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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-289-RBJ
ZAKARIA HAGIG,
on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States;
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (“DHS”);
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (“CBP”);
JOHN KELLY, Secretary of DHS;
KEVIN MCALEENAN, Acting Commissioner of CBP; and
LASHANDA JONES, Denver Director, CBP,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, Plaintiff Zakaria Hagig, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, by undersigned counsel, respectfully moves this Court for entry of a
preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of Section 3(c) of the Executive Order issued by
President Donald Trump on January 27, 2017.1
INTRODUCTION
Section 3(c) of the President’s Executive Order entitled “Protecting the Nation from
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States” (the “Executive Order”) violates the Due Process
Clause and Equal Protection principles of the Fifth Amendment, as well as the Establishment
1

Pursuant to D.C.Colo.LCivR 7.1(a), counsel for Plaintiffs conferred with counsel for the
Defendants regarding this motion. Defendants oppose the relief requested.

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Clause of the First Amendment. Absent preliminary injunctive relief, irreparable harm from the
unconstitutional Executive Order will continue to afflict numerous Colorado residents who hail
from the seven majority-Muslim countries in question, and to whom the Federal Government
(the “Government”), after thorough vetting, has already granted valid student visas (and
accompanying spousal/family visas). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff seeks entry of a
preliminary injunction barring enforcement of Section 3(c) of the Executive Order.2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 27, 2017, Defendant Donald Trump signed an Executive Order entitled
“Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States” (the “Executive
Order,” attached as Exhibit A). Among other things, the Executive Order imposes a 120-day
moratorium on the resettlement of refugees; proclaims “that the entry of nationals of Syria as
refugees is detrimental to the interests of the United States,” and therefore “suspend[s]”
indefinitely their entry to the country; and limits to 50,000 the number of refugees from all
countries who may be admitted in fiscal year 2017 on the ground that admission of a greater
number of refugees would be “detrimental to the interests of the United States.”
Also on January 27, 2017, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services at the Bureau
of Consular Affairs of the Department of State, relying on the authority of the Executive Order,
summarily and provisionally revoked all valid nonimmigrant and immigrant visas of nationals of

2

Other federal courts around the country are simultaneously addressing similar issues as those
raised in the First Amended Complaint and this motion. The Ninth Circuit has affirmed a district
court’s decision to stay enforcement of portions of the Executive Order nationwide. See
Appendix, Tab 11. Because of the temporary nature of that decision and the uncertain future of
the Executive Order (and any future attempts by the Government to issue similar executive
orders), Plaintiffs nonetheless still seek the relief requested here.

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seven predominantly Muslim Countries (the “Designated Countries”), subject to exceptions not
relevant here (the “Provisional Revocation Letter”). The Designated Countries are Iran, Iraq,
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The Provisional Revocation letter ] threatens
countless nationals of the Designated Countries who are currently in the United States or who
reside in the United States but were traveling abroad when the letter was issued.3
The Executive Order and Provisional Revocation Letter included international students
who had entered the United States or were planning to enter the United States to pursue a course
of educational study on student visas. This includes the named Plaintiff, Mr. Zakaria Hagig. Mr.
Hagig is a 24-year-old student of Libyan national origin who is Muslim. Mr. Hagig lawfully
entered the United States on a student visa in October 2014, and he has remained here since then,
studying business at Community College of Denver in Colorado.
Mr. Hagig currently plans to travel to Canada in March 2017 to visit his family. But since
the Executive Order and Provisional Revocation Letter, Mr. Hagig’s ability to travel
internationally has been eliminated. Further, if he is not permitted to re-enter the United States
because of the Executive Order and its implementation, he will be prevented from continuing his
undergraduate studies. He would be denied reentry and his opportunity to study on the basis of
his national origin and religion.

