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March 29, 2017
The Honorable Brian M. Cogan
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201
Re: United States v. Joaquin Archivaldo Guzman Loera, 09 CR 466 (BMC)
Your Honor:
We write in reply to the Government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Vacate or Modify Special Administrative Measures (“Govt. Memo”). In its
memorandum, the Government seeks to keep in place draconian conditions of confinement
imposed on Mr. Guzman by the Department of Justice through so-called Special Administrative
Measures (“SAMs”). The Government posits that the oppressive nature of Mr. Guzman’s solitary
confinement, as well as complete isolation from his family, are necessary to address “a substantial
risk that the defendant’s communications or contacts with persons associated with the Cartel and
certain other third parties could result in death or serious bodily injury to persons, including
potential witnesses in this case.” (Govt. Memo. 2). Furthermore, the Government contends that
this Court has no jurisdiction to consider Mr. Guzman’s objections to the SAMs. (Id. at 13-16).
As stated in our submission of March 13, 2017 (Dkt. No. 50), the SAMs, as currently
applied, are not authorized under 28 C.F.R. § 501.3. Furthermore, the nature of Mr. Guzman’s
confinement under the SAMS violates his Sixth Amendment rights to have effective assistance of
counsel, develop a defense, conduct a meaningful investigation, and his right to a fair and impartial
jury; his Fifth Amendment right to due process; and his First Amendment rights to free speech and
freedom of religion. Also, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), does
not deprive the Court of jurisdiction over Mr. Guzman’s requests to modify the conditions of his
pretrial confinement.
The Government does concede that the SAM’s restrictions on defense counsel’s
communications with Mr. Guzman’s family interfere with his right to counsel of his choice. To
remedy this constitutional violation, the Government proposes that defense counsel, or other
private counsel who have met with Mr. Guzman, be permitted to “send prescreened
communications to the defendant’s family members for the limited purpose of communicating the
defendant’s desire to retain particular counsel and the logistics of obtaining funds to do so.” (Id. at
24). This proposal is inadequate to remedy the infringement on Mr. Guzman’s right to counsel
imposed by the SAMs.

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Therefore, for the reasons stated below, and in our letter of March 13, 2017, Mr. Guzman
moves for an immediate modification of the SAMs to allow: 1) him to speak with his wife, Emma
Coronel Aispuro, either in person or by telephone, for the limited purposes of communicating his
choice of private counsel and determining the availability of assets necessary to retain such counsel;
and 2) defense counsel or private attorneys to relay messages between Mr. Guzman and third parties
for the limited purposes of ascertaining and securing the assets necessary to retain counsel—without
disclosing the contents of these messages to the Government. Mr. Guzman further moves that the
SAMs be vacated in their entirety and asks the Court to sign the attached proposed order which will
allow a researcher from Amnesty International USA to visit 10 South at MCC to investigate the
conditions of Mr. Guzman’s confinement.
I. Background
A.

The Conditions of Confinement

The Government argues that Mr. Guzman is no worse off than other inmates held under
SAMs. (See Govt. Memo. 37-38 citing United States v. Felipe, 148 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1998) and United
States v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2000)). In fact, Mr. Guzman is being held under the worst,
most restrictive conditions of any prisoner currently detained by the United States government.
The defendants in the cases cited by the Government were held under objectively better
conditions than Mr. Guzman faces. The defendant in Felipe (who was convicted of ordering murders
while in prison) was allowed to communicate with five people in addition to his attorney, including
his sister-in-law and his niece. Felipe, 148 F.3d at 107. The defendant in El-Hage was eventually
housed with a cellmate and allowed to call his family three times per month. El-Hage, 213 F.3d at 78.
Mr. Guzman, who has not been convicted of any crime, has had no contact with his family since his
extradition. It is significant that the cases cited by the Government as precedent for the oppressive
nature of Mr. Guzman’s detention involved conditions of confinement clearly less severe than those
imposed in this case.
Similarly, in United States v. United States v. Mohamed, 103 F. Supp. 3d 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), the
defendant was charged with the murder of a civilian employee of the Department of Defense and
the attempted murder of a United States Marine in an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Niger.
Mohamed, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 282. The defendant was alleged to have ties to terrorist organizations,
including Boko Haram and al-Qaeda. Id. at 283-284. Mr. Mohamed had been sentenced to serve 20
years in prison in Saudi Arabia for an alleged 2009 attack on Saudi officials. Mr. Mohammed was
also alleged to have participated in two prison breaks before his detention in the United States; the
escapes were alleged to have been conducted with the assistance of terrorist groups and it was
alleged that three prison guard were killed during one of the escapes. Id.at 288. At the time of his
detention in the United States the defendant’s bothers were reported to have ties to terrorist
organizations. Yet, unlike Mr. Guzman, Mr. Mohamed was permitted to have contact with his
wives. See United States v. Mohamed, 13-cr-527, E.D.N.Y., Dkt. No. 41 at 13.
The severity of Mr. Guzman’s confinement also outstrips that imposed on notorious,
convicted criminals held at USP Florence ADMAX, known colloquially as Supermax. Even in

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Supermax, inmates are allowed to watch television in their cells and to exercise outside in cages
where they can see, and speak with, other inmates. See What’s life like in Supermax prison? (CNN
television broadcast, June 25, 2015.)1 Mr. Guzman exercises alone in a cell and has only recently
gained access to television (meaning whatever DVD the jail staff decides to play) during the one
hour of recreation he is allowed on weekdays. He is never outside.
The Government appears to argue that Mr. Guzman is exaggerating the nature of his
confinement. 2 (See Govt. Memo. 11-12). After all, according to the Government, Mr. Guzman has
the largest cell in the unit with a “frosted glass” window and a radio. (Id.) There is no window in Mr.
Guzman’s cell. Defense counsel has not been afforded the opportunity to inspect the cell, 3 but Mr.
Guzman describes a space where a window may have once been. It is guarded by bars and filled by a
sheet of opaque plastic. Mr. Guzman can’t say whether it “allows daylight to come into his cell”
because the light in his cell has never been turned off and he can’t tell from the “window” if it is
daytime or nighttime.
The Government also grossly overstates the BOP’s attention to Mr. Guzman’s concerns.
Mr. Guzman comes from a country where tap water can be hazardous. After arriving at MCC, he
asked if he could purchase bottled water. Despite the Government’s assurance that the BOP has
allowed him to “buy bottled water from the commissary” (id. at 12), Mr. Guzman has never been
allowed to do so. While inmates in general population are permitted to purchase bottled water, Mr.
Guzman has not been permitted to do so. Federal Defenders staff has reviewed all of the

1

Available at http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/25/us/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-supermax-prison/.

