PUBLIC RELEASE SPECIAL Aces-$5 REQUIRED No. COPY NATIONAL SECURITY - COUNCIL INFORMATION Notice The attached document contains classi?ed National Security Council Information. it is to be read and discussed only by persons authorized by law. Your signature acknowledges you are such a person and you promise you will show or discuss information contained in the document only with persons who . are authorized by law to have such access to this document. Persons handling this document acknowledge he or she knows and understands the security law relating thereto and will cooperate fully with any? iawfut investigation by the United States Government into any unauthorized disclosure of classi?ed information contained herein. Access List . . DATE NAME DATE NAME SPECIAL ACCESS REQUIRED PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE No. In El): 511111121113 QEourt at the minim ?tates Filed with Classi?ed 0 Information 5w? oer ABD AL-RAHIM AL-NASHIRI, C150 ?5 Petitigzg'tr? A V. BARACK OBAMA, et a1., Respondents. 0 On Petition For AWrit 0f Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The District of Columbia Circuit 6 CLASSIFIED APPENDIX RICHARD KAMMEN MICHEL PARADIS KAMMEN MOUDY Counsel of Record 135 N. St., #1175 LCDR JENNIFER POLLIO, USN, JAGC Indianapolis, IN 46204 ROSA ELIDES MARY SPEARS KRISTINA HON US. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARY COMMISSION DEFENSE ORGANIZATION 1620 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20301 1.703.696.9490 x115 michel.paradis@osd.mil Counsel for Petitioner PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE CLASSIFIED APPENDIX Photographs Class.App. 1-12 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency ?5 Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary (Dec. 3, 2014) (excerpts) Class.App. 13-123 Declaration of Dr. Sandra Crosby, MD. (October 24, 2015) Class.App. 124-128 RMC 706 Sanity Board Evaluation of Abd al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad Al Nashiri (Mar. 28, 2013) Class.App. 129-170 Translated Graduation Record for Abd al Rahim Hussein Al Nashiri Class.App. 171 Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at (Oct. 29, 2003) Class.App. 172?175 Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General Special Review: ounterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 October 2003) (May 7, 2004) (excerpt) Class.App. 176-180 CIA Documents Released Under FOIA Class.App. 181-188 Class.App. 189-215 Unof?cial/Unauthenticated Record of Trial (excerpts) Class.App. 216-236 Jose Rodriguez Bill Harlow, Hard Measures (2013) (excerpts) Class.App. 237-238 James Mitchell Bill Harlow, Enhanced Interrogation (2016) (excerpts) Class.App. 239-255 I Summaries Provided by Prosecution to Defense Counsel Class.App. 256-327 Military Commissions Proceedings Class. App. 328-337 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 1 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 2 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE ClassApp. 3 PUBLIC RELEASE wmrm>mm wmrm>mm PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 5 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE C1ass.App. 6 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 7 Wm PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 8 .. mum-- PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 9 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 10 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 11 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 12 PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE In 2005, the chief of the CIA's BLACK derentioft sire, where many of me detainees me ClA assessed as "high-yalue" were held. complained that CIA Headquarters "manllgers seem 10 be selecting eimer problem, underperforming offieen. new, totally inexperienced officeli or whomever seeJ11£ to be willing and able to deploy at any given time," resulting in "'the production of mediocre or, I dare say. useless intelligence. ,..,,]1 Nwnerous CiA officers had serious documented personal and professional problems-including historiels of yiolence and records of abusive treatment of others-that sbouJd have caned into question their suhabili[)' (0 participate in me CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, their employment with the CIA, and their continued access to classified information. In nearly aU cases, these problems were known -to me CIA prior to the assigmnent of these office" to derention and intc:rrogation positions. #13: Two contract p8yclJoiogists devised tbe CIA's enbanced InterruptioD techDiques and played a cen1ra1 role in die operation, assessments. and management or the CIA'5 DetentiOD and Interrogation Pregrarn. By 2005, tbe CJA had oftcwhelminliy ouuource~ operations rellded to the prop-am. The CIA contracted with two psychologists to develop, opcnre, and assess its. interrogation operatlons. The psychologists' prior experience was lit the U.S. Air Porce Survival, Eyaslon, Resutance and Escape (SERE) schoOl. Neither psychologist had any experience as an interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al-Qa'ida, a background in counterterrorism, or any releyant cultural or linguistic expertise. On me CIA '5 behalf, the contract psycnologisu deyeioped mearies of interrogation ba&ed on "learned helplessness:'J2 and developed the lise of enhanced iJlterrogalion techniques that was approved for use against Abu ZUbaydah and subsequent CIA detainees. The psychologists personally cunducted intcJrogations of some of the CIA's most significant detainees using these tectmiqucs. They also eyalualed whether detainees' psychological state allowed for the continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including some detainees whom they we~ them5elYes inrerrogating or had inrerroeated. The psychologists carned out inherently governmental functions, such as acting as liaison between the CIA and foreign imeUigence services, assessing the effectiveness of the interrogation progmm, and participating In me interrogation of detainees in held in fo~ign go'f'emment custody. In 2005, the psychologi&tli fonned a company specifically for the purpose of conducting meir work with the CIA. Shortly thereafter, the CIA ou!~un:ed YirtUally all aspects of the program. In 2006, the yalue of me CIA's ba.~e contract with the company formed by the psychologisu wim all optians eJte~ised Wll.!li in excess of $180 million; the contrllCtors recei \led $81 million prior to me contract'8 termination in 2009. In 2007, the qA provided a multi-year indemnification agreement to protect the company and its employees from legalliabiliry arising out of the program. The CIA has since paid out more than.$l million pursuant to the IIgmement. Page 11 of 19 I:fP48l:Jt881F1EB UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE ldeo!Jfyilll OQunuiu ,,. rc~ted. TIl.: Study lherefon: lisls lhe COlIntties by lellet, 11Ie Study UICI die tllrn& daignltions consi5lenl1Y.lio "Country J," ~e[ll 10 tbe same cowlll'}' lhroupout Itt. Sludy. 10 July ~I. 2000. email from John Ritto to _ _ re RumiPC an interroiatlons. lCILotu5NOlllsme$sefromCh[efoflheCiAStatiOninCounuytoDK:TC. COPS; c~ in: elnlil from 10 [IlEDACTED1.IRBDACTEDJ, IX: [REDACTEDI, _ _ iiiii@ sUbj: ADCt Tatlclna Points rar cau to DepSeo Annitage, dale 9f.23J2004." 7:40:43 PM Briefioe Ilicb, OA lJllerropdon I'rognm. July 29, 2003 D No CIA dotention filoilirles 'IW~ established in Ihe&e 1\110 counttiei. J) U.S. I.... (22 U.S.C.• '927) requires ilt.. chiefJ or miuion "WI.l be kepi. 'Illy mel cummtly Informed with tr.Ipect 10.11 Kliviuu lad Clpel'ltiop. of the GoVl:mnlcnt wilhin t!lllll:OUnlly," iadlld.inl dill mivlliea &Cd os-~tlOllS orche CI.... !' Sao:tiIlM COU\lllllllic:atioll, between JoWl P. Mudd~AFiI I), 2005. B SIll'Cri_ ccnamllftiQfion. between loiuJ P. Mudd and April 13, 2005. ~ MMe. ~, CJNil CO rc A·Z Iatl!rnllition PIatI. Jl rmm ~? ALK_<181.32IZJULO%) II JanulrY i. 1989, Le4_ fromIol'ID 1.. He!~ D~ ofConpaional "'~.IO Vice Qairaw, WiUiam S. '.&. Cohen, SeA:lte Sdect COClual4a« on IlIIdf~ ~ SSCI ~ 011 GI :Ill {REDACl'EDl U2& (19JWJl. DEC 03) JII Repotc of Audit, CIA -ccnlrollcd DewuiOll FlIlciJitlrs Ofcr&Cr.d UDder die 17 Sqltembu 2001 Norifu;ation•. ~an No. 200S.()()17-AS.IufIe 14. 200e. Me.torandDIlI of ~-m: emiirfi:oiii1RED'Acrj;jjlJC!IliforBise DETENnON"SITE SL}.t;K}; 10_ _ ,iii a • _ ~ Gena'lll Comments. Qf "lcllll1ed holples.MIS·'lit thu Contexl Wit (he theory ttUlt delainec.s mipt bel:Ol\'lll pusive ltIc.lde5lR.wd til 10 Id~eae or IInconttllllabJe e~nt5.lInd would \bus coopenllc ~ ~\'idc information, Mel1llO hum Grayson SWIO.ERT. !'b.D., Febnwy 1.2003, "Qualifications to provide speciaJ mi~sion inteRoiuIOl'll:Onsliltation." n They niso conc:Jucll:d that lhe Cl... "W>uld ll()l; be in lhebusincss of running priiO~dct~tion facilities, ..' May 12, 2004. Mcmomndum lor Deputy Dircclor for OpcIatiQlls frotn - - . Chief, InfonJllltion Openuions Ceoler. Dnd Henry Crumpton. Chief, Naliomll Rcsourc:ca Diviaion via Auociilte Deputy Dlrec:1OI for OpcraCions. wUh ~ iubjed line. "Opetaliooal Review of CIA Detaloee Program." :w Marc:b 11, 2005, MemOl:~tldllm for Depllty Director fOfOperalions from Robart 1... Otcnicr, Direcltll' OCI CounterteLTOl'lIm Center, re Proposal for Full-Scope Independenl swdy of Ibe CTC Re:nditlort, Ce!enlioD, .nd Interrogation Propa1l'll, J' ScpCcmber 2, 2005, Mcmotlnd\lm from • • • • • • • 10 DireclOl' Por1ef (los" C[A, ,...... nl or EJTs J2 ~5potl~e 1Ie'. .. Effect! l'CIle'~" 1lI kl'l/!mbcr 'Z3, 2005, MCIDOllllldu.1n froIlI to'T11e Hona...ble F'I:lnrr ~s. DI~'IQ1', Central II*UisenC& AgetlC)'. "blpOftle \0 ~1HlS' !'rom DkeClDt for Assessment of EIT eft'«:Uvcnel'." '?Febnaary HI, 2(106. MClUlnlldum for ' CIA OFFICER I), CDUo.CltI'T~"cenler, Naliohal Claadt:ltilte ~te, from Ellccutive Dited« ~ AJ;cD1Jnhlbllit, Decision. JI CongsCS5ion" noriflCaI1ou. CIA ~ to OIG t,,~iption kcuctiag the ItClldition Md DeMllon of GautIlJll CiliUlll KhIItid .t·MlWri. 0CIuber- 9, 2DJ7. J9 ~emoralldumlbr Inspeaor OeJleml; troa; JIIDO PIlvill. Deputy ~or b O~OIIt; _jea: ft. CCM'lme.u to Dnft ICi Specialltcvj6_, "'Coun'UIromJrlosm DefeolioD CIl11B1a101l_ion Prograat" (:100).712).[0); dell: FcbnlMrJ 27, 2004••!adlmllnl: Febniary 24, 20M, lwkUlOlUdutll ~ SlICC'tlSIeS of CIA', CouMetV.mJriSIlt De&efllioo lind 'al!llJVlltion o'\cdvitic.a. 40 febrU8f}' 2.4, 2004, MClllOt1ln4llm front Scoa W. MIIILer. GcnenI Cow!x.I, 10 INpectell· Ocacral ~ [n~pliOll Prornm Special Revje~ (2003-7 I23-1G). ~'.N,0.van.bt!riil9ii'i2006i email.fnJmIohn .... 1Uuo. to MIChaeIV. Haydr:ll.Srept.n R.. KAflpcs, Michie:! Morell, I!!! • I Subjccl: Fw: 5 Deumber 2006 MUitinS witlllCRC Rep• •, CIA ComllWltf on the Febl\lllY 20071CRC Report on lIIe TTearmcm or Fourteen "HlBb Value Oct 1Ii lIalI'· ia CiA • cc: Custody," ~~ Sen.leSeI"1 Commi_a« tIrl Inlltllil"llt.e t1earing lrIlllSCl'ipt lbr April 1:1,2007. 4.1 DCIA T&1ki RI Points for J 1 Janllllry 2006 Meeting willi the ~sldc!ll. re: Way KIrwan:! on C"'Il'ltec1cltttlriSl ~ition. Ddentlon IDd lftlcn'oglliOl'l Progmm. _5 HE...DQUARTERS ~Z JUN (4) oi6[RED... creDI5759~03);ALE.C_,t • • • 03);ALE.C_.'• • • • 03) Page 19 ofl9 tjU8LJt881F1EIi UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE specific requests for additional information on che CIA's Deten[ion and Interrogation Pragmm. Internal CIA emails include discussion of how the CrA could "get. ,. off the hook on the clIeap" regarding Chairman Graham's requests fur IIdditional infonnauon.2J~ In the end, CIA officials· simply did not respond to Graham's requests prior to his departure from th~ Commhtee in January 2003. C. Interrogation in Country land the 1anuary 2003 Guidelinel I. 1M CIA Establislw!s Officer i1l ChtJrge DerE~ION SITE COBALT, Pmces lnexperiLnced l'irsl-Towr I (~) PIWlS for a speciaUled CIA detenti~Counny began in April 2002, with the intention that it would t;.e "tolally under ~Station COIltrol.',m On June 6,2002, CIA H~liIdquar[~ approved more than $200,000 for the constrUction of the facility, id<::nufied in this summary os "DETENTION SITE COBALT:'I:l6 In a 2003 interView with the CJA Office oflnspector Genel1ll, Associate Deputy Director for Operations de$Cribcd his views o( this facility and "ltated that [DETENnON SITE COBALT] ~causethere needed ID be a detention sire in lCountry for those detainees enroute _ _ to [OETENTrON srrn GREEN]. It was not a place for the use o( E1Ts.'l137 - II srm (~) DETEN'l10N COBALT. constructed with CIA funding, opened in Country! Seprember 2002. 2Jll According to CIA records, the windows at DETENTION SITE COBALT were blacked out and detainees were kept in total darkness. The _ guards monitored deminees using headlamps and loud music was played constantly in tbe faciliry. While in lheir cells, delainees were shackled to the wall and given buckets for human waste. Four of the tWenty cells at rhe facility included a bar across the top of lhe cell.2J9" Later ~ports describe det:3inees being shackled to the bar with their hands above their heads, forcing rhem to stand, and the~fore not aUowing the detaInees to sleep.240 in t14 Email from: Stanley MClstowilz; to; John H. Moseman: ee: Seoc! MDller and Jalnea Pa... ia; lIUbjec:l: [BlIached document) Re: Grnlullu rcque.ll 011 inlen'Opiions; da~: DecembEr 9.2002. at 0':415:11 PM. . n~ By June 2007lbe bad taJccn eusla1y orfiY~~ainees who were cllfllured oUtside of Cou/IttY __and placed Iheu CIA dctaiocCli in Coonlry detention facilities. TIle de!aince.t were held .JIbe COIlnt'}'- -. r.clliliea 81 !tie .~t orlhe ClA lind tbe ClA "Id unlilPired accen 10 IhClT1. See 21141 crA 236 DIRECTOR _ (062212Z JUN 02) m In~iew Report. 2003-712]-10. Re...ie.... of Inren'OSllIionr fot CountenenoriSl1I f'UtpoI:er•• • • • • ~eplember9, 2OOl. '11 For ad::IitiOMI information on DETENTION SITE COBAl-T,.IN Volume [ and Volume 111. l'1Ie specific dale iiilCnUAli2:ed al fbe ra~~s;:: the erA. :s 240 Far addiliollli information on document5: DErENTIJi·-o-N1s'rmlllllllc'oBALT•.rce VOllln~8Ild Voluw lUld autO other 31118 DIRECTOR . email from: [REDACT'ED]; 10: (RIIDACTED), [REDACTED]. [REDAcrEDI, [REOACTBD]: liubjecl: Meetillg wilh SO &: Federal Bureau of PriICn~; dlle: Deuallber 4.2002; etl18il froID: [REDACTED); 10: [REDACTEDI; SUbject: Meeting wilh SO & Federal BUlI:6u of PriIons; dale: Decemt.r ~. 2002; Special Review, COlilltenl5TorlSm Dc1enllon and (nl~galion Activities (Septemt.r2001- Ocaober 2003) (2003-7123-£0). May 1, 2004: Melftorandum for Depul)' Di.c~lOr of mzioRi frolD •Jal1Uary 28, 2003, Subjecl: Page 49 of 499 UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App.16 ~ ) The CIA officer in charge of DETENTION SITE COBALT. ~ OFflCER 1], was a junior officer on his tint overseas assisgmenc with no previous experience or Imining in handling prisoners or conducting inteaOsationl. _ (ClA OFFICER 1] was Ihe DETENTION SIrn COBALT managt:r dunng the period in which a CIA detainee died and llumeroUS CIA detainees were subjected to unap~\'ed coerci ve inten-osodon technique•.'41 A review of CIA records found that prior to _ [CIA OPFJCHR l'sl deploymeJ1t Ind a5~gnm.ent as the CIA's DEl"ENTION SrrB COBALT mln.aer, oltler CIA officen recommended • d(CIA OPPIC~ 1Jnot have a>ntinucd acee8& ro e_lined infortnalion due to a "lack of judgment, and rnal\lrity :'JI1 Accordina to ~rds, "the chier olerC told I (CIA OFFICER ~would not wan-t [him] in his ovenees mlliOll."'141 A supervising officer asscased thaC _ _ [CIA OFFICER I): hoocsi' "has issues wilh judgment atd marurity. [and his) potential behavior in lhe field is also worrisome. (The offACer) further advised that _ [CIA OPFlCER 1)] WQS only put inlo processing (or an ovetsrm JIOdIition so thlllt sOlfteone would evaluare aU of the evidence of this situation alHOgtl"er['1'~ officerfurthernoce could not "threaten his family with imminent dealh"; • using "vague t!l~lIt8" to creole D"mind virus"lhat would cnusc al-NII.liar to belieYe that his situalion wO\Ild COI'tinue to gel: worse unbl he coaperoted;~~ • lJ'lanipu'ating Ridlulal-Najjar's environment wing a hood. reslnlints, and music; and· • employing sleep deprivlllion duuugh the use of round-the-dod:, intetroprion$.2S} (~ The coble WeDt an to note chat Ihe "'possibility lhal (1I1.N~II) may have cwrent threat or lead infonnaliOll de mands that we keep up the 1ft5~re on hi m," • With the exuplion or D brier mention of "diminished ~tums from lilt most m:c:nt in IQviews of aiNaijar," and rererenus to Chc detainc.e'HO·mplaints about pl1ysicli.lliilriiei\b. the cable ofctis- no evidence: al.N~liar w.s aeci vely resisting CIA inlt:rnJgators.1SS I, (~~) Ten days later, 011 July 26. 2002, CrA officet'$ In Country nane of whom had been troined in the use or the CIA's enhanced inlerro3atiOfl teehniques,'proposed puttIng d-Nalilt in jsol:uion1~ and using "sound disorientation techniques," "sense time deprivation," limited light, cold temperatures, and sleep deprivation.13? The erA officers added mat they relt they had a "reasonable chan;:e of breaking Najjar" to gct"the intelligence nnd locator lead i~rormacion on UBL and Bin Ladin' 5 family."238 The plan (or ul·Nlijjar WilS circulltted to senior CIA orncen as part of the Daily DCI Opcnlliun~ Update. ~9 or A.L~(1621 3SZ J UL 02). The deputy chief of ALEC Star.ioll. lind eTC ~£a1 •. . . _ . . would 1'nIvei to DETENTION SITE GREEN (0 obsc:f\'e the ..e of the CIA. ',s e.ncN Interrogation techniqUA I18flin&t Abu Zubeydu!l. mTht lefQa -ud yin!s"1"nt lIPSR:lred III die =mlpIians of Abu ~baydall. $H LOO86 (201900Z "Ifi lSI APR01). U) Rd~ July 16. 2002. eIIble is "LEC _ !Ji ALEC. (1621352 JUL 02) (l62IJSZ JUL (2). ALE.C (16213SZJUL02) At 1!1ii time. lilly 2', 2001. AtlG 2ube14l1h was in i80lllbOD ar DETENTION GlEE... Abu z..bI1411b WU$ pI8ccd il' 1aota1lon on J1U1C 18, zcxn,aftd RmM!Ied in isdarioD _47 aye, IoII11iI tile CIA bcPJ' subjee:ci. him It! il6 enhanced in tedln' on Augult 4, 20m. 217 lSI 07 (260903ZJUL lX2.) 2)C 2S 107 (260903Z JUL 02) m Email froID: (REDACTEiiII; 1'0: 81l1Z Kron,ard, Jabn O. Brennan, (RBDACTEDI, {flEOACTEDI. John H. MosemlKl, [REDACTED]. REDAcrEDJiWACTEO], r a E o AREDAct"eD), cr.-o [REDA~DACTED]. JaM: Rodriguez. John P. !tS sm :till Mudd.~, {REOAcrED1. {ReDACTEDI. (REDACTEDI, (REDACTED). [REDACTED), [RElDACfEDI. [RBDACTED). [REDACTED). (REDACTED]. [REDACTEDl. [REDACTED). (REDACTED), [RBDACfBDj. [REOACTEP). [REDACTED]. (REDACTED), [R£tJACTB01. (REDACTEDI. [REDACTED], [REDACTEDI. [REDACTED REDACTED. REDACTED. (ReDACTBD), (REDA.CTED), Page 52 of 499 ~tt81s'88IFl [8 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE (~) On August S, 2002, the day after Abu Zubaydah's interrogation using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 1lI DETENTION SrtE GREEN began, CIA Headquarters authorized the proposed inrenngation plan for ai-Najjar, ro include the U5e of loud music (at less than the level that would cause ~ysical bann such as pen'Danent hearing loss). Worse food (as long DS it was nntt1tionaJly adequate for sustenance), sleep deprivation, and hood ing,2!iO , (~) More than a month larer, on September 21,2002, CIA interrngILors described ai-Najjar Wi "clearly a broken man" and "on lhe verge of complete breakdown" as result of Ihe isolacion.2lI1 The cable added thlt a)-Najjar was willing .10 do whatever the CIA officer asked.~~ (~) In OclOber2002, office~ from lhe U.S. military conducn:d a short debriefing of ai-Najjar at DETENTION srrn COBALT IUld subsequently expressed an interest in fl morc thorough debriefing.:W On November 1.2002, a U.S. military legal advisor visited DETBN110N SITE COBALT and described it as a "OA deten~ingthat "while CIA is lhe only user of lhe fllcility Chey contend it is a [CounU')'.--:J facility."264 The U.S. military officer also noted that the junior CIA officer designated as warden of Ihe facUity "has little Co no experience with intenngating or handling prisoners." With respect to 81Najjar specifically, the Ic::galadvisor indicilted that the CIA"s interrogation plan included "isolation in rotal darkness; lowc:ring the quality of his food; keeping him at an uncomfortable tempecaD.lrc (cold); [playing music124 hours a day; and'keeping him shacl:led and t1ooded:' In addition, at-Najjar was described liS having been left hanging-which involved handcuffing one or both wrists to an overhead bar which would not allow him to tower his arms~for 22 hou~ each day for two comccutive days, in ortier to '''break' his resistance," lt was also noced 111Najjar was wearing a diaper and had no access 10 roilet facilities.J65 ( ~ The U.S. militory legal advisor coocluded that, because of al~ Nlljjar's treatment, and the concealment of the facility from the: lCRC. milhury participation in al·NaJj&"s interrogation would involve risks for the U.S. mJUtary _ . ~ recommended briefing the CIA' s delention and inlerrogation acli viLies to U,S, _ _ _ [REDACTED]. (REDACTED]; 5ubjecl: ABU ZUBAYDAH -SENSITIVE ADDENDUM OPS UPDATE - 26 JULY; date: luly 26, 2002, TO DC(DA1LY 1630 2&q DlReCTOR _ (OS2309Z AUG 02). 1b&: OLe uplnlon thaI revil.'wed and approved lTte \lie orelA's cnhnnced inlerroga(ion techniques. signed on Augusl 1.2002. \Io'lIS $pecifiC 10 Abo Zubaydah. The Office of Legal Couosel did pOl pMd~ce legal opinions for al·Naiiat or Olher detainees held by or for lttc CIA unlil Augusr2Q04. •• ~, [REDACTEDj27297 (2l0713ZSEP02) 1Ii:l [REDACTED) 21297 (210713ZSEP02 ••, Novc\n~11002,Memorandum fot.~~"~~ !11"'~~~."~." Subjece: Legal Analysis o f . Personnel Pmicipaling in IPlerrogatlOll at the CIA Dete"llolt FecUity m JC [RBDACTeDl(alca "[DIITENTJON SlTECOBALW. 264 November I 2002. Memor.lndum for • • •_ • • • • • • •I111• • • • • • • • • Subjccr: Legal Analysis o f . ~onnl.'l P~nicipaUng in IntemJpcion at lhe CIA Detention FBdlity tn (REDACTED} (aka "[DETENnON SlTEiC,O.B-.AiLD.").,• • • • • • • • • • • • • Novembcc 12002, MClJ1o~mfor • Subject: Legal Analysis o f . Personnel Plltticipoting In lntmQplion at ll1cCIA Decention Pacilily In [ReDACTED) (aka "[DETENTlON SITE COBAL ". 165 Page 53 of 499 , '0 '0' • nn'c'en V'''VL.l'''\~'1 .'-U' UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBUC RELEASE _ {combatant commllRdj to alert the commnnd of the rilks prior to the U.S. militllt'Y ~n8 involved in any Bllpect of the interrogation of al~Naiiar.M6, According to !he CIA inspector general, lhc detention and Interrogation of Ridha ol~N~nr "became the model" for handling other CIA detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT. 1 The CIA dlsseminlllted one inteUigcnce report from Its detention and interrogation of Ridha e.I-Nlljjar. 2M 4. D~(JJII ofGflI RaJunan !.Law CIA HeadqlllJrters to Learfl ofUnreported CoerciH r,cMiqlltl at DETENTION SrrE COBALT;' Cllt l,ufNctor G~lleraJ Rtvlnll Rl!yeo/$ wet o/OlJerli,ht ofrM DelmRoll Site ' IfllerroglJtioll (~ In November 2002, ALEC SlBrion otriurs ~que.sled tluu CtA conuaet inlm'OpLor Haonnond DUNBAR, one of ~ two primary interrogAtors of Abu Zubaydlh in August 2002, travel fo OOTENnON SlTE CODA LT to assess a detainee for !he possible usc ot the CIA's enhancc.d interro~- While DUNBAR was ptegent 111 DJITEN110N Sm! COBALT. he BSlis~ [CIA OffiCER t] in the interrogations 01 Qui Rahman•• S\lspct~ Islamic extremist. As repoIt£d to CIA HeadqUar1I:D. . this i ntermgatioo included "48 huu~ uf sleep depriVlUi.OO. oudirory overlold, tOlal darkness. isolation,. cold sttowetT&ad ftlugh [RO,tme:nt,"--eIA Headqttartel's'did'ilor-appro ye these - . interrogation techniques in advance. Upon receipt of these cables, however, officers lit CIA Headquarters responded that they were "motivated to eXb'Dct lIny and all operational information on oJ.Qs'ida and Hezbi blami from Gul Rahman" and suggested that "enhanced meuures" might be needed to gain QuJ R.ahman's compliance. CIA HeadqwsneMl ...lso requcsl1:d that 8 ps)'chologic&las5elSment of RllIunan be completed.2'JO Prior 10 DUNBAR's dcpIlrture from the detention site on November •. 2002. [a few days befOte the dcatll of Out Rohman} DUNBAR proposed the use 01 the CIA's enhanced interrogDtion techniques on other dCUlinees and offe~d suggestions to _ (CIA OFfiCER 1], the site manllger, on. the use of IUch. tcchniques. m (~ On November. 2002. _ [CIA OFFICER. 1] ordcmd that Gul Rahman be shackled 10 the wall of his cell in a position wat ~del.Ginee to rest on the bllre conc~te floor. Rahman WBS wearing only a sweatshirt, as _ _ [CIA OFfICER I] had ordered that Ratunllft'~ cloming be ~moyed when be hod been jlldsed to f)e uncooperative during an elUrif.r intenosalion. The IIeltrday,lhe guards found Gul ~man'sdead body. An internal CIA n:yicw Ilfld aUlopsy usessed thllt RahmlUl likely died from hypothcnnilt-iD pan ••• ~ No... mba 12002. MC"llllnftC~lIft(Of'~~.".~."'.~IIIIJ"~.~lII~ SDb,jca; Lopl Anal,si!l of "1Qll~1 hrtil;ipa/iIll in InlrnOphOll Illtte etA Ort.,..lion fa:Siit)' in [REDACTED) (AlIIt "[DeT£NTIOf'l' SITE COBALTM. -iltlate Jltl} ar ad,. Au....l2002, I !enio~fiOe!tOmc.u Oft TOY 10 . . . . . _ ill6erlOplid • plU1kulatt)' obsuur.e deui_ [RidbD aJ-Najja'l i l _ CScleniiOn ra"liey lila! Wal ..m. e-r," (COBALTl-.. openlld, n.: cfficzr dnt~ a cable lb.. proposed red1niques Ihlt. aftl"Ullcl,. became !be IlIOCkI for (COBALTl.'· S.. April 27, 2005, rcpon by the crA Inllleetelt Ge.n&nl. Dnlh of. Delainee • • • • • •(200J.7402.(G • $" Gz,,, Interview Report,. 2003-7123-LG, Relfiew of Inttml,lltiOIM ror Coun~riMl Purpoees, ,A l30 2003; Interview Report, 2003·7123·10. lle~iew of Inl8n:lg81iM$ for Counteltllmlri:im ~.. • April 2. 2003. 1d1 SN VolluM n alld. Volume ill for additional information.. 11111 AaDrdirIC 10 lhe 10 repo«l. 269 770 ALEC ALEC 271 Page '54 of 499 "U8L:A881F1E8 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFlEDllFOR PUBLIC RELEASE from having been fon:ed to sit on Ihe bare concrtte Boor without panls.m _ (CIA OFFICER J'5] initial cable 10 CIA Headquarters on Rahman's death included a number of miulBtemc:nts and omissions that wen: not discovered until internal investigations into Rahman's death. m (~ The death of Oul Rahman reiulted in increaied attention to CIA detention and interrogation activities in Country. by CIA Headquaners. The erc fonnall)' designated the CTC's Renditions Gmupl'" as the responsible entity for the management and mainrenance of all CIA interrogation facilities, including DETENTION SITE COBALT. in earl)' December 2002. 715 Despite this change, man)' of the same indi~iduals within tile OAincluding DUNBAR, officers at DBTBNTION SITE COBALT, and office~ within ALEC Station who had recommended the use o( the CrA's enhanced i1lterrogation techni.ques against Gul Rabman---remained key figures in Ihe CIA interroglltion program and rtcei~ed no reprimand or sanction for Rahman s death. Instead, in March 2003, just four montns after the deadJ of Gul Rahman. the CIA Station in CoulW)' I recommended lhat _ [CIA_ 9FFICER 1] receive a "c85h award" afS2,500 for JUs "consistently supe~rk--:-.. [CIA OFFICER IJ rtmained in his position as manager of Ihe detention site until July 2003 and coltriftued to be in~olved in !he intem>g(lDoos of other CIA detainees. He was formally certified as II CIA intem>caoor in April 2003 aflec the practical portion of his training n:quirerne:nt was wai ved because of his pasl experience with interrogations II{ DETENTION SITE COBALT:m T16-_ I 2n Mrmoranl.lum for Deputy Director or Opentions, from JBnUIll)' 28,2003. Subject: Dead! lnvestilation - QuI RAHMAN. Other conrributing fEton~ idenlified IS dchydnlliOll, lICk of food, and iJMI~ due ro "short cJulinillg-," :m _ 30211 See Volume find IIi fer addition;al details. 