U.S. Department of Justice National Security Division Washington, D. C. 20530 EMAIL: savage@nytimes.com NSD #16-065 March 24, 2017 Mr. Charlie Savage The New York Times 1627 I Street, NW. Washington, DC. 20006 to Dear . age: This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated January 7, 2016, for ?a copy of - and, as necessary, declassi?cation review of - the memo on discovery issues raised by Stellarwind written by Pat Rowan and dated May 4, 2005?. Your request was received on January 8, 2016. In response to your request, we have conducted a search of Of?ce of the Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division (N SD). We have located one record and processed this document under the FOIA. We are withholding the record in part pursuant to one or more of the following FOIA exemptions set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552(b): (1) which permits the withholding of information properly classi?ed pursuant to Executive Order No. 13526; (3) which permits the withholding of information speci?cally exempted from disclosure by statute, including but not limited to Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947; (5) which permits the withholding of inter-agency or intra?agency memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency, including but not limited to information protected by the deliberative process privilege, the attorney work product doctrine, and/or the attomey-client privilege. which permits the withholding of records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes the release of which could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, and which concerns, inter alia, records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes the release of which would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions. For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement information and national security records from the requirements of the OIA. See 5 U.S.C. ?552(c). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the OIA. This is standard noti?cation that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist. Although this request is now the subject of litigation, we are including the following information on OIA mediation and administrative appeals. You may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is: Of?ce of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi College Park, Maryland 20740? 6001, or at ogis@nara.gov, or 202-741-5770, or toll free at 1-877-684-6448, or facsimile at 202- 741-5769. Or you may contact our Public Liaison at 202-233-0756. If you are not satis?ed with this response, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Of?ce of Information Policy, US. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Avenue, N.W., Suite 11050, Washington, DC. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through FOIA portal by creating an account at: Your appeal must be postmarked or transmitted electronically within 90 days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit an appeal by mail, both the letter and envelope should be clearly marked, ?Freedom of Information Act Appeal.? Sincerely, Eevin G. Tiernan Records and FOIA MEMOMNDUM FOR ASSISTANT A RNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION FROM Patrick Ro - sel to the Assistant Attorney General DATE May 4, 2005 RE Discovery Issues Raised by Stellar Wind a ecause i ere were no additional attorneys within the Criminal Division who were read into the program (and very few in the Department generally), 'we have been unable to assign work to others or to fully consult with others within the Division. As a result, we have proceeded in a very care?rl and deliberate fashion. I am generating this memorandum at your request to summarize our work up to this point. Backgound After our initial brie?ng on this program, I reviewed OLC memos concerning this program, including the Memorandum fir-'1? bf?. mi?- ral, Disclosure Requirements under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16? (molosure Requirements), and the Memorandum for the Attorney General, Review of the Le alit of the Program (May 6, 2004' DiscoverLOinoations Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for discovery of, among other things, the defendant?s own recorded statements. Pursuant to Rule ?upon a defendant?s request, the government must disclose to the defendant . . . any relevant written or recorded statement by the defendant if. . . the statement is within the government?s possession, custody, or control; and the attorney for the government knows or through due diligence could know that the statement Some analysis of this provision is contained within Disclosure Requirements Memorandum. Bxculpatory information, including