In support of their argument, the Government points to statements by Silvia Delgado, one of Mr.
Guzman’s attorneys from Mexico. (Govt. Memo. 12-13, n.6). However, the Government is well
aware, since it prevented Ms. Delgado from visiting or speaking with Mr. Guzman, that she has had
no direct contact with Mr. Guzman and cannot provide any firsthand account about his conditions.
Further, Ms. Delgado’s statements were clearly based on a misunderstanding of Mr. Guzman’s
actual conditions, as she reported that Mr. Guzman is allowed one hour outside to exercise, a fact
the Government knows to be false. See http://www.rgvproud.com/news/local-news/oneofjoaquin-el-chapo-guzmans-attorneys-speaks-about-his-extradition-and-currentsituation/654748848
(last visited on March 28, 2017). Further, Ms. Delgado was largely referring to the fact that Mr.
Guzman’s visits with defense counsel were more limited in Mexico. Certainly Mr. Guzman would
prefer the visits with his family he was entitled to in Mexico to the visits from defense counsel he
receives in New York.
2

Amnesty International USA recently requested access to 10 South to observe the conditions of
confinement, but has not yet been given access.

3

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commissary forms provided to Mr. Guzman. 4 The forms provided to Mr. Guzman are all in
English. Further, bottled water is not included in the list of beverages. 5
Similarly, the Government’s assertion that “there are typically Spanish-speaking staff
available” (id.) has proven false. Mr. Guzman still often finds himself struggling to make himself
understood to the staff at the MCC. It must also be noted that the Requests for Administrative
Remedies filed by Mr. Guzman were all prepared and served by defense counsel and their paralegals
and that, without this assistance, Mr. Guzman would likely be unable to comply with the BOP’s
byzantine Administrative Remedy Program.
It is true that “[t]he BOP [] allowed the defendant to purchase a clock from the
commissary.” (Id.) It is also true that officials took it away from him a few days after he bought it—
with no explanation and no refund. It’s difficult to see how these facts advance the Government’s
argument that the SAMs, as enforced by BOP, are not punitive in nature.
The Government has little to say about the effects of solitary confinement on prisoners in
general and Mr. Guzman in particular. This was perhaps to be expected, since the devastating effects
of solitary confinement are widely acknowledged. Instead of disputing these deleterious effects, the
Government argues that Mr. Guzman isn’t really in solitary since his counsel and their staff meet
with him twice a day, on average. (Id. at 9). Even with this burdensome (for counsel) visitation
schedule, Mr. Guzman has already begun to exhibit worrying signs of mental illness. The
Government writes off “claims of auditory hallucinations” as “merely [] hearing sound from a
radio.” (Id. at 13). However, unless that radio was playing Mexican music, Mr. Guzman is hearing
non-existent sounds.
B.

Mr. Guzman’s Family

As noted above in and our letter of March 13, 2017, Mr. Guzman has had no direct contact
with his family since he was extradited to this country. His wife, Emma Coronel Aispuro, applied to
the BOP to visit him. Proof of the marriage was provided to the Government. Only after receiving
these documents did the Government inform defense counsel that Ms. Coronel would not be
allowed to visit her husband. The Government relied on its February 2, 2017 ex parte letter to the
Court in rendering this decision. As this letter predated Ms. Coronel’s application, defense counsel
can think of no reason why we weren’t informed at the beginning of the process that Ms. Coronel
would not be allowed to see her husband. Instead, time and resources were invested in assisting Ms.
Coronel with her application, including translating a marriage document, for no apparent reason.
It is for these reasons that the Court should reject the Government’s implicit assertion that
the only reason Mr. Guzman hasn’t been able to see anyone from his family is because “defense
When a paralegal requested that Mr. Guzman be allowed to give his commissary forms to the
paralegal to provide to defense counsel, she was informed that Mr. Guzman would have to purchase
stamps and send the documents through the mail to counsel.
4

Blank commissary forms are available on the Bureau of Prisons website clearly indicate that
bottled water is not available on 10 South. See
https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/nym/NYM_CommList.pdf
5

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counsel have not made a request for any other family member to visit the defendant.” (Govt. Memo.
11). The Government has been investigating Mr. Guzman for decades. It is aware of all of Mr.
Guzman’s family members. If there is a family member that would pass the Government’s
“vetting” procedure (and be able to obtain a visa), the Government should inform defense counsel,
rather than requiring counsel to participate in another charade of a clearance process.
As noted in our prior letter, Ms. Coronel is not only the family member closest to Mr.
Guzman, she is also one of very few who may legally enter the United States. In its memorandum,
the Government notes that it “discussed facilitating a visit between the defendant and his minor
children with defense counsel” (id.), as if this were some sort of proof of good faith. In fact, Mr.
Guzman and Ms. Coronel’s twin 6-year old daughters are much too young to be expected to travel
to another country, enter a high security prison, be locked in a small visiting booth with strangers
while they sit behind a screen, and speak to their father without their mother present.
The Government identifies two potential immediate family members Mr. Guzman could
elect to visit him in keeping with the SAMs, an “adult daughter and his sister” (Id. 10). Regarding
the “daughter” it seems peculiar indeed that the Government is prepared to allow Rosa Isela
Guzman Ortiz to establish her paternity through an article in the Guardian, but required Ms. Coronel
to submit legal documentation of her relationship to Mr. Guzman (Id. 10). 6 The Government is
obviously well aware of Ms. Coronel’s relationship to Mr. Guzman. Mr. Guzman does not believe
that Ms. Guzman Ortiz is in fact his daughter and maintains that he has no relationship with her.
She is not someone he would reasonably rely on when retaining private counsel. As for Mr.
Guzman’s sister, he does not believe at this point it would be feasible for her to travel to the United
States, or assist in the actual logistics for retaining counsel. Further, it can hardly be said that a sister
is a substitute for the counsel of a spouse or partner. The law has long recognized the special
relationship between a husband and wife as distinct from other family members. See, e.g. Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, (1980) (Describing the “ancient roots” of the spousal privilege and its role
in “fostering the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship.”)
The fact remains that Ms. Coronel is the only member of Mr. Guzman’s family who can
reasonably be expected to travel to New York and visit with him. The Government argues that the
ex parte allegations that undergird its prohibition on Ms. Coronel visiting are further proven by Ms.
Coronel’s visit to the MCC after defense counsel were informed that she would not be approved.
(Govt. Memo. 11, 32). All that this episode proves is that Mr. Guzman must be able to meet with
Ms. Coronel if he is to arrange to hire a private attorney. Defense counsel was appointed by the
Court and had never met Mr. Guzman or Ms. Coronel before the day Mr. Guzman first appeared in
this District. It is unsurprising that Ms. Coronel would have questions about and perhaps not trust
information provided to her by strangers. Under these circumstances, appearing at the jail in person
to request visitation is a rational action. A similar problem is likely to arise if a private attorney
contacts Ms. Coronel and tells her that Mr. Guzman has hired him or her. Under the SAMs, even
with the Government’s proposed modification, she would have no way to confirm her husband’s
wishes.
citing Californian, businesswoman, ‘narco daughter’: El Chapo’s American daughter, The Guardian, (March 4,
2016), available at https://www.theguardian.com/world /2016/mar/04/el-chapo-daughter-joaquinguzman-california (last visited on March 28, 2017)
6

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C.