174 As noted, the- RendiliDll8 Group WIIS aha tIIowa durlngthe program lLIthe "Renditions and lnlerroptions Group," ll$ well as me "Rendition• .Detention, IIIld InteTTOgIIljon Oroup,"lIlld by the iniUuls, "RDf' and "ROO:' m DIRECTOR 032)362 DEC 02) , 176 34909 117 DIRECTOR In lale 1005, the CIA oonvcnM olI11 Aa:ounU\billly Board 10 revie-.r.o tbt acti0l16 or CIA. personnel In 001 R;Jhman's denlh. n. board reccmlllended lhallhc ex~ntive direelof "il1l~olI 10 day suspension "';lhOUI pay" on (CIA OFFICER 1], lind noted!tl:lr this aclion ..... Duld "strike' tbt IIppropria~ balance bcrll,'cen: I) the flK:ltballJ [C'A OFFICER lUlI,'lIs the- only IndivldLIIII who rMCIe decisions that led dmdy, albeit uninlentiooally, to Rahman'l>deldh, and 2) I~ significant weighllho Board, . .~. anached to tbl! mitigalin~ fodon; at pIa, in this incidelll." (Su. MeR\Ol'lndum for E:leculi\le DiJeaor from • • Deputy Director for Science Dnd Technology, ~: Report and RecOinIl'lendllrions of the Special Accowtfabllily Board Rqarding the Dtllth o~Dl:llllince QuI Rohmi/l.) 00 Februar)' 10, '2006, howcl'er. CfJt CI.... Ex~ri ~ Direclor K.B, Fouo nOlilied _ [CIA OFFICER 1]lI1at h~ il\llmded 10 taG no dilcipllnary llc(ioo againsl him. In his ll1Cllm dc5Cribing lhal decision, the executive cfKedar stakd: "Whi Ie not condoning your _dioM. ills imper1lti\lC, in my \liew,lbllt they... bejudged -.ilhin the opllCillional coutUlthal e.ti5ll~d al the-lime ofRllhman's delellfion. OJblc lnIffic revicllml by ttJe board sho""l conclusively that HrJllljUlll111~ generally was aware of, and !lCd no objections 10, the confinemenl conditions and interrogmion techniques bei~ impolied on RDhll1lln liS late 38 Novembct. On that d&, Headquartm IICllified [the CIA Slalion in COUNTRY Ill... Ihat it lI,'u 'lIIOlivsted 10 C1itr1lcl Dny and all opetlliional infonnl1tion' from Rahman, thlll it nnod achieving RahqulII's coope~ion to be of 'grt.ll impomncll' Ind Ihllt il acll:nowledsed tl101l: Rahman 'IDay need 10 bC.IIlbjected 10 eobllllc.ed inlem>ption meaQlrel 10 induce hiln 10 comply." (See February 10,2006, MCimonandum fcr 4. 2002. Tnini", RCpoR, Hilh Vallie Tacgr.llnlmolllllian.llIld E!Iflloil;jljolt (HVTIE) TRilling Scmin~r 12-11"'011 02 (pil411 ruani.). lIrI Dcr.cml>cr 4.2001.. Tl'Iinill8 ~tl. Hiii' Vollle TargellllCCll'Opdon and &pfoilllllio" (HvTI£) T~iMn& Scoainv 12-18 No... 02 (pWt ru~l u. $Su, fOCclC&IlI9le, ftNil fiofn:_• •!II~, (0: fREDAcrED1i$U£rj: HVT mining: dIla:: October 10, 2002; clnlliJ from: (REDACTEDI; to; • I:C: ~ IKEDACTED). (REDACTED). {REDACI"EDI;Jllbject: RVT~da1e: Oc:tobtz 10. 200Z;November I. '2002. Me.rnDI1lnduln for: Oir~lor. DCJ CollnlMm'lJri.'Cell~. f r o r i l _ Chief, RtnditlOIls Orl'lIp. eTC, I"t': Rellual for we nf Milltary Tn.i,,", in Suppan af Agency IAla'ro!ation COUllIC. REFERENCE: Marlo fur DlClC fromCIR~1CTC did 26 All 02, S~Sllbjed. 2ft Email flOm: L; to: (REDACTED]; De: Jete Rodrigl)Q, [ReDACTBD), {REDACTEDI. sllbj~l: EYES ONLY. dale: Noyember., :2002, al()J:IJ:OI PM..... s de~ribed aboVe, Oul Raltman Iikc~ to (fellh al DETENTION SITE COBA LT 501llCume in the morning of Noycmber.2002. _ ' s cmail, ho....cYer. appe:lCll to hllye bllen drali.cd befort: the: lillard' had found Oul Rahm.n'/J body and before that death wa~ reported 10 CIA NeadquBrten;. ScI IREDAcrE~ 302 J I describing the gUllrds lbIef'l~ Ralunac alive in lhe moming of Novembllr., 2002. (jul Rahman's death appeared 10 Cllbl" n,Hic 81 l e a s t _ after 's email. No tceords c:ould till iden tlfifld EO provide the impclUl for 's em~i1. 2&7 Page 58 of 499 U~4GLA681 Fl ED UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIJFOR PUBLIC RELEASE them and are satisfied wilh rheir qualifications and suiwbility for whit a~ clearly unu:liulll measures mar are lawful only when practiced co~[]y by pcnonnel whose recorUi clearly demonstrate their suitability fonhat role. The vetting pnx:cSli will not be mat dissimilar from me checks that ~ provided by the: 010, OS, etc. in certain cases before individuals an: p({)moted or receive awards, Ilnd me selection and lJ'aining of aggn:ssive interrogators ceCUlinly Wamln[s a sintilat vetting process."m ( ~ The chief of ere. lose Rodrigue:z. objected ro this approach. stuing: "r do not think chat CTCILGL should or would want to gel inlO [he bvainelS or velling panicipants, obscrvets. insouetors ()(" od1efs that IB involved ill ltIi5 program. It is &imply nO( your job. Yoor job is lO teU all whaa are the accepiable legal slandlu'd5 fur conducling inaetmg8lions per t~ 8uthorilie.~ oblained (rom Justice and agreed upon by the Wbite House."It] (~ Contrary 10 .slBtements later made by CIA D~etor Michael Hayden and other CIA officiMls lhat "[B]lllhose involved in the quesrioning of detainees ale carduUy chosen and liCreened for demons~sionl!ljudgmcnt end raal\lrityt"'~lM CIA records RJgest thai the veiling sought by _ _ did not IBke place. The Committee reviewed CIA m;ords related to IICvcral CIA office~ and contracton; In"olved in the CIA's Detention and rnterrogarion Program, most of whom conducted lnt~gations. The Committee identified lI. number or personnel whose backgrounds include notable deroptory information calling into question their eligibUity for employment, their access to classified information. and weir participation in CIA interrogaliun activities. In nearly aU cases, the derogatory information was known'to me C{A prior to the assignment of the CIA officen to die Detention Ind lnterrogatiol1 Prognlm. 'fhi~ group of officers included individuals who, among other isslies. had engaged in inappropria~ detainee interrogations. had workplace linger managemcftt lnur.s. and had reponedly adm.il~d to SC/lOua! aBSGWt. 295 7. Bum:l.II oj' PrisollJ ..WOW·....d .. by uvel 01 DepriwuiOll aI CiA 's COBALT lNreltliotl Sue ~ ) In December" 2002.lhe ClA 's Renditi.ons Group sent II team of recently trnined inlelTOg'lor~ 10 DETENTION k heallh m:e~h. 111C:et ny the CIA" in the JtlnUal'Y 2003 l,'1Jitlancc. Detainees received bi-weekly mcdical ev"hHlllollS. brushed (heir teeth ~)J\~'.c u day, wl\~hcd their hands prior to each meal, and l:oLlld Ol1lhc: OIl":C n week, Amenilies such (IS ~nlit1 fOI)d, clorhjng (swe:llshil'lS. liWemtlanlS, und sl!l)PCnl), l\ltlLtins mutcrial:;. pruyer mClI. mId KOMIllS were aV~lilable lIepending on l'hc d~lllil1co"s dc~rcc: of ' t;uopcrurion with in Icrrul:!:tlnflj :11" pCl'iml ftol'n (~) The first quarter 2003 review also fOllllU thar l.'ontlitions ue DETENTION SITE CORALT sallsrictl the January 2003 guiu1.Inc(', citillg "Sigllifk:l111 improvement!!" ~tt~h ;l.~ sr>at:~ hea(l:rs and week!! medical ev:l.luillion:;. The l-,;:vll;W 1"I11(CJ Ihal (\ new l',ll'il il)' was un(l~l' cC)lI-;lruc(inn in GlUlllry. [() repluc\: l)E~NTION $n E COBALT. :10(1 rhld t!lis lie..... dctentjl)o faL'ility, DET£~NTION SrTE ORANGE. "will tx: OJ quunhlrn lc~ l"orWOift'" hcc"u~c "I ililo/ill iOl:lIrp,>c:)tc lu:ariugJair couditiol1illg, l'ollv~Hlinn:11 pltlll\hin~. a~t'IC Ii¥.hling, sllowcr, ,lI1d laqnJry fa.:ilirie;;.'·JIll DETENTION SITE ORA!':GE t1pcocJ in _ 2004, Ald'tough S(tll~ of ,he ~Ils at DETEN110N SITE ORANGE included plullIbing, 'It, tnll'rr(l~i1til\~ C"udUClell »urJ;UWU 10 Ihe Prc:sit.lcntinl Mc:fIlItlJllldUIll ofNllrilku(j,," .. I" 17 2001, .~il! Ilell hy \oCl'Ir,,, 'I'tllel. Dileclor (If CentJ:;allln~lligcnL-e.Jtt.nllilry lS, 2~U, ." GuilldibeH \"\ I ntem 'I',ltilll\' Cllnducic\.l Pur5u~nl 1\\ the PTe-ilk"l inl MCIUOI1Ullium of N"ri ll~ill\llil Ill' 17 Seplc:mbc:l''1001, .•ignt'd by Olll1f~e T':~I, Djf~cl(lrl,lfCenllU Inlcllilleoce, Jllmllll'Y 28. 2003, Wli CIA dlJCUQlenl Clliell. Qu:lt'!~ly "",vie ... ofConflnemtlll umditions (orClA Detuint:c~. In8103·· 41:l0/0~, May 22.20gacion facilities.) 9 Prior to that time, the fna:r1O,ation program was ''joiaoo at the hip" wiJh CTC', AL6C Stalion, according to ~ Legat, although aJ\OIheTeTC attorney who WILli dinlctly lnvollted in the progrlm infonncd the CIA OIG IhIt she "was never sure what group in ere was relipONible (or inlelrogBlion ac.:ti vities.'·)2Q Even anu the formal deaigoalion of the CIA' $ Renditions Gruup.l!J tensiOlU cocuinlled. particularly between eTC pe.rsonnel wbo supported SWIGERT and DUN8AR's continued rvle, and the Renditions Group, which designated _ ill the J4TDCRECTOR _ (302J 26Z JAN 03); DlRECTOR_ (.l11102Z1AN OJ). Dupilt tbl fermat nItOcd U£plng rcqu~ment. the: CIA 'J June 1013 Rcsp"'ie illgUes thllt dct~i1r.d ~porlinll all the UK of rbl CtA '! enhanced incermSlIliOllleChniquGl lit CIA clellntion Illes wu not ns:eu.ary. statin!l: "Fint, the decline in reporti1l8 oyer time lhi~ UJoC of enhl1nc:ed loc:hn!quelI, which the Study chalac1erizes IS poorordempti\le RIClOnI u.epinl, lICtuall)' ~celS the maNratlon of the prollJ"'lll1. In em)' 2003. a process Wa! put in pillce whtNby In!at'Olators requellCd permission in advance for inlemlplion pldll'. The UJoC of these phllli for each detainee obvi.t~ Ihe 11_ for rcporti nl il\ extensive decail 01:1 the usc of specific IccNliques. unless then: ware dc:Villliolll frvm the approved plllll." 1\. dellliltd in the Study, the pnx:e5I pill In pllK:e by the CIA in enrly 2003 explicitly rr.qulnld ~"ClI11lulepinl, includtl'lll ~thc nQtu~ and duration of each .such lCdlniqlle employ~. the idenlltllll oflMie p'"enl, IIId II CiLItlol1lo the rrlQIlired HcadqllaocnI approval cable." That requi~nent WIIS ne"er [Il.. ls~, on 111 Sublaluellt to the January 2.003 goldMK:e. many cables reponing the use of t~ CJA', enhlnco:l intcrrogurion b:hnl.qur.llli.lted the technjq~ ulCd 011. J*1lcular day, bUI did not describe liIe m:qll&ncy with wllicb lho. lochniques wen: el1lpJoyed, nor dlclltley inl!'grJlte the specific tecbniqut:6 into nlllTlJtivel of the InlllmllllrjOn5. A' t~ CIA illlcn'Oplion P/"irlM continued, d1scriplions of the U5e of die CIA's cnhanc:ed inlcm)gation lechniquOi wen: ret:oJdeu j" jftcruJingly summarited bm, providing lillie in6:lnl.llliOIl 00 how Of when Ihe ~hniquCll were lIpplied <1IIrin8 BIl inlenOc.d'ion. l1le:re 8R abo trw CiA ~OrtI.I ~llili ng't. n:adltion ~s for detaillee.. lind their lfnn'P~lIlton 10 or bIl't\lleen ddIenliOllsites. CIA records do include ltefainec comln&'nl.' Qn their reRdl,ion elpCriaQsllIId ph0ln3ral"u of dtllli_ ill the p1JCl::ISS of being tnmsparta:I. Baaed on II rtlvic" of Ihe pIIOfo"'s, dclllinee1 lnftlC'O"lCd "" Iht OA by aiRnIfl ~~ typica8y hooded ..illl.heir IuInd~ I" fed 'hlldllcd 1bc ~.iMlelI W~ larp '-lJaJ 10 eliminate 'Mir obilit, Ul hear, MId mea beadaalI ~ 'Ypically afJiud to. dc:llUlI£C's head with dll" "tNI nut lhe c:imJlIIftftrtce of the Ikbinec's hud. CIA deuillCCS \IIeft' pl~ in dispn ft(IlI pcIlIIjned to _ (he 1.".061 on lhe ain:laft. [)qleudina OG the ~,detainee! llOCIe eilha $InAJcd illlo lUIS dun", 1M ftlgtb. (If IlIid ckJwn and Sirllppcd 10 thr. floor of 1I~ pta- hariZOf'lQlly lib e.go. See CIA pMr0Il.~ ofretlclitiOllll8nlOIIg CIA IIMcaiob JII'O'W'ided to lbc ConImiltoc PUQUJlllt 10 tlte OlIltftliftoClC'S ckIcumt.Ilt "'lIuat"" well »CIA de.faineetr:w'icll'S in Volume III ~r additional illlorllUlllon on 1M lnmport of CIA 1'1" detltinees. m D1RBCrOR_il!323362 DEC 03) ]10 11I1~iew of _ _ by [REOAClCD), (RBDACTED) and [REDACTEDl, Office of Ole Inspector Genulll, Auaust 20.2003. Inlerview otflll• • • I. by IREDACTfDl and (REDACTED]. OffICI of liIe Illlipcctor Ciencral. Febl'\lQry 14, 'Z003. CTC Chief of Operaljon~ told lhc.lnspeclcr (jeneral !hit Ih. handled by dle Abu Ztlbaydllh Tad.. Fo~c. s,~ ~bnlllfY 11.2003, int=rYiew rllpon of Oflhilllo.clOrQenc~1. Dl N. f1Qted, the ClA's RendWoo iiIii Wat Office Onlup Is IIlJli.ably kno",," as thill "Relldiljons Orovp," n "Renditlons and Detllincci Onlup:' thill '"Renditions, DelcIntion$ IlIId Interro atinns Grou "Il.tld by Ihll! Inllialt, "RDI" ~ "ROO." Page 64 of 499 , "'0' • CS'C'CO " " • • _ - &'""'f_ •• --- UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIF1EOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 31 CIA's chiefinterrogator. 322 As late: as June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR. operatingout&ide of Ute direct management of the Rendirions Group, were deployed to DETENnON SiTE BLUE to both intellOgare and conduct psychological reviews of detainces. m The displiae extended to interrogation pnlctices. The Renditions Group's leadership considered the waterbOard, which Chief of Interrogations _ was not cmified to use, as "life threatening'" and complained to the 010 that Gome crA officers in the Directorate or Operations believed that. as a result, the Renditions Group was "running a 'sissified' inte1lO~ogram,"314 At the SIUDC time, CrA penionnel criticized the Renditions Group and _ ror their use of painful stIeSs positions, as well as fur the conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT.:W ere ( ~ There were also con<:crns about possible conflicts of intc~st related to the con[rftclOrs, SWIGERT and DUNBAR. On January 30.2003, B cable from erA Headquarters stated that ''the individual at lhe interroglltion site who adminlstel1l the techniques is nol the same person wtlo issues the ps)'CItological 8SSe5tlmen[ or .record," and that only I staff psychologist, not a contnlCtoc, could issue an assessment orrecorcl...126 In June 2003, however, SWIGERT and DUNBAR wen: deployed 10 DETENTION SITE BLUE tointt.rrogate JCSM. as well as to aS5eSS KS~s "psychological stability" and "resistance posture."m As described luta in this summary, the conlraclQrs had earlier subjected lCSM to the waterboard and olher CIA enhanced interrogation 1eauuques. The decision to ~end the cOlllne1 psychologists to DETENTION SITe BLUE prompted en OMS ps)'Chologist to write to OMS leadership that lnlccview of ,by lREDACTEO.t.ACfED], Office oflflelnspeclor Genenl.April 3.2003. Februa{y 21,2003. jllfervie... rqJO(I, Office of Utc l~peclor Geneml. Hammond DUNBAR lDtd !he Office of InspcctorGellerDl !IU1t then: WlI& "intrigue" be~n Ibe ROO lIlId him IrQ SWIQERT, and "then: ~ eltllils coming 10 [DETENTION sm BLUE) lhol qucslioned (hi&) nnd (SWIOERTj'_ qQnlificalions." See lnlervie... of H:mntond DUNBAR, by (REDAClBD] and [RfDACfBD]. Office of Ihe Inspeclor General Febru 4,2003. 12l Email from: ~ to: . subjecl: Re: DG Tasking for lC Psycllologi!1s [DUNBAR] and (SWIGER11;date: lune 20. 2003,_ 5:23:29 PM. OMS eilprlissed concetlJ Ibat "no profeu.ionol in lhe field would etedil[SWlGERT lind DUNBAR's later 'udgmeols as mol ists U&CS5'n dlc ~their enballCCd mcasUrl:&." (Set! email from: ,10: • I:C: 322 • •jiilj, _. , . ce:1I " _ • 5lIbJed: L Re: Taslcina fOf Ie PsycholOgists DUNBAR ~ SWIGeRT; date: lune 20, 2003, at 2:19:53 PM.) The erA's lune 20 13 Response stllleS 111111 CIA "Headquarters eSlllblished 'CI'C's RendiliOllli lItId Delentjons Group CTC1UXi 18 the responsible entity far ll1J OA detention lind intenugBlion &ile,w in D~r 2002. remlWi Ill! an)' \alent insticutional confusion." l i ' Interview of ,by [REDACTED) and lREDACfEDJ. Office ofthCl fnlpeClarGeneral, FebrulUy 21. 1003. The chief of inletrogllions, tOld lhe JOllpec:tot GCller1lllhal1he wale!boenJ WlIJ o~sed \lIilh Abu ZUblIydllh Dnd KSM and was ineffeclive in abe intenogalions of KSM. (See lrJeelview _ by [REDACT!:!)} and [REDACTEDl of the Ofrtc:e onhe lnspeclocGenerll, MIfCb 27,2003.) One BIOI' iovo! ¥'Cd in CIA itJteClOplions using lhe WllIerboard InlermSllrion lcdInique s&3.1ed IhQt _ "'has a hoge bias aaainst the watClbOllld ble be's not aAlroved to use il. TbCl reve\'Se is true of b oonlrllet elCays_,SWIGERT lind DUNBARI who have II vested interest in favor ofil." S~ email from: _ 10;. , cc: [RBDAC7ED);subject: re: MOK; date: 2003. DI 08:11:07 AM. J'.IS March m, 2003, interview report of ,Office ofille I~1or General. lnlen-iew of_ _ _• by (~ACTEDl and nUIDACTE01, Office of the fnspectoc Oeoer.ll.~brulry27, 2003. Iil. .iew of- - . by [REDAcreDllnd [REDACTED). Offl.ce of the Inspeclor Oeneral. Aprn 3, 2003. Mlrch 24,2003, intenoiew rein of • Office ofChc 'nspl:lttor Oenr.nt ~ DlRECTOR (30J835ZJAN03) 371 12168 (301822Z JUN 03) at. AE'l1. Page 6:5 of 499 ''''0' 'OOlC'CO ••• VI"""~~ ~., UNCLASSIF1EOIIFOR PUBLIC ~ELEASE UNCLASSIFJEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 32 "[a]ny data collected by them (rom detainees with whom they pre'Yiously inreracced II!IS inlCrt'OgalOfW will alw.ys be suspect."illl - = - M S lbcn Informed the MGnligement of the Rendition, Group that "no profes~ional in the field would credit [SWIGBRT and DUNBAR's] lat2r jUdgments IS psychologists assessing the subjects of their enhanced melsures."3Z9 At the end of Ibelr deployment, in June 2.003. SWIGERT "nd DUNBAR provided their aSllessment of KSM Bnd recommended that he shouJd be evaluated on 11 monthly basis by experienced interrogGIOt blown ro him" who would assess how fOl1hcoming he is and "remind Iai m that there Me differing coI1Jequcnces for c ~_not coopcratilll."33D In hi5 JeSponse 10 the dft~ Inspector Genecal Special R.e'Yiew. ~MS noled Ihlt "OMS concxms obour COftfljCf of i nlcmlt... were nowhere mote graphic than in lbc seninl in wbich !he some individuals applied an BIT which only they were appI'O'Yed 10 employ. judpd both its effecci vc~ss and delainee resilience, ilnd implicitly pl"oposed conlinued UK or the rubnique - It a daily compensation "'fKX1Cd to be Sl8OOlday. or fOur limes 111.[ of iJlte.rrogllOR wbo could nof use rite ~hnique ..·m "81\ D. 1be Dclention "'0 InlelTOg&lion of I Abel ai-Rahim aJ·Nashiri I. CIA lru#rrngators fX.f(Jcrt~ wall CIA H,aJqllan.~r.JAbout AJ·NtUhir/'$lIvd of Coop~r~riotl,' {lftrl"O/lOlors Oppou Conrinued U.J~ qftlte CIA·.J Enltanced {lIt~"ogCAtion T«ltn14lJe~ (~ •Abd aI-Rahim al·Nashiri,llz asses~d by the CIA to be an 31Qa'ida "terrorist operations planner" who was "intimately involved" in planning both the USS Cole bambinlllnd the 1998 Bast Africa U.S. Embassy bombings, was eapl\l~d in the United At8b Eminltes in mid-OctobC:t 2OO2. m He provided informalloli while In Ihe ,ustody or. fareiiR gO'Ycmmcnl, including on plDtting in the Persian Gulr,3l" lind was then rend~ by the :JIll Tha email. which exp,.1Id concern [hal SWIGERT and DUNBAll would inted~ ....ilh on ·.ile pllydlololllsts, slaftld lhnt. "(allthoulh these lJIl)'S be.lieYe lhal dIeU .... Doy iJ the only WDy. Ibcl'll 5hOllld be an ctron 10 del\nc tulu and re.,ponslbilitiea bdOnllhelr IrtOlllJlle and nal'Ci5sism evolve inlo ~ve conftlclln 1M field," Se, el1lDil j ·lIIIJl , •••• ... ii subject: Re: TaWftl felf Ie P5ycttologi&ts DtJN8~R lI.nd !'rom: ' to: I _ subjllCt: ~DO Taskill' for IC hyclloloJi8ts DUNBAR. and SWlGER~ dIl1:: JODe 1 2003, .Il4.=jS4,:3,2 PM ~. ~ Email ftom: Ill); 'a:: II!ll II!!' SWIGERT: dice: 18ne 20. 2003. n 2:19:53 PM. 110 12161 (30 IS:22Z 'UN 11)). The CtA', JUlie 201l1t=lponAc ....: Uln plXlice, by April1OOO.lCIA I saff psydlologisfs bid eaten over 11I11:III all of the pmvisioas of suppon to lIle RDJ P'Ol"lm, I\s il aJIIt'a1\Cd (SWIGERT] ad (DUNBAR), however. dIe.~ ofiqlrupriety continaed, alheil to • brc:aIae rbey t,Wfe ~ Q y..1ced to provide inpur IQ ~Pllicm ddain!lCs wtMInIlhIy II" "DlI"taropR(f" (em,b."s Iddtd). T1It CIA's 111M 2013 Rc5ponIe 0 1II1lCCW1111!. IU" a~. in 111M 1000. S WKiEll Tam DUNBAR pro.ided ......._ot an KSM•• dtlUDCIt wbom thl!y '-I intaropM4. m McmonKlduJn for 11W;E0c1ll:l3l. AUIcntion: ~i51nllG fOl' Investipliom, IRl!DI\CI"&I)J, t'lvm [RIIDA-CTECJ. M.O.. . J ~R. Draft SpeciaL Revkw-CounlBJtem)rism Det~lion ~dd 11I1errosation PrOJt1l111 ( ~-7123-laJ, at n. In F()l' mont inform,lion WI oL-Nuhirl. ne detainee review of 'Abd a!·Rmim lll-N8$h.Iri In Volume DL mAL~ 11351 021242ZDEC02: 36710 Iea_--. Dol s_ ~~9S For dillSelUineted Incelli • 36726 eDCC, ft. ALEC CIA IA lA from al-Nashiri while h~ WIl' in foteian ,al/emment clIstody, se~ Page 66 of 499 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE CIA tD DETENTION SITE COBALT in COURtl}'. 00 November. 2002, where he wasbeld for. days before being transferred to DETENTION SITE GRBEN on November. 2002,315 At DETENTION SITE GREEN. al-Nashiri was interrogaled using the CrA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including being subjected to the waterboard at least thru- timcs. 336 In December 2002, when DETENIlON SITE GREEN was clOled. aI-Nashlri and Abu Zubaydah wen: R':ndered to DETENTION SITE BLUE,m (~ In. roraL, aI-Nashiri was subjeclcd [0 the CrA'8 enhanced intetrOgation E£C:hniques during at least four sepmte periods, wilh each period typically ending with on lils~ssmen[ from on~sile interrogalDlli that aI-Nashiri waS coropliant and cooperaove. JJ8 Officers~ l " 3diSllgreed with rhese asseSlmJenB, with the deputy chid of ALEC SUllicn,.___. commenting that OBTENTION SIre BLUE inlerrogatoB should not make "sweeping statemeRls" in cable traffic regarding III-Nashlri's compliance.3J51 ,Officers at CrA Headquarters sought to reimtatc rhe use of the CIA's enhanced Intetrogation technique5 based on their belief IhDt al.Nashirl bad not yer provided aclionable intelligence on immineru attacks.""' (~) Shortly afrer 8l·Nashiri lI"rrived at OBTENTION SITE BLUe, CiA interrogators at !:he detention site judged aJ.·Nashiri·s cooperation and compliance by his engllgement and willingness to answer questions, while CrA Headquarters personneljud&ed his compliance based on the &pccirJc actionable intelligence he had provided (or the lack thereof). For example, in December 2002. intcrrogaron infurmed CIA Headquarten; thai aJ.-Nashiri was "cooperative and truthful." and thot the ·'consensus" at the detention she was I:bat al-NlI&hiri was 0866 ~ . Fordl~minaled iJrtelliJenoc:.~;·_ 29768 NOV 0'2} ~!!I. NOVOZ);!! 11246 11270 NM;VOZ' NOV 02): 1322 1]22 DEC 02); NOV NOV 02). 78215 DEC 02) J3t. AJ.Nasbiri'& lime at DBTENTION SITE COBALT is not WI:IU !txP.nv:llteo:l ill CJA records. A.s deicl:ibed elseWhere, standard operating procedure p.t COBALT allhe Ilme included totallighl depr;varion.loud rontimlous music, bolalian. DlId dietary manipulation. Bued on CIA ~.lheolhe[ four "Ilnham:ed inlelTDgatioo" pmiod& SLUt ofal-Nashiri look place at DiITENTION SITE 011 [)cr;Iembe[ ::i-S, 2002; December 27,2O(J;~:2:-:JU:""':'~I'~ 2003~January9-10.2003;300 11l11llllry 15-27, 2003. :iu_JQl;!~ (ll154IZDEC 02)~ 100'78 (2117))Z DEC.@):_lOI_46(0311Z7ZJAN03};ALEC_{191729ZJAN03l:. Email from:~; to: I {REDACTED}; 1:1:: . I, »II , {REDACTED). [REDACTEDI; subjec(; [DETENTION SITE BLUE] follow-up; dale: Do:ember 1.5. 2OOZ. fore;l;.ampl~ A L E C . (072315Z DEC (12); AUI:: _(130352Z DEC 02); ALEC_ (l80247Z DEC 02); ALEC (I91719Z J AN O]l; OA Office or.lnSpci~or Geneca~ RIlporl oflnvUliptiun: Unauthori~ Illterrogilion Tedmjque.s. at ID5TEN11ON SITE BLUE). {2Q;)}.112]·IOJ. Oaober29, 2003. Sa (11:0 CIA Office OfInspedOf GCncnll'llpart, Coun~nanuriun DdenOon And fntelTDglIlion Acllyiliell {September 2001 . Oc:lober 200]} (200]-1123·10), ~leased on Ma 7 2004. JooO See. Page 67 of 499 UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 34 compliant detainee" who was nOl ''widlholding important threat information."34\ Qfficen from (he CrA's ALEC Station stCfA HcadquBrtersresponded: "II "it is inconceiYBl;Jle 10 us that BI-Nashiri cannot provide us concrete leads•.•. When we are able to capture other tr:rrorists based on his leads and to thwart future plots based 011 his reporting, we will have much more confidence that he is. indeed. genuinely cooperative on some Ievel.·..142 ~ Later, aftermulriple follow-up debdefings, OBTENTION SITE BLUE officeni again wrote that they hlld "reluctantly concluded" that al-Nashiri was providing "logical Bnd mtional explanations" 10 questions provided by CIA HeadqOarters and therefore they recommended "agl1insr'resumillB entlanc~ measures" unless ALEC Stolion had evidence al-Nashiri was lying. 343 A cable Crom the detention si Ie .stllted~ (1'8J. "without tangible proof of lying or intentional withholding. however. we believe employing enhanced measures will accomplish nothing eltcept show [al-Nashiri] that he will be punish~ whether he cooperates or not.. thus eroding any rerooining desire 10 continue cooperating.... [The] bottom line is thlll we think [al-Nashiri] is being cooperative. lind if SUbjected to indiscriminate and prolonged enhanced measures,lhen: is 8 good chance he will either fold up and cease cooperation. or .suffer the sort of permanent mental harm prohibit~ by the Stlltute. ThereCore. a decision to resume enhanced measures must be grounded In fact and not general reelings.'·l,u 2. CIA Heo.dqll.tll1er.r S~ndJ Untrained Inurrogotor to ReslllTU! Al-Ncuhiri's llllerrogaJwru: lnt~rroga10r 1'hreaJe1t3 aJ-Ncuhirl with 0 GU'I and tl Drill (~) After the DET~NTION SITE aLUE chief"ot Base sent two interrogaron back to the United Start5 because of "prolonged absences from family" and the "Cact thll.t enhanced measures are no longu re~d for al-Nashiri," CIA Headquarter.; sent [CIA OFFICER 2], II CIA _ officer who had not been trained or qualified liS an interrogator, to DETENTION SITE!. BLUB 10 question and assess id-Nashiri.:M' ),1'.0030 (111S41Z DEC 02) )£2 ALEC HS0247Z DEC 02) )lJ 10085 (230906Z DEC 02) ]+4 ~5 DEliihRii 1008' (2)(F)l06Z DEC 02) 10040 (122122Z to . [CIA OfFICER 2'SllkpI0icnt. CIA recotd.~ nuRtaOl:ls ~cerns abolll [CIA OfFICER 2's) in&cr IDlInIIgemenf, and For more infOrmation on [CIA OFFICER 2] and other CtA penonne1.in tbe progl'8l1J wilb similar aillmlin issues in their bIc unci .ru Volume III. The CIA's Jl:lnc :2.013 Res nse lralel thllt: ' some Df lbe otTu:ets UleDtioned in the SILld houJd have been exclllded-much of1hc mlllory infcrmalioo was nOl1n ftcl available 10 senior minai¢ts making _UIPmcnb • iioded ." Notwilh3landin the CIA'a June2013l1Scertion, lIlI dctaUedln Volume 01, senior mlloag~n: were aw~ of e.oncems related 10 [CIA OFFICER 2 rior to NS deploYlDenl. Page 68 of 499 1:I Nel::A"SSIFlEB UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE ~ In late December 2002, following a meeting at CIA HelldqulIl1elS ~e use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation ~hniques against al-Nasbiri. - - - - . the chief of RDc?d-~atmanaged die CIA's Deu:ntion and Interrogation Program-objected to sending _ _ [CIA OFfICER 2] to the detention sire because he "had not been wough the interrogation training" and because _ "had heard from some colleagues lhat CrA OFFICER 2]) was too confident, .had a remper, and had some securi issues," later learned from other CIA officials that "[CTC chief of operations ~ (CIA OFFICER 2]) at [DETENTION SITE BLUE) over !he holidays." ~ Office of Inspector General that "his assessment is that the Agency~l\l fclt thll[ the [ROO] intem:Jgllton were being too lenient with III-Nasbiri and that ~ [CIA OFFICER 2]] was sent 10 (DB'rENTION srrn BLUE] to 'fix' the siNation." 1 (~) _ [CIA OFFICER 2) anived Bt DETENTION srre 8LUI~--on- ~ 2002., and the CIA resumed d1e use of ih enhanced interrogation techniques on al-Nashiri shortly thereafter, despile d1e faet c h a t _ {CIA OFFICER 2] had riot been tmined. certified. or approved to use the CIA's enhanced inten-ogarion techniques. _ [CIA OFFlCER 2] wrore in a cable to CIA Headquarters that "[alJ-N.slliri responds well to harsh treatment" Hnd 3uggesred thar the inrerrogaton eontimle to administer "various degrees of mild puniShment," bUt still allow for "a .small degree of 'hope: by introducing some 'minute tewards.",14& ~ II was later learned that during thelie inrecrogation sessions, ~CER 2], wilh the permission lind participation of the DETENTION srm BLUE chief of Base, who also had not been tt'llined and qualified 85 an inre~aeda series of unauthorized incerrogation techniques against al·Nashiri, For example, _ _ [CIA OFFICER 2] plDCCd aI-Nashiri in II "standing stress position" with "his hands affixed avec his head" fo. Dpproximalely two and a hal~Later, during the cou rse of w~Nashiri's debriefings, while he was blindfolded. _ _ raA OFFICER 2] placed a pistol nea, wNashiri's head and operated a cordless dIillllCar al-Nashiri's body.