Neil Gorsuch
On May 10, 2006, George W. Bush nominated Neil Gorsuch to the Tenth Circuit. He was
confirmed to the Tenth Circuit on July 20, 2006 by voice vote.
Neil Gorsuch was born on August 29, 1967 in Denver, Colorado, and moved to Washington D.C.
in 1981. His mother, Anne Gorsuch, served as Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) under President Reagan. He graduated from Georgetown Preparatory School in
Washington; Columbia University; and Harvard Law School. After law school, he clerked for
Supreme Court Justices Byron White and Anthony Kennedy from 1993–1994. He also obtained
a doctorate in philosophy from Oxford University in 1995. Gorsuch served as Principal Deputy
to the Associate Attorney General at the U.S. Department of Justice and as a partner at Kellogg,
Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel.
Judge Gorsuch is a far-right extremist who would manipulate his politically loaded version of
―originalist‖ methodology to overturn basic and well-established Supreme Court precedents and
principles of American law and, most importantly, prevent the federal government from properly
enforcing countless acts of Congress—for example, critical laws that ensure workers‘ rights and
safety, guarantee equal opportunity, safeguard consumers and investors, ensure the safety of food
and drugs, and protect our environment.
Notably, Judge Gorsuch has been critical of progressives who have brought constitutional
challenges in the courts. In particular, Judge Gorsuch has harshly condemned those who have
turned to the courts to advance LGBT equality, enforce church-state separation in the context of
vouchers, and to address individual autonomy and the right to physician aid in dying. He claims
this is inappropriately using the courts to debate public policy, ignoring courts‘ inherent
responsibility to address constitutional challenges brought to them by injured parties and his own
support for repeated challenges to the Affordable Care Act. In fact, when Gorsuch says courts
should not address certain issues, what he really means is that they should address them, but
issue conservative rulings. He also minimizes the critical role the courts have played in ensuring
equality and the enforcement of critical constitutional values through landmark civil rights and
women‘s rights decisions.
Judge Gorsuch has been described as ―a predictably socially conservative judge who tends to
favor state power over federal power,‖ and as a member of ―as good a College of Judicial
Cardinals as the conservative and pro-life movements have ever seen.‖
Gorsuch would seek to restrict the ability of the federal government to protect all
Americans
Gorsuch would make it more difficult for agencies to enforce laws that keep our air and water
clean and safe; that ensure our food and medicine are safe; that protect essential workers‘ rights;
and that safeguard consumers and investors.
Gorsuch‘s position on agencies‘ authority to do their jobs is extreme, even in contrast to that of
the late Justice Scalia. Scalia accepted a legal principle that gives agencies authority to determine
how they will carry out their mandates when the law governing their actions might be open to
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 different interpretations. Gorsuch does not. Rather, he embraces a philosophy that courts should
be able to overrule the agency experts when it comes to their important work in enforcing
regulations. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1143 (10th Cir. 2016) and Caring
Hearts Personal Home Services., Inc. v. Burwell, 824 F.3d 968 (10th Cir. 2016). It is difficult to
overstate the damage this would cause to our nation. Eliminating this principle, known as the
Chevron doctrine, would tie the hands of precisely those entities that Congress has recognized
have the depth and experience to enforce critical laws, safeguard essential protections, and
ensure the safety of the American people. Importantly, the agency leaders whose expertise
Gorsuch would dismiss are answerable to the people‘s elected representatives in Congress, and
anything they do can be overridden by statute. As even Justice Scalia rightly noted, ―[i]n the long
run, Chevron will endure and be given its full scope‖ because ―it more accurately reflects the
reality of government, and thus more adequately serves its needs.‖
In another troubling departure from decades of Supreme Court precedent allowing agencies to
set rules protecting the public, Judge Gorsuch has called for reinvigorating a doctrine last used
successfully in 1935 by a famously reactionary, and short-lived, Supreme Court majority bent on
invalidating New Deal laws. See United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666 (10th Cir. 2015).
Indeed, Justice Scalia himself authored a modern day Supreme Court opinion rejecting the most
recent attempt to resuscitate that now-discredited doctrine—the nondelegation doctrine. As
Justice Scalia explained, reviving that doctrine would deprive Congress of authority essential to
empower agencies to effectively implement and enforce critical statutes that protect the
American people in countless areas from ensuring financial stability to controlling health
hazards. In Justice Scalia‘s words, ―we [the justices] have almost never felt qualified to secondguess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those
executing or applying the law,‖ Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001)
(quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting), because ―a
certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive and judicial
action,‖ Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Judge Gorsuch would flout these
principles, overturn decades of precedent, and disable Congress—and the electorate—from
making government work for the American people.
Gorsuch is a friend of big business and harms the rights of workers and consumers
In a working paper for the Washington Legal Foundation, Settlements in Securities Fraud
Class Actions: Improving Investor Protection, Washington Legal Foundation 3-4 (2005),
Gorsuch recommended that the legislature and courts make securities fraud class actions
more difficult to achieve. He lamented that ―[b]ecause the amount of damages demanded in
securities class actions is frequently so great, corporations often face the choice of ‗stak[ing]
their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of
bankruptcy [into settling] even if they have no legal liability.‘‖
In his private practice, Gorsuch drafted a brief in the Supreme Court involving issues related
to corporate class actions that advocated for corporate interests. See Brief of Amicus Curiae
for the United States Chamber of Commerce at 2, Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336
(2005) (arguing that the class action rules under securities fraud claims place an excessive
burden on businesses). In an article, No Loss, No Gain, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005,
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 discussing the case, Gorsuch launched into an attack on plaintiffs‘ lawyers for using such
cases as vehicles for ―free ride[s] to fast riches.‖ He concluded that they involve ―frivolous
claims . . . [that] impose[] an enormous toll on the economy, affecting virtually every public
corporation in America at one time or another and costing business billions of dollars in
settlements every year.‖
In Weeks v. Kansas, 503 F. App'x 640 (10th Cir. 2012), Judge Gorsuch held that a state fire
marshal's in-house counsel was not protected under Title VII when she alleged she was fired
after she took complaints made to her by employees to the fire marshal. Judge Gorsuch
concluded that the attorney‘s actions, even when she presented evidence that she had taken a
position adverse to her employer, were insufficient to show that she had engaged in protected
activity. In the opinion, Judge Gorsuch acknowledged that his application of the Tenth
Circuit‘s jurisprudence might have been superseded by a Supreme Court decision, see
Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271 (2009), but declined
to apply the Supreme Court‘s test because the plaintiff had not explicitly relied on it in her
briefing to the court.
As a judge, he has consistently ruled against employees, including in a number of dissents. In
Compass Environmental, Inc. v. OSHRC, 663 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2011) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting), he voted to overturn a Department of Labor fine against a company whose
failure to train a worker caused his death. He dissented from a decision upholding an NLRB
back pay order where the employer improperly reduced wages. See NLRB v. Community
Health Services, Inc., 812 F.3d 768 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). He dissented
from a decision that agreed that a trucking company improperly fired an employee because
he was a whistleblower. See TransAm Trucking, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., No. 15-9504,
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13071 (July 15, 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). And in Strickland v.
UPS, 555 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part),
he dissented from a ruling giving a female UPS driver a chance to prove sex discrimination.
Judge Gorsuch argued that the plaintiff had not provided any evidence that she was treated
less favorably than her male colleagues even though several of her coworkers testified that
the plaintiff was treated differently from her male counterparts. The plaintiff was regularly
outperforming her male colleagues, but was required to attend individual meetings and
counseling sessions about her performance.
Gorsuch has demonstrated hostility to women’s right to access reproductive health care
Judge Gorsuch joined Judge Hartz‘s dissent from the denial of en banc review in Little
Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colo. v. Burwell, 799 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir.
2015). There, the majority opinion had upheld the birth control accommodation for
religiously-affiliated non-profit organizations, which allows them to opt out of providing
birth control coverage by signing a form, but still ensures that women get that coverage from
their regular insurance plan. Judge Gorsuch disagreed with the majority‘s decision refusing
to rehear the challenge brought by the Little Sisters of the Poor.
In Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), later affirmed by
the Supreme Court, Judge Gorsuch joined the majority in holding that corporations are
persons exercising religion for purposes of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
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 and that the ACA contraceptive-coverage requirement was not enforceable as to the
corporation. The Hobby Lobby decision has been invoked not only to support curtailing
employees‘ access to reproductive health care but also to justify noncompliance with child
labor laws, see Perez v. Paragon Contractors Corp. v. Perez, No. 2:13CV00281-DS, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128339 (D. Utah Sept. 11, 2014); anti-kidnapping laws, see United States
v. Epstein, 91 F. Supp. 3d 573 (D. N.J. 2015); and antidiscrimination laws, see Comments
from United States Conference of Catholic Bishops to Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (Mar. 30, 2015).
Judge Gorsuch would have allowed the Governor of Utah to defund Planned Parenthood of
Utah after false videos surfaced, purporting to show other Planned Parenthood affiliates
negotiating the sale of fetal tissue. See Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah v. Herbert, 839
F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). The Tenth Circuit had granted a
preliminary injunction in favor of Planned Parenthood, see Planned Parenthood Ass’n of
Utah v. Herbert, 828 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2016), and Judge Gorsuch dissented from the
denial of a request to rehear the case en banc. Judge Briscoe, writing in support of the denial
of rehearing, accused Judge Gorsuch‘s dissenting opinion of ―mischaracterize[ing] this
litigation and the panel opinion at several turns,‖ to reach its desired result. Planned
Parenthood Ass’n of Utah, 839 F.3d at 3 (Briscoe, J., concurring).
Gorsuch protects police officers who use excessive force
In Wilson v. City of Lafayette, 510 F. App'x 775 (10th Cir. 2013), Judge Gorsuch held that a
police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim arising
from his use of stun gun that killed a young man. The officers had approached the man ―near
an area known to be used‖ to grow marijuana. Id. at 776. After the man admitted the plants
were his, he fled, and the officer deployed his taser. Judge Gorsuch reasoned that the use of
force was reasonable because ―[defendant] was resisting arrest by fleeing from officers after
they identified themselves—even if the crime of which he was suspected was not itself a
violent one, he was likely to be apprehended eventually, and he hadn't harmed anyone yet.‖
Id. at 777.
Gorsuch is hostile to commonsense environmental regulations
In Wilderness Society v. Kane County, 632 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2011), Judge Gorsuch
concurred in a case that dismissed for lack of standing, a claim brought by several
environmental organizations asserting that a county ordinance that opened a large stretch of
federal land to off-highway vehicle use was preempted by federal law. The dissent accused
the majority of ―misstat[ing] and misconstrue[ing] the positions of the parties and the rulings
of the trial court to achieve this result.‖ Id. at 1180 (Lucero, J., dissenting). The dissent
further stated that the holding ―will work untold mischief‖ and ―will have long-term
deleterious effects on the use and management of federal public lands.‖ Id. at 1180, 1195.
Gorsuch would not protect the rights of disabled students
Contrary to an earlier decision by an impartial hearing officer, Judge Gorsuch held that a
student with autism did not have a right under the federal Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) to an education that would provide a chance to achieve intellectual
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 and social skills outside the classroom. This, even though Congress made clear that
―prepar[ing] [students] to lead productive and independent adult lives, to the maximum
extent possible" is a major goal of the IDEA. See Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., ex
rel. Jeff P., 540 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2008).
Over a vigorous dissent, Judge Gorsuch authored the majority opinion in A.F. ex rel
Christine B. v. Española Pub. Sch., 801 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2015), which held that a student
cannot, for technical reasons, assert a claim for violations of the Americans with Disabilities
Act if she had earlier settled with a school district for violations of the IDEA even though, as
Congress made clear, students have distinct rights under both laws.
Judge Gorsuch authored the majority opinion in Garcia v. Board of Education of
Albuquerque Public Schools, 520 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2008), holding that even when a
school violates a student's rights under the IDEA, the student may still be entitled to no
remedy for an IDEA violation if the student leaves the school out of frustration with the
school‘s continuous failure to follow the IDEA.

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