Defense Counsel’s Visitation and the Role of the Public Defender/Defense Attorney

In its memorandum, the Government correctly notes that, since Mr. Guzman’s first
appearance in court, he has had, on average, four to five hours of legal visits a day—either with
appointed counsel, Federal Defender paralegals, or SAMs cleared private attorneys who are
permitted to visit to explore the potential of representation. (Govt. Memo. 9-10, 38-39). The
Government makes a point of noting that “on many of these occasions, MCC officials have noted
that [Mr. Guzman] has met exclusively with paralegals from the Federal Defenders in the evening
hours.” (Id. at 10). The only reason to note this visit schedule is to cast the specter of some
impropriety—but the SAMs clearly allow paralegals to meet with Mr. Guzman on their own and
make no distinction between the hours of visitation.
Before arriving at 10 South’s counsel visit area, attorneys and staff must pass through a metal
detector, a number of security check points, and be searched with a handheld metal detector three
separate times. For female visitors this generally means, unlike the airport, they are searched by male
guards. These counsel visits are designated as no-contact visits by the MCC (the terms of the SAMs
allow for contact visits). During the legal visit, both the visitor and Mr. Guzman are locked into
opposite sides of a small enclosed booth. Mr. Guzman is separated from his visitors by a wall that is
half metal screen and half Plexiglas. It is not possible to pass papers back and forth, papers must be
held up to the Plexiglas so the party on the other side may view them. No physical contact is
permitted between Mr. Guzman and his attorneys, not even a handshake in greeting or before
departing.
The doors to the visiting booth have a large window allowing the BOP officers, who sit at a
desk just a few feet away, to view the parties during the visit. Additionally there are cameras which
also appear to capture the legal visit. 7 Despite their close proximity to the visit from their seated
positions, the BOP officers routinely walk past the interview booth during the counsel visit. While
there is a “white-noise” machine, it clearly does not serve its intended purpose as counsel can easily
hear the officers as they chat with each other and can verbally communicate with them when the
need arises. As is apparent from the Government’s response, the Assistant United States Attorneys
prosecuting Mr. Guzman are keenly aware of every legal visit Mr. Guzman receives, who was
involved, and how long it lasted. The Government also appears to monitor the contents of what are
supposed to be privileged confidential communications. For example, the Government reports that
paralegals were observed reading articles to Mr. Guzman or teaching him English. (Id. 10, 39).
It is under these burdensome, improper conditions that we must conduct Mr. Guzman’s
privileged, confidential legal visits. To be clear, the SAMs do not permit the monitoring of Mr.
Guzman’s privileged communications, which the Government acknowledges. (Id. 5, n.1). Yet the
Government appears to be doing just that. The Government’s absurd claims that the BOP officers
accidentally determined that legal visitors were teaching Mr. Guzman English and reading articles to
him by observing the mouthing of words, or inadvertently seeing a piece of paper held up to the
The Government avers that prison officials must “maintain visual contact for safety purposes.”
(Govt. Memo. 10). There is no basis for this claim as both Mr. Guzman and the visitors are locked
inside separated ends of the booth and are physically separated. “Maintaining visual contact” serves
no safety function under these circumstances.

7

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Plexiglas, defy credibility. It offends the very nature of the right to counsel and the right to
confidential, privileged communications with one’s lawyer to have legal visits conducted in a virtual
fishbowl, while the BOP secretly observes and reports back to the prosecutors assigned to the case.
Further, the allegation in its memorandum that Federal Defender staff are conducting legal
visits for the “purpose of teaching the defendant to read and speak English, and to read him
newspapers” demonstrates the Government’s complete ignorance of the importance of the
relationship between a defendant and the defense team. 8 The attorney-client relationship is
predicated on trust. No lawyer develops such trust by limiting their interactions to discussions of
the facts and law controlling a given case. Indeed, lawyers routinely invite clients to meals, concerts
and sporting events—and are generally entitled to deduct half the cost of doing so on their taxes as
”ordinary and necessary” business expenses—in order to develop relationships with their clients. Mr.
Guzman's lawyers do not have that luxury given his strict confinement. The Government's efforts
to pass judgment or diminish the necessity of our having what they view as extraneous
conversations with our clients is ill-informed and borders on outrageous. As public defenders,
appointed by the Court, Federal Defenders must always overcome the suspicion on the part of a
client that somehow the loyalty of his or her attorney lies with the Court or Government and not the
client. 9 An attorney cannot instill faith in the fairness of the judicial process without first establishing
a relationship of trust with the client. While this is an ever present concern for any public defender,
it is especially heightened in this case, where Mr. Guzman is facing a minimum sentence of life in
prison, has been completely cut off from friends and family, and was airlifted to New York without
prior notice to him or his attorneys in Mexico.
The Government seems to argue that Mr. Guzman is not actually suffering from the effects
of isolation because counsel has visited him as often as possible. Surely visits from strangers,
appointed by the Court, cannot substitute for the ability to communicate with his wife, children, and
family. Further, counsel has visited Mr. Guzman whenever possible precisely because we have seen
Mr. Guzman’s condition deteriorate as he languishes in solitary confinement. While absolutely
necessary, the visits are a tremendous strain on resources. At this early stage of the case, before
defense counsel has received any discovery, it is onerous, but not impossible, to visit Mr. Guzman
every day. Once discovery and trial preparations begin in earnest, this will not be the case. The
Government’s reliance on defense counsel visits to keep Mr. Guzman sane will likely be proven
mistaken as the case progresses. And Mr. Guzman’s condition may well deteriorate to the point that
competency hearings may be required under 18 U.S.C. § 4241.
Further, defense counsel is not alone in their concern over the conditions Mr. Guzman’s
confinement. In a letter dated to AUSA Andrea Goldbarg, March 28, 2017, Justin Mazzola, the
Defense counsel has a duty to “establish a relationship of trust and confidence” with their client.
ABA GUIDELINES DEFENSE FUNCTION, Lawyer-Client Relationship, Guideline 4-3.1 (2008).
8

See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, Law & Contemp.
Probs., WINTER 1995, at 81, 87 (“Clients' misunderstandings of the criminal justice system often
lead them to level unfair charges against their public defenders. For instance, public defenders have
been criticized for their close alliance with other court agents, including judges, prosecutors, and
police.”) (Citations omitted.)

