S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330319
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360

JTF-GTMO-CDR

19 March 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000679DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment
1. (S) Personal Information:
•
•
•
•
•
•

JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Muhammad Tahar
Current/True Name and Aliases: Yasir Ahmad Ali Tahar,
Muhammad Ahmad Ali Tahir, Muhammad Ahmad Ali Tahir
al-Ibbi al-Dini, Muhammad Taher, Hamad Taher, Farabi
Place of Birth: Ibb, Yemen (YM)
Date of Birth: 1 January 1980
Citizenship: Yemen
Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000679DP

2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.
3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:
a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention
Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Transfer Out
of DoD Control (TRO) on 22 January 2007.
b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be an Islamic extremist and a
member of a Faisalabad, Pakistan (PK) cell created by senior al-Qaida member Zayn alAbidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), after
fleeing hostilities in Afghanistan (AF) with the purpose of returning to Afghanistan to
conduct attacks against US and Coalition forces using improvised explosive devices (IED).
Detainee is assessed to have traveled to Afghanistan for training in July 2001 based on his
recovered passport, and adopted a false education cover story citing travel only in September
CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20330319

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JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000679DP (S)
2001 to hide his true intent and activities. Detainee probably fled hostilities in Afghanistan
along with his brother and other members of the Martyrs Brigade with assistance of the
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT). 1 Detainee was arrested at the Issa Safe House controlled by GZ10016. Detainee acknowledged associations with members and facilities associated with the
Jamaat Tablighi (JT), 2 which are assessed to be linked to an al-Qaida facilitation network. It
is assessed detainee will engage in extremist activities upon release. He has threatened JTFGTMO personnel and continues to support jihad. [ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.] JTF-GTMO
determined this detainee to be:
•
•
•

A HIGH risk, as he likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.
A HIGH threat from a detention perspective.
Of MEDIUM intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee’s
assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be
annotated by ¾ next to the footnote.)
• Information was added in this assessment about detainee’s threat against US
personnel and his support for jihad. Due to this information, detainee’s risk level was
raised from MEDIUM to HIGH.
• Added aliases Farabi 3 , Muhammad Tahir al-Sulami 4 , Muhammed Hammed Allah,
and Yassir Ali Abdullah Ali Ahmed Al Sulaymi. 5
• Incorporated information about the activities at GZ-10016 and Issa Safe Houses
4. (U) Detainee’s Account of Events:

1

Analyst Note: The LT is a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Priority 1 Counterterrorism (CT)
target. Priority 1 targets include issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of
interest of the President, Vice President, DNI, and NSC/HSC Principals and Deputies. This includes terrorist
groups, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a
clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests. This includes those preparing to employ Weapons of Mass
Destruction.
2
Analyst Note: Variants for Jama’at Tablighi are Talique Jammat and Markez al-Tablighi. The JT is an NIPF
Priority 3 Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 3 TSEs have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide
financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack U.S. persons or interests, or provide witting operational
support to Priority 1-2 terrorist groups.
3
¾IIR 6 034 0144 03, 000707 302 14-Sep-2002, Analyst Note: Listed as Muhammad Ahmad Ali, photo A020A.
Initial research on this alias produced no results.
4
¾GUAN-2007-B03750, Analyst Note: Listed with variant Muhammad Taher al-Sulamee
5
¾Multiple ISNs Yemeni Delegation 26 MAR 2008.

