SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIVIL DIVISION—CIVIL ACTIONS BRANCH
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Petitioner/Plaintiff,
v.
TERRACE MANOR, LLC, et al.,
Respondents/Defendants.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Civil Case No. 2016 CA 007767 2
Civil I, Calendar IV
Judge John M. Mott

ORDER
This matter comes before the court on defendants Terrace Manor, LLC, Sanford Capital,
LLC, and Oakmont Management Group, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff the District of
Columbia’s opposition, defendants’ reply, and the District of Columbia’s sur-reply. For the
reasons stated herein, the court denies the motion.
Background
The Complaint alleges the following pertinent facts. Sanford Capital, LLC has an
ownership interest in and and controls Terrace Manor, LLC, which owns the Terrace Manor
Apartments, an eleven-building, sixty-one unit rental housing accommodation located on
Savannah and 23rd Streets SE. Oakmont Management Group, LLC acts as the property manager
for the Terrace Manor Apartments.
In December 2012, Terrace Manor, LLC purchased the Terrace Manor Apartments. As
part of the purchase agreement, Terrace Manor, LLC entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Terrace Manor Apartments’ tenants’ association, which provides, inter
alia, that “all buildings and units [would be] in compliance with the D.C. Housing Code within 6
months of closing on the [p]roperty.” In addition, Terrace Manor, LLC and Sanford Capital,
LLC entered into lease agreements with tenants already living in the Terrace Manor Apartments,

 which contained express provisions that the property would be maintained in a manner consistent
with District of Columbia law and regulations.
Defendants, however, did not maintain the Terrace Manor Apartments in a manner
consistent with the District of Columbia housing code. The buildings are in deplorable
condition, with many units and common areas containing vermin infestation, mold, and water
damage. Some units lack functioning heat and air conditioning systems and hot water, and
trespassers in vacant units and common areas are a persistent problem. In February and March
2016, the District of Columbia Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (“DCRA”)
inspected the Terrace Manor Apartments and cited 129 housing code violations, twenty-five of
which were found to constitute a serious threat to the life, health, and safety of the residents.
Defendants failed to abate the conditions within thirty days as required by law. The instant
lawsuit followed.
Standard
A motion to dismiss under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12 (b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a
complaint. Carey v. Edgewood Mgmt. Corp., 754 A.2d 951, 954 (D.C. 2000). To withstand a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must state sufficient facts to establish the elements of a plausible,
legally cognizable claim. Potomac Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531, 544
(D.C. 2011). While a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must contain
more than “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusations.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). When determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the
court must accept all allegations within a complaint as true and view all facts and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Hillbroom v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 17
A.3d 566, 572 (D.C. 2011).

2

 Analysis
Defendants argue that the court must dismiss the District of Columbia’s District of
Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code §§ 28-3901, et seq., (“CPPA” or “the
Act”) claim for three reasons: the conduct alleged in the complaint does not constitute an
“unlawful trade practice” under the Act; failing to abate housing code violations on rental
property is not an unlawful trade practice; and finally, the complaint fails to allege with
particularity the conduct the District of Columbia seeks to enjoin. The court will address each
argument in turn.
First, defendants contend that their alleged misconduct—namely, misrepresenting their
intent to provide maintenance and repairs at the Terrace Manor Apartments in the future—is not
an unlawful “trade practice” under the CPPA because the Act purportedly does not apply to
representations regarding future services. The District of Columbia responds that the plain
meaning of the CPPA reflects that the statute proscribes misrepresentations regarding future
services.
The CPPA prohibits individuals from engaging in “unlawful trade practices” in the
District of Columbia. D.C. Code § 28-3904. The Act has three purposes: to “assure that a just
mechanism exists to remedy all improper trade practices and deter the continuing use of such
practices”; to “promote, through effective enforcement, fair business practices throughout the
community”; and to “educate consumers to demand high standards and seek proper redress of
grievances.” Id. § 28-3901 (b). To promote these purposes, the trial court must construe the
CPPA broadly and apply it liberally. Id. § 28-3901 (c).
The court determines that the CPPA applies to representations regarding future acts or
services. The Act’s definition of “goods and services”—“any and all parts of the economic

