DISTRICT COURT, WATER DIVISION 5, STATE OF
COLORADO
Court Address: Garfield County Courthouse
109 8th Street, Suite 104
Glenwood Springs, CO
81601

DATE FILED: February 17, 2017 3:57 PM
CASE NUMBER: 2014CW3095

CONCERNING THE APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS OF:

COURT USE ONLY

HIGH VALLEY FARMS, LLC
Case No. 14CW3095
IN PITKIN COUNTY, COLORADO

ORDER REGARDING ISSUES RAISED IN THE SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION

The Court having considered High Valley Farms, LLC’s (“High Valley”) Response to
Division Engineer’s Consultation report filed on November 13, 2015 in the above-captioned
matter, and being fully advised in the premises, makes the following determinations.
I.

Factual and Procedural History

This case concerns High Valley’s application for an underground water right, surface
water rights, storage water rights, and a plan for augmentation including exchange. See Second
Amended Application, filed on May 31, 2016. High Valley is seeking to appropriate water from
the Roaring Fork River. High Valley is not claiming the use of any federal contract water or any
federal water facilities. The application specifically lists one of the proposed uses as
“commercial and industrial uses associated with operation of a marijuana cultivation facility,
which includes, but is not limited to irrigation within a 37,500 square foot greenhouse, Operation
of the Mechanical Systems and Commercial In-House Uses.” Id. ¶ 7. High Valley is licensed to
operate a marijuana cultivation facility. Response to Division Engineer’s Consultation Report, at
2 (November 13, 2015).
1

 As required by statute, the Division Engineer for Water Division 5 filed a Summary of
Consultation for each amended application in this case. See Summary of Consultation (filed on
November 12, 2014, August 31, 2015, and January 23, 2017). In each Summary of Consultation,
the Division Engineer asked High Valley to explain how its water rights can be granted in light
of the statutory definition of beneficial use – “the use of that amount of water that is reasonable
and appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purposes
for which the appropriation is lawfully made.” Id. at concern 1 (emphasis in the Summary of
Consultation). The Division Engineer also asked for an explanation on how a plan for
augmentation could be granted pursuant to the statutory definition of a plan for augmentation –
“a detailed program . . . to increase the supply of water available for beneficial use.” Id. at
concern 2 (emphasis in the Summary of Consultation). High Valley provided a response to the
Summary of Consultation on November 13, 2015. In its response, High Valley explained why
use of water for marijuana cultivation is lawful under Colorado water law. Response to
Summary of Consultation, at 1-9. High Valley requested that the Court decide this issue.
II.

Issue

The issue before the Court is whether High Valley can lawfully appropriate water to
cultivate marijuana and for use in its greenhouse facilities in light of the Federal Controlled
Substances Act (the “CSA”), which prohibits all marijuana use. Whether High Valley can seek
to appropriate water for marijuana cultivation is a threshold issue in this case. To resolve this
issue, the Court must determine how “lawful” is used in the water law statutes and if there is a
conflict between those statutes and the CSA.

2

 III.

Standard of Review

The primary purpose in statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislature’s intent. Doubleday v. People, 364 P.3d 193, 196 (Colo. 2016). The court first looks
to the statutory language, giving words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Id. The
court reads the words and phrases of the statute in context, and construes them according to the
rules of grammar and common usage. Id.
Further, courts are required to interpret a statute to give effect to the purpose of the
legislative scheme. Id. at 196. “In doing so, we read the scheme as a whole, and we give
consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. We also must avoid constructions
that would render any statutory word or phrase superfluous or that would lead to illogical or
absurd results.” Id.
IV.

Legal Standards

A. Colorado’s Authority to Allocate and Regulate its Internal Water Resources.
Colorado’s authority to develop a system to regulate and allocate its water resources
derived from the federal government, which initially owned almost all of the lands within the
boundaries of Colorado and other western states. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver
Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 154 (1935). In 1866, Congress passed the Mining Act to
expressly confirm the federal policy of deferring to State sovereignty in the determination and
allocation of water resources within State boundaries. Mining Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14
Stat. 251, 253 (currently codified at 30 U.S.C. § 51 (2012)). The Mining Act affirmatively
acknowledges the federal government’s acceptance of “the validity of the local customs, laws,
and decisions of courts in respect to the appropriation of water.” United States v. Rio Grande
Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 704 (1899).