~ AI-Nashiri did nol provide any additionallhrc:at information during, or alta. these iruerrogations. JS1 ltlI As described, Ihc "Renditions and IlTterrogllllons Group," is IIbo n:fllll\\d to as Cbe "RendiliolJS Group," die "Rendilion. DelenliOll. and Imerrogillon OIOGP," "RDl,"lInd "~DG"ln CIA. ~s. 3471nterview RepoI1, 2003-7123-10. ~e. of fnlemlglltlOllS for Countcrterroriam PuqlOl/e.I, • • • • • • febnly 23, 2003. 301~ 10140 (03 r721Z JAN 032~, Sce email t to: ; subject: EYES ONLY -I I ONL Y - MEMORANDUM fOR hDOD/ODO; dale: JlInUllry 22, 2003. In un Ap'ill2, 2007, Senam Sclecl eommi~ on Intelligence be.ring, SmalOr Carl Levin aSked the CI.... OiRiCtor ifltle aA disputed DlkglltiQIliII in.l' Inlemlllionlli Cotnmitlec of the Red ClaSS n:port chill sllggeslcd CIA dctainCColl ~rt plKcd in "CpholougW strcsa 5tlllldlnJ!l posirion, nllked, ann[sJ chllined above the hc:ad...... 1be OA DitllClOr n=lIpondcd, "Not above the hcBd. Sln:lla positions ~ purt of tbc BITs, and nlllzdnesl> were putt Dr lfle EITs, SenalDr:' Se, Se:nale Select COI1Imiru:e on fnlelligeooe HearilIg Tnnscripl. dam! April 12, 2007 (DTS tr.zOO?-3U8). »ll See, for exampk, CIA Office aC lnsp~tor Ocnerll1, Report of Inve$Ugation: Unaudlori:r:ed Jn~lroIlltion T~blli~t1cs at (DETEmlON SITE BL~OctDbcr29,2003; email [OE'IBfTION SITE BLUE] COB to: ~ subject: EYES ONLY ~ JONLy ~ MEMO FOR ADOOIDDO; date: January 22, 2003. 3~1 For additional dIll.ilib, see Volume Ot from;l.iiiiiiii•• 7D1; Page 69 of 499 U'JSL'..eS!F!ED UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE (~) Based on a repoll from CTC, the CIA Orfiee or lnspector General conducted a review of lhese interrogation jnddents. and issued a ~port of investigation in the faU of 2003,m The Office of Inspector Genemllate.r described additionolllllegations or unauthorized techniques \lsed again.st al-Nashiri by _ (CIA OFFICER 21 and other interrogators, includins slopping IlI-Nashirl multiple times on the back of the head during interrogations; impJyinB tho.t his mother would be brought before him and sexually abused; blowing cigar smoke [tl aJ-Nubiri's rsa:; giving al-Nashiri a fon:ed bath using a stiff brush: and using improvised srress positions thlU caused cuts and broises 1'e.5ulti"g jn !he intervention of 8 medi~1 officer. who Will concerned that a!·Nashiri's .shoulders would be dis10carcd using the .stress pceitiona. m When IntttYtewed by die Office of InspectOl" Gel1et8l. lhe DETENTION SrrE BLUE chief B~ staled be did not object to using the glln and drill in tbt inrerf'OgllbGnS because he believed _ (CIA OFFICER. 2] was sent from. CIA Heedqu~n "to ruoIyc the matlet of al·N_shiri', coopenItion" aDd that he believed _ (CIA OmCER 21 had penn.iuion to use the interrOlation !ecl1niques.lS4 The chid of Base added thAI his Own oft-Idle approval wu ba5ied on this and "Ihc. prasuR! he felt from HeadquartCA to obcain imminent rtrre_t infortlleriol'l from .1·Nuhiri on 911 i-style 3lfaCka..,m In April 2004. _ [CIA OffiCER 21 and the chier of Base were diKipllned.l!6 or 3. CIA ConmJ.ccm JVontOtiOM, wlthin-sr-dle SIep i~.~iJlc~ or pumalleJlluj,'Y InQeaSel darine ,hilt oee-yeerpcriod. ~ Ex . I ~ Aw ~d=Woo did QOl bomJIes or' IIOIt- forms of [CIA OffiCER 2's ell ibil' itiOlt, Su Reprim8rtd and lIlen.day ,u.pension withoul CIA during rile penod of reprimanl1. 011 indlvjdllll] ~Iin!ld fmm the CIA, See Page 70 of 499 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 10 UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE ( ~ On Janullry •• 2003, CIA contractor DUNBAR arrived at DBTENTION SITE BLUE to conducr a "Psychological interrogation Asseisment" to judge atNashiri's sui tability for the additiolJal use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation rechniques and develop recommendations for his jnreITOgation. The resulting interrogation plan proposed Ibat the inrerrogatoni would have the "latitude ro use the fuU ronge of enhanced exploiration aod interrogation measures," adding that «the use of the water: board would require additional support From" fellow CIA conInlCtor Gl"llyliOn SWIGERT. According to the inlcD"Ogation pian, once the inn:rroga[ors had eliminated al-Nashiri's "sense of eontrol and pmiictabiJity" and established a "desired level of helpless ness," tbey would reduce the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and transition to B debriefing pl\ase once aglJin?S1 ( After receiving the proposed lnterrogation plan for aI-NBShiri on I anuary 21 j 2003. , the CIA' 5 chief of interrogations-wOOK preSence had previously prompted al-Nashiri to tremble in fersl--emailed CIA coUeagues to notlfy them that he had "infonncd the front offia: of ere" Ibllt he would "no longer be associated in any way with the interrogation progmm due to serious reservation(s] [he had] about the eum:nt stan: 01 affairs" lind would instead be "retiring shortly." In the same email, _ wrote, "(t]his is a tnUn wreak- [sic] waiting to happen and I inlCnd to get the heU off the train before it happens:~39 _drafted a cable for: CIA Headquarrers lD send to DETBN'TION SlTB BLUe raising a number of concerns that he, the chief of inteerogations, believed should be "entered for the n:rord." The CIA Headquarters cable-whicb d~ not appear to have beea disseminated to DETENTION srrn BLUE--iflcluded the foUowing: "we haYe serious mservalions with the continued use of enhanced techniques with [al-Nashiri] and its long tenn impBCt on him. (AI-Nashiri] has been held for three months in very difficult conditions, bath physically and mentally. It is the assessment orthe prior intem>gal:ors lhat [al-NashltiJ has been mainly truthful and is nol withholding signifialnt infonnlltion. To continue to use enhanced rechniqlle[s] without clear indications that.he [is] withholding important info is excessi ve and may cause him to <:ease cooperation on any level. (AI-Nashiri] mllY come to the conclusion lhatwhether he eooperatesor not. he will continually be subjected to enhanced rechniques, therefore, what is the incentiYe for continued cooperation. A\$o, bolh ~hief of ere ROO andHVTlrn~r~who departed IDIITENTION SITE BLUE] in ~anuary, believe continued enhanced methods may pu.o;h [al·NashiriJ over the edge psychologicBlIy.'·l6O 10261 1)7 :ue Aydin, 10 a December 12.2002, CIA clblc, 1I1-Nashiri "Yi~ibly and Dllll'Udly trembles willi fear every lime be sees I." S~e 10038 1221l9ZDEC 02). , ~: [REDACTED); l5Ubj~t;- Re: dale: JanulIl)' 22, 2003. Oespil& this nOlification. did immedialely JeSign from the lnlemle!!0.!!.f!2f"h.,• • ]6Q Brnllil fTom: (0: [REDACTEDJ. •• ~ [REDACTED). [R6DAetIID1; SUbi'ect: CONCERNS OVER REVISED INTERROOATlOt'; PLAN fOR NASHlRI; dare: January 22, 2003. I refcn:nc:ed in lIJepaS8ge as a "HVT InteaogalOt:' ~l3ae chid' Df inlenOSaiions. 1" Emllil frolll: ; to: not Page 71 of 499 tlNetASSlflEB - UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 38 (~) Thedra(t cable from responsibility" concerns, stating: .lso- nised "conflict of "Another area of concern is the use of the psychologist as an in leIIOgator. The role of the ops psychologist is to be a detached observer and serve as II cheCk on the inlenoglltor to prevent the in~ogalor from lIny unintentional excess of pn:ssure which might cause permanent p&yclJoJogicaJ harm EO the'subjecL The medical officer is on hand 10 p[t;lvide the same prol£.Ction from physical actions that might harm the subjoct. 'Therefore, the medical officer arid the psychologist shouJd not serve as an interrogalOr. which is a conflict of responsibility. We note tba[~lanl contains a psychological interrogation assessment by~ psychologi.st [DUNBAR] whic:h is to be carried out by intenogator [DUNBAR]. We have a problem with him conducting both roles simultaneousJy."~61 ~) Rather than releasing the cable that was drafted by _ CIA Headquarters approved iI plan to reinstitute the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation I.echnique8 against al-Nnshiri, beginning with shaving him, removing his clothing, and placIng l1im in a st1Inding sleep deprivation position with his arms nffixed over his head.3ti2 CIA cab!~ describing sul»equent interrogations Indicate that aJ-Nashirl was nude and, at times, "put in the standing position, handcuffed and shacJcled."363 According to cables, CIA lntenugators decided to provide IJI~Nashiri clothes to "hopefully slnbjJiz.e his physiological symptoms and prevent them from deteriorating,"l64 noting in a ciLble the ne~t day thar ol-Na!lhiri wa~ suffering from a head cold which cau:oed his body to shake for approximately ten minutes during nn i nrerrogatloll. 365 ~J:) Beghlning in lune 2003, the CIA trrlRsfcrred al-NashLri In five different CIA deleotion facilities befor.: he WIlS transferred to U.S. miliOity custody on September 5,2006.)66 In the interim, he was diagnosed by some CIA psychologists as having "lU1xiety" Bnd "major depressive" disordc:r.J67 while others found no symplDrns of either iIlness. J611 He was a difficult and uncoopel3tlvedetainee and engaged in repeated beUiger.:nt . acts, inclUding attempts to assault CIA detention site penonnel Bnd efforts to damage il.ems in his Joll Email from: ' 10: [REDAcrEbl• • • • • •~,. .~.~• • (RE!DACTEDL (REDAcreD); subjecl: CONCERNS OVER REVISED Im'ERRCiGATLON PlAN FOR N ASHIRl; date: JanuilfY 22, 2003. As nDted abo~. pcn;onnel from CIA'a Office of Modical SerVjr:es rlli$ed tllie Ame ~nceml about Illcdical and psychological pelSORne! seuiDg both 10 lISIeSS the bealth of II detainee and 10 participate In !be iJllen'Ogation process. . 162 DIRECTOR _ (201659Z JAN DIRECTOR _ (23000az IA~ ~.10289 (241203Z lAN03); J0296 (25ll1:3ZJAN (3),_10306 (261403ZJAN 03) ~ 10309 (261403ZSANOO) 3lil 10312 (2701154Z I AN 03) )66 HEADQUARTERS_COOI945Z SEP 06); 1242 (O~44Z SEP (6); HEADQUARTERS_ (OS 161 3Z SSP (6) :In See, t:Ot ~rnple, 11247 (141321Z APR. 03): _ _ 1959 (111700z Dec 04): ~• • • 2038 } 1558Z JAN 0$).' :2l69 {251IJjZ M A ~ 11701 (191tS4QZ MAY (3); 1756 (1908OQl. SEP 1502 (02I84IZ "UOO4); '2709 (271517ZAPR 06); _ 3910 (241852Z IAN a6); 2709 (2.71 SIn APR (6) 0i 031' Page 72 of 499 $ '00.7 oOA,e,eO UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE cell.l69 Over a period of years, al-Noshiri accilsed ihe CIA staff or drugging or poisoning his food, and complained of bodily pain and insomnia.l?ll At one point, al-Nashiri launched a shortli",ed hunger strike lhat resulted in the CIA force feeding him rectally.J7I ~ In OclOber 2004, 21 months after the final documenred use oftfJe CIA '.$ enhanced interrogBtion techniques against al-Nashiri, lin 8S5cssmenl by CIA contract imerrogator DUNBAR Bnd aRother CIA imerrogator concluded that al-Nashiri provided "essentially no actionable infonnarion:i BlJd that "the probabiliry that he has much more 10 contribute is Jow.'~n OVO" the courreor al-Nashiri's detention and interrogarlon by the CIA, lhc CIA disseminated 145 inreHigence reports based on his debrief"mgs. AI-NW!iihiri PM"ided information on post operational plotting. B.S5ociares whom he e:llpectcd 10 participare in plots, details. on completed operations, and background on Bl-Qa'ida's structure and methods of operation,371 AI-Nashiri did not provide the infocmation that lhc CIA's ALBC Station sought and believed IIl-NliShiri possessed, specifically upcrishable thrt:at information to help [CIA] thwart funlle attacks and capture additionaloperati",a."m E. Tensions with Country. Relating to the OA Derenrion Facility and the Arrival of New Detainees ~ ) According 10 CIA records. three weeks after ~eadersh1pof Countl')' • agreed to host a CIA detention facility, the CIA infonncd the U,S. ambassador, because, as was noted in a ClIble, by not doing so, the CIA was 3G'Ses, forel;i1mple,.o29{2917SJJZJUN ( 6 ) i . 1 4 2 (04135"8Z AU006):_1S43 (lll600ZAUG 04); 1116 (180742ZSEP04): 3051 (30123:iZ SEPOSJ:. (29115OZJUN 06); 2474 (2:i1622ZJUN 05); 2673 (0214:iIZ AUG OS); 1716 (180142Z S E P 0 4 _ · 570 See, torexllmple. 1356 (011644ZiUL 04}; ~ 1880 (14091n NOV 04); .1'!S9~\!"!1700Z! DEC (4); 1%2 12102gzDEC~19:i9(111700zDEC04I' ~. 2038 (21 1:i58ZJAN 05 ; 1091 (031835ZNQV03); II 1266 (052309Z JAN 04); J630 (27I440Z MAR 04). 1029 " ' _ 1 2 0 3 (231109ZMAY 04); 1202 (231644Z MAY'{)4) m 1843 (2113~GZ OCT (4). In Ihe final yeZl'li of al-Nasbiri's delentloll, most of the infel1igmr;e requirements for al-Nashiri involvtd showing al-Nashiri phologmphs. I!l June~, the DETENTTON SITE BLACK. chiefofBlJ5e suspended even 1lJc:sc. debriefings because il WliS "llIe very, very rare mOIlWI1l"ltulllIl-NlI5hiri wCIIlld lCCOlnize- a photognlph. lIJId b~u5e-1he dcbrlefillJ$ ofIl:ll ~ the "ClIlalysl" for hi~ otllboCJls. S- I 2414(2516Z2Z)UNOS,_ :m While sfill in the cuSlodyofa fo~gn governmenl, prior [0 his relldition 10 ClA clnlody, al-NlIshiri JlRlvidlld ddails 011 IlI.ultiple tClrrorist plofS in which he WIlS involved priorkJ his dchlntlon, inclUding the atl8l::ks- agliinsllhe USS Cob. and the MV l.imbM'1' plans to sink 011 l8nU:ni in the Strail oflionnuz,. plllJLi Ie lIRlIck IIi'lII3/tipIi doI;l:~ It ports in Dubai anclJedllall. and his ~ii' of a Dubai amll8ernenl arlc". This mfQnnation was dissemioared ill intelli : _ 365"95" I 3 6 7 2 6 . . /to I. . For disseminated intelli ce, gee WU8LAGliilFlBJ UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 40 ItNOFORN "liN~lng that he hear {If this inithlli .... C"· from Country • offidllls.J7.~ As was the Cr h' Ihl: StllLly he,~ rclclC-;uoo t<> the U.S. Sl:Ilate fronl the off·.\ite reseurr:h f"~lliIY, '1'1. 7S275 "'IIIREDAcTEDj1888 '" IREDACTED] 2666 DEC, 1M' HEADQUARTERS ,".' [REDACTEDj3280 I\ccording tu the ~abll:', the CIA Station ~l'eCU1"led 11m! Ihe l'h;llllle nr p",iliun wlls "al "'IIS( ~<)filewhlltllllril:'lltllbte.. III nur sJft 'If _milliun...." .." S"tr Vnlume ( fnr m1l.liti{)n~1 det'rlllfi. \~. (l~E1),'\CTF.DI7526 t1.REDi\C1ED1IRcDI\Cnmn "", (REDACTED] 7849/1 REDA(":'TICD] IR~~)!I.II! l'OP SECR&1'I~ • Page 14 of 499 I/NOFORN l:l148b'.88IFIEB UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 41 of President Bush's SC::plernber 2006 Llbtic acknowled ment of the Cv. ptO&ram.Jl1 The CIA JS .. ''serious blow" to the bilatl:f'lIl Rlla[ionshi p. 3•• Station, for its pll1, destribed the f". The DC'lention and Interrogation or R,amzj Bin AJ~Shlbh I. Ramti BUr Al-ShibIJ Provides /n[ormDliOfl Whi/{! in Foreign GoverNrl~"r CUSfOd'j, Prior to R~t"'1t 10 CIA Onrody ~ As early as ~mber 15.2001, Ramzj bin 1l1-Shibll was assessed by me CIA ro be • flldlilaror Car me Sepccmba 11, 2001, auaeks and an ~soc:i'le 01 the 9/11 hijlrl£rs.- While tarpting lII10decr IcmJrist. Hasllll Ghul. _PatiRDfti oft'kials IIl11!qJeC1CldI~captured bin al-Shibh during nrids in Pakistan on ScpteP\ber 11. 1002..190 00 September. 2002.. bin el·Shibb was ~ 10 iI fon:ign government. _ nl Apprmimare~otlthsISler. on february 12003, bin al-Sbibb was ~ &om Ute clJstOdy o r - . to C(A custody, becoming me 41 11 ClA ~lJiDel!.m ( ~ As with Abu ZlIbaydah and •Abd ai-Rahim al-Nashiri. pcnOJUIei at CIA HCUdqu8rters--omn in AllC Sf4l5 Contrary to CIA rep-ese:ntadoos D'lade lalU to the Commicree rhaa dctainec:a WCJe al"tllllys ~n:d !he oppormnilY ID cooperate before beina subjcded to die CIA'senh8nced iJl1tm)gation lec.hniques,lbe plan staled Eltet bin el-Sbibh "tIIOLlld be shat:kJe,d INde widl his 8110S oyerhead in a cold room pliO(" to 8I1y disC4Ission with inrerrogaron or any assessment or bls Jewel of ooopcntion.- According 10 a cable, only lIftr£ me inl£rropron delemlined dual his ",nilial re.sisbmce levd (had) been dimiRisbed by Ibe conditiON" would !he quesLioning aod inlelIOgBlion pIwc bcgin.4OJ (~ The interrogation phase described. in the plan inclUded near constant interrogations. as wdl1l9 continued SCIl.'JOI)' depriVDlion, a liquid dlel. and slup deprivation. bI addition, the interrogation plan 5tBted that th~CIA's enhanced inferroption lcchniques would be uiCd, inc::luding the "artenrion grasP. walliQg. the facll) hold. thc facial slap•.. the abdominal slap, cramped confinement. waJl SIlU'Xling, stress positiON. sleep deprivation beyond 72 hours. and the waterboard, 85 appropriare to [bin al·SfUbh',) level of resistance.... ( ~ Based on versions of this interrogation plan, at least six detainees w~ stripped and shackled nude, placed in the standing position fo.r sleep deprivation, or subjected to other CIA enhanced interrogation techniques prior to being questioned by an interrogator in 2003.409 Five of these detainees were shaclded naked in the standing position wilh their hand~ above their head immediately after lheir medical ched::.'uo Thesc intetrogation _. IiiJAiiiNIiI04l11fi·A.dIl sf-L~ 1151 • 2119-"------- I Page 77 of 499 ~IU!J lsf\e8Iflf!8 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE plans typically made no ~fe~nce to the information the interrogntoIS sought and why the detainee was belie....ed to POSSefl6 the information.411 3. elA HetJdquGrttr' U,.g~s Continued Use ofthe CIA'~ E"hanced lrtlurogalion TltcluriqJUI', DeJPftt Interrogalon' Assessment VIal Ramzi Bi,. AI·Shlbh Wal Cooperath/t! (~ When CIA interrogato~ at DEI'ENTION srn; Bl,..UB assessed [hal bin 81~Shibh was coopen.tive and did not have additional 1nowled SC- of futll.re &t1lcb,412 CIA Heotdqualten dillagreed and instNcted the intenogaton; to continue using the CIA's enhanced inlerrogation lochniques. whieh failed to elicit the information sought by CIA Headquarters. 41 S On FeMillry t t, 2003. ina:rrogaWIS asked CIA Headquarters ror questions that ALEC Station was "85 percent ceteUn Ibil'l al-Shibh ) will be able 10 answer:' in order to verify bin at-Sbibh'$ level of cooperario,,:u~ The inll:Iroglitors Slated mat information from Abu Zubaydah and at-Nashiri 1iUuesred thar bin al-Shibh would not have been given I new 8ssignmellt or UU91.ed with signifICant inform.non given his high-profi!e Jink, to the September Ii, 2001. 8Itaclcs.~I> They fUr1hcr stated Ihlll bin aJ-Shibh had "achieved substantial notoriery afler t 1 ~eptemhl'.r," b\u wn, stilt unproven in al.Qa'idil. cirdes and may bave "been privy [I) information more 8S a bystander than as aD active pwticipant,"416 (~ The CIA's ALEC Station disagrttd wj[h [he assessment of che detention !lite personnel responding that it did not believe the poJtnlyals of bin al·Shibh ofTe~d by Abu Zubaydah and lll-Nashiri were accurate and that CIA Headquarters assessed that bin .1Shibh must have oc:tionllble infomuuion due to his proximity to KSM and CIA Helldqual'ters' belief rhilt bin lll-Shibh had II history of withholding information from inlelTOf:8IOOl. ALEC Station wroa:: "As base I DfITENTION SITE BLUE] is weU awam, Ramz.i had long been deliberately withholding andlor providing misleading information to his. inlC"Oaatocs in (II foreign govcrnmcn t). _.. From our optic, it is imperative to focus Ramli uclusively on [wo iS5Ues: I) What ~ !he next attacb plllnned far the US and 2) Who and when: are the operlllti'les inside the United ~."417 gatioJLll ot Rllmzi bin al-Shibh.4Z9 A CIA llSsessment, which included intelligence t't-tIm his cn. 10582 (24202hZ fEB 03): tOli27 (2111J49Z FEB 00) m 10521 (l9175O'Z FEB OJ). Thl:Cllblewre~ .o~iogbin "-ShiNt indatlcMSl ~ Il"Slalldllld lNam,ption ltd\lIiquo." tbIl_ Cllble ~ ttlal d1Iring!be night of February '8, 2003. tile lilllll wenl out ih btn aI-8hiblI'5 cdl.nd ••, "[..... lheTueQltity ~ Ilfl'iWlll ltue,1IIcc die bulb, bin a1·Sbibh W~ rowering in lhc SeQlrlay peQOftftll noted dial lie 8ppC8l'Cd ~lieWJd ., .. 1M liC'" - . . ~." . a. nS902U191.OCT(4);HEADQUAlttBRS-'23ZNOVOS); 1890 (17InS'Z NOV 0.); 131S (l4091 SZ NOV 04l~ 1930 (06 I 62QZ DEC (4): 2201 I U31CJZ APR OS)~ 2110 141SO'TZ APR OS); 2535 r1805% JUt O~r. 2589 (1101S1ZJULOS); 2&30 (2913042 AUG OS): 1890 (1712257. NOV 04 • 1893 831Z HOV (4): CIA dol:amatentilla1, "J)ej.aillCli Tultin, Poi.", felt ICRC BabuUII• • .lhiverir' j (141S()7Z. APR OS); 193iiil620Z DBC 04): 42' ~ G'7 2210 141S07ZAPRQ5);~MI8Q5ZJULjeCl: Re: MEDICAL SlnEP 3110: d....e: MIlICh 12. 2003.~09:47 PM. .., Email 6om: _ ; to: IlUIDACTBD): c:c: lose Rod[4:o~ subject: Rei: EYES ONLY - L.eglll alld PolitiCil QUilldar)': date: Mardil). 2003. It 8:01 :12 AM, 411 Email from: : to: [REDACTED}; cc: Jose Roclri;\Iet. _ 41' ••••. ers and , I Tandil:: ; subjecl: EYES ONLY - Use ofW8lCl' BOIlldi date: March 13. 2003. at 08:28 AM, ~ Emili! from: [REDACTED}; to: ; ee: . fiobjc:cl: Re: Slate eable;; date: M~h 13,2003. It I :43:17 PM. TheprClvioul day, tIlCllTllldical afficull.t ,.ril'tcn !hili-lama the e.I.CnIl!Iilc 10 rr (0 handle Ibis in II non cOIIftonlational manner." Hmllil from: [REDACTED); to: ' cc: ; subject: Rc: MEDICAL SITREP 3I10;c;!a1e: Mllrt:h 12,2003••' 5:17:07 AM. 10803 (13l929Z MAR 03) Page 87 of 499 ... !"to, 'pntEleD "" ......, ........... """'~ UNCLASS1FIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App.54 ( ~ Shonly thereafter. CIA Headquar1£rs began lUyaJuating the use of the waleJ1)OlIrd intcl'tOgation technique. According to a March 14,2003, email from lin inlcrTOgator who WlIS not at DETENTION SITE BLUE, but was revic;wing cable traffic, the "ro]vcrall yicw seems to be" that lbc wl:llerboord "is not working in gainins KSM('II] cOOlplianee.·...7 The deputy chief of the CIA interrogation program ~sJlO'\dcd in agn:ement. Bddil'lg thDt "[a]pin&t KSM it ha& proven inefftctiye,.. IIIld that "[t]he polCntial for physical haem is fal' greater with the w!lterbOlltl1 than with thi: other techniques, bringing into question the iasue of riu n. gain•.•." The ckputy cb.ief further 5Ugge&ted that the w&terbolrd was COlJnrerp.roductive, Slating thaI ''(w)e JCCm to hnve lost ground" with KSM Rince pro~.u mlldc at DETENT10N SITE COBALT. and all a result, the CIA should "con.&ider me possibility"lh1t me introduction of the wacuboan1 lntenogation b:chni~ dill! ....eU...• The em6il in which ~ scnDmenls Yl'ere e~preslCd was sent to . . . _ _ , l h e ere aoorne)' oYCBrJeing the interrogarion of lCSM. Dcspile lbese R:5ClVaaions UId assessmellfs, !he Vtacerbolnfing of KSM conlinued for another 10 days.l: ",bje.ct: Ie SummllfY of ISM Wllerbowd Seaslcns - As of 1000 HRS 14 ~ar 03; dille: ~1rd1 14. 2(0). at 10:44;12 AM. EntaD (ram: • • • • • 10: . a:: . _ [REDACTED), (REDACTED)• ul1>jel:(: re SlUIUZW)' of ICSM Walelborud Sessions - As. of 1000 HRS I. MAl ()); cJal£: N~II. "I • ji.iiilt. 14,200:), at 02:02:42 PM. 49 ~~ delailtd - review (If dIeIe sessi0n5 U. Vol.... In. lO8lliU tslQZ MAR 03); 10841 (152007Z MAR OJ); br (R1!9A~1 03); ~ o f _ W,yIS,2003. 10849 (I6IOJR WAll and [REDACT'BD]. otr~ of dle lItapectClt GeIlCnl. . •• De oriJIMt ~&-._ a1,q.·ida IIaI pllldtued IItldeu Riccavs 1ft 'rCZNIl. . . 1_rdtilmtUltN to be IIIlsed on 4,. efrotl b)' IlOkltO'N1l Yemeols to JdI"suiDJe ~"lo al-Qa'idll. AItha lIle offer was • SQIh. Su 14491 as498 (~ The same day, KSM provided additional information on the Heathrow Airport plotting, much of which he would recant in 2004,499 KSM also discussed laffar aJ· Tayyar again. prompting the detention site pe~onnel to refer to the "all-purpose" ill, Tayyac whom KSM had 'Iocyoven.,. into praclically every story, each time with a differeni role."~DQ After KSM had included al-Tayyar in his discussion of Majid Khan's gas slation pial., KSM debriefer_ wrote in an email that "(tloday [al·Tayyar's] worlcing with Majid Khan, yesterday the London crowd. the day before Padilla - you get the point,"SOl Beginning the evening of March 18.2003, KSM began a period of sleep deprivation, most of it in the standing position, which would last for seven and a half days. or approximately J80 hours.502 (~) 0., March 19.2003, the interrogators at the detention site deeided to waterboard KSM due to KSM's inconsisrent information about Jaffer al-Tayyar' s passport.S(l3 According to CIA cables, after assuming his position on the waterboard, KSM "seemed to lose (1ontrol" ond appeared "somewhat frantic," stating that he "had been forced to lie. IUld ma[k:]e up soories about" Jaffllr a1-TaYYllr becau!ie of his interro8~toR,504 KSM then stated thalrus _ - _.... reporting on el-Tayyar's role in Majid Khan's plotting was 11 "complete fabrication" IUld that alTayyar bad been compromised as an opereti ve and that as a result, ai- Tllyyar could not be used fOT a terrorist operation. SQ5 In response, me interrogato~ told KSM that they only wanted to heaT ~ if he was revealing Information on the next attack. 5D6 Deputy Chief of ALEC Station _ _ later told the inspector genem1 that it was around trus rime that contract interrogator DUNBAR stated that "he .had not seen a 'resistor' [sic] like KSM, and wns 'going to go to school on trus guy)"S01 According ro CIA records, the interrogators thel1: "de vote [d] all measures to preSSUr111g [KSM] on the single issue of the 'next attack on America,''' including attention grabS, insult slaps, walling, water dOll~ing. and Ildditional waterboard sessions. SOlI (~) On March 20, 2003. KSM continued to be subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques througholJt the day, including a period of "intense questioning -«>'_10884 (J82140Z MAil 03) "9?10883 (J82127Z MAR 03), djSiieminllted lIll ; _22939 (031S4IZJUL 04). CIA recotds illdicare that CIA officeJl\ belieW!d lhat KSM's recanllltioni weIll credible. See KSM detainee review in VolumeDl.. SOD lQ884 (J821402 MAR 03) ERlllit-KOiri:-(REGAc:rED], OFFICE: _ , to:''{'REDAeT60Ji 5tIbject: JAFAR REQUEST~dlilc:: Mllt'dt to, 18'12003 'at 08:16:G7 PM. 10884 (t82140Z MAR 03); 10888 (1!1l0S0SZ MAR 03); 10999 (260835Z MAR 10969 (2409SOZ MAR OJ) m 10892 (191503Z MAR 03),'• • • 1090:2 (20IOl1Z MAR 03) so.t 10902 (201a37Z MAR 03) 30J 10894 (191S13Z MAR OJ): • • • 10902 (201031Z MAR OJ) ~ I~Ol037Z MAR OJ) ,;l1111Iel"View or_• • • • by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of tbe 111~pectl'.. G~neri1l. April 3, '00. 03).' 2003. 301 ' 10902 (20103'7Z MAR 0]), 10900 (l91907Z MAR 03), 10896 (19l.524Z MA R OJ) 'Page 90 of 499 Wt~8b':8iIFlE8 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE and wlllIing.,,500 I(SM was de5lClibed as "(t)irc:d BIld son:," with ab1'1Jslons on his anldes, shins, and wrists, as weD as on the back of his head.'lo He also suffered rrom pedal edema resulting from extended standing;S1l After having concluded lhot £heft: WillS "no further roovemau" in the inlerrogation, the detention site personnel hung a piclUre of KSM's sons in his cell as a way to "(heighten] his imlBination concerning where are, who has them, [and] what is in store for them."Sll they ~ The waretboarding of KSM on March 21, 2003, and March 22, 2003, was bas~fintelligence provided by Majid Khan~hiefof ALEC Station . According to a cable from the CIA's , Khan, who W!lS In foreign government custody, had staled that I(SM wlIJlled 10 use ''two to rbn:e unknown Black American Muslim convClU who were currently training in AfghanistlU!:' to "condUcl 8nacks" on gas statioRi in the United Stales, 8IId rhBt "I(SM was interesled in~ anyone with US status to assist with this operarion.',·m Upon n:ccipt of this reporting, _ _ wrote in an e\Tlaii "i love the Black American Muslim at AQ camps in Afghanuistan (sic} .,. Mukie [KSM] is going to be hatin' life on this one.'0514 However, her subsequent questicmng of KSM WIlS not based on Khan's actual reporting. which was about potential opentives already in Afghanistan, but rather something Khan had not said---lhat KSM directed him to make contact with Arrican-Arocrican convcrtll in the United States,~JS Accoroing to CIA records. in 8 "contentious" session that lasted for houn. Bnd in valved the use of the CIA's enhanced Interrogation lechniques. KSM '"flAtly denied" any effortS to recruit AfricllJl-Amencan Muslim converts. KSM was then wllterboanled.S16 Laler" in the day, faclng the tlueal of a second warerboarding session. KSM "relemed and said that maybe he had told Khan that he should 5Ce if he could make conlaCt with members of the Black American Muslim convert community." The CIA interrogators then returned KSM to the standing sleep deprivation position wiIhouta second watetboa.rding session.S17 (~) The next day. March 22, 2003, interrogators subjected KSM to "intense" questioning and walling, but when KSM provided no new information on AfricanAmetican Muslim converts or threats inside the United States, he was subjected to additional 5010. $10 J09J6 (2108452 MAR (3); J0916 (2108452 MAR 03) 10921 (21l00iZMAR (3) m 10909 20191SZMAR03) m lnlCI(Vjew of by (REDACTED) In be a seriou ~ ,:oncern, especiall~ as lhis omission may well halJe cost American lives had Paki,cani aulhorities not been diJigent in following up on unrdaled criminlllleadslhat led (0 the capnJlt: of Ammar, bin Atrash. and other probable oper;ativcs involved in dJ£ anad plans,""2 ( ~ In May and June 2003, Ammar 1lI-8aluchi and Khalhld bin Atwh provided ~ninglhat controdiclf:d KSM's SClitements about the Heathrow AiJPOrt plolting and included informacion Ihat J(SM had not provided.S enhanced interrogation tEchniques apin6t KSM, ~nior ALF..C StAtion and ROO offu::.ers met at lellst twice to discuss c::Ol'lCClN about KSM'sI8Ck of coopel'\llion.H7 As an ALEC Station cable noted Ill: lite time, tfICSM'. pam:rn of bellavLor over lhe pastlhtee moruhs. Irying to conlrol hi~ cnvlromnent, Iyillland ltED admitting lhinp only when pn:sscd !hal odJen ha~ been caught and have likely .dmided ~ pIol, is II caUJe for concem."sea In an email, one OA otfice.