3

 output of society, at any stage or related or necessary point in the economic process, and includes
consumer credit, franchises, business opportunities, real estate transactions, and consumer
services of all types”—is quite broad and does not indicate that the legislature intended to
exclude representations regarding future services from the CPPA. Id. § 28-3901 (a)(7). Indeed,
the phrases “at any stage … in the economic process” and “services of all types” suggest that the
Act applies to all services regardless of timing.
Further, the statute lists thirty-five examples of “unlawful trade practices,” two of which
expressly contemplate a failure to deliver on promised services. For instance, the CPPA states
that it is an unlawful trade practice to “advertise or offer goods or services without the intent to
sell them,” id. § 28-3904 (h), which describes a scenario wherein an individual promises to
provide a service in the future and then reneges on that promise—a situation akin to the
allegations in the case at bar. In addition, the Act prohibits a rental housing locator from
“refus[ing] or fail[ing] to honor any obligation under a rental housing locator contract.” Id.
§ 28-3904 (z). Given that a rental housing locator (or any person, for that matter) can only
contract to provide services in the future, this provision shows that the CPPA contemplates that a
broken promise to engage in an act in the future can constitute an unlawful trade practice.
Accordingly, in keeping with the court’s obligation to interpret the CPPA broadly and liberally,
the court determines that the Act applies to misrepresentations regarding a person’s intent to
perform a service in the future.
Defendants’ second argument is that the Petition for Appointment of Receiver
(“Petition”) fails to state a claim that they violated § 28-3904 (dd) of the CPPA, which
designates any violation of title 16 of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations
(“DCMR”) as an unlawful trade practice. Defendants contend that 16 DCMR § 3305 (the

4

 regulation relied upon by the District of Columbia in the Petition) does not actually proscribe any
conduct and thus cannot be violated. The District of Columbia responds that since 16 DCMR §
3305 incorporates the District of Columbia housing code by reference, any housing code
violation also constitutes a violation of title 16 of the DCMR.
Section 28-3904 (dd) provides that it is an unlawful trade practice “to violate any
provision of title 16 of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations.” Title 16 chapter 33 is
titled “Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) Infractions,” and § 3305 lists
dozens of housing code violations organized into various “classes” of “infractions.” These
classes of infractions are themselves organized into a schedule of fines and are a component of
the District of Columbia’s regulatory consumer protection scheme. See 16 DCMR §§ 3100, et
seq., 3200–01. The language of § 3305 itself is neither prescriptive nor proscriptive; it is simply
a list.
The court determines that the Petition does state a claim that defendants violated title 16
of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations. When the drafters of title 16 created the
District of Columbia’s consumer protection-related regulations, they chose to incorporate
housing code violations via § 3305. Thus, to violate a housing code regulation is to expose
oneself to liability for a “civil infraction” under title 16. Accordingly, it can fairly be said that to
violate the housing code is to violate title 16 and, in turn, D.C. Code § 28-3904 (dd). Without
question, the Petition adequately alleges that defendants violated the housing code, as the
Petition incorporates notices from DCRA inspectors setting forth in detail the myriad housing
code violations observed at the Terrace Manor Apartments. Therefore, the Petition adequately
states a claim upon which relief can be granted with respect to § 28-3904 (dd).

5

 Finally, defendants argue that the District of Columbia is not entitled to injunctive relief
for the CPPA violations alleged in the Petition. They assert that the Petition fails to allege with
particularity the specific behavior that the District of Columbia seeks to enjoin and that
defendants engaged in unlawful trade practices. The District of Columbia responds that it
plainly has alleged that defendants are engaging in unlawful trade practices by continuing to rent
out apartments at the Terrace Manor Apartments despite failing to abate the housing code
violations at the property.
The CPPA authorizes the Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia to
petition the Superior Court to enjoin any person from engaging in unlawful trade practices. Id. §
28-3909 (a). Here, the Petition is very clear that the District of Columbia seeks to enjoin
defendants from continuing to violate the CPPA by representing, both expressly and implicitly,
that defendants would render the property habitable and bring it into compliance with the
housing code; by failing to abate the housing code violations; and by collecting rent while failing
to abate the violations. See Pet. ¶¶ 42, 44. This court has found that these allegations constitute
legally-cognizable CPPA claims.
Accordingly, it is this 10th day of April, 2017, hereby
ORDERED that defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

___________________________
The Honorable John M. Mott
Associate Judge
(Signed in Chambers)

6

 COPIES TO:
Jimmy Rock, Esquire
Argatonia Weatherington, Esquire
Benjamin Wiseman, Esquire
Stephen Hessler, Esquire
Via CaseFileXpress

7