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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CRIMINAL
VERSUS
NO. 16-80-JWD-RLB
JUSTIN LANDRY

RULING AND ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is the Motion to Suppress (Doc. 20), filed by Defendant Justin Landry
(“Defendant”), which is opposed by the United States (Doc. 22). The Court held an evidentiary
hearing on January 26, 2017. (Docs. 23 and 25.) Defendant and the United States filed PostHearing Memoranda (Docs. 26 and 28, respectively), and the United States filed a Reply to
Defendant’s Post-Hearing Memorandum. (Doc. 29.) After careful consideration of the parties’
arguments, for the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 5, 2015, Detective Verrette of the Plaquemines Parish Sheriff’s Office
(“PPSO”) was conducting an undercover investigation into child pornography distribution and
possession. (Doc. 22 at 2.) In connection with his investigation, Detective Verrette searched files
on a peer-to-peer file sharing platform called BitTorrent. (Doc. 22 at 2.)
By way of background, BitTorrent is one of the most frequently used file sharing systems
for distributing large amounts of data. (Doc. 22 at 4 (citing Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53784, *2 n.1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 24, 2015).) File sharing consists of the transfer
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of electronic files between internet users. (Doc. 22 at 4 (citing Malibu Media, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 53784, *2 n.1).) Programs such as BitTorrent are based on user reciprocity, thus the
amount of files a user is entitled to download is based on the amount of files the user makes
available for others to download. (Doc. 22 at 4 (citing Patrick Collins Inc. v. John Does 1-28,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11349, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2013).) The BitTorrent platform
enables the mass transfer of data by breaking down files into many smaller pieces, which are
exchanged between BitTorrent users, and then reassembled by BitTorrent to complete a digital
movie or image. (Doc. 22 at 4 (citing Malibu Media, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53784, *2 n.1).)
When a user places a file in his “shared” folder, it is publicly available to everyone on the
BitTorrent platform. (Doc. 22 at 6—7.)
When investigating the possession and distribution of child pornography on platforms
such as BitTorrent, law enforcement officials often use software that is compatible with
BitTorrent that allows them to isolate and identify a file’s source, also known as “sole source
downloads.” (Doc. 22 at 5.) As explained by the United States, the software utilized by
investigators in this case, Torrential Downpour, “has a prophylactic setting to positively identify
purveyors of contraband to the exclusion of all other users.” (Doc. 22 at 5.) This software is
limited to an examination of files that are placed in a user’s “shared” folder; i.e. it exclusively
accesses those files which have been made publicly available. If a file is not in a publicly
available shared folder, it is beyond detection of the investigators’ software. (Doc. 22 at 9.)
In this case, the BitTorrent software Detective Verrette used is called Torrential
Downpour. (Doc. 22 at 6.) The Torrential Downpour software differs from the publicly available
BitTorrent software in the following respects: 1) it sole source downloads thereby “eliminat[ing]
suspects to the exclusion of all but one IP address”; 2) it allows its users to download files

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without the requirement of reciprocal file sharing; 3) its searches are automated; and 4) its
searches are directed toward ferreting out the possession and distribution of child pornography.
(Doc. 22 at 5.)
The automated searches that target files containing child pornography utilize “hash
identifiers” of known pornography images identified in previous law enforcement investigations.
(Doc. 22 at 6.) This ensures that users cannot conceal contraband by replacing the title with an
innocuous file name (thus, a pornographic file renamed “Piano recital” will not evade detection
by the software). (Doc. 22 at 6.) “A ‘hash identifier’ is ‘a 40 character alphanumeric string that
forms a unique identifier of an encoded file’; in other words, it is the file’s digital fingerprint.
(Doc. 22 at 6 (citing United States v. Richardson, 713 F.3d 232, 233 (5th Cir. 2013).) As
mentioned above, the automated searches are limited to an examination of only those files placed
in a user’s “shared” folder; i.e., it can only search those files which are available for download by
anyone on the BitTorrent platform. (Doc. 22 at 7.)
In connection with his October 5, 2015, investigation, Detective Verrette identified a
BitTorrent user with internet protocol (“IP”) address 70.180.47.237 who was sharing files with
titles suggestive of child pornography. (Doc. 22 at 2.) Some of the files associated with this IP
address had the acronym “PTHC”, which stands for “pre-teen hardcore”, which commonly
suggests the content depicts hardcore sexual images of a child under the age of twelve. (Doc. 22
at 2.) Detective Verrette downloaded and saved a video entitled “5 year old boy – excellent cock
sucker” which depicted a boy around the age of seven or eight years performing oral sex on an
adult male. (Doc. 22 at 2.) The next day, Investigator Ratcliffe of the Louisiana Department of
Justice (“LA DOJ”) downloaded an additional fifteen videos from the same IP address using the