-nOll:d that "whit KSM's doing is fairly rypiQl of other ddainees... KSM. Khallad [tJ;n Albl!lhl, and others ~ doing*hallllllk£s sense illlheir Sin-Illion - PRtend coopmldon.-' ( ~ In «be {all of 2003. after KSM'$ ckpJanel10na about bow CO dccrypC phocc munbel1 relaaed to Bocist! opentive Iss&. al·Brilani {fCSM did not Ihip. Funher, as n, 20m, de CIA hd Il'I JI:$ deslgM_ IDY lItChAIAJue U. "uiladMtd'" le::Dlllq.., Decluee aleep deprivalion Willi im:lIIlkd ill the August 1,2002, OLe lnomorandumlppRl,lnl 1M uti of che CIA" enhanced IntemllMion IlIChniquelI 011 Abll Zut.ydah, abe COQllllittu incilided. aITIQI'll the 17, CIA subjeclCd to ,Ieep dcpri\llllion without CIA Hcadqull.l:ten; aUlbori1a.lioo JlffOf to Jllfl\lllfY 2001. In J.al*}' 1OOJ, dec&i_. alee:p dIlp,ivlllon under a sps:ilk lima lindl WII calegorized ill a "lIllnd2lrd" CM IRICnOlafiOll techniqae, Secortd, 1M Janu~ 2003 luldelin06 "Ite lhat cmPflffU CIA HeadqulII1eB approvlIl ....as requinld for "standard"IC(llilliques """hellO"r fallble." For IhiI rMaOll, lhe Commiltee did not include caMlS wht:nl CIA Inlell'ClllalO~ fliled loobllin auumozllJton In advance. but did acquire upproval within Je"tero.l days of inllillclr'lg!he Ule ofJhe ".landlnl" lcchnlquq. F1nlll wator dousil'll WII5 I'IOt chDrDCterized as a "slandard"lllChnique until ' .. no 2003. • u DIRECTOR 211 5I8ZJUN 03}; DlRECTOR_<302126ziAN 03l;OIRSCTOR ()11702Z JAN OJ); 39582 (041143Z JUN 03).) In nUlTlCfOlIJI cucs plio.' to lune 2003, Wlllef l1ou~inl w~, !!.2!!£!!IY cluetlbed 11\ CIA cables iii an "erihli~ed" interrogalioll Iel:hnlquc. (ttl, b'llImp1c, DIRECTOR _ ptlon Acltlvltla (September 2001 October 2003), May 7, 2004- ~SKGI~ Page 102 of 499 "tJG' A_SS!rIED UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Nashiri.S97 Ramzi bin al.Shibh.~ Aslldallah,m Musrafa al-HawS!Swi,600 Abu Khatid,601 Laid bin Duhman aka Abu HUdhaifa.6l1l Abel al·Karim.6ll3 Abu Hazim.6OI Sayyid Dmmim.6M Abu Yasir al·Jaza'iri,- and Suleiman AbduUah.ClO1 In evetyease e~ccpt al-N!lshiri.lhe unaulhoriwd 'If Abd at-Rdlim 11.1-1'lllSbici was IIUbjecled tQ unapproved lIudily IIId approximately two-and...-Ilalf d.ys of slefjp depriYllliOn in ~nlber 200; wilh his atmS shackled over his had foe IS IoD~6 hoW1, Su email from: (DETEN11ON SITE BLUE). ' to: _ : subject: EYES OHLY • • J ONLY --MEMO FOR ADDOIDDO; dale.: JIDUt)' 22. 2003• •"'.Th.e.fi,IciaJ.'"hoild.w.a used a ainat bUlli bin II·SJIibh m .eltimes f wilhout appl9V1l. S~ II!! ' J0429 (tDl21SZ FEB Ol); IOS73 (24114lZ FEB 03); IOS82 (242026Z PEB 03); 10091 (2S2002Z FEB 03); loon (262Q2ot FEB 03); 10633 (01l537ZMAR 03); and 10104 (071 239Z MAR 03). _ 1!IIl JnterrogllQf1 used wDterdousin&. oudity,. c;rampc.d confinement OIl AudllU.h wilhout havilli lOQaht or received authorization from CIA Headquarters. Bld~ng delllineq did I1Ot.requn authorillltion by CIA Headqu~; however, I. described in ClA cables, die appliclltion or ''1lllltUn(' in 1l1e CllSe or Asadlnlllh wu doae punitivel)' and wllllllled .,.., inlel1'Oplion h:Choi(jlJe:. Nudiry WIIS allO ulled in amjultction with water• • • • • dOUSinfifing JIld llIter as an inten'oelion lecJm' ue witbOllt .1 frout CA See 34241 It and 34310 I ' liOU,M.USiilll.fiia iill.-Hiia.WjSaWi was subjected 10 water dousing wilhollt aflprO¥al rrom CIA He;dqoar1a5. ~e • • • • , (081201Z APR 03). ~llntenogltorS used slcc:p deprivalion agail'l&t iflAbU Khllid to JeeldnIiUthorimion from CIA HClIdquarteol, and then failed 10 obtainauch authorization. S".!. • 35193 .aJlCl Abu Kh.lid ad been in CIA wsllXly for 17 days prior lD the use of ~ Iccbnique, Advance IIIthoriDtiOtl from CIA He:adqultta:l was IhcretOl'e "feasible:' and tbus requM under the guideliae5. tin. Abu Hudhaifa war sUbjeiClcd 10 baths in which ice ....Ier WIS UItd. sLinding sleep deprivarion Ibr 66 houtS lb•• ...IUI discontinued due to • swollen leg IItlribl1led 10 colon s t . , audit ad ~ ~ n . (5ee email from: 10: [REDACTEDl. • ~ and • • sllb eel: our telecom, dare~ March 2004~ CIA Office ollnilitorGe:nenl Retx.!rt; 200.~-808S·Ia: 39098 ; •_ 39042 MAY W); and 39101 MAY 03),). No requeat oupproval foe the use of standard or enbanced intmog.tion techniques could be located ill CIA m:1Xds. «13 Abet 1" • II • ) by-,_or Page 105 of 499 ca's'te t '.'0' , VI'9"rJ,-"",""""tl'L..U UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 72 Olher ACCOunts susgest dewnees were water doused while placed on 8 waterbolrd.61'7 Although CIA Headquaners approved the use of lhe "water dou~ng" interrOgation [Uhnique on several detainees, interrogators used it elltenllive1y on a number of detaine2s without seeking or obtaining prior authorization fromClA Headquarters.618 ( seniDr CIA (ntenogator and another mtclTOgator used the water dousing technique on detainee Mu.stnfaal-Hawsawi at DBTENTION SITE COBALT. AI·Hawsawi later dacribed me session to a different aA interrogator, , who wrote that aJ· Howsaw i might ha't'c been w6lerboarded or subjCClcd 10 ~bDent that "could be indistinguishable r~m !hi: waaerboard..."ll An email from tbe in ~S.ror $lafed mat: "We did noc prompc a!-H.w5lilwi - he dcsaibcd the process aM !he table on hi' own. As you know, I have serious rescrv8tiOftS about walUing litem in a prone position beca~ ir noc douc with ~, the net effect can approach lhe effect of the ,"ler board. If one i, he.. down on his bact. on lhe mbJe or on the Ooor. with water poun:d in his fo.ce I thInk if gou bcyoftd douling and the effect. 10 the recipient. cnulfi be: indiltinguishoblc from me waUlt board. I have etal probleras wilh putting one of thero on the walelr bOll:l'd tot 'dCl'UsiJ18.' PuEling him in a head dOWn altitude and pouring water around his chest and foce is just too close to the water board, and if it is continued mny lCDd to problems for us:~:10 (~ Several months later. the incident was l't\(e~d to the CIA inspector generillfOt tnvestigatiOn. A Detembec 6, 2006. inspector gerieiill,"epQl't summarized Ute findings o.ttbJ~,il!wlllatiQn..iDd~ating.lhat .water was poured on al~Ha.wsawi-whi·~ho-w ..s l)'iAg·on thc-- - . floor in II prone: position, which, in the opinion of at tellst one CIA inletrogalOr quoted in the report, "can easily approximate waterboBrding."611 The OIG could not conaborale whether aJHilwsawi w~ JEnPped to Ih: wQferbOOld when he was intelTOgated .. DBT'ENTION SfrB COBALT. 80th or tlte intenugators who subjected al-Hawsawi (0 the CIA' s ellh.need interrogation teclWquei on April 6. 2003. iaid that aI-Haws3wi cried out for God while !he 611 &Mil from: ~ng lREDACTFJ»)lI«Qlllfj to: • • • • • • • •i j ~tllbjecl: AI-Hnnawi IncideAt;dafe: HOYCIIIbc:f 21. 2«1), ... Foe 1ddicj0Ml dct&.ItI s ~'Ernail fronI: Volume m ~ EJnIil frOIll: l'''.JJ ~ , _ I __ lR'~AC11iD1 acoOU~: 10: . ~~8wifJEidml;tWe: Nov4!!llbertt2'003. ~_ .._. r _ m (aEDACTEDl «lQOlIllIj to: • • • • • IUbjcct: Al·Hawsawj Incidenl; cIaIlc: NoYember 21, 2003. Volume DJ or ~ Committee Shldy Inchldts • CIA pbotoanpll or II woocJc.q w.cctbolrd .. D£TBtolOfIl mE C08ALT. A., detailed in dte filII ComlDilla!e :'INdy. Ibm: IIal DO m:ords of the CIA DSiog the wafErbaIId lntcnvPI{on.lIldlnilille at COBALT. The ,"~de-.,il:li in eM phocognph is ~ by b~~cJ!••ilb. baltic of Ilnbo'la pillll: 1Ollliioo (filled two at lbI= way III dI& lOp) and a wl!ering C1lII (C1tinS QlI dDt woodan bums of WIIIedlurard. In n,mnl! between lhe C_ic* IIftIrrand the CIA ialhal summer 0(21113, tbc ClA wlI.llMble 10 elIphlin t"- detail. oflhe phD(osClIph.IO Inclade lb. bucltcu,lOllltion. ..m _telilll cu. as 'oWl1 .. the wall:rlJo8ld'. ~eDOe.t DBT6f'1l10N SITE COBALT. ell C'A oro Di&poaidan MemCll'1lndllm. ..Allep U~ of Unaolhorized Inlcrroplion. TechniqUCI" oro Cut 20041604-10, Dea:mbu 6, 2006. all llIiiiiiiiiiil~8I\d th_ ~lEGRI~ Page 106 of 499 , 't'D' 'oo'c'cn UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE ClB.ss.App. 73 waler was being poured on him Bnd one of the interrogaoom asserted that th,i.f: 'lt8$ because of the cold lemperature of Ibe w:tler, Both of the interrogators also stated that a1~Hawsllwi saw the walerboard and that its purpose WllS mooe clear to him. The inspeetor genel'1ll ~port Blso indicates that al·Hawsawi's experience reflected "the way waler dousing was done at [DETENTION SITE COBALT]," and that this melhod was developed with guid.nce froll'\ CIA ere anomeys Bnd Ihe CIA's Office of Medical Scrvices.Gt (~ This allegation was reponed to the CIA inspector aenenal on August 18,2004. The CIA n:ported this incident as a possible criminal violation on September 6lI CIA DIG Dlspolidon Memcnn4am, "Alleged Use of UnaDlboriud InlemlgDlion TllCblliqllCS" DIG c.c 2004- 1604-1G, December 6. 2006. ~) An l(I:usallon RhltCid 10." Dddiliooal dwzlnc:e was included In a Seplembcr 6,2012, HlimlUl Righta W8D:h f . , " cruillcd, "Delh'cn:d lnto Enemy HlndJ:." .The report 1IS&eI1& that dcx;umenls lind inttJ'llews of former del1.blC,ell conlTlditl CIA cttlIN th.el "lJllly Ihr'te men in US t..'ustod, had been walerboatdcd." SpccificaJly, the Rp:)n stala thol Mohammed ShorociYI. W Abd al·Kurim, "~yided detliled lind credible lc:stilklDny that he wu wataboirded 011 rcpealC'd oa:o.siOl1oS during US Inl&l1'OgaliolVl in Afgh.enislin." Acam1in&" to the report, Moh.emmCld Shoroc:i'li silted thai a "ood wu pl&ed OWl his head and he: _ snppcd to I ''wooden bo2d." The fomer CIA. detolMe Silled hI af1cr biting Sl~ 10 the Wllterbaanl, "Iben they &UrI with lJle Willer pourin., .• 1be)' SW'l to pour Wiler 1: ~o~'::j:t:a"':~:~.::~~ =c:=~:~~~~~~::r~~c;l~~ Studi'~:;ii 2M3. 2 r no CtA recolds at Mohammed Sboroei)'l. ab Abel II·Karim. being JIlbjccted to lIIe W&~ at Whi Ie Ibe~ IlI'C 1~!oM ni.lnl~ ~ lInUlowtl. Detatnces III DE'reJ'f11ON OEnNTION SITe lnm.:. or !he CIA in~lliollS at DEl1!N'nON SI'I'S remains sm were subjecled to lcd\nlquet ,,* ~ not ~ j" cable .incJudiltllllllltipte perillds of sleep deps:h~R,requUed liUDditl&, IDtld ~ldie. 18Mor)' dqlriVltion, Cltc!\ded ilO&llio", Rlduced qUMClly and qalil)" of food.1IlIdi11, 8d '"roDgh IrC'atment," l\.s ~ m of !be Study ilduda • CIA pbcCogopb of I w00deli wllaboes:d at DETENrIO,,", SITE _ . As deiUed in . . filII Commit_ Sfudy. !bere an: 00 fecuG& of lJle CJA ulii"llhc ""alatlotrd ill'lenoptklft ~ II DEn:m"lON srrs The w.euboard device UJ lfIe JlIIDf0p3IJh is allltWndc4 by bllCkcC$. wi.... boltte of UUIlO"'11 pink. solutioll (1i1Led two thirds of ClMi w'1lotbe top) ...t • lIf8!erina cao resunc on the Woodell betlU of w~. In IllCCIUI1I' t.lwecn die CommiUcc alIff and lJle CIA iD die SUIIlIIICI" of 201 J. u. CIA ..... "able 10 explallllhc demila of lhe. phOlQlI'Ft 10 incluQc.lIIe buwlZ.solulion. aDd .tlering tan••a "" III !be "".tertloard':s pnv.nce at DETENTJON SITE In rtipln5210 lJle allqpdiOl'Ui in IN! SeptNlber 2012 HulIWl RlJbls Wall:h lqJar1, the CIA saala1: ''11Ic aJ'!ncy lUll been on t/Ie ra:uro that illeR lire 1Ive:c sublClln~ CIS" in wllidl detaincu wc~ lab)lctCld 10 lte W&lubouding redmiquc-lIndcr the pnlgr1lrn." 5ee "Uby.n AllcFS Wiletbowin& by OA, Repotl Sa7l'," NIll+! Yort TitlSU, Sl:ptcrnber 6, 201'2. Conni,," Q.!CIA 10 Oispo(,jrion Mema, "A1lep Use of Un IIlIIborizcd. Techniquc:l5." daled ~mbcr6. 2006, 2m4-mI7. 16. Page 107 of 499 U:JSL\SS!F!ES UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App.74 10,2004. to the U.S, Attorney's Office in the Eastern District orVirglnia.62 ' The inspector geneml report concluded that there was no corrobomtion of the linguist's allegation, stating. "[t]here is no e ...ldcncc that 01 cloth was placed over Abu Hllzim's face during willer dousing or that hi5 breathing was impa.ited.'llS26 5. HtJlnbal; Fabricgtes Information While Beblg Subjected to lite CIA's Enholtced rille rrogoJ;Ofl Techniques ~~ In tile summer of 2003. the ClA caphJred thn:e Southeast A~Bn operatives: ZUbair. Utlie,QI and Hambali. (lbese captures ore discu~sed later in Ihis summary in rhe s~tion entitled, '''The Capture of Hambali.")62l> (~) In August 2003, H.1mboli ws.s captured and tnns(em:d to CJA custody. Despi~ assessmenls thai Hambali was cooperative ill lhe in~~6ew ~ss withla 2(0). (S"lt 1243 {152049Z AUG OJ).) CIA He.llqual1en IIpproved lI1e use of lite CIA '5 Cllhanccd lntemlfti.on techniques Gn Lillie on the followittg day, Al:lIlUM • • 2003. ($IC HEADQUARTERS _ AUG 03).) N lbttibed, die ColftlnidE:l!:'S toURI of detaineca Sllbjecled 10 unauthorized lechn.iqlleS did ,,01 inCllllle delainees wen a Ulfi.e. who were li'lbjel:teCIlo lbe CIA. 's "stlftdllrd" tc.chlliepes prior to lIuthociuliQfl fi'Olft CIA Headqll8l1ln, bllt fcc wIlom BUdlQriuliclI fn>m CrA Headqu8nc:rs was acq~itcd abonI)' lMtufter. As ~ the JMIUUl200J Illiddinr:s reqaired ~I~ 8flIl'fO~.' pf Q1~ ICIchniqllC~ '"Wbr:never feasible:&7617 87414• • • It CapnD:e" For 8IlIditiOOllll.dc:laiIs. $# VoI\lmc n. 1\'%1 CIA'~ ~d . - mm AUG-OJ): 1267 AUa 03). 'l'R cable also nolad lIW CIA cunlllldor Hammond DUNBAR bad alrived at Che deteRlion fie and was p;IIl1idptlti,.. ill Hambali's intemllMlons lIS lilt interropkJr. 11Lc "ps)'Chofosicar IUllUIrMnl'" f'OTlian aflhD cable was altribQlCd 10 a CIA &Iaft'psychologbl, h~'IIeI, 1I11d not 10 DUNBAR. 63J CIA ofran Inlemlsatini Hambeli in NovCimba 2003 wroCc aboul Halllbali's "accollnt 01 bow, th~ullh UllfCmenlS l1:lld 10 hJln 'nd coruUnt repetition or quewons. he WIS 1nad2 aWIre of what ~plI! of IlnS\\Oa'l his qualione:r.iJ Wlltlted: [HlnlbaliJ .ald he merdy gave IInI5.... CD lhat ~ similar 10 what IlIIS beln. llikcd IIIId wha' he infem!d the intalt'Oalltor or ddll'ief.r "'alI1ed, and ...hen the pre&&w'e sului~ or he lIIallolcJ that the. infonnation he SIIYe 'lIIlIS ok~y, [HlllnbaII] linN d\lIt he !tad pl'Ovi.dcd the answer that IlIl1S being sought" T1Ie cable stlllel, "Bue assessea [HlIIJnblliil"ldml~lign of jnViOllS IIibricatioo to be crediblr.. Hambali)'. IldmiAalon ClU!1C after t.IIRe Page 108 of 499 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE "he had provided ~he false information in an auempt to redUce rhe pressure on himself ... and to gi'r'e an account that wa$ colUistent with what (Hambali) assessed the questioners wanted 10 hea1.'tIlll ( ~ CIA officer.l later suggested thaI the misleading answers and resistance to interrogation rhat CIA interrogators cited in their requests to uSe the CIA'!> enhanced interrogllotion techniques against Hwubali and an aSSOcilloted C1A derainec, Lillie, muy not have been resistlKlce to interrogation. but nther the result of issues reilloted to culture and their poor English language SkiU!>.II34 6. After 'lie Use ofth.~ CIA'.J EManced lTl~rrog"tiorz Techniqlles, CIA H~(Jdq"(Jrler.J Que.Jlioll.l Detention ofDttainu and RecOlnm~nds Reu4re: .[Htainu TrtuI:f[trred 10 U.S. Military Custody and Heldfor An AdditioMJ FolU Year.r (~) In October 2003. the CIA interrogared ADaillo .IOuth. an Afghan nationllol in his mid-fifties who was believed to hD'r'e assi&ted Usama bin Laden in his escape througb the Tora Bora Moun~ains in late 2001.m Af[er S6 hou~ of standing sleep deprivarion, Arsala Khan was described as barelYJlb1e to enunciate, and being "Yisibly shaken by his hallucinations depicting dogs mauling lUId killing his sons and family:' According to CIA cables, Arsala Khan "stated that [the intW"ogatorJ W8.i responsible fur klUing them Blld feeding them to the dOgs."636 ( ~ ) A~la Khan was subsequently sUowed to sleep.6Jl Two days later, however. the inteaogaton returned him to standjng sleep deprivlltion. After subjocung Khan m 21 IIddirional hours of sleep deprivation, interrogators stopped using the CIA's enhanced weeks of daily debriefing sessions wilh rUle c:o.se offlCefl c:anieli OUI ..Irrv::I3f Cl'IlinI!y in Bllhua lndonc:si;. [Hambali] has o::mmlently wanned 10 (lIM! case offi~'s] diKuJ.liions wilh him, and h:U provided 10 [rbe c:ase officer] additional information IIl.It he had Avoided in Ihe p:ul.•. More Iellingly, [Hambali] has opened up consida1lblyto [the c:ase ()ftjcu) about hi5 fears and Inotivalion.. and hu taken 10 trWlling [die case officer) II. his 1OIOrd. [Hambali] looks 10 [(he calil: officer) ~ his sole contidllli and !he Olle penon wIlo has [Hambali]'s inl2reslln min d•••' :'.Sii"i11 _ 1142 (30IOSSZ NOV OJ). TNs cable 8PfZ11n1 to have been retlanlllDilted 'be following duy III j 1144 OIO&23Z DEC 03). m 1142 (30105SZ NOV 03) i 1072 (t'10l506Z OCT03);~28Zocr03)j _1142 (30IOS~ZNOV 03); IIS8 (081 459Z DEC 03); 1604 (191232Z JAN 04). Al'Ier an Indonesian spealcer was deployed 10 debrief Hambali, the debriefer "&01 tbe di"incl il1lJmSsion {HlImbali] was just ~spOll:o_lOO6Z OCT 03). TIle inrtmnallon was Ibo I1llellJed in . . . . . . CIA recoros indicate that ihe (]A's interroprons ofAnala Khan resuilell1 ~~~!t, derived from information lO1~ided rbe dry he eaiienccd the ....iaClA WASHJNGTONOC_ _ I 1393 (2010062. ocr 03 Page 109 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED/IFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASS1FIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Clasa.App. 76 ill(erruglltion tcc.:hni~uc.~ "ltJll1c w Inc~ ofinfol'l11ation from [Arsaln Khanl pinning hillt dirccdy to a ~cenlllCliviIY:' IN Thrcc Utly~ afteJ' the rCpOniJlg abOlll Khlln's h.llllucinUliCll1s, and utlcl'lhc i ntCITng.1CtlJ'S haJ 1I1rcaJ y s ubjecl-cd Khan til the lIlkli tio""l 21 hlll1t~ lIf ~Il&ndi ng ~Ieep llcp 1'1 vutiOn (bl'ytmu thc initiul ~6 hUUI'lil. CIA "leacl1luarrcrs sent a canJc st ~Ii~"ed thllt Anmla Khan should not be liubjeclcd to ntJditionul !ltan~lin!& sleep dq}Jiv;\tion beyond the !i6 hUll!" becuuse of his hallucim\tions.1tll) (~) Aftel'l.lpp1'Oltimarely a month of deten lion Il1\d "he clI'rcnsivc mt: of Ihc CIA's cnhane~d {nletTtlguoon ledmique5 on Ar$alD KhBtl, the: CIA concludcl.llhllt the "det'd.ince Arsal:l Khgo dac~ nul appeal' to be dlC 5ubjcc{ involveLi in ... cun'Cl'lt I)u,ns l)/ ::I.cnvlric.li :lgainst U~'I)CC'l\Oflf1d (11' f;I\:i!iliC'S." ilml n:commcnd~ tRill he be TclcuseU'o hi~ \/iIJl1Yc wilh II clLc;h ra,ymcnt.6lIO CIA inu:fn)~too; at DETENTJON SITECOBALT in!ifc:ad Iran5km:d him to U.S. milit:U"Y cll~\)dy. when: be W;a!; hdd fur;an additional four years de.,'l(1ile !he devclupmc:at nr "ignirlC:UIl illldlig~ncc indi("~ting Ibat (he soun:e who l'Cpot1C~ Ihal Arsclla Kholl hlSllllidcd UsamOl bin L:uJ.:n I'lll'" u ve"dctra a~ilinslA~la Khiin"s filmily.6u 7. A Yrur Aller [)ErCiV110N SITE COBALT Opt-Ln, t~ CIA R~porl.~ "lhtuttU", Di..,<.'(.".er)' Are' H.,IJiltK L1 Numb(!,. (.I}' Dl'lainet'.f Ah,ml Wltnln WI' KnlllF Vt'I)' Li((/~" Tlwt Wt! ( ~ ) In the filII of 2003. CIA officcn; bcl'ltn til lllke II closer louli. lIt lhe CrA lJcrai"C'C1l being held in CO\lncry r",isil1g concerns about borh the number and types of detalMes belnt; hcl~l by the CIA, etA oftkcrs in Country pmvidcd a li!;t of CIA dctuinccs tl) CIA HCllcJqUllrrerll, re~\lIting In the obscrvatiun by CIA Headquarters lhllt the)' had nClt pl'eviout;ly had the nonle:/ \If All 44 CIA u~(ll;nccS being held in t'hut' country, At ~he t.lirccti()Jl of CIA Hc:.dqlluJ'tcr~, the StUlinn in Cllunr,ry '\:omplctco. an cxhaustive ~£nrch of ;\11 '!vnilablc ,rocurlJs in an attClnl'1 It1 develop 1\ dCllror unucrslanlling of the (CIA! dctaino~." A Del~cnlba:r 2003 l."lblc t'nlm the S~1Tiun in COLAJl\:I}'·1 CU etA HC,tr:Ktutll'ter:r;--SI&le1l11y'l'r:, '" - " , .' - ... - - " I, I I "Itl the pl"OCe!>~ of lhi~ l"Csellrch. we have made the \lIt1'lct!'lillj dis,,'ovcl')' thut we Ute holding a number of dcminccs ahoul whom we knuw very little. l'~c nlnjnrity uf ICIA I del<.linccs in [CUUlltn' IllUlvc not been dcm-lcJeu fol' 11wnt!l, tlnd, itl ~)llle Clb\C~. for over iJ ~.lJ'. MallY of them Ill'pear \0 us to h:.vc n\l fW'1hc:r ;nlellit/.c"ce value for(lhc CIAI and should more pmpcrly be: WJ'fted U'tel' t(1 lhe III .S. lnilil \U)' 1. 10 ICountry authoritie~ or In thi au coonlric:- fur funher h,vcsllllltiOft and posl'ibly pra;«Ution. In a few ca..;c:li. d1CR: doo.~ not I\Pl'Clir In r.e c:ftoll~h evidence (0 I:Oftlinui incaiccciitimr. lIN1, if lhi~ iii ia rlllct the: C3SC" the delQLnCl:ll 5f1ould. oc n:lca.."cd. ~1 I' .:VI HEADQUARTERS "'" HEADQUARTERS tool SI!C, ftll eXllIll Ie. Page 110 of 499 ~r.81!i':88IFlii UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE ~ Records indi~e that an of Ihese CIA dctainees had been 'kept in soUtary confinement. The vast majoriry of these deutinees were later released, wim some receiving CrA payments for having been held in derention,643 8, CL4. Detention Sitts in COWlrry. Lack Sl(ffic~ttJ PtrsollJlel aN! T/TJIUwors lQ SUPPOrT the lnterrogationr ojDetcJinets (~ Throughout 2003, the CIA lacked sufficient"Eer5onnel and adequate translators to conduct debriefings and interrogations in Country •. Because of dtis personnel shortage, a number of detainees who were tmnsferred to CIA custody were not intcrrogated or debriefed by anyone for days or weeks afrer dteir arrival at CIA detention facilities in Country As noted in a cable from th~ CIA Smtion in Country. in April 2003: .,644 "Station is supporting the debriefing andlor interrogation of a large number of individuals... and is consttained by a lack. of peLWnnel which would allow \IS to fully process them in a rimely manner,"64~ I. Other Medical, Psychological, and BehaviQlllI Issues 1, CL4./l'Iterrogations Tah Precedence Over Medical Care ~ While CIA Headquarten informed the Department of lustice in July 2002 "that steps wiU be taken ro ensure mat [Abu Zubaydah's) injury is not in aDy way exacerbatcd by the Die of these [enhanced interrog&Llon} methods,'0646 CIA HeadqullIlCrs informed CIA inrerrogators thar the inrerrogation proce~ would rake "precedence" over Abu Zubaydah's mediclll carc:.641 Beginning on August 4.2002, Abu Zubaydah was kept naked, fed a "bare boncs"liquid diet, and subjected to the nat-stop use Dftlle CIA's enhanced interrogation rechniq\les.648 On August 15,2002. medical pen; While ClA l'eClllnk toll.... iRfCll'lnIlfion 01\ olber detainee medical complailMs (we 'VOllolnlC tU>, loose ftGDI'dJ aho ~UClllhlldet8ieace ~I ~lna cwld t:-lIRdeaqloned inClA I ~ ICiCOrd$. foe'~. CIA lnCIIicaI ~ ooMiueAlly IqIlJd ..... CIA dElDi_ Romzi bi8l11-Shibb bid lID medinI COftIptaiQIL ~YU, CIA iDtCf1Ogsujc)n RlCOnii indiceR lh. 1I'fJca bin II..shibtl had previOllSly ODfIIIlIIiDcd 01 ....... 10 CIA pct1'OMd, rJe • • sllbjecl&d 10 Ille CIA'. enh.-d i~iIJ.-IIId I1lIcI b)o CIA ~ lhlIt biB medical condiliQll ttU lIat of ~ncern to CDc al\.. (.SR _10S91 (J~2002Z FEB (I)): _ 10621 all949Z FEB (0),) In '"timon)' on Apcit 12.2007. CIA. DiRdor MicMd Hayden rdelCflcod JIIClCI~.1 c;ae of dccainca in Ihe COMeu ofltllt ICRC ~ro- oa OA detentions. Haydm C=lifted 10 !be Commiuee: ~ taedicalleCrioa of' ~ [eRC ~pell ,ondu An Oer:obet 2004 psychologicallWe55ment of al-Nasttiri was used by the CIA to advance its discussions wil:h National Security Council offICials on establishing an "end'aJDII!" foe !he prog~ ..m In July 2005. CIA Heodquartus expressed concern Jqarding al·NasJUri', "continued stale of depress,on and uncoopenativc attinade:~ Days ur a CIA psychologist assessed that aI-Nashiri wos on the "vC'I:JC of a breatdown.o.616 ~) Beginning in March 2004, and continuill.g until his rendition to U.S. mi1i~ry c\1!lJtody IU OlJantMama Bay in September 2006, Majid Khan cnglled ill II series of hunger strikes and attempts It self-mutilation that required significant Ilttention from CIA detention site penJOMel. In reosponsl! to Majid Khlln's hungec strikes, medical personnel IlllI ~1 For additlone! details, sa Volume m. 1759 0213l9Z Ocr04}; HBADQUARTER_0400'23Z NOV M}i ~~ 1878 (l409\SZ NOV 04); 1930 (06162OZ D~ 2207 U 1319Z APR 05); 10 141507Z APR OS); 2S3S (051SOSz.JUL OS); 2589 (120857Z JUL 05); 2830 (291304Z AUG OS); J8110 (tl1225Z NO~ (4); J893 200831Z NOV (4); CIA documenlcntil1ed. "Detainee Talking PoinD tor JeRe RebullAl. 12 Aprii'iE!&7l', . ~PR 0S1:~(JS18OSz-rot.~-· (141507Z APR OS); 2535 (OSI80SZJUL ~ 2830 (291304Z A U ~ 19~061620Z DEC 04); 2210 (141S077.APR 05) 22 10 (l415arz APR (5); 2535 (051BOSZIUL ~)~ 2830 ('291304Z AUO (171225Z NOV (4); eM. 05} Mf~ogl (0816C»Z SBP04};~!716 (180742Z S E P 0 4 } . _ 9 907S1Z 8 JAN OS)~2011 (lSI nsz SAN 05)~2SIS (30194&JUN OS); I!SO (282019'"LNOv 0]) ~111_1029('291750Z1UN 06);_142 (04HS8Z AUG 06);~ 150$1 (l11600Z AU0(4)~ ~ 1716 (l80742Z SEP 04); 3OS1 (30I235ZSm>05);~029 ~1750ZJlJN ~!. fl'1 s~~. fur N"'1o, 114'" (ZS I~ JUN OS}; __ 1673 (0l1451Z ~ Uo ~): • 1116 (l80142Z SSP 04 . . m See, fOf eumpte. l3S6 (Oll644Z JUL(4); ~.!!IQ(J409 In NOV (4); 1959jl11700z D6C(4); 1962 12J029Z DBC~ 1959 (lll700ZiijI.D.EC.04.>.i• • • 'Z())8 (2J tsSSZ JAN os . 1091 (03183SZ NOV 03);. • J~OS2309Z JAN (4); J6JO (271440Z MAR 04). IilJ. 1203 (231709Z MAY 04)i 1202 (2J1644Z MAY (4). CIA ISOrd~l11dlcale U.8111 asl five d!lIDincet W~ cubjec1cd to rectal reby4ration or rectal feeding: A.bu Zubaydah. Abel II-Rahim aJ·Nll.8hiri, Khalld ShaykJI MOiwMl.ad.~. and MaJWDD a1-1abbnr. &t! VDlume III b addiriOI\ll.1d.O.IIl.iI,., .1 Emlil from: ' 10: _ [DET~ON SITE BLACK_ OIl: • 5llbjcct: IbtClltUpllX ASR&*mellWRcqucat for Endgame ViCWl; date: Ck!Dbcl 30, 2004. 674 67S 6'16 HEADQUARTERS _<282117ZJULOS) CIA SlU'lltlime oll;chanp, elIted 291JULJOS 08:0 I:51 - 08:SO: 13; between Page 114 of 499 ~"8I!J1:881F1E8 UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE and _ UNCLASSJFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App.81 implemented various techniques to provide fluids and numents, including lhe use of II n680gasrrlc rube and the provision oC imravenous fluids. CIA records indicare d18l Majid Khan coopetat.ed with the feedings and was permilted to infuse the nuids and nulrient~ ,himse If.m Afrer approxlrnalely tI'uee weeks. the CIA developed a more aggressive lI'eBtroent regimen .Iwilhout onnecessary conversation :0671 Majid Khan was then ,Subjeclcd to involuntary rectal (eeding and reC;:Ql hydration. which included two bottles of Ensure. Later that same day. Majid Khan's "lunch t:nl.y," consisting of hummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, llnd raisins. was "pureed" and .rectally infused. m Additional sessions of rectal feeding and hydration followed. QO In addition lO his hungu Sb"ikes, Majid Khan engaged in acts of self-hann that included 8ltempting to cut his Vo'rist on [WO ooca5ions,6lI1 an attempt to chew into his arm at me inner elbow.