3

 Following the Mining Act, Congress passed several other acts that resulted in “sever[ing]
water from other property interests in land, consigning the establishment of water rights to the
states while also retaining its continuing power to establish reserved water rights under the law
of the United States.” Chatfield East Well Co., Ltd. v. Chatfield East Property Owners Ass’n,
956 P.2d 1260, 1267 (Colo. 1998). See, e.g., Desert Lands Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19
Stat. 377 (currently codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321 to 323, 325, 327 to 329 (2012)); Timber
Culture Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 591, 26 Stat. 1095 (currently codified at 43 U.S.C. § 946
(2012)). Similarly, section 8 of the Reclamation Act recognizes that “nothing in this Act shall be
construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State
or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use or distribution of water used in irrigation . .
. .” 43 U.S.C. § 383.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that throughout the history of the
reclamation of arid lands “runs the consistent thread of purposeful and continued deference to
state water law by Congress.” California, 438 U.S. at 653, 98 S.Ct. at 2990. Accordingly,
“federal statutes, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, recognize Colorado’s
authority to adopt its own system for the use of all waters within the state in accordance with the
needs of its citizens, subject to the prohibitions against interference with federal reserved rights,
with interstate commerce, and with the navigability of any navigable waters. Dept. of Natural
Resources v. Southwestern of Colorado Water Conservation Dist., 671 P.2d 1294, 1307 (Colo.
1983) (overruled on other grounds as stated in Humphrey v. Southwestern Development Co., 734
P.2d 637 (Colo. 1987)).
B. Appropriation and Beneficial Use under Colorado Water Laws.
The Colorado Constitution expressly recognizes that “[t]he water of every natural stream,
not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of
4

 the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation
as hereinafter provided.” Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 5. Under Colorado’s prior appropriation
doctrine, a water right is a usufructuary right that is created when a specific quantity of water is
applied to an actual beneficial use. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro
Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256 P.3d 645, 661 (Colo. 2011). “The right to divert the
unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied.” Colo.
Const. art. XVI, § 6 (emphasis added). The Constitution “guarantees Colorado’s system of prior
appropriation as it had developed since territorial days and protects the people of the state from
divestment of appropriation.” St. Jude’s Co. v. Roaring Fork Club, LLC, 351 P.3d 442, 448
(Colo. 2015). A statute cannot “prohibit the appropriation or diversion of unappropriated water
for useful purposes.” Fox v. Division Engineer, 810 P.2d 644, 646 (Colo. 1991) (citing Larimer
County Reservoir Co. v. People, 8 Colo. 614, 618, 9 P. 794, 797 (1886)).
An appropriation is statutorily defined as “the application of a specified portion of the
waters of the state to a beneficial use pursuant to the procedures prescribed by law.” Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 37-92-103(3)(a). Under Colorado law, an appropriation consists of two elements: (1) the
diversion of water from a natural stream; and (2) the application of that water to a beneficial use.
Diversion of water alone is not enough to create a water right. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property
Owners Ass’n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54 (Colo. 1999). “The touchstone of Colorado's prior
appropriation doctrine is beneficial use. As such, an appropriator of water perfects a water right
only by application of a specified quantity of water to an actual beneficial use.” Widefield Water
& Sanitation Dist. v. Witte, 340 P.3d 1118, 1123 (Colo. 2014) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).

5

 Section 37-92-103(4) defines beneficial use as the “use of that amount of water that is
reasonable and appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the
purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully made.” While what constitutes a valid
appropriation under Colorado law has been addressed and defined in numerous cases since
Colorado’s territorial days, neither the Constitution nor the 1969 Water Right Determination and
Administration Act (“1969 Act”) define the parameters of what constitutes a beneficial use. See
Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27, 34 (Colo. 1997) (citing Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo.
551, 570 (1872)). Instead, “the 1969 Act’s definition of beneficial use is expansive, leaving
room for new, innovative uses.” St. Jude’s, 351 P.3d at 449.
The Colorado Supreme Court has defined a lawful appropriation as the amount of water
sufficient for the decreed purposes of the water right that an water user “may apply . . . to any of
the beneficial uses he may see fit, as against other parties whose rights have accrued
subsequently to his own, provided the amount of water taken by him is not thereby increased
beyond that of his original appropriation nor the rights of those coming later injured or impaired
in any manner.” Santa Fe Trail, 990 P.2d at 53 (citing Clesson S. Kinney, A Treatise on the Law
of Irrigation 375 (1894)). Accordingly, a water right in Colorado is a right to use a certain
amount of water for beneficial use, “from the available supply of surface water or tributary
groundwater, that can be captured, possessed, and controlled in priority under a decree, to the
exclusion of all others not then in priority under a decreed water right.” Id.
C. Laws Governing Marijuana Cultivation.
i. Colorado Law.
The Colorado Constitution authorizes the personal and commercial use of marijuana as
well as the operation of marijuana-related facilities. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16(3)-(4). In
response to the constitutional amendments, the Colorado legislature adopted the Colorado Retail
6

 Marijuana Code (the “Code”). Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-43.4-202(2)(b). See also 1 CCR 212-2
(“Regulations”). The Code and the related Regulations contemplate that an adequate source of
water will be supplied to allow the operation of marijuana grow facilities. See 1 CCR 212-2,
Regulation 504(B)2(c), 10, and 11.
As the entity responsible for the administration and distribution of the waters of the state,
the Office of the State Engineer has issued a Written Instruction and Order regarding the use of
water for marijuana irrigation. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-501(1) (“[t]he state engineer and
division engineers shall administer, distribute, and regulate the waters of the state in accordance
with the constitution of the state of Colorado, the provisions of this article”); Written Instruction
and Order 2015-01, dated March 25, 2015 (the “Order”). The Order defines irrigation as the
application of “water to any type of plant that may be legally grown under Colorado law for the
purpose of growing such plants.” Order, at 2. Further “[t]he State Engineer and Division
Engineers shall allow Irrigation Water Rights to be used to irrigate any type of plant that may be
legally grown under Colorado law . . . .” Id. at 1.
ii. Federal Law.
The CSA classifies marijuana as an illegal drug and prohibits marijuana use. 21 U.S.C. §
844(a)(2012). The CSA prohibits all marijuana use. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29
(2005). The CSA also includes language that it does not preempt state law on the subject matter
“unless there is a positive conflict between a provision of [the CSA] and that State law so that the
two cannot consistently stand together.” 21 U.S.C. § 903.
In the Gonzales case, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the Commerce
Clause and the Supremacy Clause both include Congressional power to prohibit the local
cultivation and use of marijuana. Id. at 2201-15. Gonzales raised the question of whether a
locally grown product used within a state’s boundaries rather than sold on the open market is
7

 subject to federal regulation. In reaching its conclusion, the Court stated that Congress can
regulate purely intrastate activity, if it concludes that a failure to regulate that class of activity
would undercut the regulation of the interstate market for a particular good. Id. at 2205-06. The
Court also relied on the Supremacy Clause, which recognizes that if “there is any conflict
between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail.” Id. at 2212.
The Bureau of Reclamation has issued a policy regarding the use of Reclamation water
and/or its facilities for marijuana cultivation. Policy PEC TRMR-63 (May 16, 2014) (the
“Policy”). The Policy states that “Reclamation will operate its facilities, make available contract
water, execute and administer its water-related contracts, and otherwise perform its contractual
and legal duties in a manner that is consistent with the CSA.” Id. ¶ 5. The Policy specifically
exempts non-federal water and non-federal facilities. Id. ¶ 5.D.
iii. Conflict Between Colorado and Federal Law.
The Colorado Supreme Court addressed the conflict between Colorado and Federal law
governing marijuana in Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 350 P.3d 849 (Colo. 2015). Coats involved
an employment statute that protected the “lawful activities” of employees. Id. at 852. However,
the statute did not define the term “lawful.” The issue before the Court was whether medical
marijuana use permitted by Colorado law but prohibited under federal law is lawful under the
state employment statute. Id. The Court concluded that “lawful” as used in the statute at issue
means lawful under both federal and state law. To support its conclusion, the Court explained
that the “Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal
and state law, federal law shall prevail, including in the area of marijuana regulation.” Id. The
Court also noted that in the employment law context, lawful is generally understood to mean
complying with the applicable state and federal laws. Id. at 852-53.

