 30, 2017 35    Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1-1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 1 of 7 PageID# 36 THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary For Immediate Release January 27, 2017 EXECUTIVE ORDER - - - - - - PROTECTING THE NATION FROM FOREIGN TERRORIST ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and to protect the American people from terrorist attacks by foreign nationals admitted to the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows: Section 1. Purpose. The visa-issuance process plays a crucial role in detecting individuals with terrorist ties and stopping them from entering the United States. Perhaps in no instance was that more apparent than the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when State Department policy prevented consular officers from properly scrutinizing the visa applications of several of the 19 foreign nationals who went on to murder nearly 3,000 Americans. And while the visa-issuance process was reviewed and amended after the September 11 attacks to better detect would-be terrorists from receiving visas, these measures did not stop attacks by foreign nationals who were admitted to the United States. Numerous foreign-born individuals have been convicted or implicated in terrorism-related crimes since September 11, 2001, including foreign nationals who entered the United States after receiving visitor, student, or employment visas, or who entered through the United States refugee resettlement program. Deteriorating conditions in certain countries due to war, strife, disaster, and civil unrest increase the likelihood that terrorists will use any means possible to enter the United States. The United States must be vigilant during the visaissuance process to ensure that those approved for admission do not intend to harm Americans and that they have no ties to terrorism. In order to protect Americans, the United States must ensure that those admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes toward it and its founding principles. The United States cannot, and should not, admit those who do not support the Constitution, or those who would place violent ideologies over American law. In addition, the United States should not admit those who engage in acts of bigotry or hatred (including "honor" killings, other forms of violence against women, or the persecution of those who practice religions different from their own) or those who would oppress Americans of any race, gender, or sexual orientation. Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1-1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 2 of 7 PageID# 37 2 Sec. 2. Policy. It is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from foreign nationals who intend to commit terrorist attacks in the United States; and to prevent the admission of foreign nationals who intend to exploit United States immigration laws for malevolent purposes. Sec. 3. Suspension of Issuance of Visas and Other Immigration Benefits to Nationals of Countries of Particular Concern. (a) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall immediately conduct a review to determine the information needed from any country to adjudicate any visa, admission, or other benefit under the INA (adjudications) in order to determine that the individual seeking the benefit is who the individual claims to be and is not a security or public-safety threat. (b) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the President a report on the results of the review described in subsection (a) of this section, including the Secretary of Homeland Security's determination of the information needed for adjudications and a list of countries that do not provide adequate information, within 30 days of the date of this order. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide a copy of the report to the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence. (c) To temporarily reduce investigative burdens on relevant agencies during the review period described in subsection (a) of this section, to ensure the proper review and maximum utilization of available resources for the screening of foreign nationals, and to ensure that adequate standards are established to prevent infiltration by foreign terrorists or criminals, pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f), I hereby proclaim that the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens from countries referred to in section 217(a)(12) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1187(a)(12), would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and I hereby suspend entry into the United States, as immigrants and nonimmigrants, of such persons for 90 days from the date of this order (excluding those foreign nationals traveling on diplomatic visas, North Atlantic Treaty Organization visas, C-2 visas for travel to the United Nations, and G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 visas). (d) Immediately upon receipt of the report described in subsection (b) of this section regarding the information needed for adjudications, the Secretary of State shall request all foreign governments that do not supply such information to start providing such information regarding their nationals within 60 days of notification. (e) After the 60-day period described in subsection (d) of this section expires, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the President a list of countries recommended for inclusion on a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit the entry of foreign nationals (excluding those foreign nationals traveling on diplomatic visas, North Atlantic Treaty Organization visas, C-2 visas for travel to the United Nations, and G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 visas) from countries that do not provide the Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1-1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 3 of 7 PageID# 38 3 information requested