~ an a~mpt to cut a vein in the top of his (00t,613 and an attempr to cut into his skin at the elbow joint using a filed lOothbrush.1SlI4 J. The CIA Seeb Reaffilll'Ultion of the CIA '$ Dctf:ntion and Interrogation Program in 2003 1. AdnUn.lslrQtjon SttJlemellr~ Abol4t the Humane Treatment ofDerailtees Raise Concerns at rhe CIA AboUl Posslbk liJck of Policy SlIpp(Jrtfor CIA lfllf!rrogtJll()fI Activities (~) On several occasions in early 2003, CIA General Counse) Scott Muller expressed concern to the National Security CQun<,.iJ principals. White Hoose staft and Department of Juslice pc~onnd that the CIA's progmm might be inconsistent with public stalemenLoi from the Adminisrration mat the U.S. Government's treatment of detainees was "huroane."615 CIA G'cneral COUflIiCI Muller therefore sought to veri fly wim White House and Dep811mc:nt of Jbstice peIMnneJ that. February 7,2002, Pre&idential MemoI1ilndul1l requiring the U.S. miliwy to b"e8l detainees humanely did nO'[ apply [0 the CIA.6ll6 following those 3J84 (I 61618Z SEP 04)~ JJ83 (I61626Z SSP 04 ; 3196 (2017)IZ SEP 04); 3190 (181S58Z SEP 04-); 3206 (211819Z SEP 04): 319'1 (20113IZ SEP (4): ~181 (16162IZ SEP04) 3J35 (12062SZ SSP 04); 3237 (23m2Z SEP 04) 3240 (231S39Z SEP (4) 3ZS9 (261734Z SEP (4). TheClA's Junc20l3 Response stales ltIal'''mcta1 rehydralian" is II "well acknowledged medical technique to address pressing health issues." A follow-up erA OOcumenc prtlyiclcd on OelOber 25,2013 (DTS '2013-3152), Silltes lhat "{flrom a heallk- P'"pective, Majid KIllin became unroaperlltivCl 0II3t AlJgllsr2004, when he initialed a hunF miH and betare l1eundcrwenl RlCIal rehydllItion... CIA asseslie.S lhallhe uScolrcr;:llIl rehydration Is II medicaUy IIOUndhydnllion lechPtque... ,~ n.: Il5scrtion thai Majid Khan '#;lIs "u\1lXIOpG'alive" prior 10 !'lElal rehyMlion and I'CCllll feeding ill inac:curale. ~ described in C(..\ records, prior 10 being subjected to recall rebydrarion lind ~Ial ~ing, M_jid lCban cooper-led wieh the IIlIlI ric teedin and wall pennitled to irrfulllllllllIuidJ aDd nUlricnb himaelf. 611 3694 (301800z NOV Of.); 4242 (J 9USOZ MAR (5): 4250 (221213Z MAR OS) 3724 (031723Z DEC 04) 3835 (2606S9'Z DEC (4) lit+ 4614 (01J3S8Z /UN OS) February 12,2003, MFR from Seolt Mullet, Subjecl: "Humane" \reatment of ClA cIclainca; Mllft:h 7.2003, MClllorapdum for DDCIA from Muller. Sl1bPcI: Proposed Responscto Human Righls W.b:h Uloer. 6116 January 9,2003, Drafl MClllOl'andum for Scott MI,ICUer [sicl. Oenenl Counsel of the CelltrallnteUlaenoc Arenc)', fn;Irn J~n C. Yoo. Depul)' ~sislanl Ana General, OffIce of 1.4 aI CaWlIle!, Ie: AppliCll,rion of the President's .5 Page 115 Df 499 t",ee::melrU!15 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC REI,.EASE UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Claae.App. 82 dj~5sions in clrly 2003, thc While House pres,s secretary was advised to avoid usinS the teon "humane lrCaUllent" when discllSsing the detention of BI..Qa'ida and Taliban penon,nel.Oft (~ fo mid·2cxn, CIA officials also engaged in diliCusstons with die Depa~nl of Justice, the Department of Defense, and atromeys in the Whi~ House on whether represenlatlons could be made thOlt the U.S. Government complied with certain requirements llrising otIt of the Convention Against Tort\Ire, namely that the treatment of detainees wall consistent with constlt\ltionW standams in !he Plfth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 6I• In late June 2003, lifter numerw& in~-agency discussions, William Haynes, die gencnll counsel of the Depanment 01 Defense. ~ded to a letter from Senator Palriet Luhy stating that ir was ~cy to tQmpt~S.'89 According to a memorandum (rom the CIA's ~C Lepl,~die August J. 2002, OLe opinion provided a legal "safe harbor" fOf che CIA's use of its Cfthanccd inC'cmJpbOQ tecbmques.lt9O The AuSUSf I, 2002. opinion did nat, however, ~ Ihe co-slitutional 5lltndards described ill the letru from WiUiam fbynes. ~ In July 2003, after me. Wh~ House mode a number of atOl~mentl again SllJUlCSans thl~ U.S, ttatment of detaiR9S was uhumonc," the CIA .~lr.cd lIle national securicy ad \'isor for polley ruff'111ll8bon of the CIA's use of its eft.h.anad lnterroption teehniquCA. DUring the time we requesl was being conside~, CIA Hendquarten stopped approving R:questl fiom CIA officen to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques."l Because of this stand-down, CIA interrogators, with CIA Headquarters approval, Instead u,w:d repealed applications of the CIA's "staodam" interrogation techniques. These "standanl" techniques were coercive, but not consid~ to be as coercive as the CIA's "enhanced" interroglllion techniques. At Ittis lime, sleep deprivation ~yond 72 hounl was considen:d an PtlirulfrY 7. '2002, Memar."chlrn on . . nc:lIt!V. eon'venilon (DI) ong-mo!JJei 'Re1eiLlie.orIui if Q8e1IIl~jol.rn~lo· tbe CUllOdy of the CI A. The 11Icmcnndum slaled lhlll neilher al-QI'ida noe Tiliban dOIQi~e5 qualified 8J priaon«C1 of WIJl ul'der Cknev~, Illd lha' Common AJ1ide J ofGtD:rn. rr.qUicill' bllmane ~11'menl of irdlviduals in.ll conflict. did nO' apply 10 al-QI'ida Ol Tallblm ~inecll 117 "'aeh 18. 2003.... emonndllfn for the RIx:Drd fro• • • • • • • Stlbjcet: ~illl .... ltb DOJ and NSC L.qaiJ AdvisCl. .... Su, fDreurllplc, Jr1.rclt i8, 2003, email horn: 10: ScDll Muller, I&Ibjeel: MIltnOnlndllm for lhe Rc:earcI- Tdco~n wiIh01.C· a.e: MGdlI3',2003;cmail from: Scott~. MIIIkr; 10: S\ellley M. M'ol~~hz. Jab" H. Mosemaa;~; John A.. RIZZO, sdtjecl: Inlen!llallOllS; ~ A....I I. 2nrems abOLlt CIA '5 lack ofpreparedness for the detention and interrogation of Abu ZUbllydah. 721 Other CIA officers eltpRlssed concern about the lII1aJytical assumptions driving interrogatioos,m as well as the lack of language and cultural bacqround among om's me EllIail Ilnm: (REDACTED]; to: John RillO, [RfDACTEDii: [REDACTED), {RBDAcreDl. (REDACTED], [REDAClIDJ, [REDACTED), • IolC Rodriguez, Johll P, Mudd, [REDACTED), (REDACICDI. [REDACfED]; subject DoD's position on lCRC notification; dllte; Sepl.elDbcr 13, 2004. 119 J IJne 13, 2OOS, Lctller lo JCRC, rapondins III 2Q)4 JeRC nou ~rbo~. 110 Special Revie.... Counterterrorism Detention aOO IntemJgBtion AcIivilie3 (ScptCllIlber 2001 ~ Qaober20(3) (2003-7123-10),7 May 2004, (DTS 11004·2710). 711 The chierorStation iJllhe CO(Jn!ry Ihat hosted tile CIA's fil1ll detention site told the OIG thai. "[lihe Reporu Offie:c:n: did norlr.llOw what was required of !hem, 81111ylll IIo'Cre IlOt tnowlcdgCllblc of die LBI'Jlct, tnI/ls1aron ~ not lllltiYOli AJllb speakers. and lItlcaSI one of lhe {cfticfs of Base] hlld limilCld fiel_':nC~." Set: iolcrview repll1 of [REDACTED], 0ffiQ: orlhe In.pedor General, May 20, '2003. According to Qf ere up!' ("ere was no ~reenInl procedure in ploce for offers 1l5!ligned 10 DE1t'.NI10N S~ GREEN. S4ll inteI"ViC'tt' of ~REDACTEDWd{REDACTED, Officc aflhe InspClCt~ ~I. FcbrtllK:Y 14,2003. S.C 01:>0 in~iew of Office of lhe lnspector General, M.rdI 24, 2003. m In I'CIdiliOl1 to IIIe statClllenu to die 010 described above, reSin! tile il'lt'Cmlglltion of Abu Zubaydah, CIA officers cJ.~d more FnClllI concerns. 1\$ noted, lhc BSSI!lnplions Dl CIA Headqu8l1ClS thlIt Abu Zubaydllll"lr.new e'ter)'lI1ing obOllt AI-Qa'idll, inclUding details of tbe next znack" reflCCUllJ 110W "!he 'Anal)'tt vs. Intcl1'Ogator' issue ha(dl been 8lOIInd 'd!ly one.... (~e jllt.ervlew of Office oftbe Inspel::lor Gerlerlll, FebrllBl)' 27, 2003.) ACcoJding IU ChIef ofInterrogBtlons ,subjec:f milllei' apats afttl1 provided inlenogation requirements that Win "not valid at well thOll&ht oul," providing the example of M\lSlllfB al-Hawsawi. (Se4! Inlerview of , Office of the Ins tor Oeoend, April 7, 2003.) Senior CIA 711 rmm Page 121 of499 UtJ CLi£S!FlEB --- . - -- - - - - - UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE of the interroglltion team5. 7~3 Some ClA officel$ described pRiuure from CIA Headquarters to use the CIA's etthanced interrogation techniques, wruch. th.e)' attributed to faulty ana,tical isumptions about what deUlinces should knoW,'T24 As the chief of M G . _ stated to the OIG in II February 2003 inte... iew: IJIClJlben "crc docs nOI know Q lot about aI-Qs'ida and 115 II result. HeldqulU1C~ ~ C:onStnlcted 'models' of what al-Qa'ida n:presents to them. noted that the Agency does not have the linguists or subject malter c,.pcm it ncedl. 1be qllC8tiQn& sent from CTClUsamll bin Laden (UBL) to the inft:rrogacon ~ bused an SIGINT {signals inleUigenu) and ocher intelligence that ora Urnes ;8 incompl~ DI' wrong. When me detaifa does IIOl respond 10 the queSbOft. the assumption ~t He&dquaners is lh.u me dcu.ioce 15 holding bock and 'bows' more. and consequently, Heooquaners reconuneods resumpcion 01 BITs. This diffm:na: of opinion between the illterrogators llftd Headquar1en as 1.0 whether lhrderainee is 'co~1he type of oagoing p~ure the iftCm'Ogallon ream is exposed to. ~ beJicyes lhe watuboarc1 WIS uscd 'recklessl)" -"100 mailY rimlC.1· on Abu Z..beydah a( (nfl,TENl1ON SITE GREEN}. based in part 01\ fllUlty inteIUgcnc:e. "m ~ Inlem)sator told lhe DIG Ihal inrerrogmors "su ffeted from ~ lll':k of subllllltlvc ftq\Iitalnenll f!V1II ClA HC1uar11ft," Md that '1n e.~ clllno fir, Headquarters' model of what lhe of Khalllld bin AllalJl. wfIo, be mid d1eOIG, w.dlttallYned by tha dliclof Ilaalll is- DETENTION SIT2 BLUE not CD -W_t~ lhe OA 's ePlwlUd iJIatnoprioft liItCt.iqac::t, Accordln, lID·"• • railed AIK 511110n i1n<1lol>d lhalllD "10 10 !he ~ •• ill ~Iia. tor use or the CIA 'a * dcbriefer eahancecllD~.llon1eChnlques. elAimin, dW bin AtuIh WIlli hold"'" bcIt infomllltlon. (Sea ~e.. or • Office of ctIe Il\SI*lof GeI1tf1lI, April ]0.. 2003.) I d~ribed lhe '~ntlcrCtlllCnticnl thai occ.~ion.lly "leu bel'olfUtl oIficcrs II (be iolarogiiOon f8tiJilic.ll and those II Headquatletll -'0 viow Irle dc!linees lie wilhholcllns illfOrm_lion," provided tbe examS of Abu 'tllllll AI..IllD'lrl. (:St~ Inb!lniew of , Off"!ce 0(. 'MpecIOt OenCillI. May 8, ZOO],) also described dj~agt1lemenIS on whelher to AlbjeI.Jl detlh,. . III the CIA 'I enhanced interrogation techniques III I "field Yllnilla HeadquuteB Lo;jue." (S~~ in1CfVlcw of Office of I~ lN~ror General, August 18, 2003.) A! deKriblJ.d, lnletvlewlld IIIIK1 described prcuUte from CIA He$!!<etS n:llled 10 the intClTOgations of ICSM and AtrIl ZubQ)'dIlh. 72SlntQ\'iewof _om~?I,2lX)), ~~IECRE~~0¥9R~ Page 122 of 499 UNeLAeSIFIED UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE (~) One senior interrogator, , informed the DIG that differt:nces between CIA 'Headquarters und the interrogators at the CIA detention sires were not part of the official record. According to _ "all of the fighting and criticism is done over the phone and is not put into cables," and that CIA "[c]ables reflect things thai: are 'all rosy! "1::l1li (~ As is ~licribed elseWhere, and reflected in the final 010 Special Review, CIA office[S discussed numerous other topics with die OIO, including conditions at OE'mNTION SITE COB ALT, specific interrogations, the video taping of imerrogatiom, dJe administration of me program, and concerns abo,ut the lack of 8Jl "'end game" for CIA detainees., as well as the impact of possible public revelations cOncerning the ex isrence and opuation of the CIA's Detention and InteJrogtltion ProgrllD1. m (~) In January 2004, the OA inspector general cilCulated for comment to various offices within the CIA a dml of the OIG Special Review of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Among other maners, the 010 Special Review described divergences between the CIA '5 enhanced inturogatJon techniques as applied and as described to the Department of Justice in 2002, the use of unauthorized techniques, and oversight problems rdated to DETENTION SITE COBALT, The draft OIG Special Review elicited ~ponses from the OA's deputy dirt:ctor for- operations,lhe depury director for sdcnce and technology. the Office of General Counsel. and the Office of Medica! Services. Several of the responses-paniculady those from CIA General Counsel Scon Muller and CIA Deputy Di~tor for Operations James Pavitt-were highly crirlcn! of the inspector genual's draft Special Re view. GenCl'1lI Counsel Muller wrote that the OIG Special Review presented "an imbalanced 8Jld inaccurate picture of the Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," and claimed the OIG Special Review, "[o]n occasion," "quoted or summarized selectively and misleadingly" from CIA documents. m Deputy Oirector for Operations James Pavin wrote that the 010 Special Review shouJd have come to the "concJusion that our efforts have thwarted atl~ks and saved lives," and that "errs (including the water board) have been indispenl!iable to our succe&Scs." Pavitt attached to his ~ponse a document describing information the CIA obtained "as a result of the lawful use of Errs" IhaE srated. "[t]he evidence points clearly to dte fact tbat without the use of such techniques. we and our allies would (have] suffered major temnist Tl611f1eniewof Office otitic !nJP!Cl(W General, April 30, Z003. Pavitt de8cribcil pos8iblll pllblic R:vtlillions rda:1r.d to (he CIA's D&leIItioo and Inlenoplion ~ u "!be: CIA '5 wont night~." Interview of JIIIIClI Pavln, Office of the Inllpll(:t« GellCral. Se~mber 21,2003. According 10 OIG m:onIs of an inlcrv;cw willi. DCI Tend, ''Tenet believes lhat jf the general publill WCR 10 rllld WI about thi8 prQgJ1ml, {filmy would believe "'e are tortUR:rs." Tenet Iddcd, ho_vu, that his "only potcnlial ~J dilemma would be if more Ameril::ansdie at the haftlk ottc:ITDI'iJtSlnd we had someone in ouralslDdy-..bo po6sessed inft'ltnWion that could h~.-e prevenlCd deadlll, bul_ h8d 001 oblllined such informadon:' S. int~w at George Tend, orn~ Dfllle Inspector Genen". muoorandum dlled, September 8, 2003. '1]'1 Su CIA Memonllldum rrom Scott W, Muller, Gcmere1 Cellnsel, to IDspector Genenl re Inrenogation Prognlll Special favjew. dilled Febcullty 24.2004 (2003-7123-[0. 117 000 Page 123 of 499 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualtIes...m A rev lew of CIA records foond that Ihe repn:sentalions in the Pallvitt materials were 21hnOSI entirely inaccurate. no ( ~ In addition to conveying inaccurate information an Ihe operation, mllnagement, and effectiveness of the CrA program, CIA leadership continued to impede the OIG in its efforts to o\'ersee the program. In July 2005. Director GOS8 sent a memorandum to the Inspector general to "express several concerns regarding the in·depth. multi-facered review" of the CIA's The CIA director W'I"Ote that he was "increasingly concerned abOut me cumulative impact of the OIG's work on CTC's performance." adding that '<1 believe it makes sense to complete existing reviews, •. before opening new ones," DireclOr Goss added, "[tlo my knowledge. Congress is satisfied that you are meeting its ~uirements" with regard to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program,731 At the time., however. the vice chairman of the Senllte Select Comminee on Intelligence was seeking a Committee investigation of the OA program, in part because of the aspecu of the propam that were not being investigated by mOe Office of InspeclOr General. 73'2 In April 2007. C1A Dmtor Michael Hayden had his "Senior Councilor"-an individual within th2 ClA who was accountable only 10 the CJA • CIlier. Int'0rm8liOft ~Iiona CcalU". alld Henry CnamptOD, <:Wef. N~ R~ DiwiJion. via Asscx:illle CepIt" Oim:tor (or OpentiOftS fa Opcnl~'IId Re1I'ie_ oC OA DElaiBlIe Propam. ,. Sft VoIu_ I for Iddltio" i1IfDnl1lJ1on. 'HI ElMil flVln: John Hel&CfIOn; fO; ~t:I' Oosa. , a;; lea Rodligtle:~.lCllmRb:7.o, [R£OAC'TEOI. lREDACTED]; 5ubje&ll: DCIOUe.slfon RepnliO\:?IO date: Janullt)' 28. 200S. .,.~ I3m1l11 from: Jolin HeT'eJ'$Un; to: PoNtOt!st>, ; cc: JOSIil Rodriguet, JQhn Kluo, (REDACTEDI. [I\BDACTED): .abj«t: DCI Queillon Reellldin~lUluacy 28. 2003. ..., email fmm: JOM Helgerson; to: PolW 00l5.~;cc: Jose Rodriltle:l, John Riuo, [REDACTEDJ. [RED"CJaOj; SUbject: DCI Qul!$l.lOft ReprdinCOIG Repatt~dale: JlInliary 28. 200'. TheClA'sJune 2013 Responx mtlnllilla tha' "r-J aystematlc snsdy over time of the dfective:nC8& of lI\Il ~chl'llqll£. wou lei have been cocumbenld by III numbllr of faotors," 1Al:tuding MFedenl policy on the protection cf h11llJ8n lubjccts lind !he impnlCllcabllhy of estabUshln, Qn. effective control 011." Rrn; Page 126 of 499 t!lr.8~:,8iIFlii UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App.93 "Action R,equested: None. This memorandum ~pond5 to your request for an independent study of Ihe foreign inreUigence efficacy of using enhanced intenogation rechnlques. There is no way to conduct such. study. What we can do. howcycr. if [sic] sef forth below the intelligence die Agency obtained from detainees who, before their inlerrogations. were not providing any infonnation of intelligence [valuel."744 (~ Under a subon of the memorandum entitled, "Rcsulbl," the CIA memo asserts that Ihe ''CIA's Ulie of DOl-approved enhanced inten'ogation rechlliques, as part of II comprehensive interrogation approach. has enabled CIA to disrupt [Crrorist plots [and] capture additional teO"Orisl.5." The memomndum then lists examples of "[k]ey intelligence coUected frt>m HVD interrogations after applying intenogation techniques," which led to "disropte(edJ tenori5t plots" and the "capture [of] additional terrorists,'" TIle examples inclUde: the "Kamchi Plot." the "Heathrow Plot," "the 'Second Wave'" ploUing, lhe Identification of lhe "tbe Gunba CelI,"lhe identification of "[ssa aI-Hindi,"lhe arrest of Abti Talha ai-Pakistani. "Hambali's Capwre," information on 1affar aI-Ta)'yat. the "Dirty Bomb" plot, the &:rest of Sajid Badar, and infonnation on Shkai, Pakistan, CIA records do not indicate when. or if. lhis memorandum was provided to the national security advisor.?4~ ( ~ A subsequent CIA memorandum, dated March S, 200S, conceming an upComing meeting berween dIe CIA director and the national S&uriry Bdvisor on the C[A's progress in completing the OIG recommended n:view of the effectiveness of lhe CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques states, "we [CIA] believe lhis study is much needed and should be headed up by highly respected national~level political f'igun:s with widely recognized reputations far independence and fpimess.,,7C~ ~ ) On March 21, 2005, the director of lhe ere CormaDy proposed lhe "estBbli~ment of an independent 'blue ribbon' commission ... with a charter to stud our BITs."147 The CIA then be an the process of establishin a anel mat included and Bom panelists received briefings and papers eJA personnel who participated in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Progmm. _ [the fir,;t panelistl wrole: "n is clear (rom our discussions wilh both DO and Dl officers that the program is deemed by them to be a great SlEcesS, and I would concur. The Errs, as PNt of Ihe OVeniU program, IV'e credired wilh enabling the US to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional tCrrorisfS, and collect a high volume of usdul intenigence on al~Qa'ida (AQ) •... There ore accounts of numerous plots against Ihe US and lhe West that were re vealed as a result of HVD from JlI4 Decembet 2004 CIA Memorandum to "Nadollil Security Al1visor:' flam "Di.reClorof CcnrraI IDIClllgence," SubjCCl: "Effec:liYeneu of[J1e CIA Counlcnemllist IntertOl_ilm Techniques." 1II5 December 2004 CIA Memorandum to "Nadonal Security AdviJor," flam "Directot of Centtll! Intellisence.... Subject: "Effilcti veness of the CIA Countr.rterrorilllnterrogDllon Techniques." rt.lics ig original. 14~ Maroh ~. 200~, Tlilkins PaUlli for Weekly M.eetlng with NlIliOlla\ Security AdvllOr re-CIA Proposal fcc Independenl Study or the EtfeetjYe~ ofCTC InleCTogalion Prol!l'am's Enhanced rn~rroptioD Tcdu1iquu. 141 Man:h 21, 2005, Memorandum fcc Deputy Director for Operv.tions from Robcn L. Grenier. Director DCI CaunleJtelfOriam Cenru. Ie Proposal ror Full-Scope IndqJCJldellt SNdy of the ere Rendilion, Delention. and Interrogation Prograll'l6. ::JQIl.~~ Page l27 of 499 OJ4CDtWII lea UNCLASSIFIEOI/FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE interrogations." He also observed. however, that "[n]cither my background nor field or expertise particularly lend themselves to ju~ectiveness of interrogation techniques, taken [the second panelist] concluded that "there is no indi vidually or -collectively :,148 objective way to answer the question ot efficacy," but stated it was possible to "make some genenlll ob5er\lations" about the program based on CIA personnel assessments of lithe quality of the intelligence provided» by CIA detainees. Regarding Ihe effectiveness or the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, he wrote: ~ enten! the epistelDological problem. We can never know whether or not this intelligence could have been extrllCted though alternative procedures. Spokesmen from within the organization firmly believe it could not have been."14' 4. Tlu CIA WrongfiJ.lIy Detains KhiJlid Al-Masri; CIA Director Rejects Accountability for Officer InWJ(ved (~) Afrer the dissemination or the draft CIA Inspcetor General Special Review in early 2004, approvals from CIA Headquarters to use tlle CIA's enhanced interrogabon techniques adhered more closely to lhe language or the DCI guidelines. Nonelheless, CIA records indicate that officers at CIA Headquarters continued to fail to properly monitor justifications for the capcure and delention of detaint.es. all well as the justification retr the U$e of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on particular detainees. no ~) Por ex~le, on January • 2004~ tlle C1A rendered German citizen Khll.lid aI-Masri [0 II Counuy • facilily used by the CIA foc detention purposes. The rendition WBi based on tllc determination by o(ficers in lhe CIA's ALEC Station that "ai-Masri knows key information that could assiSt in the capture of orhtr al-Qa'ida operatives that pOllie a serious threat of vioJence or dealh to U.S. persons and interests and who may be planning terrorist acti\liries,"1.SI The cable did not srate lhat KhaJid al·Masn himself posed 11 serious ttueat of violence or death, the srandlUd required for detention under tlle September 17,2001. Memorandum of Notification (MON), ( ~ ) CIA debriefing cables from Country. on January 27. 2004•.800 January 28, 2004, note that Khalid ai-Masri "seemed bewildered on why he has been sent to this particul8J" prison,"1~'Z and was "adamant that [CIA] has the wrong person,"Ul Despite doubts rrom CIA officers in Country. about Khalid aI-Masri's links to terrorists, llIld ROO's COllcurrence wilh those doubts, different compol1ents within the CIA disagreed on the process for his release.1s4 As later described by the CIA inspector general. officers in ALEC Station continued to lhink that releasing Khalid ai-Masri would pose II threat to U.S. interests and that 141 September 2, 200.5 Mernonllldum from to Oiledill' Parter GClSS. CIA Ie Assessment of GlTs Effediwoeness. ForadditionaJ information,leI Volllror. U. "" September 23, 2005 Memonndum Ilom. 10 the Honorable Porter Gosa, Director, Cenuallolelligenoe AJelJr;y.re RapoRlle to Requea from Din:d.or fIX Assl:pmenl of Err Efrecll.venc:llSo For lIdditional iul'crm.allon, le~ Volume II. ?la For lIdditionll information :Jee Voh~me lIT. m 1658 ~~ )4)05 113 54301 'H 1871 MH 0") (0223412 APR (4) Page 128 of 499 07 omFtEt ..... , .. ..., ..... ""' .... ,, --s UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIlFOR PUBLIC RELEASE CIlLS9.App. 95 monir~ing should be required, while those in me CIA's _ Division did not want to notify lhc German government about the rendition of a Gennan citiz.en,7S:I BeC81.lsc of Ehe significance of lhc dispute., the Nlt!onal Seturiry Council settled the marter, concluding thllt al·Ma3ri should be repatriated and that the GetmanS should be told about aI-Masri's rendilion,"'" (~) On May • 2004~ Kbalid al·Masri W8$ U1lIlsrerred from Countlj' • to ~S1~Masri Ilrrived CIA otlkers released him and IlCnl him towanf a fake border crossing, whe~ the officers told him he would be ~t back to German 'I becau$C he had elltmd _ ilJegaUy.1S1 At the time of his re~se, ai-Masri wa5 provided 14.'00 EUJ'OS,759 as well as his belongjngs. 7fiO i"-. ~ On 1111'1 16.2001. the CIA illSpCClor general issued a Report of InvcstlgaCion on Ihe rendition and detention of Khalid al·Masri. COIlcludlng chat "laJvailable inld Iigcnce information did not provide Il aUlicient b85is to render end delaill Khatid aI.Mlt$Ii," and thai the "Ascncy'J prvlonged dctenrion olal-Masri was unjustified."1'l OQ ~obcr9. 2007, Ihe CIA informed the Commie= that it "Jacked sufficient basis !D reader and detain ai-Masri:' and dun the jud,me.nt b)l operations OffiCCB Ihar ai-Masri was anociMed v--fcb lemJr131J who posed II tfuocu to U.S. ilul:rcsllI "was not suppotUd by available i~ CIA di~tor nonethcrw decided that no further lelian was wamulted against , dlen Ihe depury ehief of ALeC Station, who lIdvoca~ for aI-Muri's ~nditiol1. because "(c)he Dituror strongly helieYes that mistakes should be expecred in a business fiUed with unc:ertaincy and Khat, when they ~sult from petfonnance that meets reasonable standards. CIA leadership must st3tId behind lhc office", who roake Utero," The notification also stated that "with regard to counterterrorism opcrolions in genemllnd the ai-Masri matter In particular, lhc Di~tor beJievcs the scale tips dccisivel)l in favor of accepting mistakes that over connect die dots apinst those: that under conatet thcm,'·162 7Sol CTA Off'1Cl> ortns~1l)'I' Gen~ml. Report or Investi!lIuon. The Rendition lind Delenrion ofOmnln Cititen KJlalid ai-Masri (2004·760t-JG). July 16. 2007 1M CIA Office or Inspector General, Re'i'Ort of rnvemptiop, The Rendition ud DelBnliQII 01 Cienn4tl Cirlten Khalid III· Masri 2004-7601·10 Jol 16.2007 . JJ7 2507 m 426SS '" ~ Y 2004 ellChT niles, dais alnOUflled to llpprolimarcly517,000. 42655 ,.. CIA Office of InlpeC(Of Oeaaal. RqJort at IIlvatipiOll, n. Rmditioo Md Dc.l.enlion 01 Gcnnan Citizen Dalid .lI1-M:wi (2004.-7 ""iiII2OO1, "'1 JUremns to and I IZlCOlId CTC oftica' named iD llI£I OIG', Repor1 ollaWo$Ciplion. 1tlc I'OtifiQ'ion (0 Conpeu slUed daal ~ d~ ~cIoa nut bdieYe 1biI.•. !he ~.llCC of lk ('M) nUDell CTC ol'ficea I"aO bcJOlll a reDIClllGbte. luwI or pro(C5SilKlllliI... llill, arw;I dilitlCftCClllS dIltiCled in a A. '. S _dad t\x Emplo)'oe t\oQDunlibitlly:' The l1DliflCa1ion.&1IO slaled dnd lhlnl WIllI I -,up '*-- covirvnrnr.nl" Il!he cia. of ~ t1lI1di~oll. which ....,u Cillll'ltially idcJltil;a11O &he one in whidl ere employees, iadlldoill8 the two in ~.n he~ previol"ly h.. been ~lrpl1 crtciaiECd far nl'l <:O~ lhr: doll priot 10 91'11." The lIOtific:uio" lCbo.tlecl8cd "In insufficienl lepl,tuaif'icllIlon• .,hich failed to mtlCllhr: sllllldard ~bcld in dl~ (MONI:' and RM'cd to lhe IClin, pnerll caunld the tAsk orlIueaains Iclll advice iII1l1 penonsllllXOUntabiliay. BAaed on IeCOmmcndlliont &om lhr: inS~lot FlIa'al, the CtA "galOCi it me detention she lhc:n t'equCJted to use lite CIA's enhanced interrogation techniquC5 on Ghul, writing: 'lithe] inl£TTogation I£llm belicves, based on (Ha9san Gbul'a) ~tion to me initial ~ontae" thai his el-Qa'ida briefmgs and his earticr CJpeneoces with U.S. mililal)/ jnrerrog~on have convinced himlbcre!Me limits to me pbysicaJ contact inlcrroslton can hlsve wilh him. The illterrogation team believc& the Ippl'O'tai .tld employment of enhanced measun:s shou Id suClicicnlly shifl (Hassan Ghul's) paradigm 01 what he cxpecls to happen. 