policing the right to protest. G20 Systemic Review Report. Gerry McNeilly, Independent Police Review Director o May 2012 . Table of contents. DIRECTOR'S NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. OIPRD Mandate And Systemic Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. PART ONE - PREPARATION AND PLANNING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Toronto G20 Summit And Its Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Role Of Protesting In Democratic Societies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CHAPTER 2: THE G20 SECURITY STRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Steering Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Integrated Security Unit (ISU). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Command And Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Security Zones And The Fence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jurisdiction In The Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Analysis Of Jurisdictional Legal Authorities And Areas Of Responsibility . . . . . . . . Incident Command System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Major Incident Command Centre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MICC Command And Control Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Police Resources At The G20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8. 11. 14. 18. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 26. 28. 31. 32. 32. 40. 43. PART TWO: PROTEST AND RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44. CHAPTER 3: SATURDAY, JUNE 26 TO EARLY SUNDAY JUNE 27, 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . CHAPTER 4: STOP AND SEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Legal Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Issues And Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Police Training On Authority To Stop And Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Officer Interpretation Of Powers To Stop And Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The G20 - Extraordinary Circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46. 68. 69. 74. 80. 83. 83. 84. 90. 92. OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Table of contents CHAPTER 5: QUEEN'S PARK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Issues And Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Designated Speech Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Crowd Warnings And Breach Of The Peace / Unlawful Assembly Arrests . . . . . . Containment And Mass Arrests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Use Of Force Allegations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CHAPTER 6: ARRESTS ON THE ESPLANADE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Issues And Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Containment As A Means To Arrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Were The Arrests Unlawful? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Was Excessive Force Used In Effecting Arrests? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CHAPTER 7: UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO ARRESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Issues And Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Were The Arrests Lawful And Necessary? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Was There Unnecessary Use Of Force? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CHAPTER 8: QUEEN AND SPADINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Issues For Analysis And Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Police Announcements To The Crowd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mass Arrest And Detention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CHAPTER 9: THE PRISONER PROCESSING CENTRE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Prisoner Processing Centre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Planning For The G20 Detention Centre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Policies And Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Roles And Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Areas Of Concern And Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95. 96. 103. 104. 104. 108. 113. 114. 120. 122. 123. 134. 135. 135. 136. 139. 141. 142. 143. 144. 158. 158. 158. 161. 163. 164. 165. 183. 184. 184. 186. 193. 199. 200. 201. 202. 205. 207. 210. 212. 242. PART THREE: AFTERMATH AND REFLECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244. CHAPTER 10: THE G20, THE PUBLIC, AND THE MEDIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Security Passes And Accreditation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Communications Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Issues And Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Issues And Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CHAPTER 11: TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ISU Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TPS Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CHAPTER 12: THE REVIEW PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The OIPRD's G20 Systemic Review Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Review Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Systemic Submissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246. 247. 247. 249. 252. 253. 255. 256. 257. 257. 263. 264. 265. 265. 266. 267. APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Director's note. In June 2010, when Toronto hosted the G20 summit for international leaders, the event attracted thousands of protesters. What occurred over the course of the weekend resulted in the largest mass arrests in Canadian history. These disturbances had a profound impact not only on the citizens of Toronto and Canada generally but on public confidence in the police as well. It is my hope that this Report will provide a comprehensive account of the G20 security operation - from planning to conclusion. This Report is not about condemnation. It is about learning, moving forward, and using the lessons learned to improve future events of this scale. The results of the massive G20 security operation were significant. Although the summit itself was not disturbed, the security operation disrupted life as usual in downtown Toronto. We saw high security fences, police patrolling in riot gear, people demonstrating for all sorts of causes, protesters in black employing "Black Bloc" tactics, businesses vandalized, property destroyed, and police cars burned. Toronto lost its innocence that weekend. We realized we were not immune to mass protest and violence, and not removed from police having to employ extraordinary tactics in order to keep the peace. At the conclusion of the G20 summit, my office began receiving complaints regarding police conduct. In total we received 356 complaints, and the analysis of these complaints revealed allegations of a pattern of conduct that occurred throughout the summit. I determined that it was necessary to begin a systemic review of the G20 and what had happened. In July 2010, I announced that my office would be conducting this review. In preparing this Report, the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) has had the advantage of reviewing reports and documents that have already been written on the Toronto G20 summit, along with the many reports prepared after similar events in other jurisdictions. What occurred in Toronto during the summit is not much different from what took place in other cities that have hosted international gatherings. In addition to attracting large protests, these gatherings also tend to attract small groups of individuals who intend to commit criminal acts in the midst of peaceful protests and spark widespread disorder. The fact that so much has already been written about public order policing during international gatherings speaks to the need for improving police planning, training, and operations in this area. More important than that, it highlights the significant value we place in our fundamental freedoms, such as the freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. One of the fundamental goals of this Report is to help ensure the protection of the right to peaceful protest as well as the duty of law officers to police those protests. The disorder that occurred during the G20 summit and the ensuing police response certainly came as a shock to many, including some of the police. As a result, some members of the public have expressed a loss of trust in the police, and the police themselves have engaged in their own critical assessment of their actions. The vast majority of police officers carried out their duties in a professional manner during the G20 summit. Many made personal sacrifices to prepare for the summit, and many placed themselves at significant risk during it. For many officers, this was the first time they were part of a security operation of this magnitude, and it was the first time they were faced with such a large number of protesters, some of whom were intent on destruction, riot, and violence. The officers who acted within the law, who carried out their duty to serve and protect with diligence and respect, must be congratulated, commended, and thanked. All in all, given the size of the summit security operation, its integrated nature, the number of police jurisdictions involved, and the short time frame for planning, policing was generally carried out very well. Some things need to be corrected and improved, and it is my hope that this Report and its recommendations will go a long way in assisting with that. i Over the past 20 months, we have been reviewing tens of thousands of documents, videos, and personal accounts of that weekend to prepare this Report. Like any investigation, the more you search the more you uncover. This new material in turn requires requests for additional disclosure and more interviews. At a certain point, the information becomes overwhelming and the decision becomes where to stop. I have faced challenges in preparing this Report, but through hard work and determination we have completed a document that is a credit to the OIPRD and to civilian oversight of policing. One of many issues we faced was with disclosure in terms of both numbers of documents and delivery. The sheer volume of information was timeconsuming to prepare, deliver, and, at our end, to research and evaluate. Scheduling and conducting interviews with officers and civilians from services across Canada presented many challenges for me and my staff. It required the coordinated efforts of many people, layers of approval including police associations and lawyers, and a great deal of time and cooperation. Another issue for our investigators was officer identification, for many reasons. But the fact that some officers removed their name tags cannot be ignored. With the number of officers and services involved in the G20, identification of officers who were involved in complaints about police conduct was a challenge that required a great deal of time and effort. Because the information uncovered in our investigations provided a valuable resource for the systemic Report, I wrote to Toronto Police Chief Blair requesting his assistance in identifying officers. I would like to thank Chief Blair for his cooperation. My office interviewed and requested disclosure from numerous officers from police services across Canada, but most extensively the Toronto Police Service, the Ontario Provincial Police, and the RCMP. I would like to thank all the services that cooperated with my investigation and with the preparation of this Report. I appreciate the time spent and frank discussions that occurred, providing both insight and perspective to the inside workings of the G20 integrated security team. I would also like to recognize all the civilians who were interviewed and provided their insight. My office interviewed civilians offering many perspectives, including those of protesters, media, duty counsel, and legal observers. I appreciate their participation in this review. I would also like to note that we received 16 submissions regarding the G20 systemic review, and I appreciate the time that was spent in preparing those submissions. I would like to personally thank all my staff for their hard work and professionalism throughout this project. I have learned a great deal about conducting systemic reviews of this nature, and my staff and I will take our lessons learned and move forward, improving our practices as an organization. It is in this spirit that I trust my recommendations and analysis are received by both the public and the police. In a democratic society, it is important to recognize that our fundamental rights and freedoms can only be exercised with the assistance of the police. Both police and the public have a duty to encourage and assist in peaceful protests. This systemic review has driven home the necessity that these two groups work together to ensure that these rights can be exercised in a positive and meaningful way. The intention of this Report is to provide insight into what occurred and to present an accurate account of how and why events unfolded as they did. Throughout the systemic review process, my goal has been to encourage understanding and to promote trust in the police and in policing. The recommendations in this Report aim to strengthen that trust. I sincerely believe they provide a map to improve the interaction between the public and the police during large-scale events, and I hope that both the police and the public throughout Canada can benefit from the lessons learned at the G20 in Toronto. Gerry K. McNeilly. ii Independent Police Review Director. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Executive summary. As part of its membership in the G8 and G20, Canada committed to host the 2010 G8 and G20 summits. In June 2008 the Canadian prime minister announced that the G8 summit would be held on June 25 and 26, 2010, in the small town of Huntsville, Ontario, about 200 kilometres or three hours' drive from Toronto. Not until December 2009 did the federal government announce that the G20 would be held in Toronto on June 26 and 27. The Metro Toronto Convention Centre was officially chosen as the venue on February 19, 2010. That left the federal and provincial authorities with just four months to plan the security and policing needs for the summit. As a result of these short timelines, planning was rushed and inadequate, leading to a breakdown in executing many of the operations during the event itself. The G8 and the G20 summits were the largest domestic security operations in Canadian history. Almost 21,000 security personnel were deployed. The close time span between the two summits, and the location of the G20 in a large city, created a distinct set of circumstances and challenges for Canadian security operations. Never before had one nation hosted both the G8 and the G20 summits back to back and in two different locations, so planning for these two summits in Ontario in 2010 surpassed many previous summits in scope, scale, and complexity. of the Restricted Access Zone. Outside of that was a large Outer Zone that took in most of downtown Toronto. The RCMP policed the Controlled Access Zone and the Restricted Access Zone, while the Toronto Police Service (TPS) had jurisdiction in the Interdiction Zone and the Outer Zone - the areas where the protests occurred. Security planning and operations for both the G8 and the G20 summits was coordinated by the Integrated Security Unit (ISU), led by the RCMP in partnership with the TPS, the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), the Peel Regional Police, and the Canadian Forces. Both the security planning and its implementation depended to a high degree on the intelligence gathered on potential security threats to the summit. Throughout these preparations, the police carried out several threat assessments. Their intelligence told them that anarchists using the Black Bloc tactics of street violence and disruption would be at the summit and buildings in downtown Toronto, especially in the financial district, would be targeted. The Major Incident Command Centre (MICC) was the central point of command and control for the Toronto Police Service. The TPS G20 planning committee created the operational plan and provided training for TPS and outside services (except the RCMP) taking part in the G20 security operation. The training that did occur was largely delivered electronically, with minimal in-person instruction. The officers saw photos and videos of previous summits showing violence, weapons, and injuries to police officers. They were led to believe that the crowd would likely become violent and were told to be prepared. There was little attempt to prepare them to support peaceful protests during the summit. Inevitably, in the weeks leading up to the G20, some groups posted calls on the Internet for militant and confrontational action to "humiliate the security apparatus" in the area surrounding the summit meetings and in the streets of Toronto. And just days before the meetings began, Toronto police found stashes of potential weapons, groups of old bicycles locked together with new locks, and fire hydrants with their caps loosened. Rallies and protest marches began in the week before the G20 leaders arrived in Toronto. Police began to stop and search protesters who were gathering to demonstrate or people they considered suspicious. Messages and information issued generally by the police emphasized threats to the public; they appeared to be targeted more at keeping people away from downtown Toronto than in facilitating peaceful protest. Many demonstrators saw the police as having a "them versus us" approach to security, and tensions between the two groups significantly increased. The media focused on this potential for confrontation rather than on the imminent summit meetings. The drama was exacerbated further when the media learned about a new regulation, passed hurriedly by the Ontario legislature, which applied the Public Works Protection Act (PWPA) to the fence around the Interdiction Zone around the summit site. The public had not been told about this long-forgotten law, which had been passed in 1939 to prevent sabotage on the eve of the Second World War, and people became aware of it only as a result of arrests that took place after the regulation came into force. It seemed that it had been passed in secret, and that's what the media reported. The regulation had not been passed in secret, but the TPS announced it publicly only in the wake of the arrests. Police Chief Blair told the media that the security designation extended five metres out from the fence. That information was not correct - the boundary for PWPA authority was at the fence itself - but although the mistake was corrected internally in the TPS, it took some time to filter down to individual officers, and it wasn't until the G20 was over that Chief Blair said anything about the change to the public. When asked by reporters at a news conference if there actually was a five-metre rule, he replied, "No, but I wanted to keep the criminals out." On Friday, June 25, commanders in the MICC, which was located on the third floor of police headquarters, had their first sighting of the Black Bloc right on their doorstep. Closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras on the building captured video of a group of masked people dressed in black in the centre of a demonstration on the street outside. Queen's Park, Saturday, June 26. On the opening day of the summit meetings, June 26, labour groups and various other associations organized a large demonstration. The Southern Ontario Anarchist Resistance (SOAR) coordinated a second demonstration to take place during the Canadian Labour Congress march. SOAR posted information online stating it would confront the police state and Toronto's corporate culture with militant and confrontational action, seeking to humiliate the security apparatus. At the appointed hour, between 7,000 and 9,000 protesters set out on the "People First" march from Queen's Park south on University Avenue. A line of police officers with bicycles walked in front of the march, bicycle officers rode alongside, and police cruisers brought up the rear. When the march turned west on Queen Street, protesters challenged police lines at every intersection along the route. Police officers put on their helmets to shield themselves from objects that were being thrown at them. By 3 pm, the main body of the march had turned north on Spadina, as planned, and made its way back to Queen's Park, without incident. In the rear, however, near the intersection of Queen and Spadina, someone in the middle of the crowd lit a flare, or some other incendiary device, and black-dressed protesters sprinted east on Queen. Other protesters split off from the main group heading north to follow them. As they ran east, some of the black-dressed protesters attacked one of the two police cruisers that were at the rear of the march. The officer trapped inside was hit in the head with a pole. A small group of fellow officers got the threatened officer out of the car, but they were surrounded by a large iv iii Security planning for the G20 summit. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) had overall responsibility for security during the G20 summit and the legal authority to establish security zones. This force set up three zones in all, with varying levels of security. The Controlled Access Zone covered the areas immediately surrounding the Metro Toronto Convention Centre and the hotels in which the internationally protected persons (IPPs) and dignitaries were staying. This zone had the highest security and was surrounded by a threemetre-high anti-scale fence. The Restricted Access Zone wrapped around the Controlled Access Zone and was also fenced in. The Interdiction Zone extended several city blocks beyond the perimeter OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD number of protesters chanting "Whose streets, our streets." The officers were ordered to leave the cars and, when they did, the crowd swarmed the cars. The crowd, led by people in black, continued east, overturning mailboxes, breaking windows, and attempting to smash storefronts and ATMs as they ran down Queen Street and turned south on Bay Street. At Bay and King streets, two police cruisers were set on fire. As the cars went up in flames, the crowd sprinted east to Yonge Street. On Yonge Street, crowds of shoppers and onlookers rushed to get out of the way as this group ran north, led by people dressed in black who smashed windows and vandalized property as they went. TPS Deputy Chief Warr, the Incident Command Lead told the Incident Commander in charge at the time that he wanted "the crowd shut down now." Though the police were in constant pursuit of these rowdy protesters, they could not keep up with their progress through the streets on that Saturday afternoon. The riot equipment, or hard tac, that public order unit (POU) officers wear weighs approximately 100 pounds, so they cannot move easily or quickly in it. During the G20, these officers were transported in vans and charter buses, but they frequently got gridlocked amid demonstrations or caught in traffic because their civilian drivers were not authorized to drive through red lights. Another problem arose with the officers who had been brought into Toronto from other police forces to assist with crowd control on the streets. Some of these POUs did not have TPS liaison officers to assist them in getting around the city. One POU commander said he was never exactly sure where he was going as they were continually loading and unloading off buses. Another said that a colleague picked up a rudimentary map from a subway box to assist them with getting around the downtown core. Late in the afternoon, both public order units and bicycle and mobile officers were ordered to Queen's Park to arrest the rioters from the Yonge Street march. The remnants of the main demonstration that marched on the planned protest route via Spadina Avenue and College Street were still scattered throughout the grounds of the park. Protesters dressed in black were seen taking off their dark clothes and blending into the crowds. There was clearly a rising level of frustration among both the officers on the ground and the commanding officers in the MICC about the lack of control that the police appeared to have over the protest on the streets and their inability to stop the Black Bloc vandals. According to the night shift Incident Commander, this frustration went right up to Chief Blair, who called the day and the night shift Incident Commanders into a meeting at around 5 pm and questioned why police officers weren't visible on Yonge Street. The day shift Incident Commander put it down to the difficulty in moving POUs that required transportation to the areas where they were to be deployed. The night shift Incident Commander said Deputy Police Chief Warr told him that he wanted him to take back the streets. "I understood his instructions to mean that he wanted me to make the streets of Toronto safe again," he explained. "He wanted the streets that had been made unsafe by the terrorists that were attacking our city to be made safe again by restoring order." When the night shift Incident Commander took over Incident Command, he immediately informed command staff that they were going to take steps to restore order and that the process might involve mass arrests. He ordered POUs to sweep north from the intersection of University Avenue and College Street. POU officers shouted at the protesters to move or be arrested. Some officers fired rubber bullets, followed by muzzle blasts of tear gas. The long-range acoustic device (LRAD) was deployed, warning protesters once in English and once in French that "the violent behaviour of some members of this demonstration is causing a public safety concern. Reasonable grounds to arrest exist, and force may be used. For your safety, you are now requested to leave this area." No dispersal route was given in the announcement, and the police moved immediately on the crowd. It is evident that a great number of the people at Queen's Park did not hear any announcement, and, in any case, a police order to "move" does not meet the standard of "clear directions." Even if some people in the crowd did hear this communication, they had no time to react or comply with it. It is fair to say that the level of force used in controlling the crowds and making arrests at Queen's Park was higher than anything the general public had witnessed before in Toronto. In some cases the use of force was excessive. going to be arrested. More than 260 people were arrested. The exact number is difficult to determine because of the unreliability of TPS arrest records. The night shift Incident Commander explained that he ordered the crowd to be boxed in and arrested because, as he said, "I wasn't able to box in Queen's Park, so the mobility was there and, again, highlighted my concern and the need for this boxing in." He said he did not disperse the crowd because he needed to isolate the protesters and arrest them. They were in a "riot situation," and he had to break with normal TPS procedures, "to go outside the box," and not disperse the crowd. v vi The Esplanade, Saturday, June 26. Some of the protesters who were pushed out of Queen's Park decided to march north to Bloor Street. By 9 pm a crowd of about 500 marched east on Bloor to Yonge Street, where they turned south. More people joined the group as they marched south on Yonge. Police were concerned that this group intended to go to the security fence on Wellington Street. The police blocked off access to the fence by setting up lines across some streets so that the crowd would be diverted in another direction. As the crowd moved along, so did the police, to ensure that the marchers did not reach the security fence. The protest group was described as loud, but not hostile or aggressive. The crowd continued moving south and east until it arrived in the area of The Esplanade and Yonge Street. The protesters gathered in front of the Novotel hotel to show support for the striking workers there. Just after 10 pm this crowd, now 200 to 300 strong, was boxed in by lines of riot police who blocked the street east and west along The Esplanade. While demonstrators sat down in the street and chanted "Peaceful protest, peaceful protest," the police line began to advance, limiting the space and movement of the crowd. At approximately 10:30 pm the police, following orders from the Major Incident Command Centre, announced that everyone in the crowd was University of Toronto, Sunday, June 27. The Graduate Students' Union (GSU) at the University of Toronto was one of several places that billeted people who came to Toronto from out of town to protest at the G20. The police had been watching the GSU since Friday, June 25. They had contact with University of Toronto security and knew when the buses of protesters arrived. On Saturday morning, June 26, before the People First march, the Director of the University of Toronto campus police ordered a retired TPS police officer, who was working under contract as a private investigator with the campus police during the G20, to go into a building opposite the GSU and photograph people as they came and went into the students' union. According to a GSU representative, the building was closed and locked from 10 am until 5 pm. Police continued to watch the GSU throughout Saturday evening. . . At around 9 am on Sunday morning, the TPS POU Alpha Section Commander entered the GSU and advised parties present that they were under arrest for participating in an unlawful assembly. Some of the people who were arrested stated that police officers dressed in riot gear swarmed into the gym and woke everyone up at gunpoint. They described officers as being verbally abusive and using force as they arrested and removed the occupants. . . OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD vii The Commander said he did not suggest that an unlawful assembly was taking place inside the GSU. He acknowledged that he did not know whether all the GSU occupants had been involved in the events of the preceding day, but he had reasonable grounds to believe that some people in the GSU had been involved in illegal activities on the Saturday. It appears that he intended to arrest everyone and then release those who were found not to have participated in criminal activities on the previous day. In fact, though, all the GSU occupants were taken to the Prisoner Processing Centre on Eastern Avenue and detained there. In total, 108 people were arrested at the GSU. Later that same afternoon, the charge was changed to conspiracy to commit an indictable offence - mischief. Many police officers ignored the basic rights citizens have under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and, by stopping and searching people arbitrarily, they overstepped their authority. Wearing bandanas and carrying heavy backpacks are not reasonable grounds to stop and search, and police should have used much more discretion. Queen Street and Spadina, Sunday, June 27. At approximately 5 pm on the Sunday, a large protest of more than 700 people began marching north on Bay Street from King Street and then turned west on Queen Street West. Although they were disruptive, interrupting pedestrian and vehicular traffic and causing streetcars along Queen to stop, this group was non-violent. By the time the crowd reached Queen Street and Spadina Avenue, it had attracted more protesters, members of the media, and a number of curious onlookers. When the night shift Incident Commander assumed control of the MICC, he ordered public order units and more bicycle officers to Queen and Spadina to box in the group and to arrest them all for conspiracy to commit mischief. Just after 7 pm a torrential thunderstorm began. About 400 people were detained in pouring rain for four hours while the arrests were being processed. One of the protesters said: "After an hour under that pouring rain, I was shivering. It was getting very cold. We didn't know what was going to happen. We couldn't believe that they were going to arrest everyone, which eventually happened. So after a while, I was so cold that we decided to surrender in order to get out of that situation, to get to a warm place. I would have done anything to get away from that situation." POU commanders made two requests to the MICC - the LRAD to communicate with the crowd, and an exit route for people to leave the area - but both requests were denied. The commanders on the ground were forced to shout instructions to the crowd, but many people did not hear them. Some police officers went against orders to allow people in distress a way out. In an audio recording, one police officer on the line can be heard saying, "He's maniacal this MICC, he's maniacal." In the end, Chief Blair himself went to the MICC. He called the Incident Commander and the Public Information Officer out of a meeting and ordered that the people at Queen and Spadina be released "unconditionally and immediately." By then, more than 300 people had been arrested or detained at the intersection, most of them for breach of the peace. It was unreasonable and unnecessary to have continued over a four-hour period to arrest people one by one during a severe rainstorm. The Prisoner Processing Centre. People arrested during the G20 were, for the most part, sent to the Prisoner Processing Centre (PPC) in Toronto's east end. The Toronto Police Service was the lead in both planning and operating the PPC. TPS used examples from previous G8/G20 summits to plan the size of the facility, and it decided that the PPC should have a capacity of 500 prisoners. It also decided that the PPC would be a "unique entity that does not fit into the definition of a lock-up." That description would allow the planners to use existing policies, procedures, and regulations for the PPC operational plan. The PPC was intended not only to hold prisoners arrested during the G20 but also to serve as an operation centre for various investigative services. By these means, the planners hoped to create a seamless operation in which the detectives had immediate access to prisoners and could charge or release them based on the investigative information provided. Specific procedural training was minimal to nonexistent for officers who were performing day-today duties in the detention centre, but it was also seriously lacking for senior officers. One location administrator in charge of prisoner management had not received a fire or an evacuation plan in case of an emergency and was told to use the other location administrator, on the opposite shift, as a resource. The lack of training and preparation meant that staff were not able to deal with the sudden influx of prisoners beginning on Saturday night and continuing through Sunday. It is quite evident that the G20 operation plan for the PPC was not sufficient or detailed enough to provide guidance to those operating the facility. The gaps in the overall plan are obvious, and they were brought forward to senior management in advance of the G20 weekend. There was no plan for breachof-peace arrests, for example, indicating that those planning the PPC did not consider the possibility that people arrested on this charge might be brought to the facility. There was no policy or procedure for the prisoners to speak with a lawyer or to have access to a telephone, and no process in place to release them. viii Stop and search. The number of times police stopped and searched people in downtown Toronto increased exponentially between Friday, June 25, and Sunday, June 27. Many police officers believed they were obeying orders in stopping and searching people arbitrarily. On Sunday morning, senior officers were called to the MICC for a briefing and given instructions for the day. These instructions were passed on to the sergeants and staff sergeants, who then briefed officers before they went on shift for the day. The officers told the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) that they were ordered to investigate anyone who was carrying a backpack and anyone who was wearing a disguise - gas masks, balaclavas, bandanas. In the days and weeks leading up to the G20, however, the mainstream media, as well as alternative media and protester websites, had all published or posted advice on what to expect at protests, what to take to protests, and even what to wear. Almost every one of them urged people, as protection, to take gas masks or swimming goggles and to carry bandanas soaked in vinegar with them. As a result, a great number of people fit the newly invoked police description of "suspicious individuals." Containment. During the G20, containment was used as a tactic on at least 10 occasions. On The Esplanade and at Queen and Spadina, protesters were contained specifically to arrest them - a response that conflicts with the policies and procedures of the Toronto Police Service, the Ontario Provincial Police, the RCMP, and most other police services. However, this tactic was part of one Incident Commander's strategy to "take back the streets." As a result of this action and others, the operation of the MICC during the night shifts on Saturday and Sunday became dysfunctional. Communications within the MICC and between the MICC and field officers frequently broke down. The Incident Commander accepted little input from Operations Chiefs and others in the MICC who were there to offer support and advice, and, in effect, he took away the independence and decision-making from the operational commanders on the ground. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD The G20 planning document indicated that the arresting officer was responsible for filling in the hand-off team (HOT) sheet, or arrest card, at the scene, but, in the turmoil on the streets, this paperwork frequently was not completed. The lack of accurate and completed paperwork as protesters arrived at the PPC caused serious problems both in processing prisoners and in investigating the reasons for their arrest and detention. ix down. Hundreds of people were inconvenienced, many were deprived of their Charter rights, and it is fortunate that, in all the confusion, there were no deaths. This systemic review focused on the planning, training, implementation, and overall policing of the G20 security zones controlled by the Toronto Police Service, specifically on the "hot spots" where the majority of incidents occurred. Our findings and recommendations are provided to assist those planning future events and to help create a balanced approach to policing large protests. Paperwork from the PPC was also sporadic and incomplete. For example, the OIPRD received disclosure giving three different numbers for "arrested persons": total arrests, 1,112; G20 persons arrested, 1,057; and the prisoner booking program, 886 arrests. In addition to our own findings, complainants and witnesses consistently identified and raised 12 main issues of concern about the PPC: access to duty counsel, access to a telephone, meals, overcrowding, excessive period of detainment, environmental conditions, privacy, handling of property, medical attention, treatment of young offenders, use of flex cuffs, and strip searches. o PS chose to use mostly "existing TPS policies and T procedures" for the operational plan. This decision may have resulted from the short time available for planning, but it created a cumbersome system that officers on the ground were not able to follow. Furthermore, police services brought in from cities outside Toronto were not familiar with TPS policies and procedures, and the minimal training program provided was not sufficient to ensure their understanding. o he electronic system to track officers on duty T failed days before the G20 began, leaving the Major Incident Command Centre with no idea how many officers were working or what services were on duty. No back-up system was in place. o olice officers were given the impression by those P in command that the Public Works Protection Act gave them the authority to stop and search people throughout the downtown core, often nowhere near the fence around the Interdiction Zone. Even the Toronto Police Chief was under the impression that this authority extended to a distance five metres from the fence, and, when the mistake was uncovered on the eve of the summit, the correction was not appropriately clarified to officers on the ground. The details of the police authority to stop and search was not communicated to the public, leading to confusion and some confrontations. o ommunications between protesters and the C police were inadequate and sometimes nonexistent. The crowd dispersal methods were often not heard by the majority of protesters, who then complained that "the police just started running at us and shoving us, yelling 'Move.' " This breakdown in communications created increased tension and an "us versus them" attitude between the two groups. o rotesters were not the only ones who resorted to P violence during the G20. Numerous police officers used excessive force when arresting individuals and seemed to send a message that violence would be met with violence. This reaction created a cycle of escalating responses from both sides. o nce the violence began on Saturday, June 26, O police tactics changed. Crowds of protesters were surrounded and contained with no exit routes. The Incident Commander ordered the mass arrests of people at different "hot spots" throughout the city. On several occasions, people who lived in the area but were not part of the protest ended up being surrounded and contained. o espite clear examples of non-protesters being D rounded up, officers refused to let anyone leave, indicating that they were "following orders." The Office of the Independent Police Review Director knows of some occasions where officers on the ground personally removed non-protesters and peaceful protesters and allowed them to go home. Unfortunately, the vast majority of accounts are of officers blindly following orders - even those officers who questioned the orders that were given to them. o he Incident Commander at the MICC referred to T crowds of protestors as 'terrorists / protestors," leaving the impression that they were criminals. This attitude resulted in the decision to contain and arrest approximately 1,100 people during the summit, most of whom were peaceful protesters. o he Prisoner Processing Centre was poorly T planned, designed, and operated. This detention facility was not operationally prepared for the mass arrests that took place on the Saturday night and on Sunday, leading to gross violations of prisoner rights, including detaining breach-of-peace arrestees for over 24 hours and with no access to a lawyer or a justice of the peace. In some cases the decision to detain those on a breach of the peace for more than 24 hours was ordered by the Superintendent in charge of the facility. o he processes, or lack thereof, in place at the T PPC led to prisoners being lost within the system and to inadequate staffing to deal with prisoners' legitimate needs. The resulting problems included overcrowding, lack of basic privacy, and young offenders being placed in cells with adults. x Findings. o oronto Police Service planning for the entire G20 T security operation was incomplete and inadequate and very general. It did not provide a proper breakdown of operations, so it was impossible for officers who were unfamiliar with TPS methods to have an appropriate understanding of how the plan should be executed. Even those who were from the TPS, but lacked long-term experience with the force, were either unaware of the procedures assumed in the plan or simply did not follow them. o PS did not have a great deal of experience T in planning and executing operations of this magnitude. Other Integrated Security Unit members had more knowledge and understanding of large international events, but the operational plans for crowd control and for the Prisoner Processing Centre were entirely the responsibility of TPS. It seems that expertise that was available within the TPS was not adequately used. o he operational plan did not include time for T standard operations: for example, moving POU officers from one location to another or, when such a move was required, what the preferred route would be. The plan provided few specific details, such as appropriate crowd control methods or standard TPS practices. As a result, once all the different services were deployed, there was no cohesive plan. Conclusions. The incidents that occurred on the streets of Toronto during the G20 weekend of June 26 and 27, 2010, resulted in the mass arrest of more than 1,100 people and in hundreds of protesters being contained. There appears to have been a lack of thorough planning and preparation for the G20, and, although insufficient time was certainly a factor, the operational planning committee should be faulted for the decision that it would be "business as usual." The violence that occurred on Saturday afternoon left the MICC scrambling to react, and its approach to crowd control changed dramatically that evening. The result was an overreaction at the MICC, causing an almost complete clampdown on all protesters and the mass arrests. These arrests in turn had serious repercussions on many other parts of the security process, including arrest procedures, transportation of prisoners, and detention at the PPC. The system became overwhelmed, and, in some areas, it broke OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD xi o aperwork throughout the G20 was not properly P completed and, in some cases, not completed at all. As a result, it is impossible to state accurately the number of people who were arrested over the course of the summit weekend. The sheer number of forms that required completion according to TPS policies was unrealistic, and the resulting chaos in paperwork could have been foreseen. Even more disturbing, the lack of appropriate paperwork resulted at the PPC in several violations of human rights, including unlawful detention and arrest, no access to prescription medication or medical attention, and little or no access to food and water. o ccording to the TPS, 1,118 people were arrested. A The Prisoner Processing Centre reported a total of 1,112 arrested. The RCMP claimed that a total of 1,115 people were arrested. The OIPRD disclosure indicated that at least 1,140 people were arrested, but, given the lack of paperwork, there is no way to give a precise number. Recommendations. All the recommendations as they appear throughout the Report are consolidated below. References to the chapter locations appear in square brackets at the end of each recommendation so that the reader may refer to the related evidence and discussion. xii Planning. Overall planning. 1. Police services had only four months to plan security for the G20 summit, a length of time acknowledged as wholly inadequate and one that may in fact have been irresponsible. In future, wherever possible, governments and police services should ensure that joint security events be given adequate planning and preparation time. In particular: a) Policies and procedures should be developed by policing entities for future events so that they can be modified as required to suit specific events and implemented quickly. b) The development of policies and procedures for future events should allow sufficient time for input from the public and police. c) Police should also incorporate contingency plans into their overall policing plans. For example, there should be plans for deploying officers in response to unexpected and urgent situations. [See Chapter 1]. 2. The Toronto Police Service (TPS) should develop policies and procedures regarding any agreements entered into with other police services for any future integrated project, regardless of its size. These policies and procedures should be developed early in the planning process. The focus must be on the authority, structure, roles, strategic, operational, and tactical processes, and implementation. [See Chapter 2]. 3. For any future integrated security projects, police services must contemplate that later disclosure of documents, records, and protocols will be required. Disclosure should be incorporated into the planning process. [See chapter 2]. 4. Because of the nature of civilian protests, officers' movements must be fluid. The Toronto Police Service and all police services should develop a more robust, coordinated, and effective means to track officer movements. This ability is crucial for officer safety and for the investigation of criminal activity, as well as questions about police conduct. [See Chapter 2]. Communication planning. 5. To ensure that officers on the ground can communicate with each other and with the command centre effectively, police services should review the failures of communication encountered during the G20 summit. Police services should work through the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police to ensure that a consistent and workable communication system is in place for all future large-scale events and joint projects. [See Chapter 2]. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Processing of prisoners. 6. Police services should develop specific procedures for the processing of prisoners that reflect the circumstances, depth, and scope of large or extraordinary events; they should not use existing procedures that are meant for everyday scenarios. In the case of the Prisoner Processing Centre, it is clear that the existing procedures failed. xiii 9 The planning for any detention facility should also specify what the physical plant should be and what the capacity is for each cell as well as designation of male, female, and youth cells. [See Chapter 9]. Training. 12. Police services should review and revise specific training regarding the policing of large protests and applicable police powers. This training should be implemented as part of the general continuing education of officers. The training should include a clear understanding of parameters of a legal protest and the rights of protesters. Although police must train and be prepared for possible violence, training should not depict all protesters as violent and confrontational. [See Chapter 11]. 13. Police services should provide practical training to equip officers with the skills to facilitate peaceful protest, including de-escalating potentially violent situations and communicating effectively in challenging situations. That should be the police officers' primary goal. [See Chapter 11]. 14. The Toronto Police Service and all other Ontario police services must provide refresher training on its policies regarding use of level 3 or "strip" searches to ensure that its policies are followed. [See Chapter 9]. Command and control. Officer identification. 10. The Toronto Police Service and other Ontario police services should ensure that the names and badge numbers of officers at public order events are displayed prominently on outer clothing and helmets at all times. This requirement should include hard tac equipment. Senior officers should also be accountable for enforcing the policy. Where major events involve more than one police service, security planning for the event should include an agreement among the police services that name badges will be used by all officers no matter what policy the individual police services have in place. [See Chapter 5]. 17. Ontario police services should work through the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police to review the use of the Incident Command Management System and develop a coordinated approach and consistent policies and procedures throughout Ontario for all police services. These procedures should include ongoing training and implementation for integrated or joint projects. [See Chapter 2]. 18. If multiple police services are to work together under the same Incident Command Management System structure, training should be a cooperative effort. Those who will be working together in the system should train together. [See Chapter 2]. xiv a) Recognizing that extraordinary events may lead to mass arrests in the future, police services should develop policies and procedures to deal with mass arrests, especially policies and procedures to track prisoners and their belongings. b) In situations of mass arrest, police services should develop better methods to ensure that existing policies are followed - particularly the policies that protect the rights and dignity of the prisoners, such as access to counsel, reasonable use of a telephone, and conditions governing strip searches. [See Chapter 9]. Diversity. 19. In light of the diverse nature of Toronto, the Toronto Police Service should expect that persons with diverse needs may attend largescale protests. The TPS should ensure that reasonable accommodations, as required by the Human Rights Code, are included in the planning process. For example, the TPS should have a contingency plan for providing interpretation services within a reasonable time for persons who do not speak English. [See Chapter 9]. Police responsibilities. 11. All Ontario police services and all senior officers must take responsibility for ensuring that the policies, obligations, and requirements of good policing are met. Senior officers especially should not condone, or distance themselves from, the misdeeds or misconduct of subordinates and colleagues. To condone any inappropriate behaviour is to bring great disrespect to police and policing and weakens the public confidence in police. To this end, the Police Services Act of Ontario and the current Code of Conduct regulations should be reviewed to impose a positive duty on all officers: (a) to disclose potential evidence of police misconduct regardless of whether any public complaint has been made, and (b) to impose a positive duty on all officers to assist with investigations of police conduct. [See Chapter 5]. Prisoner detention facility. 7. Any prisoner detention facility set up specifically for a large protest event must have emergency management plans created by policing entities to provide specific instructions on what constitutes an emergency and what steps should be taken in each scenario. Every person staffing such a facility must be trained on the emergency procedures, and appropriate run-throughs should be conducted to ensure the safety and security of staff and detainees. [See Chapter 9]. Police powers. 15. Officers should be provided with refresher training in the legal parameters of their authorities to stop and search protesters, and the legal authorities to detain and arrest. [See Chapter 4]. Arrests and containment. Warnings. 20. Police services should ensure that, before police take action to make mass arrests or arrests involving extractions from a crowd of protesters, loud and clear warnings are given and enough time allowed for protesters to comply with any police direction. Before any major protests begin, the Toronto Police Service should test its public announcement systems to ensure that public announcements can easily be heard by all who attend the event. [See Chapters 5 and 8]. Incident Command Management System. 16. If, in future, the Toronto Police Service polices a large event using the Incident Command Management System, it should ensure that officers in charge of the command system are well trained in managing large-scale protests and it should train all those working in the command system, especially regarding their roles and responsibilities. [See Chapters 2 and 8]. 8. The planning for any detention facility should include specific benchmarks or timelines for procedures. Such benchmarks should include the length of time before prisoners must be fed and the length of time physical restraints can be used. [See Chapter 9]. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Breach of the peace. 21. The Toronto Police Service should develop policies for dealing with breaches of the peace at large protests. The objective should be to remove people from the scene of the protest and to restore the peace. The TPS policies should include criteria to determine when to arrest for breach of the peace, and, in the case of mass arrests, criteria to determine the length of detention. In any event, a detention for breach of the peace should not exceed 24 hours. [See Chapter 6]. 25. Police services should recognize that containment must not be used for purposes of effecting mass arrests but must only be used for temporary crowd control to ensure that the peace is kept. [See Chapter 6]. 26. The Police Services Act and the existing Code of Conduct regulation should be revised to expand the misconduct of "unlawful or unnecessary exercise of authority" to include an unlawful or excessive detention where no physical force was used. [See Chapter 8]. Tactics, equipment, prisoner handling. Flex cuffs. 29. Police services should discontinue the use of flex cuffs, or, in the alternative, only use them in dynamic situations, such as mass arrests, and then only for a short time, replacing them with regular metal handcuffs as soon as possible. In all cases, handcuffs should be removed from prisoners who have been searched and lodged in cells unless there is good reason to continue their use. [See Chapter 9]. xv 33. Police chiefs and command leads should proactively communicate with the public through traditional media such as television, radio, and newspapers, as well as through non-traditional means such as social media, to address situations, to explain measures being taken, and to seek the public's cooperation. Protesters should be made aware of likely police action so that they can make informed decisions. [See Chapter 10]. 34. Police services involved in large events or protests should make a greater effort to communicate policing plans to protests groups at an earlier stage of planning. As much as possible, police should develop communication strategies for protest groups that are reluctant to communicate or respond to police. Such attempts by police would go a long way to build trust and better relations. [See Chapter 10]. 35. The police have a very public role. Officers must recognize that the public will take photographs and video recordings of them performing their duties, especially at events such as protests. The police must recognize the public's right to do so without being subject to detention, search, or confiscation and destruction of property. Disciplinary action specific to this issue should be developed. The Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police and the Government of Ontario should consider whether any amendment to the Code of Conduct regulation is required to effect this change. [See Chapter 10]. 36. In this day and age we understand that surveillance cameras, including closed-circuit television cameras, are used on the streets daily and more so during major public events or protests. Police services or municipal bodies that put up these cameras have a duty to inform people that they are under surveillance. They must ensure that there is visible notice to the public that they are being filmed. This requirement includes signs on or near the cameras. [See Chapter 10]. xvi Containment. 22. With regard to the circumstances under which protesters are allowed to leave a "contained" area, the police must: a) Reorganize their policies and procedures. b) During any containment procedure, all officers must be authorized to use their discretion to allow access and egress, trusting their own judgement and experience when necessary. [See Chapter 8]. 23. The use of containment tactics should also be closely linked to the intelligence information police have received. The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that the protesters being contained are actually causing a disturbance or likely to cause a disturbance elsewhere. Innocent bystanders and non-violent protesters (where they can be identified) must be allowed to filter out. Containment should continue only for as long as absolutely necessary, and the well-being of those contained must be given as much consideration as possible. [See Chapters 6 and 8]. 24. In situations where mass arrests may be anticipated, police services should prepare a workable model for transporting, booking, holding, feeding, and administering and ensuring the health and safety for an anticipated large number of prisoners. [See Chapters 6 and 8]. Record retention. 27. In light of the large number of arrests that did not result in a charge or resulted in the charge being withdrawn, the Toronto Police Service should consider whether it is in the public interest to retain the police records of the arrestees who were either not charged or whose charge was withdrawn. It is our understanding that TPS policy allows for records to be expunged. It is recommended that the TPS should consider exercising its discretion to expunge those records where it is not in the public interest to retain them. Further, it is recommended that the TPS should communicate that policy to the public and allow members of the public to apply to have their records expunged. [See Chapters 6, 7 and 8]. 28. The Toronto Police Service should develop criteria for determining when it is necessary to fingerprint and photograph persons arrested for "breach of the peace." When the TPS does fingerprint and photograph persons detained for "breach of the peace," it should consider how long those records should be retained. It is noted that the Criminal Records Act provides that a record of an absolute discharge should not be disclosed more than one year after the date of the discharge. The TPS should expunge all records relating to persons arrested for "breach of the peace" at mass protests within a similar time period unless there is good demonstrable reason made to the IPRD to retain the record. [See Chapters 6 and 8]. Public order units. 30. All police services that have public order units should continually review their tactics for maintaining public order. These tactics should enable them to respond effectively to existing protester actions or evolving actions that may be employed at major events or events of mass disorder. [See Chapter 5]. 31. Police services that have public order units should look into developing POU uniforms to permit the officers enough mobility to allow them to respond quickly. The existing hard tac gear does not permit officers to move with sufficient agility. It should be possible to develop a uniform that offers much of the protection of hard tac while providing the mobility of soft tac. [See Chapter 2]. Communication and the public. 32. Major events require robust communication plans. Police services in Ontario should work with the IPRD to develop plans for improved communications. The public's support for security measures is crucial to their success. Police services should develop a detailed public communications plan for major protests that includes the police's role in facilitating peaceful protest. [See Chapter 10]. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Abbreviations and Acronyms. 37. The public needs to take responsibility for working/cooperating with police security organizations, especially when requested to relocate during incidents that appear to be bordering on danger or violence. It is recommended that police ensure that the public be informed of the reason to relocated before employing police security procedures. Thereafter the public must be aware that they are subject to police action. [See Chapter 5]. 41. The Toronto Police Service, other Ontario police services and the RCMP must develop procedures for better, more seamless, and earlier disclosure of documents with agencies responsible for oversight or reviews. [See Chapter 1]. 42..The Police Services Act should be amended to specify the time limits for investigating complaints of police conduct arising from mass protests. The current section 83(17) requires a notice of hearing to be served within six months of beginning an investigation. Although the Act allows a police services board to extend this time, the Act does not recognize the reality of investigating large-scale events such as the G20. The Office of the Independent Police Review Director received 356 complaints in relation to the events of the G20 and retained the investigation of 207 of them. The last disclosure package from the Toronto Police Service arrived more than 13 months after G20 summit. In order to provide a consistent approach to the investigation of complaints arising from largescale events, the legislation must recognize the workload involved. [See Chapter 1]. ACC. AMC. AP. CAZ. CBRNE. CCC. CCTV. CF. CIPS. CRG. CRU. CS. DEC. DRPS. EDU. EMS. ETA. ETD. EOC. ETF. FAIT. F&A. FIA. FIS. FMIOA. GTA. GTAA. HOT. HQ. IC. ICS. IMS. IPP. IPRD. ISU. IZ. Area Command Centre. Alternative Media Centre. Arrested person. Controlled Access Zone. Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosives. Criminal Code of Canada. Closed-circuit television. Canadian Forces. Criminal Information Processing System. Community Relations Group. Community response unit. tear gas (2-chlorobensalmalononitrile). Direct Energy Centre. Durham Regional Police Service. Explosives Disposal Unit. Toronto Emergency Medical Services. estimated time of arrival. estimated time of departure. Emergency Operations Centre. Emergency Task Force. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Finance and Administration. Forensic Identification Assistant. Forensic Identification Services. Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act. Greater Toronto Area. Greater Toronto Airport Authority. hand-off team (prisoner). Headquarters. Incident Commander. Incident Command System. Incident Management System. Internationally protected person. Independent Police Review Director. Integrated Security Unit. Interdiction Zone. OPP. OZ. PACT. PATH. PC. PEMU. PIO. POU. PPC. PRP. PRU. PS&EM. PWPA. RAZ. RCMP. SIU. SMO. soft tac. TACC. TAVIS. TFS. TPS. TPSB. TSV. TTC. UC. UCC. YO. YRP. JIG. LogOps. LRAD. MICC. MCSCS. MTCC. OIC. OIPRD. Joint Intelligence Group. Logistics Operations Centre. long-range acoustical device. Major Incident Command Centre. Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services. Metro Toronto Convention Centre. Officer in charge. Office of the Independent Police Review Director. Ontario Provincial Police. Outer Zone. Public Affairs Communication Team. pedestrian tunnel system - downtown Toronto. Police Constable. Property & Evidence Management Unit. Public Information Officer. public order unit. Prisoner Processing Centre. Peel Regional Police. Primary response unit. Public Safety and Emergency Management. Public Works Protection Act. Restricted Access Zone. Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Special Investigation Unit. Summit Management Office. partial POU gear. Toronto Area Command or Control Centre. Toronto anti-violence intervention strategy [used with rapid response team]. Toronto Fire Services. Toronto Police Service. Toronto Police Services Board. traffic services. Toronto Transit Commission. Undercover. Unified Command Centre. Young offender. York Regional Police. xviii ARWEN. Anti-riot weapon Enfield. xvii The media. Accreditation. 38. Police services should be aware that largescale events are likely to attract the attention of traditional and non-traditional media. Policies should be developed regarding criteria for media accreditation. These policies should be public documents and involve the media in their creation. Police services planning for security at large events should ensure that accreditation of all media (including new media and nontraditional media) is handled by one office. The accreditation, once issued, should be respected by police. That said, media personnel must be aware that they are subject to police action if they obstruct or hinder officers in performing their duties. [See Chapter 10]. Post-event planning. 39. Following large events and protests, police services should debrief officers and discuss what worked or did not work, areas of concern, or best practices. This feedback will help to improve policies and training plans for future events. [See Chapter 11]. 40. Police services involved in policing large events and protests should develop a process for consistent note-taking and record-keeping to ensure any issues of police conduct can be reviewed. [See Chapter 9]. hard tac. full POU gear. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD planning that took place for the Prisoner Processing Centre as well as the operation of the facility and the treatment of prisoners held there. We have also included chapters on police communication with the public and the media and police training for the G20. Each chapter is self-contained and can be read on its own. 1 Introduction. As leaders from around the world gathered in Toronto for the fourth G20 summit in June 2010, an estimated 10,000 protesters and an even greater number of police officers took to the streets. Since their inception, both the G8 and G20 meetings have attracted noisy and sometimes violent protests. Security for the Toronto G20 was the largest and most expensive security operation in Canadian history. Planning began in February 2010 and was coordinated by the Integrated Security Unit (ISU), led by the RCMP in partnership with the Ontario Provincial Police, the Toronto Police Service, the Peel Regional Police, and the Canadian Forces. They built a three-metre fence surrounding the site of the summit meetings and completely closed it off to the public. They created a security perimeter around the site, with traffic and pedestrian diversions and restrictions that subjected people living and working in a large swath of downtown Toronto to security and identity checks. The Integrated Security Unit set up a command and control structure and deployed 20,000 police officers and security personnel. OIPRD mandate and systemic review. The Office of the Independent Police Review Director is an arm's-length civilian agency of the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, created and governed by the Police Services Act. The role of the OIPRD is to maintain public confidence in police oversight and to make sure that public complaints against police in Ontario are dealt with fairly, efficiently, and effectively. The OIPRD is responsible for receiving, managing, and overseeing all public complaints against the police in Ontario. Its mandate includes Ontario's municipal and regional police services and the Ontario Provincial Police. In addition, under section 57 of the Police Services Act, the Director has the power to examine and review issues of a systemic nature that give rise to public complaints and to make recommendations respecting such issues to the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services, the Attorney General, chiefs of police, police services boards, and any other body. This review seeks to identify problems and recommend solutions. The aim is not to blame any specific individuals, community, or organization. Where necessary, inconsistencies or failure to comply with policies, procedures, or reasonableness will be stated through findings of concern. But certain individuals who were the directing minds or had a decision-making role in the G20 event, security, policing, and the actions taken or applied must assume responsibility for the end result. In the opinion of the Director, they now are faced with the responsibility to accept and implement the recommendations of this review that pertain to them, and should do so in a positive manner to ensure that we have all learned lessons from this experience. This review considered the issues of systemic concerns and developed recommendations about the practices and policies of police services - specifically to address the policing of large protests and the maintenance of public order, and generally to enhance public confidence and trust in police and policing. It aims to improve the policing of large demonstrations and to allow for peaceful protests while balancing those objectives against public order and other security needs. The OIPRD has no jurisdiction over the RCMP, whose participation in the review was voluntary. By cooperating in this systemic review, however, the RCMP leadership has exhibited its desire to do the right thing and to recognize the role that the force played in the Integrated Security Unit. 2 The normally vibrant Toronto street atmosphere was transformed into one of barbed wire and concrete fences, boarded-up buildings, and no-go areas. The silence was eerie and the feeling, foreboding, as Toronto braced for the G20 weekend. On Saturday, June 26, 2010, the largest demonstration of the weekend began peacefully at Queen's Park, the site of Ontario's legislature, and made its way along a preplanned route that would take it back to its starting point. However, protesters dressed in black broke off from the main demonstration and other protesters followed. For the next two-and-a-half hours, police officers chased but never caught up with the protesters, who were able to move quickly through the downtown core. Led by people employing Black Bloc tactics, protesters left a trail of graffiti, broken glass, and destruction all along Yonge Street, Toronto's main thoroughfare. When protesters returned to Queen's Park, they were met by hundreds of police and a degree of force they hadn't expected. For the rest of that day and the next, police were ordered time and time again to box protesters in to keep them from moving. Mass arrests were ordered. By the end of the weekend, police had made more than 1,100 arrests, and many people were accusing them of "police brutality" and civil rights' abuses. In the days that followed, dozens and dozens of complaints poured in to the Office of the Independent Police Review Director. In all, our office received 356 complaints regarding policing at the G20. The Independent Police Review Director conducted a systemic review of the issues, and this Report is the result of that review. This Report sets out the planning for security at the G20 and outlines the security structure that was put in place for the G20. It also examines some of the command and control issues that arose during the G20 weekend. A timeline of the protest march that took place on Saturday, June 26, 2010, and the events that occurred during and after the march is included. Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 cover the "hot spots" of the G20 with analysis of the issues from those incidents. Chapter 9 examines the G20 systemic review. On July 22, 2010, the OIPRD announced the initiation of a systemic review of issues underlying the complaints received concerning police activities during the G20 summit held in Toronto on June 26-27, 2010. By July 22, the OIPRD had received nearly 275 complaints relating to events during the G20. After reviewing these complaints, it became evident a pattern existed. The Director determined that a systemic review of the G20 was necessary to provide an overall analysis of police practices and provide recommendations for improvement. Terms of Reference. On November 4, 2010, the OIPRD released the Terms of Reference for this review. These terms of reference provided that the OIPRD would gather information, review complaints, and conduct investigations in order to identify issues arising from policing during the G20 summit. As well, the OIPRD would consider submissions from stakeholders, including public and police organizations invited to participate, regarding their views on policing practices during the summit. The Terms of Reference appear as Appendix 2 at the end of this Report. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Disclosure. To investigate complaints comprehensively, accurately, and fairly, the OIPRD gathers as much relevant information as possible. Given the complexity of the issues around complaints against police during the G20, and to assist in the systemic review, the OIPRD requested all relevant materials from police services. The OIPRD received operational plans, policies and procedures, training materials, organizational charts, meeting minutes, Incident Command scribe notes, senior officer scribe notes, officer interviews or statements, officer notes, closed-circuit television (CCTV) and other video, occurrence reports, officer duty rosters, arrest records, arrest photos, and booking videos. The OIPRD also reviewed information from various Internet sites, including media sites and YouTube. Most of the relevant systemic review disclosure was from the Toronto Police Service, the RCMP, and the Ontario Provincial Police. The disclosure had to be handled and reviewed carefully because some of it was of a sensitive nature. Overall, the OIPRD received tens of thousands of pages of documents and photos and several thousand hours of video footage from CCTV cameras on the ground and in the Prisoner Processing Centre, as well as video from OPP ground crews, aerial video, and audio scribe notes from OPP officers. The OIPRD also interviewed more than 600 officers and 200 civilian witnesses. The volume of disclosure was overwhelming and time-consuming to sort through and log. In addition to the extent of disclosure and the number of interviews required, the timing of disclosure created challenges for the G20 team. At the beginning of the review process, full disclosure for the purposes of the systemic review was not entirely forthcoming by the TPS or the RCMP, the two organizations identified as having the greatest amount of the information relevant to the review. The OIPRD requested disclosure from Toronto Police Service on August 8, 2010, and the first major disclosure from TPS was received on October 22, 2010. The OIPRD had to make multiple requests over the course of several months before disclosure, often unlabelled and incomplete, trickled in. The OIPRD received 17 separate G20 disclosure files from TPS between October 22, 2010, and August 17, 2011. We created a tracking mechanism and a spreadsheet that was exchanged weekly with TPS. The spreadsheet itemized the disclosure being requested and received. This measure helped the disclosure process greatly, and the amount of material obtained was substantial. As investigations evolved, they often required that more disclosure be requested. The RCMP is a federal police service and does not fall under the jurisdiction of the OIPRD. The OIPRD's first request for disclosure (of 32 documents and "things") from the RCMP was on November 9, 2010. The request yielded one document on February 22, 2011. The Independent Police Review Director met with the RCMP on March 7 and March 19, 2011, in an attempt to address the lack of disclosure received, with no results. The Director wrote to the RCMP on March 29, 2011, to convey these concerns, and the RCMP responded on April 13, 2011. The Director again met with the RCMP on July 13 and July 19, 2011, and at that point they agreed on a protocol for disclosure and the process was set up. The OIPRD actually received the first batch of disclosure on July 8, 2011, and all requested disclosure was finally received from the RCMP on October 14, 2011. One of the challenges in the RCMP disclosure process was that the need arose to coordinate requests for particular disclosure material with the Commission for Public Complaints, the organization that oversees complaints against RCMP officers. Notwithstanding the challenges and length of time before it started to flow, when disclosure was received it proved very useful in helping to complete investigations and fill in the blanks on some incidents. The OIPRD requested disclosure from the OPP on March 8, 2011. The disclosure requested was large and the nature of the material was similar to that requested from TPS and the RCMP. The OPP provided disclosure to the OIPRD, indexed and categorized, on March 30, 2011. The OIPRD also requested video material, specifically unedited video of incidents that occurred during the G20, from television stations. All stations refused the request. 3 Throughout the disclosure process, the OIPRD considered using its summons powers provided under the Public Inquiries Act to legally compel documentation. In one instance, the OIPRD chose to rely on its summons powers to compel evidence. That power was regarded as a tool of last resort for three main reasons. First, once concerns were expressed and the initial challenges were overcome, police services cooperated with the OIPRD and the information obtained was considered sufficient for the purposes of satisfying the goals of the review. Second, taking an additional step to obtain further information from outside third parties that was not critical to the review would have unduly delayed the completion of the review. Finally, the use of those powers was likely to be met with litigation before the courts. Considering the amount and quality of information already available, such litigation would have been an unwarranted distraction to the systemic review. In addition, given that this was the first systemic review of its kind, the OIPRD sought to establish processes to facilitate the acquisition of information. It is hoped that should another systemic review become necessary, procedures and expectations will be in place to enable the OIPRD to obtain information more efficiently. 4 OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Part One: Preparation and Planning. 6 OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Chapter 1: Background . 1 OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD 8 OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR security coverage. Resources from the G8 could not be easily re-allocated to the G20 because the two summits were back to back and more than 200 kilometres apart. While the decision on the location was being discussed, ISU officials met with some of the planners from the 2009 G20 meetings in Pittsburgh and London to gain insights into the issues involved. They found that security services faced a number of challenges, most notably in how to deal with the multi-issue protest groups. 9 The G20 is a group of representatives from key industrial and emerging-market countries created in December 1999 to consult about global financial issues. The G20 group includes 19 countries and the European Union and represents more than 80 per cent of the global gross national product. The first G20 meeting of finance ministers and central bankers took place in Canada in 2000. In response to the global financial crisis, the first G20 leaders' summit was held in Washington, DC, in 2008. Before the Toronto summit, G20 leaders met in London in April 2009 and Pittsburgh in September 2009. the secure zones to travel to additional meeting sites. So from a security perspective, it was safer and more efficient to have the summit at the MTCC with the hotel accommodations nearby as opposed to travelling from the hotels to somewhere like the Direct Energy building. The additional distance would have required extending the secure zones to a much larger area which would have negatively impacted freedom of movement in the city, and was cost prohibitive and not possible from a human resource standpoint. Our planning was much more focused. We had everyone in a close proximity which made planning much easier, not only for the RCMP but also for our partners. 10 Metro Toronto Convention Centre. The Toronto venues that were considered included the Direct Energy Centre, the Allstream Centre (both conference and exhibition centres on the Canadian National Exhibition grounds), and the Metro Toronto Convention Centre (MTCC). (Initially, the MTCC was also considered as a possible location for the international media centre.) Additional potential sites were toured by the RCMP and other security officials. Some of the benefits in selecting the MTCC were that it is within walking distance of many of Toronto's major hotels, and, from the perspective of the ISU, it offered security and convenience. Because internationally protected persons (IPPs) could stay in hotels and meet within the same area, the MTCC allowed the ISU to concentrate the security perimeter in a small centralized area in downtown Toronto. If the summit were held in another location, it is likely that the ISU would have been required to secure and close off a larger section of Toronto. As one senior official noted, the MTCC was the best choice because: We would not have to put the leaders in motorcades and transport them distances through potentially vulnerable situations to get them to functions or meeting sites or official dinners. We had their accommodations, their official dinners and functions within a secure fenced environment. They could hold the summit, bilateral meetings and dinners without leaving Since their inception, both the G8 and the G20 have often attracted noisy and sometimes violent protests. The G20 leaders' summits have attracted international attention and large-scale protests since they began in 2008. Given the experiences at previous G20 summits, it was expected that largescale protests would disrupt the summit in Toronto. As part of its membership in the G8 and G20, Canada committed to host the 2010 G8 and G20 summits. On June 19, 2008, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced that Canada would host the G8 in Huntsville, Ontario, a town of 20,000 people more than 200 km (about a three-hour drive) from Toronto. In November 2008, Tony Clement, Treasury Board president and Member of Parliament for the Huntsville riding, announced that the G8 would be held from June 25 to 27, 2010. It wasn't until September 25, 2009, that Prime Minister Harper and the President of South Korea announced that the two countries would co-chair the 2010 G20 meetings, with Canada hosting the first G20 leaders' summit of 2010. No Canadian location for the G20 was set until December 7, 2009, when the government stated that the G20 would be held in Toronto on June 26 and 27, 2010. This left little time to plan and execute the event. The decision to hold the G20 summit in Toronto was made for a variety of reasons. This meeting requires vast resources to accommodate all the leaders and officials in attendance. The 2010 G20 included an additional six nations to the 20 members as well as 10 international agencies and world bodies. The size of the each delegation ranged from 25 to 1,500 people. It became clear to organizers that a small town would not have the resources to host the event. In addition, it was unprecedented for one nation to host both the G8 and G20 summits back to back in two different municipalities, and that fact alone presented a unique security challenge. The organization of the summit is the responsibility of the host country. After several discussions among the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), the Privy Council Office (PCO), the Summit Management Office (SMO), and the Integrated Security Unit (ISU), the decision was made to host the G20 in downtown Toronto immediately following the G8. Because the venue, the Metro Toronto Convention Centre (MTCC), was officially chosen on February 19, 2010, there was less than four months to plan for the summit's security and policing needs - a very short timeline for organizers. According to ISU officials, once the official announcement of the venue was made, all the general planning previously made for the G8 had to be revisited and re-synchronized to ensure that both locations would have the required Considerations and consequences. Although it is outside the scope and expertise of this review to determine whether the MTCC was the best location for the G20 summit, it is recognized that the timing of the site selection and its location created a number of challenges and inconveniences for both the police and the public. The G8 and the G20 summits were the largest domestic security operations in Canadian history. The short time span between the two summits and the location of the G20 created a distinct set of circumstances and challenges for Canadian security operations. The G20 summit surpassed many previous ones in scope, scale, and complexity. Almost 21,000 security personnel were deployed in support of the G8 and G20 summits, including 5,000 personnel under RCMP deployment, 3,000 personnel from Canadian Forces, 6,200 personnel from the Toronto Police Service, 3,000 Ontario Provincial Police personnel, and 740 personnel from the Peel Regional Police Force. Many of the G8 officers were later deployed to Toronto. Additional officers were brought in from elsewhere in Ontario - Hamilton, York, Ottawa, Halton, London, Niagara Falls, Peterborough, Durham, London, Sudbury, Waterloo, and Barrie - as well as from Newfoundland and Labrador, Winnipeg, Montreal, Edmonton, and Calgary. The economic and social significance of OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD these summits also placed Toronto and Canada in the midst of public and media attention, both nationally and internationally. The selection of the MTCC created a variety of concerns. Some citizens expressed the view that Toronto became a "police state" that resembled an "urban combat zone" with razor-wire fences lining the downtown streets, helicopters clattering overhead, and protesters confronting police officers in riot gear. Many business owners worried about potential loss of revenue, property damage, and other negative consequences of being located in the downtown core. the summit in Toronto presented a unique opportunity for people to demonstrate against government policies and provided an occasion for groups and individuals to communicate their messages to a large, world-wide audience. Throughout the preparations, police carried out threat assessments. As RCMP Assistant Commissioner Alphonse MacNeil, who was heavily involved in the planning of both summits, told the IPRD, "The intelligence indicated this was going to happen. The Black Bloc were going to do certain things, from the information provided to us, groups showed up just as predicted." In a court case in which the Canadian Civil Liberties Association challenged and succeeded in limiting TPS's use of the long-range acoustic device (LRAD), OPP Superintendent Charlebois, in an affidavit, summed up the challenges that police face in dealing with security and demonstrators. (The LRAD is a distance hailing device and crowd control weapon that sends out messages, warnings, and pain-inducing tones that, according to some experts, can cause hearing damage.) "I am aware that past international summits have seen significant public disorder, lawlessness, personal injury and property damage," Superintendent Charlebois stated. "Policing such events to prevent violence from causing damage of that nature is a significant challenge. Stringent security measures are required to keep the peace, ensure public safety and keep the participants of protests safe from harm." He continued: While I am not an expert on international terrorism, I am aware that events of this magnitude that involve so many world leaders and diplomats pose a tempting target for terrorists. Such events also provide an opportunity for violent groups or individuals to engage in illegal activities. The methods used by violent groups or individuals can result in significant risk of injury or property damage. Their methods can include the use of incendiary devices, hand-held batons or sticks, rock-throwing or mass movement towards or charging police lines or fences. They may also seek to breach security perimeters by climbing fences or scaling buildings. The OPP recognizes the constitutional rights of protesters to freedom of expression and freedom of association. The OPP recognizes that events of the magnitude of the G20 summit provide an opportunity for groups and individuals to communicate their messages to a larger audience. The great majority of those groups and individuals are peaceful and respect the law. Unfortunately, there are small numbers of individuals who use violence and engage in criminal behaviour. The OPP makes best efforts to try to focus its attention on those individuals, but the presence of those individuals may necessarily affect the manner of policing a larger crowd. Police services are, therefore, required to consider, plan, and prepare for a broad spectrum of potential threats such as those to the city's infrastructure, transportation, communications, and information technology, as well as chemical and biological threats. Security planners could not discount that Canada has been identified as a potential target on several occasions, especially from both international and "homegrown" extremist groups. Black Bloc. Although Black Bloc is often mistaken for an organization, it is a tactic used by individuals, who typically describe themselves as anarchists, to infiltrate demonstrations and anonymously attack corporate targets. These individuals often wear black clothing, balaclavas, scarves, hoodies, ski masks, motorcycle helmets with padding, or other faceconcealing items. People using Black Bloc tactics often carry backpacks for extra clothing, projectiles, weapons, gas masks and the like. The clothing is used to avoid being identified. The tactic was first used in the 1980s in Europe by protesters against issues such as nuclear power. It spread to North America in 1999 when demonstrators in Seattle protested against a meeting of the World Trade Organization. Black Bloc tactics include creating tight, hard-tobreak blocks that can break through police lines, misleading the authorities, administering first aid to people affected by tear gas in areas where protesters are barred from entering, building barricades, and attacking police. Black Bloc protesters have been known to throw projectiles such as paint bombs, rocks, flares, firecrackers, and Molotov cocktails. Typically, participants in Black Bloc tactics take positions at the front, rear, or perimeters of a protest march in order to provide a strong defensive presence at vulnerable points. This way, officers are unable to disrupt the movement of a demonstration without first having to subdue a highly militant, dedicated, and prepared section of the protest. Participants often carry metal pipes, wooden clubs, and stones, and don protective padding and helmets. Participants are also known to use large continuous banners, poles, or ropes to line their perimeters. The purpose of these tools is to make it more difficult for the police to single out individuals for arrest. To carry out arrests, police officers would have to pass through a collectively held barrier while simultaneously contending with potential blows from clubs. Another tactic is the use of the "outer perimeter group." The individuals in this group are dressed in unobtrusive clothes. The only thing they do is form a wall around participants, which allows 11 12 Analysis. The security team faced two specific challenges. First, the relatively short timeline for planning and the fact that the two summits were scheduled back to back, made the sharing of personnel and resources a concern. Second, although the summit location in downtown Toronto worked to secure the safety of the participants, it made protesters hard to control and caused disruption and inconvenience to the population of Canada's largest city. These difficulties made it necessary to bring in police forces from other jurisdictions, many with practices and procedures different from those of the Toronto Police Service. Training and practice time was limited by costs and the short timeline. Protester tactics. In most planned demonstrations, protesters' tactics are peaceful. Demonstrators march, chant, sing, picket, and hold sit-ins. There are, however, certain techniques that tend to lead to violent tactics against police, the public, and property. These techniques include forming human chains and human shields; using weapons and projectiles; and breaching fences, barricades, and secure zones. Such tactics create a situation where police are required to continually assess potential threats, rely on intelligence, and respond to any potential threat to public order while preserving the rights of citizens to protest peacefully. In recent years, the development of Black Bloc tactics and the use of social media have created special challenges for policing protests. The Toronto G20 summit and its challenges. "Policing is all about prevention and we will never know all that was prevented." Alphonse MacNeil, RCMP Assistant Commissioner. The policing challenge: potential threats. The hosting of an international event requires extensive security planning. The complexity of policing the G20 summit cannot be underestimated. Given the concentration of world leaders in one place, demonstrations, rallies, and protests generally accompany the G8 and G20 summits. As a result, OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD them to change their clothing intermittently. One of the rationales offered for the use of the "outer perimeter group" is to reinforce the notion that participants are supported by neutral protesters in the march. Another reason is to camouflage their intent by giving the perception that they are "regular" people with intentions to protest. Another Black Bloc tactic is for participants to embed themselves within an otherwise peaceful group of protesters and inflame them to the extent that some of the peaceful protesters become their "soldiers" or provide cover for them by adopting Black Bloc tactics or actions. People who use Black Bloc tactics are adept at coopting peaceful members of protests to join in their deeds. Participants are known for their ability to push protests in a more militant direction. This tactic is mostly achieved by them positioning themselves at the forefront of the demonstration and subsequently forcing an escalation between police and protesters. Examples include resisting arrest, refusing to remain on sanctioned parade routes, challenging police barricades, and actively directing anger at corporate targets. date - primarily in monitoring the information flow and the use of such tactical intelligence - and adapt to the fluidity of protest tools. The role of protesting in democratic societies. "One need look no further than the daily headlines ... to recognize how vital political demonstrations are to the operation of a viable democracy ... Indeed, rights of expression, peaceful assembly and association are enshrined as 'fundamental freedoms' under s. 2 of the Canadian Charter [of] Rights and Freedoms." R. v. Puddy (2011) ONCJ 399 (CanLII). Operations and logistics. The planning and implementation of the G20 summit involved the coordination of thousands of security personnel, the identification and procurement of considerable resources, the development of an accreditation process, the preparation of integrated and detailed plans, and a highly complex command and control structure with various operational plans and protocols. The movements of internationally protected persons are highly complex. Motorcade operations were an area of planning that required extensive interagency coordination. The successful movement and transportation of IPPs both on land and in the air was an important strategic objective. Marine, air operations, highways and roads, and major airports were areas that required planning and coordination. In addition, there are the practical daily security requirements of harmonizing movements and maintaining tight security for the IPPs and delegates - all of which also had to be coordinated with climate and weather changes. The G20 summit occurred near Lake Ontario, so it was important for security planners to consider the possibility of a marine incursion. Protesters or other persons wishing to breach security on the waterways could pose a physical threat to the IPPs and cause a disruption to the summit meetings. Furthermore, a protest coming from the water could be dangerous to the protesters themselves, endanger the personal safety of both law enforcement personnel and members of the public, or result in damage to private or public properties. Security planning at Toronto Lester B. Pearson International Airport required extensive planning for the arrival and departure of the IPPs. Similarly, railway line threats had to be considered. 