pursuant to subsection (d) of this section until compliance occurs. (f) At any point after submitting the list described in subsection (e) of this section, the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Homeland Security may submit to the President the names of any additional countries recommended for similar treatment. (g) Notwithstanding a suspension pursuant to subsection (c) of this section or pursuant to a Presidential proclamation described in subsection (e) of this section, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security may, on a case-by-case basis, and when in the national interest, issue visas or other immigration benefits to nationals of countries for which visas and benefits are otherwise blocked. (h) The Secretaries of State and Homeland Security shall submit to the President a joint report on the progress in implementing this order within 30 days of the date of this order, a second report within 60 days of the date of this order, a third report within 90 days of the date of this order, and a fourth report within 120 days of the date of this order. Sec. 4. Implementing Uniform Screening Standards for All Immigration Programs. (a) The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall implement a program, as part of the adjudication process for immigration benefits, to identify individuals seeking to enter the United States on a fraudulent basis with the intent to cause harm, or who are at risk of causing harm subsequent to their admission. This program will include the development of a uniform screening standard and procedure, such as in-person interviews; a database of identity documents proffered by applicants to ensure that duplicate documents are not used by multiple applicants; amended application forms that include questions aimed at identifying fraudulent answers and malicious intent; a mechanism to ensure that the applicant is who the applicant claims to be; a process to evaluate the applicant's likelihood of becoming a positively contributing member of society and the applicant's ability to make contributions to the national interest; and a mechanism to assess whether or not the applicant has the intent to commit criminal or terrorist acts after entering the United States. (b) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the President an initial report on the progress of this directive within 60 days of the date of this order, a second report within 100 days of the date of this order, and a third report within 200 days of the date of this order. Sec. 5. Realignment of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for Fiscal Year 2017. (a) The Secretary of State shall suspend the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) for 120 days. During the 120-day period, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of Homeland Security and in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1-1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 4 of 7 PageID# 39 4 review the USRAP application and adjudication process to determine what additional procedures should be taken to ensure that those approved for refugee admission do not pose a threat to the security and welfare of the United States, and shall implement such additional procedures. Refugee applicants who are already in the USRAP process may be admitted upon the initiation and completion of these revised procedures. Upon the date that is 120 days after the date of this order, the Secretary of State shall resume USRAP admissions only for nationals of countries for which the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence have jointly determined that such additional procedures are adequate to ensure the security and welfare of the United States. (b) Upon the resumption of USRAP admissions, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, is further directed to make changes, to the extent permitted by law, to prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual's country of nationality. Where necessary and appropriate, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security shall recommend legislation to the President that would assist with such prioritization. (c) Pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f), I hereby proclaim that the entry of nationals of Syria as refugees is detrimental to the interests of the United States and thus suspend any such entry until such time as I have determined that sufficient changes have been made to the USRAP to ensure that admission of Syrian refugees is consistent with the national interest. (d) Pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f), I hereby proclaim that the entry of more than 50,000 refugees in fiscal year 2017 would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and thus suspend any such entry until such time as I determine that additional admissions would be in the national interest. (e) Notwithstanding the temporary suspension imposed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security may jointly determine to admit individuals to the United States as refugees on a case-by-case basis, in their discretion, but only so long as they determine that the admission of such individuals as refugees is in the national interest -- including when the person is a religious minority in his country of nationality facing religious persecution, when admitting the person would enable the United States to conform its conduct to a preexisting international agreement, or when the person is already in transit and denying admission would cause undue hardship -- and it would not pose a risk to the security or welfare of the United States. (f) The Secretary of State shall submit to the President an initial report on the progress of the directive in subsection (b) of this section regarding prioritization of claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution within 100 days of the date of this order and shall submit a second report within 200 days of the date of this order. Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1-1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 5 of 7 PageID# 40 5 (g) It is the policy of the executive branch that, to the extent permitted by law and as practicable, State and local jurisdictions be granted a role in the process of determining the placement or settlement in their jurisdictions of aliens eligible to be admitted to the United States as refugees. To that end, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall examine existing law to determine the extent to which, consistent with applicable law, State and local jurisdictions may have greater involvement in the process of determining the placement or resettlement of refugees in their jurisdictions, and shall devise a proposal to lawfully promote such involvement. Sec. 6. Rescission of Exercise of Authority Relating to the Terrorism Grounds of Inadmissibility. The Secretaries of State and Homeland Security shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, consider rescinding the exercises of authority in section 212 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182, relating to the terrorism grounds of inadmissibility, as well as any related implementing memoranda. Sec. 7. Expedited Completion of the Biometric Entry-Exit Tracking System. (a) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall expedite the completion and implementation of a biometric entryexit tracking system for all travelers to the United States, as recommended by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. (b) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the President periodic reports on the progress of the directive contained in subsection (a) of this section. The initial report shall be submitted within 100 days of the date of this order, a second report shall be submitted within 200 days of the date of this order, and a third report shall be submitted within 365 days of the date of this order. Further, the Secretary shall submit a report every 180 days thereafter until the system is fully deployed and operational. Sec. 8. Visa Interview Security. (a) The Secretary of State shall immediately suspend the Visa Interview Waiver Program and ensure compliance with section 222 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1222, which requires that all individuals seeking a nonimmigrant visa undergo an in-person interview, subject to specific statutory exceptions. (b) To the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary of State shall immediately expand the Consular Fellows Program, including by substantially increasing the number of Fellows, lengthening or making permanent the period of service, and making language training at the Foreign Service Institute available to Fellows for assignment to posts outside of their area of core linguistic ability, to ensure that non-immigrant visa-interview wait times are not unduly affected. Sec. 9. Visa Validity Reciprocity. The Secretary of State shall review all nonimmigrant visa reciprocity agreements to ensure that they are, with respect to each visa classification, truly reciprocal insofar as practicable with respect to validity period and fees, as required by sections 221(c) and 281 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1201(c) and 1351, and other treatment. If a country does not treat United States nationals seeking Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1-1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 6 of 7 PageID# 41 6 nonimmigrant visas in a reciprocal manner, the Secretary of State shall adjust the visa validity period, fee schedule, or other treatment to match the treatment of United States nationals by the foreign country, to the extent practicable. Sec. 10. Transparency and Data Collection. (a) To be more transparent with the American people, and to more effectively implement policies and practices that serve the national interest, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall, consistent with applicable law and national security, collect and make publicly available within 180 days, and every 180 days thereafter: (i) information regarding the number of foreign nationals in the United States who have been charged with terrorism-related offenses while in the United States; convicted of terrorism-related offenses while in the United States; or removed from the United States based on terrorism-related activity, affiliation, or material support to a terrorismrelated organization, or any other national security reasons since the date of this order or the last reporting period, whichever is later; (ii) information regarding the number of foreign nationals in the United States who have been radicalized after entry into the United States and engaged in terrorism-related acts, or who have provided material support to terrorism-related organizations in countries that pose a threat to the United States, since the date of this order or the last reporting period, whichever is later; and (iii) information regarding the number and types of acts of gender-based violence against women, including honor killings, in the United States by foreign nationals, since the date of this order or the last reporting period, whichever is later; and (iv) any other information relevant to public safety and security as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General, including information on the immigration status of foreign nationals charged with major offenses. (b) The Secretary of State shall, within one year of the date of this order, provide a report on the estimated long-term costs of the USRAP at the Federal, State, and local levels. Sec. 11. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect: (i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals. Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1-1 Filed 01/30/17 Page 7 of 7 PageID# 42 7 (b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations. (c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. DONALD J. TRUMP THE WHITE HOUSE, January 27, 2017. # # # Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1-2 Filed 01/30/17 Page 1 of 1 PageID# 43 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division Case No. 1:17-cv-116 Tareq Aqel Mohammed Aziz and Ammar Aqel Mohammed Aziz, by their next friend, Aqel Muhammad Aziz, and John Does 1-60, Date: January 28, 2017 Petitioners, v. DONALD TRUMP, President of the United States; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (“DHS”); U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (“CBP”); JOHN KELLY, Secretary of DHS; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, Acting Commissioner of CBP; and WAYNE BIONDI, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Port Director of the Area Port of Washington Dulles, Respondents. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, the Court orders that: a) respondents shall permit lawyers access to all legal permanent residents being detained at Dulles International Airport; b) respondents are forbidden from removing petitioners—lawful permanent residents at Dulles International Airport—for a period of 7 days from the issuance of this Order. Dates: January 28, 2017 1 Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1-3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 1 of 3 PageID# 44 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK --------------------------------------------------------------- X HAMEED KHALID DARWEESH and HAIDER SAMEER ABDULKHALEQ ALSHA WI, 011 beltalf oftltemselves and otlters similarly situated, Petitioners, DECISION AND ORDER - against - 17 Civ. 480 (AMD) DONALD TRUMP, President oft/1e United States; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ("OHS"); U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION ("CBP"); JOHN KELLY, Secretary of DHS; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN,Acting Commissioner ofCBP; JAMES T. MADDEN, New York Field Director, CBP,, Respondents. ---------------------------------------------------------------X ANN DONNELLY, District Judge. On January 28, 2017, the petitioners filed an Emergency Motion for Stay of Removal on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. IT APPEARING to the Court from the Emergency Motion for Stay of Removal, the other submissions, the arguments of counsel, and the hearing held on the 28th of January, 201 7, 1. The petitioners have a strong likelihood of success in establishing that the removal of the petitioner and others similarly situated violates their rights to Due Process and Equal Protection guaranteed by the United States Constitution; Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1-3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 2 of 3 PageID# 45 2. There is imminent danger that, absent the stay of removal, there will be substantial and irreparable injury to refugees, visa-holders, and other individuals from nations subject to the January 2 7, 2017 Executive Order; 3. The issuance of the stay of removal will not injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; 4. It is appropriate and just that, pending completion of a hearing before the Court on the merits of the Petition, that the Respondents be enjoined and restrained from the commission of further acts and misconduct in violation of the Constitution as described in the Emergency Motion for Stay of Removal. WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the respondents, their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all members and persons acting in concert or participation with them, from the date of this Order, are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from, in any manner or by any means, removing individuals with refugee applications approved by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services as part of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, holders of valid immigrant and non-immigrant visas, and other individuals from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen legally authorized to enter the United States. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that to assure compliance with the Court's order, the Court directs service of this Order upon the United States Marshal for the Eastern District of New York, and further directs the United States Marshals Service to take those actions deemed necessary to enforce the provisions and prohibitions set forth in this Order. Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1-3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 3 of 3 PageID# 46 SO ORDERED. M. Donnelly nited States District Judge Dated: Brooklyn, New York January 28, 2017 Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Case 2:17-cv-00126Document Document 1-45 Filed Filed01/30/17 01/28/17 Page Page11of of22PageID# 47 1 2 3 4 Matt Adams Glenda Aldana Madrid NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT 615 Second Ave., Ste. 400 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 957-8611 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 UNITED STATES DISTRI CT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE _______________________________________ John DOE 1, John DOE 2 ) ) ) Petitioners, ) v. ) Donald TRUMP; President of the United States ) ) of America; John F. Kelly, Secretary of the ) Department of Homeland Security; DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; ) ) KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, Acting ) Commissioner of Customs and Border ) Protection; CUSTOMS AND BORDER ) PROTECTION; and the UNITED STATES OF ) AMERICA, ) ) Respondents. ) ) ) ) Case No.: C17-126 Agency No. A ORDER GRANTING EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY OF REMOVAL 23 24 25 26 27 28 ORDER- 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus North west Immi grant Ri ght s Proj ect 615 Second Ave., Ste. 400 Seattle, WA 98104 Tel: 206 957 -8611 Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Case 2:17-cv-00126Document Document 1-45 Filed Filed01/30/17 01/28/17 Page Page22of of22PageID# 48 1 2 THIS MATTER HAVING COME TO THE COURT UPON PETITIONERS’ 3 EMERGENCY ORDER FOR STAY OF REMOVAL, AND THE COURT HAVING 4 CONSIDERED THE EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, 5 6 7 DOCKET NO. 1, AND THE MOTION FOR EMERGENCY STAY, DOCKET NO. 2, HEREBY GRANTS THE FOLLOWING ORDER: 8 1. THE COURTS GRANTS A STAY OF REMOVAL. 