1bc lack ollhcsc inen:asd (sic] rncU\RS m:ly limit the tcam's cllpllbility to coUcct ~ritkal ond ~li.ble infonnation in 0 timely rnanrICr:>n1 ( ~ CIA Headquarters approved tbe request me same day.'"' Following'9 houl'1 of sleep depriv&lion,TIO Hassan Ghul experienced haUuciniltions, but was told by a psychol()Sist that his ~actions wen: "consistent willt what many others experience in his condition," and lItlit he should calm himself by teUing himself his cJpcricnccs arc normQland will SUbside when he decides ro be truthful.nl Thc sleep deprivation, as weUas olhcr enhanced interrogations, contlnur4,":J as did Ghul's halJucinations. 7Il3 Ghul 0150 complained of back pain ilnd asked to sec: II doctor,114 but interrogators responded that the "pain wu nonnal, and would stop when IGhul) was confirmed as telling the tnIth." A cable states that "[ilnl£tTOgatQl"s told [Ghuilihey did not care if he was in pain, but cared only if he provided complete 1WI truthful infotmstion."7&S A CIA physician assisLllI'lt later observed tholt Hassan Ghul was upeciencing "notable physioloslcal fatiguc," including "abdominal and bftCk IYUisde palrl/spasm, 'heaviness' and mild paralysis of atIN.legs lIld feet {that] arc sc:condary to hi. hanging POSitiM and ex~me ,,~ Mad! ],. 20M, MemonlIldum for SIe'Ye Bndbllry flOm _&..cpt Group. OCI C(JIlJI~/i!lIOrise Ccnler, re: Effeclivencss of lbc CIA Coua~ '.em:lJlldDn For addilioftll ~laIiotJl IJU VcWllIe II. "'.1283 12M 77> m 1215 ""(4) AN (4) ANot ~.UARTI!JtS - TedwoiquCl. balies in Grislul. 1m 1m JAN (4) JAN 04) ftl JAN (4) 10 1308 .rAN (4) 7D 1)08 JAN (4); • • •~ 1312 ,rAN 04}. ~ CIA.'s June 20n lW,pon_ stateS tIIal wilen haUucirl"Cions «Cline4. h 4). II' ~ VollUIIC m fOi addiliOD6! details. 111 Jol r •" 1512 Page I 36 of 499 1:I.lelJO,&&IFI(9 UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE ex.perienced auditory and visual hnlll.lc:inations.· 17 Accortling to a cable. lanat Gul was "not oriellted to time or place" and told C1A otrJCeC'S that he SBW "tUs wife and children in the mirror and hud bean! their voices in the white noise"" u The questioning of lanat Gul cootinucd, aJlhough the CIA ceased using the ClA '5 cnbanced illtumgation techniques for several days. Ac:cortling to a CIA cable, "[Gul] asked to die, or just be killed."sI9 Aftercontinued interrogation se&SioRS with GuJ, on August 19, 2004, CIA detention site personnel wrote that the interrogation "team does not believe [Gull is withholding imminent threat infoonation:·2.0 On August 21. 2004, u cable from CIA Headquarters slared that lanat Gul "is believed" to possess threat information, and that the "use of enhanced rechniques is Ilppropriate in order to oblain thlt information:,s21 On that day, August 21, 2lX)4, CtA interrogatol1i ~sumed using the CIA's enhanced interrogation recbniques against Gu1. rn Gut continued not to provide any ~poning on the prc..election threat described by the CIA sourt:C.11'll On August.25, 2004, CIA inteaogatoni sent a <;able to CIA Headquarters staring that lanat Gul "may not possess all that {the CIA] believes him to know."ll24 The interrogators added that '"many issues linking [Gul] to alo.Qaida an: derived fn)m single souroe reporting" (the CIA source).82j Nonetbeless, CIA lnlerroglltors con~inu~d to question Guion the pre-elcetion threat. According to all August 26, 2004, cable, after a 47-hour &ession of standing sleep dl;privarion,lanat Gut was returned to his cell, aU owed to remove his dia~a towel arid a meal, and permitted to sleep.816 In October 2004, lhe CIA conducted a _ _ of the CIA source who had identified Gul as ha ving knowledge of attack planning for the pn:·eleccion threaL the CIA souree admitted. to fpbricaHn lhe information. 1m Gul was subsequently ttallsfened to a fo~ign govemment. On ·nformed lhe CIA thac lanat Gul had ~en releasccl.&28 (~ Janat Gui never provided the threat information the CIA originslly told the Nadonat Security Council that Gul possessed. Nor did the use of the CIA S enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul produce the "immcdlute threat information that could $8ve American lives," which had been the basis for the CIA to scck..authorizatlon to use the tech niques. As described else whe~ in chis summllrY, the CIA' s justifi<;lltion for employing jl§ enhanced interrogation techniques on b,nac Gul---lhe fU1lt detainee to ~ subjected to the techniq\leS foUowing the May 2004 SUjpension~hanged over time. After having initially cited Gul's knowledge of tbe pre-election Ihreat. as reported by tile CIA's source, the CIA began repre5enting that ilS enhanced intenogation techniques were required for Gullo deny the existence of the (hreat, thereby disproving tbe credibility of the CIA sowce,l29 9 ::~II:~: 1567 111' ~ ~I HEAD an m a~ as ~6 m m 1574 UARTERS 1603 1003 1622 1622 1622 14U 04) 04 . See Volume U.I.fUr.·.1ICfd.iti.on.al.in.,onnation. 39S 4S492. ~9 MCnlOOllldum farlohn A. Rizzo, Senior Dl:pllty Venenll Coonsel, CenJJ1Illalc1llllel1Cll AgellCy, rtom Steven G. Bradbury, Principal'Depuey .4.ssislllnt Allaroe au.eml, Office of Counlld. May JQ, :zOOS, lUi: AppIiclition of Page 137 of 499 UHOt::AeSIFIEB UNCLASSIFIED/IFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE (~) On August II. 2004, in the midst or~ of Janat Qui using die CIA' s efthlnced interrogation techniques, CIA attorney wrote I letter to Acting Assistant Attorne)' Gcncml Olin Levin with "brier bioglllphics" of four lndJvidu.llls Whom the CIA hoped to detain. Given tile requirement Ilt the time that the CIA seek individual approval from the Deparmlent of Justice before usi ng the CIA's enhanced Interrogation lCChniques aaail'1St a deminu, Ehe CIA leller states, "[w]e lin: providing these preliminary biognsphics in preptlration for a fu~ request ror a legal opinion on dldr subsequent incerrogadon in CrA control." Two of the individual~Abu Fanj ai-Ubi aM Hlrnla Rabi' ahad not yet been C8plUred.1nd thus the «biographies" made flO refaert<:e to dicit inlmOsations or ~ need to use the CIA', enhaftced inlerrogation tecbniqUCL The third individual. Abu Talha. ~gn Fvernmcnt custody. His debriefing1 by a foreian aovenunent.. - - - - . were de$cribed in the lcut:r a, "only moocnlteJy etreerive" because Abu Taiba Wlb "disncrlns {chute questioning him} wim oaocrilicallnformalion that is tnllhfuJ, but i5 Aot relaltd to openauonat plannina." The fOldb individuaL Ahmed tQ,aJren Ghailani. was also in rarer.n govemfOCnt custody and bei ng debriefed by foreign goVernment officiail_ . Accmdina to the letter". Ghailaai's ftxt:ign govqnmeot debricfinSli wen: "ineffective" because Ohailani hod "denied knOWledge of current threats." The Idtcr described ~portini on rhe pn:.-eledion du'eot-much of which ca.mc £10m me CIA 5OUTC~in the conte~t of aJi four individuals.1](l Ahmed GhBillI1i and Abu FlU"llj al-Libi were eventuatly renden:d to ClA c:uslDdy and liUbjected to the CIA', enhQnccd inlCrrogation techniques. (~ On September. 2004, after the CIA had iniUallld a counterinrellipnce review of the CIA source who had reported on the pre-etecdon threat, ~t prior to the CIA sou~e's _ the CIA took. custody of Shllrif IIl.Masri, whom the etA source hod nlpor1ed would abo have information about the [Wetll,iJl Intelligence provided by Sharif ai-Masri while he WQS in foreign govcrnmeflt. CllSIOOY ~Itl;d In the dls8emination of more thun 30 CIA intelligence reports,lU After cntering CIA custody, Sharif aI·Muri expressed his intent to C:CXlpel'ilte with the CIA. indicating ~ned of iOlClfOglKions bccau5e he had been lOrtured while being inrerrogaled in - - ' . 1 3 3 The CIA nOfletheleH souaht approval 10 use Ihe CIA's enhanccd inlermgation IeCboiques against al·Maari because of hi. failure to provide information on the pre-elccOOllllllal.Dl ( ~ After IWrmimalE1y a wed. of inn:nogating aI-Masri ustnS the CIA' 5 enhanced interrogation led\nlqucs. iocluding sleep depriv8lion Ibal coincided with Unile4 s~ ObIil'ldon. Undr:t Mic:te 16 of !he COiIlI'WeIIIiDa Apilllll TcDI~ 10 Cue.in Techniques dtlll Moly Be UIICd ill1be InBlvllliolt of HiJIl v.1ui!i II Qtleda DIlIai-. aI I!. SH Udion of Ibis .5DIIUNIY Itld Volume 0 ~lidl:d ...... AsIIertion ltllUCIA Detainees SubjldCd 10 enlunced InfalQpIion Ter:bniqlllllllUlp VIIldlte CIA So~" Assillallt ~cna[ CmIIdC1, fa OlIn Levin. A.ctina A-UUlll AlIQrne)' G-rw.1, • 'DO• Let.lIl:r.m,m ,2004. iIiIsm.N.G.TO.N IJZ S~e' rorCllIlnl MAR. D4). S•• HEADQUARTERS Ie Page 138 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED/IFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE audirory hallucinations. CIA interrogators repol1eoinl Pl'CiIClllation, OA ~il'Cles: ~nd!lIme Optiom and Pllns. dlilm AUIl'l6( 19, '2()1)4 161 Septembr:r 17, 2004, DRAFT Tilldn,a ~inls for lbe ADa: ElldgluJIe Opoons I.lld Plans fDr CIA Dct.a1rlMl. - The CIA log" tu&1ody or Abu FBraj al·Libi, Abu Munlhlr al-M.aglrbi, IbrBbim JBll, and Abu Il'flr el.lrlqiln 2005, and AIXl al·Hadi 1Il.lnllqi ill 2006. 170 Th~ fint d~.. in~$ in CIIIJ~ ZOO). CIA dellinees were hald within In lll(illting COUIllr}' • facility ill CounU)'. from. 10 _":fOO3, and then lIfIain beBinning In Foe IddJt10nll inromllllion.li~ Volume t. ."'",cd _:w04. Page 143 of 499 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App.110 the " naturaland progressive ctrects of long-term solitary confinement on detainees" ilnd ongoing behllviorBl problelDS.17l . (~) With respect to the personnel al DETENTION SITE BLACK. the chief of Base wrote; "I am concemed It what appeBrllo be ill lack of resolve at Headquane~ to deploy 10 the field the brightest and most qua.lified officers for :service ac [the detention site). Over the cotJ1'1C of the last year !he quality of persoMcl (debrierc($ and (security protective officel!!i)) ha&de.c1in~ sipificantly. Wid'l regard to dCbriefen. mast III1l mediocre. a handfulllsic} Bte eAccprionai 8nd IQ(R thaft • few are bosi.c:ally incompetCf1t From what we ~n determine there is no eslabtished meltlodology as to (he selecoon of debrfefm. Racher than look for their best. managers seem to be selecting either problem, undcqJerforming off"lCU5. new. fOIally inexperienced officers or whome...er seems to be wiHing 1M able to deploy al any given lime. We see no evidence chat thought i$ bcinS given to dcpIoyinS 11I'I • A-Team.' The result. quite naturally, i$ the production of medioc:n: or, 1dare say. useless i.lIclligence •... We h....c see n a similar deterioJ"lltion in me quality or !he ~urity personnel depioyed to the site.... If this program truly does rep~5ent one of the ajetlcy's most secret activitie!; then it defies logic why inexperienced. marginal. undflrperforming and/or officers with pctentinlly significant [coun~rintc:l1liCllCeJ problems are pennined to deploy to thil; site. It is WO imporranc tt~at we immediately inact (sic] some form of rigorous trainiJ\~ proSrllm...lIT3 (~ A CIA OlG audit completed in lune 2006 "found that personnel assigned to CIA-controUcd detention facilities, for the most part. complied with the standards and guidelines in carrying out their duties and n:.sponsibilicies." The OIG also found thlt. "except Cor the shonage of debriefers, dle facilities were stnffed with sufTIcietlt numbe~ and l)'Pes of penonnel." The hick of debriefers. however. was described as "an ongoing problem" for rhe Pr'Ogrul. AccOftiing to the audir.1hc:re wen: CJ{~nded periods ill 2005 ~ hen lhe CtA's DErnNnON SI113 ORANGE in Coorttry • had either one or no debricrers. At lust t~ ice in lhe summer of 2005. the chief of Station in .... country rnquesred addillmar debriefen, warning that inlelUaenoe collection could surfer. Mondls latel", in January 2006, the chief of Base at mil delelluon site edvised etA HcadqUllJ1En that ""tbe facility snU lacked debriefc:n to support inceUigcna colte.:'lion tcquiremcnrs, that critical requi«ments were ·stecki". up,' and that S-PS in the debrien"i or detainees we~ impacting the quanti[)' lind quality or irneUigence reponing and ,""ould rNke d1e ~ork: or future debriefcn; mo~ difficult...m Email fmlD: (RED.....CTED) (COB DETBNTJON SITE BUCK); to: • • • • • • • • • • • Iubja:t: ClenMI Comments; dQ!: April 1.5. 2005. IU EmaU from: [ReDACTeD] (COB DEIENTJON SlTE BUCK); 10: • • • • • •~ • • • • • • • • • lubject: Cleneral Comment_; date: April 1.5. 2005. f7) Report of Audit. CIA-collltOtle4 Delenlion PlIcilities Operated Under die 11 SClptel1lber 'ZOOJ MctnOnllldlll1l of NolifiCIIlion. Repon No. 2~"()() 17-AS. June 14.2006, at DTS 1# 2006-2793. AI furthv .Icribed in &he 01 Page 144 of 499 WU&1s8diiIFlE8 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE M. Legll) and Operational OaUenges in 200.5 I, Department ofJustice Renews Approl'aljbr lhe Use ofthe etA '.I En/lanced Il1terrogaJiOfl Techniques in May 2005 (~) On May 10, 2005, dte new acting assistant an~y general for OLe. Steven Bntdbury, issued two legal memoranda. The first analyz:ed whether the individual use afme CIA's 13 enhanced interroga!ion techniques-including waterboarding, as well lISa number of interrogation techniques that had been used in 2003 and 2004, but had not been analyzed in lhe original August 1.2002, OLe memorandum-were consistcnt wim the criminal prohibition on torture. B74 The second memorandum considered the combined use of the OA's enhanced intel1'Ogation tcchniques.!73 Both legal memoranda concluded that the use of the CIA '5 enhanced interrogation techniques did not violate me torture statute. ~ ) On May 26, 2005, the CIA inspector general, who had been provided with the two OLC memoranda, wrore a memo to the CIA director recommending mat the CIA see~ additional legal guidance on whether the CIA's enhanced inlerrogation techniques and conditions of confinement met the standard under Article 16 of the Convention Agllinst T0r1ure. 816 The inspector general noted tha~ "a slIOng case can be made that the Agency's aumoriz.ed interrogarion t«;chniques are rhe kinds of actions that Article 16 undermk.cs to prevent," adding that me use of the watcrboard may be "cruel" and "exlended detention with no clothing would be considered 'degrading' in mosr cu)tult:S, particularly Muslim." The inspector general fulthcr urged that the anll1ysis of conditions was equaUy important, noring that the inspector general's staff bad ''found a number of insrances of detainee b'eatment which arguably violate lhe prohibition on cruel, inhuman. and/or degr.lding treatment.',871 Committee Study, Ihe In~pedD[" General lIudit described 110'11I rhe CIA's detention facllities Well: nO! ~uippc:d to provide detainees with tnedicill ca~. The audit ~crjbc.d unhygiCllic fQod prepar'dlion, including 11I1 facility ';tb II "rudent infeslalion," Ilnd noted lhot ~ pft)'liciuD lISsistant 1I1iribuied :;yrnptoms of ICUIe pstroinle:Slinlll iIInCllIl BrId giurdi,\lsi~ Il.Sperienud by six staff and Bdetainee (0 food and Willer CQrlClll1til\lltion. The audit f\lrl!Jer idenlified insufficiCllt guidelines cowring possiblr. delllinee escape or IJle death ofll dc1l1inClCl. 874 S~e Melnorundum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy OellWll Collntel, Cenlnl Jnfdligence Agency, frol~ Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Asaiitant Anomey General, 0fT1\;C of Leg~ Counlel, May 10, 2005, Re: Applicalion of 18 U.S.C. §§ 234()'2340A to Certain Tedlniquu That May Be Uad in the 'llteaoption of B High Value .1 Qaeda Dcllllntlll. . S~ Memorandul1t for Iohn A. Riz:l:O, Senior Deputy GcnClllI Counsel, Ccntnllnlelligena: Agency, fml1l Steven G. Bndbury, Principel Deputy AuiSIIllll Alto~y GelJ!%liI, Ofr.a:of Lepl Counse!, May 10,200'. Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to tbe Combined Use of Cenain TecbniqueJ Thaf May Be Uaed ill tbe lrermgation of Higb VIIlue pi Qaeda Detainees. m May 26. 2005, MCl1Ionmdum tot Dirmer, CentmllnlelUg':nce Agency, from John Helgel"lon, InsplClOCOenerlll, re; Reoommcndalion for Additional Approach 10 Dcplll1ml:nt orJuslice CollOeflling Legal GlIidan(% 011 Inlerrogalion II' TecluJiques. nl Mlly 26, 200', Melnorandum for DRder, Ceollll.lll1rdligence Agency,lrolII'ohn Helgerson,lnspector Gelledl, Ri: Rcoommcndalion for Additional ApproilCk to Depan1llCnt of Jusfice Concerning Legal Guidance 011 lnt~ptiOD Techniques. Page 145 of 499 l:IUebfttS81F1EB UNCLASSIFIEDI/FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBUC RELEASE (1l;/~) OR May 30, 200S, a third OLC memorandum examining U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture was compleled. 81I The conclusions in this opinJon were based lqely on the CIA's representations about the cffecrivenesl orthe dA inr.elTOgation proatUm in obtaining unique and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelliiellce." As described later in this liummary, and in more detail in Volume n, the CIA's effectiveness represenlltlons were almost entirely inaccu(ale. 2. ~bll Faraj M·Uhi. Subjtcr,d to ,he CM 's E~ed 11J/~rrogaJicn T,chniqllll P""r 10 DepCUfmMt 01Justlu Mtmorandllm on TOr1Ii~: CIA U.S. OblisOl;OIU Undlr 1M CDrtll'fltlo1l Agailut SlibjecI$ Abu Faruj AI-Libi U> tM eM's EnhQI.Cld Irt~no'aliotr. T«1JnJqwe" W,vn H~ CD1fIpI4iJu 01Herm'n, Problenu (~ On May 2. ~, when Abu Paraj at.Libi, al·Qa·jd.'s chief of operations, was CapNred in Palciscan, the OLC hIld not yea iMUed the three aforementioned May 2005 legal memocanda.119 CIA officen desaibed Abu PaBj at-Ubi 's capNre as the "most important al..Qa'ida Clpnue since Kholid ShlIykh Muhammad."810 St'lortly after al·Libt's capture. the CIA beaan discussing the possibility that Abu Faraj at-Ubi milt'll be renc1crecS 10 U.S. custody.eal (~). On Ma)'.I1._2005•.four days;_ before the rendition or Abu.fantj ~ Libi to CIA (,"\IltOOy, Direclor of erc Robert Grenier asked CIA ()ireClor Porler OOllS to send a memoC'llndum to the nlliional security advisor and the di~tor of national intclJilCnce "'Rformini [hem of the CIA's plans ID take custody of Abu Faraj aI·Ubi lind to employ intenogatioR techniques if warranted and medically safe."8lr2 On May 24,2005. the White House informed the CiA thilt a National Security Council Principals Committee meeting would be n~5illlry Ul discuss the UN of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Flraj al.Libi, but the travel &Chedul£ of one or the principals was delaying liUch a meelinl'lU CIA Ol~ctor ~Fl instructed CIA officcr1i to proteed as planned. indicating tbat he would ClIlIlhe princi-pals individually and inform rhem that, if Abu Paraj aI-Ubi was found not to be coopel"lllting lind there were no conrraindiealions to sue" an interrogllltion, he would approve the use of all of the CIA'5 enh.nc£d interrollatiOtl tedlniqllCs other than d1e waterboard. without ...lIilinl for. lDecling Dr 'ahft ." S- NemomMllllll f(ll' A. RimJ. SeniUI' DE:puly 0encnI CGaaId. Cenlral "ell~ Alel"')'_ rrol" Steven . 0. BradbaIy, P,inci.-l Depul, Aillislanl Anaracy (XnenI, Office ofLqu CouDSd, M&J' », 2005. Rc: "AI1ie.ion of U.. il~ Slates Obti...ton. UDder Miele 16 oldie COII~Iq Ag.iIl. Tonul"C 10 Cc:naln Tec:llnlquu ..... ""., Be U~ if' &be IntcnoSMiuo of High VIhle.t QIeda Detainees. m Far mace illformatioft 011 Abu Faraj .I-Libi's cleferllioll.Dd iDfImosllliol\,'" Yollilne III lID HBAOQUARTERS.(25U40Z MAY III s~, foreu"..,le, I08S( _ (describing ~iJl&l QII M.y 6 and 7, ~). In May., 200S, Mem«4Ddum (or Diteaor, CellenllnlelligcDcc Agency, via ACIin( DepUly Diftlc[OI', CenCI'll In~lliICl~ Aeenc~, Exccllfiw. Di~garion lechniquel. the CIA ~ Abu Faq,j aI-libi about U8L faeililator Abu Ahmad aIKu.waicl fur the {ir$C lime.m Abu Fan.j al·[j1Ji denied kDowledge r# III·KuwaJd.- J. CIA Acqwi~.r Two Defoi"us/rom fIlL U.S. MiJiJDry (~ Another legal issue in lare 2005 was meted to the U.S. Deptltment of Defense'8 involYement in CIA detention aL':tivities. In Seplembec 200~, the CIA end the Dcpn.n:mtttt of Defense..aisncd a.Mtmorandum of Unden:tanding on thili 5ubjeet,197 and the u.s. ' milimry agreed to transfer two cktainees, Ibrahim Jan and Abu la'far ai-Iraqi, to CIA c:u&tody. Both were held by the U.S. militll)' without being registered with the JCRC for oyer 30 dDyl, pending tl1eie trlOsfer to CIA eu.~tody.'\IlI The transfer of Abu Ja'far ill-Iraqi took plac:e nolWithstanding Department of State concerns that the In.nsfer would be inc:onsislcnt wiltl ~:-...-,-.,_~,.....,-J.ta~e!M!!!!-,m~~~~tfI.fY.~~e.,lAAW:.S.,OO.~~ ..iRlra.q.'.,~.l4.I§maiBQQIR~,~NL. -_ ... law of anned canmel, Inc:luding the QClIevll. Con ventions. lI99 ~ Email hm~ 10: - . . . (R&DAC11IDJ.lREDAcmDl. cc: (REDA.cnmJ.J!tIDACTEDI'I• • • (REOACT60I.1 IUbjeet: ~~Tuk1nIoI1 Jul)'OIl Abu Fanj ~;_~200S ••t~M. - DIRECTOR _<121841ZJUL'05); HEADQUAR1'ERS'_ _ AN(J¢~2m61 (2912J2Z JAN 04): DIRECTOR _ (04OS22Z idAY04.) -_Z94S4 (UI70IzruLGS) of Undel'llMdlnl CollCmlil1,B DOD SUJlPDd lD CIA wilk SeGsiti we c.p1We and DetoNtion OptniioRl tD !fie Wei 0" TeftIOflsm. - S. cmaill'roln; [REDACTED)•• • •_Ill: [REDACTEDL [REDACTED). cc: _ [UOAcrEO). (RBDAC'n!Dl. [RBDM:T1IDl. [llEDAClE01. [REDAcrEO); ~bject: 000 Reqllel\ fur 111 UII ot HvT, 1Ir:C to be lULled ISH nUl!l'-"'. lbe emllil ItIIlr.d: "In conjlll1l;!ion ...Iltl dikll"ill'll5 between CIA IIld 000 oyer de weekend rcprdiq ClUl' teqUC$IIO have !be mil itary render Ibnh..im Jan to O'Ir cullWdy QIId NOT inuin; bim In lSI'( number. DoD b.. rcqUC.liled CIA provide ~a list of HVTs 10 Wholl'l If captured, tile ITlililuy ..1 Mc:rw:maodum illliiiit' slkJuld NOT iUUll15N numbe..." (empbuia in 1505 ocr (5). - Ju.l7 • 2005 McltlOl'lndum for Ialnl Staff' from ~: lnlaim OllldlllClC Rc&IlI'dlDI(~ ~gPSICRE~~~RN Page 148 of 499 IdtlQbAJ&GIJPIIiQ UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDflFOR PUBLIC RELEASE (~) In late 2005, during the period the U.S. Senate wu debaling the Det~i nee Treatment ACI barrinS "cruel. inhuman, or degrading treatment Qr punishment.'oOOO the CIA subjected Abu Ja'fAr ai-iraqi to ilS enhanced interrogation techniques. 901 A dnft Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) 5wed that Abu la'far ai-iraqi prmldcd "almost no information mill could be used to locate fonner colleagues or disrupt attack plots"-lhc type of information sought by lhc CIA, and the ClA'sjustification for the use of ilS enhanced InterTOplion ted1niques.9G2 Later, the SLatemcnt milt Abu la'far BI-Iraqi provided ".lmDst no jnformllion milt coold be u~cd (0 loclle rormer colleagues 01" disrupt altaCk plom" was deleted from the dnd't PDB.9Ql Abu Ja'far aj·lraqi remained in CIA custody until e.rly September ~06. when he Will transferred 10 U.S. milinary custody in lnlq.1llK 4. Tn, CM S~1u "Elld Gant¥N for Delll~es in Early 2005 Dlle 10 U",i~d SlIPPon From Lioison Pcnncn ce:_ - E~ I'nw: [IlEDACTEDJ: to: [aEOAC'TED), (R.EOACl'ED); • • • • (IlEDACTEDJ, (REDACTED}; Subjea: McCain AmcndJnent 0'11 Detlinee Trulll¥lll; dUe: Oao. 6. 2OM,1II12:31 PM. 101 AcconIinl to CtA rc.oRk, A.bu J. 'fllr Il-lrIIqi .....11I subjected kI nDdity, dlCluy manipulation. ;lIltllll!aps. abdominal 61ap5, dllentlon StRIpS, flll:iBI holds, Wlllling. ~s posiliOllS,llIC! wlla" dousi118 with '4 degra: FahJ':lIhc:it wuler for 18 laIAli!u. ffe Will s~~kled in die Slanding paliliotl fOr ~4 houn IIG pat1 of al"" *privatl~. llllC! ell,(X2'iliinued s_IUn. In hulo.... IeI' ~ulr1ng blood lhlllnCl' and spim llal balldlsea- He W1IS 1II11led to II sitrjn~ position, ~ hi. Mle.:p deprivation WGoS "tended co 18 boun. AftcI- the swelling $llblidcd, he .... pr'Dvided .....llb more blood thinner lIlld wall rehll1'll!d III the Slauding position. The sleep depri Yllion WI. ell:lCndlld til J02 hours. AAcr four hOUri of .~P. Abu la'f.. al.lraqi .....as subjccled to III1l1ddillonai 32 houri sleep cIIlprivatlcn. allor .....hich CIA HcedqullI1cl1 infbnl'led interrogators that eight hours wadle mlnUnum ~.t pa-Iod ~lln 51"" dcpl'ivlIIlon ~IUlW c:xtcc'dinS'8 hOlin. In addilion to the s.....elling. Abu J,'rac a1-Jraqi .Iso ~1\ "c:nwd an edelllA on IUs heud due 10 Walili1n .b.....ions on !Us neck, lind blisters on his ankles from ,hllCldN. s.~ 1310 or • DEC OS); DEC OS); 181J.DECOS); 1848 1819~ECO~' DOC OS); HliADQUARTERS _ 1847 DEC (3). ~t .ddillOI1Dllnfcrmaticn on Abu la'far II.Jr:IlU.niiiv.OI.Ume •• m . Dal8: Decclnber lIOI POD I>nIfI tltJcd~ • -. 13,2005. ALT (01: ·213~86. Ditettor (Jon notified the lJ8.honalsecurily advisor Ihal he had .1IICllor.ited dle.- of the CfA'$ enhuced inlc:mJS8Ilo,. ~iqlil:S on Aba Ja"flll"al-lrIqi bocalllZ "CIA belie... dill Abtl Jo'far polIlIlCHleI conaiduable ~iDNII iBfonnlll;oo IIbcnJ.t AbII MII'a;b a1-Zant-i." Sa Dl:crmber 1, 2.005, MeUlOlMd\llll fur lhe ....tional Sealtie)' ~vitor, Dir«lor of ~atiollllJ 11IIC11i~ Iiom p~ Gass. eenU'llllnlClltscnu Aljency. S\lbject. "COtInferremlrist .M~:IciOQ T~" .00 PDB Dmt deled: _ _ . . . . .~. .~ID*: December 16, 2.00~. ALT 10: 200S1217 POD on Abu Ialu 11-lloqi. Ulpng (he ~F 10 Il& draft POB, one or 6e i ~ invol.t ill A,* I ..'far "'lraqi'$ &nle'cTOal&ion wevle, "II' woe .lIow Che DiIcc:tor co gi¥e IhM PDB, • il ilwrillcn. to 'Ill '~klelll, 1 would imqi. 'he f'raidalc would ..y. 'YOII _ked IDe ID mk RlJ IftIidenq an )'Que intenvglliorls. ud no. 1011 gi ~ ItVlIhis 1hIIIIllptia me inlcn'081lIonl8A: DOl Vl'Odani. 'Wb1 do _ bott-'l' We flIink: tile lOne of die PCB .It()lll)d be NoUked. Some or fie conclusions. balCd ~ 0Ul e~' obIU11a,jollS, GIlould be ilmcDdcd. 11M: &!:!2.!! half full. nol twfempC)', and is .elling l110Rl full everyday." ~ emliJ from: lReD.A~1 _ • • •' to: [REOACTEO). [JU:DACTEDI, [REDACTED): cc: [REDACTED), [REDACJl!DJ. [REDACTED]: .U~l: POB on [Abu Ia'C. 4t-l~tc: December U. 2005, 1112::B AM. lllM I 2 0 3 1 _ In June 2007. inllOCUnlle information abouldle etrcctlwneu oflhe CIA'3 enhanced jnlCtroSllion tec:hniques on Abu Ja'fllr al-Jraqi WlIS provided to Ilia COl'Dmiun. S", CIA RC!Sii",aro Senllle 8e1ec:1 COlnnlhlec on Inlclll ence QUe$lions for !he Record. June 18.2001 (DTS 12007-2$64); . . ~OCT05' !!!!~_327rn ocrOS;32726 OCTO:!): 32944 OCTOS. ..--mIO I~QFQaN TQP Page 149 of 499 WrJ lla;7:IIIJI18 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE OCT OS): UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBUC RELEASE Cwsa.App.116 ( ~ ) In carly 2003, tbe CIA again iOught an "endgame" policy Cor irs detainees, citing ill unstable relatloll$ \Vim host governments and its difficulty in identlCying IldditJonal counllies to host etA detention racililies.~ Talking pojnts prepared fot me CIA director Cor a meeting with the nationlll security advisor made the fofl'lwinl appeal: ''CIA uflIently needs [the Pl1:sident of the Unil.ed States} Dnd Principals Committee dite<:tioo to csmblish a long-term disposition policy fOt the 12 High.VaJue detainees (HVD)s we hold in overseas deacntlon sires, Our li.ilOn Fillers who hostlhese 5ites 8~ deeply concerned by lREDACTeD)POe p~SI teaks. and they are incre1l.Singly skeptical ofttle IU.S. government's] commitment to keep seem tb:ircoopenbon•..• A combination of press leaks, international tcrurilly of .Ueged (U.s. govemmefU] detainee abuse. and Ihe pen:eplion dut [U.S. Jovemment] policy on de(ainees lacts direction is eroding our partners' trult in U.S. resol¥e EO pnJleCt their identities and SUPPoninl rotes. If a (U.S, governmenl] plan for long·tenn (detaineeJ dispotition docs nOI emerxe soon. the handful of liaison partners who cOOl'cratl: may iIlIk. UJi to dose down our filcitirics on their territory. Few couJltries are willi". to 8C~ept me huge riskllSSOCilc£d with hosti ng a CIA detention. site, so 'hri"k8~ of thI: already small pool oC willing candidates ~ould force us to curtail our highly successful inl,crrogation and detention program. Fel1l' of public exposure may also prompt previously cooper1lti~e liailon plrUlcn not to iK:(%pl custody of detainees we have captured and inrcrrogated, EJloblishment ora dear, pUblicly announced [detainee] 'endgame' - one sancrioncd by [the Pl1:sident of the United Statts] and . , . enthuslasm for helping the US in the Wlir ;;~-T~~~rism."901 ( _ ) 1n Ma~h· p~ints prep~d for the director tor a disclJssion with the Notionlll Security Council Principals Conunittee stilted thlJt it WIIS: :r005.l:aiking CIA .. The CIA'£ June WI) RtI>pOMC \lat9 !hilt an "imponant flElDc" conlribJ.ltf"s to the .Iower plIU fII CIA ckte"tion opt.t'atlonc wu ~a'i]; to: [REDACTEDJ; cc; _ IR6DAC'TEOI. [REDACTEDI,/REDACTEOl. [REDACTED]. WACl1ID'iilDACTED1; Ii1lbject: PIlon. c:aU flQlll SICT Amb. Hank CnlrllplOl'110 AClIbes.1.dorin . dae: NoVClJlbef J, 200S.1( 6:13:21 PM. AI\cr die: subxqllelll ,.us ~_tioM. die u.s. ~ in asked.,.in llbout ..,~het' the se.c~ry of cur. hiId ~ briefed, prudlpdltllbe CIA Stilton in Couob:y note in II. ClIbte _ briefi~ U.s. olticlolb ~l:lide of Ihc CIA ~W be &$' fbIlI ~ '"-~ . ... Sa ctED EDACTI!D . pxmary. lID 'I' itt ~ll'riJou5, .. lite WQlhin Post, November- 2, 2005. Slit! C I b REDAC1l!D] !iiEii ItHEADQUAR 1O . clbla to (REDACTED! III HEADQUAR _ and HBA~UAR S248S tDlI . 