The Government’s various press releases suggesting that the Executive Order may or may not
be enforced against lawful visa holders does not address the constitutional violations discussed
below. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189
(2000) (“It is well settled that a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not
deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice. If it did, the courts
would be compelled to leave the defendant . . . free to return to his old ways.”) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
3

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The stated justification for the Executive Order is national security, but in the various
travel ban cases around the country the Defendants have proffered no evidence that the Executive
Order furthers that goal. The evidence is exactly the opposite. See Declaration of Madeleine
Albright et. al, included in the attached Appendix at Tab 5. (“We view the Order as one that
ultimately undermines the national security of the United States, rather than making us safer.”)
Further, the public record is replete with statements by the President and others that the true
motivation of the Executive Order is to impermissibly disfavor one religious group as compared
to others. See Exhibit B (compiling a list of web pages the Court can access that reflect the
various public quotes other courts in travel ban cases have relied upon in finding discriminatory
animus).
LEGAL STANDARD
A preliminary injunction is an equitable remedy available within the discretion of the trial
court. Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980). While it is an extraordinary
remedy, an injunction nevertheless should issue when the right to relief is “clear and
unequivocal.” Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 269 F.3d 1149, 1154
(10th Cir. 2001). “The burden is on the movant to make a prima facie showing of a probable
right to the ultimate relief and a probable danger of injury if the motion is denied.” Big O Tires,
Inc. v. Bigfoot 4X4, Inc., 167 F.Supp.2d 1216, 1221 (D. Colo. 2001).
Whether Plaintiff is entitled to preliminary injunctive relief requires consideration of the
following factors: “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that the movant will
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in
the movant’s favor; and (4) that the injunction is in the public interest.” RoDa Drilling Co., et al.

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v. Siegal, et al., 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); see also Haggard v. Spine, No. 09-cv-00721, 2009 WL 1655030, at
*13 (D. Colo. June 12, 2009). Plaintiff satisfies each of these elements, warranting the
imposition of preliminary injunctive relief.
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF IS LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS.
Plaintiff has pleaded a number of reasons why the Executive Order is invalid. See

Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 46–84 (alleging six different claims for relief). For purposes of the
present motion, Plaintiff focuses on three claims: that Section 3(c) violates (1) the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause; (2) the Equal Protection aspect of the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause; and (3) the First Amendment Establishment Clause. Plaintiff is likely to succeed
on the merits of one or more of these claims.
A.

The Denial Of Re-Entry To And De Facto Travel Ban On Visa Holders
Violates Their Due Process Rights Under the Fifth Amendment.

Section 3(c) of the Executive Order denies entry and re-entry to Plaintiffs studying in the
United States on student visas. Under the Executive Order, Plaintiffs travelling abroad will be
deported if they attempt to re-enter the United States, and those who remain will be forced to
refrain from international travel to avoid that devastating result. This draconian restriction
violates the due process rights of those individuals.
Student Visa Holders Are Protected By The Fifth Amendment.
Student visa holders have property interests protected by the Due Process Clause. The
Fifth Amendment protects all persons who have entered the United States “from deprivation of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 69, 77

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(1976). This protection applies to all persons within our borders, regardless of immigration
status. Id. (“Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is
entitled to that constitutional protection.”); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); see
also de la Llana-Castellon v. I.N.S., 16 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 1994).
Like lawful permanent residents, visa holders have routinely relied on and built their lives
around a legal status the United States has accorded them. Those extensive reliance interests
demonstrate that visa holders have a “legitimate claim of entitlement to,” as opposed to “a
unilateral expectation of,” their visa status. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 576–77 (1972). As the Supreme Court recently observed, “[b]efore issuing a visa, the
consular office must ensure the alien is not inadmissible under any provision of the INA.” Kerry
v. Din, 135 S.Ct. 2128, 2131 (2015) (emphasis added). The award of such a visa after complying
with that drawn-out vetting process entitles the recipient to present himself for entry to the
United States, and surely “secure[s] certain benefits and . . . support[s] claims of entitlement to
those benefits.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
Mr. Hagig is a current Colorado resident who lives, works, and attends school in
Colorado under a lawfully-issued visa. Plaintiff and the Class therefore have a constitutionally
protected property and liberty interest in not having their approved visas arbitrarily revoked
based on their national origin and religion.
The Executive Order violates the Plaintiffs’ due process rights by both
denying them entry and precluding them from traveling outside the
United States.
The Executive Order infringes on multiple protected liberty interests enjoyed by visa
holders, most relevant here being the right to travel.

