STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A16-0736

Court of Appeals

Lillehaug, J.

Tony Webster,
Appellant,
vs.

Filed: March 15, 2017
Office of Appellate Courts

Hennepin County and
Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office,
Respondents.
________________________
Scott M. Flaherty, Cyrus C. Malek, Emily M. Peterson, Samuel Aintablian II, Briggs and
Morgan, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Daniel P. Rogan, Senior Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondents.
________________________
SYLLABUS
1.

On a motion for a stay pending appeal, a trial court must identify the relevant

factors, weight each factor, and then balance them, applying the court’s sound discretion.
2.

The decision of the administrative law judge to issue a stay pending appeal

was not an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.

1

 OPINION
LILLEHAUG, Justice.
Appellant Tony Webster sought public government data from respondents Hennepin
County and the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office (collectively, Hennepin County) under the
Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (the Data Practices Act). See Minn. Stat. ch. 13
(2016). Dissatisfied with Hennepin County’s response, Webster filed a complaint with the
Office of Administrative Hearings. The administrative law judge (ALJ) held that Hennepin
County had violated the Data Practices Act and ordered it to produce all requested data.
Hennepin County appealed the decision and obtained a stay from the ALJ pending appeal.
The court of appeals denied Webster’s motion to lift the stay. Webster then petitioned this
court for review. Because we conclude that a trial court, or as in this case, an agency ALJ,1
has broad discretion to grant a stay pending appeal, and that the ALJ did not abuse its
discretion in doing so here, we affirm.
FACTS
On August 12, 2015, Webster submitted 14 requests to Hennepin County for public
government data under the Data Practices Act. Among Webster’s requests was one asking
that Hennepin County perform a computer-aided search of its stored e-mails using
20 separate search terms. Eventually, Hennepin County responded to all of Webster’s

1

For purposes of appeal, an ALJ is a trial court. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 101.02, subd. 4
(defining “trial court” on appeal as “the court or agency whose decision is sought to be
reviewed”). The parties do not dispute that, in the context of this case, the ALJ functioned
as a trial court.
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 requests except for the e-mail search request. Hennepin County asserted that the search
request was “too burdensome with which to comply.”
Webster filed an expedited data-practices complaint alleging that Hennepin County
had violated the Data Practices Act by failing to promptly and substantively respond to his
data requests. After an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ concluded that Hennepin County had
violated the Data Practices Act. The ALJ ordered Hennepin County to, among other things,
(1) implement a procedure by June 1, 2016, to ensure that electronically stored public data,
including e-mail, is organized for easy access and use by the public; and (2) begin
production of the requested data on a rolling basis, including e-mails, to Webster by May 2,
2016, with all requested data to be produced by June 3, 2016.
Hennepin County gathered the relevant e-mails and began producing data on a
weekly basis. Webster was able to inspect some of the relevant e-mails on May 2 and 9,
2016.
On May 3, 2016, by petition for a writ of certiorari, Hennepin County appealed the
ALJ’s order to the Minnesota Court of Appeals. The next day, Hennepin County asked the
ALJ to issue a partial stay pending appeal. Hennepin County argued that, absent a stay, its
“right to appellate review will be eclipsed because it will be forced to act, including
performing the e-mail term search that Respondents believe is not required by the Data
Practices Act.”
The ALJ granted Hennepin County’s motion on May 18, 2016. The ALJ relied on
two cases discussing the standard for granting a stay pending appeal: State v. Northern
Pacific Railway Co., 22 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1946), and DRJ, Inc. v. City of St. Paul,
3

 741 N.W.2d 141 (Minn. App. 2007). The ALJ cited Northern Pacific Railway for the
proposition that a stay may be granted “to protect the appellate court’s jurisdiction” and to
“avoid a multiplicity of suits.” See N. Pac. Ry., 22 N.W.2d at 574-75. The ALJ cited DRJ
for the proposition that the court “must balance the appealing party’s interest in preserving
the status quo, so that effective relief will be available if the appeal succeeds, against the
interests of the public or the prevailing party in enforcing the decision and ensuring they
will remain ‘secure in victory’ while the appeal is pending.” See DRJ, 741 N.W.2d at 144
(quoting 3 Eric J. Magnuson & David F. Herr, Minnesota Practice—Appellate Rules Ann.
§ 108.1, at 446 (2007)). Applying the law from these two cases, the ALJ stated:
While it is clear that the purpose of the [Act] is to ensure timely access to
requested public data, this important provision will only be temporarily
delayed by granting the requested stay. Complainant, and the public, will
not be denied access to the requested public government data. The right to
prompt access must be balanced, here, with preserving the jurisdiction of the
Minnesota Court of Appeals. If the order is not stayed there may be no live
controversy for the Court to consider.
The ALJ also stated that the stay should be granted “to help ensure minimal future litigation”
regarding the Data Practices Act.
Webster filed a motion in the court of appeals to lift the stay, arguing that the standard
from DRJ—and the ALJ’s application of that standard—deviated from our standard
announced in Northern Pacific Railway. The court of appeals denied Webster’s motion,
stating that DRJ was “consistent” with Northern Pacific Railway. Webster v. Hennepin
Cty., No. A16-0736, Order at 3 (Minn. App. filed July 5, 2016).
Webster petitioned this court for review.