2. DEFENDANTS ARE ENJOINED FROM REMOVING JOHN DOE I AND 9 10 11 JOHN DOE II FROM THE UNITED STATES PENDING FURTHER ORDER 12 OF THE COURT. 13 14 15 16 3. The Court SETS a hearing for 10:00 a.m. on Friday, February 3, 2017, to determine whether to lift the stay. DATED this 28th day of January, 2017. 17 A 18 19 20 Thomas S. Zilly United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ORDER- 2 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus North west Immi grant Ri ght s Proj ect 615 Second Ave., Ste. 400 Seattle, WA 98104 Tel: 206 957 -8611 CaseCase 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD 2:17-cv-00702 Document Document 5 Filed 1-5 01/29/17 Filed 01/30/17 Page 1Page of 4 1Page of 4 PageID# ID #:51 49 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Ali Khoshbakhti Vayeghan, Petitioner, 12 13 14 15 16 Kelly, et al., v. Respondents. ) ) Case No. CV 17-0702 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 17 18 19 On January 28, 2017, Petitioner Vayeghan filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 20 Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, an Order to Show Cause re 21 Preliminary Injunction, and an Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order 22 (“TRO”) staying his removal from the United States, and ordering his release from the 23 custody of the Department of Homeland Security. [Doc. ##1, 2.] Before the Court could 24 rule on the TRO, he was placed on a flight to Dubai to be removed to Iran. On January 25 29, 2017, he filed an Amended Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order 26 (“Amended TRO”), which is currently before the Court. [Doc. # 4.] 27 28 -1- CaseCase 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD 2:17-cv-00702 Document Document 5 Filed 1-5 01/29/17 Filed 01/30/17 Page 2Page of 4 2Page of 4 PageID# ID #:52 50 1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs the issuance of TROs and preliminary 2 injunctions, and courts apply the same standard to both. See Credit Bureau Connection, 3 Inc. v. Pardini, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL 2737128, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 12, 2010) 4 (citing Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless & Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 1199 v. 5 Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006)). The purpose of such injunctive relief is 6 to preserve the rights and relative positions of the parties, i.e., the status quo, until a final 7 judgment issues. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank N.V., 590 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th 8 Cir. 2010) (citing Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 9 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981)). 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Having reviewed and considered Petitioner’s written submissions, the Court finds that: 1. Petitioner has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in establishing that removal violates the Establishment Clause, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and his rights to Equal Protection guaranteed by the United States Constitution. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152(a)(1)(A) (“[N]o person shall receive any preference or 18 priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of 19 the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.”); Johnson 20 v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506–508 (2005); Board of Educ. Of Kiryas Joel Vill. 21 Sch. Dist. V. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696, 702–703 (1994); Vill. of Arlington 22 Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–67 (1977). 23 24 25 2. There is a strong likelihood that Petitioner is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of interim injunctive relief. 26 27 28 -2- CaseCase 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD 2:17-cv-00702 Document Document 5 Filed 1-5 01/29/17 Filed 01/30/17 Page 3Page of 4 3Page of 4 PageID# ID #:53 51 1 2 3. The balance of equities weighs sharply in favor of Petitioner and granting interim injunctive relief. 3 4 4. The Court must consider the public interest in upholding constitutional rights. 5 Preminger v. Pincipi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2005). Given the constitutional 6 rights at issue in this case, interim injunctive relief is in the public interest. 7 8 In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1. Respondents are enjoined and restrained from barring Petitioner’s return to the United States. 2. Respondents shall transport Petitioner back to the United States and admit him under the terms of his previously approved visa. 3. Respondents shall communicate the terms of this Court’s order immediately to officers in Dubai, and to authorities in the airport in Dubai holding Petitioner on Respondents’ orders. 20 21 22 4. Respondents shall file their opposition to Petitioners’ Ex Parte Application by February 3, 2017. Petitioner shall file her reply by February 7, 2017. 23 24 5. Respondents shall appear before the assigned judge on February 10, 2017 at 9:30 25 a.m. to show cause why the preliminary injunctive relief sought in the Ex Parte 26 27 28 -3- CaseCase 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD 2:17-cv-00702 Document Document 5 Filed 1-5 01/29/17 Filed 01/30/17 Page 4Page of 4 4Page of 4 PageID# ID #:54 52 1 2 3 4 6. Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause re Preliminary Injunction should not be granted. IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 6 7 DATED: January 29, 2017 DOLLY M. GEE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 DATED: January 29, 2017 17 DOLLY M. GEE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -4- Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Case 1:17-cv-10154Document Document 1-66 Filed Filed01/30/17 01/29/17 Page Page11of of33PageID# 53 Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Case 1:17-cv-10154Document Document 1-66 Filed Filed01/30/17 01/29/17 Page Page22of of33PageID# 54 Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Case 1:17-cv-10154Document Document 1-66 Filed Filed01/30/17 01/29/17 Page Page33of of33PageID# 55 Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1-7 Filed 01/30/17 Page 1 of 2 PageID# 56 CIVIL COVER SHEET JS 44 (Rev. 0 /16) The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.) I. (a) PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS Linda Sarsour, Rashida Tlaib, Zahra Billoo, John Does 1-10, Jane Doe 1-2, et al. (b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Kings County, New York Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, sued in his official capacity, John F. Kelly Secretary of DHS in his official capacity County of Residence of First Listed Defendant (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) NOTE: (c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number) Washington DC (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY) IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED. Attorneys (If Known) Gadeir Abbas -(720) 251-0425 The Law Office of Gadeir Abbas 1155 F Street, NW 20004 II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an “X” in One Box Only) u 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff u 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party) u 2 U.S. Government Defendant u 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III) III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an “X” in One Box for Plaintiff (For Diversity Cases Only) PTF Citizen of This State u 1 u u u u u TORTS u u u u 110 Insurance 120 Marine 130 Miller Act 140 Negotiable Instrument 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment 151 Medicare Act 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excludes Veterans) 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran’s Benefits 160 Stockholders’ Suits 190 Other Contract 195 Contract Product Liability 196 Franchise u u u u u u REAL PROPERTY 210 Land Condemnation 220 Foreclosure 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment 240 Torts to Land 245 Tort Product Liability 290 All Other Real Property u u u PERSONAL INJURY u 310 Airplane u 315 Airplane Product Liability u 320 Assault, Libel & Slander u 330 Federal Employers’ Liability u 340 Marine u 345 Marine Product Liability u 350 Motor Vehicle u 355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability u 360 Other Personal Injury u 362 Personal Injury Medical Malpractice CIVIL RIGHTS u 440 Other Civil Rights u 441 Voting u 442 Employment u 443 Housing/ Accommodations u 445 Amer. w/Disabilities Employment u 446 Amer. w/Disabilities Other u 448 Education and One Box for Defendant) PTF DEF Incorporated or Principal Place u 4 u 4 of Business In This State Citizen of Another State u 2 u 2 Incorporated and Principal Place of Business In Another State u 5 u 5 Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country u 3 u 3 Foreign Nation u 6 u 6 &OLFN KHUH IRU 1DWXUH RI 6XLW &RGH 'HVFULSWLRQV FORFEITURE/PENALTY BANKRUPTCY OTHER STATUTES IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an “X” in One Box Only) CONTRACT DEF u 1 PERSONAL INJURY u 365 Personal Injury Product Liability u 367 Health Care/ Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability u 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY u 370 Other Fraud u 371 Truth in Lending u 380 Other Personal Property Damage u 385 Property Damage Product Liability PRISONER PETITIONS Habeas Corpus: u 463 Alien Detainee u 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence u 530 General u 535 Death Penalty Other: u 540 Mandamus & Other u 550 Civil Rights u 555 Prison Condition u 560 Civil Detainee Conditions of Confinement u 625 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC 881 u 690 Other u 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 u 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 PROPERTY RIGHTS u 820 Copyrights u 830 Patent u 840 Trademark LABOR u 710 Fair Labor Standards Act u 720 Labor/Management Relations u 740 Railway Labor Act u 751 Family and Medical Leave Act u 790 Other Labor Litigation u 791 Employee Retirement Income Security Act u u u u u SOCIAL SECURITY 861 HIA (1395ff) 862 Black Lung (923) 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) 864 SSID Title XVI 865 RSI (405(g)) FEDERAL TAX SUITS u 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) u 871 IRS—Third Party 26 USC 7609 IMMIGRATION u 462 Naturalization Application u 465 Other Immigration Actions u 375 False Claims Act u 376 Qui Tam (31 USC 3729(a)) u 400 State Reapportionment u 410 Antitrust u 430 Banks and Banking u 450 Commerce u 460 Deportation u 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations u 480 Consumer Credit u 490 Cable/Sat TV u 850 Securities/Commodities/ Exchange u 890 Other Statutory Actions u 891 Agricultural Acts u 893 Environmental Matters u 895 Freedom of Information Act u 896 Arbitration u 899 Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision u 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes V. ORIGIN (Place an “X” in One Box Only) u 1 Original Proceeding u 2 Removed from State Court u 3 u 6 Multidistrict Litigation Transfer (specify) Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): Remanded from Appellate Court u 4 Reinstated or Reopened u 5 Transferred from Another District u 8 Multidistrict Litigation Direct File Establish and Free Exercise Clause, Equal Protection Clause, Admin. Procedures Act [5 USC 702-706] VI. CAUSE OF ACTION Brief description of cause: President Trump's executive order is