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The Supreme Court has made clear that due process “is a flexible concept that varies with
the particular situation.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). Courts apply the
Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to determine what the Constitution requires in each case:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
First, the Executive Order’s effective trapping of Plaintiffs here in the United States
violates due process. A “temporary absence from our shores” does not deprive Plaintiffs of their
right to due process. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953)
(citing Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 601 (1953) (holding that denial of re-entry to
legal permanent resident must comport with due process where resident had spent four months
abroad)); Ricketts v. Simonse, No. 16 CIV. 6662 (LGS), 2016 WL 7335675, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 16, 2016) (legal permanent resident who had spent a few weeks abroad and was caught with
drugs upon re-entry entitled to due process). “[N]oncitizens, even those charged with entering
the country illegally, are entitled to due process when threatened with deportation[.]” de la
Llana-Castellon, 16 F.3d at 1096. Specifically, “[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Id.
By denying international students the ability to leave and return, the Executive Order also
impermissibly infringes on their right to travel, which is a well-established constitutionally
protected liberty interest. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (holding that Secretary of

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State could not deny passports to Communists on the basis that right to travel abroad is a
constitutionally protected liberty interest). The right to travel “may be as close to the heart of the
individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads,” and is “basic in our scheme of
values.” Id. at 126; see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (“the ‘right’ of international
travel [is] an aspect of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.”). Additionally, the Executive Order’s arbitrary deprivation of the students’ legal
status implicates the right to pursue employment and education. See Schware v. Bd. of Bar
Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 238–39 (1957) (“A state cannot exclude a person from the practice of
law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923). And for students with family abroad, the de facto travel ban also denies the right to
connect with their families, “a right that ranks high among the interests of the individual.”
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). Section 3(c) directly infringes those rights and
liberty interests.
The Executive Order provides no process for the deprivation of
Plaintiffs due process rights.
The Executive Order plainly provides no individualized process, let alone process that
meets the Mathews v. Eldridge test, for providing Plaintiffs their due process rights under the
Fifth Amendment. Considering “the interest at stake for the individual, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of the interest through the procedures used as well as the probable value of additional
or different procedural safeguards, and the interest of the government in using the current
procedures rather than additional or different procedures,” Landon, 459 U.S. at 34. Blanket
exclusions based on national origin cannot pass muster.

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Residents currently present in Colorado based on a student visa must be given the
opportunity to dispute the characterization that they personally pose a national security risk (a
determination Defendants have made based on national origin). Those Colorado residents are
entitled to an individualized, pre-deprivation hearing. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82
(1972) (“The right to a prior hearing has long been recognized by this Court . . . . [T]he Court has
traditionally insisted that, whatever its form, opportunity for that hearing must be provided
before the deprivation at issue takes effect.”); see also Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2144 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“These procedural protections help to guarantee that government will not make a
decision directly affecting an individual arbitrarily but will do so through the reasoned
application of a rule of law.”). Section 3(c) denies procedural due process by telling Colorado
residents who come from the majority-Muslim countries that the Government will not readmit
them if they leave the United States. But visa holders have extensive reliance interests premised
on the knowledge that their visas will continue to be recognized and not arbitrarily canceled.
It would be fundamentally unfair and discriminatory to permit the Defendants to
summarily revoke an individual’s legal right to be in the United States for no reason other than
that they were born or naturalized in, or traveled through, a majority-Muslim country. See Reno
v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 344 n.30 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and the decision to uphold “the exclusion from particular
‘military areas’ . . . all persons of Japanese ancestry without a determination as to whether any
particular individual actually posed a threat of sabotage or espionage”). This bar on departure or
re-entry by international students without “proceedings conforming to . . . due process of law” is
patently unconstitutional, Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. at 212, and the Plaintiffs are therefore likely to

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succeed on the merits of their due process claim.
4.

The Executive Order Violates the Equal Protection Component of the Fifth
Amendment

The Supreme Court has made clear that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause also
has an “equal protection component,” and noncitizens come within the ambit of that Clause.
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 297 (1980); see also Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 874 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Under standard Equal Protection jurisprudence, “classifications based
on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close
judicial scrutiny.” Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971). The blanket
assumption—that Colorado residents from the seven majority-Muslim countries pose some sort
of terror threat—is a form of religious bigotry that cannot possibly survive strict scrutiny.
But even if the Court were to apply lesser scrutiny in consideration of the Government’s
plenary control over immigration, the result would be the same. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 695 (2001). Where governmental action is principally motivated by animus towards a
religious group, the action denies equal protection of the law. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“In determining whether a law is motivated by an improper
animus or purpose, ‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’ especially require careful
consideration.”) (citation omitted); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (“[I]ts sheer
breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable
by anything but animus towards the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship with legitimate
state interests.”). As the Court recently said in Windsor, “[t]he Constitution’s guarantee of
equality ‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.

