New Zealand Headquarters Joint Forces NZ +64 (0)4 529 5000 0pc Kama 0 Aoteama Trentham x, I Private Bag 900 TlM.GALLl@nzdf.mil.nz Upper Hutt, 5018, New Zealand nz CIA-20142014 ?3 December 2016 Mr David Fisher Senior Writer, New Zealand Herald 2 Graham Street AUCKLAND 1040 David.Fisher@nzherald.co.nz Dear Mr Fisher I refer to your email of 28 January 2014 requesting, under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA): A copy of any and all post-Afghanistan reports completed following the final rotation of PRT personnel through Bamiyan. On 7 March 2014, the Defence Force initially declined to meet your request under 35. and of the OIA, that is, on the grounds that the release of the information would be likely to prejudice the security and defence of New Zealand, to protect individual privacy and to maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and frank expression of opinions between of?cers of the NZDF in the course of their duty. I did not consider that the public interest in disclosing the information withheld under section 9 of the outweighed the need to withhold it. There is a document, however Lessons Collection Synopsis, AFGHANISTAN, OP CRIB 21 and Theatre Extraction, February-April 2013 that now am prepared to release in large part, albeit with redactions. I regret that it has taken so much time to ready the document for release. The document also requires comment, although I shall restrict that comment to a small percentage only of the criticisms that are warranted. The Synopsis was mostly based on interviews conducted by a four-person team that visited Afghanistan in early 2013, although it also drew on other sources. The Synopsis was quickly evaluated as being insufficiently accurate to be signed, accepted and circulated. That is why it has remained in draft form: the observations reported in the J8 group?s conclusions diverged quite markedly from those of other, more experienced, on?the?ground observers. This divergence of views was not a reflection of the J8 group?s independence, but rather because of self-contradictions in the Synopsis and the group?s willingness to record many matters as ?issues?, instead of as topics that were actually unremarkable or mere ?business as usual" irritations. An example of self-contradiction is the contrast between the Operation Overview on pages 10 and 11 of the Synopsis (which summarises the history of New Zealand?s engagement in the Provincial Reconstruction mission, includes a general description of the means employed to undertake the overall task and some of the particular tasks, and gives very brief descriptions of milestones and accomplishments), and the claim in paragraph 1 on page 14 that there was a lack of a cohesive campaign plan for New Zealand?s operations in Afghanistan Furthermore, in addition to the overview in the Synopsis, the claim that there was a lack of a cohesive campaign plan, etc., ignores all the information in the public domain in New Zealand, going back to the very beginning of the mission in Afghanistan. That information left no doubt that New Zealand was going to operate as a member of a coalition, what the Defence Force?s missions were to be and that, during the course of the Provincial Reconstruction mission, our personnel would construct or re?construct buildings, schools and infrastructure, and support and/or train local authorities, safeguard eventual free elections, and so on. The rest of the Synopsis is devoted to dozens of ?issues?, most of which could be characterised as being minor at best. While some may be worth keeping in mind for future deployments they may be regarded as lessons to be learned for example, the topic covered in para. 14, p.18), the importance of others was signi?cantly exaggerated or completely misjudged: a Poor between HQ JFNZ staff branches and the deployed force resulting in, among other things, duplicated sourcing of pallets and tie-down straps 14). is never perfect. Skilled personnel, supplies and equipment, however, were always readily available in Afghanistan. 80, any fleeting lack of pallets and tie?down straps or other non?critical resources that there may have been, for however short a time, did not actually ?frustrate? the mission; a New Zealand?s lack of all the necessary supporting operational enablers in Afghanistan, which required NZDF personnel to rely on coalition resources 15). See also para. 8, p. 16). This refers to such capabilities as air support and air transport. On this and on future similar deployments, the NZDF shall also rely on resources from allied units. The Defence Force is not in a position to spend very large sums on such contingent capabilities as close air support, surveillance drones and medevac helicopters. The access to such capabilities is, of course, a strong argument in favour of coalition, rather than unilateral missions; the introduction of LAV was perceived to have increased the threat level against New Zealanders 15). Any supposed ?perceptions? were plainly nonsensical. NZLAVs were deployed to mitigate threats to New Zealanders; a that NZDF personnel found working Within a large coalition structure challenging It would be surprising if they did not; although it is clear that NZDF personnel more then held their own in coalition operations. a Situational awareness [was] localised with little awareness of events outside the immediate area of operations 19). For particular tasks, the repair of a school or a culvert, situational awareness should be and was focused. The claim that there was little awareness of events outside the deployment?s immediate area of operations is simply in error; 0 There is a strong ?she?ll be right? culture evident (para. 11, p. 17). Neither my predecessors nor i agree in the slightest with this assertion. A reduced emphasis on formality while on operations is not a mark of complacency or carelessness. In the same paragraph, the claim was made that there had been a decrease in Improvised Explosive Device awareness and security. All members of the various CRIB rotations were fully and increasingly aware of the spread of lEDs in Afghanistan, of the need to question the appearance of things at all times, and to rehearse patrol and other procedures to maintain personal and unit security. It was and is generally agreed that it is dif?cult to maintain maximum alertness levels at all times. The relevant ?lesson? is that the dif?culty absolutely must be overcome; a Medics acting in non-medical, secondary roles in theatre in contravention of the laws of armed conflict This assertion is entirely unwarranted: medics deployed to Afghanistan did ?gt compromise their special status under the laws of armed conflict. The comment rejecting the claim that laws of armed conflict were breached that appears immediately below paragraph 21 is from J9, that is, HQ legal branch. The practice of tactical flying 0-1303 into Bamiyan was at variance with the tactical picture for the host nation, and created the risk of death or injury to locals used to the air?eld SOP of overflight prior to landing (paragraph 59, p. 33). By ?tactical flying?, what is probably meant is the practice of avoiding long, comparatively~slow, straight-line approaches to airfields. A tactical approach instead involves a spiral descent with a short ?nal approach leg. The tactical approach of RNZAF Hercules into Bamiyan air?eld did not present a?y risk of death or injury to local civilians above that presented by a conventional approach. Similar observations apply to many, if not most, of all the other issues raised. Therefore, as already noted, the draft SynOpsis was not signed, adopted and distributed. Some redactions have been made in the attached version of the Synopsis pursuant to ss. 6(d) and of the CIA, to avoid the risk of prejudice to this country?s security and defence, and to the safety of individuals. In addition, I do not consider that any public interest in disclosing the names of a few members of the Defence Force outweighs the desirability of protecting their privacy, given that they were not in command roles. I trust that this generally satis?es your request for of?cial information, but you retain the right under s. 28(3) of the to ask an Ombudsman to review this response. Yours sincerely ALL Major-General Commander Joint Forces New Zealand Enclosure 1. A copy of Lessons Collection SynOpsis AFGHANISTAN, OP CRIB 21 and Theatre Extraction, February-April 2013