'nd ~lIble 10 /REDACTED) at HEADQUAR . Memonndum from D/elA Go.!as 10 Hlldley, Town~lnd Ind N'IRlponle. Page 152 of 499 LojfJ81s't881F1 CB UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE ~ The CIA catalogued how the Wa.rllillSltoll Polt story created tensions in its bilatual counte~rrorlsm relations with _ allies and determined that: 'l[t]he article II prompling our parblerS to reassess the bend'lts and COlts of coopenting with the {U.S. govcmment] and CIA, These servi=s hive COOduclcd~actopemrioos with CIA qainst... WJcts. includlng~.We no longer expect r11e servic;es ro be as 8gBJaSivc or cooperative: ~ fn April 2006. informed CiA officc:n lhat pre" stories on the erA' s ~ntioo and IntcrropDon Prograrn Jed the _ governmenc ro pnihibit _ from providing '"informaD()ft IhIt could lead to the rend.don 01' deCcal.ion ol81~'ida or other ICIJ"Clrisrs ID US. Govcntmellt c..srody ror in~.dOft. including CIA end Ihe DcpMmeBt orDefawse.,.g3C ~) Media leaks also ~bllCnsiec~mber .·2005, the chief ~~ S~rion in ~ountry • • -tit ., • met with the who wu not concerned about the CIA' § detention of terrorists in his country, but wanted alsurances lhat the CIA interrogation program did not include the U~ of = =..""'.,""=-'-"".=-.det m HEADQUARTERS _ {(It ED AClliDl I REDACTED J}. Xl! also HEADQUARrSRS_ ({REDAC'1"£Ol CREDA. ED. • . . t'O [.REDACTEDI 50 14 101 HEADQUARTERS nl See CIA R~ Letw 10 DOD fur Medical Asaistmee. dated _ _ .2006. fro", OCIA Pcftef l1 [REDACTEDI JI45 ?4l HEADQUARTERS 9'lf fREDACTEDj6481 "oS (REDACTEDI6481 OJofi [REDACTED168TI OWl HEADQUARTERS !il4f [REDAcrEDI1670 114~ Si!C email from: t,EDACfEOJ; 10: ; subjc:cl: CT mc:ctin discussion is also referenced in CICT~DO; subjeCl: Site: Visit 10 Rc:oommcndaliollS. A.s described. in June 2006, till! CIA inspector gtllllmlf mllcd an audit thalooDCllJded thai wbileCIA detention fadlitics lacked sufficientdebriefet:s,lbcy "'1 "wereconmul;:ted" equipped, and staffed 10 securely and safely conlllin detainees and prnlf1pl intlllligen:e uploitalion of delaincea." llte audit funficr detcnuincd lbat the fllCililics "II[C. nOl equipped to provide medical neatil1enllo detainees woo have or develo serious UcaI ormental disorders, and operable plans lire nOI in plllCC Page 155 of 499 ...................... " ....... , m,o, 'OS'ElSO UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFJEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Cla8s.App. 122 $. ~ By the time a CIA team visilCd the Country. detention she in late 2006, the CIA had already invesced million in the new facility. Describing the absence of adequate emergency medical care options as "ulLII.cceptable," the chief of ROO ICCommended in a drort memo that conslnlction efforts be abandoned for this reason.9~ The following day, an edi[C.d ve~ion of the some memo described the issue as a "challenge," but did not recommend that the CIA cease constIuctlon of the fadlity.9S1 The resulting CIA detention facility, which would eventullUy cost _ million, was never used b~e CIA. Press reports about the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program that appeared in and. eventually fon:ed the CIA to pass possession of the unused facility 10 the CounltY gO\lemment.9~2 ( ~ In early January 2006. officials at the Department of Defense. informed CIA officers that Seererary of Defense Rumsfeld had made a formal decision not to accept any CIA detainees at the U ,S, military base at Ouantanamo Bay. CUM.f)S3 At the circe, the CIA was holding 28 delainees in its two remaining facilities, DETENTION SITE VIOLET, in Counrry lind OIITENTION SITE ORANGE, in Country 9~ .In prepor.ltion for- a meeting with Secrerary of Defense. Rumsfeld on January 6. 2006, CIA Director Goss was provided n document indicating that the Depanmenl of Defense's position not to aHow the transfer- of CIA detainees to U.S. milirary custody a~ G'lllltltanamo Bay "would cripple legitimate end game planning" for the CIA.9ll The talldng points fC1r that meeting suggested that Director Goss tell SeCretary Rumsfeld lhat lhe: I, I. "only viable 'endgame' ror continued US Goyemment custody of these mosl dangerous terrorisCS is a transrer to OTMO.,. [albscnt the nvailabililY of Gl'Mo..aJlCl,e¥eatu8lDw}~·A.~ssarily·Aa,,~·wgiil • lransferring those delainees no longer producing intelligence to third countries. to pruvide inpatient are for detllillC~," and o;Jll~ludcd II1lIt CIA delention flu::ililies wr.re nol equipped 10 provide emet'lenc:y medical CIlre to delainee.s. 1k Budilleam did nol visit the fllCilily in Country. bu t slaled, with regard to 1.nOIher caul'Itr)', Counlly. Ihal '"CIA funds have been wasted in COflsll\lcling lind equipping a medical fllcility thai .... lI.9ll1lCr *!ermined n011 be. viablll oplion fur pIOyidlng inpatient Clift: far del.Dinces," See Report of A1Idir, CIA-eonlrollcd ~Iention Facililies Oper.llcd lJllder die 17 Sepll:ITlbcr 2001 Meg:grondum of Notiticalion, Report No. '2OOS..(){)L 7-A.S, June J4, 2006, III DTS" 2006-2793. The CIA'~ _ sllpet"o'ised the CIA.'s RenditioDS lind ~lentioll Grollp. . _____. ._. ~ 006, Memorandllm ror die Record, 10: CICT~ franc ~OO. 1\'1; Sile Visit to aDd Recommendalions. .tro<16. MemonDldum for I~ ReIXJ!d.lo; CXT1i1Jl\'1: Clcr~OO. Ie: Sile Visil 10 and Recommeodations (2). 'ISl CoogRlSsioo111 NatiflCalion: Centrllllr~Respo_lG HOlt Counfl')' Go..-emment Order to Veate an IllIICtive Blaclcsite Detention Facility. _ _ (~ 12009·37 J I)i SSCI Memorandum ror &he Record, CIA Document, RDI Program Bac:kplund 8rid'fOl' f,.cOD Panerta, 2009. 's] DeJA TaUciDg Points for (j 111nuIII)' 2006 Brelltfast wilh Secretar)' of Defense, Ri; SeeDef RefuSllI to Take CfA Deuinccs on QTMO. U4 See CIA Memo, ••~ of 01 JaDulllY 2006. Ihel'll ~ 28 KYo. in CIA. cualody." IU noled abO'o'c, DETENTiON SITE VIOLET in COlInII)'. "ould be clOlCd in _ 2006. '" [)CIA. Talting Polftu for 6 JanllUY 2006 Brellkfasl .... hh Secmary of Def=nse. re: SccDef Refusal 10 Take CV. DetaineCll 01\ OTMO. Page lS6 of 499 ~ ..eLA8eIFJEB UNCLASSIF1EOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Clas6.App. 123 which may release them. or Idle CIA itself may need to] outright ttlease them."~ ( ~ ) After Secn:tary Rumsfeld declined to reconsider his decision not to allow the: transfer of CIA del.ainces to U.S. miJiwy cusrndy at Guantanllmo Bay, CIA officen; proposed elevating the iRsue to the pn:sident. CIA officers prepared talking points for Director Goss to meet wilh the pn:sident on lhe "Way Forward" on lhe program on lanUlll}' 12.2006.!ilfl The talking points recommended that lhe CIA director "Slress that absent a decision on the 10118term issue (so called 'endgame') we are srymied and the pTOgIllDl could collapse ot its own weight."?5B There IIIC no records to indicate whether Director Goss made lhIs presentation 10 thI: president. ' ~) 'In 2005 and 2006, the CIA transferred detainees from it! custody to at least nine countries, lnclucli • as well as to lhe U.S. military in Iraq. Many of lhese detainees wet'C subsequently reJeased. 959 By May 2006. the CrA had 11 detainees whom it had identified as cand Idales prosecution by II U.S. military commission. The remaining detainees were described as having "repatriation optioR8 open.,,!l6Q ror 6, T/~ CIA Considers Changes to the CIA Detention and InterrogatIon Program Following tbe Detainee TrtalmenJ Act. Hamdan v. Rums/eld ( ~ Following the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act in December 200s. the CIA conducted numerous discussions with !he National Security Council principals about modifications (0 the program lhat would be acceptable from a policy Dnd legal standpoint In February 2006, tDlking points prepared for CIA Director Goss noted that National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley: "aslced ro be informed of the criteria CIA will usc before accepting 8 detainee into its CIA Counterterrorist Rendition. Detention, and Interrogation ProgtBm. Slating thal he believed CIA had in the past accepted detainees it should not have."961 (~ The CIA director proposed future criteria that would require not only lhaC CIA detainees meet thI: standard in the MON. but that they possess infonnation about threats to the citizens of the Unired States or other nations, and that detention in a CIA facility 't~ OCI" Talking Points i'ot6 January 2006 B.eaJcfllst with SCCl'cw)' of Defense, Ri: SceDef Refllsllilo Take-CIA DelllinCIC:I on GTMO. DeJA Talking Pojn~ fur 12 JlllluUry 2006 Meeting with W Prcsicknl, re: Way ForwlR1 Oil Coontc:rtenurisl Relldition, DClentionlnd Interrogation Program. • 5& 00..... Talking Points for 12 January 2006 Meeling with Iht Presidl:rll., re: Way Forw8l'lfoo COUl'lIett«roriu Rendition, Detr:nlion alld [nlemJglltion PI'QVIIIl, 9$9 See Volume I for nddilional delails. I'l1O P,fly 18,2006. Ikpulics Co",mil~ (Un-DC) MDCling. PrelimillBry Delllinee End Game Opcionl, For .ldjtiQllill 'iT infonnaLion. Silt! Volume I. DeJA Totting Poinls for 9 Febnwy 2006 Un-DC. re: Future of the a" CounrelttlTUist Rendilion, Detention, and fnterroglllion Prognm- Detainees, '161 Page 1~7 of 499 , '0,0: , o n , c e = = U'."'LI"\UUI ,- '~L.I UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 124 Declaration of Dr. Sondra S. Crosby I. I am a licensed physician in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and am board certi?ed in the specialty of lntemal Medicine. I graduated from the University of Washington School of Medicine, and received my clinical training at the Boston City Hospital (now Boston Medical Center) residency program in lntemal Medicine. Currently, I am an Associate Professor of Medicine and Public Health, at the Boston University Schools of Medicine and Public Health, in the Departments of Medicine, and Health Law, Bioethics, and Human Rights, and a member of the Section of General lntemal Medicine at Boston Medical Center. 2. My clinical practice focuses on care of asylum seekers and refugees, most of whom have experienced torture. 1 have taught extensively on the medical care and evaluation of refugees and survivors of torture, and I have given invited presentations throughout the United States and internationally on various topics related to caring for survivors of torture. I have taught and mentOred Istanbul Protocol evaluation and documentation in Bishkek, Dushanbe, Tajikistan; Istanbul, Turkey, Reyhanli, Turkey, Almaty, Kazakhstan, and Amman, Jordan as a medical consultant for Physicians for Human Rights. I have given workshops on the preparation of medical af?davits and have lectured in the Asylum Of?cers Basic Training Course in Lansdowne, VA on medical forensic ?ndings in asylum cases. 3. In addition, I have published scholarly papers in The New England Journal of Medicine, The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), Annals of Internal Medicine, The British Medical Journal, The Journal of General Internal Medicine, The Laryngoscope, The British Journal of Ophthalmology, and Urology among others, on, my work in caring for survivors of torture. 4. have been quali?ed as an expert witness in United States Immigration Court in- Boston, Federal District Court for the District of Columbia, and the Military Commission Cbiit?tiri Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (United States v. Al-Nashiri). I have written over 300 af?davits documenting medical and sequelae of torture 5. have evaluated and examined nearly 1000 survivors of torture in my medical practice. I am consultant to Physicians for Human Rights, and have evaluated the effects of torture, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and displacement on Darfuri women living in a Refugee Camp in Chad, and former detainees in US detention at Guantanamo Bay, and at other sites in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, I have served as a medical forensic expert for the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, investigating allegations of torture. 6. I am co-founder and director of the Forensic Medical Evaluation Group, a multidisciplinary group at Boston University School of Medicine and Boston Medical Center, providing evaluation and documentation of physical and evidence of torture and abuse. 7. On March 7, 2012, I was appointed by the Department of Defense as an expert in the ?eld of internal medicine and the treatment of victims of torture to consult with defense counsel representing Abd Al?Rahim Al?Nashiri and to conduct an evaluation of Mr. Al-Nashiri?s physical and mental condition. PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 125 8. I have reviewed both classi?ed and unclassi?ed records including records of Mr. Al- Nashiri?s treatment while in the custody of the CIA. I have met with Mr. AI-Nashiri on multiple occasions at Guantanamo Bay. I have evaluated Mr. Al~Nashiri for approximately 30 hours. My medical evaluation (physical and was based on the Istanbul Protocol, which is the international standard for the medicolegal investigation of torture. 9. I have spoken with Barry Rosenfeld, a also employed by the Al-Nashiri defense team. Dr. Rosenfeld did a mental status evaluation of Mr. AI-Nashiri at the request of the defense. I 10. I have reviewed the publicly available ?ndings of the military competency board that evaluated Mr. Al-Nashiri at the request of the prosecution. I concur with the competency board?s ?ndings that Mr. AI-Nashiri suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and major depression. l. have also reviewed the unclassi?ed SSCI Torture Report and the declassi?ed CIA- Inspector General Investigation, which were both released by the Government and detailed certain aspects of the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation program. These reports revealed that Mr. AI-Nashiri was waterboarded, subjected to mock execution, anal rape, and other forms of torture. According to these reports, the goal of the program was to induce a detainee to a state of ?learned helplessness.? A concept coined by experimental Dr. Martin Seligman in the 19605, inducing ?learned helplessness? consisted of restraining dogs and subjecting them to random and repeated electric shocks. Dogs that could not control or in?uence their suffering in any way ?Ieamed? to become helpless, collapsing into a state of passivity. Dr. Seligman found that if a researcher in?icted uncontrollable pain on a dog over a long enough period of time, the animal abandoned any attempt to escape its con?nement or avoid further pain, even if given the opportunity. Mr. AI-Nashiri was in essence, broken down in the same way as the dogs in the experiments. I2. Based on my own evaluation of the records made available to me, my conversations with Dr. Rosenfeld and my own evaluations of and conversations with'Mr. Al-Nashiri personally, it is my conclusion that Mr. Al-Nashiri suffers from complex posttraumatic stress disorder as a result of extreme physical, and sexual torture in?icted upon him by the United States. In my opinion, the CIA also succeeded in inducing ?learned helplessness? in Mr. Al-Nashiri. The result is that Mr. AI-Nashiri is most likely irreversibly damaged by torture that was unusually cruel and designed to break him. Indeed, in my many years of experience treating torture victims from around the world, Mr. AI?Nashiri presents as one of the most severely traumatized individuals I have ever seen. Making matters worse, there is no present effort to treat the damage, and there appear to be efforts to block others from giving him appropriate clinical care. 'l3. The physical and diagnoses of Mr. AI-Nashiri are compelling. One suffering from complex PTSD would be expected to be hyperviligent, suffer from intrusive recollections and ?ashbacks, sleep disorders, nightmares and other recognized sequalae of torture. Mr. AI-Nashiri displays every of complex PTSD. suffers chronic nightmares, the content of which, while classi?ed, in my opinion directly relate to the Speci?c physical, emotional and sexual torture in?icted upon Mr. AI-Nashiri while in US custody. He experiences ?ashbacks, which are triggered frequently by reminders of torture. 2 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 126 I4. The torture experienced by Mr. Al- Nashiri has fractured his trust in humanity,'which has damaged his ability to interact with all humans, including counsel, doctors, other detainees, and even family. While much of Mr Al-Nashiri? 3 treatment remains classi?ed, there is no question that Mr Al -Nashiri was tortured at the hands of the CIA and that his current and poor health directly relate to that torture. I5. My physical examination of Mr. Al-Nashiri strongly supported his account of torture. This examination included a detailed history of historical and current physical in addition to examination ?ndings, including scars. Many of his physical ailments, notably chronic pain, can be linked to torture techniques utilized during his detention. 16. Despite the passage of time between Mr. Al-Nashiri?s direct torture in CIA custody and the present, he shows little sustained improvement. Although, even in the best of circumstances, the horrific and calculated nature of his torture would be expected to have long lasting effects, there are multiple factors that are unique to Guantanamo and the military proceedings against him that are further exacerbating his and suffering. A principal factor in Mr. Al Nashiri?s current condition is that Guantanamo itself was one of the so-called ?black sites? in which Mr.Al-Nashiri was hold, during hisperiod of secret detention in the RBI program. It is dif?cult to overstate the pervasive consequences of this.- On a periodic basis Mr. Al-Nashiri is confronted with reminders (visual, audible) of his time in CIA custody. Seeing these reminders particularly when shackled as he often is while moved to and from meetings with counsel and to court, triggers traumatic stress and causes him intense anxiety, dissociation, and pain?il ?ashbacks to his experience of torture. His deterioration is exacerbated by the lack of appropriate mental health treatment at Guantanamo. Based on my assessment and vast experience caring for survivors of torture, the physical and mental health care afforded to him is needs. A signi?cant factor in my opinion is that medical professionals, including mental health care providers, have apparently been directly or indirectly instructed not to inquire into the causes of Mr. Al-Nashiri?s mental distress, and as a consequence, he remains misdiagnosed and untreated. Any discussion of his experience of torture, which is the primary cause of his most chronic physical and mental ailments, appears to be off limits. 1 base this opinion on my review of medical records and the public testimony of ?Dr. 97,? who was Mr. AlaNashiri?s attending mental healthcare provider until recently. Dr. 97 changed his diagnosis of Mr. Al-Nashiri from PTSD to Narcissistic Personality Disorder shortly in advance of a hearing that involved the adequacy of Mr. Al-Nashiri?s medical care. This is professionally irresponsible and is representative of the quality of mental health care that Mr. Al-Nashiri receives. 19. Lack of adequate mental health treatment is exacerbating Mr. Al-Nashiri?s suffering and instability, and he continues to suffer from ongoing PTSD including somatic complaints, nightmares, hyperviligence, ?ashbacks, numbing, and a host of other 20. The procedures and circumstances of the Mr. Al-Nashiri conditions of confinement and military trial process are sources of triggering events. The lack of treatment has left Mr. Al- Nashiri with out the tools necessary to self-regulate his emotional responses to triggering events that others may not perceive. Without realizing it, guards, military trial personnel and even Mr. 3 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 127 Al-Nashiri?s defense team may do or say things that seem benign, or at least manageable in terms of their emotional valence, but which are profoundly and disproportionately upsetting to Mr. Al-Nashiri. The absence of an adequate mental health support system in Guantanamo causes each of these episodes to exacerbate Mr. Al-Nashiri?s complex PTSD. The environment in Guantanamo lacks stability or any sense of relative safety. This lack of stability profoundly exacerbates Mr. Al-Nashiri?s complex PTSD. i understand from public court ?lings that the policies and procedures within the detention facilities are highly variable and unpredictable. This appears to be at least partially the result of an unstable command environment. Most of the detention personnel are stationed in Guantanamo for only 6 to 18 months. in addition, multiple chains of command are responsible for various aspects of his detention, the military trial process, and his health care. A key strategy of the CIA's program was to keep the detention facility's policies and procedures unpredictable in order to induce helplessness. Whether deliberate or not in Guantanamo, the effect on Mr. AI-Nashiri is the same. 2 I. This chronic uncertainty conSpires to present him with ever-changing rules and procedures, whose rationales are obscure to the point of arbitrary. While healthy adults might be able to accept that this atmosphere of uncertainty is now only incidental and a consequence of bureaucmtic mismanagement, Mr. Al-Nashiri has no way of differentiating this from the government?s prior deliberate efforts to destabilize his personality. Whatever the genesis of the chronic uncertainty, the effect is the same. There is an almost daily retraumatization of Mr. Al- Nashiri and no adequate mental health care to provide him the tools to deal with that. 22. At present, the military trial process is a principal driver of this instability. Rules governing hearings and how the issues will be dealt with are highly fluid and unpredictable. Moreover, the military judges have reSponded to defense requests pertaining to Mr. Al-Nashiri's conditions of con?nement by stating that they have no power to control the various agencies that impact Mr. Al-Nashiri?s well-being, such as the command that is responsible for control over the facility where Mr. Al-Nashiri is housed or the medical staff at Guantanamo. To be clear, I have no insight into the merits on any issue other than issues pertaining to Mr. Al-Nashiri?s health care. However, in my opinion, the inability or unwillingness of the presidingjudge to act on the merits of issues directly impacting Mr. Al?Nashiri?s conditions of con?nement and consequently his mental heaith contributes to a general atmosphere of arbitrariness that, given the stakes involved, exacerbates his trauma. 23. Given that the military trial is seeking to impose the death penalty against him, the ad hoc character of the proceedings causes Mr. Al-Nashiri profound anxiety. This anxiety is exacerbated by the fact that often his own defense counsel are typically unable explain or predict the course of the proceedings to him, to articulate applicable rules and standards, or set reasonable expectations for what will transpire. Indeed, given the ad hoc nature of the proceedings, it is unclear ifor when a trial will occur. 24. One of the most destabilizing aspects of the military trial process is the lack of continuity of Mr. AI-Nashiri?s defense team. Only one of his lawyers who were present at the beginning of the proceedings in 201 1 remains. I understand that this is a consequence of military personnel rules. But Mr. Al-Nashiri is ill equipped to understand, let alone cope with, the loss of lawyers with whom he has developed relationships of varying degrees of trust. Particularly signi?cant in 4 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 128 my opinion is the loss of CMDR Brian Mizer with whom Mr. Al-Nashiri had a particularly trusting relationship. CMDR Mizer?s departure, over Nashiri?s objection, is particularly damaging. He also had a relationship with Ms. Nancy Hollander, which was involuntarily severed. While other lawyers have departed with Mr. Al-Nashiri?s understanding, the chronic turnover in his defense team contributes to the lack of stability in his world. This has a signi?cantly deleterious effect on his ability to cope with circumstances and undermines his ability to trust others who claim to be helping him. - 25. Another aspect of the military trial process that causes a great deal of anxiety and traumatization is his periodic exclusion from the proceedings. When the military commission goes into ?closed session,? not only is Mr. Al-Nashiri excluded from the courtroom, but his attorneys are prevented from explaining to him what transpires or providing .spcci?cs as to why the session was closed in the ?rst place. This in my opinion seriously interferes with his ability to trust his attorneys. What is more, he is generally aware that sessions are closed when issues relating to his torture are being discussed. This causes him acute distress associated with his exclusion from a discussion of his 'own experiences. 26. In my opinion, a capital trial of Mr. Al-Nashiri in the current Military Commission regime will have a profoundly harm?al- and possibly long lasting effect upon him, to the permanent harm already in?icted. While I would expect a capital trial in any court to be stressful, my knowledge of the more predictable procedures of federal con?nement and trials causes me to believe that the contemplated military trial is stressful on a different order of magnitude and, given Mr. Al-Nashiri?s situation and fragile state induced by torture, exponentially more harmful. 27. Al-Nashiri?s ability remain physically or mentally capable of handling the physical and emotional stress of the military trial process. As things stand, hearings in Guantanamo have lasted no more than a few days a week, perhaps one week per month. When a trial, expected to last several months, begins and trial proceedings are held daily and particularly when issues surrounding his torture are litigated in an adversarial setting, I fear that Mr. Al?Nashiri will eventually decompensate. Without adequate mental health support and in light of the unusual and unpredictable character of the proceedings, there is a strong likelihood that this decompensation will have a permanently disabling effect on his personality and his capacity to cooperate meaningfully with his attorneys. Pursuant to 28 U. C. 