a defendant?s own statements, is subject to the rule of Brady v. Mm?land, 373 US. 83 (1963). analysis is correct, there should be no question that the government?s prosecutors have acted in good faith with respect to their Rule 16 obligations. Moreover, because the Brady obligation is designed to ensure that defendants receive fair trials, 21 prosecutor?s good or bad faith in suppressing exculpatory evidence is considered irrelevant Brad}; 373 U.S. at 87. Prosecutor?s Discoveiy Obligations Charge to Conviction After Conviction Rule 16 Requires disclosure to defendant of Appears to impose no obligation on Obligations written or recorded statements that are the government to disclose (1) relevant'; statements to the defense.3 (2) within the government?s possession custody or control; and (3) the attorney for the go'vernment knows or through due diligence could know that the statement exists.2 Brady Brady and the decisions applying it Following a trial, the government Obligations hold that the government has a duty to continues to be obligated to disclose disclose exculpatory information when evidence that is .?material in the Sense such disclosure is necessary to ensure a that its suppression undermines fair trial.4 con?dence in the outcome of the trial.?6 Brady does notrequire the government to provide the defendant with It appears that there is no immediate access to Brady material. Constitutional obligation to provide Instead, the government satis?es its exculpatory evidence a?er a Brady obligations as long as it provides defendant pleads guilty, but there are Brady information to the defendant in some lower court decisions time for its effective use at trials characterizing the principle as a ?general rule? with exceptions for those instances in which the government makes material misrepresentations that render a plea unintelligent, particularly if the misrepresentations concern factual innocence.y Endnotes 1. The term ?relevant statements? does not encompass statements that are innocuous, statements unrelated to the crimes charged, or statements that are Completely separate from the Government?s trial evidence. SE United States v. Doe, 20 F.3d 544 (9?h Cir. 1995); United States v. Clark, 957 F.2d 148 (6?1 Cir. 1992); United States v. Sca_rpa, 897 F. 2d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 1990); United States 697'F.2d 459 (Ed Cir. 198.2).? . 2. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 4. Brady, 373 U.S. at 37~88. 5. United States v. O?Keefe, 128 F.3d 385, 889?899 (5'El Cir. 1997), denied, 523 U.S. 1078 (1998); United States v. Valencia?Lucena, 925 F.2d 506, 514 Cir. 1991). 6. United States v. Baglev, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1935). SE also v. Ritchie-480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987) (evidence is material ?only if there is a reasonably probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been di?erent. A. ?reasonable probability is a probability suf?cient to undermine the con?dence in the outcome? (quoting Baglev, 473 U.S. at 682)). 7. Compare Smith v. United States, 376 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. (holding that Brady claim did not survive entry of a guilty plea), cert. denied 493 U.S. 869 (1989), with Matthew y. Johnson 201 F.3d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that some circuit decisions hold a defendant pleading guilty may challenged his conviction on the ground that the prosecutor failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence prior to a plea,and listing cases). In United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629630 (2002), in holding that the Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering into a plea agreement with a criminal defendant, the Court rejected the argument that a guilty plea is not intelligent and voluntary if it was entered into without knowledge of impeachment information. As noted in Eng, the Supreme Court has found that the Constitution does not require complete knowledge of the relevant circumstances, but permits a court to accept a guilty plea, with its accompanying waiver of various constitutional rights, despite various forms of misapprehension under which a defendant might labor. SQ Bradi,r v. United States. 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970) (defendant ?misapprehended the quality of the state?s case?); United States v. Broce. 