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Torrential Downpour software, all of which depicted the anal, oral, penile, genital, or digital rape
of a juvenile victim. (Doc. 22 at 2.)
Investigators determined the IP address belonged to a Cox Communications (“Cox”)
subscriber. (Doc. 22 at 3.) Cox’s response to a subpoena request revealed that the user’s address
was located at 16366 Beach Street, Prairieville, Louisiana, 70769. Investigators ascertained that
Defendant Justin Landry (“Defendant”) resides at 16366 Beach Street, Prairieville, and sought
and obtained a search warrant for the premises. (Doc. 22 at 3.)
On the morning of November 13, 2015, the LA DOJ, PPSO, Homeland Security
Investigations, and the Baton Rouge District Attorney’s Office executed the search warrant.
(Doc. 22 at 3.) Landry was home alone. (Doc. 22 at 3.) Investigators found over twenty
computers, hard drives, and USB storage devices, including a Toshiba laptop that contained eight
videos of child pornography. (Doc. 22 at 3.) Landry waived his Miranda rights and agreed to
speak with investigators. (Doc. 22 at 3.) He admitted he used BitTorrent to download child
pornography; that he watched children as young as six years old; he used keywords such has
“PTHC” and “PTSC” (pre-teen softcore); he intended to download the results of his “PTHC”
searches; that he would watch young girls strip on webcams; and that he only used his own
internet connection. (Do. 22 at 3—4.)
At the hearing held on January 26, 2017, Special Agent David Ferris, a nationally
certified peer-to-peer instructor employed by the LA DOJ, Bureau of Investigation’s Cyber
Crime Unit, testified regarding the logistics of BitTorrent and Torrential Downpour. (See
generally Doc. 25.) Agent Ferris was not personally involved in the investigation that led to
Defendant’s arrest, and his testimony at the hearing was relegated to explaining how peer-to-peer
software functions and how investigators’ software materially differs from that which is publicly

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available. He also opined as to the specific means by which investigators downloaded files from
Defendant’s shared folder in this case. (See Doc. 25 at 4—23.)
III.

DISCUSSION
a. Standard

A suppression hearing allows the court to make a preliminary determination regarding the
admissibility of certain evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional
rights under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1269 (10th Cir.
1982). The proponent of a motion to suppress bears the burden of establishing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the evidence at issue was obtained in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights.” United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1467 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting
United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 176 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164, 177 n.14, 94 S.Ct. 988,996, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (“the controlling burden of proof at
suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.”).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Although the Fourth Amendment does not expressly state when a
search warrant is required, the Supreme Court has inferred that a warrant must generally be
secured, unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452,
460, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011).

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The “touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment analysis is whether the individual had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,
403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006); United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th
Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). It is well-established that items in public view do not carry with
them a reasonable expectation of privacy. “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (citing Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206, 210, 87 S.Ct. 424, 427, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966); United States v. Lee, 274
U.S. 559, 563, 47 S.Ct. 746, 748, 71 L.Ed. 1202 (1927)). Files which an individual voluntarily
places in a shared folder on a peer-to-peer network are considered publicly available, and thus a
law official’s warrantless use of peer-to-peer software to identify the user’s IP address and to
download possible child pornography from a file shared by the individual does not violate his
right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. United
States v. Weast, 811 F.3d 743, 747—48 (5th Cir. 2016).
b. Parties’ Arguments
i. Defendant’s Arguments
Defendant moves to suppress the evidence seized from his computer, alleging that
Detective Verrette’s search extended beyond those files that were publicly available and
impermissibly ventured into his private files. (Doc. 20 at 2.) Defendant alleges that “[a]fter
scanning private areas of the computer, Detective Verrette downloaded non-public images, data,
content, and private information.” (Doc. 20 at 2.) He further alleges that the LA DOJ’s October
6, 2015 search likewise unconstitutionally used software that granted broader access to