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States at America that the foregoing IS true and correct. . Executed on October 24, 20 5. Sondra S. Cro M.D PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 129 Id SC~IGT lEi raSiBSilBI5 Dr eGA Center for forensic Behavioral Sc;ence5 Walter Reed National Milirary Medical Center 6000 Py1acArthur 81"11, Ste 1099, Bethesda, MO 20814 28 March 2013 Memomndum For: Mr. Richard Kammen, civilian learned council, and CDR(S) Stephen Reyes, IAGC,USN SUBJECT: RMC 706 Sanity Board Evaluation of Abd Al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad AI Nash iri: ISN# 10015 .1. IDENTIFYING INFORMATION Mr. Nashiri is a 47 year-old single, Middle Eastern, male of Saudi Arabian and Yemeni decent who has been in US custody for approximately ten years. Mr. Nashiri is currently incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 2. REASON FOR REFERRAL Mr. Nashiri is referred for the purpose of conducting a Sanity Board in accordance with Rules for Military Commission (R.M.C.) 706. According to the supporting documentation provided with the Sanity Board Order, a government motion dated 15 November 2012 raised concern that the accused may not be competent to stand trial due to a mental condition, The govemment's inquiry is based on several comments made by the accused during a motions hearing on 24 October 2012 referencing his "bad nerves" and poor treatment/threats from the guards which preclude him from attending court proceeding$. The current Board is comprised of one psychiatrist and one psychologist assigned to the Center for forensic Behavioral Sciences (CFBS) at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC) and one psychologist assigned to United States Anny Recruitin Command (USAREC): Lieut~ David Johnson, M.D., Major (MAJl Psy.D., and M A I _ Psy.D., respectively. The Sanity Board Order requires that the following three questions be addressed by the Board: a. Is the accused presently suffering from a mental disease or defect? b. What is the clinical psychiatric diagnosis? c. Does the mental disease or defect render the accused menally incompetent to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or cooperate intelligently in or conduct his defense? 1fI8-8@~aS$m 1."-'.1 w 1.L-1.. sn psswn .'\..I..I;&Li .... '5 A.....oII...I....I,.JI.1. Q? 'JILJ.I""'1. UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 130 1'8 88~q6i if!!T~JIJt!flJ'MtJf e@t SUBJECT: RMC 706 Sanity Board Evaluation of Abd Al Rahim Hllssayn Muhammad Al Nashiri: ISNIill0015 3. LIST OF CHARGES CHARGE I: VIOLAnON OF 10 U.S.C. § 950t(17), USING TREACHERY OR PERFIDY Specification: In that Abd at Rahim Hussayn Muhammad al NASHlRI, an alien unprivileged enemy belligerent subject to trial by military commission, did, in or around Aden, Yemen, on or about 12 October 2000, in the conlext of and associated with hostilities, invite the confidence and belief of one or more persons onboard USS COLE (DDG 67), that two men dressed in civilian clothing, waving at the crewmembers onboacd USS COLE (DOG 67), and operating a civilian boat, were entitled to protection under the law of war, and intending to betray that confidence and belief, did thereafter make use of that confidence and belief to detonate explosives hidden on said civilian boat alongside USS COLE (DDG 67), l<:illing 17 per$ons (see Charge n for a list of deceased) and injuring one or more persons, all crewmernbers onboard USS COLE (DDG 67). CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF 10 U.S.C. § 950t(15), MURDER IN VIOLATION OF TIlE LAW OF WAR Specification: In that Abd al Rahim H ussayn Muhammad al NA SHIRl, an alien unprivileged belligerent subject to trial by military commission, did, In or around Aden. Yernen, on or about 12 October 2000, in the context of and associated with hostilities, in violation of the law of war, to wit: by committing an aa of perfidy, said act of perfidy being two men dressing in civilian clothing, waving at the crewmember.; onb08rd USS COLE (DDG 67), OJ;Id operating and detonating an explosives-laden civilian boat alongside a United States navsl vessel, intentionally and unlawfully kill the foHO'Ning 17 persons: I. HT3 Kenneth E. Clodfelter, USN; 2. ETC Richard Costelow, USN; 3. MSSN Lakeina M. Francis, USN; 4. ITSN Timothy L Gauna, USN; 5. SMSN CheroneL. GuM, USN; 6. ITSN lames R. McDaniels, USN; 7. EN2 Marc I. Nieto, USN~ 8. EW3 Ronald S. Owens, USN; 9. SN Lakiba N. Palmer. USN; 10. ENFA loshua. L. Parlett, USN~ 11. FN Patrick H. Roy, USN; 12. EW2 Kevin S. Rux. USN; 13. MS3 Ronchester M. Santiago, USN; 14. OS2 Timothy L. Saunders, USN; 15. FN Gary G. Swenchonis, Jr., USN; 16. f:NS Andrew Triplett, USN; and 17. SN Craig B. Wibberley, USN. en~my 2 UNCLASSIFIEDilFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCu\SSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App.131 '8 B @ _ t e l { Tjl@J'f MVtriW88 BY 88:\ . SUBJECT: RMC 706 Sanity Board Evaluation of Abd AllUhim Hussayn Muhammad AI Nashiri: ISN#1001.5 CHARGE III: VIOLAnON OF 10 U.S.C. § 95Ot(15), 10 U.S.C. § 950t(28), AlTEMPTED MURDER IN VIOLAnON OF THE LAW OF WAR Specification 1: In that Abel al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad al NASHIRI, an alien unprivileged enemy belligerent subject to trial by military commission. did, in or around Aden, Yemen, on or about 31anuary 2000, in the context of and associated with hostilities, with the specific intent to commit Murder 10 Violation of the Law of War, attempt to intentionally and unlawfully kill one or lDore persons onboacd USS TIlE SULLIVANS (DOG 68). in vioiation ofthe law of war, to wit: by committing an act of perfidy, and comm itting acts that amount to more than mere preparation, and to effect the commission of Murder in Violation of the Law of War, the said NASHIRI rented real property, acquired a boat, acquired explosives. then altered, assemble~ and launched an explosives:-Iaden boat, after ordering those onboard to perfidiously approach USS THE SULLIVANS (DDG 68), and then to detonate the explosives so as to dwnage and sink USS THE SULLIVANS (ODG 68), and to kill one or more persons onboatd that vessel. Specification 2: In that Abd a.I Rahim Hussayn Muhammad al NASHllU, an a.lien unprivileged enemy belligerent subject to triaJ by military commission, did, in or arOWld Aden., Yemen, on or about 12 October 2000, in the context of and associated with hostilities, with the specific intent to commit the 0 ffen5e of Murder in Violation of the Law of War, attempt to intentionally and unlllwfully kill one or more persons onboard USS COLE (DOG 67), in violation of the law of war, to wit: by committing an act of perfidy, and commi~ng acts that amount to more than mere preparation, IIl1d to effect the commission of Murder in Violation of the Law of War, the Said NASHIRl rented real property, acquired a boat, acquired explosives, altered the boat, and ordered those onboard to launch the explosives-laden boat, to perfidiously approach USS COLE (DOG 67), and to detonate the explosives while alongside USS COLE (DOG 67) so as to damage and sink USS COLE (DDG 67), and to kill one or more persons onboard that vessel. CHARGE IV: VIOLA nON OF 10 U.S.C. § 95Ot(24), TERRORISM Specification 1: In that Abd al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad al NASHlRI, an alien unprivileged enemy belligerent subject to trial by military commission. did. in or around Aden, Yemen, on or about 12 October 2000, in the context of and associated with hostilities, and in a manner clllcul9ted to influence IlIld affectthe conduct of the United States government by intlmidation and coercion and to retaliate against the United States government, engage in an act that evinced a wanton disregard for human life, to wit: intentionally detonating an explosives-laden boat alongside USS COLE (DDG 67), resulting in the deaths of seventeen persons (see Charge H for a list of deceased) and the infliction of great bodily harm on one or more persons. all cn:wmembers onboard USS COLE (DOG 67). Speclficalion 2: In that Abel al RBhim Hussayo Muhammad al NASIDRI, an alien unprivileged enemy belliserent subje<:t to trial by military commission, did, in or around the coast of AI Mukallah. Yemen. on or about 6 October 2002. in the context of and associated with hostilities, and in a manner calculated to influence and affect the conduct of the United States government UNCu\SSJFJEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE ClassApp.132 "8 8~f8"y'tjf MlJtFifJ\ii88 8V 881'. SUBJECT: RMC 706 Sanity Board Evaluation of Abd Al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad AI Nashiri: ISN#1001S by intimidation and coercion and to retaliate against the United States government, intentionally kill and inflict great bodily harm On one or more protected persons and engage in an act that evinced a wanton disregard for human life. to wit: detonating an explosives-laden boat alongside MV Limburg, resulting in the death of one civilian person, Mr. Atana.s Atanasov. onboard MV Limburg. CHARGE V; VIOLATION OF 10 U.S.C. § 9S0t(29), CONSPIRACY Specification: In that Abd al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad al NASIURI, an alien unprivileged enemy belligerent subject to trial by military cOllUOission, did, at multiple locations in and around Yemen. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emira.tes (hereinafter "UAElt) . Qatar, Bosnia, the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula, and other locations, in the context ofBJld associa.ted with hostilitiei, from an unknown date prior to approximately August 1996, through approximately October 2002, willfully conspire, agree, and join with at least one oftbe following: a. Usama bin Laden b. Ayman AI Zawabiri c. Mohammed AteC d. Mushin Musa Matwalli Atwah e. Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak bin 'Attash f. Jamal Ahmed Mohammed Ali AI-Badawi g. Fand MohammedAhmed AI-Quso h. Hassan Sa'id Awad Al Khamri i. Ibrahim AI-Thawar j. Taba Ibrahim Hussein AI-Abdal k. Hadi Muhammad Salm AI-Wirsh I. Nasse~ Ahmad Nasser AI~Bahri m. Khalid Ibn Muhammad Al Juhani n. Fawzi Muhammad 'Abci-Al-Qawi AI-Wajih o. Fawzi Yahya Qaim AI-Hababi p. Muneer AI Sharabi q. Walid AI~Shaybah r. Mohammad Rashed Daoud AJ~Owha1i s. Jihad Muhammad Abdah Ali Abdullah AI-Harazi t. Ali HJUnza Ahmed SuJiman AI-Bahlul u. Nasir 'Awad v, Husayn AI-Badawi; w. Ahmed Mohammed at Darbi x. UOlar Sa'id Hassan larullah y. Muhammed Sa'id Ali Hasan AI-Amari z. and others, both known and unknown; 4 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Clas8.App.133 'P!C8e_HGT 1W' M9 i'tPJ iJiIi!IB 81 88/2 SUBJECT: RMC 706 Sanity Board Evaluation of Abd AI Rahim Hussayn Mul1ammad AI Nashiri: ISN#I001S to commit 1'errorism and Murder in Violation of the Law of Wor, both offenses triable by military commissim, with the conspirw:yresuiting in the death of one or more victims and, knowing that Terrorism and Murder in Vio\a1ion of the Law ofWIIC were the unlawful pLllpose of the conspiracy, and intendil\8 his actions to further the unlawful purpose ofthc: c:cnspirncy, the said NASHIRI did knowinsly commit aI leastone ofthe following overt acts: I. Between a"p~ilm.tely 1994 and 1999, NASHIRI and co-¢OnSpiralors joined a call to jihad against the enemies orIslam by Usama bin Laden C'bin Laden"). NASHIRl and the co-conspirator.a tr.sveled to locations sudt as Bosnia. Tajikistan, and Afghardstan.. In these locauons NASHIRI and co~onspirato~ attended bBining amps either run by or associaled with aI Qaeda. NASHIRlliained in or gave training in mllitaty tactics. including but nO{ liJDited 10, craining on combat. ~apons, bomb-milking, an.d ossa55ln.non. NASHIRI and the co-conspiratcm then panicipated in. or ll~mpt.ed to participate in. jihad by fighting in brigades of mujahideen. 2. Between epprol(imatety 1996 and 1999, NASHDU and co·CQn'pindo~ m~ pasonaJ Iy with bin Laden and other high-ranking members of III Qacd a and some of the c,,~nspjrators s won: an oath of allegiance to bin Laden. During this time period. NASH1Rl de"cloped relatiornhips with indj"iduals who would later assist him in what would become known as the "boats operation." \ 3. In approx.imately late 1997 to 1998, NASHIRI discussed with bin Laden plans lOr II boats OpLT.tlon to attack ships in the Arnbian Penirnula, Q plan wbic:h p~Ylously bad been d~L1ssed by bin Laden and Walid Muhammad Salih Mubatak bin 'Attash ("Khallad"). 4. NASHIRI. bin Laden and Khallad ultimately planned at Qaeda's bollt3 opemtion. which came 10 encompass at least three- separate terrorist att&:ks: an attempted attack on USS 1l£E. SLTLUVANS (DDG 68) 003 January 2000; acomple~ aaadt on USS COLE (DOG 61) on 12 ~tober 2000; IllJd a completed attack on II FraKh 51i1~. MY Lilftburg. on 6 October 2002. s. In approlC.imillely 1998••• the direction of bin Laden, NASHIRI and Khatlad lJ8yelted to Yemen, at the southern tip of the Anbian Peninsulo, 10 prepare for the boats operation. NASHUlJ scoured tbe AI-Hudaydal1 area of Yemen and conducted 5WVcillan~ of ship traffic in the region. As NASHIRI ond Khallad collec:ted infonnation, they and bin Laden began 10 focus their attention on mounting an attack in Aden Hatbor. 6. In approl(immly the summer of 1998, in response to direl:tion by bin Laden, NASHIRJ and Khallad assisted in another 01 Qaeda plol. simultaneous attlll;!l3 on United Slates embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in East Africa, where NASHIRI pro"ided a fraudulent Yemeni passport used by one of the suicide bombers to enter Kenyoll immediately before the attack on the Embassy of the Unired States in Nairobi. '8,,,-'0= '== • ,'-'~ .1L.I 5 DEZ_UIED 1.~".I.I.J"l'UV ft"J Ene ""'''-'6Wo UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE ClasaApp. 134 18 OU_fCT1TTPF'!WV.TP PlJ @'9.'z SUBJECT: RMC 706 Sanity Board Evaluation of Abd AI Rahim Hussayn Muhammad AI Nuhin: ISN#lOOIS Kenya, and where K.ballad provided that same suicide bomber wltll deta.ils of tile attack plan. 7. In BPProximat.ely early 1999, at Ule direction of bin Laden. NASHIRl and KhalJad continued ptepuring for the boats operation, including (but not limited to) obtaining and storing e'Xplo~ives for use in the roal$ operation. NASHlRl then left Yemen becauie KhaJ lad had been 8J'TeSted by Yemc:ni autllorities. 8. After KhaJlad's alRStandsubscquent release from jail in May 1999, NASHlRJ rcNmed 10 Vemen witb instructions from bin Laden. NASHIRJ took control of the boals operation, at the direction ofbin Laden, due 10 unwanted eaendon Khallad received as a result of his anesl NASHlRJ wok ova preparations (or the boals opemtion, BI1d Kballad reblmW to Afghanistan. 9. During late 1999 a,nd early 2000. NASHIRI spoke with Khallad on 1M phone several times to relay information about the boocs operation, and on at least one occ:a.sion Khallad relayed this inrormation to bin Laden. . 10. Between approximately the swnmer of 1999 and the winter of 1999, NASHIRI continued malting preparations to implement al Qrw:da's boa~ operllLion, some of which he accomplished personally and some of which he directed others to accomplish. 1lle"e preparations included, but were not limited to, enlisting the asslSlance of additional co-conspirators, purchasing vehicles, purchasing a boat and materials, renting hou.ses to store the boat and materials and to assemble the attack boat, and obtaining flllse identification documents. 11. On or aoout 3 January 2000, the first boat5 operation attack commenced when, at NASH IRJ's direction, at least two of the co~nspirators launched B bo3t packed with explosives from the Madinat AIMShaab beach area into Aden Harbor, in1.ending to steer it !award 8 United States wmbip, USS TIlE SUUIVANS (DOG 68). which was refueling nearby. The attaclc. ultimately fsiled wben the expiosives-illden boat beached in the surf or Aden Harbor. 12. On or about +6 January 2000. NASHIlU and other co-conspirators ~oveRld 1M ar:tack bOal frOm the beach at Madinat Al-Shaab, on Lhe- edge of Aden Harbor. NASHIRI aIld other co-conspiralors cecovutd the boat, Its motor, ics cargo of explosives. and other materials used in the attempted attKk. During these recovery efforn, NASH.IPJ claimed ownership of the attack boat and the motor. NASHIRl and U1c other co-conspirators ultimately used a front-end loader, crane, and flatbed truck to recover and take physical possession oftbe attack boat and RltUrn it to its storage location in Aden. 13. After the atltmpted attack on U SS TIIE SULLIVANS (PDQ 68) In January 2000 but 6 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App.135 '8 8@~f6tret ftf)'lft!';'1t!e In 6e\ SUBJECT: RMC 706 Sanity Board Evaluation of Abd AI Rahim Hussayn Muhammad AI Nashiri: ISN#I00IS before approximately September 2000, NASHIRI returned to Afghanistan, where he and Khallad met with bin Laden and other high-ranking members of aI Qaeda at bin Laden's compound in Qandahar. 14. After the attempted attack on USS THE SULLIVANS (DOG 68) in January 2000 but before approximately September 2000, NASHIR] received additional training in Afghanistan from an aJ Qaeda explosives expert. 15. After the attempted ll.t1ack on USS THE SULLIVANS (DOG 68) in January 2000 but before approximately September 2000, NASHIRI tested the explosives he re<:.overed from the failed attack to make certain they were still usable for future attacks. 16. Later in 2000, after returning from AfghanistAn, NASHIRI continued preparations some of which he accomplished personally and some of which he directed others to accomplish - for a second boats operation attack. These preparations included, but were not limited to, renting another house from which to conduct surveillance of Aden Harbor, repairing and re-fitting the attack boat, transferring ownership of and registering the lIttack boat, purchasing another vehicle, securing another location at which to store tbe attack boat. testing the attack boat on the waters of Aden HarboT. making arrangements for the attack to be videotaped, and hiring a crane operator to launch the attack boat 17. During approximately the summer of20oo, NASHIRI infonned Khallad that the boats operation was nearly ready and that bin Laden should send the suicide bombers. 18. In OT about September 2000, NASHIRI informed Khallad thatthe boats operation was ready to execute and further informed KhallOO that he had already chosen the suicide bombers for the attack. 19.1n or about September 2000, NASHIRI spoke again with }(ballad, who relayed to NASHIRl a directive from bin Laden that NASHIRI leave Ym\eD before the attack and return to Afghanistan. 20. At some point after January 2000, but prior to 12 October2oo0y NASHIRI filled the attack boat with explosives in prepamtion for the attack. 21. In approximately September or October 2000, prior to the attack, NASHIRlleft Yenten, as instructed by bin Laden. NASHlRJ met }(ballad, and the two traveled 10gether to Qandahar, Afghanistan, lo meet with bin Laden. NASHIRI infonned bin Laden that an attack on Il United Slates warship in Aden was inuninent. 22. On OT about 12 OClober 2000, pursuant to NASHIRI's instructions, the coconspirators removed the attack boat from its storage location, drove the attack boat to the launch site and, using a crane, lowered it into the water. 1 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Claea.App. 136 +8 8 & _ ' 8 T 'IMP _:'Ilf.\ililt ItY j'A S'tJBJECT: RMC 706 Sanity Boarc1 Evaluation of Abd Al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad Al Nashiri: ISN#IOOI5 23. On or about 12 October 2000, as a result of planning and preparation by NASHIRI and others, the suicide bombers, at the direction ofNASHDU, dres..~d in civilian clothes. piloted the explosives·Iaden boat to where USS COLE (DOG 67) was refueling, offered friendly gestUres to several crew members, and brought their boat. alongside USS COLE (DDG 67), roughly amidships. Once alongside at approxima~ly 11: 18 a.m. (local), the suicide bombers detonated the Cl(plosives. blasting It hote in the side ofUSS COLE (DDG 67) approximately )0 (eet in diameter. killing 17 crewmembers and injuring BlIe85t 37 crewmembcTs. The sukide bomben died io the attack. 24. In approximately May 2001, NASHIRl met witt! bin Laden and anolhcT hiah.raWnl membCf oral QBeda at bln Laden's compound in Qandahar. 2S. [n approximately 2001 and 2002. NASHfRI continued BI Qaeda'$ boots opennion by directing acts which included. but ~ not limited to, acquiring a boot for use in the an.~~ acquiring explosives for use in the attack. lransferring ownership and re~i&tral.ion Q(Yte boat, and obtaining a globBi positioning system (CPS) device for use in planning the attack. NASHIRI supplied the neccssaryresourus, planned the attac~ and directed the transfer of money for use an upcoming atta~k. 26. In approximately 2001 and 2002, NASHDU and other co,oonspirators implemented operational security measures to avoid detection. 27. On or about 6 October 2002, nellf the port of A1 Mukallah, Yemen, as a result of planning by NASHDU and others, suicide bomber.!, at the direction ofNASHlRI, used an explosives-laden boat to attack the French supertanker MY Limb~'g. l1le explosion blasted a hole through the hull of the ship, resulting in the death of a crewmember, injury to approximately 12 crewmembeni, and spillage of approximately 90,000 buTels of oil into Ihe Gulf of Aden. CHARGE Vi: VIOl-AnON OF IOU.S.C. § 95Ot(13),lNfENflONAlL Y CAUSING SERJQUS BOD1L v INlURY Specification: In dlat Abd alRahim Hllssayn Muhammad al NASHIJU, an alien unprivileged enemy beJligerentsubj"t 10 ttl.1 by military commi~ion, did, in or around Aden. Vemen, in the {;ootext of and aSJOoillted with hostilities, on Of" about 12 October 2000. intentionally C8U.9l:l serious injury to Ihe body of one or more persons, .11 crewmembcrs onboBtd USS COtE (DOG 67), with unlawful force and violence, in violation of the law of war, CO wit: perfidiously openlting and detonating lin explosives-laden vessel alongside USS COLE (DDG 67). Te QQ'_1.''-I~ ____ • 8 .&.&...1.1 r wnw'; S S 'E Lt'..,. """""",.. ....~".I....L.IlIl ..... UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Cls85.App. 137 1 ' ~ 2TaW'Rm nmrwu'ED Pl' - . -_ _ £11 ............ &'"""""".~",...- __ • .. .&"..I .... 80 _i. t SUBJECT: RMC 706 SllIIity Board Evaluation of Abd AI Rahim Hussayn MuhlUltm/ld Al Nashiri: ISN#IOOlS CHARGE VII: VIOLATION OF 10 U.S.C. § 95Ot(16), DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY IN VIOlATION OF THE LAW OF WAR Specification: In that Abd 111 Rahim Husssyn Muhammad al NASHIRI, en alien unprivileged enemy belligerent subject to trial by military commission. did, in or aroWld Aden, Yemen, on or about 12 Oaober 2oo0~ in the context of and associated with hostilities, intentionally deslroy property belonging to another person, without that person's consent, in violalion ofthe blw of war, lo wit: two men pemdiou$ly approaching USS COLE (DDG 67), and detonatiJli concealed explosives, n:sulting in the destrvaion ofUSS COLE (DOG 67), destruaion oC supplies and rations locsted onboa!Q USS COLE (DOG 67), and dem'lKlion of pmiOnal dfects located onboud USS COLE (DOG 67). CHARGE VIU: VIOLATION OF 10 U.S.C § 9501(16),10 U.S.c. § 95Ot(28),ATT'EMP'TED DESTRUCTION OF PROP£RTY IN VIOlATION OF ll{E LA W OF WAR Specification: In that Abd al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad at NASHlRl, en alien unprivileged enemy helligerepl subject to trial by military commission, did, in or around Aden, Yemen. on or about 3 January 2000, in the conlext 0 f and associated with hostilities, with me specific intent to commit the offensL' of Destruction of Property in Violalion of me Law of War, attempt to intentionally destroy property belonging to another, without the lawful owner's consent, to wit: USS mE SULLIVANS (DOG 68), by committing certain overt aas, in violation of me law of war, including, but not limited to, renting real property, acquiring a boal, acquiring explosives, altering a boBt, Bnd assembling and launching a boat; the said NASHlIU's actions Bmounted to more than mere preparation and tended to effect the commission of Destruction of Property in Violation of the Law of WSf, to wit: two men perfidiously dressing in civi Iian C!Clth ing md operating an explosivcs·laden civilian vessel, in an attempt to detonate said explosives-laden civilian vessel alongside USS THE SULLIVANS (DOG 68), which would have resulted in the destruction ofUSS THE SULLIVANS (DOG 68), deslIuction ofsupplies and rations locab;d onbosro USS THE SULLIVANS (DOG 68), and de5tnlction ofpersonal effects localed onboard USS THE SULLlVANS (DOG 68). CHARGE IX: VIOl.J\TION OF 10 U.S.C. § 950t(2), ATIAClONG ClVll..IANS Specification: In ahat Abel al JUhim Hussayn Muhammad 81 NASHIRI, lUI alien unprhtilegcd enemy belligerent subject to trial by military commission. did, in or lIlound the com of Al Mukallah. Yemen. on or about 6 October 2002. in the context or and associaled wim hostilities, intention&lly attack clvililll'l persons onboard MY LiI1Iburg a civilian oil tanker creweClass.App. 289 10015?00076521 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 290 10015-00076522 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 291 10015-00076523 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 292 1001 5-00076524 PUBLIC RELEASE wmrm>mm wmrm>mm PUBLIC RELEASE 10015-00076526 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE ClassApp. 295 1W1 5-00076665 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App?. 296 5?00076666 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE 10015-00076667 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 298 10015-00076668 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE 10015-00076669 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 300 10015-00076670 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE 1001 500076671 PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE ClassApp. 302 jetas-z'd··s_i'." ( , .. " 10015-00077166 UNCLASSrFIEDllFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App.303 (J19Q(J($$;{' tf$:bJ /litsti6 ~~~FW3F~~ . _ •• _ ••• _ . _ , - ._ _ •• ~ ••• _.~._ _ ~ •••• ~ _~_• • • • • • • •_ ~ •• _ • • • • • • _~._•••• _ . _ _ UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE ••• I •• _ 10015-00071167 _ _. __.. -_._.- _ _- UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE ~:._._._ __ _ _._ - _ _.. __.._--_ __.__ --.- __ - •... __ __.._ _ _ UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE ..- _._ _ _-_ 10015-00077168 _ _.. _-----_ .. ..-- } PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 305 - 10015-00076633 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE 10015-00076634 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 307 10015-00076635 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 308 10015-00076636 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 309 10015-00076637 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 310 10015-00076638 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE .311 10015-00076639 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE ClassA . 312 1001500076640 PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App.313 :f"._",~tiii!l!';"Il!l~,".N,.,,"--.8, ",.···.;"<-"1 (> : . . . . . . . . . ••••••••• .,~, 10015-00076729 UNCLASSIFIEDI/FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 314 . i ,reF nnmsrmsn rotree'tp r 7' ::ti'tfiliii_ _ilif1jil4" 10015-00076730 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Clas8.App.315 Oi4CLAinlP ida,yx e.ltt1l!, 8Qi:~M,~'M'ieFf)~1 , ,-~ "77;'.';:7" UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 10015-mm wmrm>mm PUBLIC RELEASE Class?App. 333 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 334 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 335 PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE .mf?kt-Delatled Def?nse Counsel Allison C. Danels ON BANELS Maj,1 USAF Amman! Detailed Defense Counsel DOD Appamred Learned Counsel PUBLIC RELEASE PUBLIC RELEASE Class.App. 337 CERTIFICATE OF SERWCE Comtand wada copy on All cotmselofrecordwafhcsame BRIAN L- MIZER CDR, JAGC. USN Assistam Dgtailed Defense Counsel PUBLIC RELEASE