13 political parties such as the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation or the Bloc populaire canadien. Others have resulted in violence, such as the Upper and Lower Canadian rebellions of the 1830s, or the terrorist Front de lib?ration du Qu?bec that emerged in the 1960s. Historically, protest movements in Canada were concerned particularly with the economic grievances of farmers and workers, which erupted in the early part of the 20th century. Recently, protests in Canada have occurred at public events, conferences, or international summits. In 2001, one thousand demonstrators rioted at the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City. That summit attracted an estimated 20,000 to 50,000 demonstrators, made up of trade unionists, anarchists, anti-globalists, and civil rights groups such as Greenpeace Canada and the Council of Canadians. On the first day of protests, a small group was able to breach the perimeter fence, resulting in the police use of tear gas and a broader confrontation that lasted for two hours. On the following day, between 30,000 and 60,000 protesters converged near the summit site, resulting in a massive confrontation. Rocks and glass bottles were thrown at police, and they reacted with tear gas. During the 2002 G8 summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, protesters demonstrated in Calgary. A large group of demonstrators took part in a snake march in the commercial centre of the city, stopping traffic and jamming the streets. Many protesters targeted shops that sold goods made in developing countries. All major thoroughfares were closed, many shops in Calgary were boarded up, and police reportedly outnumbered protesters six to one. 14 Peaceful protest has a long history in Canada. A public protest is taken to mean a collective public gathering to express criticism of - or support for - particular policies, governments, public officials, or social issues, using verbal or non-verbal forms. The ability to publicly critique government is important in Canada and a key component of our political system. In addition to allowing us to express ourselves politically, freedom of expression also permits us to share our ideas, learn about the ideas of others, and develop as individuals in an open society. The free flow of ideas allows people to make informed decisions on issues of political importance.1 The rights to peaceful assembly and to freedom of expression are enshrined in our Charter of Rights and Freedoms and reflect national values that promote freedom and social change. The right to protest and demonstrate, and the right to peaceful assembly, are widely considered fundamental to democratic practice and the epitome of collective political expression in a democracy. Social media. Protesters, both militant and non-militant, are adept at using social media such as Twitter, Facebook, and MySpace to organize and circumvent police. Their ability to recruit and communicate with large groups of people has created another challenge for policing protests. For example, Twitter allows the simultaneous, immediate transmission of short text messages to an unlimited number of individuals, making it an invaluable tool for protesters. Twitter allows protesters to change plans at the last minute, providing them with the flexibility to adapt quickly. The continuing evolution of communications technology, from social networking sites to videos immediately posted to YouTube from cell phone cameras, to the global immediacy of informationsharing via Twitter, provides more (and simpler) tools that groups can use to their advantage. Consequently, law enforcement must keep up to Protests in Canada. Throughout Canadian history, political protest has taken many forms, including peaceful demonstrations, polite petitions, the creation of new political organizations and parties, violent strikes in the workplace, armed rebellion, and even acts of terrorism. Some protest movements in Canada were assimilated by the political process, becoming new 1 Richard Moon, The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). See also Graham Darling, "Freedom of Expression Background," Centre for Constitutional Studies, online : http://www.law.ualberta.ca/centres/ccs/issues/freedomof expressionbackground.php. Protests in Toronto. Although Toronto has its own history of violent disruptions beginning with the short-lived 1837 Upper Canada Rebellion led by William Lyon Mackenzie, the city's first mayor, protests for more than a decade before the G20 summit have largely been peaceful. Indeed, peaceful protests, ranging from individuals standing in front of City Hall to marches along the downtown streets, have been a familiar sight in the city. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD 15 Aside from the G20 summit protests, perhaps the most notable Toronto protests in recent memory involved the city's Tamil community in the first part of 2009. The Tamil protesters wanted Canada and the international community to intervene in the armed conflict in Sri Lanka and gathered downtown in the thousands to protest, sometimes congregating in front of the U.S. consulate, sometimes marching through the streets of the city, and sometimes forming a massive human chain across the city's streets. Although disruptive, especially on the one occasion when the protesters marched onto the Gardiner Expressway, the demonstrators were generally peaceful and few arrests were made during the months of protests. Large, violent protests in Toronto have not occurred for some time. In 2000, a large anti-poverty demonstration in front of Queen's Park led to a violent altercation between demonstrators and the police. Thirty-two people were arrested, and dozens of protesters and police officers were injured. In 1996, a labour protest at Queen's Park impeded members of the provincial parliament from entering the legislature and also led to a violent confrontation between protesters and the police. A subsequent public inquiry made a number of recommendations, chiefly about the security arrangements around Queen's Park but also on the need for the police to wear personal identifiers and the importance of ongoing police communications with peaceful protesters. In 1992, an anti-racism protest was followed by two consecutive nights of rioting along Yonge Street that saw extensive property damage, looting, and injuries to police officers.. More than 50 people were arrested during those two nights. Similar behaviour was also prevalent around that time at the annual close of the Canadian National Exhibition. political leaders seek to convey may be expressed as well. Our Charter of Rights and Freedoms is designed to ensure that everyone in Canada enjoys the same freedoms of assembly and expression. The security measures and the police officers involved in implementing them may become viewed as symbols of the issues about which the protesters are protesting. Some people may simply use the opportunity of a police presence to protest against the police themselves. Policing in such an environment requires the balancing of competing rights and must be recognized as a considerable challenge. In Demonstrating respect for rights? A human rights approach to policing protest, the UK House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights2 cited the following from Blackstone's General Police Duties (2008): Public order law and the policing of it "involves balancing opposing rights of individuals with one another against wider entitlements and requirements of society - a task that, in practical terms, can seem like trying to satisfy the insatiable." Although there is no doubt that the policing challenge is significant, a considerable wealth of material aimed at guiding the police in meeting such a challenge exists in reports prepared by legislative, government, and policing bodies. This information, and the recommendations included, should be considered required reading but, where necessary, should be incorporated into future planning for similar types of events and acted on as lessons learned. Police services have a responsibility to protect and facilitate the opportunity for people to protest peacefully. To fail to do so would be counter to Canadian democratic principles and jeopardize several Charter rights, including the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and the right to freedom of expression. In preparation for future summits, similar events, or protests, police and government officials should avail themselves of the wealth of information and recommendations on protest and policing. Criminal Code provisions. Several sections of the Criminal Code are specifically relevant to the policing of international events such as the G20 summit. They include the sections on preventing breach of the peace (s. 30); use of force to suppress riot (s. 32); unlawful assembly; riot; causing a disturbance; and threat to commit offence against internationally protected persons. The concept of "breach of the peace" tends to involve some disturbance or threat or tumultuous and riotous activity. The common law also provides a police officer, if he or she honestly and reasonably believes there is a risk of imminent harm, with the power to arrest a person in order to prevent an apprehended breach of the peace.5 Although breaching the peace is not itself an offence, those who commit acts amounting to a breach of the peace or are at the cusp of doing so may be arrested and temporarily restrained under the Criminal Code or, in the latter case, the common law. This is a form of proactive or preventive police power designed to preserve the peace and inhibit criminal conduct. Pursuant to the ancillary powers doctrine, the police may arrest for apprehended breaches of the peace at common law. The justification for and limits of this power are thoroughly developed in Brown v. Durham (Regional Municipality) Police Force, [1998] OJ No. 5274 (CA). The police power to arrest and detain for actual breaches of the peace has a statutory foundation in section 31 of the Criminal Code.6 Detentions for breach of the peace must be necessary for the maintenance of the public peace. A lengthy detention is not permitted. The police will generally be required to release a detainee sooner if the risk of a breach of the peace has passed.7 A person arrested for breach of the peace should not be held for more than 24 hours without being charged.8 A person arrested for breaching the peace can be released without any further consequences.9 Criminal charges do not automatically flow from the arrest. 5 6 7 8 9 Hayes v. Thompson (1985), 18 CCC (3d) 254 (BCCA), and Knowlton v. The Queen (1973), 10 CCC (2d) 377. R. v. Puddy 2011 ONCJ 399 (CanLII). See R. v. Grosso, [1995] BCJ No. 1802 at para. 55 (BC Prov. Ct.). R. v. Lefebvre (1982), 1 CCC (3d) 241 at 244 (BC Co. Ct.), aff'd (1984), 15 CCC (3d) 503 (BCCA). Re Januska and the Queen (1996), 106 CCC (3d) 183 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.). 16 Framework for public protests: police powers and individual rights Legal authorities. The legal framework around public order and protesting is complex. Police officers have an array of duties found in the Police Services Act and under the common law. These duties include preserving the peace, preventing crime, and apprehending offenders. A necessary corollary to these duties, of course, involves the granting of certain powers to police officers so they may effectively carry out their duties. These powers are found in the common law and in legislation such as the Criminal Code. The common law. The common law's ancillary police powers doctrine recognizes that the police must generally engage in some form of action to maintain the public peace, prevent crime, and protect life. In determining whether police conduct comes within the common law ancillary powers doctrine, the nature of the police duty giving rise to that conduct is important.3 Where the police rely on ancillary police power to justify police conduct that interferes with individual liberties, a two-pronged case-specific inquiry must be made. First, it must be demonstrated that the police were acting within their duties and responsibilities; and second, the actions taken must be justifiable relative to that duty.4 Protests and policing. International meetings such as the G20 summit are important opportunities for political leaders from different nations to discuss matters of global significance. Such events also present opportunities for alternative ideas, counter ideologies, opposition, and protests - so that messages other than those the 3 4 2 U.K., House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, Demonstrating respect for rights? A human rights approach to policing protest, (HL Paper 47-1, HC 320-1, London, 23 March 2009), 22. R. v. Godoy (1997), 115 CCC (3d) 272 at 278 (Ont. CA), aff'd, SCC, December 2, 1998. R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659 (C.C.A.); Knowlton v. The Queen, [1973] S.C.J. No. 87, 10 C.C.C. (2d) 377 (S.C.C.); Dedman v. The Queen, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, 20 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.); R. v. Godoy, [1998] S.C.J. No. 85, 131 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.). OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD 17 A riot can occur when three or more persons assemble together with a purpose and with the intent to use force that would be a cause of concern to a reasonable person. Under the Criminal Code, the use of force is permitted in the suppression of a riot when necessary. Every peace officer is justified in using or in ordering the use of as much force as the peace officer believes, in good faith and on reasonable grounds, is necessary to suppress a riot; and is not excessive, having regard to the danger to be apprehended from the continuance of the riot. Similarly, an unlawful assembly is a gathering of three or more persons who disturb the peace or cause others to disturb the peace or assemble in such a manner to cause fear in persons nearby.10 It is also an offence to cause a disturbance in a public place. The purpose of this section is to prevent the disruption of the public's normal activity and use of a public place.11 Officers may arrest a person for obstruction under section 129 of the Criminal Code, if the person resists or wilfully obstructs the police officer in the execution of his or her duties. The person's conduct does not need to completely frustrate the officer, but only affect the officer in relation to the duty being executed. "Wilfully" also implies that the accused knew what they were doing and intended to do what they did. An officer must be engaged in some form of police work or be more than simply "at work." However, the officer does not have to be involved in the investigation of a specific crime.12 justified in using as much force as is reasonably necessary to prevent the commission of an offence. Officers are also criminally responsible for any excessive use of force. Recommendations. o olice services had only four months to plan P security for the G20 summit, a length of time acknowledged as wholly inadequate and one that may in fact have been irresponsible. In future, wherever possible, governments and police services should ensure that joint security events be given adequate planning and preparation time. In particular: a) Policies and procedures should be developed by policing entities for future events so that they can be modified as required to suit specific events and implemented quickly. b) The development of policies and procedures for future events should allow sufficient time for input from the public and police. c) Police should also incorporate contingency plans into their overall policing plans. For example, there should be plans for deploying officers in response to unexpected and urgent situations. o he Toronto Police Service, other Ontario police T services and the RCMP must develop procedures for better, more seamless, and earlier disclosure of documents with agencies responsible for oversight or reviews. o he Police Services Act should be amended to T specify the time limits for investigating complaints of police conduct arising from mass protests. The current section 83(17) requires a notice of hearing to be served within six months of beginning an investigation. Although the Act allows a police services board to extend this time, the Act does not recognize the reality of investigating large-scale events such as the G20. The Office of the Independent Police Review Director received 356 complaints in relation to the events of the G20 and retained the investigation of 207 of them. The last disclosure package from the Toronto Police Service arrived more than 13 months after G20 summit. In order to provide a consistent approach to the investigation of complaints arising from large-scale events, the legislation must recognize the workload involved. The Charter. In Canada, everyone enjoys significant rights and freedoms, which include the freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and association. These freedoms are guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Our Charter also grants us rights to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived of those rights except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. In addition, we have the right to equality, which prohibits discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability. In any democracy, especially a democracy such as Canada with our Charter of Rights and Freedoms and an absolute right to peaceful protest, there is an understanding and acceptance that the right to peaceful protest must be balanced against the duty of police to ensure protection and safety of all citizens - both the public and the police - by their ability to impose lawful restrictions on protesters. Although it is acknowledged that the balancing of these two rights is a challenge, actions used by police during the G20 summit appear to have wavered at times in ensuring and protecting the right of peaceful protest. An example would be the events that occurred at Queen's Park on the evening of June 26, 2010. It can be said that most police officers deployed during the summit had a good understanding of the right to peaceful protest, but there was confusion over how that right was to evolve. 18 Use of force. The Criminal Code provides police officers with powers to execute their duties. It also authorizes the use of force for lawful purposes. Under section 25 of the Criminal Code, an officer who is acting on reasonable grounds and authorized by law to do anything in the administration or enforcement of law is able to use as much force as reasonably necessary for that purpose. A police officer is also 10 R. v. Patterson, [1931] 3 DLR 267. 11 R. v. Lohnes, [1992] SCJ No. 6, 69 CCC (3d) 289 (SCC). 12 R. v. Noel, [1995] BCJ No. 1852, 101 CCC (3d) 183 (BCCA); R. v. Tortolano, [1975] OJ No. 1055, 28 CCC (2d) 562 (Ont. CA). OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Chapter 2: The G20 Security Structure . 2 20 OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD The Integrated Security Unit (ISU). Security planning, operations, and demobilization for both the G8 and G20 summits were coordinated by the Integrated Security Unit (ISU). The ISU was led by the RCMP in partnership with the Toronto Police Service, the Ontario Provincial Police, the Peel Regional Police, and the Canadian Forces. This chapter draws on disclosure provided by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Toronto Police Service, the Ontario Provincial Police, and the Peel Regional Police, as well as interviews conducted throughout the systemic review. The overall strategic goals of the ISU were to ensure the safety and security of the general public and heads of state attending the G8 and G20 summits in Canada. Everything that the ISU did from a planning perspective related to nine key objectives: o etermine all summit safety and security D requirements. o evelop the concept of operations, business plan, D and operational plans for the summit safety and security. o ncorporate summit safety and security partners in I an Integrated Security Unit. o oordinate and focus intelligence to support C summit safety and security. o evelop a network to facilitate liaison between D local, provincial, and federal agencies. o evelop the information technology systems and D communications process required for an integrated planning / operations group. o rovide situational awareness and training for all P summit security personnel. o nsure the safety of employees. E o evelop and implement a comprehensive "transfer D of knowledge" strategy for future major events. The ISU publicized, in messages to the community, that it recognized and supported the guaranteed rights and freedoms as stated in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms including the freedoms of opinion, expression, and peaceful assembly. The ISU noted that most groups would want to express themselves in a peaceful and responsible manner; however, it was preparing for any eventuality. "Any interaction police have with demonstrators would be measured, balanced and appropriate to the circumstances at hand. Demonstrations that result in criminal behaviour will not be tolerated and specific charges will be applicable to anyone committing criminal offences." The decision making matrix. As a part of the planning, the ISU developed a Command and Control document that included a decision matrix. The matrix set out the responsible authority for specific incidents clearly and succinctly and defined the levels of authority: public order units, Site Commander, Jurisdictional Commander, Area Commander, Unified Command Commander, and Steering Committee. As well, it identified the distinction between authorized and informed status for a decision on each potential type of incident. The command that issued a decision or received information was to ensure that the commands above and below it were notified. The matrix identified that the communication link between the Major Incident Command Centre's Jurisdictional Commander and the RCMP's Site Commander would be through the Area Command, whose responsibility was to ensure that both areas were informed. Generally, operational or safety issues at sites were to be addressed by the police force of jurisdiction. Site commanders were not precluded from taking initial action on the discovery of situations not affecting IPPs; however, they were to contact the Area Commander for further direction. Police resources assigned to Sites / Jurisdiction came under the command of their respective commanders. The Unified Command Commander was responsible for directing the movement of police resources between areas. The Steering Committee was to be briefed regularly by the Unified Command Centre (UCC) to maintain situational awareness. 22 21 The planning and organization of the G20 summit rested with two federal government offices. The Summits Management Office (SMO) within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (FAIT) was responsible for hosting the summit. Security planning was the responsibility of the Office of the Coordinator for the 2010 Olympics and G8 Security, part of the Privy Council Office. The RCMP is the sole agency with federal policing jurisdiction and the legislative mandate to provide security for international events. This authority is derived from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and from the direction taken from the Minister of Public Safety. The Covenant of the Government of Canada and the Foreign Mission and International Organizations Act (FMIOA) provide the legal authority for the RCMP's lead role in security for intergovernmental conferences and protection of internationally protected persons (IPPs). The RCMP retained overall responsibility for security during the G20 summit event. higher level of coordination as well as to ensure that any significant or contentious issues were reviewed in an appropriate forum. The committee was made up of senior officers from the RCMP, the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), Toronto Police Service (TPS), the Peel Regional Police, and the Canadian Forces. The decision was made early on in the planning process to create a separate fully functional facility for the Executive Steering Committee in close proximity to the ISU that ensured that the committee was available for immediate consultation as required. The Steering Committee was briefed by the Unified Command Centre (UCC) regularly on developments to maintain situational awareness and to make sure that decisions related to the summit were made in accordance with a decision matrix that had been developed. The Steering Committee assessed and directed all strategic decisions involving the security of the summits that were outside the parameters of authority of the Unified Command Incident Commander. It was expected to make decisions that would support, manage, and assess the impact of decisions among police agencies, departments, and services and ensure that strategic decisions were consistent with the individual forces' mandates and roles of the partners. The Steering Committee. The G20 summit had a Steering Committee to provide high level senior executive oversight of security during the summit. The Steering Committee was included in the security structure to act as a The Joint Intelligence Group. ISU planning and implementation depended greatly on the intelligence gathered on potential security threats to the G20 summit. The intelligence function was managed by a Joint Intelligence Group (JIG). OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD The JIG was a joint effort of the RCMP, the Ontario Provincial Police, Toronto Police Service, and the Peel Regional Police and had critical liaison roles for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Canadian Forces, Communications Security Establishment Canada, and the Canadian Border Services Agency. The mandate of the JIG was to collect, collate, analyze, and disseminate accurate information and intelligence in a timely manner to facilitate the decision-making process in both the planning and execution phases of securing the summits. The JIG fulfilled this mandate by conducting intelligence investigations of possible threats and suspicious activity associated with the summits. Credible threats and criminal offences were reported to the appropriate authorities for the required action. The JIG produced a variety of analytical reports including, among others, Threat Reports, Situation Reports, and Trend Analyses. o he Unified Command Centre T o he Toronto Area Command Centre T o he Toronto Police Service Major Incident T Command Centre. RCMP Assistant Commissioner Alphonse MacNeil told the IPRD: Early on in the planning for the G20 it was decided Toronto Police Service were going to employ a Major Incident Command Centre in their headquarters building. They felt this command centre was necessary to give them the capability to run operations in the city around the G20 site and at the same time respond to the normal day to day policing in the rest of the city. The remainder of the security operation for the G20 in Toronto was run from the Toronto Area Command Centre at Pearson Airport. Liaison Officers would be present at both sites to facilitate information sharing. I do not believe having two command centres in Toronto was the best approach; however, planning and set up time as well as availability of facilities were factors that influenced the decision. In future this aspect of the operation should be closely reviewed to determine the best approach. I do believe, however, that even with the two command centre system, roles and responsibilities were understood but operations could have been more streamlined under one command centre. were supported by public order units and were under the operational direction of the MICC. The MICC Incident Commander was in charge of all resources under the command of the TPS and had tactical control of those resources to ensure the integrity of the Interdiction Zones. The MICC was also responsible for the continuity of policing services throughout the City of Toronto and for maintaining communications and shared operational awareness with the Toronto Area Command Centre and the Unified Command Centre. Unified Command Centre. The Unified Command Centre (UCC) was the highest level of command and control for both the G8 and G20 summits and the operational decision-making authority in the Unified Command structure. It was made up of commanders from all participating agencies, departments, services, and forces. The RCMP Incident Commander assumed the role of overall Commander. All participants contributed to the command process by determining overall goals, planning jointly for operational activities, conducting integrated operations, and using all assigned resources with maximum efficiency. The structure of the UCC was aimed at easing information flow to the RCMP Incident Commander. Under the UCC command structure, all services had geographic or functional authority over an incident in their respective jurisdiction. 23 24 The security zones and the fence. The security established for the G20 summit was relatively complex and covered a large part of downtown Toronto, with security responsibilities divided between the RCMP and TPS. The Foreign Mission and International Organizations Act gave authority to the RCMP to secure the perimeter of the security zone with fencing and restrict access to this zone through the use of checkpoints and other measures. These legal authorities allowed the RCMP to establish security zones, including the Controlled Access Zone (CAZ), Restricted Access Zone (RAZ), and Interdiction Zone (IZ), as well as security perimeters around these zones, for purposes of fulfilling their legal duties. Those duties included protecting IPPs and ensuring security for the proper functioning of the intergovernmental conference. Areas were secured by a combination of fences and barriers, and access was granted only to accredited and cleared individuals, vehicles, and required items. The Integrated Security Unit Perimeter Operations Plan outlined the various security zones. Controlled Access Zones were established for the immediate areas surrounding the Metro Toronto Convention Centre and the InterContinental and Westin Harbour Castle hotels in which the IPPs and dignitaries were staying. This zone was policed by the RCMP and was the zone with the highest security with a 10-foot-high anti-scale fence to protect the area. Valid credentials Information management Each ISU partner operated independently of one another. Each had unique information technology, managed information differently, and communicated on separate radio systems. The process of information and intelligence exchange was facilitated through the Event Management System (EMS) at each command centre and through a Situational Board, referred to as the EMS Sit Board. The EMS Sit Board was a web-based national system that provided the command centres with updated communication and incident-related data throughout the weekend. Toronto Area Command Centre. The Toronto Area Command Centre (TACC) operated under a Unified Command structure and served as a link to the Unified Command Centre. All activities, movements of internationally protected persons, and requests for specialized resources and support were required to flow through the Area Command Centre. Although there was discussion early in the planning stage about whether the TACC should have been the sole command centre in the Greater Toronto Area, TPS decided it would have a Major Incident Command Centre to handle the G20 and the other policing duties that would be taking place in the city at the same time. Peel Regional Police - Peel Incident Command Centre. The Peel Incident Command Centre (PICC) was located in the TACC. Peel Regional Police provided information to the PICC so that the PICC Incident Commander would have tactical control of all resources under its command, specifically to ensure the integrity of the Restricted Access Zone at the Lester B. Pearson International Airport. Command and Control. Police Command and Control was delivered through a series of interconnected operations centres performing at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Key command and control centres relevant to the G20 included: Toronto Police Service - Major Incident Command Centre. The Toronto Police Service Major Incident Command Centre (MICC) was the central point of command, control, communication, and information for the TPS. The MICC also had site commanders who were in tactical control of foot, bicycle, and mobile officers in the Interdiction Zone, the PATH (pedestrian tunnel system), and the Outer Zone. The site commanders OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD were required for entering and passing through these zones. Beyond and surrounding the Metro Toronto Convention Centre Controlled Access Zone was the Restricted Access Zone, also policed by the RCMP. If any arrests were made in the Restricted Access Zone they would be turned over to the Toronto Police Service or the Ontario Provincial Police. The Restricted Access Zone was also a fenced-in area. Two types of fences were used depending on the roadway or physical structure of the area. A nine-foot six-inch-high anti-scale fence supported by barriers was used, and in other areas a seven-foot-high anti-scale fence on a two-and-ahalf-foot-high barrier was placed in locations that required wider fencing. Numerous gates were placed throughout the fenced area to provide access to accredited vehicles and accredited pedestrians. Beyond the Restricted Access Zone was an Interdiction Zone extending, in some places, to several city blocks beyond the perimeter of the Restricted Access Zone. The Interdiction Zone was policed by TPS and was also fenced in. The Interdiction Zone was secured through the use of a 9-foot 10-inch-high chain-link fence. Access to this area was restricted to accredited and credentialed individuals who lived, worked, or had a lawful purpose to be within the zone. A much smaller Interdiction Zone was established around the Westin Harbour Castle hotel. Beyond the Interdiction Zone was a large Outer Zone, also policed by Toronto Police Service. The Outer Zone, an area where increased police vigilance was considered necessary during the G20, extended north to Bloor Street, south to Lake Ontario, west to Dufferin Street, and east to Jarvis Street, and was divided into north and south sectors. TPS site commanders were in tactical control of foot, bicycle, and mobile officers in the Interdiction Zone, the PATH, and the Outer Zone. They were also supported by public order units and were under the operational direction of the MICC. Each zone had a Perimeter Site Commander to maintain and oversee all operations within the zone. Police officers were responsible for securing both pedestrian and access gates to verify the identity of people entering the secured zones. According to ISU operational plans, the process generally involved a visual check of the badge or pass worn by the person requesting entrance into the zone. The officer could also perform a non-intrusive visual check of the person and any bags being carried into the zone. If an officer questioned someone's identity, the officer could request another officer to provide a secondary check. Once accredited at the gate, the individuals would enter into the restricted zones, where another screening check could be made at the other zone perimeters. Jurisdiction in the zones. Legal authorities. International conventions. Canada is a signatory to several international declarations regarding internationally protected persons. It is committed to upholding and maintaining the values of the related conventions. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 1973, contains articles that protect IPPs and other individuals entitled to special protection under international law. In that regard, Canada has specifically adopted laws requiring peace officers to protect IPPs, as defined in section 2 of the Criminal Code. It provides for cooperation among states in the prevention of the crimes, and for the communication of information. States are also required to ensure that alleged offenders in their territory are available for prosecution or extradition. 25 Map of downtown Toronto showing the G20 Controlled Access Zone, Restricted Access Zone and Interdiction Zone. QUEEN ST. W. QUEEN ST. E. 26 RICHMOND ST. W. SPADINA AVE. OXLEY ST. CL AR EN SHEPPARD ST. UNIVERSI WIDMER ST. PETER ST. DUNCAN ST. NELSON ST. TEMPERANCE ST. TY AVE. ADELAIDE ST. W. VICTORIA ST. TORONTO ST. YONGE ST. YORK ST. FRONT ST. W. METRO TORONTO CONVENTION CENTRE INTERCONTINENTAL TORONTO CENTRE BLUE JAYS WAY CRES. MARINER TER. LAKE SHORE BLVD W. GARDINER EX PWY. CHARLOTTE ST. ED MIRVISH WAY JOHN ST. MERCER ST. BLUE JAYS WAY WINDSOR ST. PEARL ST. KING ST. W. JORDAN ST. EMILY ST. BAY ST. KING ST. E. MELINDA ST. COLBORNE ST. WELLINGTON ST. W. SIMCOE ST. WELLINGTON ST. E. SCOTT ST. CE SQ . CBC HEENAN PL. PIPER ST. FAIRMONT ROYAL YORK FRO NT Federal authorities. The Covenant of the Government of Canada is the legal authority for the RCMP to assume lead agency responsibility for the security of internationally protected persons. Similarly, under section 10.1(1) of the Foreign Mission and International Organizations Act (FMIOA), the RCMP has the primary responsibility to ensure security for the proper functioning of any intergovernmental conference in which two or more states participate and that is attended by persons granted privilege and immunities under the Act. As the lead security agency, the RCMP was mandated to provide protection to the visiting IPPs and security of the sites. This meant that the RCMP was responsible for overseeing security planning and operations within their jurisdictional authority as well as the coordination of operational security requirements with provincial, and municipal law enforcement agencies. Under section 5 of the FMIOA, the Governor in Council may make an order granting privileges and immunities to individuals attending an intergovernmental ST. E. E FRONT ST. W. STATION ST. UNION STATION CN TOWER TT S CO LAN THE ESP LAN ADE LOWER SIMCOE ST. NAVY WHARF CT. ROGERS CENTRE BREMNER BLV D. AIR CANADA CENTRE FREELAND ST. YORK ST. BR EM N E R B LV D. GRAND TRUNK LAK E SHO RE D BLV W. ES ST. RE ST. YONGE OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR LOWER SPADINA AVE. HARBOU COE ST. LOWER SIM R ST. T. BAY S S QUEEN . QUAY E ROBERTSON CRES. QUEEN W. S QUAY WESTIN HARBOUR CASTLE HARBOUR SQUARE PARK LANDS Controlled Access Zone Restricted Access Zone Interdiction Zone Pedestrian Walkway Building Barrier TORONTO WATERFRONT PARK TORONTO ISLAND FERRY TEMRINAL OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD 27 conference. Upon such an order being made, the RCMP, in cooperation and collaboration with other police forces, becomes "impressed" with the primary responsibility of ensuring the protection of the IPPs as well as "security for the proper functioning" of the intergovernmental conference. To that end, the FMIOA provides that the "appropriate measures, including controlling, limiting or prohibiting access to any area to the extent and in a manner that is reasonable in the circumstances" may be taken. Under section 6 of the Security Offences Act, the RCMP has the primary responsibility for investigating threats to the security of Canada as defined in section 2 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Act, and threats or criminal acts against IPPs. The key provision of the PWPA is section 3, which states that a guard appointed under the Act or a peace officer can: o equire any person entering or attempting to enter R any public work to furnish his or her name and address, to identify himself or herself and to state the purpose for which he or she desires to enter the public work o earch "any person entering or attempting to enter S a public work or a vehicle in the charge or under the control of any such person" o efuse to allow a person to enter into the R designated area. Peace officers can arrest anyone refusing to obey these requirements. There is no requirement to prove reasonable and probable grounds to believe an offence has been committed. Every person who neglects or refuses to comply with a request or direction made under this Act by a guard or peace officer, and every person found in a public work without lawful authority, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $500 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than two months, or to both. Analysis of jurisdictional legal authorities and areas of responsibility. Throughout the planning and implementation of the summit, the scope and application of legislative authorities, as well as the appropriate jurisdiction and powers of participating police forces, became an important issue. Specifically, Toronto Police Service questioned whether it had the legal authority to set up the security perimeter in the Interdiction Zone. During the planning process, it appeared as if there were differing opinions on the matter. RCMP Assistant Commissioner Alphonse MacNeil told the IPRD that common law provisions and general police practices would have supported TPS in the delivery of their security operation in Toronto. The OPP had assessed this same issue and determined that common law provisions would be satisfactory for them to deliver the security operations in their jurisdiction for the G8 in Huntsville. The OPP also had an Interdiction Zone there. He said the RCMP did not consider designating TPS personnel as special constables under the RCMP Act because TPS have jurisdiction in the City of Toronto. This could be seen as similar to policing the Molson Indy car race when it is necessary to restrict the movement of the public with fences and barricades to keep the public and the participants safe. "You have to be able to tell people they can't go on the racetrack or in other restricted areas," MacNeil said. But TPS Deputy Chief Warr, who was on the G8-G20 Executive Steering Committee and was the designated Command Lead for TPS, felt that such authority was needed. He said in an interview with the IPRD, "We could not get the authority delegated from the RCMP ... I still don't understand why." In any case, lawyers working with the City of Toronto and the Toronto Police Service decided to ask the Ontario government to pass a regulation that would extend the PWPA to the perimeter fence for the duration of the G20 summit. Such a request had to come from the Chief of Police. A lawyer with the City of Toronto together with lawyers acting for the TPS drafted a letter for Chief Blair that requested that the Lieutenant Governor in Council designate the area of, or highways within, the intended security perimeter as a public work. Chief Blair told the IPRD that although he felt, "Our common law authorities were adequate to the task," he decided to go along with the request. He felt, "It's not necessary, but it can't hurt. My impression was that it was a strongly held belief by that legal team that they really needed this." As a result, TPS requested the development of the regulation under the existing provincial statute of the Public Works Protection Act. The Act was updated by the provincial government, but the changes were not made public. 28 Common law. The RCMP and provincial and municipal police forces have general common law police powers to take all reasonable and necessary measures ancillary to their duties. In short, police members are authorized to take specific measures if they fall within a duty either imposed by law or recognized at common law and are reasonably necessary, without involving an unjustifiable exercise of the powers. Public Works Protection Act, Ontario Regulation 233/10. Ontario Regulation 233/10, which designated the G20 security perimeter as a "public work," came into force on June 21, 2010, and was revoked on June 28, 2010. The regulation had two schedules: Schedule 1 designated a large segment of the downtown core as a public works area. The public works area generally ranged from Blue Jays Way and Wellington Street West to Bay Street, and south to Lake Shore Boulevard West to Navy Wharf Court (near the west end of the Rogers Centre). Schedule 2 identified three specific areas that were to be public works for the purposes of the PWPA: Provincial authorities. The Public Works Protection Act (PWPA) establishes the statutory authority for police, peace officers, and appointed guards to exercise powers under the Act to protect public works. It was enacted in 1939 following the outbreak of the Second World War and still applies to all public works areas listed in the Act. The Act empowers police to protect public facilities and municipal public works. The definition of "public works" in section 1 of the Act is very broad. It includes "any railway, canal, highway, bridge, power works," and "any provincial and any municipal public building." It also includes "other building, place or work designated a public work." The Act also allows any other place to be designated a "public work" by the Lieutenant Governor in Council. The PWPA is used daily to protect courthouses and government buildings in Ontario. Areas of responsibility. The RCMP had the lead role for the security of the G20. On the ground, the RCMP was responsible for policing the Controlled Access Zones and the Restricted Access Zones. Toronto Police Service is the police force of jurisdiction in Toronto and was responsible for policing the Interdiction Zone and the Outer Zone. TPS was also expected to assist in protecting IPPs and dignitaries. Peel Regional Police assisted in protecting IPPs and VIPs and ensured the integrity of the Restricted Access Zone at Pearson International Airport. The RCMP was in command of the Restricted Access Zone at the airport. 1. The area within five metres of the John Street Pumping Station and the bus parking lot of the Rogers Centre to Bremner Boulevard 2. The area within five metres of 73 Navy Wharf Court to the curb of Blue Jays Way 3. The below-grade driveway located between Union Station and Front Street West and Bay Street and York Street. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD The five-metre rule. The area designated by the regulation as public works did not extend outside the boundary of the fence. Therefore, neither did police authority and relevant PWPA powers. There was no reference to designating a public works area within five metres of the large area outlined in Schedule 1. Under the regulation, the area was designated within "a line." It is incorrect to interpret the regulation as providing 29 QUEEN ST. W. authority under the Public Works Protection Act to search any person within five metres (16 feet) of the security fence. It should be noted that the PWPA restricts any person from entering or attempting to enter any public work or any approach thereto. Therefore, it may be possible for peace officers to be required to guard the public works area just outside the designated zone. For example, it may be practical and appropriate for officers to be located on the outside of the designated public works area. Therefore, officers could be reasonably situated just outside the security fence and invoke their PWPA powers. The five-metre designation, which was referred to in Schedule 2, identified three areas within Schedule 1 and five metres within each area that were designated as public works. The phrase "within" can be interpreted to mean five metres out from the boundary outlined in the regulation. This would be a reasonable or practical application of the regulation. Only the legislature can provide reasons for the five-metre designation for these three areas. It is worth noting that the five-metre "grace" area relates to lands that are walkways or parking venues; they are neither sidewalks nor streets. For example, it pertained to land near a parking lot, land behind the Rogers Centre, and a driveway below ground level in front of Union Station. Therefore, there may be practical reasons for requiring the five-metre designation in these three areas.13 According to the RCMP, the exchange of information among the command centres was facilitated through the following: the Event Management System (EMS) Situational Board (which ran twenty-four hours per day during the summits), command briefings at all command centres (two per shift), Steering Committee briefings (two per shift), Command Centre Incident Commander teleconferences (two per shift and as required), and through the use of liaison officers. While in the command centres, personnel also kept in touch with their respective agency through telephone and other means. During the G20 summit, there were various incidents where there was confusion as to the appropriate area of jurisdiction. However, RCMP Assistant Commissioner Alphonse MacNeil said, Based on RCMP (UCC and Area Command Centres) knowledge and experience, including the G8 and G20 summits Concept of Operations and the Command and Control document, each ISU partner knew their jurisdictional responsibilities. From an RCMP perspective, there were no jurisdictional issues that surfaced during the G20 summit. The RCMP After Action Report acknowledged that although the C2 decision matrix was developed in detail and signed off by the senior managers of all security agencies and although a clear, succinct document, the manner in which it would function was not clearly communicated to everyone at the different levels of command, particularly at the tactical levels. It was also found that there was a lack of common communication structure - although this concern was mitigated by the use of liaison officers and at the tactical level, the exchange of radio equipment - and sometimes divergent departmental goals. Although not in the After Action Report, at the tactical level, RCMP POU teams that were deployed and under the direction of TPS had a TPS communications liaison with them. Further, an RCMP POU liaison was deployed to the TPS MICC on Sunday, June 27, to further assist with communications between the RCMP and TPS. The Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) used a "top secret" electronic case management system, which forced additional information-processing steps and triggered logistical and communications problems. The vast majority of intelligence documents generated throughout the G20 were not "top secret" rated and would have better been dealt with in a "protected system," which would have allowed the information to be processed more quickly and communicated more broadly. RCMP Assistant Commissioner Alphonse MacNeil noted that on occasions the Unified Command Centre in Barrie had difficulty getting any information from the MICC. Map of downtown Toronto showing the designated Public Works Protection Act boundaries. QUEEN ST. E. 30 RICHMOND ST. W. SPADINA AVE. CL AR EN SHEPPARD ST. UNIVERSI WIDMER ST. PETER ST. DUNCAN ST. NELSON ST. TEMPERANCE ST. TY AVE. ADELAIDE ST. W. VICTORIA ST. YONGE ST. YORK ST. BLUE JAYS WAY NAVY WHARF CT. BREMNER BLV D. CRES. MARINER TER. ES ST. RE LAKE SHORE BLVD W. GARDINER EX PWY. CHARLOTTE ST. JOHN ST. MERCER ST. CE SQ . PEARL ST. KING ST. W. EMILY ST. WELLINGTON ST. W. WINDSOR ST. BAY ST. COLBORNE ST. BLUE JAYS WAY SIMCOE ST. CBC PIPER ST. FAIRMONT ROYAL YORK FRONT ST. W. STATION ST. UNION STATION THE LAN ADE METRO TORONTO CONVENTION CENTRE ESP CN TOWER ROGERS CENTRE BR E M NER BLVD. AIR CANADA CENTRE YORK ST. FREELAND ST. GRAND TRUNK LAK E SHO RE BLV . DW OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR LOWER SPADINA AVE. HARBOU COE ST. LOWER SIM R ST. ROBERTSON CRES. QUEEN W. S QUAY HARB OUR SQ. Public Works Area Pedestrian Walkway Traffic Flow TORONTO ISLAND FERRY TEMRINAL 13 Ontario launched an independent review of the Public Works Protection Act (PWPA) by the Honourable R. Roy McMurtry, which recommended that the Act be repealed. R.R. McMurtry, Report of the Review of the Public Works Protection Act (Toronto: Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, 2011). OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD In an interview with the IPRD, RCMP Assistant Commissioner Alphonse MacNeil said, One of the issues was in the relay of information. The Toronto Area Command Centre for the G20 communicated directly with the UCC. The MICC communicated the status of their operations to the TACC who then informed the UCC. This resulted in a potential delay in the relay of information to the Unified Command Centre. If the MICC was asking for assistance, the process was to communicate with the TACC who would then relay the message to the UCC Commander. The UCC Commander was not in direct communication with the commander in the MICC to ask if there was anything else he could do. Now those discussions took place through teleconference briefings on a regular basis with the UCC, the MICC, the TACC, the MACC (Muskoka Area Command Centre), but in a moment of crisis, you don't have the same connection and that's where I think there was some difficulty. expanding to meet the needs of the event. Staffing within an Incident Command System is based on competencies and specialties not rank. Superintendent Russell, who was the Planning Chief in the MICC and represented Toronto Police Service on the ISU, explained: From a planning perspective, I thought it was a great system. It gave us a standardized structure that most organizations, police, fire and EMS are using right across North America and it allowed us [a way] to organize ourselves that made sense. It's completely scalable, it allows you to organize yourself of logistics, your planning group, your operations group and of course we use an investigative branch that's not necessarily in that system, but it worked well that way and I believe it put us in good stead to be able to transition from planning to operations. TPS was relatively new to the Incident Command System and had just started to think about it during the Tamil protests in 2009. Before that time, TPS used the Gold-Silver-Bronze command structure, which it picked up from the U.K. Metropolitan Police, which still uses it. The Gold-Silver-Bronze structure establishes a hierarchical framework for the command and control of incidents, with the chain of command in order of rank. Under this system, the Gold commander is in overall control of the organization's resources at the incident and formulates the strategy for dealing with the incident. The Silver commander, the tactical leader, manages the strategic direction from Gold and sets it out into actions carried out by Bronze. A Bronze commander directly controls the organization's resources at the scene of the incident. One of the main differences between the systems is that positions within the Gold-Silver-Bronze structure are filled with initial consideration for rank, while the Incident Command System fills positions according to expertise in the specific area. To work well, the Incident Command System, in particular, requires people to give direction and act within the parameters of their own roles. There have to be clear chains of command. 31 One could argue that, in paramilitary environments such as policing, role assignments as opposed to rank assignments don't work well if some individuals haven't "bought into" the system. In a role-based system, a staff sergeant, for example, could be in a position of authority over a superintendent because the staff sergeant has special training in the skills needed for that role. This type of situation could cause problems if the staff sergeant defers to the superintendent because of rank, or if the superintendent doesn't take orders from the staff sergeant willingly. If the two work together on a day-to-day basis, there could be a question of consequences following the event. Superintendent Russell, the TPS Incident Command Planning Chief, explained that in "a perfect world, when you know the individual that you're dealing with, if they happen to be of a subordinate rank but have the expertise to be able to be in charge, we should be able to accept that, but I think it might be difficult for some people to do that." For the ICS to work, all the people in all the roles must understand the system and their roles in it. This kind of understanding can be gained only through training, experience, and a commitment to teamwork. to providing a safe environment for the community at large, and to: o nsure effective and efficient crowd management E during the G20 summit o nsure safety and security of summit delegations E o nsure safety and security of public and police E o rovide security equal to the threat level of the P event o acilitate conditions for peaceful protest F o inimize disruption for residents and businesses M o aintain core services. M TPS prepared numerous operational plans for policing the summit. These plans covered such areas as policing of the Toronto underground PATH network, traffic management, and the role of the public order unit and the Prisoner Processing Centre. As the MICC Planning Chief, explained: The team that I had at the end of the day would have been a team of about 70 plus officers and another, say, dozen civilians. That team wasn't given to me from the outset. That team grew as I realized through conversation with the RCMP what our responsibilities were going to be. And, every time I learned that we had a new responsibility or we had a vulnerability and we needed expertise, I had to go out and recruit that and bring it into the team. I was bringing in new people, continually, to match the demand, to match the requirement. Once we had our concept of operations in terms of the whole plan, we developed a position assignment system. We had positioned assignments for every single officer that was going to be deployed. According to Superintendent Russell, TPS determined it could field 3,000 police officers from within its own ranks, but were going to need about 2,000 more officers to reach the goal of 5,000 officers and 800 to 1,000 civilian members required for its plan to police the G20; so at the height of the 32 Incident Command System. The ISU Command and Control document defined the Incident Command System as a standardized on-scene emergency management concept specifically designed to allow its users to adopt an integrated organizational structure without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. Command and control for the G8 and G20 summits were to function in line with accepted national and provincial Incident Command System / Incident Management System principles. The Incident Command System originated in the United States, where it was first used to deal with the California wildfires of the 1970s. In Canada, the ICS was first implemented in the mid-1990s in British Columbia for use in emergency situations and disasters. The system organizes the functions, tasks, and staff within an event or incident response situation. The basic structure is made up of five functional sections: command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance. The ICS is capable of The Major Incident Command Centre. Planning. In the months leading up to the G20 summit, senior members of Toronto Police Service held numerous, regular meetings to plan for the fulfillment of its policing responsibilities associated with the summit. The groups responsible for various aspects of policing the G20 reported to the G8 / G20 Summit Planning Team, which met bi-weekly. A Steering Committee, composed of the most senior officers in TPS, but not including the Chief of Police, was given monthly updates on the status of the planning and asked to provide guidance and support on key issues. The TPS mission statement in relation to the G20 summit was expressed as a commitment OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD summit, TPS could potentially have 6,000 people engaged. TPS went first to the OPP and got officers to assist them, then reached out to other Ontario police services and eventually to police services across Canada for officers trained in public order. The RCMP's After Action Report listed the number of security personnel deployed in direct support of the G8 and G20 summits. There were 5,000 RCMP as well as 650 other municipal, regional, and provincial police, and 2,400 contracted security personnel. In addition, there were 3,000 Canadian Forces troops, 3,000 OPP officers, 740 Peel Regional Police officers, and 6,200 Toronto Police officers. One thing that TPS should have provided was a TPS liaison member to work with and support the outof-town teams. A number of services reported that the teams arrived in Toronto and were not given a mission statement or clear objectives on their deployment. In addition, concerns were expressed because TPS did not provide a clear understanding of the command and control structure. For example, there was no TPS public order unit (POU) liaison to support deployment, nor were officers given directions or maps of relevant areas. This situation likely led to a great deal of confusion and frustration among POU officers deployed to public order incidents throughout the G20 weekend. At least one out-of-town unit reported that it had to resort to getting a street map from a subway station in order to find its way around. In an interview with the IPRD, Superintendent Russell, the Planning Chief, said: The planning group literally poured their hearts into trying to get everything ready for operations. Then when they viewed the images of the event itself and all the chaos that happened within an hour's worth of time or whatever it was, that was very, very, very disheartening for probably everybody that watched that. Emotionally, that was very hard on people. We had to step back and say just a minute, let's look at what we did here, what were we trying to accomplish? And, you know what, we did prevent that summit from being interrupted, the world leaders had their day, they had their event that was safe and the perimeters were never breached either above ground or below ground. Nobody died and there have been deaths in previous events. Nobody was critically injured in this event. Some people were hurt, there's no question, but nobody was critically injured. So, from that perspective, we accomplished that. in the MICC of the TPS. This position shall have total command over all resources assigned to the G20 Summit. o anage tactical operations M o aintain operational control over all tactical M resources o upervise the execution of the Incident Action Plan S o oordinate and communicate operations with the C Operational Branch Directors o equest resources needed to implement tactical R operations in order to complete the overall objectives of the G20 summit o ake or approve changes to the planned M objectives as required during the operational period as necessary o aintain close communications with the Deputy M Incident Commander and Incident Commander o oordinate and communicate with Operational C Branch Directors o nsure branch / section logs are maintained and E Command Log is updated o articipate in meetings. P 34 Responsibilities: o btain briefings from the prior IC before taking O command o nsure objectives and strategies are passed on to E Command Staff, Branch Chiefs and Directors once command has been handed over o nsure immediate priorities are assigned E o pprove and authorize the implementation of new A incidents in the Emergency Management System (EMS) o oordinate with other agencies and their C Commanders via the Deputy IC o nsure TPS Command is informed on the status of E the G20 summit o iaise with the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) L 33 Implementation. The Major Incident Command Centre was made up of the five functional sections of an Incident Command System: command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance. It also included an investigative function. For policing the G20, the key positions in the MICC were the Incident Commander and the Operations Chief. There were five positions, each with its own subgroups, under the Operations function: Outer Zone Branch Director, Interdiction Zone Director, Traffic Branch Director, Marine Branch Director, and Special Operations Branch Director. The Special Operations Branch Director supervised the public order units. An organizational chart appears on pages 35-36. The following excerpts from Toronto Police Service's Major Incident Command Centre roles and/or responsibilities document for the G20 summit summarize the roles and responsibilities of the Incident Commander (IC), the Operations Chief, Branch Directors, and the Special Operations Director. o iaise with TPS Intelligence L o aintain a log via the scribe assigned M o articipate in meetings. P Branch Directors. The following is excerpted from the TPS's Major Incident Command Centre roles and / or responsibilities document: Branch Directors will report to the Operations Chief. Branch Directors will include the following: o pecial Operations Branch Director S o arine Branch Director M o raffic Branch Director T o Z Director I o Z Director O Operations Chief. The following is excerpted from the TPS's Major Incident Command Centre roles and/or responsibilities document: The Operations Chief will be responsible for managing all tactical operations during the G20 summit. In addition they shall be responsible for coordinating multi-jurisdictional responses to ensure the objectives of the G20 summit are accomplished. The Operational Chief's responsibilities shall include, but are not limited to, the following: Incident Commander. The following is excerpted from the TPS's Major Incident Command Centre roles and/or responsibilities document: The IC is responsible for the overall management of the event, and shall have operational command and tactical control of all units assigned to the TPS for the duration of the G20 summit. For the G20 summit, the IC will have a Deputy IC assigned to assist with Operations. During the G20 summit there shall only be one IC. The title of IC shall belong to the position occupied Responsibilities: o eport to and maintain close communication with R the IC OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Command and Control Toronto Police Service Command Model Organizational chart showing command and control role designations for the G20. Command Operations Command Lead Toronto Police Service Business Continuity Emergency Operations Centre Command Investigative Integrated Security Unit 35 Major Incident Command Centre Incident Commanders 36 Unified Command Centre (Barrie) JIG Intelligence TPS Intelligence Public Information Lead Safety and Security After Action Report Team Video Services Site Lead Area Command Centre (PIA) Deputy Incident Commanders Staging Area Site Leads Duty Desk Site Lead TAVIS Site Lead HQ/52/Delta Security Site Leads Planning Chief Logistics Chief Operations Chief Finance & Administration Chief Investigative Chief Planning Second In Command Logistics Chief Second In Command Outer Zone (OZ) Branch Director Logistics Site Leads Outer Zone (OZ) Second In Command Interdiction Zone (IZ) Second In Command Traffic Branch Second In Command Interdiction Zone (IZ) Director Traffic Branch Director Marine Branch Director Special Operations Branch Director Investigative Second In Command Court Liaison Officer Tactical Advisor (ETF) Tactical Advisor (POU) Prisoner Processing Centre Site Leads Investigative Site Leads Outer Zone (OZ) Site Leads North/South Interdiction Zone (IZ) Site Command North/South Traffic/Transit Site Command Marine Site Command ETF Site Lead POU Site Leads Investigative Site Second In Command Media Centre Westin Interdiction Zone Designated Speech Zone Transit Command Mounted Site Lead CBRNE Site Lead PDS Site Lead Emergency Medical Service Lead Toronto Fire Service Lead OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Special Operations Branch Director. The following is excerpted from the TPS's Major Incident Command Centre roles and / or responsibilities document: The Special Operations Branch Director is responsible for supporting the management of the tactical operations of the POU, Mounted and Police Dog Services, Chemical, Biological, Radiological-Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) Unit, and Emergency Task Force resources. The Special Operations Branch Director has a representative from the Emergency Medical Service and TFS working within the Branch. Additionally, support is provided by a Tactical Advisor (ETF) and Tactical Advisor (POU). The MICC structure included a TPS Intelligence Chief who reported directly to the Incident Commander. The Intelligence Chief was responsible for monitoring incoming intelligence from intelligence gathering activities / sources and dealing with members of the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) from the Integrated Security Unit (ISU) by phone. The JIG was controlled by the RCMP. officers and the documents outlined whether an event raised concerns about public order and criminal activity. 2. Business cycle meetings. Information was passed along verbally and in written form during these meetings, which took place at eight set times in the days leading up to the G20. However, events taking place on the street had an impact on these meetings. On June 26 there were only four meetings, none after 11:30 am; on the 27th there were six meetings. 37 became an autocratic structure where the Incident Commander accepted little or no input from the Operations Chief and the field experts who were placed in the MICC to provide him with support and advice. The Incident Commander performed multiple functions within the MICC and basically used his staff as dispatchers. In effect, the MICC took all independence and decision-making responsibilities away from the commanders who were placed in tactical command on the ground. The Special Operations Director explained that the plan for the MICC command structure was for the Incident Commander to be responsible for giving direction. The Special Operations Director would then give the order to the public order unit Section Commanders on the ground, and they in turn would determine the tactics to be used. The Special Operations Director said, "Unfortunately, especially on Saturday, because of everything that was going on, it was a very autocratic process between the Incident Commander and myself and the people that were on the ground." The night shift Operations Chief echoed the comments made by the Special Operations Director, advising that in his view the Major Incident Command structure did not work as effectively as it should have. He said: My job as the Operations Chief is to communicate the mission and direction of the Incident Commander to the operational commanders on the ground. The reality is, in my view, that didn't work as effectively as the Incident Command structure would suggest that it does because I didn't have a lot of independence. When we got bunted to the Saturday and Sunday night I felt myself responding to the direction of the Incident Commander and there wasn't a lot of consultation there. In many ways, I felt my role became somewhat redundant because I was just sort of passing information to the subject specialist. I really wasn't formulating any strategy in any way because I was just a conduit for information. The Operations Chief said that the operational commanders on the ground needed to have greater independence to make decisions as events developed. He said that the people in the MICC were to deal more with the "big picture" when in fact they started performing the functions of the operational commanders on the ground, and explained: When we came in on the Saturday, very quickly [Incident Commander Superintendent Fenton] identified and he told me, "Well, you control these guys and I'm controlling these ones." Again, that's counter to the Incident Command model. The Operations Chief controls all of this. The reality was, the POU had such a primary role with those events, and I had absolutely no contact with them. I'm controlling the bike people and the resources. So, that's the way it unfolded for us on the Saturday and then again for the few hours on the Sunday. I had no input with the POU or any discussions with [the Special Operations Director]. RCMP Assistant Commissioner Alphonse MacNeil said: On occasion there were challenges with communication between the MICC and the UCC, on the Saturday afternoon and evening. Even with these challenges, we were able to safely operate the motorcades and provide security to the world leaders. It was more of an issue trying to get information from the MICC on the issues surrounding public order. There was a period of time and I can't tell you how long it was, whether it was an hour or whether it was two hours, but there was a period of time where I know the UCC commanders were concerned with the fact that they couldn't get a briefing from the MICC on what their next steps would be to deal with the public order issues. Communication within the MICC and between the MICC and field officers broke down often. Public order unit tactics were also being issued by the Incident Commander. The MICC should have been monitoring the events, and the tactics 38 3. Personal briefings. Information was passed along by personal briefings at the time it became available - if, in the opinion of the intelligence officer, there was an immediate need for the Incident Commander to be aware of the information. 4. Unscheduled briefings. These meetings, which were infrequent, were driven by the events themselves. Before the summit, the TPS Intelligence Division received information from the OPP that certain individuals or groups were indicating extreme violence toward police. This information was deemed credible. Intelligence Chief. The Intelligence Chief received police intelligence and "open source information" from sources such as the media, Twitter, and the Internet as well as intelligence information from the JIG. Additionally, the Intelligence Chief received information about other police assets, such as surveillance units and undercover officers in the field. Once she received information from the various sources, she passed it along to the Incident Commander to make decisions. Information about recent and ongoing events relating to the G20 was provided to the Incident Commander in four formats: MICC command and control issues. The turning point of the Toronto Police Service response to public disorder happened in the early evening of June 26, 2010, just before the night shift Incident Commander took command of the Major Incident Command Centre. It occurred at a meeting that was attended by both day and night shift Incident Commanders, the Chief of Police, Deputy Chief Warr, and other TPS senior officers. Deputy Chief Warr instructed the night shift Incident Commander to "take back the streets" because the City of Toronto had experienced extraordinary public disorder and damage earlier that day. As a result of the actions that the night shift Incident Commander took from that point on, the operation of the MICC during the night shifts on Saturday and Sunday became dysfunctional. The MICC essentially 1 Intelligence documents. These documents, sent by email multiple times each day, spoke in detail to events that had occurred in the recent past and events that would occur in the near future. Future events were assessed by intelligence OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD should have been decided by the on-ground POU commander and discussed and reviewed with the MICC and not the other way around. On the ground, POU commanders were confused about what teams they were responsible for, since the MICC would pull and move teams without advising the on-ground POU commander. This in turn caused confusion between teams, because they would be supporting each other and then be moved by the MICC. During the evening of June 26, an OPP public order unit commander was on Queen Street West, east of Spadina Avenue, where his team was protecting a police cruiser that had been burned out and another that had been substantially damaged. He said it was conveyed to him that the area of the police vehicles was a crime scene. He said that his team cleared everyone out of the area and they held one end of the block while another public order team held the crowd at Queen Street West and Peter Street. The commander told the OIPRD that "all of a sudden" a crowd of people were coming toward his team from the rear. When he looked to the east, the public order unit that was holding the people at Queen and Peter was gone. He explained that you never want to be a public order unit where you're facing in one direction and have a crowd coming toward your back, because there is no protection. The commander said that, as a result of this development, they split up their team and eight to 10 of them "peeled off to face the oncoming crowd." He said the crowd obeyed their directions to move back, and they were able to clear the street again. He said another public order team arrived and kept the crowd to the east of the damaged police cruisers. The OPP public order commander said that as they proceeded back to their unit, the same thing occurred, with the public order unit to their east leaving the area without any communication that they were leaving. He stated he was "dumbfounded" and upset that this happened a second time. He said the crowd approached them again, but they were more "unruly." He reported that the damaged police cruiser that was not already burned was set on fire. A decision was made that they could not hold the scene any longer, and they were directed to retreat southbound to the area of Richmond Street. During the Saturday evening, there appeared to be confusion in the MICC about when and where the long-range acoustic device (LRAD) was actually deployed. The night shift Incident Commander seemed to believe it was at Queen's Park at about 7:00 pm. In fact, it was used at 5:48 pm, under the authorization of the day shift Incident Commander. The OPP's public order unit Group 7 commander said that when he arrived at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue on June 27, the MICC placed him in charge of the scene - but in reality, he "had no command of the situation." He stated that he believed command and control was in the hands of the MICC. He explained that he did not overhear any conversations on the police radio about what the other public order units were doing, and that the next thing he knew the crowd was being pushed toward his location by the other POUs. He said that these POUs, which came west on Queen Street, cut across his formation and created another box within a box. He estimated that three boxes appeared at one time, and said it was very confusing. He emphasized that it was "abundantly clear" to him throughout the event that he did not have command and control of the scene. He explained that the tactical options he requested at the scene were denied. He said the normal procedure would be that the MICC would provide directions on what needed to be done, and that the person in command on the ground would decide on how to get it done. The night shift Operations Chief reported that there were times when intelligence information was given directly to the Incident Commander and he was not made aware of this information. He said that the intelligence information needed to be given to the whole command team to ensure correct assessment of it and allow for better consultation. The night shift Operations Chief stated that he believed if "we had a better process of consultation and discussion, we might have been able to avoid Queen and Spadina." 39 The night shift Incident Commander's tactic for "taking back the streets" was to order the boxing-in and, in some cases, the mass arrests of people without taking into consideration that there might be legitimate protesters or people innocently caught up in the containment. During his shifts on Saturday and Sunday, Incident Commander Superintendent Fenton ordered protesters to be "blocked in" or "boxed in", asked about, or had Operations request it be done on at least 10 separate occasions: on Saturday at Adelaide and Bay, at Queen's Park, in the Queen Street West area, in the financial district, on The Esplanade, and at River and Queen; on Sunday just after midnight at Queen and Spadina, and outside the Prisoner Processing Centre on Eastern Avenue, in the late afternoon at Queen and Spadina, and in the evening at Queen and Peter. During his interview and in his statement to the OIPRD, the night shift Incident Commander continually referred to people he was directing to be detained as "protesters / terrorists," which is disconcerting. When he referred to those who caused damage on Yonge Street and elsewhere in Toronto, he called them "terrorists." demonstrations, escort planned marches, and gather intelligence. They were also to assist with crowd control, traffic control, and security of identified sites. CRU bicycle officers worked closely with public order units to provide rapid response to any unplanned protests, building takeovers, and snake marches. Foot patrol. Foot patrol officers worked in teams, were responsible for security of identified sites, and provided a police presence to deter illegal activity. They had the flexibility to be redeployed by the Incident Commander to assist with crowd management. 40 Rapid response teams. The rapid response team (RRT) were teams of plainclothes police officers who worked to identify, isolate, and extract individuals committing criminal acts within peaceful demonstrations. TAVIS (Toronto anti-violence intervention strategy) rapid response teams. These officers, in their marked cars, were deployed throughout the downtown core to provide highly visible, proactive patrols and assistance with crowd control. Police resources at the G20. Prior to the G20, the TPS contracted a private service provider to develop an electronic software application to manage and track officers from the TPS and other police services working with them. This software was to track each officer as they went on and off shift, their assignment and the equipment assigned to them, so the MICC would know what resources they had on the ground at any given time. However, there were problems with the system that could not be worked out by the time the G20 started, and planners had to resort to a more manual system for keeping track of police resources. Emergency Task Force. Emergency Task Force (ETF) officers were responsible for providing an immediate response to all incidents where there was a potential for violence and lethal confrontation outside the Controlled Access and Restricted Zones, and for responding to all possible incidents where there was a possibility of explosives or an explosive device. Hand-off teams. Community response unit and mobile units. The community response unit (CRU) bicycle officers and the mobile units, in vehicles, were deployed to proactively patrol streets, monitor planned protest The hand-off team (HOT) was tasked with prisoner control and management of arrested parties by members of the POU. This team received prisoners outside the "hot zone" in a safe location. The arresting officer would hand off the prisoner and all required information relating to the arrest to the HOT OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD team. The HOT team was responsible for removing and transporting arrested people to the Prisoner Processing Centre. June 26, 2010, his team worked a 22-hour day and many of the officers had problems with dehydration. He reported that at least three or four officers went to the hospital to be treated for dehydration. The London Police Service public order Commander said that his public order unit worked 15- to 18-hour days on June 25, 26, and 27. He stated that they wore their "hard tac" equipment from Friday evening through to Sunday evening. He said it was a very warm and humid weekend and reported that a number of his officers went down with dehydration. The London Police Service public order unit Section Commander described "hard tac" as looking almost like a combination of hockey equipment and football equipment. He explained that the officer's entire body is covered in a fire-retardant layer and body armour that is very hot and bulky, and weighs approximately 100 pounds. One issue for the public order units was the mobility of the crowd and individuals who were causing the damage around the city. The London public order unit Commander explained that his team would be directed to an intersection for crowd control and, once they arrived and set up, the group of people at the intersection would run. His team would then be dispatched to another intersection "five blocks away." He said they were constantly chasing the crowd; he was not sure exactly where he was going, and the members of his team were continually getting on and off a coach bus. Some of the public order commanders from outside Toronto told the OIPRD that they did not have a TPS liaison officer to assist them in getting around the city. One OPP public order unit Section Commander said when his team arrived at the G20 on June 26, it was dispatched to Queen's Park. He said he asked for a liaison officer and a briefing on what was occurring. He was not provided with a liaison officer or any further information and was simply directed to Queen's Park. After his team completed its assignment at Queen's Park, it was immediately dispatched to another location in downtown Toronto. The OPP public order unit Commander again asked for a liaison officer, but he did not receive one and relied on directions that were given to him on where to go. Another OPP public order unit Section Commander had a similar experience. He said that his team was part of a larger public order unit, and it had only one liaison officer. He said he asked a number of times for his own dedicated liaison officer, but the request went unanswered for the entire G20 summit. He said that one of his team members picked up a rudimentary map from a "subway box" to assist them with getting around the city. All terrain vehicle patrol team. The all terrain vehicle (ATV) team patrolled off-road areas in downtown Toronto. 41 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) Team. These officers were responsible for responding to potential chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosives events. 42 Public order units. Public order units (POUs) are primarily deployed in situations involving large public gatherings and involve offences against the public order, rather than offences against persons or property. The POUs were responsible for providing, securing, and maintaining the public peace during the summit and lending extra support to police services. During the G20, the public order response was made up of public order unit officers from Toronto, York Region, Durham Region, Barrie, Hamilton, London, Sudbury, Waterloo, Calgary, Edmonton, Montreal, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland and Labrador police services, as well as the OPP. The RCMP public order units were available and present throughout the weekend. TPS also had a mounted unit in support of the POU to help deal with crowd management issues. The decision to deploy POU rested with the Incident Commander. However, once the POU was deployed, all subsequent commands and orders came from the Specialized Operations Director and tactics rested with the Public Order Section Lead. Public order working environment The public order officers who were policing the G20 summit worked extended shifts to meet the policing needs, and extreme demands were placed on them during the G20 summit. A York Regional Police public order unit Section Commander said that, on OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Recommendations . 43 o he Toronto Police Service (TPS) should develop T policies and procedures regarding any agreements entered into with other police services for any future integrated project, regardless of its size. These policies and procedures should be developed early in the planning process. The focus must be on the authority, structure, roles, strategic, operational, and tactical processes, and implementation. o or any future integrated security projects, police F services must contemplate that later disclosure of documents, records, and protocols will be required. Disclosure should be incorporated into the planning process. o ecause of the nature of civilian protests, officers' B movements must be fluid. The Toronto Police Service and all police services should develop a more robust, coordinated, and effective means to track officer movements. This ability is crucial for officer safety and for the investigation of criminal activity, as well as questions about police conduct. o o ensure that officers on the ground can T communicate with each other and with the command centre effectively, police services should review the failures of communication encountered during the G20 summit. Police services should work through the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police to ensure that a consistent and workable communication system is in place for all future large-scale events and joint projects. o f, in future, the Toronto Police Service polices I a large event using the Incident Command Management System, it should ensure that officers in charge of the command system are well trained in managing large-scale protests and it should train all those working in the command system, especially regarding their roles and responsibilities. o ntario police services should work through O the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police to review the use of the Incident Command Management System and develop a coordinated approach and consistent policies and procedures throughout Ontario for all police services. These procedures should include ongoing training and implementation for integrated or joint projects. o f multiple police services are to work together I under the same Incident Command Management System structure, training should be a cooperative effort. Those who will be working together in the system should train together. o olice services that have public order units should P look into developing POU uniforms to permit the officers enough mobility to allow them to respond quickly. The existing hard tac gear does not permit officers to move with sufficient agility. It should be possible to develop a uniform that offers much of the protection of hard tac while providing the mobility of soft tac. Part Two: Protest and Response . 44 OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Chapter 3: Saturday June 26 to Early Sunday June 27, 2010 . 3 OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD 46 OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR CHAPTER 3 Saturday June 26 to Early Sunday June 27, 2010. 48 47 Sources for this timeline include police closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras, Major Incident Command Centre (MICC) scribe notes, police officer statements and interviews, police officer notes, statements and interviews from demonstrators and observers, media reports, and social media. On Saturday, June 26, the Canadian Labour Congress, the Ontario Federation of Labour, Council of Canadians, Greenpeace, Oxfam, Canadian Peace Alliance, community groups, and various nongovernmental organizations organized the "People First" demonstration. The planned route had been shared with police: south from Queen's Park on University Avenue to Queen Street; west on Queen to Spadina Avenue; north on Spadina to College Street; and east on College to end at Queen's Park. Most people were marching for a diverse array of social causes. However, in interviews, police said they had information that the march would be infiltrated by potentially violent activists; a group using Black Bloc tactics was going to try to get to the fence via University Avenue and Queen Street, and failing that via one of the other southbound streets nearby. The Southern Ontario Anarchist Resistance (SOAR) group coordinated a second demonstration, called "Get Off the Fence," to take place during the Canadian Labour Congress march. SOAR posted information about its "actions" on anarchist information websites beginning in May 2010. Its news release said that SOAR was calling for three actions between the afternoon of Saturday, June 26, and the evening of June 27. Regarding the "Get off the Fence" action, it said: On Saturday, June 26th, we will form an anticolonial, anti-capitalist presence to walk in solidarity with the big People First march, before continuing on towards the fence to confront the police state and Toronto's corporate culture. This action will be militant and confrontational, seeking to humiliate the security apparatus and make Toronto's elites regret letting the dang G20 in here. Meet by 1 pm at the Northeast corner of College and University. Saturday Night Fever Later, from late on the 26th 'till dawn on the 27th, come join us for a roaming street party! We will dance through the streets of Toronto to the music of guerrilla DJs and renegade bands, taking back space from the corporate spectacle that this city has become. Autonomous Direct Action all day Sunday, we are calling for diverse and creative actions aimed to disrupt business-as-usual. As leaders of the G20 nations make their final deliberations, let's demonstrate the diversity of our discontent. In interviews, police said they had information that anarchists would engage them in various ways to get them to pull out or divert officers so the anarchists could get to the fence. Police reported that they had information that anarchists would have Molotov cocktails and super-soaker water guns that were going to be used as flame launchers. Police had observed people in the downtown area with large backpacks, makeshift weapons, protective clothing, ropes, and grappling hooks. For police, the focus was to stop demonstrators from reaching the fence. Day shift Incident Commander Superintendent Ferguson said in an interview, "The first step in our mission statement is to protect the summit." RCMP officers were stationed south of King Street in the Interdiction Zone around the perimeter fence and at the U.S. consulate on University Avenue. Bicycle officers were deployed to stay with the march; and public order officers were ordered to the University and Spadina area to form a line all along Richmond Street to stop protesters from going any farther south. Police had bicycle and foot patrol officers all along the march route. In addition, there were 10 horses at University and Richmond, and 10 on Spadina Avenue. Part of the police plan for the day included motorcycle officers to escort public order officers around because, in their heavy equipment, they couldn't easily move distances. However, most of the motorcycles were sent to escort motorcades of dignitaries from the G8 summit to Toronto because the weather in Huntsville had closed in, and the helicopters that were originally scheduled to take dignitaries from Huntsville to Toronto couldn't fly. During the day the weather cleared and helicopters were used, but by that time the motorcycles had already left Toronto. On Friday night, Toronto Police Service (TPS) requested public order units from the G8 in Huntsville to come to Toronto to support officers on the ground. The York Regional Police (YRP) public order unit along with one team from Sudbury and three teams from the OPP public order unit left Huntsville for Toronto at 5 a. . m OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD 49 By the time the march started, the day shift Incident Commander in the Major Incident Command Centre (MICC) had officially requested the long-range acoustic device (LRAD) and the water cannon. He advised his superiors that the LRAD would be used to warn protesters if they crossed south at Queen Street; that requests to use tear gas could be expected if the police line failed at Richmond; and that, if protesters reached the fence, the water cannon would be deployed. According to police documents, officers made a number of "targeted" arrests of known anarchists and their supporters at various addresses in central Toronto in the morning hours. Police also arrested several people with gas masks and weapons including chains and a knife, in and around Union Station. At noon, a Somali community demonstration originating at Bloor and St. George street marched south to Queen's Park, where about 50 members of the group continued south to University Avenue and Armoury Street, where closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras showed that they joined with approximately 100 people from the Coalition to Stop the War and the Canadian Peace Alliance groups. Police intelligence reports coming into the MICC reported 200 to 300 people wearing black clothes and red bandanas heading toward Queen's Park, and about 50 people changing into black clothes near the statue at the front of Queen's Park. There were also police reports of people in the crowd having weapons. At about 1:30 pm, the march, an estimated 7,000 to 9,000 strong, set out from Queen's Park south on University Avenue. A line of police officers with bicycles walked in front of the march, and bicycle officers rode along one side of the marchers. It was raining lightly. CCTV cameras showed people dressed in black in the middle and at the back of the crowd. Their numbers grew. Some put on gas masks, others began pulling bandanas and balaclavas over their faces, and some took the signs off their sticks. Public order units were deployed to the U.S. consulate to reinforce police there and, as a result, the march bottlenecked as it passed the consulate. At 1:43 pm, the Incident Commander ordered the Outer Zone Commander not to use vehicles as blocks. At 1:57 pm, the demonstration reached University and Queen and turned westbound on Queen Street. The march was strung out along the route and was followed by police on foot, two police cruisers (766, 3251) then a school bus and a CP24 TV van followed by two wheel transit vans, and finally, another two police cruisers (6903, 6904). The protest was still peaceful. POU officers were ordered not to confront people in black. Just after 2 pm, the TTC closed the subway between St. Patrick Station and Dundas Station. Shortly after that, GO Transit suspended train operations for the day and Union Station was closed at the request of police. Days earlier, VIA Rail announced that it had moved its Union Station operation to suburban locations to avoid the downtown core during the G20 weekend. At 2:08 pm, a CCTV camera at Queen and Duncan streets showed black-hooded protesters sprinting alongside the march, heading west, pursued by what appeared to be media camera operators. Another group of about 100 black-dressed protesters had bunched up and surrounded themselves with banners near the end of the main march. Police reported demonstrators confronting blackclad protesters. At Simcoe and Richmond streets protesters stood toe to toe with officers in full riot gear. The chants and shouts and the sound of vuvuzelas grew louder. At 2:28 pm, the CCTV camera at Queen and John streets showed the group dressed in black that was at the rear of the march moving through the intersection and turning south on John. These protesters breached the police line on Queen and were stopped by POU officers at Richmond Street. A CCTV camera at Richmond and John showed protesters in black engaging with police; hitting out at them with sticks from banners; and throwing objects, including water bottles, at them. Police could be seen taking sticks and poles from protesters and pushing them back. Some police officers could be seen hitting out at protesters with batons. Meanwhile, also at 2:28 pm, the MICC was advised that the Canadian Prime Minister and the German President were inbound for the summit meetings at Metro Toronto Convention Centre - their helicopters landing in 10 minutes. By 2:36 pm, the CCTV camera at Queen and John showed the black-hooded protesters and their followers moving away from the police line and rejoining the main march on Queen toward Spadina. At 2:37 pm, Incident Command noted that while the front of the march moved north on Spadina, a number of people dressed in black stopped and waited on the corner of Queen Street and Spadina Avenue. At 2:39 pm, at Queen and Spadina, public order units were confronted by protesters. About 100 blackdressed protesters, some holding sticks, engaged police; almost 1,000 other protesters stood behind them, chanting and shouting. Police officers put on their helmets to shield themselves from the pieces of wood, batteries, stones, vegetables, golf balls, and open and unopened bottles of urine that were being thrown at them. The horses in the mounted unit that had moved in behind police to back up their line were hit with golf balls. By 2:40 pm, the black-hooded group at the rear of the march had moved through the Queen and Peter intersection. At 2:56 pm, an OPP public order unit at Richmond and Spadina radioed the MICC to request assistance, saying it was being overwhelmed. 