2
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JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000679DP (S)
The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee’s own account.
These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.
a. (S//NF) Prior History: While growing up in Yemen, detainee (a member of the Tahar
Tribe) attended conventional school and had no structured religious education, although he
identifies his father as a shaykh. During high school, detainee worked and lived in a grocery
store in Aden, YM for three years, and prayed at the al-Huda Mosque. After graduating from
high school in 1999, detainee taught elementary classes at the al-Hawarith School. Detainee
did not receive military training, as his high grades in school allowed him to avoid being
recruited into the Yemeni military. 6
(S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee developed an interest in studying medicine in
Pakistan. A JT missionary told detainee before he could do so, he would have to study the
Koran. A representative from the JT mission went to the Pakistani Embassy and acquired a visa
on detainee’s behalf. In mid-September 2001, detainee flew from Sanaa, YM to Dubai, United
Arab Emirates (AE), to Karachi, PK. A member of the JT met detainee at the Karachi airport
and took detainee to the Makki Mosque. Detainee then traveled to Lahore, PK where he stayed
for two days, and then continued to the Raiwind Mosque, where detainee met with a person
named Ismael. 7 Detainee’s brother also traveled to Pakistan. 8
b. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee enrolled in the Jamia Salafia University in
Faisalabad in October 2001. 9 After Ramadan (17 November to 16 December 2001), a
Pakistani named Issa took detainee to an off-campus house, known as the Issa House.
Detainee went from the university to this house with fellow Yemenis Emad Abdalla Hassan,
aka (Imad), ISN US9YM-000680DP (YM-680), Muhammad Muhammad Hassan, aka
(Muhammad), ISN US9YM-000681DP (YM-681), Fayad Yahya Ahmed, aka (Fayad)
US9YM-000683DP (YM-683), Muhammad Ahmad Salam, aka (Muhammad), ISN US9YM000689DP (YM-689), and detainee’s brother Ali Abdullah Ahmed aka (Ali), ISN US9YM000693DP (YM-693, deceased). Issa told detainee to remain at the house at all times. 10
6

IIR 6 034 0163 03, 000679 302 19-JUN-2002, 000679 GUAN 2007-T00651-HT
000679 302 19-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: The Raiwind Mosque is assessed to be the Raiwind Center near Lahore,
PK, where the headquarters for the JT is located. See 000681 302 20-JUN-2002.
8
000679 302 07-SEP-2002, Analyst Note: Detainee refused to provide any further information on his brother’s
travel to Pakistan and it is unclear if they traveled together. The brother noted is probably YM-693.
9
000679 302 19-JUN-2002, 000679 KB 22-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: Variants for Jamia Salafia include Jamiyah
Salfiyah, Jamea Salafeyah, Salafyah University, and Salafi University.
10
000679 302 19-JUN-2002, 000679 FM40 11-SEP-2003, Analyst Note: This reporting contradicts detainee’s
reporting in his KB (000679 KB 22-JUN-2002) where he claimed he studied at the university until February of
2002; while also stating in 000679 302 19-JUN-2002, that he spent several months at the Issa House before
Pakistani Forces captured him. For reporting of detainee’s and YM-693’s relationship, see IIR 6 034 0043 03,
000511 SIR 13-Oct-2007, 000679 GUAN-2006-B03688-HT, and 000679 GUAN-2007-B04101. YM-693
7

3
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JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000679DP (S)

5. (U) Capture Information:
a. (S//NF) Pakistani authorities conducted raids at two safe houses in Faisalabad on 28
March 2002, arresting more than 30 suspected al-Qaida fighters under the command of GZ10016 and killing one. At one location, referred to as the Issa Safe House, Pakistani police
and intelligence officials arrested at least 15 suspected al-Qaida members, including
detainee. 11 At the other safe house, Pakistani officials arrested GZ-10016 and at least seven
other suspected al-Qaida members and seized manuals, tools, and components consistent
with the assembly of explosive detonators. The safe houses were operated by the LT and
were part of a network of LT houses and operatives enlisted by GZ-10016 after the fall of
Kandahar, AF to help al-Qaida’s Arab fighters escape Afghanistan. 12 Detainee and other
suspects were held by Pakistani authorities first in a prison in Lahore and then at a prison in
Islamabad, PK. All suspects were transferred to US custody in May 2002. 13
b. (S) Property Held:
•
•

Watch
Though not held at JTF-GTMO, the following item is reportedly detainee’s:
○ Yemeni Passport, No. 00458056 14