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Defendant’s private files than those which he made publicly available under the shared folder of
his BitTorrent program. (Doc. 20 at 2.)
Defendant alleges that “as a result of the illegal entry and search of non-public
information of his computer on [October] 5, 2015, and [October] 6, 2015, by law enforcement
personnel, the information illegally sized was used to grant a subsequent search warrant of his
residence.” (Doc. 20 at 3.) Further, he claims the evidence and statements obtained as a result of
the invalidly issued warrant must be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree. (Doc. 20 at 3.)
Aside from a broad reference to “the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution of the United States” at the outset of his motion, Defendant cites no other legal
authority for his contentions.
In his post-hearing brief, Defendant argues that the testimony of Agent Ferris, without
more, is insufficient evidence to withstand his motion because Agent Ferris admitted he had no
direct knowledge or personal involvement with the searches at issue here. (Doc. 26 at 2.)
Specifically, Defendant alleges that because Agent Ferris could not tell the Court where
Defendant stored the illegal files on his computer, nor could he convey whether the Torrential
Downpour was the only software used to detect such files or whether the Torrential Downpour
software used by investigators was modified in any way, his testimony, standing alone, does not
meet the United States’ burden to overcome the motion to suppress. (Id.) Defendant argues the
issue “before the Court is whether or not the Government has proven to the [C]ourt what
software programs were used to access [Defendant’s] computer” on October 5th and 6th, 2015,
and whether or not the Government used such software to access private files on Defendant’s
computer. (Id. at 2—3.) Defendant submits that the evidence put forth by the United States “does
not prove that private areas of Mr. Landry’s computer were not accessed.” (Id. at 3.) Defendant

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contends that Detective Verrette of the PPSO and the agent from the LA DOJ who accessed his
computer on October 6, 2015 are the only two individuals who could prove to the Court that they
did not access private files on Defendant’s computer, and failure to call these individuals as
witnesses as the hearing is fatal to the United States’ position. (Id.)
ii. The United States’ Arguments
The United States argues that “[t]o the extent that the defendant maintains that the
officers here were required to obtain search warrants, he incorrectly states the law. To the extent
that the defendant maintains that the officers accessed his ‘private files,’ he incorrectly states the
facts. In either event, the defendant’s motion should be denied.” (Doc. 22 at 1.) The United
States maintains that the Torrential Downpour software utilized by investigators in this case did
not allow access to Defendant’s private files, and alleges this software is limited to a search of
what is publicly available in a shared folder.
Against this backdrop, the investigators clearly did not require a search warrant. Noting
that “peer-to-peer networks have become a preferred marketplace for child pornography
traffickers,” the types of investigation and subsequent prosecution at issue here “have become
run-of-the-mill.” (Doc. 22 at 7 (citing United States v. Richardson, 713 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir.
2013); United States v. Larman, 547 Fed. App’x 475, 481—82 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 1564 (2014).) In Richardson, the Fifth Circuit held that peer-to-peer file sharing of child
pornography is distribution under § 2252A(a)(2)(B), and in so holding, compared the user who
made the file available for sharing to a gas station owner; while the owner may not be present at
the time a motorist refills his vehicle, he nonetheless made the gasoline available to the motorist.
(Doc. 22 at 8 (citing Richardson).) Similarly, by placing a video in a shared folder, a user makes
the material available for anyone accessing it.

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According to the United States, due to the increasing prevalence of such prosecutions, a
body of federal jurisprudence has developed, which has uniformly held that such warrantless
investigations that are limited to a search of publicly available shared files do not violate the
Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 22 at 8—9 (citing United States v. Weast, 811 F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir.
2016); United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 843 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ganoe, 538
F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1205 (10th Cir.
2008).) Citing Weast, the United States argues that making such files available in a shared folder
undermines a defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy to such content. (Doc. 22 at 8—9
(citing Weast, 811 F.3d at 747—48).)
The United States asserts that Defendants’ contention that investigators accessed his
private files is factually erroneous; to the contrary, “if [Defendant] had stored the child
pornography that he downloaded to somewhere in his computer other than his share folder, his
conduct likely never would have been discovered by law enforcement.” (Doc. 22 at 9.)
Furthermore, the United States contends that “because their software specifically targets hash
indicators for known child pornographic images, investigators using Torrential Downpour limit
themselves to significantly less than what users such as [Defendant] make publicly available”.
(Doc. 22 at 10.)
In its post-hearing brief, the United States argues that the standard urged by Defendant is
incorrect; rather, Defendant, as the proponent of the instant motion, bears the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence in question was seized in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights. (Doc. 28 at 1 (quoting United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1467
(5th Cir. 1993); see also Stults, 575 F.3d at 842; Ganoe, 538 F.3d at 1127).) It argues
Defendant’s motion “never specified how, exactly, officers downloading child pornography files