motivated by a bare desire to stigmatize Muslims. u CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION VII. REQUESTED IN UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P. COMPLAINT: VIII. RELATED CASE(S) (See instructions): IF ANY JUDGE Brinkema DATE CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint: u Yes u No JURY DEMAND: DEMAND $ DOCKET NUMBER 1:17-cv-116 SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD /s/Gadeir Abbas 01/30/2017 FOR OFFICE USE ONLY RECEIPT # AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG. JUDGE Case 1:17-cv-00120-AJT-IDD Document 1-7 Filed 01/30/17 Page 2 of 2 PageID# 57 JS 44 Reverse (Rev. 0 /16) INSTRUCTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS COMPLETING CIVIL COVER SHEET FORM JS 44 Authority For Civil Cover Sheet The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and service of pleading or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently, a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk of Court for each civil complaint filed. The attorney filing a case should complete the form as follows: I.(a) (b) (c) Plaintiffs-Defendants. Enter names (last, first, middle initial) of plaintiff and defendant. If the plaintiff or defendant is a government agency, use only the full name or standard abbreviations. If the plaintiff or defendant is an official within a government agency, identify first the agency and then the official, giving both name and title. County of Residence. For each civil case filed, except U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county where the first listed plaintiff resides at the time of filing. In U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county in which the first listed defendant resides at the time of filing. (NOTE: In land condemnation cases, the county of residence of the "defendant" is the location of the tract of land involved.) Attorneys. Enter the firm name, address, telephone number, and attorney of record. If there are several attorneys, list them on an attachment, noting in this section "(see attachment)". II. Jurisdiction. The basis of jurisdiction is set forth under Rule 8(a), F.R.Cv.P., which requires that jurisdictions be shown in pleadings. Place an "X" in one of the boxes. If there is more than one basis of jurisdiction, precedence is given in the order shown below. United States plaintiff. (1) Jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 1345 and 1348. Suits by agencies and officers of the United States are included here. United States defendant. (2) When the plaintiff is suing the United States, its officers or agencies, place an "X" in this box. Federal question. (3) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1331, where jurisdiction arises under the Constitution of the United States, an amendment to the Constitution, an act of Congress or a treaty of the United States. In cases where the U.S. is a party, the U.S. plaintiff or defendant code takes precedence, and box 1 or 2 should be marked. Diversity of citizenship. (4) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1332, where parties are citizens of different states. When Box 4 is checked, the citizenship of the different parties must be checked. (See Section III below; NOTE: federal question actions take precedence over diversity cases.) III. Residence (citizenship) of Principal Parties. This section of the JS 44 is to be completed if diversity of citizenship was indicated above. Mark this section for each principal party. IV. 1DWXUH RI 6XLW 3ODFH DQ ; LQ WKH DSSURSULDWH ER[ ,I WKHUH DUH PXOWLSOH QDWXUH RI VXLW FRGHV DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH FDVH SLFN WKH QDWXUH RI VXLW FRGH WKDW LV PRVW DSSOLFDEOH &OLFN KHUH IRU 1DWXUH RI 6XLW &RGH 'HVFULSWLRQV V. Origin. Place an "X" in one of the seven boxes. Original Proceedings. (1) Cases which originate in the United States district courts. Removed from State Court. (2) Proceedings initiated in state courts may be removed to the district courts under Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1441. When the petition for removal is granted, check this box. Remanded from Appellate Court. (3) Check this box for cases remanded to the district court for further action. Use the date of remand as the filing date. Reinstated or Reopened. (4) Check this box for cases reinstated or reopened in the district court. Use the reopening date as the filing date. Transferred from Another District. (5) For cases transferred under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). Do not use this for within district transfers or multidistrict litigation transfers. Multidistrict Litigation – Transfer. (6) Check this box when a multidistrict case is transferred into the district under authority of Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1407. Multidistrict Litigation – Direct File. (8) Check this box when a multidistrict case is filed in the same district as the Master MDL docket. PLEASE NOTE THAT THERE IS NOT AN ORIGIN CODE 7. Origin Code 7 was used for historical records and is no longer relevant due to changes in statue. VI. Cause of Action. Report the civil statute directly related to the cause of action and give a brief description of the cause. Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity. Example: U.S. Civil Statute: 47 USC 553 Brief Description: Unauthorized reception of cable service VII. Requested in Complaint. Class Action. Place an "X" in this box if you are filing a class action under Rule 23, F.R.Cv.P. Demand. In this space enter the actual dollar amount being demanded or indicate other demand, such as a preliminary injunction. Jury Demand. Check the appropriate box to indicate whether or not a jury is being demanded. VIII. Related Cases. This section of the JS 44 is used to reference related pending cases, if any. If there are related pending cases, insert the docket numbers and the corresponding judge names for such cases. Date and Attorney Signature. Date and sign the civil cover sheet.