4

 ANALYSIS
A stay pending appeal is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See N. Pac. Ry.,
22 N.W.2d at 573. Webster argues that DRJ’s balancing test is “fundamentally inadequate”
because it omits factors that must be analyzed under Northern Pacific Railway: whether
the appellant is likely to succeed on the merits of the appeal, and whether a stay is necessary
to protect the appellant from irreparable injury. Hennepin County responds that Northern
Pacific Railway sets forth a comprehensive test consistent with the trial court’s broad
discretion, and that the ALJ sufficiently analyzed the factors relevant to the case.
We addressed the standard governing whether to grant a stay pending appeal in
Northern Pacific Railway, 22 N.W.2d at 574-75. At the outset of that analysis, we
emphasized the “discretionary powers” of a court considering such a motion. Id. at 574.
We then quoted Corpus Juris Secundum as follows:
As a rule a supersedeas or stay should be granted, if the court has the power
to grant it, whenever it appears that without it the objects of the appeal or
writ of error may be defeated, or that it is reasonably necessary to protect
appellant or plaintiff in error from irreparable or serious injury in case of a
reversal, and it does not appear that appellee or defendant in error will sustain
irreparable or disproportionate injury in case of affirmance. It should be
granted where . . . the loss or damage occasioned by the stay can be met by
a money award, where important questions of law are raised, which, if
decided in favor of appellant or plaintiff in error, will require a reversal, to
avoid a multiplicity of suits, or to protect the appellate court’s jurisdiction.
Id. at 574-75 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 4 C.J.S. Appeal and
Error § 636 (1937)). We stated that the quoted material “express[ed] the general rules
applicable herein.” Id. at 575. From among the “general rules,” we expressly analyzed

5

 one: avoiding a multiplicity of suits. Id. On that basis, we concluded the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in granting a stay. Id.
Northern Pacific Railway demonstrates that a trial court has broad discretion in
deciding which of the various factors are relevant in each case, and that a court need only
analyze the relevant factors. See id. at 574-75; see also Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770,
776-78 (1987) (noting that a stay motion “contemplate[s] individualized judgments in each
case,” meaning that “the formula cannot be reduced to a set of rigid rules”). Among the
factors that may be relevant are: whether the appeal raises substantial issues; injury to one
or more parties absent a stay; and the public interest, which includes the effective
administration of justice.

Effective administration includes protecting appellate

jurisdiction, avoiding multiple lawsuits, and preventing the defeat of “the objects of the
appeal or writ of error.” N. Pac. Ry., 22 N.W.2d at 574-75 (quoting 4 C.J.S., supra). 2
Here, the ALJ conducted at least as much analysis as we did in Northern Pacific
Railway. The ALJ noted that there might not be a live controversy in the absence of a stay
if Hennepin County were required to produce all the requested e-mails before the court of
appeals could rule. Thus, issuing a stay would preserve the court of appeals’ jurisdiction
by preventing a significant legal issue from becoming moot during appeal. The ALJ

2

Although Northern Pacific Railway does not require written analysis of each
relevant factor, and we do not think it appropriate to impose such a requirement on the trial
courts, the better practice is to do so in the interest of completeness and to facilitate
appellate review. Cf. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (requiring specific findings of fact and
separate conclusions of law when deciding motions for interlocutory injunctions), 65.04
(requiring an order for an injunction or restraining order to set forth in specific terms the
reasons for its issuance).
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 correctly identified this as the most important factor to consider. The ALJ then balanced
this factor against Webster’s and the public’s interests in gaining prompt access to the
requested data. The ALJ also noted that granting the stay would reduce future litigation
regarding Data Practices Act requests. Only after conducting this additional analysis did
the ALJ grant Hennepin County’s motion for a partial stay pending appeal.
The fact that the ALJ did not expressly analyze every factor listed in Northern
Pacific Railway was not an abuse of discretion. Depending on the circumstances, a court
could abuse its discretion by failing to consider a relevant factor. But a critical omission
did not occur here. The ALJ considered the factors relevant to this case.
Webster also takes issue with DRJ’s statement that a trial court “must balance” the
interests of the parties and the public. See DRJ, 741 N.W.2d at 144. But that is what the
trial court should do: identify the relevant factors, weight each factor, and then balance
them, applying the court’s sound discretion. See Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch
Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1953) (discussing “the balance of hardships”); Town of
North Kingstown v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1651, 65 A.3d 480, 481 (R.I. 2013)
(stating that the various factors are “ ‘interrelated considerations that must be balanced
together’ ” (quoting Service Emps. Int’l Union Local 1 v. Husted, 698 F.3d 341, 343 (6th
Cir. 2012))); 20 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 308.21 (3d ed. 2016)
(stating that “the district court should balance the parties’ potential harms”); 16A Charles
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper & Catherine T. Struve, Federal Practice
& Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3954 (4th ed. 2008) (stating that the “factors should be
balanced”). That is what the ALJ did here.
7

 Therefore, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision to issue a stay pending appeal was
not an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.

8