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from him – which he made public through his peer-to-peer software – is any more an invasion of
his privacy than officers entering a home during an open-house or examining a bike at a yard
sale.” (Doc. 28 at 2.) It argues Defendant similarly failed to show that he had any privacy right in
publicly shared files, nor did he show how investigators violated that alleged right. (Id.)
In its reply to Defendant’s post-hearing brief, the United States asserts that it “is not
aware of any case, in any jurisdiction, holding that a person has a privacy right in the files they
share on peer-to-peer networks, and if there is such precedent, 1) the defendant fails to provide it,
and 2) it is contrary to that of the Fifth Circuit.” (Doc. 29 at 1 (citing Weast, 811 F.3d at 747—
48).) It notes that Agent Ferris is one of only two nationally certified peer-to-peer instructors in
Louisiana, and that his testimony was more than sufficient to defeat Defendant’s motion. (Doc.
29 at 1—2.) It further argues Agent Ferris was entitled to rely on the investigative reports drafted
by the investigating officers, even if he was not personally involved in the investigation. (Id. at 2
(citing Fed. R. Evid. 1101, 1104(a)).)
The United States argues that Defendant has failed to provide any support for his
allegation that the software investigators used granted broader access than that which is used by
the general public, and through such software, investigators gained access to his private files.
(Id.) It urges the Court to reject Defendant’s argument that Agent Ferris’s testimony is
insufficient because he could not state whether the Torrential Downpour program had been
modified, and responds to this argument by noting that Agent Ferris testified the software used
by investigators here did not grant broader access to Defendant’s computer than what his own
file-sharing software permitted. (Id. at 3 (citing Doc. 25 at 5).) They also point to Agent Ferris’s
testimony that the software used here was no different than the software used in other cases, nor
was there any indication that the software had been modified by investigators to grant broader

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access than it generally permits. (Id. (citing Doc. 25 at 25).) According to the United States, the
standard which Defendant proposes, which would “require the Government to prove a negative
by eliminating any possibility of peculiarities with the software [ ] is well beyond [the
Government’s] burden.” (Id. (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 n.14 (1974)).)
Based on the foregoing, the United States requests the Court deny Defendant’s motion.
c. Analysis
In the digital age, the question of what carries with it a reasonable expectation of privacy
has become an ever-evolving inquiry, as physical barriers no longer define what is public and
what is private. The Fourth Amendment protects only reasonable expectations of privacy. Katz,
389 U.S. at 360, 88 S.Ct. at 516 (Harlan, J. concurring). An individual “has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743—44, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2582, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979); see also United
States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358—60 (5th Cir. 2014) (discussing the third party doctrine
enunciated in Smith).
Subscriber information provided to an internet provider, including IP addresses, is not
afforded Fourth Amendment protection “because it is voluntarily conveyed to third parties.”
Weast, 811 F.3d at 747 (citing United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted); United States v. Wheelock, 772 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010)). Federal courts of appeal, including the Fifth Circuit,
have held that neither IP addresses nor files shared through peer-to-peer networks entitle the user
to a reasonable expectation of privacy of the data contained therein because such information is
readily available to third parties. See, e.g., United States v. Weast, 811 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 2016);
Christie, 624 F.3d 558; United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir.2008); Wheelock, 772