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Just as Windsor and Romer invalidated laws based on animus towards gay people, even under the
rational-basis tests the religious animus here cannot be justified either. As other courts have
found, the public record clarifies that religious animus motivates the Executive Order. See
Exhibit B (collection of public statements); see, e.g., Appendix at Tab 8 (order from Judge
Brinkema of United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia).
B.

The Executive Order Violates The Establishment Clause By Discriminating
Against Visa Holders On the Basis of Their Religion.

Plaintiffs are also likely to succeed on their Establishment Clause challenge because the
Executive Order plainly discriminates against visa-holders on the basis of religion. As the
Supreme Court explained in Larson v. Valente, “[t]he clearest command of the Establishment
Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” 456 U.S.
228, 244 (1982). “The State may not adopt programs or practices . . . which aid or oppose any
religion . . . . This prohibition is absolute.” Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1127 (10th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Larson, 456 U.S. at 246); see also Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687, 728 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he Establishment Clause forbids the
government to use religion as a line drawing criterion. . . . Just as the government may not
segregate people on account of their race, so too it may not segregate on the basis of religion.”).
Where a “law grant[s] a denominational preference,” the Court “treat[s] the law as suspect and
[applies] strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality.” Larson, 456 U.S. at 246; see also
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Here, “[t]o survive strict scrutiny under Larson, [Defendants] must show (1) a compelling
government interest, and (2) that the [Executive Order] is ‘closely fitted’ to that compelling
interest.” Awad, 670 F.3d at 1129 (“Strict scrutiny is required when laws discriminate among

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religions because [n]eutral treatment of religions [is] the clearest command of the Establishment
Clause.”). The Executive Order fails this test.
First, the two purposes listed in the Order are (1) national security, and (2) to reduce
“investigative burdens on relevant agencies” during visa-adjudication review process. See
Exhibit A at § 3(c). However, no post-hoc excuse the Government might now offer can justify
what operates as a Muslim ban. With respect to national security, there is a “near-absence of
terror attacks” perpetrated by lawful permanent residents or visa holders from Iran, Iraq, Syria,
Libya, Somalia, Yemen, or Sudan in the United States.4 Thus, it is a vast overreach to claim that
all members of those majority-Muslim countries pose national security risks, let alone Colorado
residents with strong ties to Colorado. With respect to the “investigative burdens on relevant
agencies,” there is no reason to believe visa applications from 7 countries will overwhelm the
Executive branch. The Executive Order is not justified by a compelling government interest.
Second, even assuming the Executive Order had a compelling government interest,
banning all individuals from seven countries from the United States plainly is not narrowly
tailored to either purpose. Even if there were a risk to national security and administrative
burdens, neither of those exist for the Plaintiffs who have already been vetted and already gone
through the administrative process. And limiting the order to seven countries—as a pretense to
survive legal challenge—cannot purge the unconstitutional motive. Courts look for
unconstitutional motive in history and context of a challenged law. E.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist., 530 U.S. 290, 309 (2000) (examining “evolution” and history” of high school football
prayer policy to conclude that it promoted religion); McCreary, 545 U.S. 844, 857 (2005)
4

Elise Labott, Over 900 US career diplomats protest Trump order, CNN, January 31, 2017,
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/30/politics/career-diplomats-dissent-memo/.

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(rejecting changes to Ten Commandments display to cover up initial religious motivation).
In short, the intent of the Executive Order is to discriminate against persons from Iran,
Iraq, Syria, Libya, Somalia, Yemen, and Sudan on the basis that they are more likely to be
Muslim. Because the Executive Order was motivated by animus to a particular religious group,
the Order is unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.
II.