50 3 pm-4 pm . Saturday, June 26, 12 noon-2 pm . At 12:30 pm, people began gathering on the grounds of Queen's Park for the "People First" demonstration. At 1 pm, police reported two people were arrested with incendiary devices outside a Royal Bank branch at University Avenue and Dundas Street. At 1:15 pm, a CCTV camera at University Avenue and Armoury Street showed the group from University and Armoury marching north on University Avenue to Queen's Park. At 1:19 pm, Toronto Police Chief Blair visited the Major Incident Command Centre and met briefly with the day shift Incident Commander Superintendent Ferguson on the floor. By 3 pm, the main body of the march, accompanied by bicycle officers, had turned north on Spadina and was on its way back to Queen's Park without incident. At this same time, the end of the march and police cruisers 3251 and 766 had just passed the CCTV camera at Queen and Peter streets. At 3:03 pm, a CCTV camera at Queen and Peter showed smoke in the crowd somewhere between Peter and Spadina. Someone in the middle of the crowd had lit a flare or other incendiary device that gave off a lot of smoke. Police on the line put on gas masks and stood shoulder to shoulder with their shields and sticks out. Some protesters started putting on gas masks. The Incident Commander ordered all bicycle officers and "flat hats" (officers without riot helmets) out of the Queen and Spadina area. He made a request for more OPP public order unit reinforcements to come to Toronto from Huntsville. 2 pm-3 pm . By 2 pm, the rear of the march had left Queen's Park. By that time, groups of people dressed in black had started breaking off from the march - at Dundas Street and at Armoury Street - running down the side streets and south toward the police line at Richmond. Police said they spotted what they called "Black Block medics" at King Street and University Avenue. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD The end of the march became stalled on Queen Street, just past Peter. The CCTV camera lost sight of the two forward cruisers, while the CP24 van, school bus, wheel transit vans, and last two police cars waited at Peter Street. At Queen and Spadina, about 100 black-dressed protesters bunched up and sprinted back east on Queen. Other protesters split off from the main group to follow the route of these protesters. Officers were ordered to ensure all units were in gas masks and not to engage the crowd. One of the demonstrators told the OIPRD: We joined the main protest at Queen and University. Once the entire march got to Queen and Spadina, everything stopped. Things changed a little bit. Some people went north on Spadina and east on Queen. We went east on Queen and then things started to get kind of bizarre. At 3:11 pm, the CCTV camera at Queen and Peter showed a group of people in black running back east, weaving through the crowd. As the group approached the vehicles at the end of the march, the uniformed police officers, who were walking at the end of the march, appeared to form a line in front of one of the two backup cruisers and the CP24 van, which then backed up and turned north on Beverley Street. The other vehicles stayed where they were, with officers standing next to them. At 3:12 pm, some of the black-dressed protesters who were part of the group running east on Queen Street attacked cruiser 766, which was following at the end of the march. Sticks and rocks shattered the windows and lights. There was an officer trapped inside. Staff Sergeant Graham Queen was the officer trapped in cruiser 766. He described his experience to OIPRD investigators: The parade had stopped for about 10 minutes and then started to reverse their field. At that time I was outside my vehicle talking to [the officer driving cruiser 3251]. At that time I decide to go to my car, I was going to reverse the car 51 to give the parade a bit more room because they were starting to come toward the car. As I sat in the car, black bloc members exited the parade and attacked me in my vehicle. One gentleman jumped on top of the windshield of my car, smashed the windshield in. Other people came up beside the car and started smashing the windows of the vehicle, while I was inside the vehicle. I tried to start the car - I did start the car and tried to move away but I wasn't able to see out of any of my mirrors. The mirrors were broken or hanging down, so I turned the car back off. At that time somebody on my left side, he had smashed the window, and then he smashed the back of my head with a pole. I was fairly disoriented for a while there. Eventually I was removed from the vehicle. Once I got out of the car, we were completely surrounded by a large group of people who were part of the parade. They were chanting, "whose streets, our streets" - that was the main chant they were chanting, they were throwing rocks at us, throwing bottles, urine, threatening to harm us and smash our cars. [The officer driving cruiser 3251] had removed himself from the area. I was in the car but he never made it to his car. A smaller group of officers surrounded my car to get me out then we made a small circle of officers around the two cars. It took about 20 minutes before the public order unit was able to come in and rescue us from that situation. Mine was attacked first and damaged, [the other officer's] was left - it was perfectly intact. Originally we were going to get both those cars taken out. At the last minute the Inspector from York Region public order unit was told to leave the cars. I don't know why. That decision was made at a higher level than myself. Once we pulled back from the cars then the crowd just swarmed the cars, they kicked and smashed it. I lost some very important property in the car. A call to assist police officers at 415 Queen St. W. was put over the police radio. At 3:13 pm, CCTV footage showed police cruisers and unmarked vans arriving on Queen from Beverley Street. The vehicles stopped at that intersection, and the officers got out of the vehicles. They were joined by more police vehicles and bicycle officers who arrived from the east of Queen. In all, there were at least 10 police vehicles in the intersection. Likely, they were responding to the officer assist call. At the same time, the front-leading group of about 50 protesters in black slowed when it had passed the end of the march and waited for others to catch up. Members of this group then linked arms and continued east. At 3:15 pm, the protesters led by people in black turned north on Soho Street, but within minutes reversed their course and ran back to Queen; there they were met by more protesters, who had also left the main body of the march to follow them. The crowd surged east. The CP24 van resumed following the crowd. At about the same time, bicycle officers arrived at 415 Queen St. W. and set up a perimeter around the cruiser. The crowd booed and yelled at the officers, and some threw objects. The bicycle officers attempted to move the crowd back, shouting at them to "back off." Police moved forward using their bicycles to push the protesters back. At this point they made a request for assistance from the public order unit. At 3:19 pm, as this crowd approached, the officers at Queen and Beverley got back into their vehicles and left, going north on Beverley. The crowd continued east. CCTV cameras showed protesters throwing rocks, overturning mailboxes, breaking windows, and attempting to smash storefronts and ATMs as they ran down Queen Street. At 3:29 pm, Operations in the MICC noted that Command Lead Deputy Chief Warr advised he didn't want protesters on Yonge Street. Operations advised that public order units couldn't get there in time; they would stay on the buses. To move public order units around, police had to use vans driven by police officers and charter buses driven by civilians that continually got caught in traffic that was gridlocked because of the demonstration. Civilian drivers were not authorized to drive through red lights or break traffic rules, and the motorcycle officers who would close intersections to escort the buses through had left Toronto to escort motorcades from the G8. The Special Operations Director said in an interview: The intelligence all weekend was that they were going to come and destroy Yonge Street at some point in time, it wasn't supposed to be until Saturday night at 6 pm. So, they decided to go to plan B early in the game, which meant they went southbound on Bay Street and started that activity. At 3:33 pm, Operations in Incident Command reported all radio channels down except for POU. One of the challenges Incident Command reported facing that day involved the radios. Officers talked at the same time, which incapacitated the radio system. In addition, new radio equipment, which the officers had not used before, was issued for the event. These radios were designed with extension microphones that sat on the shoulder. The mics had an emergency button that, when pushed, sounded a tone and locked the operator into the radio system - but locked everybody else out. When officers hit the button at the same time they would lock each other out and, in the MICC, the tones could be heard but no one could communicate with the officers. At 3:35, Operations reported radio channels were back up. Operations also reported the public order units were "all done!" and put a call out for any public order unit that was not engaged at an intersection and could be freed up. The CCTV camera at Queen and Bay showed the crowd turning south on Bay and people in black breaking the Starbucks window. By this time, public order officers were engaged with the crowd at almost every intersection on Queen between Spadina and University. At 3:35 pm, the OPP public order unit was ordered to assist officers trapped at 415 Queen St. W. At Queen and Peter, York Regional Police POU sent in 52 OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD its section along with Sudbury and two of the three OPP units to push the crowd back in an attempt to get the cruisers and the officers out. A YRP staff sergeant said in an interview: Trying to push cars on the road with all those protesters would have taken a long time. We had already been fully hard tac'ed in gas masks for an hour and 20 minutes. People were starting to go down. We had a full-time tactical medic assigned to us making sure people were okay. We had to make a choice for the welfare of our folks or a couple of police cruisers. We brought out our officers; we dragged back one officer who had just rag-dolled. Another was dragged back and the medics were trying to get an IV in his arm and there's blood squirting all over the place. Shotguns and keys were removed from the vehicles, and the Toronto officers just melded in behind the protection of the POU and were escorted out. At 3:36 pm, Operations in the MICC made a call for any public order units that were not engaged to go to Front Street to be deployed at King and Bay. MICC operations scribe notes also indicated: "destroying police car - King / Bay, officer in car." At 3:36 pm, as the crowd moved south on Bay Street, CCTV cameras at the King and Bay intersection showed police cruiser 768 approaching the Bay and King intersection eastbound. The cruiser pulled into the westbound traffic lane and made a wide right turn, stopping traffic. The lights on top of the car did not appear to be on. The cruiser stopped for a few seconds in the intersection southbound on Bay Street, while two officers on foot removed traffic cones that were set up to block traffic south and let the cruiser through. Cruiser 768 departed southbound on Bay Street, made a U-turn, and parked facing north on the west side of Bay, south of King. This cruiser was followed closely by two police cruisers (TAV 59 and TAV 56) with lights flashing and an unmarked van; all pulled into the intersection eastbound at King and Bay and stopped diagonally northwest to southeast across the intersection. They were followed by two other cruisers (TAV 58 and 730) and another unmarked van that stopped on the west side of the intersection in the westbound lane. As soon as the police vehicles stopped, all 12 officers immediately got out of their vehicles, leaving the flashing lights on. At 3:37:12, two police motorcycles that had joined the front of the march at Bay and Richmond staying half a block ahead of the southbound crowd, crossed King Street moving between the stopped police vehicles to go south on Bay, then turned west on Wellington. By 3:37:28, the officers who had got out of the cruisers had put on helmets and were walking to the south side of the intersection. They appeared unhurried. They did not open the trunks of the vehicles. The officer from cruiser 768 (on Bay south of King) got out of the car and appeared (on CCTV) to issue directions to the other officers. As the officers moved away from the vehicles, half a dozen black-dressed protesters went south through the intersection, passing between the vehicles and officers. At 3:38:14, the main crowd reached the intersection. At 3:38:30, protesters dressed in black hammered on the windows of the empty cruiser in the middle of the intersection (TAV 56). Some protesters got up on the car and jumped up and down on the roof. Protesters dressed in black and in regular clothes surrounded both empty TAVIS (Toronto anti-violence intervention strategy) cars (TAV 56 and TAV 59), while people with cameras snapped photos of the action. Most of the crowd stopped on the north side of the intersection, while some went through south on Bay. At 3:39 pm, the officer from cruiser 768, which was parked facing north on Bay Street south of King, got back in the car and reversed back to Wellington. In an interview with the OIPRD, Command Lead Deputy Chief Warr had this to say about the police cruisers at King and Bay: 53 Regarding the TAVIS officers that came down and ended up getting caught: they were responding to a general call out for assistance. And when that happens, normally the closest officers respond. So I think they were doing their normal thing, and they were driving into a situation they had no idea what was going on. They weren't part of the G20 deployment. They were the Rapid Response team for other things. They hadn't been directed down there by the Incident Commander, they responded to that general call, because a general call for assisting goes out across the system. At 3:39 pm, CCTV cameras showed that two more cruisers arrived at King and Bay from the east and stopped side by side. Four uniformed officers got out of these cars and attempted to push protesters away from the trapped cruisers with their batons. They were, perhaps, responding to the officer assist call. When objects were thrown at them, they retreated to their cars to get helmets. A third cruiser arrived on the scene from the east, and together the six officers attempted to approach the cars but retreated as a group of eight POU officers in full riot gear arrived on foot from the east. Another small group of POU officers arrived on foot from the south. Three more cruisers arrived from the east. The officers from these cruisers, along with the POU officers, formed a line on the east side of the intersection. People in the crowd threw objects at them, but the officers did not engage the crowd. Protesters continued to attack the two TAVIS cars in the intersection, jumping on them and breaking the windows with sticks and other objects. Other protesters carried on marching south on King for another half a block before turning around and heading back north to the intersection of King and Bay. The CCTV camera did not show any police on Bay Street south of King to Wellington, where the Interdiction Zone and the perimeter fence were. RCMP officers were inside the perimeter of the fence. At 3:40 pm, Operations ordered horse-mounted officers across Wellington from Windsor Street to Bay. Also at 3:40 pm, CCTV cameras showed that four police cruisers and unmarked vehicles arrived on King Street from the west and pulled up behind the parked police cars. At 3:41 pm, the Incident Commander ordered Outer Zone command to get all TAVIS officers out of King and Bay. At 3:42 pm, CCTV cameras showed that more than a dozen officers got out of the cars that arrived from the west. Some directed traffic to turn around and leave the scene westbound. Other officers lined up in front of their cruisers and unmarked vehicles and watched the crowd in the intersection. The crowd regrouped on the north side of King and Bay. There appeared to be indecision about where to go from there. At 3:43 pm, a group carrying red flags marched south again through the intersection. At 3:44 pm, at Adelaide and Bay, CCTV cameras showed that several people changed from black to plain clothes, surrounded and protected by people dressed in bright pink. Also at 3:44 pm, another CCTV camera showed a group of protesters, some in black and some not, starting to rock TAV 56 and trying to turn it over. At 3:45, someone started a fire inside the car. One protester pulled a yellow police vest and two police caps from inside the car. Within seconds, the car was ablaze. People milled around it taking photos. At 3:46 pm, the line of POU officers slowly moved back toward the east and the six cruisers retreated a block to the east. Operations reported that all TAVIS officers were accounted for. An RCMP public order unit marched from the fence at Wellington and Bay half a block north. The protesters who had marched south of the intersection turned back north to join the large group that stood on the north side of the intersection. As they went back through the intersection, protesters attacked the other two marked police cars on the west side of the intersection, kicking them, breaking the windows, and looting things from inside the cars (TAV 58 and 730). 54 OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD At 3:47 pm, CCTV cameras showed that mounted police units arrived on the scene from the west. CRU (bicycle) officers arrived at 3:48 pm. At 3:49 pm, there were explosions from the burning car. The crowd began to run eastbound on King toward Yonge Street. Others in the crowd at King and Bay turned back north and then went east on Adelaide toward Yonge Street. As the police cruiser burned, at least eight small explosions went off inside it. One protester told the OIPRD: Once the march got to Bay Street, we started going down Bay Street and that's when you have all the burning police cars and everything. And, at that point, we were pretty freaked out but, at the same time, we didn't want to leave the crowd because we saw the amount of police that were around elsewhere and we didn't really know what was going to happen if we left the crowd because we heard rumours while we were in the crowd of, "Oh, be careful." Police have been really aggressive in the last couple days - strangely aggressive in the last couple days. At 3:49 pm, Incident Command issued an assist officer call to Adelaide and Yonge. A CCTV camera at Adelaide and Bay showed officers running to the south side of Adelaide near Yonge to deal with an incident. The shadows did not allow a clear view. At 3:51 pm, Incident Command ordered all non-POU officers out of the King and Yonge area, and ordered POU Lima Section to go up Yonge Street. Public order officers backed up King Street ahead of protesters moving east. At 3:52 pm, a CCTV camera at Yonge and King showed the crowd turning north on Yonge led by about 100 people dressed in black. Protesters stopped at the intersection of Yonge and Adelaide as two traffic police attempted to turn traffic back north on Yonge. More protesters coming east on Adelaide joined the group. When the light turned green, protesters moved through the intersection, vehicles made U-turns, and the traffic police moved back through traffic, waving vehicles off the road. The officers moved to the west side of the street and out of CCTV range. At 3:52 pm, police estimated there were about 1,000 protesters going north on Yonge. People in black were in the lead, running and smashing windows as they went. At 3:55 pm, the Incident Commander ordered all officers off Yonge Street. A minute later he ordered dispatchers to put over the police radio band "all police constables [non-public order units] off Yonge Street." At 4:05 pm, Command Lead Deputy Chief Warr advised that he wanted "the crowd shut down now." Operations reported they were working on getting resources. At 4:08 pm, the Incident Commander ordered anyone not directly involved in command to leave the MICC floor. At 4:08 pm, Incident Command advised that [U.S. first lady] Mrs. [Michelle] Obama was on the move, incoming to Toronto. At 4:09 pm, the front of the protest march reached the northeast side of Yonge and Dundas, where black-dressed protesters broke windows in the Adidas and Rogers stores. They continued north on Yonge, breaking windows in storefronts as they went. At 4:09 pm, officers reported being under attack at 415 Queen St. W. and asked for assistance. The Incident Commander ordered the Outer Zone Deputy Director to get the officers out. At 4:09 pm, Operations in the MICC reported radios down and that officers were under attack and calling for assistance. At 4:12 pm, officers in the field reported that the officer who called for assistance was okay. At 4:15 pm, another crowd of protesters began to form on Queen Street West. Most in this group were dressed in ordinary clothes. At 4:15 pm, Incident Command ordered the mounted unit to go curb-to-curb northbound on Yonge from Colborne Street. The Outer Zone Deputy Director informed the Incident Commander that the Outer Zone Site Lead's team was staged at Queen's Park. At 4:16 pm, protesters smashed the windows of a jewellery store at Yonge and Gerrard streets. By this time, some people in the crowd could be seen changing out of their black clothing. Some left the clothes lying on the street. At 4:17 pm, Operations ordered public order units to stop the crowd at Yonge and College Street. 55 At 4:19 pm, CCTV cameras showed that a public order unit on foot, which had come from King and Bay via Adelaide, followed by a horse-mounted unit, marched up the middle of Yonge Street and stopped next to two coaches and two unmarked vans that had pulled over on Yonge at Richmond, facing north. Police in the intersection stopped traffic to allow 22 unmarked police vans, an EMS vehicle and two more police coaches to turn north on Yonge from Richmond West. The horse-mounted unit then proceeded north on Yonge, and the POU officers got into the coach and unmarked vans and left, turning west on Queen Street. At 4:20 pm, the crowd on Queen moved east past John Street and turned south on Bay Street. At 4:21 pm, Operations reported that protesters were going westbound on College, breaking windows at the Winners store at Yonge and College, and ordered Toronto Police Service headquarters at 40 College Street locked down. At 4:22 pm, the officers at 415 Queen St. W. were extracted. At 4:23 pm, Operations reported that protesters had broken glass at police headquarters and public order units were being deployed back to police headquarters. At 4:29 pm, the mounted unit reached Gerrard and Yonge, turned west on Gerrard to Bay, and then north on Bay. The Incident Commander ordered the Special Operations Director to pull units off Richmond to set up and box in the crowd at Queen's Park. By 4:32 pm, the crowd that had come from Queen Street had grown to several hundred, but was stopped by police officers on bicycles at Bay and Richmond. At 4:32 pm, the Incident Commander ordered that those in the Interdiction Zone be alerted that public order units were pulled from Richmond. The Outer Zone Deputy Director told the Incident Commander that the units would be redeployed to Avenue Road and Bloor Street, just north of Queen's Park. 56 4 pm-5 pm . At 4 pm, cruiser 730 at King and Bay broke out in flames. Incident Command ordered fire trucks out. Two minutes later, fire crews arrived on the scene. The fires were put out by 4:20, and by 5 pm all vehicles had been removed from the intersection. At King and Bay, two TAVIS police cruisers were burned (TAV 56 and 730), and two cruisers (TAV 58 and TAV 59), along with two unmarked police vans, were damaged. At 4:01 pm, CCTV cameras showed a black balaclava-clad protester putting an "It's right to rebel" protest sign through the window of the Bank of Montreal at Yonge and Queen. Another protester smashed a BMO ATM with a stick. As the protesters approached Yonge and Dundas, crowds of shoppers and onlookers rushed to get out of their way. Black-dressed protesters zigzagged through the crowd, armed with sticks, poles, hammers, rocks, construction and traffic signs, and street debris. A man in the crowd grabbed a blackdressed protester who was making a third attempt to break a store window with a rock. The man held on to the protester for a minute, saying something into his ear before letting him go. At 4:02 pm, officers at 415 Queen St. W. were surrounded by a crowd of protesters. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD The crowd turned south on Bay at College, trapping a woman in a small white car. CCTV showed that people in masks assisted in helping her to back up and leave the area. It also showed the crowd milling around for a couple of minutes before turning back and heading west on College. At 4:36 pm, the police cruiser (766) that was abandoned on Queen Street was set on fire. 57 At 4:53 pm, the Outer Zone Deputy Director reported to the Incident Commander that there were huge crowds southbound on Bay and southbound on Yonge, that some Black Bloc were wearing police jackets, and that the RCMP was there. TPS public order unit Charlie Section Commander indicated in his scribe notes at 4:56 pm that the crowd [at Queen's Park] was escalating and getting louder: "We are giving loud verbal commands 'Get back, move back.' The crowd is actively resistant, male in line provoking with 'No we will not move.' " At 4:59 police video log estimated at least 2,000 protesters on King between Bay and York. At 5:13 pm, the TPS Intelligence Chief advised the MICC that protesters at the front of Queen's Park were going northbound wearing gas masks. At 5:15 pm, another group of protesters filtered in from the east on King to line up on the south side of Bay. Now the POU officers in the intersection had protesters on both sides of them. At 5:17 pm, the police video log indicated that video footage from air support showed arrests being made at Queen's Park. At 5:18 pm, Incident Commander Superintendent Ferguson returned and took over as Incident Commander. At 5:22 pm, Intelligence reported to Incident Command that Black Bloc members at University and College were changing back into black clothing. At 5:24 pm, night shift Incident Commander Superintendent Fenton inquired about the location of the LRAD. At 5:25 pm, Superintendent Fenton took over as night shift Incident Commander, and day shift Incident Commander Superintendent Ferguson reported off-duty. At 5:26 pm, Operations noted that public order units were moving to 155 College, west of University. At 5:27 pm, Incident Command was notified that 1,000 officers were mobilizing from Huntsville to Toronto. Incident Command ordered all TPS officers out of the Interdiction Zone once they had been replaced by the RCMP. At 5:30 pm, day shift Operations Chief confirmed that night relief officers were deployed to Queen's Park. These units and their Outer Zone North Site Lead joined the day shift officers and were conducting a sweep of Queen's Park with a public order unit section. The night shift Outer Zone South officers with their Site Lead coordinated with the day shift and deployed in a line: "Spadina / Richmond to Church / Spadina." [as indicated in scribe note] At 5:31 pm, the RCMP telephoned Incident Command to confirm that the MICC wanted them to take over the Interdiction Zone. The night shift Incident Commander confirmed and asked to be contacted when they took over the Interdiction Zone. At 5:32 pm, the night shift Incident Commander ordered the Outer Zone Branch Director to have bicycle units in the north of the Outer Zone to make their way south to University and College. The Incident Commander also ordered Special Operations Branch Director to move his resources to University and College. At 5:39 pm, the day shift Operations Chief advised that three RCMP troops were being used as public order units - one inside the Interdiction Zone. At 5:40 pm, the scribe for TPS public order unit Alpha Section Commander Inspector Meissner indicated in his notes that Inspector Meissner, who was in charge of the LRAD, was setting up to use it: Laser range to crowd from north side of College at University on right side 11 yards, left side is 8 yards, north curb to grass ridge in centre is 16 yards. Inspector Meissner with LRAD at north curb near centre of line. At 5:41 pm, the Incident Commander advised the Deputy Incident Commander of his plan to move the RCMP out of the Controlled Access Zone to take over the Interdiction Zone. At 5:43 pm, Incident Commander Superintendent Fenton ordered the LRAD deployment to be broadcast on all channels and requested the Outer Zone Branch Director to advise officers of impending arrests. At 5:45 pm, the day shift Operations Chief updated the night shift Operations Chief about the ongoing situation. At 5:45 pm, TPS public order unit Charlie Section Commander indicated in his scribe notes, "Crowd starting to sit; we stand fast; continue to give loud verbal commands, 'Move or you will be arrested.' " At 4:37 pm, the TPS Intelligence Chief informed the Incident Commander that groups westbound on College from Elm Street were smashing storefronts. At 4:38 pm, Intelligence reported 200 Black Bloc were westbound on College to University. Operations reported people at College and University were smashing a van and there was possibly a driver inside. [No one was inside.] At 4:39 pm, the mounted unit reached the southeast corner of Bay and College. Mounted officers reported hearing the crowd yelling, "Get those officers off those horses." At 4:40 pm, CCTV cameras showed that POU officers turned north on Yonge from King West and marched up Yonge. At 4:40 pm, the TPS Intelligence Chief reported to the MICC that Black Bloc at Adelaide and Bay were removing black tops and replacing them with pink. At 4:41 pm, the Incident Commander ordered bicycle officers to University and College. At 4:42 pm, POU officers deployed a muzzle blast of tear gas at University Avenue and College Street. Police reported that Black Bloc were running north on University to Queen's Park. At 4:47 pm, the TPS Intelligence Chief reported that protesters were on top of the bus shelter southwest of Queen's Park and that he had intelligence that protesters were going to try to torch the damaged van on College Street. 58 5 pm-6 pm . At 5 pm, another line of POU moved in to form a semicircle facing south behind the officers who were lined up across the north side of King and Bay. In all, there were approximately 100 officers in the intersection. At 5 pm, the Incident Commander authorized TPS public order unit Alpha Section Commander to set up and use the LRAD to disperse the crowd at Queen's Park. At 5:04 pm, Operations ordered officers at Queen's Park to "use a muzzle blast, only one, no gas." At 5:05 pm, the Operations Chief took over as Incident Commander in the MICC while Incident Commander Superintendent Ferguson was off the floor. At 5:06 pm, TPS public order unit Charlie Section Commander noted: "Crowd now north of University Ave., we continue to punch out14. Crowd moves back and halts next to TTC subway entrance; rocks being thrown; plastic bottles being thrown at us." At 5:10 pm, officers at University and Adelaide issued an "assist officer" call. 14 A "punch out" is a public order unit tactic where officers on a line suddenly push or dart out two or three metres to make a barrier around an arrest team to protect them while they are making an arrest. A punch out is also sometimes used to move a crowd or a line of people back. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD At 5:46 pm, the Incident Commander ordered the Special Operations Director to push his public order units north from the intersection of University Avenue and College Street to restore order. At the same time, TPS public order unit Charlie Section Commander indicated in his scribe notes that his unit gave shouted warnings to the crowd to move or be arrested for obstructing police, and the crowd did not comply and actively resisted. Also at the same time, TPS public order unit Alpha Section Commander indicated in his scribe notes that he "used the LRAD at the top of a mound when the crowd was pushed back. Two warnings, one in English and one in French (warn #3); crowd encroached." At 5:52 pm, a person with a gun was reported at Yonge and Isabella streets. Incident Commander Superintendent Fenton requested Emergency Task Force units to be sent to that location and ordered a "person with a gun" alert to be broadcast on all channels. According to the Incident Commander's statement to the OIPRD, at a later time he was advised that they were found to be police officers. At 5:56 pm, Incident Command asked the Special Operations Director if the protesters at Adelaide and Bay were blocked in; he confirmed that they were. At 5:57 pm, the day shift Operations Chief was relieved by the night shift Operations Chief. At 5:58 pm, TPS public order unit Charlie Section Commander indicated in his scribe notes that his unit started moving forward giving loud commands, "Move or you will be arrested." Projectiles were being thrown from the crowd, including wood blocks, sticks, and plastic bottles. His scribe advised that he observed a projectile hit the Section Commander. A protester who was interviewed by the OIPRD said, "It seemed as though the riot police had boxed us in and there was no way out. We did not hear anything that resembled an alarm or audible warning telling us to leave or else we would be arrested." 6 pm-7 pm . 59 At 6 pm, the Incident Commander ordered the Operations Chief to get more resources so that the crowd did not scatter from Queen's Park. The Incident Commander also ordered all units to go to Bloor Street because the crowd was running northbound. He then ordered public order units to go to the prisoner wagons at Elizabeth Street and College because the investigations branch advised that crowds were coming at the prisoner wagons. He also instructed all units to hold their lines. At 6:04 pm, the Special Operations Director advised the Incident Commander that arrests were starting to be made at Adelaide and Bay. At 6:05 pm, Operations reported information from EMS that tear gas had been deployed at College and University. At 6:06 pm, the police video log noted a police car was on fire. At 6:07 pm, Operations advised the Incident Commander that only 30 officers were available and they were going to try to get Outer Zone leads to move resources. At 6:09 pm, the Outer Zone Deputy Director advised Operations that fire had started at Queen and Spadina and one arrest was made. At 6:11 pm, the Incident Commander ordered Operations to move regular police north of the crowd at Queen's Park to block them in. The Incident Commander also asked about public order units at Queen and Peter and was informed they were heading to where the vehicle was on fire. At the same time, the Intelligence Chief notified Incident Command that shotgun shells went off at Queen and Spadina - possibly in the car fire. AT 6:11 pm, the Deputy Operations Chief advised that three RCMP troops would be coming out of the Interdiction Zone (to assist). At 6:15 pm, the Incident Commander ordered the Deputy Incident Commander to hold back all day shift units. At 6:17 pm, the day shift Operations Chief advised Incident Command that the RCMP had called, asking whether air assets were needed; Incident Command advised yes. At 6:17 pm, Operations was advised that a police foot unit at 415 Queen St. W. was surrounded. At 6:20 pm, Operations advised that the Toronto Fire Department was needed to attend the burning car at Queen and Peter, and that public order units were also needed. At 6:22 pm, Operations advised Incident Command that there were no public order units on site at Queen's Park. At 6:25 pm, the Outer Zone Branch Director advised that he wanted horses to create a wedge and push the crowd down. At 6:25 pm, the TPS Crisis Management Information System crashed. Incident Commander Superintendent Fenton instructed staff to go to hard copy records. At 6:26 pm, the Special Operations Director advised the Incident Commander that 15 arrests had been made in total and no use of force had been required. At 6:26 pm, TPS public order unit Alpha Section Commander indicated in his scribe notes: "Group 4 [Alpha Section] to Richmond and Peter; on site moved it to Queen; pushed crowd back; some bottles thrown at police; LRAD used again to warn crowd; naked male arrested." In an interview with the OIPRD, TPS public order unit Alpha Section Commander Inspector Meissner had this to say about the use of the LRAD on Queen Street: I understand why they wanted us to ask the MICC for permission to use it. But, I didn't ask for it on Queen Street, because I was told to arrest everybody and to my way of thinking as a site commander, I needed to assure myself and I needed to prove to everybody else that this was a compliant crowd. And, as a consequence, I stepped out of the line and did not ask for permission to use the LRAD, but used it to prove a point. And the point was that if you are involved in an engagement where, in fact, the crowd can hear the message clearly and is willing to comply, then all they want is direction. At 6:27 pm, the police communications log indicated arrests were being made at College and University. In a statement to the OIPRD, the night shift Incident Commander stated: At 18:27 hours, I was advised that there were no POU north of the POU line at University and College Street. I indicated that we need police assets at this location to ensure we do not scatter this crowd and end up chasing groups of marauding terrorists across the city. At 6:29 pm, Operations ordered Outer Zone Site Leads to get resources deployed to box in the crowd. At 6:30 pm, the OPP public order unit's operational timeline indicated that it was deployed to Queen's Park in hard tac to support TPS public order unit Lima Section. The OPP was to provide relief on the line (for TPS public order unit Charlie Section) and perform punch outs to allow arrest teams to effect arrests. At 6:32 pm, the Deputy Chief of Operations informed the Incident Commander that the Unified Command Centre was deploying 100 officers and asked where they were wanted. The Incident Commander advised to deploy them to the Interdiction Zone so TPS resources could be deployed outside the Interdiction Zone. At this same time, the Investigative Chief inquired if the LRAD was needed at Queen and Peter. The Special Operations Director advised that the LRAD was not needed at Queen and Peter. At 6:35 pm, the Deputy Incident Commander advised the Incident Commander that 300 OPP and 500 RCMP officers were available for deployment if required. The Incident Commander advised that all officers available would be deployed. At 6:37 pm, the Special Operations Director notified Incident Command of mass arrests at University and Queen's Park, Queen and Peter, and King and 60 OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Yonge. Incident Command requested the Incident Command Investigative Head to advise the Toronto Police Chief of the arrests. At 6:38 pm, Operations was advised that Outer Zone North Site Lead's officers were behind public order units at University and College and the POU commander on the ground had asked them to remain static. Mounted units, in troops of six, pushed the crowd 75 feet north at Queen's Park. The mounted unit scribe noted "horses made contact with the crowd." The officer involved described what happened when they were instructed to perform a centre break manoeuvre: We commenced the manoeuvre and I was in the front row. As the mounted line moved northward virtually all the protesters scattered. A lone woman did not move and continued to stand her ground despite the advancing horses. She was directly in my path and would have been able to both see and hear the advancing horses. I had officers and horses on both sides of me and behind me with nowhere to go but straight ahead. My horse struck her upper body as we continued to move forward. I am not aware what happened to her after that. As we performed the recall and returned to our original position I looked for her but could not see her on the road or in the crowd. A YouTube video taken of this incident shows a woman standing with her knees bent and arms raised slightly in front of her. It appears she is deliberately standing in the path of the mounted officers and, as the horses approach, she appears to brace herself but does not move away. As the horses move past they make contact with her, causing her to fall to the ground. She can be seen on the ground as several horses move past her; however, the horses do not appear to step on her. At 6:40 pm, Toronto Police Service POU Charlie Section Commander's scribe notes stated the command was to stand fast. They gave loud commands - "move or you will be arrested" - to a crowd he described as "curious, passive." At 6:45 pm, the Incident Commander advised that he needed a south and a north boundary defined to assist with the deployment of officers. Deputy Operations Chief advised the Incident Commander of updates on Black Bloc members along the fence gates. At 6:46 pm, Operations called Outer Zone South Site Lead to advise him to work with the OZ North Site Lead to go north and south to start boxing people in. At 6:47 pm, York Regional Police POU was still on Queen Street, holding back the crowd while the Toronto Fire Department put out the fire. The crowd was pushed back several hundred metres and began to disperse. At 6:49 pm, Operations reported Black Bloc at Front and Bay streets. At 6:52 pm, the Incident Commander advised the Special Operations Director that units were needed at 16 Bancroft Ave. because Black Bloc were on site. At 6:54 pm, the Deputy Operations Chief advised that resources were needed at Bay and Front streets. The Operations Chief advised that they were waiting for RCMP to deploy - there had been miscommunication. At 6:55 pm, the Incident Commander instructed the Interdiction Zone Director to send officers to 16 Bancroft to assess and make arrests of Black Bloc found at that location. At 6:56 pm, Operations noted that RCMP advised that TPS was not on site. At 6:57 pm, Operations noted that RCMP had advised that the switchover was being arranged. 7 pm-8 pm . At 7:09 pm, the Investigative Chief advised the Incident Commander that "Black Bloc" were at the University of Toronto pub - "parties that were there last night are back." The Incident Commander ordered the Investigative Chief to keep plain clothes officers inside and to advise if they start to move. At 7:14 pm, the Special Operations Director informed the Incident Commander that all were blocked in at Queen and Peter. At 7:14 pm, Incident Command was advised that 200 "Black Bloc" were seen at University and College. At 7:20 pm, Incident Command reported "Black Bloc" at University and Wellington and that officers were on site to start making arrests. At 7:25 pm, the Special Operations Director advised the Incident Commander he was moving his units out from the Queen and Peter area. The Incident Commander instructed him to move them to the north end of Queen's Park. At 7:30 pm, a member of the York Regional Police POU was treated for heat exhaustion at Queen and Soho. At 7:33 pm, Operations advised the Incident Commander that members of the Black Bloc were engaging police at Blue Jays Way and Wellington. At 7:35 pm, the Incident Commander instructed Operations to broadcast that they were arresting people for breach of the peace and all parties out there participating in protests were now in breach of the peace. At 7:35 pm, mounted units moved the crowd from the south end of Queen's Park to the north end, then east. Other mounted units went to the west side of Queen's Park. At 7:38 pm, Operations had broadcast to police officers that anyone in the demonstration at Queen's Park was to be arrested for breach of the peace. At 7:45 pm, the Interdiction Zone Operations Director informed the Incident Commander that 16 Bancroft Ave. was quiet and the officers who were there had left. The Incident Commander instructed him to get the officers back to that location to monitor Black Bloc at that location. At 7:50 pm, York Regional Police POU was redeployed to Richmond and Spadina to support an Ontario Provincial Police POU section stationed there. York POU, in conjunction with Sudbury, Peel, and OPP units, gained control of the intersection and forced the crowd west of the intersection. At about the same time, the second abandoned police car was set on fire. At 7:50 pm, the Incident Commander instructed the Special Operations Director that arrests needed to be made at Queen and Peter. At 7:59 pm, the Special Operations Director requested all police vehicles be moved off the street. The Incident Commander instructed Operations to broadcast an order to remove police vehicles in all areas experiencing disorder issues. In a statement to the OIPRD, Incident Commander Superintendent Fenton stated: At 19:59 hours, I was approached by Deputy Warr, Command Lead, who began to speak about his instructions given to restore order. I got the sense that he was concerned about potential police overreaction. I told him that if he sees me do anything that he is not comfortable with to simply tell me and that I would stop that activity. He nodded and said "OK." I updated him on the ongoing activity on the street. 