9

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Deputy Director of Research for Amnesty International USA wrote to express his organization’s
concerns “about the conditions under which Joaquin Guzman Loera has been held while in federal
pre-trial detention.” (Letter of Justin Mazzola to AUSA Andrea Goldbarg, date March 28, 2017,
attached hereto as Exhibit A). Deputy Director Mazzola wrote that Mr. Guzman’s current
conditions of confinement fall below the “United Nations (UN) Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners.” (Ex. A at 1). Amnesty International is seeking permission from the
Government and the Bureau of Prisons to meet with Mr. Guzman at the MCC and inspect his
conditions for themselves. We join in this request and ask the Court to sign the attached proposed
order permitting Mr. Mazzola to meet with Mr. Guzman and to observe the conditions of his
confinement in 10 South. (Proposed Order attached hereto as Exhibit B).
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Court has jurisdiction to grant relief

The Government argues this Court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or modify the SAMs
because Mr. Guzman has not exhausted his administrative remedies. In support of this argument,
the Government contends that Prison Litigation Control Act (“PLRA”), which states “[n]o action
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), controls. The PLRA
was enacted “to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.” See Porter v. Nussle,
534 U.S. 516, 524-525 (2002). However, the instant motion—seeking a ruling or order from the
court on a matter impacting the pending criminal proceedings—is substantively different that than
the initiation of a new lawsuit. See Sattar v. Gonzales, 2010 WL 685787, at 2 (D. Colo. Feb. 23, 2010).
Mr. Guzman has not brought a separate action, rather Mr. Guzman’s motion directly
addresses this Court’s ability to manage these criminal proceedings. Mr. Guzman’s motion to vacate
or modify the SAMs is not an “action” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as was the case in Porter; thus, the
Government’s reliance on Porter is misplaced. In Porter, the Supreme Court held that an inmate had
to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit under the PLRA.
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, (2002). Porter did not hold that “an inmate's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies deprived courts of subject matter jurisdiction over a 28 U.S.C. § 2241
petition or any other type of claim.” See Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 472 at n.1 (11th Cir.
2015). As noted above, Mr. Guzman has not filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit under the PLRA. Mr.
Guzman has challenged the constitutionality of the imposition of Special Administrative Measures.
Specifically, Mr. Guzman submits that the SAMs impair his ability to present and assist in his
defense, his right to counsel, his right to fair and impartial jury, and severely impact on his physical
and mental condition in such a manner that, left unaltered, will undoubtedly effect his competency
to stand trial. Thus, Porter does not control. 10

The Government’s reliance on Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001) is equally misplaced. In Booth
the Supreme Court ruled that an inmate who brought a suit under §1983 seeking money damages
must exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 39-41.
10

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The other cases relied on by the Government are equally unavailing. Three of the cases
concern defendants challenging conditions of confinement imposed as part of their sentences, not
constitutional challenges to the impact of such conditions on their pending criminal cases. See United
States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 165 (2d Cir. 2003)(Defendant objecting to district court’s
recommendation of special conditions of confinement as part of his sentence was required to
exhaust administrative remedies; as the district court’s recommendation was not binding on the
Bureau of Prisons, the recommendation was not appealable as a final decision or final sentence.);
United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 243–44 (4th Cir. 2008)(Holding a defendant objecting to
SAMs imposed as part of his sentence based on Attorney Generals recommendation was required to
exhaust his administrative remedies); Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2001) (Defendant, a
sentenced prisoner, brought a Bivens action seeking monetary relief challenging SAMs imposed in
conjunction with his sentence.) The only cited case even possibly on point, United States v. Khan, 540
F.Supp. 2d 344 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) is not only an outlier among courts who have considered challenges
to conditions of confinement brought by pretrial detainees, it is readily distinguishable. In Khan, the
defendant brought a challenge to conditions imposed as a result of a determination made by the
acting warden of the prison, not the imposition of SAMs by the attorney general. Khan, 540 F.Supp
2d at 346-47. Further, unlike Mr. Guzman, there is no indication that Khan raised an allegation that
his conditions of confinement impacted on his ability to assert his constitutional rights in his
pending criminal case.
At the heart of Mr. Guzman’s challenge to the SAMs is the impact of the SAMs on his right
to counsel and his ability to present and assist in his own defenses. Mr. Guzman’s challenges relate
directly to this Court’s ability to fairly and efficiently manage the defendant's criminal prosecution,
and is not a motion “within the category of lawsuits to which the PLRA was aimed.” See In Re Nagy,
89 F.3d 115, 117. (2d Cir. 1996) Mr. Guzman’s challenge is nearly identical to the challenge brought
by the defendant in United States. v. Hashmi, 621 F. Supp. 2d 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). The court in
Hashmi held that Mr. Hashmi’s constitutional challenge to his SAMs did not constitute an “action”
within the meaning of the PLRA, thus, Mr. Hashmi was not required to exhaust his BOP remedies
and the district court had jurisdiction over his claims. See Hashmi 621 F. Supp. 2d at 84.
In United States. v. Savage, the defendant serving a 30-year prison sentence was indicted for
charges including 11 counts of murder in aid of racketeering. United States. v. Savage 2010 WL
4236867 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2010). It was alleged that the defendant had ordered several of the
murders while incarcerated at the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia. Savage 2010 WL
4236867, at 1. After the imposition of the SAMs, Mr. Savage was transferred to the MCC. In its
decision, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recognized that the MCC is a
severely restrictive facility even in comparison to the maximum security unit “ADMAX” at Florence
Colorado where that defendant had previously been housed. Id at 1-2. Although Savage was
accused of ordering murders while incarcerated, and “threatening to kill federal agents, prisons
officials and witnesses,” the government and the Bureau of Prisons agreed to a modification of the
defendant’s SAMs to facilitate contact visits between the defendant and his attorneys by agreeing to
transport him once a month to the FDC in Philadelphia for such visits. Nonetheless, Savage moved
to vacate the SAMs in their entirety, complaining that his legal visits were inadequate, he had
insufficient access to the law library and that he was unable to focus on his defense due to his
conditions of confinement. United States v. Savage, 2010 WL 4236867, at 2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2010).
The court found that Savage’s motion directly related to the court’s “ability to manage these criminal

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proceedings” and, thus, was not barred for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies under the
PLRA” Savage at 7. In reaching this decision, the Savage court noted that a “survey of the case law
reveals that every court that has considered the issue has found that a motion to remove SAMs that
is filed pre-trial in a defendant’s criminal case is not an “action” to which the PLRA applies” Savage
2010 WL 4236867, at 3-7.
Other courts have recognized that motions by defendants relating to issues affecting their
pending criminal cases are not the types of claims the PLRA was enacted to handle, and, as such, the
exhaustion requirement does not apply. In Sattar v. Gonzales, 2010 WL 685787, the district court held
the defendant was not required to exhaust administrative remedies before challenging his SAMs
because his challenge related to his right to access to the courts. See Sattar, 2010 WL 685787at 2. 11See
also United States. v. Lopez, 327 F. Supp. 2d 138, 140-42 (D.P.R. 2004) (Holding defendant challenging
the impact of the SAMs on his right to counsel and his ability assist in his own defense need not
exhaust administrative remedies.) More recently, another Judge in this District held the exhaustion
requirement inapplicable to a SAMs challenge brought by a defendant in his pending criminal
proceeding. United States v. Mohamed, 103 F. Supp. 3d 281, 285 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (unlike postconviction appeals initiated by prisoners, motions filed by pretrial detainees in government-initiated
actions do not constitution “actions” under the PLRA and are therefore not barred). Accordingly,
the Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Guzman’s motion to vacate or modify the SAMs.
The Court also has jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), because Mr. Guzman is in
custody under or by color of the United States and is committed for trial before the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York and because his present custody and
confinement violates the Constitution and laws of the United States. The federal habeas corpus
statute “draws no distinction between Americans and aliens held in federal custody . . . .” Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004). Further, as noted above Porter does not impose an exhaustion
requirement on motion made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
B.