8

 In the Crouse case, the Colorado Supreme Court applied a preemption analysis to
determine if compliance with Colorado law would necessarily require noncompliance with the
CSA. People v. Crouse, 2017 CO 5, ¶ 14 (Colo. 2017). The issue in Crouse was whether the
Colorado law that requires law enforcement officers to return marijuana conflicts with the CSA’s
provisions regarding the return, or distribution of marijuana. Id. ¶ 2. The Court noted that the
CSA does not preempt state law unless there is a positive conflict between the two provisions.
Id. ¶ 13. A positive conflict exists when a federal and a state law cannot “consistently stand
together.” Id. The Court held that law enforcement officers could not comply with both
Colorado law and the CSA, accordingly, the Supremacy Clause applied and the CSA controls.
Id. ¶ 18-19.
V.

Analysis

A. Definition of Lawful Appropriation.
Section 37-92-103(4) describes beneficial use and states that “use of that amount of water
that is reasonable and appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without
waste the purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully made.” In this provision “lawfully
made” is closer to the word “appropriation” than the word “use.” Under principles of statutory
construction, “relative and qualifying words and phrases . . . are construed to refer solely to the
last antecedent with which they are closely connected.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-4-214) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). Accordingly, the term “lawfully made” as used in section 3792-103(4) modifies appropriation not use.
While the 1969 Act does not contain a definition of lawful appropriation, Colorado case
law holds that an appropriation is lawful if there is a diversion of a certain amount of water for a
specified use that can be captured, possessed, and controlled in priority. See discussion supra
Section IV.B. Thus, the water court must determine whether the claimed appropriation is lawful,
9

 not whether the claimed beneficial use is lawful. A lawful appropriation of water does not
require an analysis of the lawfulness of the subsequent use of that water.
In the Coats and Crouse cases, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that lawful must
be defined as lawful under both state and federal law. In contrast to the facts in those cases,
there is no federal water law that governs the appropriation of water from intrastate water
sources. The regulation and allocation of a state’s internal water resource has been expressly
delegated to the states by the federal government. There is no way to determine whether an
appropriation is lawful under federal law. Thus, lawful appropriation means lawful under
Colorado water law.
B. No Positive Conflict with the CSA.
Complying with the provisions in Colorado water law regarding the elements of a lawful
appropriation of water does not necessarily require noncompliance with the CSA. In Crouse,
law enforcement was forced to decide whether to comply with Colorado law or the CSA –
compliance with both was impossible. Similarly, Coats involved an employee who relied on
state law as a defense to his dismissal for violating federal law. In both cases, there was an
express federal prohibition on an action allowed by Colorado state law.
There is no federal law that prohibits the appropriation of unappropriated water, if that
appropriation is done in compliance with state law or lawfully. The Colorado Constitution
creates a right to divert unappropriated water for useful purposes that cannot be abrogated by the
legislature. The legislature can pass laws to regulate and administer the use of water, but the
legislature cannot prohibit a water user from making a lawful appropriation of water.
The CSA provides that it only preempts state law when there is a positive conflict that
would make it impossible to comply with both laws. In this case, there is nothing in the CSA

10

 that prevents High Valley from seeking to divert unappropriated water for a specified beneficial
use. See, e.g., Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882) (Colorado has long recognized
irrigation as beneficial use). Complying with Colorado water law standards for appropriating
water is not a direct conflict with the CSA’s prohibition on marijuana possession or use. If the
federal government decides to enforce the CSA’s provisions, the Supremacy Clause would apply
and federal law trumps Colorado state law allowing the possession and use of marijuana.
However, this does not change the analysis of whether a lawful appropriation is made under
Colorado water law. Because there is no positive conflict between Colorado water laws
governing appropriations and the CSA, the CSA does not preempt Colorado water law.
The Supremacy Clause does not require Colorado to change the application of its existing
water laws. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-56 (1992). A lawful
appropriation of water requires the diversion of unappropriated water for a beneficial use. The
fact that the CSA prohibits marijuana use does not make an otherwise lawful appropriation of
water under Colorado law illegal. Instead, the validity of the appropriation is governed by
Colorado water laws.
VI.

Order

In section 37-92-103(4), the term lawful is used to describe the elements of an
appropriation under Colorado water law. Establishing a valid appropriation does not require an
analysis of the legality of the subsequent use of the water right. Because water right
appropriations are governed exclusively by Colorado law, there is no conflicting provision in the
CSA.
Therefore, sections 37-92-103(4) and 37-92-103(9) do not preclude High Valley from
proceeding with its claims in this case.

11

 Dated: February 17, 2017.
BY THE REFEREE

Susan M. Ryan, Water Referee
Division 5, Water Court

12