61 62 8 pm-9 pm . At 8:02 pm, the Investigative Chief advised Incident Command that there were 33 people now under arrest. Command Lead Deputy Chief Warr advised that he would inform Chief Blair. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD At 8:08 pm, the Incident Commander ordered more prisoner wagons to be requested because the public order units were asking for them. At 8:10 pm, the Incident Commander advised the Special Operations Director that there were "tons of people to be arrested." The Incident Commander also received information that protesters were "masking up" at Queen's Park. 63 At 8:44 pm, Operations reported that Intelligence advised that Black Bloc was going to Yorkville and would use Church Street as a distraction sometime that night - the time was unknown. At 8:45 pm, York POU was relieved at Queen and Spadina by the RCMP public order unit. At 8:46 pm, the Incident Commander instructed Operations to arrange for additional police officers for the Yorkville area. At 9:20 pm, Incident Command noted that information had been received about protesters starting to burn stores at Yonge and Shuter streets. The OIPRD viewed CCTV footage on Yonge Street, which showed no sign of fire trucks. At 9:26 pm, about 25 police officers arrived in vans, conducted a sweep of the sidewalk and left at 9:30 pm. The MICC did not receive confirmation of any fire at that location. At 9:22 pm, Intelligence advised that information from Twitter said protesters were "taking Dundas Square and then to the fence - 'Finale.' " At 9:23 pm, CCTV cameras showed that the crowd reached Yonge and Temperance Street, where it turned west, then continued south on Bay to King, west on King, south between the bank buildings between Bay and York to arrive at Wellington Street at 9:32 pm. A large number of police lined the fence along Wellington. The crowd stayed among the buildings for a few minutes before moving out on to Wellington. When the crowd did move to the fence, police officers moved aside. CCTV cameras showed protesters milling about the fence, touching it, and taking photos. A few protesters who were dressed in black kicked or hit the fence. At 9:24 pm, the Investigations Director inquired whether the LRAD had been used to send a message out. At 9:25 pm, the Investigations Director was advised that an order at Queen's Park regarding unlawful assembly with the LRAD was given. At 9:25 pm, the Incident Commander instructed Operations and Special Operations that he wanted bicycle officers and public order units to go to Yonge and Richmond. At 9:39 pm, the Outer Zone Director advised the Incident Commander that all bicycle teams were en route to Yonge and King to form a line at that intersection. At 9:39 pm, CCTV cameras showed that the protesters, who were blocked in on two sides by police in hard tac, retreated between the buildings and went back to King Street. They crossed the street and attempted to go between buildings at First Canadian Place, while lines of riot police blocked the way east and west. Some members of the crowd sat down on the street, some shouted at the officers, and some moved to either side of the street. At 9:40 pm, information from Intelligence to the MICC indicated there was the possibility of a protest at the PPC at midnight. At 9:46 pm, the assistant duty officer advised the Incident Commander that they could box in the crowd in the financial area - York to King to Bay to Wellington to York. The Incident Commander approved. At 9:50 pm, CCTV cameras showed that the line of officers on the west side of the protesters filed away to the south, and the protesters marched west on King to Yonge. At Yonge Street, a line of bicycle police blocked the road north, so at 9:55 pm, protesters continued eastbound on King. At 8:12 pm, the Interdiction Zone Director advised the Incident Commander that the Prisoner Processing Centre (PPC) was in lockdown and, as a result, PPC staff were behind schedule. At 8:16 pm, the Incident Commander advised Operations that wagons needed to be emptied and sent back to Queen's Park. The POU tactical advisor indicated there were not enough wagons if they started making arrests at Queen's Park. At 8:16 pm, the Incident Commander advised that the wagons needed to be recycled and put back in use quickly; Operations would work on this. At 8:22 pm, the Incident Commander ordered police vehicles at Bloor Street and Avenue Road moved. At 8:29 pm, the Incident Commander reminded the RCMP liaison in the MICC of his request to have the RCMP take charge of the Interdiction Zone to free TPS officers for duty in the Outer Zone. At 8:31 pm, the mounted unit scribe noted that, along with POUs, the mounted units moved the crowd westbound from Queen's Park on Hoskin Avenue toward Spadina. At 8:38 pm, Operations advised that a large crowd was eastbound at Bloor and Bedford Road. At 8:40 pm, the Incident Commander met with Command Lead Deputy Chief Warr and Command Operations Lead Staff Superintendent McGuire regarding an update on what was happening. They passed on information that Yorkville businesses might become a target. 64 9 pm-10 pm . At 9:03 pm, the Public Information Officer advised that six officers were on the way to Yorkville to conduct door knocks to advise businesses that they might be possible targets. At 9:06 pm, a CCTV camera at Yonge and Gerrard showed a crowd of about a thousand people passing through the intersection going south on Yonge Street. At 9:07 pm, the Special Operations Director advised the Incident Commander that they were starting to box in protesters in the Queen Street area. At 9:13 pm, the Incident Commander advised the RCMP liaison in the MICC that a thousand protesters were on their way down Yonge Street. A few minutes later, the Incident Commander advised the Interdiction Zone and Outer Zone leads of the protesters on Yonge Street. At 9:16 pm, the Incident Commander asked the Special Operations Director if he had begun making arrests on Queen Street. He responded that they had just started arresting people. The Incident Commander advised that he wanted officers at King Street to stop the crowd. He also asked the Investigative Chief where the prisoner buses and wagons were, because he wanted them at King and Yonge. The Investigative Chief advised that the wagons were at the Prisoner Processing Centre, which at that time was three-quarters full. At 9:16 pm, the Yonge Street crowd had reached Queen Street. 10 pm-11 pm . At 10 pm, the Special Operations Director requested bicycle officers to assist with tracking the crowd because there were no CCTV cameras in the area the protesters had moved into, and the Incident Commander had advised that he did not want to lose that group. At 10:01 pm, Intelligence advised that the crowd was moving south on Scott Street toward Front. At 10:06 pm, the Incident Commander received information from Intelligence that people were putting on masks on The Esplanade south of Front Street between Yonge and Bay. At 10:09 pm, the Incident Commander advised the POU tactical adviser that more protesters might be approaching from the east. The Outer Zone Branch Director advised that bicycle officers were at King and Yonge, Church and Yonge, and on The Esplanade. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD At 10:15 pm, the Incident Commander ordered bicycle officers at Wellington and Simcoe to The Esplanade to assist public order units with the box. At 10:18 pm, the Incident Commander ordered the prisoner wagons be brought in closer to Church and The Esplanade. At 10:26 pm, the Special Operations Director advised Incident Command that the protesters were boxed in on The Esplanade, and requested that prisoner wagons and buses move in. At 10:30 pm, York POU relieved the RCMP on the east side of the intersection at Queen and Spadina. At 10:50 pm, they worked with the OPP and Sudbury POU to move and disperse the crowd west along Queen Street for several blocks before being relieved by the OPP. At 10:30 pm, Operations reported all was quiet in Yorkville and at Queen's Park. At 10:38 pm, Operations advised that the prisoner wagons were in front of the Novotel hotel. At 10:40 pm, Operations advised Investigations to arrest whoever is there. At 10:47 pm, the Incident Commander inquired why protesters were not yet in the prisoner wagons. The duty officer advised that they were going through the hand-off teams. At 10:50 pm, the Incident Commander instructed the Special Operations Director that as soon as the activity on The Esplanade was done, he wanted officers watching Church Street and Yorkville. The Incident Commander then instructed that no traffic was to go past Yonge and King - Yonge to remain closed - and that he wanted southbound Yonge from Adelaide Street blocked so no vehicle or pedestrian traffic could get through. At 10:56 pm, the Incident Commander inquired from the RCMP liaison in the MICC if there was a time when the RCMP would assume control of the Interdiction Zone. At 11:36 pm, Special Operations advised that they would stop the group at River Street. The Incident Commander instructed them to stop the group in front of buildings, not in a clear area, because he wanted the group arrested only if they were boxed in. At 11:42 pm, Special Operations advised the Incident Commander that the Emergency Tactical Force was on site in the intersection at River and Queen streets. At 11:45 pm, the Incident Commander advised that bicycle units were needed at the rear of the crowd. At 11:46 pm, the Emergency Tactical Force advised Incident Command that the crowd had started to splinter. The Incident Commander ordered them to let the group get to the PPC. At 11:54 pm, Operations ordered Outer Zone officers to coordinate with the public order units to box the protesters in and then arrest them. was already situated at River and Dundas and that they wanted us to move ahead of the crowd and assist POU. As I was trying to move ahead of the crowd on the north side of Dundas, there were several parked cars. I was telling them, "I need to pass, you need to move aside," and right away when I said that, their arms went up and they did the human chain and I was pushed, elbowed, right into a car and I remember falling, hitting the car and falling in between the seat and the bar, and I remember feeling a guy grab me. I wasn't sure that anybody was behind me in my team because I remember being one of the last people in our group at the back of the protest. So, when I was being pulled, I kind of got overwhelmed and scared because I was being pulled and there was a large crowd and all of the sudden, my partner came up behind me, grabbed me, helped me get recomposed on my bike. We were able to get past the crowd, and as we proceeded past them, they, all of the sudden, dispersed. A majority of them ran southbound through Regent Park. We were being told that they were heading towards PPC and that they wanted us to stop them wherever we could for breach of the peace because they were already told to disperse and that they hadn't. We made our way to Queen where there was a POU unit already blocking River Street at Queen. I observed a group of people - I heard a megaphone, I heard singing, I heard chanting. There were about 20 people in this group, and when we came from the west they were already blocked off at River Street by the POU. The crowd stopped in the middle of the street and said, "Okay, we give up." And then they went and sat against the north building of Queen Street. At one minute after 12, [the] Inspector was on scene and we were directed to start arresting the group for breach of the peace. At 12:19 a. . Incident Command advised that officers m, were needed at Queen and Spadina. 11 pm-12 midnight . At 11 pm, the RCMP liaison in the MICC advised that RCMP troops would be in at midnight. At 11:03 pm, the Incident Commander ordered that it be broadcast that the traffic plan was being implemented. No vehicles were to be allowed in, and officers were to limit pedestrian traffic as best they could. At 11:07 pm, the Incident Commander was advised by the Investigative Chief that there was a delay in processing the arrested people. The Incident Commander also instructed the Special Operations Director to have Forensic Identification Services photograph the property left by the arrested parties on the ground at the Novotel, and seize it. At 11:16 pm, Operations reported 100 people were southbound on Church from Carlton Street. The Outer Zone Director notified the Incident Commander that three bicycle units were on the way to that location. The Outer Zone Site Lead was given authority to make arrest by Incident Command. At 11:21 pm, Special Operations informed Incident Command that they received a call from Edmonton POU, informing them that Edmonton POU had employed seven eXact iMpact rounds at Queen's Park during the day, with no injuries. At 11:25 pm, the Outer Zone Director advised Operations that the group was peacefully singing. At 11:26 pm, Operations advised the Outer Zone Director to keep monitoring the crowd and noted that protesters were eastbound on Dundas Street. At 11:31 pm, Incident Command was advised that the group had a sign that said "629 Eastern." 65 66 Sunday, June 27, 2010 . At 12:03 a. ., Outer Zone officers reported that 12 m people were left at River and Queen streets and were boxed in; the remainder had scattered. The Incident Commander ordered them arrested. In an interview with the OIPRD, a bicycle unit police constable who attended at River and Queen described what she saw and experienced: At 11:23 pm, we were requested to attend the area of Dundas and Mutual Street. There was a large crowd of people in the middle of the street that was gathering. They had musical instruments, they had megaphones. When we arrived on scene, the crowd was in the middle of the street and there was no vehicular traffic able to get through and the TTC was stuck at a standstill. We were directed to follow behind the crowd and make sure that it was a peaceful protest, and we were told that they were already told to disperse. We were then directed that they were going to the PPC and that they wanted us to try and stop them from continuing at River Street and Dundas. They advised us that POU OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD At 12:21 a. ., Incident Command advised that there m were still 50 people to be arrested at the Novotel on The Esplanade. At 12:22 a. . the Special Operations Director advised m, the Incident Commander that they were arresting people who were throwing bottles at officers at Queen and Spadina. At 12:24 a. ., the Incident Commander ordered m Special Operations to box in the crowd. At 12:31 a. ., Investigations informed Incident m Command that there were about 20 people in front of the PPC. At 12:37 a. . Operations ordered bicycle officers to m, Queen and Spadina to assist with arrests. At 12:40 a. ., Operations advised public order units to m push the crowd northbound from Queen. At 12:46 a. ., Operations advised the Incident m Commander that bicycle units were on site at Vanauley Walk (north of Queen, west of Spadina). At 12:57 a. ., Operations ordered 10 officers from the m Interdiction Zone to Church and The Esplanade to help wrap up arrests. At 1:02 a. . Incident Command received a phone call m, informing them that the Chief might be on the way. At 1:03 a. . Investigations asked for police officers at m, the PPC. At 1:13 a. . Operations advised that a public order m, unit and a tactical team were on the way to the PPC. At 1:29 a. ., Special Operations advised that two m more POU sections were on the way to the PPC. They would give warnings to the crowd, using the speaker on the Emergency Tactical Force vehicle. At 1:35 a. ., the Deputy Incident Commander m advised that one of the prisoners had possible broken ribs and he would check to see if the special investigations unit should be notified. The Deputy Incident Commander advised that there were seven possible "SIU-able" cases. At 1:38 a. ., Incident Command noted that the Chief m was on the floor. At 1:40 a. . Investigations advised that people were m, crawling out of the sewers at Queen Street and Jones Avenue. The Outer Zone Director advised that mobile officers were on the way to that location. At 1:52 a. ., Incident Command advised that a POU m officer was reading the proclamation at the PPC. At 2 a. ., Special Operations advised that the crowd m at the PPC was told to move and that they were voluntarily leaving. Those who did not leave would be arrested. At 2:04 a. ., the Incident Commander was advised m that the crowd at 629 Eastern Ave. was not moving. The Incident Commander advised to "start arresting." At 2:06 a. . the Incident Commander was notified by m, the Planning Chief that the RCMP was unsure if it had control. The RCMP notified the Incident Commander that control authorization had to come from the Toronto Area Command Centre (TACC). The RCMP confirmed that it would speak with TACC over the phone regarding the process of taking control, and the RCMP would advise the Incident Commander when the conflict was resolved. At 2:14 a. ., the RCMP informed Incident Command m that it was not accepting command of the Interdiction Zone. The Incident Commander ordered Operations to get the Interdiction Zone Site Commander back to the Interdiction Zone. At 2:23 a. . the Incident Commander received a m, phone call from the Interdiction Zone Director, who reported he was in charge of the Interdiction Zone. At 2:29 a. . Special Operations advised that parties m, were still being arrested at the PPC. At 5:31 a. ., the RCMP informed Incident Command m that it had command of the Interdiction Zone. Chapter 4: Stop and Search . 67 4 OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD 68 OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR CHAPTER 4 . Stop and Search . 69 70 "This ain't Canada right now" . In a video posted on YouTube that was viewed more than 100,000 times and subsequently covered by the media, a group of officers in downtown Toronto are shown searching people's bags and explaining the "law" to them. In the video, a woman's voice from behind the camera points out that they are not within five metres of the fence. An officer asks one individual for his bag, saying he must allow his bag to be looked at or he may not proceed. That individual says he won't consent to a search and would leave. The officer puts his arm around the man and says, "You don't get a choice. Get moving." The man objects and asks why he is being grabbed. The officer says, "The rule is either we look in the bag or you leave, get moving." The officer and the man talk further: the man asks why he has to leave the area if he is going no further, and the officer responds that, if he wants to stay, he has to open his bag because it's their area. A discussion follows among the man, the officer, and others off-camera about whose area it is. The officer approaches the man more closely, saying, "You haven't opened up your bag so take off." The man says, "In Canada, that's something ...," whereupon he is cut off by the officer who responds, "This ain't Canada right now." A female officer adds, "You're in G20-Land." Legal background . The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects the individual interests of citizens against state power or interference. The sections of the Charter that are relevant to stopping and searching citizens include: o ection 7 - Everyone has the right to life, liberty, S and security of the person and the right not to be deprived of those rights except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. o ection 8 - Everyone has the right to be secure S against unreasonable search or seizure. o ection 9 - Everyone has the right not to be S arbitrarily detained or imprisoned. o ection 10 - Everyone has the right on arrest or S detention (a) to be informed promptly of the reasons thereof, and (b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that, "for a search to be reasonable, it must be (a) authorized by law; (b) the law itself must be reasonable; and (c) the manner in which the search was carried out must be reasonable."15 For a search to be unconstitutional, it must be unreasonable and violate a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. A reasonable expectation of privacy is determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. The police can search you, your clothes, and anything you are carrying if they arrest you or if you give them "informed consent" to search you. The police can also search you if: o hey find you in a place where they are searching T for drugs, and they have reason to believe that you have drugs. o hey find you in a vehicle where people are T transporting or consuming alcohol illegally, and they have reason to believe that you have alcohol on you illegally. o hey have reason to believe that you have an T illegal weapon or one that was used to commit an offence, and it might be removed or destroyed if they took the time to get a search warrant. Police powers . At the same time, police have a number of powers under which they can deny entry and stop and search civilians. These powers are outlined below. The Criminal Code of Canada . The Criminal Code contains specific powers of arrest without a warrant for a peace officer if an individual is believed, on reasonable grounds, (a) to be contravening or about to contravene any summons, appearance notice, promise to appear, undertaking, or recognizance issued, or (b) to have committed an indictable offence. Common law and Police Services Act . In carrying out their duty to preserve the peace and prevent crime, the police have extensive common law powers. These powers include powers of investigative detention, warrantless entry, warrantless arrest, warrantless search, and search incident to detention and arrest.16 16 See Halsbury's Laws of Canada, Criminal Procedure, for the legal standards that apply to these powers. 15 R. v. S.A.B., 2003 SCC 60. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD 71 To ensure police conduct is lawful, if necessary a court will analyze the circumstances of specific police conduct to determine if a common law duty or power has been acted on. This assessment process is often referred to as based on the "ancillary powers doctrine" and is derived from the United Kingdom case R. v. Waterfield.17 It has been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada18 and is cited frequently in Canadian jurisprudence. The ancillary powers doctrine is a test to assess whether the police conduct results from a lawful statutory or common law duty and, if so, whether the power used in fulfillment of the duty was justifiable.19 As the exercise of police powers can interfere with individual liberties, the conduct must be necessary and reasonable.20 Each analysis is case-specific: the exercise of a power justified to fulfill one duty may not be justified to fulfill another.21 In determining the boundaries of police powers, caution is required to ensure the proper balance between enabling the police to perform their duties and maintaining the accused's liberty and privacy. Such a determination would consider the nature of the situation, including the seriousness of the offence, the information known to the police about the suspect or the crime, and the extent to which the detention was reasonable given the circumstances. Thus the seriousness of the risk to public or individual safety must be balanced against the right to liberty of members of the public to determine whether the police action is no more intrusive than a reasonable person would think necessary. If a person is detained without legal grounds, that detention is arbitrary. In general, detention invokes the right to counsel and the right to be informed of the right to counsel. The case of Simmons (1988), 66 CR (3d) 297 (SCC), outlines three types of searches: o pat-down search or frisk of outer clothing A o body search, which involves the removal of A articles of clothing in order to examine the person's body, or parts of the body o body cavity search or probe, which may involve A X-rays, emetics, or other highly intrusive measures or techniques requiring the assistance of medical doctors or specifically trained personnel. The case of Cloutier v. Langlois (1990), 74 CR (3d) 316 (SCC), provides that the power to search is governed by three considerations: o he power to search does not impose a duty. T Police officers have some degree of discretion in conducting a search. Occasions may arise when the police do not see fit to conduct a search, while satisfying the law, and being conscious of public and officer safety. o search must be conducted for a valid objective A in pursuit of the ends of criminal justice. The conduct of the search must not be unrelated to the objectives of the proper administration of justice. This would be the case if the search was conducted to intimidate, ridicule, or pressure the accused in order to obtain an admission. o search must not be conducted in an abusive A manner. The use of physical and/or psychological constraint should be proportionate to the objectives sought and to the other circumstances of the case. (IPPs). The Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act (FMIOA) provides the legislative basis for the RCMP's lead role in the security for intergovernmental conferences. The powers the RCMP has to carry out these duties are set out in section 10.2 of the FMIOA: For the purpose of carrying out its responsibility under subsection (1), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police may take appropriate measures, including controlling, limiting or prohibiting access to any area to the extent and in a manner that is reasonable in the circumstances. 72 Trespass to Property Act . Under section 2 of the Trespass to Property Act, every person who is not acting under a right or authority conferred by law and who, (a) without the express permission of the occupier, the proof of which rests on the defendant, (i) enters on premises when entry is prohibited under this Act, or (ii) engages in an activity on premises when the activity is prohibited under this Act; or (b) does not leave the premises immediately after he or she is directed to do so by the occupier of the premises or a person authorized by the occupier, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $2,000.22 In this Act, "Occupier" includes, (a) a person who is in physical possession of premises, or (b) a person who has responsibility for and control over the condition of premises or the activities there carried on, or control over persons allowed to enter the premises, even if there is more than one occupier of the same premises; "premises" means lands and structures, or either of them. Search incident to detention . There are at least two ways in which search incident to investigative detention is different from and more limited than search incident to arrest ("incident to" means in relation to). Search incident to investigative detention is justified only on the basis of the safety of officers or the public; unlike search incident to arrest, trying to find evidence is not a permissible function of the search. More important, and a prior question to that of the purpose of the search, is the question of whether the search is permitted at all. The power to search incident to arrest arises automatically with a valid arrest: that is what it means to say that the search is "incident to" the arrest, that no further justification beyond the arrest itself is needed. However, a search power following an investigative detention does not exist as a matter of course; rather, it exists only where the officer believes on reasonable grounds that his or her own safety, or the safety of others, is at risk. Search incident to arrest . Ancillary to a valid and lawful arrest, police can, within limits, search the arrested person and the surrounding area accessible to him or her. The arrest must be lawful. The purpose of the search must be to protect the police, to protect the evidence, or to discover evidence. The search must be truly incidental to the arrest. It should not be automatic. The police are required to bear in mind the permissible scope of the search and proceed only if there is a valid purpose for it. The common law power of search incident to arrest does not extend beyond protecting the arresting officer from armed or dangerous suspects, or preserving evidence that may otherwise be lost. The police must have, subjectively, some reason related to the arrest for conducting the search when it is carried out, and the reason must be objectively reasonable. A search incident to arrest must be carried out in a reasonable manner as well. A search incident to a lawful arrest can occur immediately before, as well as after, the arrest itself, but can only extend to the "immediate surroundings" where the person was lawfully arrested. Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act . 17 18 19 20 21 R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All ER 659, [1964] 1QB 164 (CCA). R. v. Dedman, [1985] SCJ No. 45 , [1985] 2 SCR 2 (SCC). R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All ER 659, [1964] 1 QB 164 (CCA). R. v. Dedman, [1985] SCJ No. 45 , [1985] 2 SCR 2 (SCC). Brown v. Durham (Regional Municipality) Police Force, [1998] OJ No. 5274 , 43 OR (3d) 223 (Ont. CA), leave to appeal granted, appeal discontinued [1999] SCCA No. 87 (SCC). The RCMP had overall responsibility for the security of the G20 summit and was specifically responsible for the security and operations inside the Controlled Access and Restricted Access Zones. In addition to its duties to preserve the peace and prevent crime, the RCMP has duties under regulations that include protecting internationally protected persons 22 Trespass to Property Act, RSO 1990, c. T.21, s. 2 (1). OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Section 3 of this Act states that: Entry on premises may be prohibited by notice to that effect and entry is prohibited without any notice on premises, (a) that is a garden, field or other land that is under cultivation, including a lawn, orchard, vineyard and premises on which trees have been planted and have not attained an average height of more than two metres and woodlots on land used primarily for agricultural purposes; or (b) that is enclosed in a manner that indicates the occupier's intention to keep persons off the premises or to keep animals on the premises [s. 3(1)]. Section 4 outlines limited permission and limited prohibition: Where notice is given that one or more particular activities are permitted, all other activities and entry for the purpose are prohibited and any additional notice that entry is prohibited or a particular activity is prohibited on the same premises shall be construed to be for greater certainty only [s. 4(1)]. Where entry on premises is not prohibited under section 3 or by notice that one or more particular activities are permitted, and notice is given that a particular activity is prohibited, that activity and entry for the purpose is prohibited and all other activities and entry for the purpose are not prohibited [s. 4(2)]. A notice under this Act may be given orally or in writing. A police officer "may arrest without warrant any person he or she believes on reasonable and probable grounds to be on the premises in contravention of section 2." [s. 9(1)] Public Works Protection Act . The Public Works Protection Act (PWPA) gives statutory authority for police, peace officers, and appointed guards to exercise powers under the Act to protect public works. A "public work" includes: (a) any railway, canal, highway, bridge, power works including all property used for the generation, transformation, transmission, distribution or supply of hydraulic or electrical power, gas works, water works, public utility or other work, owned, operated or carried on by the Government of Ontario or by any board or commission thereof, or by any municipal corporation, public utility commission or by private enterprises, (b) any provincial and any municipal public building, and (c) any other building, place or work designated a public work by the Lieutenant Governor in Council. ("ouvrage public") [RSO 1990, c. P.55, s. 1]. The PWPA gives police, peace officers, and appointed guards the power to require any person entering or attempting to enter any public work to provide identification and state their purpose for entry, to search them or their vehicle, and to refuse them entry to the designated area. Peace officers can arrest anyone refusing to obey these requirements. They are not required to prove reasonable and probable grounds to believe an offence has been committed. Every person who neglects or refuses to comply with a request or direction made under this Act and every person found in a public work without lawful authority is guilty of an offence. perimeter as a "public work." Regulation 233/10 specified particular areas of the downtown core as public works areas, including: o he area within five metres of the John Street T Pumping Station and the bus parking lot of the Rogers Centre to Bremner Boulevard o he area within five metres of 73 Navy Wharf Court T to the curb of Blue Jays Way o he below-grade driveway located between T Union Station and Front Street West and Bay and York streets. The regulation was not generally publicized and was published in e-Laws on June 16, 2010. It came into force on June 21, 2010. Officers were informed of the original Act during their training and, as discussed elsewhere in this Report, it, and the regulation, were not well understood. Initially, officers were told that the regulation applied five metres outside the perimeter fence. Later it was corrected to five metres inside the fence. Stop and search began immediately. The public became aware of the new regulation when it was reported in the media on June 25. 74 73 June 21 . Timeline . Note: The stop and search incidents set out in this timeline are taken from complaints received by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD). They are but a fraction of the number of stops that actually took place on the streets of downtown Toronto during the G20 weekend and the days leading up to it. At 12 noon, a stop and search occurred at College Street and University Avenue. At 1:35 pm, a stop and search occurred at Allan Gardens. At 2 pm, the Incident Commander's scribe notes indicated that "key players" were converging in Allan Gardens. One police constable on the scene told the OIPRD that he and his team were deployed to the area by the botanical gardens [building], which had been "on lockdown" to prevent access to it. Intelligence had been received that one of the [protest] speakers had allegedly said that their intent was to take over and occupy a public or private building that day. The police officer's assignment was to prevent the greenhouse building from being occupied. He reported that a group of approximately 60 to 70 protesters were gathering in anticipation of hearing the spokesperson. This police officer also added that he believed the authority to search bags came from several sources, including the Public Works Protection Act. He stated that he thought the park was a Public Works designated area. At 7:30 pm, Incident Command requested the Operations Chief to advise Interdiction Zone / Outer Zone (IZ/OZ) that people would be allowed to set up tents at Queen's Park North for the duration of the G20. This was approved by Command Lead, Deputy Chief Warr. May . Regulation 233/10 passed by the Ontario government extending the provisions of the Public Works Protection Act to the G20 security perimeter became a flashpoint for public controversy. The Act itself dates back to 1939 and was designed to protect public buildings and installations during the Second World War. The regulation was requested in a letter signed by Chief Blair of the Toronto Police Service (TPS) following discussions among lawyers for the City of Toronto and TPS lawyers. Chief Blair told the OIPRD that the letter was drafted for him and he sent it, although he believed that TPS had sufficient authority under existing laws to police the G20 perimeter. The way it was explained to me, it was to bring clarity to the police officers at outer limits of their authority. It was, primarily, I think in response to concerns about potential civil liabilities. ... The letter had to go from the chief of police to the minister of community safety. Public Works Protection Act - Ontario Regulation 233/10 . A special regulation to the Public Works Protection Act that came into force on June 21 and was revoked on June 28, 2010, designated the G20 security OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD At 9:23 pm, the Intelligence Chief sought clarification from the Incident Commander about wording regarding the tent city; Incident Command advised they would NOT take down any tents that are put up, but were not encouraging people to put up tents. At 11 pm, during a business cycle meeting, the Incident Commander noted that protesters have not been granted permission to set up tents. However, it was noted that TPS would not oppose people putting up tents at Allan Gardens and the park on the north side of Queen's Park. June 25 . In an interview, Chief Blair told the OIPRD that his next recollection of being aware that the regulation had been passed was on the 25th, when it was in the newspaper: I can't recall the precise headline, "Blair Demands Secret Law." My first question was, "What are they talking about?" I wasn't aware that it was a secret. Also, I don't recall that I had demanded anything. I googled it, and the first thing I got was the act itself, and the second thing I got was the regulation that the government had passed. And, that's when I found out that it had been published on e-Laws. At 8:45 a. ., at a business cycle meeting, the m Command Investigative Lead put an order out for communication to all officers that there would be no enforcement of the Act until legal direction was sought, and they would prepare an enforcement process by noon. A message coming from the Major Incident Command Centre (MICC) would be put out at noon. Officers could make arrests where appropriate to make arrests if they felt they were justified, but no charges would be laid in relation to the fence until it was cleared through the investigative leads. There had been two arrests at that point. At the end of the meeting, the decision was that [one gentleman] would be released unconditionally. In an interview, Chief Blair said: I asked in my office, what are the boundaries of this and where does it pertain to? And, I also looked at what are the authorities that are granted under the Public Works Protection Act so that I could answer the questions that the media would have. And, I was told, "It is five metres out." And, I hadn't seen anything, quite frankly, in the regulation that caused me to think that that wasn't true. One of the officers deployed to Allan Gardens talked about the experience in an interview with the OIPRD: 75 June 24 . On June 24, at 3:05 pm, a male was arrested at Union Station and Front Street and charged with "fail to identify - Public Works Protection Act." At 3:52 pm, a male was arrested at Bremner Boulevard and York Street and charged with "ID, mischief inner perimeter / fail to identify." At 5:45 pm, a stop and search occurred at Bathurst and Wolseley. At 6:31 pm, the Deputy Incident Commander reported to the Incident Commander that an officer had located a barrel of hydrochloric acid and a ladder at Allan Gardens; CBRNE [chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosives] unit was attending. At 9:15 pm, a Public Information Officer advised the Incident Commander of a media line release regarding parties arrested under the Public Works Protection Act. At 9:44 pm, the Deputy Incident Commander advised the Incident Commander that all was in order regarding the hazardous barrel at Allan Gardens. [Note: hydrochloric acid is used to clean masonry, concrete, and rocks and would be in common use at a botanical garden. OIPRD] At 11 pm, a stop and search occurred at King Street West and Dufferin Street. We'd gained intelligence in regards to finding various weapons hidden in the park prior to demonstrations, so we were detailed to go there and be vigilant in searching. Information was something like bus-loads of Black Bloc members were attending. The information that we were given was to search for weapons and various objects that could cause injuries to the demonstrators and to the police - this all comes from all the prior training that we had and had been reinforced that morning to recognize those sorts of things. So, searching bags that came in, that's all part and parcel of the safety of everyone attending and the safety of the officers. We started off the day looking through the park and we had received information as the day unfolded, that officers were finding various things. We were constantly getting updates on the radio from other officers saying, "We've found weapons." So, as the day unfolded, we began to search people coming into the parks. We were told, "Search bags coming in, this is what's coming. Black Bloc is coming, we're expecting problems, be diligent. Search everyone. At 9:55 a. . a stop and search occurred at Pape and m, Eastern avenues. In an interview Chief Blair said, "I went downstairs and began answering media's questions about it, "What are its boundaries?" And, I said, at the time, it's, essentially, the fence and five metres outside the fence. I had an absolute iron-clad honest belief that that's what it was. It's what I had been told it was and I went down and simply repeated as honestly as I could what I had been told." (10:30 a. .) m At 11:59 a. . Operations reported information was m, received that a "known Black Bloc member" was observed at Allan Gardens. At 12 noon, a stop and search occurred at Allan Gardens. At 12 noon, during a meeting, the Command Investigative Lead reported the following: o WPA had been explained to all officers at the P "face to face" training [prior to the G20]. o egislation was amended and is valid until June 28. L o fficers can arrest if there is a threat to the fence O or IZ. o Must be a perceived threat. o f there is an arrest, the on-duty CIB Commander I will decide if the charge goes ahead. o his legislation does not apply to the PATH T [pedestrian tunnel system]. o he addition to the existing PWPA is the Fence T and the IZ. o nformation must be communicated to officers on I the ground. At 2 pm, Operations reported that they received information that 200-plus people were in Allan Gardens. At 2 pm, a stop requesting identification (ID) occurred at Cherry Beach. At 2:11 pm, Operations reported a male and female walking with stakes approaching Allan Gardens; police on scene; two minutes later the communications log noted that poles had been confiscated. At 2:24 pm, Operations advised that four buses from Montreal were unloading about 200 people at Allan Gardens; crowd continues to grow. 76 At 11 a. ., the Command Investigative Lead met with m [the TPS counsel and day shift Investigative Chief] and they agreed to document the outlines and the utilization of the Act. The Investigative Commander on duty would make a decision if a charge was to be laid or not in relation to the fence - not an arrest, but a charge on an arrestee. It was to be based on a threat to the fence itself or something inside, not outside. Command Lead Deputy Chief Warr and the Chief approved. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD At 2:30 pm, three stops and searches occurred at Allan Gardens; the Trespass to Property Act was cited in one. At 2:31 pm, Operations noted that groups in Allan Gardens appeared to be scattering to the perimeter of the park. Groups that disembarked from the buses were going through backpacks and getting dressed in costumes and distributing items in white grocery bags. At 2:50 pm, 18 police officers were observed blocking the entrance to Allan Gardens with bicycles, advising protesters they had to submit to bag search. At 2:57 pm, a stop and search occurred at Allan Gardens. At 3:18 pm, Operations reported that the Allan Gardens group was in the park and on the street with 30 Black Bloc in the middle of the crowd. Outer Zone Branch Director reported that there were 500 at Allan Gardens, the crowd was calm and that there were two foot police teams at the perimeter and 12 bicycle teams ready if the crowd started to move. In an interview, the Command Investigative Lead said: At 3:25 that afternoon, I met with [TPS counsel] who had got legal direction from [City of Toronto counsel] who, unbeknownst to me, was actually the one who negotiated the legislative amendment with the solicitor general, and the direction was that the PWPA, police authority, starts at the fence or the gate at the line. There is no five metre area outside the gate or the fence. So, essentially, the amendment was for fence itself. At 3:40 pm, I instructed [day shift Investigative Chief] to release that update to all of the officers on the field ASAP. And, that was done. As far as I'm aware, there were no other arrests in relation to breach of those fences. At 3:45 pm, Operations reported the groups at Allan Gardens were preparing to form a line on the road. At 3:49 pm, Operations advised that a speaker from one of the protest groups was speaking from the back of a pickup truck at Allan Gardens. At 4 pm, a person was stopped and questioned by police while taking photos of the detention centre on Eastern Avenue. At 4:05 pm, Operations reported that about 1,000 people were beginning to walk westbound on Carlton from Allan Gardens. An officer interviewed by the OIPRD about events at Allan Gardens said: "Later on that day, we were told that we were overwhelmed with people coming in the park and to no longer search people's bags. It came over the radio." At 4:30 pm, a stop requesting ID occurred at Yonge and Front streets. At 4:47 pm, Operations advised that a Black Bloc group within the crowd had surrounded themselves with banners. This demonstration continued west on Carlton Street and College Street to University Avenue where it turned south to Elm Street, west to McCaul Street, and north to College Street, where it then turned east to return to Allan Gardens at about 7:15 pm. At 5:41 pm, a stop and search occurred at University Avenue and Gerrard Street. At 5:59 pm, the day shift Investigative Chief sent an email to the Incident Commander and Deputy Incident Commander containing the PWPA Scope of Authority that officers received in their training with amendments to indicate that the regulation as a public work did NOT extend outside the boundary of the fence. The Investigative Chief asked for an opinion on the text for distribution to officers. At 6:25 pm, a person in a car was stopped and the car searched at Pape and Eastern Avenue. At 8:59 pm, the Incident Commander requested that the revised PWPA document be distributed to officers. At 9:02 pm, the revised document was emailed to all MICC sections for further distribution. At 11:15 pm, a stop and search occurred at Bloor and Yonge streets; police told the individuals they were under "investigative detention." At 9:40 pm, a stop and search occurred at Bedford Road and Bloor Street. At 9:45 pm, a stop and search occurred at Bedford and Bloor. At 9:50 pm, a stop and search occurred at Bloor Street West and Devonshire Place. At 10:15 pm, a stop and search occurred at John and Front streets. June 26 At 9:15 a. ., a stop and search occurred at Bloor m Street and Avenue Road. Items confiscated included swim goggles, headphones, and a flag. At 9:40 a. ., a car was stopped and searched at Allan m Gardens. Items confiscated included a bullet-proof vest, gas masks, an axe, and a nail gun. At 11:30 a. . a stop and search occurred at King and m, John streets. At 2:15 pm, a stop and search occurred at Church and Gerrard streets. At 3:30 pm, a stop and search occurred at Spadina Avenue and Clarence Square, and another at Queen Street and Spadina. At 4 pm, a stop and search occurred at University Avenue and Dundas Street. The individual was detained for 30 minutes. At 5:15 pm, a stop and search occurred at 26 Wellington St. W. at York Street. At 5:30 pm, a stop and search occurred at Wellington and Emily streets. At 6 pm, a stop and search occurred at Wellington Street West and Bay Street; PWPA cited. At 6:45 pm, a stop and search occurred at Blue Jays Way; PWPA cited. At 7:30 pm, a stop and search occurred at TPS Headquarters; PWPA cited. At 9:30 pm, a stop and search occurred at TPS Headquarters; PWPA cited. A stop and search also occurred at Bloor Street West and Devonshire Place. 