Appointment of Firewall Counsel

As a preliminary matter, should the SAMs be retained in any capacity, Mr. Guzman requests
that firewall counsel be appointed to conduct any and all clearance requests for visitors to Mr.
Guzman. Additionally, we request that the Court order the MCC to have no further
communications with the prosecution team assigned to Mr. Guzman’s case concerning observations
made by BOP staff of confidential, privileged counsel visits. In its order granting the modified
protective order dated March 21, 2017 (Dkt. No. 51), the Court recognized that assigning the vetting
of defense team members “to the very Government attorneys who are prosecuting defendant
appears to be improper in that it permits a “potential spy in the defense camp” because the
Government would be in the position to “learn[] privileged defense strategy” from the individuals
defendant is interviewing or seeking to retain as part of his defense team.” (Id. at 3)(citations omitted).
In reaching this conclusion, the Sattar court considered the holding in Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d
1214 (10th Cir. 2001), a case relied on by the Government in its memorandum. See Sattyr at 1. Yousef
does not command a different result, unlike the instant case, the defendant in Yousef filed a separate
Bivens action, not a motion seeking redress in his pending criminal case. See Yousef, 254 F.3d 1214.
11

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As the Court recognized, with regard to the protective order, firewall counsel is necessary to
safeguard Mr. Guzman’s rights under the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment concerns
expressed by the Court regarding the use of the same prosecutors to vet experts and member of the
defense team who will view protected material, extend to the SAMs process itself. The prosecution
team should not be vetting defense team members who are visiting Mr. Guzman regardless of
whether they have access to the protected material. Thus, we ask that the SAMs clearance process
be assigned to the US Attorney’s firewall counsel. 12
C.

Right to Counsel 13

The Government’s proposed modification of the SAMs does not cure the Sixth Amendment
violation caused by the SAMs. Allowing defense counsel or private counsel “to send prescreened
communications to the defendant’s family members for the limited purpose of communicating the
defendant’s desire to retain particular counsel and the logistics of obtaining funds to do so” (Govt.
Memo. 24) does not provide Mr. Guzman’s family any confidence that defense counsel or private
counsel are accurately communicating Mr. Guzman’s wishes. 14
Mr. Guzman was extradited to this country with no advance notice to either him or his
family. Upon his arrival at the courthouse on January 20, 2017, he was met by defense counsel who
explained that they expected to be appointed by the Court to represent him. Neither Mr. Guzman
nor any of his family members had ever met defense counsel prior to January 20. Neither had they
any experience with the justice system in the United States. This circumstance provides Mr.
Guzman’s family with little basis to trust appointed counsel. As previously noted, this situation
explains Ms. Coronel’s visit to the MCC to obtain information about visiting her husband, even
though defense counsel had already told her of the Government’s decision prohibiting her from
seeing or speaking to her husband.

In its March 21 Order, the Court suggests that the Government could appoint the prosecution
teams from the Western District of Texas or Southern District of California as firewall counsel.
Defense counsel notes that this could raise additional Sixth Amendment concerns if Mr. Guzman
were later tried in those districts.
12

In its memorandum, the Government indicates that its distinction between paralegals and
investigators in the SAMs is based on who the Government believes is a “core member” of the
defense team. (Govt. Memo. 28). Obviously, the Government cannot say who is necessary for the
defense team; the defense still submits that the distinction is arbitrary. However, since the
Government says that it will consider modification of this rule, we will not pursue it here. Further,
the defense will accept the Government’s clarification in its memorandum that “messages” as
included in the SAMs is defined as “verbatim messages.” (Id. at 27-28).
13

The Government’s insistence that any communication for this purpose be “prescreened” poses the
same problems that arose from the Government’s application for a protective order. (Dkt. No. 28).
In the Court’s words, allowing “the very Government attorneys who are prosecuting defendant” to
prescreen communications would permit “a potential spy in the defense camp.” (Dkt. No. 51 quoting
United States v. Massino, 311 F. Supp. 2d 309, 311 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).

14

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The Government’s proposal, by precluding any direct communication between Mr. Guzman
and his family, simply continues this untenable situation. Without some personal assurance from Mr.
Guzman to his family about what he wants in regards to hiring an attorney, it is unreasonable to
expect his family to commit resources as directed by counsel who were unknown to them until two
months ago. The Government proposal to allow “prescreened communications” from Mr. Guzman
to his family member appears to preclude delivering a personal letter that could provide his family
some assurance of his wishes; the Government makes clear that it “continues to object to allowing
direct communication between the defendant and Ms. Coronel.” (Id. at 31). Without this direct
communication, Mr. Guzman’s right to counsel will continue to be frustrated.
The SAMs were obviously written in anticipation of Mr. Guzman being allowed to visit with
family members and also to speak with them on the telephone. (See SAMs § 3). In fact, all SAMs
begin from the same template which permits telephonic contact with immediate family members
and there is a presumption that immediate family members will have the ability to have telephone
contact with the accused. 15 These calls and visits are limited in number and subject to strict
monitoring by government officials. Any phone call between Mr. Guzman and a family member
must be contemporaneously monitored and recorded. (SAMs § 3(d)). If any “inappropriate activity”
is revealed, the call may be immediately terminated. (SAMs § 3(e)). Similarly, all face to face visits
may be contemporaneously monitored and cannot involve any physical contact. (SAMs § 3(f)(iii)(1)).
These conditions are more than adequate to address the Government’s professed concern that Mr.
Guzman could pass “forbidden messages . . . to third parties.” (Govt. Memo. 21).
The Government’s worry that Mr. Guzman could use a code to deliver “dangerous”
messages if he is allowed to meet with his wife is based on complete conjecture. The Government
provides no evidence that Mr. Guzman or Ms. Coronel have ever used coded communication. The
cases cited by the Government on this point are unpersuasive; none involved communications made
while under strict monitoring conditions like those imposed by the SAMs in this case. See, e.g.
Basciano v. Lindsay, 530 F. Supp. 2d 435, 440 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (SAMs imposed on defendant only
after allegation that he tried to procure murder of five people, including the judge and prosecutor.
Defendant was still allowed visits with his family). The point is not that the Government has to
“wait for [a person] to undertake . . . violent actions in order to justify SAMs” (Govt. Memo 35), the
point is that the SAMs provide sufficient assurance, through its recording and monitoring
provisions, that Mr. Guzman could not pass “dangerous” messages if allowed to speak with his wife.
To retain counsel of his choice, Mr. Guzman is necessarily going to have communicate
personally with his wife. Third party messages relayed by appointed or private counsel cannot
provide Ms. Coronel the assurance she needs that, by hiring a particular attorney, she is fulfilling her
husband’s wishes. Without some personal communication with his wife, Mr. Guzman’s
fundamental right “to secure counsel of his own choice” will be defeated. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 53 (1932); see also United States v. Gonzalez–Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006); Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624–25 (1989); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988);
Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1089 (2016).
15