Plaintiffs Are Suffering Ongoing Irreparable Harm
Members of the Plaintiff Class are suffering immediate and irreparable constitutional

harm. Irreparable injury is established “when the court would be unable to grant an effective
monetary remedy after a full trial because such damages would be inadequate or difficult to
ascertain.” Dominion Video, 269 F.3d at 1156. “When an alleged constitutional right is involved,
most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” Fish v. Kobach, 840
F.3d 710, 752 (10th Cir. 2016). As to Establishment Clause specifically, “[t]he Supreme Court
has explained that ‘loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury[.]’” Id. (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 374 &
n.29 (1976)).
As long as § 3(c) of the Executive Order remains in effect, the Government denies
Colorado residents their fundamental due process rights and subjects them to arbitrary detention,
exclusion, and expulsion from the country. Students currently present in the United States are
effectively barred from leaving no matter the circumstances—like going home in the event of a
family member’s illness or death—under penalty of being denied reentry. These injuries are
happening now and are not fanciful or speculative. This factor weighs heavily in favor of
granting a preliminary injunction.

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III.

The Balance of the Equities Weighs Strongly in Plaintiffs’ Favor.
The balance of equities plainly weighs in favor of granting the injunction. Any benefit to

enforcing a legal action that “is likely unconstitutional” does “not outweigh [Mr. Hagig’s]
interest in having his constitutional rights protected.” Awad, 670 F.3d at 1131–32. Additionally,
“delayed implementation of a governmental measure that does not appear to address any
immediate problem with generally not cause material harm, even if the measure were eventually
found to be constitutional and enforceable.” Verlo v. Martinez, 820 F.3d 1113, 1127 (10th Cir.
2016) (citing Awad, 670 F.3d at 1131).
Because Plaintiff is likely to succeed in its challenges to the Executive Order, Defendants
cannot claim to be harmed by being forced to stop their illegal actions. Even further, enjoining
Section 3(c) as applied to Colorado residents cannot somehow threaten the Government’s
legitimate security interests. These visa holders who reside in Colorado have already been vetted
and approved for travel to the United States. If any particular person poses a security risk,
existing law amply allows the Government to take protective action. Thus, the balance of the
equities weighs in favor of granting Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief.
IV.

The Public Interest Will Be Served by Granting Injunctive Relief.
Here, the public interest is served by preventing the Defendants from enforcing the

Executive Order. Indeed, the Defendants’ violation of Constitutional and federal law “invokes a
public interest of the highest order: the interest in having government officials act in accordance
with law.” Hackwell v. United States, No. 04-cv-00827, 2008 WL 2900933, at *6 (D. Colo. July
23, 2008) (citation omitted). In addition, “it is always in the public interest to prevent the
violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114,

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1145 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Verlo, 820 F.3d at 1127; Awad, 670 F.3d at 1132.
V.

A Bond Is Not Necessary.
Although Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(c) and D.C. Colo. LCivR 67.1 requires the movant to post a

bond, the district court has “wide discretion” as to the amount of any bond. Winnebago Tribe of
Nebraska v. Stovall, 341 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2002). Absent harm to a defendant, the
Court may determine that no bond is required. See, e.g., Xantrex Technology, Inc. v. Advanced
Energy Indus., Inc., No. 07-cv-02324, 2008 WL 2185882, at *22 (D. Colo. 2008) (“Because . . .
Defendants will not suffer any harm as the result of the injunction, there is no need for a bond”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant Plaintiffs’
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and enjoin the Defendants from enforcing Section 3(c) of the
Executive Order.
Dated February 17, 2017

Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Christopher H. Toll
Christopher H. Toll
8390 E. Crescent Parkway, Suite 400
Greenwood Village, CO 80111
Phone: (303) 290-1067
ctoll@hollandhart.com
Jessica J. Smith
555 Seventeenth Street, Suite 3200
Denver, CO 80202
Phone: (303) 295-8000
Facsimile: (303) 295-8261
jjsmith@hollandhart.com
HOLLAND & HART LLP

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By: /s/ Alan Kennedy-Shaffer
Alan Kennedy-Shaffer
1051 14th Street, Box 21101
Denver, CO 80202
(712) 433-5488
alan.kennedy-shaffer@aya.yale.edu
By: /s/ Morgan L. Carroll
Morgan L. Carroll
1165 Ouray Street
Aurora, CO 80011
(303) 726-1742
morganlcarroll@gmail.com
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on February 17, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing document,
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, with the clerk of the court for the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado using the CM/ECF system, which sent a Notice of Electronic filing
to the attorneys of record for the parties.

s/Christopher H. Toll
Christopher H. Toll
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
9559353_7

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