488 U.S. 563, 573 (1989) (counsel failed to point out a potential defense). The purpose of the Court?s Brady decisions is to protect the fairness of the trial and to guard against the risk that an innocent person might be found guilty because the - government withheld evidence. That purpose is not implicated when a defendant enters a plea. The Prosecutor?s General Duty to Search Intelligence Communiw Files Disclosure Re uirements Memorandum in This conclusion is consistent with the materials that I rev1ewe seemed to analyze any government obligation to search IC ?les as deriving solely ?om Brady and its progeny. However, the precise scope of a prosecutor?s duty to search for material, exculpatory informationis one of the most unsettled areas of the law under Brady. The Supreme Court. has never had occasion to rule on whether prosecutors must search for Brady materialwithin government entities that have not engaged in law enforcement activity under a prosecutor's direction and control. In its most recent case concerning the duty to Search, Kylesv. Whitley, 514 US. 419, 437?438 (1995), the Supreme Court expressly imposed on prosecutors a limited duty to search for Brady material not known or possessed by them. At issue in that case was impeachment evidence that had not been turned over by prosecutors because police investigators had not shared it with the prosecutors. m. at 428. The prosecution argued'on appeal that it had no knowledge of the Brady material held by the police the prosecutor's investigative arm in the case and that it should not be held accountable for evidence known only to police investigators. . Id. at 437-438. The Court held that the "prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police." Id. at 43 7. The Court did not explain what kinds of relationships with the prosecution rise to the level of "acting on the government's behalf." Federal courts of appeals analyzing this issue after Kyles have not settled on a single test to determine the limits of a prosecutor?s duty to search. e. 2.. United States v. Bhutani. 175 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that if an agency charged with administering a statute has consulted with the prosecution, the agency will be considered part of the prosecution); United States v. Morris 80 F.3d 1151, 1169 (7th Cir. 1996) (prosecutors are under no duty ?to learn of ??information- possessed-by other govermne'nt agencies that have no involvement in the investigation or prosecution at issue?); Smithy. Secretary of N.M. Dep?t of Corn, 50 F.3d 801, 824 (10?1? Cir. 1995) (citation and footnote omitted) (stressing that ?the prosecution? for Brady purposes ?encompasses not only the individual prosecutor handling the case, but also to the prosecutor?s entire of?ce, as well as law enforcement personnel and other arms of the state involved in investigative aspects of a particular criminal venture"). 5g: ?33 United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, I309 (11?'1 Cir. 1939) (?Bradyg then, applies only to information possessed by the prosecutor or anyone over whom he has SQ generally United States v. Combs 267 F.3d I 167, 1 1724175 (10th Cir. 2001) (discussing various approaches taken by the circuit courts). Indeed, one commentator has noted that "the scant reasoning provided by the circuits indicate that the courts of appeals share no common understanding regarding the policies that the Brady disclosure obligation is designed to serve." Mark D. Villaverde, Structuring the Prosecutor's Duty to Search the Intelligence Community for Brady Material, 88 Cornell L. Rev.l471, 1492 (2003). In addition to reviewing court decisions in this area, I have attempted to locate any statements of Department policy concerning the duty to search the 1C. In fact, the United States Attorney?s Manual (USAM or Manual) contains policy guidance on this issue. The USAM notes that a prosecutor's obligation to review 10 ?les for discovery material will vary depending upon Whether the IC had active involvement in the criminal investigation or prosecution. USAM, Criminal Resource Manual, 2052 (2002). In those circumstances in which the IC had no active involvement in the criminal investigation, the USAM offers the following direction: Assuming no demand for speci?c discovery, there remains the question of when the prosecutOr is nevertheless required to search IC ?les. The relevant factors for answering that query are: l. whetherthe prosecutor has direct or reliable knowledge of potential Brady and/or other discovery material in the possession of the or 2. assuming no such knowledge by the prosecutor,whether there . . neVerthele'ss' eXists any reliable indication suggesting that the 1C possesses evidence that meets the Brady case law standard of materiality. A positive answer to either of these questions means that the prosecutor ?needs to know" and must conduct a suitable search of the IC ?les. If both queries can be - answered in the negative, there is no justi?cation for a search of IC ?les. 1d. Later, however, the Manual states, "As a general rule, a prosecutor should not seek access to IC ?les except when, because of the facts of the case, there is an af?rmative obligation to do so. There are, however, certain types of cases that may fall outside of that rule in which issues relating to national security and/or classi?ed information are likely to be present, e. those targeting corrupt or fraudulent practices by middle or upper of?cial of a foreign government; those involving trading with the enemy, international terrorism, or signi?cant international narcotics traf?cking, especially that if they involve foreign government or military personnel E. The Manual suggests that in these types of cases, it may be wise to initiate what it terms a ?prudential searc to assist the prosecutor in identifying and managing potential classi?ed information problems before indictment and trial. The Manual offers no additional guidance as to how a prosecutor should determine that a ?prudential search? is advisable, notwithstanding the general rule that one is not required. Criminal Division Section Practices I have also informally surveyed several Criminal Division sections to learn what practices they follow in deciding whether IC ?les must be searched for potential discovery material. It appears that these sections generally go beyond both the legal obligations discussed above and the general rule outlined in the USAM, initiating searches out of prudence, rather than a legal obligation. Lit-?37' CounteresPionage Section (CBS) reported that they initiate searches of IC ?les in virtually all of their cases. They do so even in circumstances in which the IC has had no involvement in the inve rosecution of the matter lug-Emu Dis} The Need for Further IO Nsb_oo1o b7c, b7E' - . JuStice Department review of his lactiOns, Yoo has acmioi?edged that he is not well versed in criminal law. During an Department?s Office of Professional Responsibility (CPR) in cenne?ction'With its investigation concerning his legalopinions in support Voila:detaineeinterrogation program, Yoo stated that ?criminal prosecution process theDepartrnen-t was: not my Specialty,? and ?criminal law Was not my: area-Mm? I i E131. Criminal Divisioia Examines Discovery Issues (U) Folilowin? the Justice Department?s Criminal iiyii'sionwasftas ceve oping procedures for handling Rule 16 b1 b3 b6 disclosurehusbcause the issues fell within its area of expertise. As 9. Mb b?7E? Remain 0' bx? Patrick Rowan, a senior counsel in the Criminal Dirision, was, read into the program to deal With Stellar Windmrelated discovery issue?s. ROWan?s supervisor, Criminal Division Assistant Attorney General Christopher Wray, was also read into the program at the same time. b1, b3, b6, b7C, b7E to detainee interrogations. Yo'o drafted legal opinions for this program while in the Of?ce of Legal Counsel. Ploweizer', as discussed in Chapter Four, in contrast with the Stellar Wind program at least fourother OLC attorneys assisted 'Yoo with drafting the legal memoranda. also? able to consult with Criminal Division attorneys and the client agency on this matter. WW We?? th??i? 51: Department attorn?ys with criminal. IDiviSi-Gn?level for terrorism Prosecutions to instead into the. Preemie I - 1 ?Wray?tolgdl'theOIG that after-his and Rowan.?s read-win, they ?Were-kind (if left. on om? He said- that? noao'ne directed or Rowan to. continue. studying-the Rule 16 issues or'the governments Brady obligations in international terrorism proseoLitions, nor-did anyone tell to develop-any judgments of opinions on subject. (.U) Some'point after-his- readis-in he may have read Yoo? memorandum, on the Department?s discovery b1,b3, obligations] in and he instructed Rowan to review the b6, 1376, memorandum; Rowan. told- us that he Was familiar with 'Yioo?s b7E memorandum, but stated that he could not recall whether the purpose of- -Yoo?srmemsrand 'tola "Ouztfi?'ge?eral the pertinent legal issUes . document how 11. particular'was to be handled. Rowan litC?d 'havingiany Problems with the conclSusiOris. Ybo reached, . . . The ?I'nf0rmal Process? for Treat-ing- Discovery Issues in International Terrorism Cases (U) During-his interview, Rowan described the processes at the Departmentprior tothe. December 20052 disclosure of aspects of the Stellar Wind-program in The New York Times to address discOver}r obligations with respect to Stellar WindmderiVed information. He'Saidrthat the NSA was generally aware of the Justice Department?s international terrorism criminal cases, at least (in part due to ongoing Contacts with Patrick Philbin others inthe Department. AceOrding toRowan, the general awarenessof the Departments international terrorism docketamotmted to ?informal presses? for Spotting cases that may present discovery issues. RWan- stated that prosecutors in U.S. Attorney?s Offices typically Would. request the NSA to perform ?prudential searches? of its databases for any relevant information concerning their prosecutions, including fer discovery purposes, although this did not happen in every international terrorism case. Rowan stated that if the NSA located any responsive but classified information, it would be expected to notify senior Justice Department officials with the requisite Clearances about the information. said he Was confident that if Brady infermation were-known to the NSA, it would be brought to the? attention of the Department and steps Would have been taken. to dismiss the case or otherwise ensure the prOgram was not disclosed. In addition to these routine communications between Department prQSecu'tOrs and the NBA in criminal prosecutions, Rowan described other measures'that Were in place .tokeep Stellar Wind?derived information out of the criminal prosecution process. stated- that. the FBI had ?Walled off-?1' collected. from inclusion asesby tippingout: - Stellar information under 11th- a? caveat. that: the b1,- b3, i?formation in?l?i'tipper was Rowan notedithat WE had place a; scrubbing-processto deleteprogramsderived, informatian from FISAiapplieations, Rowan these was used in international? terrorism prosecutions?l?? Finally? Rowan stated that the FBI get up,? thereby-minimizing: thelrikelihooct the? database would be the sole repository of Brady material. ,1 foe/Ne,L - B. Dis n. a, COVer-E?ssaes-Raisecl he'fS?tenar Wind?Program? - I I: GI. . ed? (in-thermemorandnm? largffily ale C: ,aSionally with Rowan ?saidvitWa's .diffieultFtoWork the matteribeeause' o?fzthe secrecy surrounding- the program-and the gf'hi'sjob?iw4'15 .A?s_disc1Issed in Chapter. Six, the caveats were intended to exclude-1 at outset any Stellar- Wind?derived information from FISH appliCations and othercrimmal pleadings. The .s?crubbingprocess acts as alsecond Cheek-against ineluding information'in FISA applications. However, neither the caveats nor the scrubbing process relieved the government of its obligationsunder Brady to disclose evidence in the government?s possession favorable tothe defendant and material to either guilt or punishment. 417 The memorandum noted, ?Because there were no additional attorneys within the Criminal Division who were read into the program (andv'ery few in the Department, l, we have been Unable to assign work to others or to fully consult with others b1, b3, b6, b7C, b7E b1, b3, WE. bjl, b3, b7E- For cases in which the Intelligence Community :nagctive:involvement in the, criminal investigation, the USAM stated that thereuare two circumstances in which the prosecutor must conduct a ?guitable search? of Intelligence Community files: where the prosecutor has ?direct or reliable knowledge? that the Intelligence Community bl, b3, b6, Brady or other discovery materialeor, in the absence *of' Suits-h'lenowledgle, Where ?there nonetheless exists-any-reIi-able indication 'thatil?the Intelligence Community possesses such material anSAMi Criminal Resources Manual 22052 (20:02). The USAM stated that, I "as. augeneralrule, a prosecutor should not Seek access to Intelligence files! unless there-Tie an af?rmative obligatiOH to do. so. However, 'itnnotecl that certain types of cases, including terrorism prosecutions, fall genera-1 In. Such-case's, the .ad-Vilsed that the should conduct search.? Id. Roman Wrote that the practice in several sections Within. the Criminal: Division'- was :to ?generally go beyond. both the legal obligations-outlined [in his-memorandum] and the general rule. outlined in the USA-M, initiating: searches-out of prudence, rather than a legal obligation.? For instance, the practice of the Criminal Division?s "QjounterespiOnage Section was to search Intelligence Community files away cage, even in 'i'nstancesfinqwhich: the. Intelli emcee Cbmmunifty lad eat ig'elice? collection concerningthe defendant as"?isuggested by the faets of the 'rnatter.? He added that the searches were requested 'fOr a variety of reas0ns, including; for purposes of meeting dichVery obligations. Dionnsaid that searches also were requested to determine whetherthe defendant. has a*?re1ationship? with an intelligence agency. He noted that CES does not request prudential searches as a matter of courseito avoid making spurious requests . ion said was a. proponent 118 prosecutors With-Whom CBS Co-prosecutes? cases should have the same knowledge-as C-ES concerning the ?national security equities" involved-in each case. Dion/said this arrangement also allows for the who is often the prosecutor most familiar with the case and the jurisdictional practices, to review any Intelligence Community material fOr Rule 16 and Brady purposes. Dion acknowledged the limitations- ,tolth?is arrangement concerning strictly com-partrnented programs?such as Stellar Wind, where the NSA Understandably'would.be reluCtant to read in line prosecutors 'for?the limited purpose of screening defenSe discovery requests. "was for attorney to use the provisions of to prevent disclosure ?Offsetgi?itivefmaterial. Rowan noted that other sections within the Criminal to protect Intelligence Community ?les found 1- - When RoWan became principally responsible for coordinating the Department?s defense discovery requests as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the (Cont?cl.) C. Shortly before. Roiwan finished his. memorandum Principal. .e'putyzASSiStant Attorney General-Steyei-Brad ury?biecam? he: acting-head of 0L0. B'rad?bul'y told us: that hereealled-havingsome discussion with Rowan about-how:disc0very matters should be-handle "in With the Stellar Wind program. Bradbury Said that John- 'Eieenberg; later a Deputy in have discossedthe matter With 2 zeradeury? stated thathe- did not believe that followed up on RoWan"s request that it continue researching these issues. -.. b1,b3, ed the Rule 16 lss-ue With Rowaniat b6) WC, Eisenb?erg told us that he discuss. eussed theBrady issue. He, WE semezpoint, but did not I I recalled ?di?souSsing Yoo' emorandurn:With-Rowanand said-behelieyes Jens ?oepar. took pesiti'on' that theY?o?o was?icorreot, at least With. respect to Yoo?s?legal analysis in When we Showed Eisenber?g a copy of Rowan - memorandum, thathe?h?acl notip Eisenberg. tel?d?usf that 0 LC would" not-typically beresponsible for addressing disecwery issues presented in Rowants memorandum and that he was not aware of any opiniOn on ?the'subjeotvother than lino-is Eis'enbe-rg also jsaid?he-was net aware Of ferr?n?a'l proeeduresfor handling Rule ,16 disclosure requestsor the go'irernmente affirmative Brady obligations Other the. experte in camera motions practice pursued by the National Security Diyis'ion, discussed below. Chief Dion agreed that OLC would not be the appropriate entity to review discovery procedures in the context of Stellar Wind, in part because OLC attorneys-generally do not have Criminal litigation expertise. Dion suggested that if?the- Department Were to develop procedures for handling discovery of Intelligence Community files, it should. be done by the Department?s National Security Division in coordination with United States Attorneys? Offices, and it should be binding only on those two entities. Rowan, while generally agreeing with Dion, told the OIG that he believed the OLC appropriately could have analyzed the legal issue of what impact a The results. Of'tli'ese sea'rohes were produced to the coUrts ex paras saga, pursuant to CIPA. WW) The - would hairs on the government?s Brady obligations- Wray? also told us that there W'asino organized Departmental effort to establish ifOrma-l procedures for reviewinginternational terrorismr "prosecution-s to .comply'with Rule 16 diSCI'osure? requests and? Brady HE Said ?the thinkihg it'l?iait'the? memoir-ancient Was- the. "?fir?St step? toward devising, ?Some kind wof. ?SYS'tem'ati'zeid process,? for ravigws, waever,we found'nonindicati-O? request to further studytheseidiscot?rery issuestwith any, of written product. :9 T- Use Of the Classi?ed Information Procedures Act (QIPA) to ?Re3p0nd to: Disemmry Requests After publication of The New Yorkaimes article's-in December 2005; the Justice" Dapart-iment received. numerous disecw?ry requests in'coenection with international? terrorism prosecutions throughout the country. After '?e?eseiart'ioles, additional of?diails- in the- were read into the Stellar Wind program, including the new AsSistant Attorney GeneralAlice other {Senior officials, both to irass?iTSt. With: the Criminal} 'DiviJSion?s . investigation into; the - leak-sot? information to ThelNe?W York Times and: to- hand?lef'the discover-y requests fellas/ring; the public confirmatioir of the program by the President in D'e'Cei-niber 2905;493 After the National security DivisiOn was createdinSeptember 270.6,. it assumed much of ?the responsibility for-handling: therespo?Se?s to idis?oc?J?Very'requestsTypically; the defensemotions sought 'tolcompel the :goVernment to produce information concerning a defendant that had been derived-from the ?Terrorist Surveillance Program,? the termsometimes used by the government to refer to what the President con?rmed after publication of The New York Times articles. The government reoponded to the discovery requeSts by ?ling ex parte in camera responses requesting to ?delete items? from material to be produced in discovery pursuant to In the following sections we provide a brief overview of CIPA and its use in international terrorism cases potentially involving Stellar Wind?derived intelligence.