See Mohammed v. Holder, 47 F. Supp. 3d 1236, 1252 (D. Colo. 2014)

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The Government’s proposed modification results in a Hobson’s choice. In order to exercise
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice, the Government requires Mr. Guzman to give
up his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Government’s proposed modification
allows the Government not only the right to review any communication between Mr. Guzman and
his family members, but, implicitly, the right to retain those communications. The Government has
not proposed any limitation on the manner in which it may seek to use the contents of these
communications in the future. There is nothing to prevent the Government from attempting to use
these recorded communications to bring new charges, or as evidence in against Mr. Guzman in the
instant prosecution. For example, the Government may allege that any large sum of money
possessed by Mr. Guzman’s family or friends must be “Sinaloa cartel” proceeds, or their willingness
to pay for Mr. Guzman’s defense says something about the nature of the alleged criminal enterprise.
See United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934, 949 (2d Cir. 1991) (Citing In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 64 (2d
Cir.1984)) (“payment of attorneys' fees by one individual on behalf of other suspected members of a
criminal enterprise ‘may imply facts about a prior or present relationship’ between the benefactor
and his beneficiaries.”)
Mr. Guzman’s situation is distinguishable from the line of cases holding that as a general
rule, a client’s identity and fee information are not privileged and attorneys must disclose such fees
for tax purposes. See Lefcourt v. United States, 125 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 1997) (Citations omitted.) cert.
denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). The Government’s proposal would grant them access to information
about Mr. Guzman’s relationship to third parties and their sources of income, even if the
communications never result in an attorney being hired. Further, Mr. Guzman is not claiming that
disclosure is impermissible because it would violate attorney-client privilege, but rather that he is
being forced to choose between asserting his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice and
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and such a choice is, by its nature,
unconstitutional.
D.

Due Process

Under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, a defendant may not be punished prior
to a finding of guilt in accordance with due process of law. See generally, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979). While the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual” punishment does not
apply to detainees not convicted of a crime, pretrial detainees “retain at least those constitutional
rights that [the Supreme Court has] held are enjoyed by convicted prisoners,” id. at 545, and their
conditions of confinement may not be punitive. Id. at 535 (“[i]n evaluating the constitutionality of
conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the protection against the
deprivation of liberty without due process of law, we think that the proper inquiry is whether those
conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.”); see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts General
Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)(the due process rights of a pretrial detainee “are at least as great as
the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.”) Thus, the Government may
not subject inmates to unnecessarily harsh and isolating conditions of confinement. See e.g. Wilkinson
v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005)(protected liberty interests are implicated where prison regulations
impose “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.”).

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Here, the Government’s assertion that the oppressive nature of Mr. Guzman’s confinement
is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose is belied by the arbitrary nature of the
conditions. For example, Mr. Guzman was allowed to purchase a clock from the commissary. The
clock was later taken away by BOP officials. The Government does not dispute these facts and,
indeed, offers no explanation for the series of events. Similarly, Mr. Guzman’s “recreation” time is
arbitrarily limited to one hour per weekday and the Government asks the defense and the Court to
accept this limitation at face value. The Government seeks the power to censor which books Mr.
Guzman may read? If these conditions are not imposed to punish Mr. Guzman, why can’t he have a
clock in his cell? Why can’t he use the exercise equipment two hours per day instead of one? Why
can’t he purchase bottled water from the commissary? Why can’t he choose which books he wants
to read? None of these conditions relate at all to the Government’s expressed concern about Mr.
Guzman passing “dangerous” messages to third parties. The inescapable conclusion must be that
the Government seeks to make Mr. Guzman’s detention as difficult and unpleasant as possible.
That is the hallmark of punishment.
The specific conditions noted above should not be taken by the Court as a list of conditions
that could be modified to save the SAMs from violating Mr. Guzman’s constitutional rights. The
listed conditions are simply some of the many which evidence the arbitrary and—because they are
arbitrary—punitive quality of Mr. Guzman’s confinement. Yes, drinking from the tap won’t make
Mr. Guzman more susceptible to solitary confinement-induced mental illness, but the lack of a
rational explanation for requiring to drink tap water proves that the Government’s goal here is
punishment.
Under the SAMs as presently applied, Mr. Guzman faces an indeterminate amount of time
in solitary confinement. The vast amount of discovery the Government says it will turn over in
addition to the nature of the charges offenses mean that Mr. Guzman will potentially be in pretrial
detention for years. The extreme deprivations presently imposed on him will have dire impacts on
his mental and physical health, especially considering “that researchers have found that even a few
days in solitary confinement can cause cognitive disturbances.” Williams v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of
Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 562 (3d Cir. 2017)(emphasis in original). The severe nature of the confinement
conditions imposed in this case, by themselves, violate the Due Process Clause. That the conditions
are not warranted by any legitimate governmental interest only makes that violation more acute.
E.

Right to present a defense

The impact of the SAMs on Mr. Guzman’s physical and mental well-being is important not
only because it evidences the punitive nature of his conditions of confinement, but because it
impairs his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. As Mr. Guzman’s mental and physical
states deteriorate under the SAMs, his ability to assist in his defense will be crippled. It is a common
phenomenon that detainees held under SAMs similar to those in this case become mired in thoughts
and litigation regarding their conditions of confinement and lose the ability to focus on the criminal
proceeding. “The SAMs [] distract a defendant from the case’s substance and prevent the accused
from concentrating on how to best challenge the indictment, which may include preparing the
defendant to testify at trial, a task requiring ‘an extraordinary amount of time and attentiveness.’”
Andrew Dalack, Special Administrative Measures and the War on Terror: When Do Extreme Pretrial Detention
Measures Offend the Constitution?, 19 Mich. J. Race & L. 415, 434 (2014) (citations omitted).

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“The defendant's isolation only makes matters worse: ‘[s]ince the attorney is the only person
with whom the client has contact, the attorney is the only outlet for the client's frustration.’ If this
itself does not create tension between the defendant and his attorney, the attorney's failure to
substantively improve the defendant's confinement conditions ‘can be met with animosity and
resistance to discussing anything else,’ depriving the defendant the benefit of his own assistance.” In
one terrorism case, although the defendant never expressed distrust towards his attorney, he simply
withdrew from the entire case and “lost affect.” Id.
Further, the severe limitations on Mr. Guzman’s non-legal contacts violate his right to
present a defense and investigate his case. The Government alleges that this restriction is necessary
to protect the safety of its witnesses. But this limitation renders it completely impossible for defense
counsel to locate, interview and secure witnesses necessary for Mr. Guzman’s defense. Most of the
witnesses to the events alleged in the indictment will be located in foreign countries and may be
skeptical of foreigners they have never met coming to speak to them, claiming to be assisting in Mr.
Guzman’s defense. In many cases, defense counsel must rely on their client’s assurances to potential
witness that they would like the witness to cooperate with the defense team before a witness will do
so. By preventing even this innocuous communication—that it is okay for the witness to speak to
Mr. Guzman’s attorneys—the SAMs completely prevent Mr. Guzman from facilitating his counsel’s
investigation in this manner.
F.