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 19 June 2002
d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the
following:

committed suicide at JTF-GTMO in June 2006 and detainee wrote family member in a manner depicting YM-693 as
a martyr. Detainee, like YM-693, viewed the suicide as a continuance of their jihad against the US.
11
IIR 6 034 0286 05, 000694 KB 22-JUN-2002, 000695 FM40 24-SEP-2003, Analyst Note: Issa’s safe house was
also called the Yemeni House and the Crescent Textile Mill house. The following were identified as those arrested
on 28 March 2002 at the Issa House: ISNs US9YM-000679DP, US9YM-000680DP, US9YM-000681DP, US9YM000683DP, US9WE-000684DP, US9YM-000686DP, US9SA-000687DP, US9YM-000688DP, US9YM-000689DP,
US9YM-000690DP, US9YM-000691DP, US9YM-000692DP, US9YM-000693DP (deceased), US9LY-000695DP,
US9RS-000702DP, and US9YM-000728DP. See IIR 6 034 0979 03, 000684 SIR 14-Oct-2004 and 000695 FM40
24-SEP-2003.
12
TD-314/18169-02, IIR 6 034 0911 04, SAP20020408000048 08-APR-2002, SAP20020330000051 30-MAR2002, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005b
13
IIR 6 034 0144 03, IIR 4 201 4063 05, IIR 6 034 0470 03, IIR 6 034 0911 04, IIR 6 034 0043 03, IIR 6 034 0872
02, TD-314/20711-02
14
000679 PASSPORT PAK1-2002-805227 22-APR-2000

4
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JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000679DP (S)
•
•
•

Recruitment of Yemeni males traveling to Pakistan to study at the Jamia Salafia
University
Curriculum of the Jamia Salafia University and its target audience
The safe house in Faisalabad used to house foreign students attending Jamia Salafia
University

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee’s Account: Detainee’s account is assessed to be almost
entirely fabricated and he remains uncooperative. Detainee’s story of traveling to Pakistan with
the help of the JT is consistent with reporting from other JTF-GTMO detainees. While detainee
probably did receive assistance from the JT, it was probably from members of the JT who were
associated with the facilitation of recruit movements to the region. Detainee’s passport indicates
he entered Pakistan six weeks prior to his claimed date of travel. Detainee reported a false
timeline to hide his travel to Afghanistan, his activities and associations with al-Qaida in
Afghanistan, and his relationship with YM-693. Additionally, detainee’s report concerning the
time period he attended Jamia Salafia is inconsistent. Detainee is concealing travel to
Afghanistan to attend militant training. Detainee’s dates of travel are inconsistent between his
own account and detainee’s associated pocket litter. None of the other residents of the Issa Safe
House have indicated detainee was anything other than a student.
7. (U) Detainee Threat:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat
to the US, its interests and allies.
b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be an Islamic
extremist and a member of GZ-10016’s Martyrs Brigade, a Faisalabad cell intended to
conduct IED attacks against US and Coalition forces. Detainee is assessed to have traveled
to Afghanistan for training and adopted a false education cover story to hide the true purpose
of his travels. Detainee probably fled hostilities in Afghanistan along with his brother and
other members of the Martyrs Brigade with assistance of the LT. Detainee acknowledged
associations with members and facilities associated with the JT, which are assessed to be
linked to an al-Qaida facilitation network. His passport shows that he entered Pakistan two
months earlier than he claimed. Detainee has continually voiced support for Islamic
extremism since his detention.
• (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an Islamic extremist and a member of GZ-10016’s
Martyrs Brigade, a Faisalabad cell intended to conduct IED attacks against US and
Coalition forces. Detainee is assessed to have traveled to Afghanistan for training.
○ (S//NF) Analyst Note: Detainee and many of the other detainees captured during
the 28 March 2002 raids adopted a false cover story citing education as their purpose
5
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JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000679DP (S)
for travel to Pakistan. They additionally denied any links to al-Qaida or even travel to
Afghanistan. These claims have been assessed to be false with reporting from other
detainees confirming their travel to Afghanistan, training in al-Qaida camps, and
participation in hostilities against US and Coalition forces. 15 Several detainees also
had false student identification cards created to support their cover story. 16 (Analyst
Note: Official documentation demonstrates detainee’s claims are false. Detainee has
claimed unsubstantiated timeline details and associates, and continues to withhold
information. It is assessed he followed similar paths to those with whom he was
captured. Detainee probably used an undiscovered alias in Afghanistan.) Detainee’s
current name is not assessed to be his true name and his true identity is not known.
As detainee and YM-693 are brothers, based on Arabic naming structure, they should
both have Ahmad as their second name. However, YM-693 identified Abdallah as
his second name. 17
○ (S//NF) Pakistani authorities captured detainee and about 30 other suspected alQaida fighters under the command of GZ-10016 during raids on LT operated
Faisalabad safe houses identified as the Issa Safe House and the Abu Zubaydah Safe
House. Detainee was captured at the Issa Safe House. GZ-10016 stated he created
the Martyrs Brigade, a unit conceived to conduct attacks against US-based targets
employing remotely detonated explosives activated by Pakistan based triggermen
using cell phones. 18
ƒ (S//NF) According to open source and other reporting, the residents of the
Issa Safe House were part of a network poised to launch attacks against American
installations and embassies in various countries. The plan had been finalized but
was broken up by the Faisalabad safe house raids that led to the arrest of
numerous suspects including its chief, GZ-10016, a key al-Qaida facilitator. 19
ƒ (S//NF) Muhammad Noor Uthman, ISN US9SU-000707DP (SU-707), stated
GZ-10016 was the director of the Issa Safe House in Faisalabad. 20
ƒ (S//NF) GZ-10016’s original plan was to flee Afghanistan and travel via
Pakistan to Iran, where he would set up a base of operations for the Brigade. GZ10016’s long-term intent was to train and place suicide bombers or remotecontrolled explosive devices in efforts to attack US and Coalition targets in

