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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01
to Google

Misc. No.

16-960-M-O 1
16-1061-M

In re Search Warrant No. 16-1061-M
to Google
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
THOMAS J. RUETER
United States Magistrate Judge

February 3, 2017

In August, 2016, this court issued two search warrants, pursuant to section 2703
of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701

et~

("SCA" or "Act"), which required

Google Inc. ("Google") to disclose to agents of the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation ("FBI")
certain electronic data held in the accounts of targets in two separate criminal investigations.
Each account holder resides in the United States, the crimes they are suspected of committing
occurred solely in the United States, and the electronic data at issue was exchanged between
persons located in the United States.
Presently before the court are the Government's motions to compel Google to
produce electronic data in accordance with these search warrants (the "Motions"). 1 Google has
partially complied with the warrants by producing data that is within the scope of the warrants
that it could confirm is stored on its servers located in the United States. (N.T. 1/12/17 at 13.)
Google, however, has refused to produce other data required to be produced by the warrants,
relying upon a recent decision of a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by
The Government filed a motion to compel in each of the above-referenced cases.
See Case No. 16-960-M-01, Doc. 4 and Case No. 16-1061-M, Doc. 5. The motion filed in each
case is essentially the same. Accordingly, the court's analysis applies to both motions.

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Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) (hereinafter "Microsoft"), rehearing en bane
denied, No. 14-2985, 2017 WL 362765 (2d Cir. Jan. 24, 2017). 2 For the reasons set forth below,
the court grants the Motions.

I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Procedural History
On August 2, 2016, the undersigned issued a search warrant pursuant to section

2703(b) of the SCA, for all data associated with three Google accounts held by an individual who
resided in the United States (Case No. 16-960-M-01). The Affidavit in support of the
Application for the Search Warrant established probable cause that the three Google accounts
described therein were being used by the target of the investigation to commit a fraud in violation
of federal law. The fraud described in the Application occurred exclusively in the United States
and the victim of the fraud was domiciled in the United States. The executed warrant was served
upon Google at its offices in California. The warrant directed Google to send the data to an FBI
agent in Pennsylvania.
On August 19, 2016, United States Magistrate Judge M. Faith Angell issued a
search warrant (Case No. 16-1061-M) to Google for all data associated with an account of an
individual who resided in the United States and was a target of an investigation pertaining to the
theft of trade secrets from a corporation located in the United States. The Affidavit in support of

2

On a request for a rehearing en bane, the active judges of the Second Circuit were
split evenly (four to four) on whether to grant the petition, and thus the petition was denied. The
Honorable Susan L. Carney concurred by opinion in the denial of rehearing en bane. No other
judge joined in this opinion. Four judges filed separate opinions dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en bane. They were the Honorable Dennis Jacobs, Judge Jose A. Cabranes, Judge
Reena Raggi, and Judge Christopher F. Droney. Each dissenting opinion was joined by the other
dissenters.
2

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the Application for the Search Warrant established probable cause that the theft occurred in the
United States and this conduct violated federal laws. The warrant was served upon Google at its
offices in California. The court allowed "Google to make a digital copy of the entire contents of
the information subject to seizure." That copy would be provided to an FBI agent located in
Pennsylvania. "The contents [would] then be analyzed to identify records and information
subject to seizure." See Aff.

i! 14(I) filed in support of search warrant.

As explained above, Google did not disclose to the Government all of the user
data requested in the two warrants. On October 28, 2016, the Government filed a motion to
compel Google to comply with the search warrant, filed at Misc. No. 16-960-M-01 (Doc. 4). On
October 28, 2016, this court issued an Order to Google to "show cause in a written response by
November 14, 2016 as to the basis upon which Google, Inc. chose not to comply with Search
Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 (Doc. 4)." On November 22, 2016, Google filed a Response to
November 22, 2016 Order to Show Cause and Motion to Amend Non-Disclosure Order (Doc. 7)
("Google Resp."). In its Response, Google argued that it was not required to produce electronic
records stored outside the United States. Google also argued that the warrant is "over broad
because it does not describe with particularity which services there is probable cause to search."
In addition, Google challenged the non-disclosure order entered by this court pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2705(b), contending that the order was an "unconstitutional prior restraint on speech."
On January 5, 2017, the Government filed a Reply to Google's Response (Doc. 9) ("Gov't
Reply").
The procedural history with respect to the Search Warrant at Misc. No. 16-1061M is similar. On November 22, 2016, the Government filed a motion to compel Google to

3

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comply with the search warrant (Doc. 5). On November 22, 2016, the court ordered Google to
"show cause in a written response to be filed by December 22, 2016 as to the basis upon which
Google chose not to comply with Search Warrant No. 16-1061-M." On December 22 2016

'

'

Google, Inc. filed its response to the order to show cause and filed a motion to amend the nondisclosure order (Doc. 7). As in its Response filed in 16-960-M-01, Google relied on the
Microsoft case to justify its non-compliance and also challenged the non-disclosure order. On
January 5, 2017, the Government filed its reply brief in this case (Doc. 8).
By order dated January 6, 2017, the court granted the parties' joint request for
consolidation of the two cases for purpose of the oral argument scheduled on January 12, 2017.
The parties submitted a Stipulation of Facts, which was filed in both cases on January 12, 2017. 3
At the hearing, both Google and the Government stressed the importance of the issues raised by
the Microsoft case. Google explained that each year it receives thousands of requests for the
disclosure of user data from federal, state, and local governmental entities in connection with
criminal matters. The Government emphasized the critical importance of obtaining the
electronic data of criminal suspects residing in the United States. Due to the priority of the issue
to both parties, the court will address the questions arising from the Microsoft decision in this
Memorandum of Decision, and will separately decide the over-breath and non-disclosure issues
in separate orders.