SAMs are unwarranted

Despite protestations to the contrary the Government has not demonstrated that SAMs are
warranted in this case. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §501.3, SAMs may be warranted if they are reasonably
necessary to protect against “the risk of death or serious bodily injury to persons” or “substantial
damage to property that would entail the risk of death or serious bodily injury to persons.” See 28
C.F.R. § 501.3. The Government has sought to justify the imposition of SAMs against Mr. Guzman
based in part on his alleged history of escaping from prison in Mexico. These allegations, while
sensational, do not provide a proper justification for the imposition of SAMs. Neither of the two
incidents of escape described by the Government are alleged to have involve acts of violence or
threats of violence. Nor has the Government alleged that Mr. Guzman’s prior reputed escapes from
incarceration resulted in destruction of physical property creating a “risk of death or serious bodily
injury” as required under 28 U.S.C. §501.3. It can only be assumed that these alleged incidents, the
sensational nature of which has been greeted with widespread skepticism, are yet further examples
of the Government relying on myth and legend rather than facts to prosecute its case.
Further, regarding acts of violence alleged to have been perpetrated by Mr. Guzman, the
Government has offered only sweeping generalizations in the documents filed on the public docket.
While the Government claims it has provided ample documentation in its ex Parte filings, Mr.
Guzman is obviously not in position to controvert allegations he has been unable to see. Surely our
system of law does not countenance that the drastic deprivations imposed on Mr. Guzman may be
instituted based on secret allegations Mr. Guzman is powerless to challenge. Mr. Guzman has
demonstrated that the SAMs burden his constitutional rights under the First, Fifth and Sixth

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Amendment. Upholding their imposition without giving Mr. Guzman the opportunity to challenge
the Government’s allegations further violated his right to Due Process under the Fifth Amendment.
G.

First Amendment and right to an impartial jury

It is well established that detainees retain First Amendment rights, including the right to send
and receive mail. Mohammed v. Holder, 2011 WL 4501959, at *7 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2011). Any
infringement of Mr. Guzman’s First Amendment rights of free speech and association are only
lawful if they are reasonably related to legitimate governmental interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
89 (1987). The Sixth Amendment secures to criminal defendants the right to trial by an impartial
jury. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). Sensational and prejudicial pretrial publicity often results
in a jury panel denuded of its impartiality. See e.g. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 378 (2010);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966); Irvin at 719.
The SAMs prohibition on Mr. Guzman communicating with news media in any way violates
both his First Amendment right to free speech and his Sixth Amendment right to trial by an
impartial jury. The Government’s argument that defense counsel “possess the ability to correct any
purported ‘false’ accounts of his life to the public” is simply wrong. 16 Defense counsel are bound by
this Court’s local rules, which prohibit publicly disseminating “[a]ny opinion as to the accused's guilt
or innocence or as to the merits of the case or the evidence in the case.” U.S. Dist. Ct. Crim. R. S. &
E.D.N.Y. 23.1(d)(7)(“Local Rule 23.1”). In fact, defense counsel are prohibited from responding to
the countless media reports about Mr. Guzman and this prosecution. While the Government
attorneys are bound by the same rule, “retired” government officials are not. 17
The SAMs, therefore, leave Mr. Guzman and the defense team mute in the face of “former”
law enforcement officials appearing in the media and publishing books purporting to reveal the truth
about Mr. Guzman. The SAMs also prohibit Mr. Guzman from responding to the numerous thinlydisguised fictional accounts of his life produced for television or to be produced as major motion
pictures.
The intense international media scrutiny of this case risks prejudicing prospective jurors. The
SAMs compound this prejudice by ensuring that Mr. Guzman has no way to counter false and
unfavorable media reports or fictionalized accounts of his life. 18 Because of this media interest (fed
The Government’s contention that defense counsel’s public filings and brief comments to the
press after Mr. Guzman’s court appearances are sufficient to combat the onslaught of media
portrayals of Mr. Guzman’s life is also misguided. In all its interactions with the press, the defense
has been guided by Local Rule 23.1.
16

As noted in our letter of March 13, 2017, the press conference held by the Unites States Attorney
on the date of Mr. Guzman’s arraignment likely violated the spirit, and perhaps even the letter, of
Local Rule 23.1.
17

The Government claims that Mr. Guzman has cultivated and perpetuated the image of himself as
a narcotics trafficker. (Govt. Memo. 36). To support this claim, the Government quotes an article in
18

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at least partially by the Government) the prohibition on Mr. Guzman speaking to the media violates
his First Amendment right to free speech and his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
The SAMs limitation on religious services available to Mr. Guzman burden his First
Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. To this day, Mr. Guzman has yet to see a priest at
the MCC who speaks Spanish. Any interaction he has with “religious personnel” has either been
through pantomime or with the “assistance” of a prison guard who speaks Spanish. This situation,
along with the SAMs bar on group religious observances, unduly encumber Mr. Guzman’s right to
the free exercise of his religion.
III.

CONCLUSION

We respectfully request that the Court grant the proposed immediate modifications
permitting 1) Mr. Guzman to have direct contact with his wife, Emma Coronel, either in person or
by telephone, for the purposes of communicating his choice of private counsel and determining the
availability of assets necessary to retain such counsel; and 2) allowing defense counsel or private
attorneys to relay messages between Mr. Guzman and third parties for the limited purposes of
ascertaining and securing the assets necessary to retain counsel—without disclosing the contents of
these messages to the Government.
We further request that the Court vacate the SAMs in full, release Mr. Guzman from the
SHU, and to place him in the general prison population. If the Court were to deny that motion, the
defense moves, in the alternative, to vacate and/or modify various sections and provisions of the
SAMs. Further, if the Court is not prepared to grant the relief herein requested, the defendant
requests an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
Finally, we request that the Court to sign the attached proposed order which will allow a
researcher from Amnesty International USA to visit 10 South at MCC to investigate the conditions
of Mr. Guzman’s confinement.

Rolling Stone by the “journalist” Sean Penn. Id. According to the cited article, Mr. Guzman had
never before given an interview or spoken publically about his life. Watch El Chapo’s Exclusive
Interview In Its 17-Minute Entirety, Rolling Stone (January 12, 2016), available at
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/videos/watch-el-chapo-s-exclusive-interview-in-its-17minute-entirety-20160112 (last visited on March 29, 2017). As for the alleged direct quote provided
by Mr. Penn, the article relates that Mr. Guzman spoke in Spanish, and that Mr. Penn described his
facility with that language as follows: “I'm pretty restricted to hola and adios.” Id. The actress Kate
Castillo is alleged to have served as a translator. Mr. Penn also described that, during the “interview”
both he and Ms. Castillo were drinking the brand of Tequila Ms. Castillo hawks.