15

¾Analyst Note: As an example, ISN US9YM-000680DP claimed he was a student at the University and was
identified as such along with detainee. See 000695 FM40 24-Sep-2004. However, YM-680 has also been identified
as a facilitator and Usama Bin Laden adherent who swore bayat. See RFI RESPONSE R-GTMO-0117-07 ISN 493.
16
Counterfeit PAK1-2002-805339, PAK1-2002-805338
17
¾ GUAN-2003-T01406 and GUAN-2007-B03917; Analyst Note: Both detainees also wrote to the same people,
although the addresses are slightly different and require further investigation.
18
TD-314/33836-02, TD-314/17440-02, TD-314/17625-02
19
SAP20020404000045 04-APR-2002, 000680 KB 22-JUN-2002, IIR 6 034 0043 03, IIR 6 034 0872 02
20
000707 302 11-SEP-2002

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JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000679DP (S)
Afghanistan. 21 (Analyst Note: GZ-10016 established a training program at his
safe house for the manufacture of remote controlled detonators and probably
established the Issa Safe House for those with explosives experience and with the
intent to send both groups back to Afghanistan for operations.)
ƒ (S//NF) At least two individuals captured with detainee at the Issa Safe House
had known explosives training. Awad Khalifah Muhammad Abu Bakr Abu
Uwayshah al-Barasi, ISN US9LY-000695DP (LY-695), an admitted explosives
trainer, reported detainee was a student at Faisalabad Salafist University. 22 Ravil
Mingazov, ISN US9RS-000702DP (RS-702), received bomb training at the alQaida al-Faruq Training Camp from mid-August through mid-September 2001. 23
ƒ (S//NF) GZ-10016 stated Sufyian Barhoumi, aka (Abu Ubaydah al-Jazairi),
ISN US9AG-000694DP (AG-694), conducted training on remote-controlled
detonators at the Abu Zubaydah Safe House for Ghassan Abdallah Ghazi alSharbi, ISN US9SA-000682DP (SA-682), and Jabran Said Bin Wazir al-Qahtani,
ISN US9SA-000696DP (SA-696), in March 2002. 24
♦ (S//NF) SA-696 confirmed the IED plan, stating that he intended to make
circuit boards at the safe house to be used with explosives for operations
against US forces in Afghanistan. SA-696 purchased enough components to
produce 30 detonators and had produced two test units by the time of the
raids. 25 Electronic schematics, electrical components, and a voltmeter were
recovered in the raids. 26
♦ (S//NF) GZ-10016 instructed Binyam Ahmad Muhammad, ISN US9ET001458DP (ET-1458), and others to go to Pakistan for training in remote
control detonators and subsequently to return to Afghanistan to train the
Afghans. If they did not train the Afghans, then they were to build the devices
and provide them to the Afghans. 27
ƒ (S//NF) GZ-10016 described his escape from Afghanistan with a group of
other al-Qaida operatives under his command via Birmal and Zormat, AF and
Bannu and Lahore, PK to Faisalabad with the assistance of the LT network of
facilitators. According to GZ-10016, the safe houses, as well as transportation

21

¾TD-314/33836-02, TD-314/35879-02, TD-314/17440-02, TD-314/17625-02, TD-314/17060-02, TD314/16969-02, TD-314/17373-02, TD-314/59808-05, For SU-707’s reporting on Padilla, see 000707 MFR 17-JAN2003, IIR 6 034 0657 02, IIR 6 034 0755 02,and IIR 6 034 0827 04
22
IIR 6 034 0196 05, 000695 FM40 24-SEP-2003, 000691 FM40 16-SEP-2003
23
IIR 6 034 0911 04, IIR 6 034 0196 05, IIR 6 034 1483 03
24
TD-314/17440-02, TD-314/17060-02, TD-314/17625-02, TD-314/18041-02, TD-314/35879-02, TD-314/3971603
25
TD-314/35879-02
26
¾TD-314/63481-03, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005(b)[1]
27
IIR 6 034 0282 05, 001458 FM40 27-JUL-04, 001458 FM40 28-JUL-04

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JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000679DP (S)
and security for these moves was provided by LT operatives. 28 (Analyst Note:
Detainee is assessed to be a member of the group of al-Qaida operatives who fled
Afghanistan with GZ-10016.)
♦ (S//NF) Senior al-Qaida facilitator Abu Bakr Muhammad Boulghiti, aka
(Abu Yasir al-Jazairi), reported Fahmi Abdallah Ahmad Ubadi al-Tulaqi, ISN
US9YM-000688 (YM-688), was with a large group of Yemenis in Faisalabad,
all of whom fled Afghanistan for Pakistan and were seeking to return to
Yemen. 29 YM-688 was captured with detainee at the Issa Safe House. 30
♦ (S//NF) GZ-10016 corroborated Abu Bakr Muhammad Boulghiti’s
statements stating the Yemenis were moved out of Afghanistan and put into a
safe house in Faisalabad to wait for new documents. 31
○ (S//NF) Analyst Note: It is assessed detainee traveled to Afghanistan in July
2001, two months after his brother YM-693. Detainee uses a common al-Qaida cover
story linked to the JT to hide his assessed travels to Afghanistan where detainee
probably received basic training, rejoined his brother, and fled with his brother to
Pakistan during Operation Enduring Freedom.
○ (S//NF) Affiliation with the JT has been identified as an al-Qaida cover story and
al-Qaida is known to have used the JT to facilitate and fund the international travels
of its members. 32 Detainee stated a JT member obtained the Pakistani visa for
detainee. After traveling to Karachi, detainee was met by a member of the JT who
took him to the Makki Mosque and, after an unspecified period, detainee traveled to
the JT world headquarters in Raiwind, PK. 33
ƒ (S//NF) Analyst Note: While detainee claimed he received assistance from
the JT, this assistance was either provided based on his expression to the JT that
he intended to perform dawa (missionary work) for the JT, or more likely as part
of an established al-Qaida facilitation network between Yemen and Pakistan. It is
unlikely that dedicated JT members would obtain detainee’s travel visa for him in
Yemen except in the furtherance of dawa activities. It is equally unlikely that the
JT would allow him to stay at the Makki Mosque in Karachi. The Makki Mosque
is the central/main JT Mosque in Karachi and numerous detainees have used the
Makki Mosque as part of a JT cover story for travel to Pakistan. Detainee has
28

¾TD-314/16265-02, TD-314/18169-02, IIR 6 034 0911 04, SAP20020408000048, Multiple ISNs FBIS
SAP20020330000051 30-MAR-2002, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005b, 000114 Lashkare-Tayyiba 23-DEC-2004, LASHKAR E TAYYIBA, NGIC - Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 1-Jan-2001
29
TD-314/44476-03
30
000679 FM40 11-SEP-2003
31
TD-314/41623-02
32
IIR 2 227 0131 03, Jamaat Tabligh Provides Cover as of 28-DEC-2005, JITF-CT Special Analysis US Jamaat
Tabligh
33
000679 302 19-JUN-2002, 000679 302 07-SEP-2002Analyst Note: The Raiwind Mosque is assessed to be the
Raiwind Center near Lahore, PK, where the headquarters for the JT is located. See 000681 302 20-JUN-2002.

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JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000679DP (S)
failed to validate his claims that he traveled for education and provided a false
travel date in order to withhold disclosure of probable travel to Afghanistan.
Detainee’s claimed travel for education is further discredited by his passport
which contained a one month tourist visa (discussed below), not a student visa. 34
ƒ (S//NF) Contrary to detainee’s claims of entering Pakistan in September 2001
to study, detainee’s passport had a Pakistan entry stamp dated 30 July 2001. The
passport also contained a one month tourist visa obtained 11 June 2001 which was
valid for two months. The visa was obtained from the Pakistan Embassy in
Sanaa. 35 (Analyst Note: Like detainee, his brother YM-693 presented the cover
story he traveled to Pakistan to study at the Jamia Salafia University. Detainee
traveled to Afghanistan two months after YM-693, whose passport has a Yemeni
exit stamp dated 20 May 2001 and a Pakistani entry stamp dated 21 May 2001. 36 )
♦ (S//NF) GZ-10016 photo identified YM-693 as an individual he met in
Kandahar in September 2001. GZ-10016 stated YM-693 was with Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad, aka (Mukhtar), aka (KSM). GZ-10016 also stated he
recognized detainee’s photograph, but could provide no other details, although
he did provide information on others captured at the Issa Safe House. 37
○ (S//NF) Detainee’s name, Muhammad Tahir, appeared on a list that documented
completed training, weapon expertise, and operational experience. The document
noted Tahir completed basic training in August 1998, spent one month on the front
beginning in July 2000, and requested training on tactics, artillery, and anti-aircraft
systems. 38 (Analyst Note: Although detainee is assessed to have received militant
training in Afghanistan, it is unlikely detainee traveled to Afghanistan in 1998. On
the document, Tahir noted his country as Pakistan and recorded that he attended the
Khalid Bin al-Walid Training Camp. The al-Walid Camp is known to have accepted
other trainees from Pakistan and Tahir is a name used in Pakistan as well. Detainee
can not positively be identified as this Muhammad Tahir.)
• (S//NF) Detainee has threatened to engage in extremist behavior upon release, has
threatened JTF-GTMO personnel, and continues to support jihad.
34

Analyst Note: For additional information on the JT and it’s links to al-Qaida, see 28 Jamaat Tabligh Provides
Cover as of 28-DEC-2005, IIR 6 034 0278 04, IIR 6 034 0286 04 28, and Abu Bakr University Analysis (JDIMS,
References). Other detainees associated with the Makki Mosque include US9YM-000028DP, US9BA-000052DP
(transferred), US9SA-000114DP (transferred), US9YM-000152DP, US9MO-000294DP (transferred), US9SA000333DP (transferred), US9SA-000507DP (transferred), US9JO-000651DP (transferred), US9YM-000683DP,
US9YM-000686DP, and US9YM-000691DP – the last three were captured with detainee.
35

000679 PASSPORT PAK1-2002-805227 22-APR-2000, Analyst Note: The Visa was obtained in June and was valid through
August but only allowed the holder to stay in Pakistan for one month during the period.
36

000693 Passport 29 Mar 2000
TD 314 20711 02
38
¾AFGP-2002-901078, Analyst Note: Detainee is listed on page 43. The document listed detainee’s country as
Pakistan, possibly indicating detainee transit route into Afghanistan.
37

9
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330319

 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330319
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000679DP (S)
○ (S//NF) Detainee has stated he wants “the infidels [non-Muslims] destroyed
because they are attacking God.” 39
○ (S//NF) During a debriefing, detainee prayed to God that the linguist be killed
and threatened to instigate some sort of uprising in the camp, claiming the Americans
are assaulting Islam. 40
○ (S//NF) Detainee commented, “The world is watching the outcome of what is
happening in Cuba.” Detainee stated he will clap when the United States falls. When
asked how this would occur, detainee responded that the debriefer will see and then
realize it when this occurs. 41
○ (S//NF) Detainee threatened to kill members of the JTF-GTMO guard force. 42
○ (S//NF) In a letter to his family, detainee discusses the death of his brother, YM693, in which detainee states YM-693 “went to Allah.” 43 (Analyst Note: Detainee’s
statement indicates he does not believe YM-693’s suicide was a sin, but instead
believes YM-693 sacrificed himself for jihad against the US and his martyrdom
granted him access to paradise.)
c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention
perspective. His overall behavior has been non-compliant and hostile to the guard force and
staff. He currently has 65 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most
recent occurring on 3 March 2008, when he failed to follow guards instructions when
refusing to return from recreation yard. He has nine Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for
assault with the most recent occurring on 1 December 2007, when he was reported throwing
feces on the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting
and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules,
inappropriate us of bodily fluids, unauthorized communications, damage to government
property, attempted assaults, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food
and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of 27 Reports of Disciplinary
Infraction and three so far in 2008.
8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee’s
most recent interrogation session occurred on 1 February 2007.

39

IIR 6 034 0163 03
000679 FM40 24-SEP-2002
41
000679 SIR 23-JAN-2006
42
¾JDG INTREP dated 03-Dec-2007, 18-Nov-2007
43
¾000690 GUAN-2006-B03690-HT
40

10
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330319

 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330319
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000679DP (S)
b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was captured with a number of other
Yemenis during raids on two safe houses belonging to GZ-10016. GZ-10016 was utilizing
individuals in his safe house to receive explosives training and assemble IEDs in preparation
for attacks against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. The JT recruited and facilitated
detainee’s travel to Pakistan, possibly in preparation for militant training in Afghanistan.
While detainee and other safe house residents possibly fought and trained in Afghanistan,
there is no additional reporting to validate whether or not detainee received training.
c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: If detainee entered Pakistan in mid September 2001,
as detainee claims, and was captured in early March 2002, detainee probably has limited
knowledge of al-Qaida, training and personnel. Detainee probably associated with Islamic
extremist elements during his time in Pakistan, given his affiliation with the JT and the Jamia
Salafia University. Detainee can possibly provide information on Taliban and al-Qaida
fighters who were transiting from Afghanistan into Pakistan attempting to return to Yemen.
Detainee would have knowledge of Islamic extremist recruitment practices and personnel
operating guesthouses and safe houses. Detainee has made only one statement concerning
his brother traveling to Pakistan. Further information is required to ascertain how detainee’s
brother was involved with Islamic extremist activities.
d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:
•
•
•

•

•
•
•

Recruitment of Islamic extremists in Yemen
Al-Qaida training, facilities, and activities against US and Coalition forces
Safe houses in Pakistan
○ GZ-10016
○ Abu Zubaydah Safe House, activities and associates
○ Issa Safe House, activities and associates
○ Planned actions against US and Coalition forces
○ IED and explosives training
The JT and the LT
○ Associates and leadership, funding, operations
○ JT mosque and religious studies facilitated
○ International travel
○ Al-Noor Mosque in Taiz, YM, and al-Huda Mosque in Aden
○ Courses of study
○ Support to al-Qaida
The Jamia Salafia University in Faisalabad
○ Curriculum, ideology, recruitment, safe house associations, and individuals
Ingress and egress routes through Pakistan and Afghanistan
Possible involvement of brother in extremist activities
11
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330319

 s E c R E T //NOFORN I   20330319
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT:Recommendation
for ContinuedDetentionUnderDoD Control(CD) for
(S)
Guantanamo
Detainee,
ISN US9YM-000679DP
o

Terrorist biographical and psychological information

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemy combatantstatuswas reassessed
on 7 December2004,
and he remains an enemy combatant.

,,,1
tt,
.-1 4.

,

i4.7(

K- 1'+z1t ' - -//'//do/t
\
MARK H. BUZBY
,/ \
1-'/
RearAdmiral,US Navy
Commandins

-

Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessmentcan be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College
October 2001 guide Intelligence Ll/arning Terminolog,'.

t2
S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20330319