3

The parties entered into a Stipulation regarding the architecture of Google Inc. and
its businesses. See Case No. 16-960-M-01, Doc. 22 and Case No. 16-1061-M, Doc. 11.
4

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B.

Stored Communications Act
As noted supra, the search warrants at issue in the present cases were issued under

section 2703 of the SCA. 4 The SCA "was born from congressional recognition that neither
existing federal statutes nor the Fourth Amendment protected against potential intrusions on
individual privacy arising from illicit access to stored communications in remote computing
operations and large data banks that stored e-mails." In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement
Consumer Privacy Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 145 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted), cert.
denied (2016). Section 2701 of the Act prohibits unauthorized third parties from, inter alia,
obtaining, altering or preventing authorized access to an electronic communication stored in a
facility through which an electronic communication service is provided. See 18 U.S.C.§ 2701.
Section 2701 also imposes criminal penalties for its violation. Id. Subject to certain exceptions,
section 2702 of the Act prohibits providers of electronic communication services and remote
computing services from disclosing information associated with and contents of stored
communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702. Significant to the cases at bar, the SCA also empowers
the Government to compel a provider to disclose customer information and records. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 2702(b), 2703. The Government may seek information in three ways: by subpoena,
court order, or warrant. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703. The particular method chosen by the Government
dictates the showing that must be made by the Government and the type of records that must be
disclosed in response.

4

The SCA was passed as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).

5

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The Court of Appeals in Microsoft succinctly described the SCA's disclosure
structure as follows:
Regarding governmental access in particular, § 2703 sets up a pyramidal structure
governing conditions under which service providers must disclose stored
communications to the government. Basic subscriber and transactional
information can be obtained simply with an administrative subpoena. 18 U.S.C. §
2703(c)(2). Other non-content records can be obtained by a court order (a"§
2703(d) order"), which may be issued only upon a statement of "specific and
articulable facts showing ... reasonable grounds to believe that the contents or
records ... are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." §
2703(c)(2), (d). The government may also obtain some user content with an
administrative subpoena or a§ 2703(d) order, but only if notice is provided to the
service provider's subscriber or customer. § 2703(b)(l)(B).
Microsoft, 829 F.3d at 207. The statutory provisions most relevant to the cases at bar pertain to
the court's authority to issue a warrant requiring providers to disclose information and
authorizing the Government to search the disclosed information. To obtain such user content, the
Act generally requires the government to obtain a warrant that has been issued using the
procedures set forth in Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 18 U.S.C. §
2703(a)-(c).

C.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41
Rule 41 describes the procedures for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant.

Of particular relevance here is Rule 41(b)(5) which provides the following:
(5) a magistrate judge having authority in any district where activities
related to the crime may have occurred, or in the District of Columbia, may issue
a warrant for property that is located outside the jurisdiction of any state or
district, but within the following:
(A) a United States territory, possession, or commonwealth;
(B) the premises - no matter who owns them - of a United States
diplomatic or consular mission in a foreign state, including any
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appurtenant building, part of a building, or land used for the mission's
purposes; or
(C) a residence and any appurtenant land owned or leased by the
United States and used by United States personnel assigned to a United
States diplomatic or consular mission in a foreign state.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(5).

D.

Google's Production of Electronic Data
Google is a United States-headquartered company that provides a variety of online

and communications services to its users. (Stip.

~

1.) Google stores user data in various

locations, some of which are in the United States and some of which are in countries outside the
United States. (Stip.

~

2.) Some user files may be broken into component parts, and different

parts of a single file may be stored in different locations (and, accordingly, different countries) at
the same time. (Stip.

~

3.) Google operates a state-of-the-art intelligent network that, with

respect to some types of data, including some of the data at issue in this case, automatically
moves data from one location on Google's network to another as frequently as needed to
optimize for performance, reliability, and other efficiencies. 5 (Stip. ~ 4.) As a result, the country
or countries in which specific user data, or components of that data, is located may change. Id. It
is possible that the network will change the location of data between the time when the legal
process is sought and when it is served. Id. As such, Google contends that it does not currently
have the capability, for all of its services, to determine the location of the data and produce that
data to a human user at any particular point in time. (N.T. 1/12117 at 15-16.)

Google stores data in a dynamic network which distributes the data, sometimes in
bits and pieces, to servers located domestically and in foreign countries. Google maintains data
centers across the Americas, Asia and Europe. See
www.Google.com/about/datacenters/inside/locations/index.html (last visited February 2, 2017).
7

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At oral argument, counsel for Google explained that each year Google receives
over 25,000 pieces oflegal process from federal, state, and local governmental entities seeking
the disclosure of user data in criminal matters. (N.T. 1112117 at 7.) Only Google personnel in
Google's Legal Investigations Support team are authorized to access the content of
communications in order to produce it in response to legal process. (Stip.

~

5.) All such Google

personnel are located in the United States. Id. Thus, Google discloses data to the Government
by having one of its authorized employees in the United States access the data through its
computers located in the United States. Indeed, Google admits that this is the only way data can
be accessed in response to legal process and the Government has no other available process to
obtain the data. 6 (Stip. ~ 5; N.T. 1/12/17 at 17.)
Google avers that it has fully complied with the warrants at issue in that it has
"produced all records identified with sufficient particularity that are responsive to the
warrant(s)." (Google Resp. at 4.) Relying on Microsoft, Google posits that a warrant issued
under the SCA "lawfully reaches only data stored within the United States." Id. (citing
Microsoft, 829 F.3d at 222). According to Google, it has "already produced all records that it
can ascertain are stored within the United States." Id. It further contends that the warrants at
issue here cannot compel Google to produce records that are or may be stored outside the United
States. Id. To date, therefore, Google has produced only responsive data which it has confirmed
to be stored in the United States. See Deel. of John R. Tyler at~~ 1-4. Prior to the Second

6

At oral argument, when asked how the Government could obtain the sought-after
data absent Google's production of the data in accordance with the Government's SCA warrant,
Google's counsel indicated that the Government could work to reform the SCA. (N.T. 1/12/17 at
17.)
8

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Circuit's decision in Microsoft, Google routinely complied with federal courts' search warrants
which commanded the production of user data stored on Google servers located outside the
United States. (N.T. 1/12/17 at 8.)

E.

The Microsoft Decision
The Microsoft decision was the result of an appeal from an order of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of New York which denied Microsoft
Corporation's motion to quash a search warrant. In that case, United States Magistrate Judge
James C. Francis, IV, issued a search warrant pursuant to the SCA authorizing the search and
seizure of information associated with a specific web-based email account maintained by
Microsoft Corporation. Microsoft moved to quash the search warrant to the extent it required
Microsoft to access user data stored and maintained on servers located in Ireland and import that
data into the United States for delivery to federal authorities.
In a comprehensive opinion, Judge Francis denied the motion to quash and held
that the warrant did not violate the presumption against extraterritorial application of a law of the
United States. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 15 F.Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Judge Francis found that under section
2703 of the SCA, the term "a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure ... by a court of competent jurisdiction" is ambiguous regarding
jurisdiction. Judge Francis explained as follows:
This language is ambiguous in at least one critical respect. The words "using the
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure" could be
construed to mean, as Microsoft argues, that all aspects of Rule 41 are
incorporated by reference in Section 2703(a), including limitations on the
territorial reach of a warrant issued under that rule. But, equally plausibly, the
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statutory language could be read to mean that while procedural aspects of the
application process are to be drawn from Rule 41 (for example, the presentation of
the application based on sworn testimony to a magistrate judge), more substantive
rules are derived from other sources. See In re United States, [665 F.Supp. 2d
1210, 1219 (D. Or. 2009)] (finding ambiguity in that "'[i]ssued' may be read to
limit the procedures that are applicable under§ 2703(a), or it might merely have
been used as a shorthand for the process of obtaining, issuing, executing, and
returning a warrant, as described in Rule 41 ");In re Search of Yahoo, Inc., No.
07-3194, 2007 WL 1539971, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2007) (finding that "the
phrase 'using the procedures described in' the Federal Rules remains
ambiguous").
Id. at 4 70-71. Judge Francis resolved this ambiguity by finding that an SCA warrant is a hybrid
between a search warrant and a subpoena. Because an SCA warrant is served on a service
provider rather than on a law enforcement officer, it "is executed like a subpoena in that it ...
does not involve government agents entering the premises of the [internet service provider] ... to
search its servers and seize the e-mail account in question." Id. at 471. Thus, the search
warrant's subpoena-like qualities required the service provider to hand over information it
controls no matter where that information is located. This interpretation was supported by the
well-established principle that a court's power to require a person to disclose information applies
to all information in that person's custody or control, regardless of where the information is
located. See Marc Rich & Co., A.G. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1983)
("Neither may the witness resist the production of documents on the ground that the documents
are located abroad. The test for production of documents is control, not location.").
Judge Francis also held that "it is difficult to believe that, in light of the practical
consequences that would follow, Congress intended to limit the reach of the SCA Warrants to
data stored in the United States." In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled
and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F.Supp. 3d at 474. The court reasoned that allowing
10

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Microsoft to withhold the data stored in Ireland would force the Government to rely solely on
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties ("MLAT"s) to obtain information stored abroad. Judge
Francis found that this could not have been Congress' intent as the process under a MLAT is
"slow and laborious" and many countries have no MLAT with the United States. Id. at 474-75.
Finally, Judge Francis noted that "the concerns that animate the presumption against extra
territoriality are simply not present here."
"[A]n SCA Warrant does not criminalize conduct taking place in a foreign
country; it does not involve the deployment of American law enforcement
personnel abroad; it does not require even the physical presence of service
provider employees at the location where data are stored. At least in this instance,
it places obligations only on the service provider to act within the United States."
Id. at 475. On July 31, 2014, Chief Judge Loretta A. Preska of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York affirmed Magistrate Judge Francis' denial of the motion to
quash. See In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 2014 WL 4629624 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2014). On appeal, the Second Circuit
reversed. Microsoft, 829 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2016). The majority opinion was authored by the
Honorable Susan L. Carney and joined by District Judge Victor A. Bolden. Circuit Judge Gerard
E. Lynch filed a concurring opinion.
Significant to the Second Circuit's analytic framework in Microsoft is the
principle of construction utilized by the United States Supreme Court in Morrison v. Nat'l
Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). The Second Circuit noted the presumption against
extraterritorial application of United States statutes analyzed in Morrison to be "strong and
binding." Microsoft, 829 F.3d at 209. The court stated:

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When interpreting the laws of the United States, we presume that legislation of
Congress "is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States," unless a contrary intent clearly appears. [Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255]
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty.,
579 U.S._,_, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 195 L.Ed.2d 476 (2016). This presumption
rests on the perception that "Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to
domestic, not foreign matters." Id. The presumption reflects that Congress, rather
than the courts, has the "facilities necessary" to make policy decisions in the
"delicate field of international relations." Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
_U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664, 185 L.Ed.2d 671 (2013) (quoting Benz v.
Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147, 77 S. Ct. 699, 1 L.Ed.2d 709
(1957)). In line with this recognition, the presumption is applied to protect
against "unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which
could result in international discord." Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v.
Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 113 L.Ed.2d 274
(1991) ("Aramco"); see generally Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto.
Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
Id. at 210. The Second Circuit further explained that, when deciding whether the presumption
against extraterritoriality applies to a particular act, a court must evaluate whether language in the
relevant act indicates a congressional purpose to extend the coverage of such an act beyond
places over which the United States has sovereignty or some measure of legislative control. Id.
(citing Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248). "The statutory provision must contain a 'clear indication of an
extraterritorial application'; otherwise, 'it has none.'" Id. (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255).
Based on the approach set forth in Morrison, the Second Circuit engaged in a twopart inquiry into the extraterritorial application of the SCA's warrant provisions. The court first
analyzed whether the SCA's warrant provisions contemplate extraterritorial application,
ultimately concluding that the statute does not indicate that it applies extraterritorially. Id. at
210-11. 7 The court noted that the plain meaning of the SCA supports this finding. Id. at 211. In

7

In Microsoft, the government acknowledged that the warrant provisions of the
SCA do not contemplate or permit extraterritorial application. Id. at 210.
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addition, the court determined that the term of art "warrant" as used in the SCA was intended to
protect privacy rights in a territorial way. Id. at 212. 8
Having determined under the first step of the Morrison analysis that the relevant
statutory provisions of the SCA do not contemplate extraterritorial application, the court
proceeded to the second step. That is, the court identified the statute's focus and assessed
whether the execution of the warrant would constitute an unlawful extraterritorial application of
the SCA. Id. at 220-21. In so doing, the court examined the plain meaning of the SCA' s warrant
provisions, the focus of the substantive provisions of the Act, the focus of sections 2701 and
2702 of the Act on the protection of stored electronic data, the adoption by the SCA of the
procedures set forth in Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 which reflects the historical understanding of a
warrant as an instrument protective of a citizen's privacy, and the legislative history of the
statute. See id. at 217-20. Ultimately, the Second Circuit found that the SCA focuses on user
privacy and determined that enforcing the warrant by directing Microsoft to seize the contents of
its customer's communications stored in Ireland would be an unlawful extraterritorial application
of the SCA. Id. at 220-21.

F.

Morrison Step Two Analysis
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court further elaborated on the proper analysis

at step two of the Morrison inquiry. In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090

The court rejected the district court's interpretation of the word "warrant" as used
in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) as one being akin to a hybrid between a warrant and a subpoena.
Microsoft, 829 F.3d at 213-14. Instead, the Second Circuit held that the term warrant was a term
of art, tied to the restrictions of Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(5) which limits search warrants to a
United States territory, possession or commonwealth. The court noted that the SCA itself
distinguishes between subpoenas and warrants and the Act does not use the word "hybrid" to
describe a warrant. See id. at 214-16.
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(2016), the Court considered the extraterritorial application of two separate sections of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961

et~

("RICO"), and

applied the principles of Morrison to its analysis. In RJR Nabisco, the Court considered whether
RICO's substantive prohibitions, contained in§ 1962, apply to conduct that occurs in foreign
countries and whether RICO's private right of action, contained in§ 1964(c), applies to injuries
that are suffered in foreign countries. In its analysis, the Court reiterated that the first step of the
Morrison framework asks "whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted
- that is, whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially."
Id. at 2101. When describing the second step of the Morrison analysis, the Court again indicated
that it requires the reviewing court to look at the statute's "focus" to determine whether the case
involves a domestic application of the statute. Id. The Court further elaborated, stating:

If the conduct relevant to the statute's focus occurred in the United States, then the
case involves a permissible domestic application even if other conduct occurred
abroad; but if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign country, then
the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of any
other conduct that occurred in U.S. territory.
Id. Given the facts of the case before it, and in light of the statutory provisions at issue, the Court
did not employ the second step of the Morrison analysis as it described. Ultimately, the Court
determined that the substantive prohibitions of§ 1962 of RICO may apply to foreign conduct and
concluded that the presumption against extraterritoriality was rebutted but only with respect to
certain applications of the statute. Id. at 2101-06. The Court also held that § 1964(c) requires a

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civil RICO plaintiff to allege and prove a domestic injury to business or property and does not
allow recovery for foreign injuries. Id. at 2111. 9

II.

DISCUSSION
Much like the issues presented in Microsoft, the present dispute centers on the

nature and reach of the warrants issued pursuant to the SCA. The court must determine whether
the Government may compel Google to produce electronic records relating to user accounts
pursuant to search warrants issued under section 2703 of the SCA, or in the alternative, whether
Google has provided all records in its possession that the Government may lawfully compel
Google to produce in accordance with the Second Circuit's ruling in Microsoft. The Government
urges this court to depart from the Second Circuit's reasoning in Microsoft and compel
disclosure by Google of the relevant electronic data. See Gov't Reply at 3-25. The Government
argues that the Microsoft decision is incorrect, inconsistent with the weight of authority, not
binding on this court, and should not be followed. For the reasons that follow, this court
concludes that compelling Google to disclose to the Government the data that is the subject of
the warrants does not constitute an unlawful extraterritorial application of the Act.

9

Since the RJR Nabisco case was decided, other courts have applied the RJR
Nabisco interpretation of the Morrison second step. See, e.g., Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown &
Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 194-96 (5th Cir. 2017) (following guidance ofRJR Nabisco and
analyzing whether there was any domestic conduct relevant to the plaintiffs' claims under the
Alien Tort Statute); see also Tatung Co., Ltd. v. Shu Tze Hsu, 2016 WL 6683201, at *8 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 14, 2016) (analyzing whether the plaintiff suffered a domestic injury to business or
property for the purposes of civil RICO's private right of action); Bascufian v. Daniel Yarur ELS
Amended ComplaintA, 2016 WL 5475998, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2016) (to determine
whether a plaintiff may maintain a private cause of action under § 1964(c), the court must
consider where the alleged injury was suffered).
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A.

Application of the Morrison Analysis
As an initial matter, the court notes that the parties do not dispute the Second

Circuit's conclusion at the first step of the Morrison framework - that Congress did not intend
the SCA's warrant provisions to apply extraterritorially. Rather, the Government takes issue
with the second step of the Morrison analysis as applied by the Second Circuit in Microsoft. The
Government argues that the Second Circuit erred when it determined that the "focus" of section
2703 of the SCA is privacy, as opposed to disclosure. 10 However, the court will assume,
arguendo, that the focus of the SCA's warrant provisions is privacy as the Second Circuit
reasoned.
With this "focus" in mind, a reviewing court must determine whether the case
involves a domestic application of the SCA. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. To do so, the
court must examine where the conduct relevant to the statute's focus occurred. See id. ("If the
conduct relevant to the statute's focus occurred in the United States, then the case involves a
permissible domestic application even if other conduct occurred abroad; but if the conduct
relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible
extraterritorial application regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S. territory.").
1.

Analysis of Extraterritoriality in Microsoft

With respect to this portion of the Morrison framework, the Microsoft court
examined where the electronic data was "seized" and the "invasion of the customer's privacy

10

Relying on Morrison and RJR Nabisco, the Government contends that step two of
a proper extraterritoriality analysis should proceed on a section by section basis. See Gov't
Reply at 13-16. According to the Government, the Second Circuit incorrectly concluded that
privacy concerns trump the actual focus of§ 2703, which is disclosure.
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takes place." 829 F.3d at 220. 11 The Second Circuit found that the SCA warrant had
extraterritorial application because "the content to be seized is stored in Dublin [Ireland]." Id.
The court explained:
Although the Act's focus on the customer's privacy might suggest that the
customer's actual location or citizenship would be important to the
extraterritoriality analysis, it is our view that the invasion of the customer's
privacy takes place under the SCA where the customer's protected content is
accessed- here, where it is seized by Microsoft, acting as an agent of the
government. Because the content subject to the Warrant is located in, and would
be seized from, the Dublin datacenter, the conduct that falls within the focus of
the SCA would occur outside the United States, regardless of the customer's
location and regardless of Microsoft's home in the United States.
Id. at 220-21. The court ultimately concluded that enforcement of the warrant, insofar as it
directs Microsoft to seize the contents of its customer's communications stored in Ireland,

11

The Second Circuit used familiar Fourth Amendment terms such as "seizure" and
"invasion of privacy" to determine whether the search warrant was applied extraterritorially. See
Microsoft, 829 F.3d at 220. The court described the SCA's privacy protections as "analogous" to
those guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 206 (The SCA's legislative history shows
Congress' intent "to extend to electronic records privacy protections analogous to those provided
by the Fourth Amendment."). Moreover, the court rejected the district court's conclusion that the
search warrant was a hybrid between a subpoena and a search warrant, but found it to be a
traditional search warrant, which carried with it the territorial restrictions of Fed. R. Crim. P.
41(b)(5). See id. at 214-15 ("We see no reason to believe that Congress intended to jettison the
centuries of law requiring the issuance and performance of warrants in specified, domestic
locations, or to replace the traditional warrant with a novel instrument of international
application."). The court thus found that because a warrant procured under section 2703 of the
SCA is a traditional warrant, it is appropriate to analyze the application of the search and seizure
warrant under the Fourth Amendment's "seizure" and "invasion of privacy" principles. See id. at
212 ("[A] warrant is traditionally moored to privacy concepts .... "). This court notes that the
Fourth Amendment provides even greater privacy protection than the SCA See United States v.
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2011) (Fourth Amendment rights of a person were violated
by compelling internet service provider to turn over emails without first obtaining a warrant
based on probable cause even though sections 2703(b) and 2703(d) of the SCA permitted the
disclosure).
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constitutes an unlawful extraterritorial application of the Act. 12
2.

Analysis of Extraterritoriality in the Present Cases

In contrast to the decision in Microsoft, this court holds that the disclosure by
Google of the electronic data relevant to the warrants at issue here constitutes neither a "seizure"
nor a "search" of the targets' data in a foreign country. This court agrees with the Second
Circuit's reliance upon Fourth Amendment principles, but respectfully disagrees with the Second
Circuit's analysis regarding the location of the seizure and the invasion of privacy. The crux of
the issue before the court is as follows: assuming the focus of the Act is on privacy concerns,
where do the invasions of privacy take place? To make that determination, the court must

12

As noted supra, the Honorable Gerard E. Lynch filed a concurring opinion in the
Microsoft panel decision. See Microsoft, 829 F.3d at 222-33. Judge Lynch found that because
of the amorphous nature of cloud technology, the question of whether compelling disclosure of
data stored in Ireland constituted an extraterritorial application of the SCA was a "very close"
question. He stated, "[t]he government's characterization of the warrant at issue as domestic,
rather than extraterritorial, is thus far from frivolous and renders this, for me, a very close case to
the extent that the presumption against extraterritoriality shapes our interpretation of the statute."
Id. at 229. Judge Lynch explained:
Corporate employees in the United States can review ... [electronic documents],
when responding to the ''warrant" or subpoena or court order just as they can do in
the ordinary course of business, and provide the relevant materials to the
demanding government agency, without ever leaving their desks in the United
States. The entire process of compliance takes place domestically.
Id. at 229. Judge Lynch criticized the majority's finding that "the locus of the invasion of
privacy is where the private content is stored." Id. at 230 n.7. He stated that this determination
seemed to be "suspect when the content consists of emails stored in the 'cloud."' Id. He stated,
"[i]t seems at least equally persuasive that the invasion of privacy occurs where the person whose
privacy is invaded customarily resides." Id. However, Judge Lynch ultimately concluded that
because the nationality of the Microsoft account holder was unknown and was probably a citizen
oflreland, Congress did not intend for the SCA "to reach situations of this kind." Id. at 230. He
explained that the case would be different "if the American government is demanding from an
American company e-mails of an American citizen resident in the United States, which are
accessible at the push of a button in Redmond, Washington." Id.
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analyze where the seizures, if any, occur and where the searches of user data take place. This
requires the court to examine relevant Fourth Amendment precedent. The court recognizes that
the cases discussed below address seizures and searches of physical property. However, these
cases are instructive, and binding, in the absence of Supreme Court or Third Circuit caselaw
addressing such issues as they pertain to the electronic world.
The Fourth Amendment "protects two types of expectations, one involving
'searches' the other 'seizures."' United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). The
Amendment "protects property as well as privacy." Soldal v. Cook Cty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 62
(1992). "A 'search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable is infringed." Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113. "A 'seizure' of property occurs when there
is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." Id.
See also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (same);
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) ("From the time of the founding to the present,
the word 'seizure' has meant a 'taking possession."'); Mark Taticchi, Redefining Possessory
Interests: Perfect Copies oflnformation as Fourth Amendment Seizures, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
476, 477 (2010) ("Courts generally interpret possessory interest to mean physical possession,
even when the property allegedly seized is intangible, like information."). 13
13

The Supreme Court has stated with respect to the distinction between a "seizure"

and a "search":
Although our Fourth Amendment cases sometimes refer indiscriminately to
searches and seizures, there are important differences between the two . . . . The
Amendment protects two different interests of the citizen - the interest in
retaining possession of property and the interest in maintaining personal privacy.
A seizure threatens the former, a search the latter. As a matter of timing, a seizure
is usually preceded by a search, but when a container is involved the converse is
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Electronically transferring data from a server in a foreign country to Google's data
center in California does not amount to a "seizure" because there is no meaningful interference
with the account holder's possessory interest in the user data. Indeed, according to the
Stipulation entered into by Google and the Government, Google regularly transfers user data
from one data center to another without the customer's knowledge. Such transfers do not
interfere with the customer's access or possessory interest in the user data. Even if the transfer
interferes with the account owner's control over his information, this interference is de minimis
and temporary. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125-26 (holding that permanent destruction of small
portion of property for testing a de minimis intrusion on possessory interest); United States v.
Hoang, 486 F.3d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[N]o seizure occurs if a package is detained in a
manner that does not significantly interfere with its timely delivery in the normal course of
business."), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1144 (2008).
This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). In Hicks, a police officer was searching an apartment under exigent
circumstances when he noticed an expensive stereo system that he suspected had been stolen. Id.
at 323. Accordingly, he wrote down the serial number of some of its components. He later
confirmed that the serial numbers matched stereo components stolen during an armed robbery.

often true. Significantly, the two protected interests are not always present to the
same extent; for example, the seizure of a locked suitcase does not necessarily
compromise the secrecy of its contents, and the search of a stopped vehicle does
not necessarily deprive its owner of possession.
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747-48 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).

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Id. at 323-24. The Supreme Court found that copying the serial numbers did not constitute a
"seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. The Court explained:
We agree that the mere recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a
seizure. To be sure, that was the first step in a process by which respondent was
eventually deprived of the stereo equipment. In and of itself, however, it did not
"meaningfully interfere" with respondent's possessory interest in either the serial
numbers or the equipment, and therefore did not amount to a seizure.
Id. at 324. Following Hicks, the Third Circuit has held that a police officer's movement of
documents from one place to another so that the documents could be reviewed by another law
enforcement officer did not constitute a seizure. United States v. Menon, 24 F.3d 550, 559-60
(3d Cir. 1994) (Becker, J). The court reasoned that the police officer did not seize the documents
at issue when she carried the documents from one office to an adjacent office because such
movement did not meaningfully interfere with the possessory interest of the individual from
whose office the documents were taken. Id. at 560.
Other circuit courts have held that photocopying documents or taking photographs
of materials did not constitute a "seizure" because such actions did not meaningfully interfere
with the owners' possessory interest. See United States v. Mancari, 463 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir.
2006) (photographs); Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 707 (6th Cir. 1992) (photographs); United
States v. Thomas, 613 F.2d 787, 794 (10th Cir. 1980) (photocopies). It is not surprising,
therefore, that two district courts have held that accessing electronic data is not a "seizure." See
In re United States, 665 F.Supp. 2d 1210, 1222 (D. Or. 2009) (court found no "seizure" because
there was no "meaningful interference due to the nature of electronic information, which can be
accessed from multiple locations, by multiple people, simultaneously."); United States v.
Gorshkov, 2001 WL 1024026, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2001) (FBI agent's act of copying
21

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data on computer was not a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment because it did not interfere
with the defendant's possessory interest in the data). 14 For these reasons, the execution of the
two Google search warrants, at issue here, will not result in a "seizure" in a foreign country. 15
The court's Fourth Amendment analysis does not end there, however, for the
court also must examine the location of the searches in the instant cases. As noted supra,

14

Rule 41(e)(2)(B), which deals with a warrant seeking electronically stored
information, provides:
A warrant under Rule 41(e)(2)(A) may authorize the seizure of electronic storage
media or the seizure or copying of electronically stored information. Unless
otherwise specified, the warrant authorizes a later review of the media or
information consistent with the warrant. The time for executing the warrant in
Rule 41(e)(2)(A) and (f)(l)(A) refers to the seizure or on-site copying of the
media or information, and not to any later off-site copying or review.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B). One commentator posits that the express language of Rule 41
reinforces the view that copying information does not constitute a seizure. See Taticchi, supra, at
489. By joining "copying" and "seizure" with the conjunction "or" the rule implies "that the two
concepts do not overlap, i.e., that copying is not a seizure." Id. Rule 41(f) also refers to seizures
and copies as alternative options. Id.
15

This court's conclusion that a "seizure" would not occur when Google accesses
the undisclosed electronic data required by the two warrants also is supported by Judge Raggi's
dissenting opinion from the denial of rehearing en bane. This opinion was joined by the three
other dissenting judges of the Second Circuit. Judge Raggi found:
even if privacy is the focus of§§ 2702 and 2703, the territorial event that is the
focus of that privacy interest is the service provider's disclosure of the subscriber
communications to a third party - whether in violation of§ 2702(a) or as
authorized by warrant under§ 2703(a). It is where that disclosure occurs that
determines whether these statutory provisions are being applied domestically or
extraterritori ally.
2017 WL 362765, at* 16. Judge Raggi also rejected the majority panel's ruling that Microsoft's
accessing of the emails in Ireland constituted a "seizure." Judge Raggi reasoned that "it is simply
wrong to characterize Microsoft's actions in retrieving customer electronic data in Ireland as
'"Microsoft's execution of the warrant,"' much less as a seizure by Microsoft." Id. at *15 (citing
Carney, J., Op. at 3; Microsoft, 829 F.3d at 220).
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pursuant to Fourth Amendment precedent, a "search occurs when the government violates a
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable." Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). When Google
produces the electronic data in accordance with the search warrants and the Government views it,
the actual invasion of the account holders' privacy- the searches - will occur in the United
States. Even though the retrieval of the electronic data by Google from its multiple data centers
abroad has the potential for an invasion of privacy, the actual infringement of privacy occurs at
the time of disclosure in the United States. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984)
("[W]e have never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute
searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. A holding to that effect would mean that a
policeman walking down the street carrying a parabolic microphone capable of picking up
conversations in nearby homes would be engaging in a search even if the microphone were not
turned on."). See also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 ("It is clear that the attachment of the GPS device
was not itself a search; if the device had not functioned or if the officers had not used it, no
information would have been obtained.") (Alito, J. concurring). 16

16

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)(2)(B) allows law enforcement officers
to copy the electronic data and review it at a later time to determine what electronic stored data
falls within the scope of the warrant. See also Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Seizures of
Computer Data, 119 Yale L.J. 700, 711 (2010) ("When the government makes an electronic copy
of data, it obtains possession of the data that it can preserve for future use. To be sure,
subsequently viewing the data in the copy and thus exposing its contents ordinarily amounts to a
Fourth Amendment search."); Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 Harv.
L. Rev. 531, 551 (2005) ("[A] search occurs when information from or about the data is exposed
to possible human observation, such as when it appears on a screen, rather than when it is copied
by the hard drive or processed by the computer.").
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Under the facts before this court, the conduct relevant to the SCA's focus will
occur in the United States. That is, the invasions of privacy will occur in the United States; the
searches of the electronic data disclosed by Google pursuant to the warrants will occur in the
United States when the FBI reviews the copies of the requested data in Pennsylvania. These
cases, therefore, involve a permissible domestic application of the SCA, even if other conduct
(the electronic transfer of data) occurs abroad. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. 17

B.

Other Considerations
Having concluded that the record before the court does not present an

extraterritorial application of the SCA, the court will address several other considerations raised
by the parties, recognizing that such considerations are not determinative of the primary issue
before the court. In this court's view, the analysis set forth above does not run afoul of principles
of comity and also presents a commonsense interpretation of the SCA which will not lead to
absurd results.

17

In contrast to the facts in Microsoft, there is no evidence in our record regarding
the precise location of the servers which store the electronic data requested by the search
warrants. Therefore, Google's case is easily distinguishable from the facts in Microsoft, wherein
all the relevant user data of a presumably Irish citizen was located exclusively in one data center
in Ireland and remained stable there for a significant period oftime. See Microsoft, 829 F.3d at
220 (finding "that the data is stored [exclusively] in Dublin, that Microsoft will necessarily
interact with the Dublin data center in order to retrieve the information for the government's
benefit, and that the data is within the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign"). Indeed, a key
assumption made by the majority in Microsoft was that "messages stored in the 'cloud' have a
discernable physical location." Id. at 221 n.28. As explained supra, because of the changeable
and divisible nature of Google's cloud technology, this critical assumption cannot be made in this
case. See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 Yale L.J. 326, 379 (2015) ("The
intermingling of data means that it is often difficult, if not impossible, to make the kind of finetuned identity- and location- based distinctions that Fourth Amendment ... law demands.").

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1.

Risks to International Comity

The court acknowledges that the presumption against extraterritorial application is
utilized to protect against "unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which
could result in international discord." Microsoft, 829 F.3d at 210 (quoting Equal Emp't
Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). One scholar has
suggested that when determining whether a search and seizure warrant for electronic data has
been applied extraterritorially, the court should not look to where the Fourth Amendment seizure
or invasion of privacy occurred, as the Second Circuit majority panel did in Microsoft, but
whether there was interference with a foreign state's sovereignty to determine its own rules
regarding privacy of data stored in its domestic server. See Daskal, supra at 372 n.170.
However, Judge Cabranes, in his opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing en bane, stated
that "Morrison ... does not permit a court to conclude that a particular application of a statute is
extraterritorial simply because it believes that the application threatens international comity."
See 2017 WL 362765, at *9 n.23 (Cabranes, J., dissenting).
Even if the interference with a foreign state's sovereignty is implicated, the fluid
nature of Google's cloud technology makes it uncertain which foreign country's sovereignty
would be implicated when Google accesses the content of communications in order to produce it
in response to legal process. As explained earlier, Google's architecture not only divides user
data among data centers located in different countries, but also partitions user data into shards.
Furthermore, the data automatically moves data from one location on Google's network to
another as frequently as needed, to optimize for performance, reliability and other efficiencies.