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Thank you for your attention to these matters.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/
Michelle Gelernt, Esq.
Michael K. Schneider, Esq.
Edward Zas, Esq.
cc:

Clerk of the Court [by ECF]
AUSA Patricia Notopoulos, Esq. [by ECF]
AUSA Andrea Goldbarg, Esq. [by ECF]
AUSA Michael Robotti, Esq. [by ECF]
AUSA Hiral Mehta, Esq. [by ECF]
Mr. Joaquin Guzman

 Case Document 54-1 Filed 03/29/17 Page 1 of 2 PageID 924

AMNESTY 

INTERNATIONAL

Andrea Goldbarg

Assistant US Attorney
Senior Litigation Counsel
US. Attorney's Office
Eastern District of New York
271-A Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, NY 11201

28 March 2017

Dear Assistant US Attorney Andrea Goldbarg.

CONDITIONS OF DETENTION OF JOAQUIN ARCHIVALD GUZMAN LOERA AND GENERAL CONCERNS ABOUT SAMS

lam writing to express Amnesty International concern about the conditions under which
Joaquin Guzman Loera has been held while in federal pre-trial detention and to request access to
the Metropolitan Correctional Center.

We are informed that, throughout the nearly three months of his pre-trial detention, Mr. Guzman
Loera has been held in solitary confinement in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) ofthe Metropolitan
Correctional Center (MCC) in New York which is in the 10 South wing ofthe facility, where he
currently remains. The lights in the SHU are kept on 24 hours a day. He is reportedly confined for 23
hours a day to a cell, with only one hour of daily exercise in a small, interior cage which gives no
access to fresh air or sunlight. On weekends, he is not allowed any exercise and is confined 24 hours
a day. He is allowed only visits with his attorneys and has not been granted a visit by his wife since
his extradition to the USA. While we understand that currently he is receiving legal visits lasting
between 4 to 5 hours a day to ameliorate this problem, we have been informed that this level of
staffing by his legal team will be impossible to maintain. He is authorized to make phone calls to
his family at ?a minimum of one phone call per month?, however he has not been afforded this
privilege and at this point, his wife, who we understand is the only immediate family member likely
to be able to visit, has been restricted from visiting him in detention. His meals are passed through
a slot in the door of his cell, where he eats alone. He is also subjected to 24-hour electronic
monitoring in the SHU, both inside and outside his cell, including when he is showering or going to
the toilet. Further to this, very few of the guards or prison staff with access to the SHU speak
Spanish, causing his further isolation. While held in isolation in Mexico awaiting extradition to the
USA, it is reported that Mr. Guzman Loera was still provided access to his family without incident.

We understand that beyond his solitary confinement, the above conditions (among others) have
been applied to Mr. Guzman Loera's detention pursuant to ?special administrative measures?
(SAMs). Amnesty International USA has previously written to the US Government in regards to the
isolation and imposition of SAMs on pre?trial detainees.i

Amnesty International USA recognizes that the authorities have an obligation to take protective
security measures to the extent necessary. However, we are concerned that the conditions
imposed on Mr. Guzman Loera appear to be unnecessarily harsh and to breach international
standards for humane treatment. Some ofthe conditions, such as the lack of outdoor exercise,
directly contravene the United Nations (UN) Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USAI 5 PENN PLAZA NEW YORK, NY 10001-1810
212.807.8400 I 

Case Document 54-1 Filed 03/29/17 Page 2 of 2 PageID 925

There is a considerable body of evidence in the USA and elsewhere, that prolonged isolation can
cause serious and physical harm, particularly if accompanied by other deprivations
such as lack of information about the outside world, confinement to an enclosed space and
inadequate exercise. The Human Rights Committee, which monitors states? compliance with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), has noted that prolonged solitary
confinement may amount to torture or other ill-treatment prohibited under Article 7 of the treaty.
It has also emphasized that the requirement under Article 10 to treat all persons deprived of their
liberty with humanity and respect for their dignity is a ?fundamental and universally applicable

II it

rule .

Although we have general concerns about conditions such as those described above, these
concerns are heightened in the case of pre-trial detainees, where the risk of mental impairment
brought on by prolonged isolation might in certain circumstances impact on a prisoner?s ability to
assist in his or her defence and thus the right to a fair trial.

Recent reports suggest that Mr. Guzman has difficulty breathing and suffers from a sore throat and
headaches due to his conditions of confinement. He has also complained that the air conditioning
in the SHU is kept at extremely cold levels, to the point where he is left shivering, and without
proper clothing to stay warm.

In furtherance of the recent reports in the case of Mr. Guzman Loera and by previous attorneys who
had clients held in the SHU, Amnesty International USA is requesting access to 10 South of the
MCC in order to observe the conditions of the SHU and to interview Mr. Guzman Loera regarding
the impact of his conditions of confinement and the imposition of SAMs are having on his health
and well-being.

We thank you for your consideration of this request and look forward to your reply.

Respectfully,

Justin Mazzola
Deputy Director of Research

Amnesty International USA

 

See. Amnesty International letter to Anomey General Holder. Re: Conditions of Detention of Syed Fahad Hashmi and General Concerns about SANS. 29 April 2010,
AMR 5 ?20101042. Amnesty International letter to Attorney General llolder. Re Special Housing Unit in the Metropolitan Correction Centre. New York. l6 February
201 I. AMR SIIZOI Amnesty Intcmational letter to Attorney General Holder. Re Fahad llashmi and Conditions of prc-trial detention. 30 May 20l2, AMR


General Comment 2  ofthe Human Rights Committee on Article l0

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA 5 PENN PLAZA NEW YORK. NY 10001-1810
212.807.8400 I 

Case 1:09-cr-00466-BMC Document 54-2 Filed 03/29/17 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 926

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------------X
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
:
-againstJOAQUIN ARCHIVALDO GUZMAN LOERA,

:

ORDER

:
09 CR 466 (BMC)

Defendant.
:
---------------------------------------------------------------X
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
The Bureau of Prisons’ Metropolitan Correctional Center is directed to provide, subject to
SAMs clearance, supervised access to the Unit 10 South of the MCC to Justin Mazzola, Deputy
Director of Research for Amnesty International USA, including but not limited to the cell where Mr.
Guzman is currently detained, the recreation room Mr. Guzman is permitted to use, and the counsel
visit area. This access includes the ability to observe, document, and photograph the aforementioned
areas. Additionally, the Bureau of Prisons is directed to permit Mr. Mazzola to meet with Mr.
Guzman in the counsel visit area in the presence of Mr. Guzman’s defense counsel.
DATED:

BROOKLYN, N.Y.
April ___, 2017

HONORABLE BRIAN M. COGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE