45c; Case Document 33 Filed 02/08/17 Page 1 of 12 - - IN THE UNITED si?itsin?is FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ocean?s gig"? to; hi" MINAL No. Mfg- ;7?069 - 8 if?? i lful Retention of National Defense HAROLD T. MARTIN rmation, 18 U.S.C. 793(e); Forfeiture 18 U.S.C. 981) Defendant. INDICTMENT . COUNTS ONE THROUGH TWENTY (Willful Retention of National Defense Information) The Grand Jury for the District of Marylandcharges that: At all times material to this Indictment: General Allegations The Defendant 1. Defendant Harold T. Martin 111 now age 52, was a resident of Glen Burnie, Anne Arundel County, Maryland. 2. Beginning in or about December 1993, and continuing through on or about August 27, 2016, MARTIN was employed as a private contractor, assigned to work at a number of government agencies. In connection with his employment, MARTIN held various security clearances and had access to national defense and classi?ed information. Classi?ed Information 3. Pursuant to Executive Order 12958 signed on April 17, 1995, as amended by Executive Order 13292 on March 25, 2003, and Executive Order 13526 on December 29, 2009, national security information was classi?ed as or Case Document 33 Filed 02/08/17 Page 2 of 12 National security information was information owned by, produced by, produced for, and under the control of the United States government that was classi?ed as follows: a. Information was classi?ed as TOP SECRET if the unauthorized disclosure of that information reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security that the original classi?cation authority was able to identify and describe. b. Information was classi?ed as SECRET if the unauthorized disclosure of that information reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that the original classi?cation authority was able to identify and describe. c. Information was classi?ed as CONFIDENTIAL if the unauthorized disclosure of that information reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the original classi?cation authority is able to identify and describe. 4. Access to national security information classi?ed at any level could be further restricted through compartmentation in Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) categories. Only individuals with the appropriate security clearance and additional SCI access(es) could have access to such classi?ed national security information. 5. Classi?ed information, including SCI, was marked according to its classi?cation and applicable SCI compartments, following standard formats for different types of media, including headers and footers stating the highest classi?cation level and SCI compartments of information a document contained and individual classi?cations markings for each paragraph. 6. Information classi?ed at any level could only be accessed by persons determined by an appropriate United States government of?cial to be eligible for access to classi?ed information, who had signed an approved non-disclosure agreement, who received a, security clearance, and who had a need to know the classi?ed information. Classi?ed information could only be stored in an approved facility and container. Case Document 33 Filed 02/08/17 Page 3 of 12 Relevant Government Agencies 7. The US. Intelligence Community (USIC) consisted of US. executive branch agencies and organizatiOns that worked separately and together to conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the United States. 8. The US. Department of Defense was a US. executive branch agency, the mission of which was to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of the United States. 9. The National Security Agency (N SA) was a US. government intelligence agency with various of?ces and facilities, and was a component of the USIC and primary facility and headquarters were at Fort Meade in the District of Maryland. NSA was responsible for, among other things, collecting, processing, and disseminating intelligence derived from intercepted foreign communications to US. policy-makers and military forces; protecting secure government systems that handle classi?ed information and were otherwise critical to military and intelligence agencies, and Computer Network Operations (CNO), which involves operations and intelligence collection to gather data from target or foreign automated information systems or networks and actions taken to prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within information systems and computer networks, for the United States and its allies. 10. United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was a US. military command and a component of primary facility and headquarters were at Fort Meade in the District of Maryland. USCYBERCOM was responsible for, among other things, planning, coordinating, integrating, and conducting activities to direct the operations and defense of speci?ed information networks, and conducting full spectrum 3 Case Document 33 Filed 02/08/17 Page 4 of 12 military cyberspace operations to ensure freedom of action in cyberspace for the United States and its allies, and deny the same to the adversaries of the United States. 11. The National Reconnaissance Of?ce (NRO) was a US. government intelligence agency with various of?ces and facilities, and was a component of the USIC and primary facility and headquarters were in Chantilly, Virginia. NRO was responsible for research and development, acquisition, launch, deployment, and operation of overhead systems and related data processing facilities to collect intelligence and information to support national and departmental missions and other United States government needs, including, among other things, the collection of signals and imagery data used to inform U.S. policy-makers and military forces on the strategic and tactical intentions and capabilities of the adversaries of the United States. 12. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was a US. government intelligence agency with various offices and facilities, and was a component of the USIC. primary facility and headquarters were in northern Virginia. CIA was responsible for, among other things, collecting (including through clandestine means), producing and disseminating foreign intelligence and counterintelligence used to inform U.S. policy-makers; conducting counterintelligence activities; conducting administrative and technical support activities; conducting covert action activities approved by the President; and conducting foreign liaison relationships with intelligence and security services of foreign governments. Access to National Defense and Classi?ed Information 13. From in or, about July 1988 through in or about July 1992, MARTIN?served on active duty in the United States Navy. MARTIN held a SECRET security clearance in connection with his active duty service. Case Document 33 Filed 02/08/17 Page 5 of 12 . 14. From in or about August 1992 through in or about March 2000, MARTIN seived in the United States Naval Reserve. In or about August 1994, security clearance in connection with his Naval service was upgraded to TOP SECRET. i 15. Beginning in or about December 1993, and continuing until on or about August;i 27, 2016, MARTIN was employed by at least seven different private companies and was assigned as a contractor to components of DOD and the USIC (collectively, the ?government agencies?). MARTIN was required to receive and maintain a security clearance in order to work at each of the government agencies to which he was assigned. As a private contractor, MARTIN held security clearances up to TOP at various times. 16. Over his many years holding a security clearance, MARTIN received training regarding classi?ed information, including the de?nitions of classi?ed information, the levels of classi?cation, and SCI, as well as the proper handling, marking, transportation, and storage of classi?ed materials. MARTIN received training on his duty to protect classi?ed materials from unauthorized disclosure, which included complying with handling, transportation, and storage requirements. MARTIN knew that unauthorized removal of classi?ed materials and transportation and storage of those materials in unauthorized locations risked disclosure and transmission of those materials, and therefore could endanger the national security of the United States and the safety of its citizens. In particular, MARTIN had been advised that unauthorized disclosure of TOP SECRET information reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States, and that violation of rules governing the handling of classi?ed information could result in criminal prosecution. Case Document 33 Filed 02/08/17 Page 6 of 12 17. MARTIN worked on a number of highly classi?ed,?specialized projects and had access to government computer systems, programs, and information, including classi?ed information. Theft of National Defense Information 18. Because MARTIN held a security clearance and was assigned to various government agencies as a private contractor, the United States Government entrusted MARTIN with access to sensitive government materials, including information relating to the national defense that was closely held by the government (?National Defense Information?) and classi?ed documents and materials. 19. Beginning at a time unknown, but no earlier than in or about 1996, and continuing through on or about August 27, 2016, MARTIN stole and retained U.S. government property, including the documents listed in paragraph 25, below. 20. Many of the documents MARTIN stole bore stande markings indicating that they contained highly classi?ed information of the United States, including SECRET and TOP SECRET, as well as SCI, information. The information in the classi?ed documents included National Defense Information. 21. MARTIN retained stolen documents, in hard copy and digital form, containing National Defense Information and classi?ed information in a number of locations within his residence and in his vehicle. 22. Martin knew that the stolen documents contained classi?ed information that related to the national defense. 23. MARTIN was never authorized to retain these documents at his residence or in his vehicle. Case Document 33 Filed 02/08/17 Page 7 of 12 24. MARTIN knew that he was not authorized to remove National Defense Information and classi?ed documents from secure locations, was not authorized to retain them at his residence, and was not authorized to retain them in his vehicle. 25. MARTIN willfully retained stolen documents that contained National Defense Information, including the following Classi?ed Documents, which were classi?ed as SECRET, TOP SECRET, and SCI: NSA Documents: A. A March 2014 INSA leadership brie?ng outlining the development and future plans for a speci?c NSA organization. . B. A 2014 NSA report outlining intelligence information regarding foreign cyber issues, containing targeting information. C. A 2014 NSA report outlining intelligence information regarding foreign cyber issues, containing foreign cyber intrusion techniques. D. A 2009 draft of a United States Signals Intelligence Directive, which outlined speci?c methods, capabilities, techniques, processes, and procedures associated with . CNO used to defend the United States. E. February 2008 NSA email correspondence containing an NSA intelligence assessment about an overseas project, containing information directly related to a subject that implicated national security policies and responses. F. A February 2007 Daily Operations Brie?ng concerning the daily operations of NSA activities, which identi?ed Speci?c NSA capabilities and operations. G. A NSA anti-terrorism operational document concerning extremely sensitive U.S. planning and operations regarding global terrorists. 7. Case Document 33 Filed 02/08/17 Page 8 of 12 H. 2002 NSA email correspondence and NSA intelligence information regarding extremist activity, which identi?ed targets of intelligence collection. I. An August 1996 NSA weekly status summary of national defense concerns emanating from various parts of the world. J. An NSA Threat Operations Center (N TOC) progress report that speci?cally described activities, capabilities, techniques, process, and procedures associated with NTOC, which discovers, characterizes, and proactively counters threats to US. national security systems and other networks of interest. K. An outline of a classi?ed exercise involving real-world NSA and US. military resources to demonstrate existing cyber intelligence and operational capabilities. L. An NSA User?s Guide for an NSA intelligence-gathering tool. M. A description of the technical architecture of an NSA communications system. USCYBERCOM Documents: N. A USCYBERCOM document, dated August 17, 2016, discussing capabilities and gaps in capabilities of the US. military and details of speci?c operations. 0. A USCYBERCOM document, dated August 12, 2016, discussing capabilities and gaps in capabilities of the US. military and details of speci?c operations. P. A USCYBERCOM document, dated June 9, 2016, containing information about the capabilities and targets of the US. military. Q. A USCYBERCOM document, dated May 23, 2016, containing information about the capabilities and targets of the US. military. 1 Case Document 33 Filed 02/08/17 Page 9_of 12 R. A USCYBERCOM document, dated August 9, 2007, discussing intelligence sources and method, and the US. military?s role in a planned counterterrorism operation. NRO Document: S. An NRO document, dated August 17, 2007, containing information relating to the launch of an intelligence collection satellite, an unacknowledged ground station, and other Speci?c intelligence collection technologies and programs. CIA Document: T. A 2008 CIA document containing information relating to foreign intelligence collection sources and methods, and relating to a foreign intelligence collection target. The Charges 26. Beginning at times unknown, and continuing until on or about August 27, 2016, each document being a separate Count, in the District of Maryland, and elsewhere, the defendant, HAROLD T. MARTIN 111, having unauthoriaed possession of, access to, and control over documents relating to the national defense, willfully retained the documents and failed to deliver them to the of?cer or employee of the United States entitled to receive them: to wit, MARTIN retained documents relating to the national defense at his residence and in his vehicle without authorization, including the documents Speci?ed in paragraph 25, above, and listed below: COUNT DOCUMENT AGENCY ONE Classi?ed Document A NSA TWO Classified Document NSA THREE Classi?ed Document NSA FOUR Classi?ed Document NSA FIVE Classi?ed Document NSA 9 Case Document 33 Filed 02/08/17 Page 10 of 12 COUNT DOCUMENT SIX Classi?ed Document NSA SEVEN Classi?ed Document NSA EIGHT Classi?ed Document I-I NSA NINE Classi?ed Document I NSA TEN Classi?ed Document NSA ELEVEN Classi?ed Document NSA TWELVE Classi?ed Document NSA THIRTEEN Classi?ed Document NSA FOURTEEN Classi?ed Document USCYBERCOM FIFTEEN Classi?ed Document 0 USCYBERCOM SIXTEEN Classi?ed Document USCYBERCOM SEVENTEEN Classi?ed Document USCYBERCOM EIGHTEEN Classi?ed Document USCYBERCOM NINETEEN Classi?ed Document NRO TWENTY Classi?ed Document CIA 18 U.S.C. 793(c) 10 Case Document 33 Filed 02/08/17 Page 11 of 12 FORFEITURE 1. Upon conviction ?of the offenses in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(e) set forth in Counts One through Twenty of this Indictment, the defendant, HAROLD T. MARTIN 111, shall forfeit to the United States of America, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C) and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(0), any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the offenses. The property to be forfeited includes, but is not limited to, the property of the United States seized from the defendant?s residence on or about August 27, 2016, and all digital media and devices used to store such information. 2. If any of the property described above, as a result of any act or omission of the defendant: a. cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; b. has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party; c. has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court; d. has been substantially diminished in value; or e. has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without difficulty, the United States of America shall be entitled to forfeiture of substitute property pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p), as incorporated by Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c). 11 Case Document 33 Filed 02/08/17 Page 12 of 12 18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(C) 21 U.S.C. 853 28 U.S.C. 2461(c) R0 . ens in United tates Attorney Foreperson oz/Q/W Date: 12