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See Stip. if 4; N.T. 1/12/17 at 16. 18 Because of the structure of this system, Google cannot say
with any certainty which foreign country's sovereignty would be implicated when Google
accesses the content of communications in order to produce it in response to legal process.
Before a court bars the Government from using a judicially approved search warrant to require
disclosure of user data that constitute evidence of crimes, it would do well not to be controlled by
possibilities and legal abstractions, but to focus instead on realities.
Furthermore, it bears repeating that under the facts presented to this court, the
searches pursuant to the SCA warrants will occur in Pennsylvania. No foreign nation's
sovereignty will be interfered with in any ascertainable way at the time the two warrants at issue
are executed because the searches will be conducted in the United States.

2.

Reasonable Interpretation

In addition to the presumption against extraterritorial application, a court
interpreting the SCA should consider another important canon of construction. Specifically,
courts should avoid an interpretation of a statute that produces odd or absurd results, or that is
inconsistent with common sense. See Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Southeastern Pa. Trans. Auth.,
539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). "Statutes should be interpreted to avoid
untenable distinctions and unreasonable results whenever possible." Am. Tobacco v. Patterson,
456 U.S. 63, 71 (1982). See also Register v. PNC Fin. Serv. Grp., Inc., 477 F.3d 56, 67 (3d Cir.
2009) (same). To interpret the SCA as propounded by the majority panel in Microsoft, would
lead to an unreasonable result in the cases at bar.

18

"[W]hen one stores data in the cloud, one often has little control or even
knowledge about the places where it is being held; these are decisions that are instead generally
entrusted to computer algorithms." Daskal, supra at 368.
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In Microsoft, the Government alleged that preventing SCA warrants from
reaching data stored abroad would place a substantial burden on the Government; the
Government further argued that the current process for obtaining foreign-stored data is
cumbersome. Microsoft, 829 F.3d at 221. That process is governed by a series of MLATs
between the United States and other countries, pursuant to which signatory states may request
one another's assistance with ongoing criminal investigations, including the power to summon
witnesses, to compel the production of documents and other real evidence, to issue search
warrants, and to serve process. See U.S. Dep't of State, 7 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM)§
962.1 (2013), https://fam.state.gov/FAM/07FAM/07FAM0960.html. But as the district court in
Microsoft found, the process under an MLAT is "slow and laborious" and many countries have
no MLAT with the United States. Microsoft, 15 F.Supp. 3d at 474-75. This concern was echoed
by Judge Cabranes in his opinion dissenting from the denial of en bane review of the Microsoft
decision. Judge Cabranes stated:
The United States has entered into MLATs with several countries, allowing
parties to the treaty to request assistance with ongoing criminal investigations,
including issuance and execution of search warrants. However, many countries
do not have MLATs with the United States, ~' Indonesia and Pakistan, and law
enforcement cooperation with those countries is limited.
2017 WL 362765, at *8 n.11.
In addition, the Government argues that Google's architecture creates an
insurmountable obstacle for the Government to overcome in the MLAT process. The location of
the electronic data depends "upon the working of an automatic computer algorithm aimed at
creating network efficiency." See Gov't Reply at 20. The Government seeks to draw a
distinction between Microsoft and the present case. In Microsoft, the ISP could inform the
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Government that the data was located in Ireland and that it would remain in Ireland while the
Government sought process, either under an MLAT request, or by using Letters Rogatory. In the
present case, however, the Government never will be able to utilize established legal process to
request assistance from a foreign nation to access Google's user data that is stored in that foreign
nation. Google admits that the location of the data could change from the time the Government
applies for legal process to the time when the process is served upon Google. See Stip.

~

4. The

Government explained the problem:
The data, however, is a moving target: stored one day in a data center in Finland
or Singapore; and automatically moved the next day to a new data center in Chile,
or Belgium. Further complicating things is that Google user data - such as an email, or an e-mail attachment - is not stored as one single, cohesive digital file;
instead, Google stores individual data files in multiple data "shards," each
separate shard being stored in separate locations around the world. And, Google
cannot even determine where its separate data shards are stored around the world
at any given time; and, even if one shard were to stay in one place, without all of
the shards being collected and put together at once to form the actual digital file,
each shard alone is a useless piece of coded gibberish. Of course, each shard
might move instantaneously to somewhere else; and then to somewhere else; and
so on, and so forth.

Thus Google has created a system in which Google can retrieve the data, and its
users can retrieve the data, but the government will only be able to obtain data that
happens to be stored in the United States at the very moment when Google gathers
the responsive information. Google cannot say where its foreign-stored data is
today, and to the extent that it can, such data may be automatically moved to
another server in another country within short periods. The government,
therefore, cannot request the assistance of a foreign country using an MLAT
request or Letters Rogatory, because no one knows which country to ask, and even
if specific servers could be identified, the data may no longer be there by the time
its location has been identified. Moreover, there are no Google employees in
other countries that can access their foreign-stored data; instead, such data must,
as a consequence of their network architecture, be accessed from a Google
employee within the United States. And, thus, certain Google user data - even
data that the government knows about, and writes about within a search warrant
affidavit - is never accessible through compulsory legal process. Never.
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(Gov't Reply at 21-22) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, ifthe court were to
adopt Google's interpretation of the Microsoft decision and apply such a rationale to the case at
bar, it would be impossible for the Government to obtain the sought-after user data through
existing MLAT channels. In contrast, under this court's interpretation, Google will gather the
requested undisclosed data on its computers in California, copy the data in California, and send
the data to law enforcement agents in the United States, who will then conduct their searches in
the United States.
After careful consideration of the views of the parties and the many eminent
judges who have addressed issues arising under the SCA, this court concludes that the two search
warrants executed upon Google in the cases at bar do not constitute extraterritorial applications
of the SCA.

II.

CONCLUSION
For all the above reasons, the court will grant the Government's motions to

compel Google to comply with search warrants. An appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

29