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F.3d 825; Bynum, 604 F.3d 161; United States v. Conner, 521 Fed. App’x 493 (6th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Borowy, 595 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834
(8th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. McLellan, 792 F.3d 200 (1st Cir. 2015) (affirming the
defendant’s conviction for one count of sexual exploitation of children under 18 U.S.C. §
2251(a) and one count of transporting child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1), where
the investigation originated with an FBI investigator downloading files containing child
pornography from the defendant’s Gigatribe (another peer-to-peer network) shared folder and
tracing the file’s origin to the defendant’s IP address without a search warrant.
Files shared on the BitTorrent system are squarely within the purview of the third party
doctrine. As one district court explained,
[r]ather than evidencing a subjective expectation of privacy, Defendant’s
participation in the BitTorrent swarm demonstrates the exact opposite. By using
peer-to-peer file sharing BitTorrent software, Defendant opened up his computer
to allow other users of BitTorrent to access certain files to download. By opening
his computer to the public, Defendant negates any claim he may have to
subjective expectation of privacy in the files he made accessible to BitTorrent
users online.
United States v. Palmer, 2015 WL 4139069 at *12 (M.D.Fla. July 8, 2015) (citing Columbia
Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 452 (C.D.Ca. 2007)); see also Perrine, 518 F.3d at
1204—05 (“Furthermore, as [defendant] conceded, he had peer-to-peer software on his
computer, which permitted anyone else on the internet to access at least certain folders in his
computer. To the extent such access could expose his subscriber information to outsiders, that
additionally vitiates any expectation of privacy he might have in his computer and its contents.”).
The Fifth Circuit has adopted an analogy through which it compares one who makes child
pornography available through peer-to-peer networks
to that of the owner of a self-service gas station: although the owner might not be
present and does nothing when a motorist purchases gas at the pump, the gas
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station owner distributes gasoline just as a computer user on a peer-to-peer
network distributes child pornography—by making the material available for
other users on the network just as the gasoline is available to passing motorists.
United States v. Richardson, 713 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Shaffer,
472 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2007)).
Moreover, law enforcement’s use of software such as Torrential Downpour does not
constitute a warrantless search so long as the investigators’ search is limited to files in one’s
shared folder. See United States v. Maurek, 131 F.Supp.3d 1258, 1262—63 (W.D.Okla. 2015)
(holding the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in files saved in his
shared folder on the BitTorrent network, and therefore the investigators’ search of same using
Torrential Downpour was not an unconstitutional warrantless search); Palmer, 2015 WL
4139069 at *12 (finding that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the files
he placed in his BitTorrent shared folder, thus law enforcement’s use of the software Roundup
on the BitTorrent platform to detect child pornography in his possession did not violate his
Fourth Amendment right).
In this case, Defendant claims the investigators’ warrantless search of his computer was
violative of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 20 at 1.) He cites no
jurisprudence in support of his position. Without offering any evidence in support, he alleges that
Detective Verrette gained access and searched both his public and private files, and that he
“downloaded non-public images, data, content, and private information.” (Doc. 20 at 2.)
Defendant further alleges that agents of the LA DOJ unconstitutionally accessed private files on
his computer beyond what was publicly available through the BitTorrent system. (Doc. 20 at 2.)
The United States specifically denies these allegations, and responds that investigators limited
their search to that which was publicly available in the shared folder of Defendant’s BitTorrent

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software. (Doc. 22 at 1, 6—7.) It argues that investigators did not need a search warrant to search
these files, and cites myriad caselaw in support thereof. (Doc. 22 at 8—10.) It opines that if
Defendant had not retained these files in a shared folder, and rather relegated them to a private
folder on his computer, his possession of same would have been undetectable by investigators.
(Doc. 22 at 9.)
As the jurisprudence in this Circuit makes clear, Defendant, as the proponent of the
motion to suppress, bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the files
taken from his BitTorrent software were obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
See, e.g., United States v. Iraheta, 764 F.3d 455, 460 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v.
Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1467 (5th Cir. 1993) (internal citation omitted)); United States v. Wilson,
510 Fed. App’x 339, 342 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 752, 758 (5th Cir.
1997); Brown, 2017 WL 444338 at *4 (citing Kelley, 981 F.2d at 1467); United States v. Brown,
16-47, 2017 WL 444338 at *4 (M.D.La. Jan. 31, 2017) (citing Kelley, 981 F.2d at 1467).
However, Defendant has erroneously premised his post-hearing briefs on the notion that the
United States has failed to prove the constitutionality of the search. After careful consideration of
the arguments of the parties and the testimony of Agent Ferris, the Court finds that the United
States has put forth sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated by the October 5th and 6th searches, and Defendant has
failed to offer any evidence to refute this conclusion. Specifically, Defendant has not proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the files the investigators downloaded were not in a shared
folder, or that they were even able to access areas of his computer that were not made publicly
available. Without such showing, Defendant has not established that the investigators’ violated
his constitutional rights, and accordingly his motion must be denied.

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IV.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. 20) is DENIED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on March 9, 2017.

S

JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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