77 78 June 27 . At 4:50 a. ., night shift Incident Commander m Superintendent Fenton met with the Deputy Incident Commander, the day shift TPS Intelligence Lead, the day shift Special Operations Director, and day shift Incident Commander Superintendent Ferguson. Superintendent Ferguson asked Superintendent Fenton about direction from the chief. Superintendent Fenton answered, "Own the streets." Superintendent Fenton went on to tell them that the streets were still dangerous and as soon as groups of people are seen, arrest them for breach of the peace. At 6:46 a. ., Incident Commander Superintendent m Ferguson's scribe notes indicated that he was "meeting with Deputy." [There were no notes of this meeting disclosed to the OIPRD.] At 6:57 a. ., the Outer Zone North Site Lead's scribe m notes indicated that the MICC advised him to attend at headquarters regarding a meeting. At a 7:10 a. . business cycle meeting, day shift m Incident Commander Superintendent Ferguson noted that "Yesterday we were back-doored and spent a lot of time on catch-up; plan for today is not to chase them, but to spread out resources and grab them when you can get them." Superintendent Ferguson detailed deployment for officer units and also pointed out that "anything that could be used as a weapon was to be removed; public order unit (POU) suggests when they mask up, there is reason to arrest; demo scheduled for 09:00 or 10:00 hours at Jimmie Simpson Park; affinity groups threatening to cause havoc across the city-suburbs; direction to OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD the north and south OZ Site Leads - keep on top of your guys; objectives: protection of the summit and keep our streets." At 7:36 a. ., Outer Zone North Site Lead's scribe m notes indicated that he was on site at TPS headquarters to meet with all south and north command. The north and south OZ Site Leads advised of no more boundaries and redeployment for bikes, POU, mobile and foot officers. The notes indicated, "if any[one] encounters anyone carrying a backpack then investigate; anyone wearing disguise is arrestable re: impersonate; gas masks, balaclavas, bandanas; bottles - weapons dangerous; anything used yesterday as a weapon, seize and arrest (weapon)." [note: this notebook was scanned by police for OIPRD disclosure, the hour part of the time was partly cut off on all entries] At 7:45 a. ., Operations scribe notes indicated that m the north and south OZ Site Leads were briefed regarding the Operations plan for the day. A community response unit (CRU) bicycle team lead, told the OIPRD in an interview that at about this time he was asked by his senior officer to go to TPS headquarters to be briefed by the north OZ Site Lead and his deputy, so the CRU bicycle team lead rode up and met them in the back on the street behind police headquarters at 40 College Street. The CRU bicycle team lead said, "[The north OZ Site Lead] had informed me that he had been at the briefing with the MICC and his instructions were for me to go back to the Delta Chelsea [Hotel] to tell the rest of the bike teams and to brief my teams that people walking around the downtown core wearing balaclavas were to be investigated and arrested and the charges could be wearing a disguise with intent. Anybody who was walking around with a backpack on, officers were to use their discretion but to search the backpacks for weapons and anybody caught with weapons were to be charged with weapon related offences. I rode right back down and advised [senior CRU officers] what I had been briefed on and they asked me to brief the rest of the team, so I briefed everybody else." When the CRU bicycle team lead was asked who at the MICC advised the north OZ Site Lead, he said, "He just said the MICC. We didn't question the MICC. It wasn't an option for us to question the MICC." At 9:50 a. ., an individual was stopped, searched, and m arrested at Yonge and Walton streets. At 10:15 a. . Operations reported a group of people m, were arrested by bicycle teams at Edward and Bay streets (Atrium) and property / evidence was seized. At 10:40 a. . a stop and search occurred at m, Allan Gardens. At 11 a. ., a stop and search occurred at University m Avenue and Queen's Park. A car was stopped and searched at a traffic light at College Street and Spadina Avenue, three arrested. At 11:15 a. . a stop and search occurred at Bloor and m, St. George streets. At 12 pm, stops and searches occurred at College Street and University Avenue, Queen and Bay streets, Yonge and Queen streets, and Beverley and Dundas streets, where an individual was told to erase photographs. At 12:27 pm, a stop and search occurred at Bloor and St. Thomas streets; the individual was arrested. At 12:30 pm, two individuals were stopped, searched, and arrested at Bloor and St. Thomas streets. At 12:40 pm, a stop and search occurred at 66 Wellington St. W. and Bay Street; PWPA cited. At 12:55 pm, Operations reported arrests of Black Bloc (masks) in Yorkville. At 1:02 pm, Operations reported that TAVIS "took down" a group of Black Bloc at Bloor and St. Thomas streets and seized backpacks. At 1:18 pm, a stop and search occurred at Yonge and College streets, officer cited "special powers to stop anyone we think is going to commit a crime," bandana confiscated. At 1:30 pm, a stop and search occurred at Yonge and King streets and at Bay and Dundas bus terminal, where an individual was handcuffed but let go, camera memory card missing. At 2 pm, a stop and search occurred at St. George and Harbord streets and at 151 Bloor St. W., where an individual was detained in police car. At 2:04 pm, Operations reported that three people in a car from Quebec were arrested with Molotov cocktails. At 2:15 pm, a stop and search occurred at Harbord and St. George streets. At 2:30 pm, a stop and search occurred at Queen and McCaul streets. At 2:50 pm, seven individuals were stopped, searched, and arrested at a restaurant at 429 Yonge St. At 3 pm, stops and searches occurred at University Avenue and King Street, Queen and Noble and Dundas Street West and Elizabeth Street, Queen and McCaul streets, and Wellington Street West and York Street. At 3:15 pm, a stop and request for ID occurred at Queen and Noble. At 3:35 pm, a stop and search occurred at 1266 Queen St. W., Quebec bound bus, black clothing confiscated, one arrest. At 4 pm, stops and searches occurred at Dundas and McCaul streets, Blue Jays Way and Front Street, Queen and Noble, and Lowther Avenue and Spadina Road, where individuals were detained for 30 minutes. At 6:40 pm, a stop and search occurred at Spadina and Bloor Street. At 7:32 pm, a stop and search occurred at Spadina Avenue and Queen Street. At 7:30 pm, a stop and search occurred at Stephanie and John streets, where the individual reported a camera broken. At 7:35 pm, a stop and search occurred at Dundas and McCaul streets. June 29 . 79 Toronto Police Chief Blair held a news conference at which he displayed items confiscated during the G20. The items included gas masks, goggles, spray paint, saws, hatchets, bats, tire irons, pocket knives, a staple gun, a drill, a machete, a slingshot, golf balls, rope, and bandanas. Media later reported that several items displayed were unrelated to the demonstrations, including fake weapons used in a medieval-themed role-playing game, and a crossbow and chainsaw. Chief Blair was asked by reporters if there actually was a five-metre rule in relation to the PWPA. According to media reports, "Chief Blair smiled and said, 'No, but I was trying to keep the criminals out.' " 80 Complaints . The OIPRD received complaints containing 76 allegations regarding arbitrary detention and unlawful searches that took place between June 21 and 28. The vast majority of stops and searches were of young people carrying backpacks, most of whom said they were walking or cycling on city streets. While members of the public reported that police mentioned the PWPA as grounds for searches in less than a dozen cases, a greater number reported that police alluded to special increased powers or said they were authorized to arrest people with telephone numbers on their arms or who were wearing particular items of clothing. Allan Gardens was the main area where stops and searches occurred on the Friday. On Saturday most stops occurred in the area around the summit perimeter and in the Queen's Park area. On Sunday OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Map of downtown Toronto with locations of police stops and searches indicated on it. STOP AND SEARCH TIMES o o o 81 g Ossin . Ave ton St. erin Duff JUNE 21 1. 2. noon 1:35 pm Dup o t. nt S Dup o t. nt S Jon Jon JUNE 24 JUNE 25 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. Dan forth Ave. Dan forth Ave. . Ave law Car ve. . Ave es A law Car ve. es A e Pap e Pap 1. 5:45 pm 2. 11 pm 9:55 am noon 2 pm 2:30 pm 2:30 pm 2:30 pm 2:50 pm 2:57 pm 4 pm 4:30 pm 5:41 pm 6:25 pm 11:15 pm g Ossin Davenport Rd . Davenport Rd . Bloo r St. E. Bloo r St. E. dv oa Br dv oa Br Do n Do n . Ave . Ave t. ge S Yon d. ue R Aven g Yon e St y wa rk Pa ley Val y wa rk Pa ley Val iew iew d. ue R Aven Mad ison . Ave . Ave ison Mad Rd. . rd Ave edfo a Bpadin S e. Av e. Av Rd. ford Bed Spa . Bloo r St. E. rbou Sh e Bloo r St. R E.o s R dina e d ale V alley Rd. 23 Low . Ave ther 23 16 17 15 4 14 Low . Ave ther 1 14 1 13 14 13 os yv e d ale Valle yR iew d. Av e. Ba Ba yv iew . Ave rbou Sh e Av e. 82 rn e St. rn e St. Bay Bay 16 17 15 4 14 . W res. ark C sP en . W res. ark C sP en o 26 W. r St. Bloo 26 W. r St. Bloo Hosk e. in Av W s Pa een Qu is Jarv St. ley es ell E. W St. ley es ell E. JUNE 26 St. o 9:15 am 9:40 am 11:30 am 2:15 pm 3:30 pm 3:30 pm 4 pm 5:15 pm 5:30 pm 6 pm 6:45 pm 6:30 pm 9:30 pm 9:30 pm 9:40 pm 9:45 pm 9:50 pm 10:15 pm 15 13 15 13 . W. y St esle Well Chu Riv e r Riv e r St. e Qu e Qu Spa Spa Nob . le St 20 21 25 18 King . St. W 2 o 1. 10:40 am 2. 11 am 3. 11 am 4. 11:15 am 5. noon 6. noon 7. noon 8. noon 9. 12:40 pm 10. 1:18 pm 11. 1:30 pm 12. 1:30 pm 13. 2 pm 14. 2 pm 15. 2:15 pm 16. 2:30 pm 17. 3 pm 18. 3 pm 19. 3 pm 20. t.3:15 pm le S Nob 21. 3:35 pm 20 21 22. 4 pm 25 18 23. 4 pm 24. 4 pm 25. 4 pm 26. 6:40 pm 27. 7:30 pm . 2 28. g St. W 7:32 pm Kin 29. 7:35 pm JUNE 27 . Ave ton a Parli a Parli St. St. l. ire P onsh Dev E. l. res. e St. ire P rk C g onsh s Pa t. Geor Dev een S Qu ard Gerr . St. E ard Gerr . St. E men is Jarv men t St t St e. in Av . Hosk t. W ley S es Well . . Harb St ord . Harb St ord . a din C a din C 2 12 13 2 10 1 12 13 St. St. lton lton Car Car 4 5 4 5 2 2 2 2 8 2 8 2 . 6 7 rdens . E. 1 6 7 rdens t 1 St. E 10 llen Ga rd S n Ga rard erra A Alle G Ger Chu St. rch Dun das . St. E Dun das . St. E St. St. e St. G E. res. rk C orge St. rch Broa Broa St. Eliz abe Eliz abe ve. wA Bayvie ve. w A St. dvie River ve. wA dvie w Bayvie 5 1 1 5 1 4 4 Que t. E. en S Que t. E. en S 2 9 12 1 . Ave 2 9 12 eg Coll . 3 e St Spa dina . Ave Dun das . St. W res. Dun eg Coll . 3 e St res. . Ave l St. ina aupad McC S rrard 11 Ge . W. St t. th S McC rrard 11 Ge . W. St t. th S Rive r St . 1 . Ave da Dun s St . E. da Dun s St . E. ern East . Ave ern East erly Bev das erly Bev aul St. 19 12 22 29 7 Uni 19 12 8 22 29 7 Uni 8 Que t. E. en S Que t. E. en S E rn te as e. Av E rn te as e. Av La S ke h eB or . lvd E. S ke h eB or . lvd E. St. St. i vers ve. ty A on D on D y lle Va y lle Va La Bay St. Bay y wa rk Pa y wa rk Pa i vers St. g Yon ve. ty A . St. W ie han Step 28 St. ie han Step 28 St. 6 16 7 7 6 g Yon King . St. E Fron t St. E. King . St. E Fron t St. E. rd r ine Ex y. pw Ga rd 16 olse 1 W t. ley S Que . t. W en S 6 27 ley St. . olse t. W 1 W en S Que 6 27 ily Em . St 11 11 Ga a er J Low r ine Ex y. pw Bath urst St. Kin . W. g St Bath urst St. e St e St York Joh St. St. York . . a er J Low 5 Kin to . W.lling g St We 24 Joh 17 3 n St . W. 9 83 5 in Well 24 gton St t. on S 17 gt ellin 10 W 9 10 8 9 W. . ily Em . St 18 18 St. gton ellin 10 W 9 wy. wy. 10 Exp Exp iner iner Gard Gard . E. . E. lvd lvd eB eB hor hor eS eS Lak Lak rvis rvis St. St. n St . n St . e Ch rry . St e Ch rry . St JUNE 28 1. 4:45 pm 2. 5 pm OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR St. erin Duff Bay St. Bay in Well gton . St. W . St. W gton W. ellin t St. W n Fro Way 11 Jay Blue Fro . t. W nt S Qu ee Q ns St. yE ua . Qu ee Q ns yE ua . Blue Way 11 Jay iner y. Expw Gard iner y. Expw ry er Ch ry er Ch Gardiner Expwy. . ay W . . s Qu .W .W Gardiner Expwy. ueen Blvd Blvd e e Q hor hor eS eS Lak Lak Gard en Que s Qu . ay W . St . St Interdiction Zone Interdiction Zone 3 3 OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD the stops and searches mostly occurred in an area of downtown bordered by Bloor Street on the north, Yonge Street on the east, the perimeter fence on the south, and Spadina Avenue on the west. There were also a number of searches at Queen and Noble streets. Of those not arrested, 10 people made allegations that their property was damaged or confiscated. At least eight people claimed they were targeted for searches because they were French-speaking. assemblies. It also provided current Canadian jurisprudence related to investigative detentions and search and seizures. The segment on investigative detention provided a high level overview of the legal parameters as well as a discussion of the limitations of police powers. It included a discussion of sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter and the lawfulness of investigative detentions. The training, however, did not provide practical examples or indicate how officers should apply the law in the general circumstances of the G20. The training on search and seizure also accurately summarized the current status of the law. It highlighted the limitations on police powers. The training might have benefited from more examples of the appropriate scope of powers. There was no instruction on the practical application of these principles. This oversight may have caused uncertainty among officers on the streets during the G20. As a result, police may have used a wide degree of discretion in applying the law. With the exception of sections 7, 8, and 9, the online training did not discuss the Charter in depth. A more substantive discussion on Charter rights should have been required for G20 training. The one-day, face-to-face training appears to have presented an accurate summary of the legal parameters surrounding police powers. The focus seems to have been on providing officers with the ability to justify police actions. Although a limited discussion of Charter rights was included, the training does not seem to have presented a balanced perspective of protesters or the important role of peaceful assembly in Canada. There was no training on how to facilitate peaceful protests. The focus was on suppressing the escalation of crowd activities and on controlling access. The presentation did not provide officers with sufficient training on public or citizen engagement. The training simply reminded officers to be polite, avoid arguments, and place safety of the public as a primary goal. Examples of ways to respond appropriately to the public were limited, and there did not appear to be a process which developed response skills or approaches. 83 Issues and discussion . Police training on authority to stop and search . The Toronto Police College designed the G20 training curriculum for TPS G20 officers. Online and face-to-face training covered aspects of police powers and authority to stop and search. Online training was mandatory for members of all police services. The training was delivered through online presentations, videos, and interactive elements. It lasted approximately 2-1/2 hours. Officers were assessed through interactive exercises and an online test upon completion of each topic. During the face-to-face training, one hour was dedicated to the examination of the articulation and the legal formation of reasonable grounds and the Charter. One hour was also dedicated to operational considerations, including prisoner management, access zones, memorandum books, and the PWPA. The mandatory training for out-of-province services provided officers with instruction on Ontario statutes such as the: Provincial Offences Act, Public Works Protection Act, Trespass to Property Act, Liquor Licence Act, Mental Health Act, Highway Traffic Act, and the provincial Special Investigations Unit. The training on the PWPA was also limited. The training outlined the main concepts of the Act, but failed to explain how and when it should be applied at the G20. The training notes stated that the legislation was enacted to create an authority to control access to designated places. However, the training screenshots did not explain the proper application of the PWPA. As a result, it is possible that police may have taken a broad application of the PWPA. Since the training occurred before Regulation 233/10 was made public, it did not refer to the regulation or its parameters. Given that the PWPA regulation was not covered in the online or face-to-face training for officers, it would have been prudent for TPS to arrange a mandatory training segment once the regulation was filed. In this way any confusion about the application and use of the PWPA and the regulation might have been avoided. The training on the duties of a guard in protecting public works instructed officers that legally it was an offence for them NOT to protect public works, and indicated that the situation was the same as in a riot after the proclamation was read. The trainers said, "Simply put, you have to act or you will be breaking the law." This instruction may have motivated police officers to take broader action than they would otherwise have taken. Overall, the training provided regarding police powers to stop and search people and the rights of citizens when they are stopped by police was insufficient. The relevant online training module was about two and a half hours, of which perhaps half was devoted to search and detention protocols. The face-to-face training was primarily intended to instruct officers on the use of gas masks, defensive tactics, and crowd management techniques. One hour was given to legal aspects of reasonable grounds and Charter rights. At most, police officers received a total of three hours of instruction on applicable laws, police powers, and citizens' Charter rights in relation to stops and searches. Officer interpretation of powers to stop and search . Police apparently relied on a number of different laws as authority to stop and search people during the G20. These laws included the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, the Criminal Code of Canada, the Trespass to Property Act, the Public Works Protection Act, as well as common law. 84 Analysis . Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act . Toronto Police Service and all other municipal police forces had no authority under the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act to stop and search people. Only RCMP officers had authority under this Act. No non-RCMP officers used the FMIO as authority to stop and search people. The OIPRD does not have information regarding incidents of RCMP officers searching people under this Act. Criminal Code of Canada . The Criminal Code of Canada allows officers to search people if they have arrested them. Section 117.02 (1) of the Code also allows search and seizure without a warrant: Where a peace officer believes on reasonable grounds (a) that a weapon, an imitation firearm, a prohibited device, any ammunition, any prohibited ammunition or an explosive substance was used in the commission of an offence, or (b) that an offence is being committed, or has been committed, under any provision of this Act that involves, or the subjectmatter of which is, a firearm, an imitation firearm, a cross-bow, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or an explosive substance, Analysis . The online training provided appeared to present an accurate analysis of the legal parameters of Criminal Code provisions, including riot and unlawful OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD 85 And evidence of the offence is likely to be found on a person, in a vehicle or in any place or premises other than a dwelling-house, the peace officer may, where the conditions for obtaining a warrant exist but, by reason of exigent circumstances, it would not be practicable to obtain a warrant, search, without warrant, the person, vehicle, place or premises, and seize any thing by means of or in relation to which that peace officer believes on reasonable grounds the offence is being committed or has been committed. The circumstances of most of the stops and searches did not meet the Criminal Code's criteria of a warrantless search. Police could not have reasonably believed that most of the people who were stopped were about to commit an indictable offence, nor were most of them under arrest. Illegal weapons as defined by the Criminal Code of Canada do not normally include bandanas, black clothing, goggles, and water bottles. o reating a nuisance or interfering with the use and C enjoyment of the park by other persons o nless authorized by permit, holding a picnic, U organized gathering, or special event for more than 25 persons.23 Provincial offences officers are authorized to inform a person of the provisions of this by-law and to request compliance with it. If their duties include enforcement of this by-law, they are authorized to order a person believed to be in contravention of these provisions to stop the activity and/or leave the park. Where a person contravenes these provisions, or fails to comply with any order, the permission and licence of the person to remain in that park is revoked.24 However, there is case law that suggests denying an individual entry to city property may violate their Charter rights. In R. v. Semple, the defendants were charged under the provisions of Ontario's Trespass to Property Act for entering the grounds of Toronto City Hall, from which they had been banned. At the time they were attending a memorial for a homeless man, which segued into a demonstration in support of the homeless. The issue was simply whether the City of Toronto's prerogative as a property owner was outweighed by constitutional protections contained in the Charter. Justice Knazan found peaceful entry into the square to be a form of expression and that the effect of the City of Toronto's notice under the Trespass to Property Act was to violate the defendants' Charter rights. In the circumstances, the ban could not be justified under the terms of section 1 of the Charter. Toronto Police Service officers told the OIPRD that they have authority to enforce the Trespass to Property Act in parks owned by the City of Toronto. They said that CRU (bicycle) officers often police city parks and would be aware of this law and their authority to enforce it. They cited letters on file with the police service that give them that authority. 23 Toronto City Parks Bylaws 608-3 and 608-11. 24 Toronto City Parks Bylaw 608-53. A number of officers, who had been deployed to Allan Gardens on June 25, told the OIPRD they had been given specific orders to search bags and it was their understanding that entry to the park was prohibited to people who refused to allow their bags to be searched. At least one officer acknowledged that, in his experience, the G20 had been the only occasion on which they were instructed to search people in parks like that. There was likely no valid reason to prohibit entry to Allan Gardens and no valid prohibited activity at the park under the Trespass to Property Act. In addition, using this Act to justify searching or removing people from a public place may raise Charter issues. Officers said that the orders to search backpacks at Allan Gardens on June 25 were given at the beginning of their shift when they were briefed and paraded by their senior officers. They believed that the orders had come from the MICC. Later in the day, before the demonstration march left Allan Gardens, officers reported that they received directions from MICC over their radios to stop searching bags. The OIPRD could not find direct orders to search backpacks at Allan Gardens in any disclosed Incident Command scribe notes or minutes of meetings. MICC scribe notes contained no direct order to cease searching bags, but it is possible that, if an order actually went out between 3:30 pm and 4 pm regarding the PWPA authority being limited to the fence and authorization for arrests having to come from the Investigations unit, officers may have taken that as an order to stop searching people. It is also possible that orders to search and to cease searching people at Allan Gardens could have originated from someone in the MICC without their being recorded in scribe notes. There may have been intelligence reports that spurred such an order from the Intelligence Unit or from the Unified Command Centre in Barrie. The OIPRD did not receive disclosure of intelligence notes, bulletins, or orders. Public Works Protection Act . The Public Works Protection Act covers three main areas: Public works . The PWPA designates as a "public work" a list of transportation and energy infrastructure, public utilities, and other "works" whether publicly or privately owned. Provincial and municipal buildings are also designated as "public works." The PWPA also allows for "any other building, place or work" to be designated by regulation. 86 Peace officers and their powers . Trespass to Property Act . Police officers used the authority of the Trespass to Property Act to search people's bags as they entered Allan Gardens on Friday, June 25th. The Trespass to Property Act creates the offence of trespass for those who, without the express permission of the occupier, enter on private or public property or engage in an activity on the premises when it is prohibited under this Act [RSO 1990, c. T.21, s. 2 (1)]. A police officer may arrest with warrant any person he or she believes on reasonable and probable grounds to be on the premises in contravention of section 2 of the Act [s. 9 (1)]. Although city parks are open to the public, a number of prohibited activities could result in a person being asked to leave the park, fined, or arrested. Some of these activities include: o ndulging in riotous, boisterous, violent, I threatening, or illegal conduct or using profane or abusive language The PWPA provides for the appointment, by anyone having charge over a public work, of "guards" with the powers of a peace officer, including powers to require people entering or approaching a public work to identify themselves and to state the purpose for which they wish entry. In addition, the guard or peace officer may search, without warrant, any person or vehicle entering or attempting to enter a public work. The guard or peace officer can refuse to permit a person to enter a public work and can use as much force as necessary to prevent entry. Enforcement . A guard or peace officer has the power to arrest, without warrant, any person who refuses to comply with a request or direction of a guard or peace officer and who enters or attempts to enter a public work without lawful authority. A person found guilty of an offence under the Act is liable to a fine of not more than $500 and/or imprisonment of not more than two months. The PWPA has been and still is used to provide the legislative authority for conducting searches at provincial courthouses. It is also used to secure power-generating stations. According to Toronto police, TPS headquarters is a municipal building that falls under the purview of the PWPA. In this case, officers deployed outside TPS headquarters probably acted within their authority in stopping and searching people approaching that building. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD 87 Two months before the G20, the province attempted to obtain support for its security measures through an agreement under the federal Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, which would allow for an arrangement between the federal and provincial governments for additional police powers. However, the federal government did not agree that this arrangement was needed and, in its view, police officers' existing powers and authorities were sufficient for the G8 and G20 summits.25 The impetus for requesting that a regulation be added to the existing PWPA came during the planning stage from lawyers for the City of Toronto who worked with the TPS legal team on options for authority to control access to the Interdiction Zone. A lawyer for the city sought legal opinions and held discussions with lawyers for the province, and eventually a letter of request was drafted. Chief Blair said he was of the opinion that the common law authorities were adequate, but the indication from the legal team was that they had discussed this earlier and were strongly of the opinion that this was necessary. Ironically, at the time Chief Blair remembers saying, "It's not necessary, but it can't hurt." On June 2, cabinet's Legislation and Regulations Committee passed O. Regulation 233/10, which would be in effect from June 21 to 27, 2010. The regulation was signed by the Lieutenant Governor on June 3 and published on e-Laws on June 16. Regulations to laws are often made in committees and passed without announcement. Regulations are routinely passed in this manner every year. It would not be correct to say the regulation to the PWPA was passed in secret - that would imply there was wilfulness on the part of the government to keep the regulation secret. The Independent Police Review Director does not believe this was the case. The area designated by Ontario Regulation 233/10 of the PWPA did not extend outside the boundary of the G20 security fence. Therefore, police authority and relevant PWPA powers to stop and search also did not extend outside the boundaries of the designated area. Because the PWPA restricts entry or attempted entry to a public work or any approach to it, it was perhaps practical and appropriate for officers located just outside gates to the fence to invoke their PWPA power. On the afternoon of June 24, two people were arrested under the Public Works Protection Act. One arrest occurred at Union Station and Front Street, the other at Bremner Boulevard and York Street. Both these locations were more than five metres from the G20 perimeter fence. Later that evening Incident Command was advised of a media release regarding parties arrested under the PWPA. Chief Blair said he was unaware that the regulation had been passed until he read reports in the media on the morning of the 25th about arrests made the previous day in which the PWPA was cited. Apparently he did not receive or read the letter from the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services advising him the regulation had been passed. The Chief then sought advice from his staff about the boundaries of the public work designation and was told it was five metres outside the fence. Later that morning, Chief Blair spoke to the media about the regulation and told them the designation extended five metres out from the fence. At a 12 noon meeting of command unit leaders, the Incident Command Investigative Lead confirmed that the addition to the existing PWPA was the fence and the Interdiction Zone. He said that officers on the ground should be informed that officers could make an arrest if there was a threat to the fence or IZ. However, if there was an arrest, the Investigative Chief would decide if the charge would go ahead. At about 3:30 that afternoon, legal direction was received that the boundary for PWPA authority was the fence itself - there was no five-metre rule. The Incident Command Investigative Lead immediately instructed the Investigative Chief to update all officers in the field as soon as possible. Two-and-a-half hours later, the Investigative Chief sent an email to the Incident Commander asking for an opinion on the text of the PWPA scope of authority with the amendment indicating that the regulation did not extend outside the fence. Three hours after that, the Incident Commander requested that the revised PWPA document be distributed to officers. It was emailed to all MICC sections for further distribution moments later. Although there appear to be only two arrests made under the PWPA, officers cited it as authority to stop and search people throughout the weekend. It is possible that many officers may not have received the notification indicating there was no five-metre rule, and continued to use the regulation as authority to search people. Also, considering the broad range of facilities and buildings to which the PWPA applies, there exists the possibility that almost any site could be considered a public work for the purposes of the Act. Certainly, some of the officers interviewed by the OIPRD were not entirely clear about what constituted a "public work." Some said it included "a public building"; some compared their authority to "walking into court or the Air Canada Centre - you have to show your bag." Neither the Incident Command public information unit nor the Chief of Police made any announcement to the public or the media that the interpretation of the PWPA regulation was not correct, nor did they inform the public about the correct boundaries. The manner in which the existence of a Public Works Protection Act and its application during the G20 came to light, and the way in which the police handled communications around it, was a public relations disaster. The media learned about the PWPA and its new regulation as a result of arrests made after the regulation had come into force. The public had not been told of this regulation that would affect them during the G20 weekend. It certainly appeared as though the regulation had been passed in secret - and that's what the media reported. According to the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services (MCSCS), it was up to police to announce the provision of the new regulation. If Chief Blair himself didn't learn the regulation had been passed until he read it in the news on the 25th, then someone in his office neglected to bring to his attention the letter from MCSCS advising him of its passage. Chief Blair's defence of the new regulation was weak. When it turned out he had been given incorrect information about the boundaries, he chose not to make any public correction. It wasn't until the G20 was over that he said anything about it. In a news conference, the Chief displayed to the media items that had been confiscated during searches. Some of the items - axes, bats, and the nail gun - may have justified some searches. Other items - bandanas and swim goggles - did not. That police placed more emphasis on seeking out Black Bloc than respecting the rights of citizen is clear in the Chief's answer to the media when asked if there actually was a five-metre rule: "No, but I wanted to keep the criminals out." 88 Common law and duties under the Police Services Act . Under common law, police duties include preserving the peace and preventing crime, and police officers have extensive common law powers to carry out these duties. The Stop . 25 R.R. McMurtry, Report of the Review of the Public Works Protection Act (Toronto: Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, 2011), online Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services . 53 S. Agrell, "Police practise for G20 Summit by simulating hostage taking" The Globe and Mail (19 April 2010), online: The Globe and Mail . 54 J. Yang, "A glimpse behind the G20 security curtain" Toronto Star (3 June 2010), online: The Star . 55 Global National, (3 June 2010) Global Television. 56 "Protests continue in Toronto as G20 nears" CBC News (22 June 2010), online: CBC See also: M. Gee, "Why the G20 protesters won't condemn violence" The Globe and Mail (23 June 2010), online: The Globe and Mail . Some anarchist groups had threatened to target people who appeared to work for large corporations. In response, the media reported that the police had advised people heading to the city core to "dress down." was any reference to the Community Relations Group and its responsibilities under the TPS public information plan. An ISU document titled "Message to the Community" provided more information to the public about its role in supporting protesters. It identified north Queen's Park as a designated speech area and expressed the hope that those wishing to protest would take advantage of this space to send their message to the summit delegates. It said that the designated speech area would be appropriately staffed with police to ensure the safety of those who attended to protest. As well, it indicated that the ISU was working with groups that wished to march to and from this location and confirmed its support of peaceful protests wherever they might occur. Much more detailed information would, however, have been helpful. The summer 2010 edition of Our Toronto, the City of Toronto newsletter, included a three-page article on the G20 summit and what to expect during that weekend.57 It covered a range of issues, such as the security zones and the impact of the summit on traffic, the TTC, the operations of Union Station, and area parking. It also included the same information on protests that had been provided in the "G20: Integrated Security Unit" pamphlet, with an additional reference to the designated speech area and the plan (which was not carried out) to televise activities at the park and transmit the images to the delegates at the Convention Centre. The public was invited to send security-related questions to the Community Relations Group, but no reference was made to the CRG's role in facilitating protests. The ISU website (the address for which was included in all the printed materials) gave additional information on a range of issues related to the policing of the G20 summit, but even there the potential of the medium was not used well to disseminate information about the role of the police in facilitating protests. The website listed 10 questions and answers related to the right to protest, gave a few brief paragraphs on the CRG's 57 "What to expect during the G20 -- June 26 & 27, 2010" Our Toronto (Summer 2010) 14, online: Toronto Communications with peaceful protesters. The breadth of information the ISU was responsible for communicating was extensive, and, despite the time constraints in preparing for the G20, commendable efforts were made to communicate effectively with the public. There were, however, significant shortcomings. 249 250 Lack of a central resource or repository of information for protesters. The information that was distributed in printed form about the role the police would have in assisting peaceful protests was small in quantity and scattered among various documents. A pamphlet developed by the ISU titled "G20: Integrated Security Unit" contained the following passage: Demonstrators. The Integrated Security Unit recognizes and supports the guaranteed rights and freedoms as stated in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms including the freedoms of opinion, expression and peaceful assembly. We believe most groups will want to express themselves in a peaceful and responsible manner however we are preparing for any eventuality. Any interaction police have with demonstrators will be measured, balanced and appropriate to the circumstances at hand. Demonstrations that result in criminal behaviour will not be tolerated and specific charges will be applicable to anyone committing criminal offences. These two paragraphs warned demonstrators that the police would respond to any criminal behaviour but provided little information to the public about the role the ISU was willing to play in supporting peaceful protests. Notably absent Public communications. The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) did not receive any complaints about the public communications process, but the systemic review revealed that there were some communications shortfalls in reaching out to the public in general, and, in particular, to the peaceful protesters. These shortfalls are set out below. The media climate. Deficiencies in the communications with peaceful protesters cannot be examined in a vacuum. Public attitudes toward the G20 summit were formed to a large extent by the media coverage, which conveyed an overall sense of trepidation. Media reports emphasized the security measures that were being implemented and their cost, which was reported to be more than $1 billion - far more than for previous summits. The media ran stories about private security firms being contracted to provide airport-style 51 Young, Jennifer. "G20 Security to be Massive" Toronto Star (23 March 2010). OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD 251 role in ensuring that the views of the community were considered in planning for security during the summit, and included a section titled "Information to Demonstrators," which reprinted section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and a list of provisions from the Criminal Code. The one reference to the designated speech area did not even provide its location. The website did, however, encourage protesters to contact the CRG in order to work with the police in planning their protest, but it gave no information on what this cooperation would entail. In general, the media environment in which the Integrated Security Unit was operating was overwhelmingly focused on the efforts by the police to prevent any criminal activity associated with protests - and to deal with the likelihood of that occurring. In this context, it became even more challenging to carry out effective communications regarding the policing of peaceful protest. Not surprisingly, the message that the police were willing to work with peaceful protesters was not widely received, and neither were some of the CRG's outreach efforts. In a media environment where the police and the protesters were portrayed as readying themselves for confrontation, much more should have been done to emphasize the role of the police in supporting peaceful protests and keeping them safe. Although it would be naive to believe that improved police communications and outreach would have prevented those individuals intent on engaging in criminal activity from doing what they did, these same police efforts could have been used to encourage a healthier trust relationship between peaceful protesters and the police in the lead-up to the summit. Nothing challenged public trust more than the passage of Regulation 233/10, which applied the Public Works Protection Act to the summit's inner security zone. This Act, which had been passed in 1939 to protect public buildings against sabotage during the Second World War, gave the police powers to search, identify, and question people in the area of the fence covered by the Act. The regulation was passed hurriedly by the Ontario government at the request of the Toronto Police Service without any public input or publicity. When word of this law finally leaked out on June 25, on the eve of the summit, the media referred to it as a "secret law." The request for the regulation required the signature of TPS Chief Blair, who later told the OIPRD that he signed it in May 2010 at the request of officials, although he felt it was "not necessary but couldn't hurt." The problem was compounded when Chief Blair told a news conference as the summit began that the law gave police the authority to search and ask identification from anyone within five metres of the outer security fence and to arrest anyone for refusing to comply. Chief Blair was conveying a mistaken interpretation of the law that was prevalent within the Toronto Police Service. When informed of the mistake shortly after speaking to the media, Blair ordered that a correction be sent immediately to his officers. However, he did not hold a news conference to inform the media and the public of the change. Only after the summit did the Chief admit publicly that his interpretation was a mistake. the police would accommodate lawful peaceful protests connected to the G20 summit. The police used Twitter too, though not in any significant degree, to communicate with protesters. Some Twitter messages did, however, advise the public that certain areas of the city should be avoided for safety reasons. The ability to transmit real-time messages through Twitter was a potentially powerful tool that could have been used by the police for communicating with protesters not only during the planning stages of a protest but also during the protest itself. The way in which social media services were used by the police certainly helped to augment the printed information available regarding peaceful protests. Yet social media was just one element of the TPS communications strategy. While a person consuming all the available police communications may have been able to piece together an understanding of the role of the CRG, the disjointed manner in which the information was conveyed, and the absence of any one place in which the role of the police in facilitating peaceful protest was fully explained, made it challenging for most people to know what the police were willing to do to assist peaceful protesters. The media. The media, both domestic and international, are a vital component of summit meetings such as the G8 and the G20. There would be little point in global leaders getting together in one location if no one wrote about or broadcast the meetings, photographed the participants, or blogged about the event. In recent years, the media have expanded exponentially in numbers, technologies, and capabilities. Where two decades ago there were a few hundred print reporters at such a meeting, a dozen television networks, two or three news agencies, and a handful of photographers, today the media corps consists of a cast of thousands. Potential threats against media participants have also increased. Security officials must make critical decisions on accreditation for media organizations and their representatives and on how best to handle the information flow. Some organizations, including police services, are having a difficult time adapting to the new media environment. Both the RCMP and the Toronto Police Service made some use of the social media in the lead-up to the G20, but they failed to recognize or exploit the full potential of new media journalists. 252 Poor use of social media. Social media were used to disseminate information to the public, but they were no substitute for a robust communications plan. For example, on June 20, 2010, the Toronto Police Service uploaded a video onto YouTube in which two members of the Community Relations Group gave a brief description of the group's role during the G20 summit. The following day, TPS uploaded an interview with a police officer about the way the police were facilitating peaceful protest groups. On June 25 the TPS also uploaded a video of two police officers discussing the role that the CRG had played the previous day in facilitating a peaceful protest by First Nations groups. These videos were certainly informative, but their usefulness was diminished by the fact that the ISU website did not have any link to them. In any case, with only a few exceptions, such YouTube items do not attract significant audiences. The TPS Facebook site was updated with photographs of police officers facilitating a number of G20 summit protests. This site also provided contact information for the CRG, emphasizing that The failure of the designated speech area. The failure to establish the audio-visual equipment at the designated speech area in north Queen's Park resulted from the inability of the Toronto Police Service and the RCMP to work effectively together on the project. The RCMP explained that, because the designated speech area was inside the Outer Zone, it fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the TPS and, therefore, its own role was simply advisory. The TPS, for its part, explained that the designated speech area was a novel idea advanced by the RCMP and that it was established only at the Mounties' suggestion. The TPS, in contrast, had always considered the entire city as a free-speech area. Apparently the TPS did not have the capacity to establish the audio-visual link without the support from the RCMP, and the reason there was no audiovisual link to the summit was simply that no RCMP support was ever received. There is no evidence, however, that this link would have defused the street protests or halted the sporadic violence. Accreditation. The process for accreditation for the media at the G20 closely resembled the process for individuals who needed access to the security zone because they lived or worked in the area. Major media outlets were accredited through the Summit Management Office (SMO), and smaller, or "secondary," media obtained their identification from the Alternative Media Centre - a media association in Canada with offices in Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal. Media accreditation at events such as the G20 typically gives journalists access to a media centre and the right to circulate to some extent in the secure area. It also serves as identification at any protests or demonstrations outside the official event. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD The media centre. The Direct Energy Centre (DEC), a large convention building on the grounds of the Canadian National Exhibition just west of the downtown core, was designated as the G8/G20 Summits Media Centre. The international media worked first out of Huntsville for the G8 meetings, and then out of the DEC in Toronto for the G20. The journalists were transported from their hotels to the DEC every day of the summit meetings. The DEC provided facilities for all members of the media, which numbered between 5,000 and 6,000 people. The site included an area of restricted access, providing a secure working environment for the international media. The majority of journalists who were arrested represented the non-traditional media. However, two photographers from the National Post newspaper in Toronto were also arrested, held in jail for 24 hours, and reported on release that their equipment had been mishandled. They were attempting to photograph clashes between police and demonstrators, and they were charged with failing to comply with a police order to disperse. One arrest that received much publicity involved a freelance journalist who worked for a number of publications, including Britain's Guardian newspaper. His arrest outside the Novotel hotel on The Esplanade was witnessed by a high-profile TV host in Toronto, who spread the news on the Internet. He reported that the journalist was punched by police while being arrested. The TV host, who had SMO accreditation, was allowed to leave, but the other journalist was arrested and taken to the Prisoner Processing Centre on Eastern Avenue, where he was held. hit five times by taser guns held by RCMP officers at Vancouver Airport. Details of the incident came to light after Paul Pritchard, the man who recorded the video, went to court and complained that the police had taken possession of his video and refused to return it to him. As soon as the judge ordered its release, Pritchard gave the video to the press. The ensuing publicity led to a public inquiry and charges against some of the officers. During the G20 in Toronto, the police did not seem to have a clear understanding of the various levels of accreditation for the media - or of the content that the media and the public without any accreditation were entitled to report on and document. It seems that accreditation from the Alternative Media Centre (AMC) was not recognized by police, even though its credentials were included in the accreditation process. In the incident outside the Novotel hotel, protesters were boxed in and an order was given that only media members with the G20 lanyard were to be released. All others were to be arrested. This order, which came from the higher ranks, failed to recognize that those members of the media accredited by the AMC had been granted accreditation as journalists, videographers, and photographers, but at a lower level of access. This lack of understanding filtered down to the officers on the street and resulted in the arrest of a journalist accredited through the AMC. Equally important, the police need to be much more knowledgeable about what members of the media and the public are entitled to film and document. Before the G20, the police were not provided with the appropriate training to understand that the media and any member of the public were at liberty to record (by photograph, audio, or videotape) events that were taking place in non-secure zones, provided this recording did not obstruct the officers in the execution of their duties This misunderstanding led not only to strained relations between the police and the public but to detentions, searches, and arrests, some of which appear to have involved aggressive and excessive force. Some media personnel were detained or arrested and told not to return to that particular protest. Others were traumatized by the way they were treated. They complained they could not, as a result, report on a subsequent day's events. Complaints from the media. The OIPRD has received 15 complaints from the media. Four of the complaints came from members of the media who had been accredited by the Summit Management Office, five from members of the media who had been accredited by the Alternate Media Centre, and the remaining six complaints were from members of the media who appear not to have been accredited by any organization. In broad strokes, while the complaints seem to reflect a lack of understanding by the police of the approved accreditation system, they also appear to reflect possible misunderstandings of the media's entitlement to report and film events. These various misunderstandings created situations in which members of the media were detained and had their possessions searched. In several instances the situation escalated and the detention led to the arrest of members of the media, with allegations of excessive force being used on occasion to make those arrests as well as damage done to computers, cameras, and video cameras. The overwhelming majority of the media who reported on the G20 summit acted responsibly and appropriately. A few, however, did not. Although freedom of expression is one of the most entrenched and strongly defended rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, it is, like all other rights, not absolute. The media must appreciate that, in some circumstances, they may unduly inflame a situation or create a danger to themselves, the police, or the public simply by the way they set out to get to a story or to videotape an incident. If and when that occurs, they are required to follow police orders, regardless of whether they feel they are warranted. Additionally, in the appropriate circumstances, members of the media may be properly subjected to lawful detentions and searches by the police. The fact that they are journalists does not of itself insulate them or provide them with a blanket immunity. 253 254 The media climate. Unfortunately, in the climate of suspicion and confrontation that prevailed, the police, the protesters, and the media all seem to have been wary and apprehensive of each other even before the summit began. The lack of communications between the police and journalists persisted throughout the G20 meetings. The news leading up to the summit conveyed a sense of trepidation, and subsequent media reports did nothing to quell this fear as they focused less on the G20 meetings and more on the street battles between the police and the protesters. This emphasis arguably resulted in a loss of public confidence in policing in general and in the Toronto Police Service in particular. Some journalists were wary not only of the police but of hard-core protesters as well. The Toronto Star circulated a "tip sheet" to its reporters which described "how to get through a protest with minimal pain or injury." The tips included this advice: get a gas mask (to offer relief from tear gas), keep a bandana soaked in vinegar in a sealed bag at all times (as backup to the gas mask), bring a helmet (to protect against rocks thrown by hard-core protesters), and strike a balance in the way you dress (to guard against the riot police treating you like a protester or protesters targeting you as main-stream media).58 58 "Getting ready to cover the G20," a 'Protest Tip Sheet' given to reporters covering the G20, from InsideToronto.com. Issues and analysis. Police and security forces in all countries that host global summits have no choice but to rise to the challenges our world presents today: not only must they investigate and accredit thousands of media representatives in the lead-up to the meetings, but they must also recognize that, with almost every journalist, protester, and observer holding a camera of some sort, their behaviour is liable to be recorded at all times. They must accept that, even under tremendous pressure, they may be held accountable for their actions. In their training, the police must be made aware that they are now operating in a digital age. Almost everyone has a camera or a mobile phone, and everyone takes photos. Except in Quebec, which has some restrictions, there are no laws in the rest of Canada against taking pictures in public places. In addition, the Toronto Police Service has video cameras positioned around the city. All police officers should heed the role a video camera played in the tragic case of Robert Dziekanski, a Polish immigrant who died on October 14, 2007, after being OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Recommendations . 255 o ajor events require robust communication M plans. Police services in Ontario should work with the IPRD to develop plans for improved communications. The public's support for security measures is crucial to their success. Police services should develop a detailed public communications plan for major protests that includes the police's role in facilitating peaceful protest. o olice chiefs and command leads should P proactively communicate with the public through traditional media such as television, radio, and newspapers, as well as through non-traditional means such as social media, to address situations, to explain measures being taken, and to seek the public's cooperation. Protesters should be made aware of likely police action so that they can make informed decisions. o olice services involved in large events or protests P should make a greater effort to communicate policing plans to protests groups at an earlier stage of planning. As much as possible, police should develop communication strategies for protest groups that are reluctant to communicate or respond to police. Such attempts by police would go a long way to build trust and better relations. o he police have a very public role. Officers must T recognize that the public will take photographs and video recordings of them performing their duties, especially at events such as protests. The police must recognize the public's right to do so without being subject to detention, search, or confiscation and destruction of property. Disciplinary action specific to this issue should be developed. The Ontario Association of Police Chiefs and the Government of Ontario should consider whether any amendment to the Code of Conduct regulation is required to effect this change. o n this day and age we understand that surveillance I cameras, including closed-circuit television cameras, are used on the streets daily and more so during major public events or protests. Police services or municipal bodies that put up these cameras have a duty to inform people that they are under surveillance. They must ensure that there is visible notice to the public that they are being filmed. This requirement includes signs on or near the cameras. o olice services should be aware that largeP scale events are likely to attract the attention of traditional and non-traditional media. Policies should be developed regarding criteria for media accreditation. These policies should be public documents and involve the media in their creation. Police services planning for security at large events should ensure that accreditation of all media (including new media and non-traditional media) is handled by one office. The accreditation, once issued, should be respected by police. That said, media personnel must be aware that they are subject to police action if they obstruct or hinder officers in performing their duties. Chapter 11: Training . 11 OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD 256 OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR o ntario Provincial Statutes and Special O Investigations Unit for Out-of-Province G20 Officers o RAD Operator Training L o RAD Training for the Public Safety and L Emergency Management Unit. The G20 training largely focused on preparing officers to respond to threats and civil unrest. Training primarily examined policing procedures and tactics and legal authorities for enforcing the rule of law and maintaining public order. Little time, attention, and consideration was directed at Charter rights pertaining to freedom of assembly, freedom of association, or freedom of expression, and practically no attention was given to human rights considerations. As a result, a number of themes and issues emerged from the OIPRD's review and analysis of G20 training materials. Toronto police officers were required to complete three training components. Specifically, two online (Training Modules A and B) were accessible through the Canadian Police Knowledge Network (CPKN), and one in-class (face-to-face) training day was held at the Toronto Police College. The online components were to be completed before the face-to-face training began. In total, Toronto police officers received approximately 15 hours of training. Officers from other Ontario municipal services were invited, but not required to attend the face-to-face training in Toronto. All police officers participating in the G20 summit from outside services were required to complete the five hours of online training in Modules A and B. Some police services provided additional G20 training. Police officers from outside Ontario were also required to complete online training in Modules A and B as well as one-and-a-half hours of training in the course on Ontario Provincial Statutes and Special Investigations Unit for Out-of-Province G20 Officers. nomenclature; protocols for dealing with bomb threats; gas mask application; and the principles and application of LRAD (long-range acoustic devices). On completion of each topic, officers were assessed through interactive exercises and an online test, each test generally including about 10 questions. The training appeared to present a comprehensive discourse on the possible dangers and risks that could be present at the G20 summit. The potential threats were the primary focus of this segment of instruction. Training provided a couple of examples of peaceful demonstrations, but mainly focused on the issues of non-peaceful protests. The section on crowd management outlined the academic theory of crowds, the composition of crowds, and the various forms of a crowd. The need for this type of training, however, is unclear. Although the learning standards indicated that crowd management theory would include information on how to deal with crowd issues appropriately, it is questionable whether it was necessary, especially for training that is only twoand-a-half hours. Instruction time may have been better allocated to more practical elements, such as ways to positively interact with the public and promote peaceful demonstrations. Training would have benefited from a discussion of methods officers can use to support protestors. No material was included on how the police can support, encourage, or direct peaceful demonstrations. Although the training highlighted the importance of police responsibilities and recognized the protection of people's rights as one of the three primary police responsibilities, rights to peaceful assembly were not reflected in the instruction and did not make up one-third of the training. Specifically, Module A included only three slides on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Attention was focused on using Criminal Code provisions to apply force and maintain public order. There was no discussion of how police can facilitate peaceful protests or the right to assemble. 257 258 ISU training. The Integrated Services Unit (ISU) training plan was directed at high-level personnel and summit commanders. Therefore, it was separate from the provincial and municipal training of ground officers. ISU training provided an orientation for officers and situational awareness and instruction related to the size of the security detail or the requirements that needed to be met. The ISU explained that most officers were already trained in the necessary policing skills and required only information about the environment in which they were working. Training at the ISU level included: o innacle Training I P o innacle Training II P o innacle Training III P o rillium Guardian T o SU Tactical Training. I The aim of Pinnacle Training I was to conduct an ISU plan rehearsal, concentrating on command and control, inter-operability, and jurisdictional issues. Pinnacle Training II provided individual and collective training for the G8 and G20 commanders. The objectives of Pinnacle Training III were to confirm security plans, command structures, processes, and operations. Trillium Guardian focused primarily on security and emergency management frameworks. About 65 organizations - representing federal, provincial, and municipal departments, as well as members of the Greater Toronto Airports Authority, the Summits Management Office, the ISU and the Government Partners Public Affairs Group - participated in ISU training. Module A -- online training (all services). This course was designed as a basic overview of required skills for all officers deployed to the G20 summit. Officers received instruction on issues that may affect public and officer safety. The course's training standards stated that Module A was approved by various Toronto Police College individuals on April 20, 2010, and given final approval on June 8, 2010. This training was mandatory for members of all police services posted to the G20 summit and included online presentations, videos, and interactive elements. It lasted approximately two-and-a-half hours. Officers examined crowd management theories; CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosives) response; IMS (incident management system) theory / TPS training. The Toronto Police College designed the G20 training curriculum for G20 officers from the Toronto Police Service. As part of the OIPRD's systemic review, TPS disclosed copies of G20 training materials, including: o 20 Face-to-Face Training G o 20 Online Training: Module A G o 20 Online Training: Module B G OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Module B -- online training (all services). This course was designed as a basic overview of required skills for all officers deployed to the G20 summit. Officers received instruction on issues that might affect public and officer safety. This course was mandatory for members of all police services and was delivered through online presentations, videos, and interactive elements. It lasted approximately two-and-a-half hours. The course training standards for Module B were approved by various Toronto Police College individuals on May 1, 2010, and given final approval on June 8, 2010. On completion of each topic, officers were assessed through interactive exercises and an online test, each test generally including about 10 questions. To better prepare themselves for this summit, officers from participating police agencies examined public order incidents, investigative detention law, search incident to arrest, arrest processes, gate management and radio usage protocols. With the exception of breach of the peace, the training appeared to present an accurate analysis of the legal parameters of Criminal Code provisions, including riot and unlawful assemblies. It also covered current Canadian jurisprudence related to investigative detentions and search and seizure. The training component on breach of the peace appeared to take a broader interpretative understanding of what qualifies as a breach of the peace by including actions toward an individual. The training stated that "Case law has defined a breach of the Peace as acts or actions resulting in actual or threatened harm to someone." The definition of breach of the peace in the training materials focuses on acts that threatened harm to an individual. This is a skewed meaning from the perspective of Canadian jurisprudence, which focuses on the level of the disturbance to the public. In case law, the concept of "breach of the peace" involves some disturbance or threat or tumultuous and riotous activity. The threat is to the general public and, as a result, requires a substantive threat rather than a particular threat to an individual. The common law also provides a police officer with the power to arrest a person in order to prevent an apprehended breach of the peace - if the officer honestly and reasonably believes there is a real risk of imminent harm. The concept described in the training can be misleading and may have caused officers to misdirect their authority. The concept of acts or actions resulting in actual or threatened harm to someone appears to be more appropriately within the realm of criminal assault. The segment on investigative detention provided a high level of the legal parameters as well as a discussion of the limitations of police powers. The training, however, did not provide practical examples or indicate how officers should apply the law under the general circumstances of the G20. In this regard, it included a discussion of sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter and the lawfulness of investigative detentions. Similarly, the training on search and seizure was an accurate summary of the current status of the law and highlighted the limitations on police powers. However, it may have benefited from more examples on the appropriate scope of powers. There was no instruction on the practical application of these principles. This oversight may have caused uncertainly among officers on the streets during the G20. As a result, there may have been a risk that police would have used a wide degree of discretion in applying the law. A more substantive discussion on Charter rights would have been appropriate for G20 training. With the exception of sections 7, 8, and 9, Module B did not include an extensive discussion of the Charter. Module B included some training on the practical elements of the G20; for example, it provided information on the OIPRD and media relations. Unfortunately there was no discussion on freedom of the press, and the level of outreach to community groups is unclear. It is also worth noting that many of the images included in the training depicted unlawful assemblies and violent crowds. and skills to make sound judgments and decisions and to give officers a chance to use their newly issued gas masks and helmets. The emphasis of this program was to make sure that officers could, and would, respond professionally and confidently during the G20 while maintaining public safety. The course examined crowd management protocols, CBRN response, operational considerations, and practical gas mask application in concert with defensive and front-line tactics. Evaluation consisted of instructor assessment of officer capabilities with issued gas masks and helmets during practical exercises, as well as of competence and confidence. One hour of training was dedicated to the examination of the articulation and the legal formation of reasonable grounds and the Charter. Another hour was dedicated to operational considerations, including prisoner management, access zones, memo books, and the Public Works Protection Act (PWPA). Notable topics throughout the training included arrests and detentions; ancillary powers doctrine; crowd control and crowd management; weapons, strategies, and characteristics of Black Bloc protests; and professionalism and duties of the police officer. The training appeared to present an accurate summary of the legal parameters surrounding police powers. There was, however, limited discussion of Charter rights in the face-to-face training. Specific Charter rights were only briefly mentioned; the focus appeared to be on providing officers with the ability to provide justification for actions. The training did not appear to offer a balanced view of protesters or the important role of peaceful assembly in Canada. The videos were of only violent protests, and most references were made to anarchists in the crowds. No training was provided on how to facilitate peaceful protests. Rather, the focus appeared to be on suppressing the escalation of crowd activities and on controlling access. The presentation did not provide officers with sufficient training on public or citizen engagement. It simply reminded officers to be polite, avoid arguments, and place safety of the public as a primary goal. There were limited examples of ways to respond appropriately to the public, and there did not appear to be a process that developed response skills or approaches. Greater attention could have also been given to issues of diversity and accommodation. The training on the PWPA was also limited. It outlined the main concepts of the Act, but failed to explain how and when it should be applied at the G20. Greater clarity was needed to explain the scope and application of the Act and connect it to the summit. The definition of "public works" in section 1 of the Act is very broad. It includes "any railway, canal, highway, bridge, power works," and "any provincial and any municipal public building." It also includes "other building, place or work designated a public work." Given that it is a provincial statute, it does not refer to municipal roads or streets. Under the PWPA, powers are provided to appointed guards to protect or restrict people seeking access to the public work. The appropriate legal application of the PWPA is ambiguous. It is unclear whether any public building can be considered to be a public work with a "guard" or police officer restricting access, or whether municipal roads, such as University Avenue, could be caught under the purview of the PWPA. The notes included in the training indicated that the legislation was enacted to create an authority to control access to designated places. However, the training screenshots did not explain the proper application of the PWPA. As a result, it is possible that police may have used too broad an application of the PWPA. Since the training took place before the Ontario Regulation 233/10 (designating the security perimeter as a public work) was made public, training did not refer to the regulation or its parameters. Given that the PWPA regulation was not covered in the online or face-to-face training for officers, it would have been prudent for TPS to arrange a mandatory training segment once the regulation was filed. This training could have avoided any confusion about the application and use of the PWPA and the regulation. 259 260 Face-to-face training (TPS only). The G20 face-to-face training was a one-day program for front-line officers of the Toronto Police Service. It took place at the Toronto Police College and aimed to incorporate and reinforce the online e-learning modules that were completed by all police officers assigned to front-line policing duties for the G20 summit. The program's standards indicated that training was to provide officers with the knowledge OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Ontario Provincial Statutes and Special Investigations Unit for Out-of-Province Officers. This course was designed as a basic overview of provincial statutes, laws, and protocols for all officers from outside Ontario deployed to the G20 summit. To better prepare for the summit, officers received instruction on provincial statutes such as the Provincial Offences Act, the Public Works Protection Act, the Trespass to Property Act, the Liquor Licence Act, the Mental Health Act, the Highway Traffic Act, and also on the Special Investigations Unit. This training was mandatory for all police officers who worked outside the province of Ontario and were assigned to the G8 and/or G20 summit. The delivery of the training was through online presentations, videos, and interactive elements. It lasted approximately one-and-a-half hours. On completion of each topic, officers were assessed through their performance on an online test. The training consisted of five-minute segments or approximately four slides on each topic and statute listed. The information provided a general overview of the pertinent sections of the acts. In many ways, it was superficial and simplistic. Once again, the training did not provide practical examples or indicate how officers should apply the law in the circumstances of the G20. Training surrounding the PWPA could have been stronger given that the Act had a potentially significant role in policing the G20 summit. In addition, the training on the Mental Health Act did not discuss the sensitive issues that may arise with some individuals. Furthermore, there was no reference to the Ontario Human Rights Code or the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005, which may also raise issues in the policing of large protests. LRAD operator training (sergeants and higher ranking officers). The course was intended for police officers holding the rank of sergeant and above or those identified by the Toronto Police Service as an operator assigned to the public order unit, emergency task force, or marine unit. It is the role of an LRAD operator to understand the complexity of the device and have a good working knowledge of its deployment, and be aware of safety concerns for both operator and public. The training consisted of one 90-minute classroom seminar of lectures, group work demonstrations, and practical exercises. The course required students to demonstrate the safe, competent, and efficient deployment of the LRAD and to be aware of all guidelines, rules, and procedures. At the end of the training, officers were evaluated on their ability to assemble both the LRAD 300X and the 100X, as well as on a written examination on the safe use and deployment of the device. To become a qualified operator, officers require a minimum grade of 75 per cent on the written examination. Methodology. The same overall training may not have been received by all officers working during the G20 weekend. The majority of officers were from the Toronto Police Service. Despite the number of other services present at the G20, there was a minimal amount of common training. Officers participating in the G20 summit from outside services were required to complete only the five hours of online training in Modules A and B, although some police services provided additional G20 training. In future, training should provide uniform information and guidance on the appropriate application of police authority to all officers involved. The training methodology may also warrant further examination. The one-day face-to-face training for Toronto officers and the five hours of online training for all officers may not have been sufficient to adequately prepare officers to deal with the conflicting demands and complexity of issues involved in the G20. Although it is recognized that officers deal with public order authorities on a daily basis, the circumstances of the G20 were distinct. The intersection between public order authorities and Charter and human rights may demand more specialized and in-depth training, something that may have been difficult to achieve in 15 hours. In addition, the methodology was limited. Based on the review of materials provided, the training did not help the officer to develop skills, nor did it provide practical examples or indicate how officers should apply the law in the circumstances of the G20. Training for events such as the G20 should include practical exercises for officers or situational roleplays to actually develop practical interpersonal skills. It is questionable whether the training sessions and online training employed was sufficient to fully develop the required skills and knowledge for policing the G20. Content. The interplay of public order with Charter and human rights may demand more specialized and in-depth training. The training received primarily centred on preparing officers for the potential security threats and risks involved in policing the G20. This is an important priority. Equally important was the goal of maintaining and preserving the civil rights of citizens to assemble, protest, and express themselves. One of the six objectives for TPS was to facilitate conditions for peaceful protest. This goal, however, was not reflected in the training materials. Training should also have examined ways to promote peaceful demonstrations. There was no discussion of how police can support or facilitate peaceful protests or of the right to assemble. In addition, training should have also included a more thorough discussion of other provincial statutes, such as the PWPA, the Mental Health Act, the Ontario Human Rights Code, and the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005, for all officers working the G20 summit. 261 262 Style and tone. For operations of this size, training frameworks must encompass consideration of the rights, as well as the challenges, of peaceful protests. This will assist the police in making sure that the choice of operational tactics is appropriate and in proportion to the situation. Most of the video images included in the training demonstrated very violent interactions between protesters and the police. Demonstrations were in effect defined by disorderly conduct. The only positive reference to protests was in Module B. In the section on Use of Force Regulation, the module referred to a police demonstration in 1993 that was noted as a peaceful protest which allowed officers to voice their concerns. The training subsequently discussed the violent student demonstrations in 1996 and the aftermath of the Ontario Coalition against Poverty demonstration in 2000. Throughout the training screenshots, protesters were mainly referred to anarchists, and there appeared to be an underlying distrust of protesters' intentions and actions. Training should aim to provide a more balanced approach and tone. Public Order Unit and Emergency Management Unit. The public order basic tactical course on public safety and emergency management training was held on April 19-29, 2010. This training focused on strong tactical means of crowd control and use of force weapons available to police. It may or may not have been specifically directed at the G20; the materials provided to the OIPRD do not state who was required to participate in this training. Although the protection of members of lawful assemblies is noted as a goal, this topic did not form a large part of the training. The training primarily addressed practical aspects of using gas masks, less lethal weapons, other types of weaponry, and the LRAD. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Recommendations . Chapter 12: The Review Process 263 o olice services should review and revise specific P training regarding the policing of large protests and applicable police powers. This training should be implemented as part of the general continuing education of officers. The training should include a clear understanding of parameters of a legal protest and the rights of protesters. Although police must train and be prepared for possible violence, training should not depict all protesters as violent and confrontational. o olice services should provide practical training to P equip officers with the skills to facilitate peaceful protest, including de-escalating potentially violent situations and communicating effectively in challenging situations. That should be the police officers' primary goal. o ollowing large events and protests, police services F should debrief officers and discuss what worked or did not work, areas of concern, or best practices. This feedback will help to improve policies and training plans for future events. 12 . 264 OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD interviews, along with stakeholder submissions and information that is publicly available, in order to identify issues arising from policing during the G20. The Director personally conducted more than 50 interviews for the systemic review. Most of these interviews involved senior police officers from the services involved in providing G20 summit security. The information uncovered from the complaints was also used to inform the overall systemic review. The investigations of G20 conduct complaints helped the team plan the larger G20 systemic review. It should be noted, however, that the investigative, interview, and disclosure process of individual conduct complaints was separate and distinct from the investigative, interview, and disclosure of the systemic review. Each complaint was investigated separately and the results reported to the appropriate individuals. Interviews for both conduct investigations and the systemic review have taken place throughout Ontario and outside the province. Investigators and the Director have conducted interviews in Montreal, Ottawa, London, Barrie, Orillia, Hamilton, Durham, Peel, York Region and Toronto. In many instances the interviews required repeat travel to the locations. Representatives of other outside services travelled to Toronto to be interviewed. In addition to the complaints made to the OIPRD directly, for the purposes of the systemic review, the OIPRD requested summaries of the complaints made to the Ontario Ombudsman. The OIPRD also ensured that it had information relating to the interaction and integration of all the police services and agencies involved in the summit. As a result, the review team sought and collected a great deal of background information pertaining to the planning and implementation of the G20 involving federal authorities, such as the RCMP. It should be noted that the OIPRD did not investigate or inquire into the management, administration, or practices of the RCMP. The OIPRD does not have a role in oversight of the RCMP; nor does the OIPRD have any authority to deal with issues of conduct in relation to the RCMP. The organization with jurisdiction over the RCMP is the Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP (CPC), which has also initiated a review of the G20. The OIPRD interviewed several members of the RCMP in order to review and gather information for the purposes of background and to gain insight into the specific interaction between individual members of outside forces and Ontario's provincial and municipal police services. Issues were identified in relation to the large-scale incidents: Queen's Park, arrests at the University of Toronto, Queen and Spadina, searches at Allan Gardens, the Prisoner Processing Centre (PPC), and arrests outside the Novotel hotel on The Esplanade. General recommendations and issues were also identified in other policing areas, such as planning and communications. In addition to the information uncovered during the course of the investigations, the OIPRD gathered disclosure from numerous police services across the province and Canada and conducted systemic interviews of both police and witnesses to provide a balanced and informed opinion of the events that transpired. 266 265 The OIPRD's G20 systemic review committee. The Independent Police Review Director (IPRD) established a G20 Systemic Review Committee with a structure that included a project lead, senior and junior counsel, information manager, report writing team lead, administrative assistant, and representatives from the OIPRD's communication, business operations, and investigative units. The committee was intended to ensure that the review process and the final Report were fair and objective and produced meaningful recommendations that could be used by any police service during large protests. The Systemic Review Committee met approximately every two weeks beginning in September 2010 to plan and discuss the development of the systemic review. The committee led the review by: o creening and reviewing complaints related to S the G20 o eviewing patterns / groups of complaints R o eveloping work plans and determining next steps D o esponding to each complainant in a consistent R manner, including allegations of unlawful searches and arrests, improper detention, and issues related to the temporary holding facility during the G20 o iaising with various police services L o oordinating and reviewing stakeholder C submissions o eveloping disclosure requests D o eviewing and analyzing disclosure documents R o orking with the G20 conduct investigative teams W o athering and sharing relevant information G o eveloping common findings and D recommendations to address issues of a systemic nature for the overall improvement of police practices, and for ensuring accountability and transparency in dealing with the public, and o reparing the review Report in an objective, P informed manner so that it provides for "lessons learned" in moving forward. The G20 team reviewed and discussed all relevant information: disclosure from police, public submissions, and submissions from interested parties, including complainants. In this way the team developed an overall picture of the G20, from initial planning to the completion of the review. The Complaints. The complaints to the OIPRD about the policing of the G20 summit and the results of the investigations into these complaints formed the foundation for the systemic review. The OIPRD received 356 complaints, of which 73 were not pursued on the grounds established under section 60 of the Police Services Act. Of the remaining 283 complaints, 237 were exclusively complaints about police conduct and 46 were about both conduct and policies and services of the respective police service. Of the total complaints received, 22 were withdrawn. The decision to either retain or refer a conduct complaint for investigation by the appropriate police service was based on whether the OIPRD or the police service would be more effective in investigating the particular complaint. In addition, a complaint identified as involving a larger systemic issue was retained for investigation by the OIPRD. Review methodology. From the outset, it was recognized that the elements of planning and implementation of the G20 were very complicated. The OIPRD took the necessary time to ensure that it had an accurate understanding of the public complaints, the events throughout the summit weekend and the policing practices and processes. The team gathered, reviewed, and analyzed a vast amount of information, including individual complaint investigations, disclosure from numerous police services, and officer and witness OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD The OIPRD investigated 207 complaints involving the G20 summit and referred 76 to the relevant police service for investigation. Investigations of conduct. The 207 complaints about police conduct investigated by the OIPRD were grouped according to issues and geographic location. Complaints arising from the G20 summit were not investigated any differently from other complaints. However, as many of the police actions during the summit affected so many individuals in the same manner, complaints with common elements or that related to the same incident were investigated together, and many complainants were sent the same final investigative report. A dedicated team was assembled to investigate. A Major Case Management Model was adopted to facilitate the investigation of complaints. This model is one often used in large or complex investigations. It provides accountability; clear goals and objectives; planning; allocation of resources; and control over the direction, speed, and flow of the investigation. Investigators were divided into teams, and each team had complaints dealing with a specific area or theme. The investigative teams were grouped as follows: 1. Queen's Park and the University of Toronto Issues and themes. The common themes found in the complaints were allegations of unlawful searches, unlawful arrests, and improper detention, as well as issues related to the temporary holding facility (Prisoner Processing Centre) used to detain people arrested during the G20. Among the various policing incidents of that weekend, the following garnered significant attention: o he mass arrests that took place at Queen's Park T after those who participated in the violent protest earlier in the day had blended in with peaceful protesters gathered at that location. o he containment and mass arrest of hundreds T of protesters on The Esplanade on the night of June 26, 2010. o he arrest of over a hundred individuals, mostly T from Quebec, who were asleep in a gymnasium at the University of Toronto on the morning of June 27, 2010. o he forceful dispersal of over a hundred protesters T in front of the Prisoner Processing Centre on the afternoon of June 27, 2010. o he detention of hundreds of individuals during a T severe thunderstorm at the intersection of Queen Street and Spadina Avenue on the evening of June 27, 2010. o he disorganized operation of the Prisoner T Processing Centre during the G20 summit weekend, with many detainees alleging, among other serious deficiencies, that the police failed to grant them reasonable access to counsel, medical attention, food, water, and toilet facilities. was important and wanted to ensure that key stakeholders were able to express their thoughts and opinions about policing during the G20 summit. The OIPRD decided to invite a cross-section of community and police stakeholders to provide submissions for the review. This ensured that the OIPRD received a broad spectrum of opinions in a focused and timely manner. The OIPRD asked numerous community groups and police organizations to provide submissions regarding the G20. Specifically, the Director asked stakeholders their views on the policing practices employed during the G20 summit. The OIPRD received 16 responses to its request. Six community groups or organizations, seven police services and three groups from the legal profession responded. Submissions were requested by December 20, 2010, but the OIPRD accepted some late submissions. These responses were used to supplement the information the OIPRD obtained through other sources. Policy, training, and accountability. The submissions received by the OIPRD also consistently highlighted the importance of policy development, training, and police accountability. It was suggested that police should adopt and implement principles that will ensure the protection of rights. Police policies and training should ensure that the right to peaceful protest is protected. In addition, submissions also noted that police misconduct and incivility should be reported to the public, and addressed. 267 268 Policing public events and supporting the right to protest. A few submissions also suggested that a legislative framework was required to govern public order policing operations. Some suggested public authorities should adopt policies and bylaws to guide and support protests and protect Charter rights. A framework for policing public events should also include public discussions and input. Common themes. Public communication and consultation: before, during, after. Many submissions discussed the lack of communication with the public about the scale and extent of policing and the police powers. In addition, submissions expressed the opinion that little information was provided to the public on how policing would actually be implemented and that there was little to no communication on the Public Works Protection Act legislation or the new regulation. In future, some submissions suggested, the police should communicate with and educate the public about upcoming events. Communications strategies should focus on police-community relations and require ongoing routine communication. The public should be informed of police roles and responsibilities when events require the active involvement of various security bodies. Submissions also suggested that the Government of Ontario should improve consultation requirements applicable to the adoption of regulations. Protection of Charter rights: investigations, detentions, and arrests. Most of the submissions discussed concerns over police actions and potential Charter violations. Concerns were raised about police actions before and during the G20 summit and centred on respecting a person's right to counsel and the right not to be arbitrarily detained, searched or arrested. 2. Queen and Spadina 3. Novotel hotel and The Esplanade 4. Allan Gardens 5. Prisoner Processing Centre. In total, investigators completed more than 600 interviews. Many of them required travel, which added to scheduling difficulties and increased the time spent on the interviews. As the investigators spoke with civilians and officers, they uncovered information that led to further disclosure requests and more interviews. Challenges of large events and public order policing. Submissions received also highlighted the challenges that arise in policing events that involve a large number of protesters and internationally protected persons. Submissions discussed the potential for serious security risks and the need to protect the general public. Many situations that could have escalated into extreme violence were defused during the G20 summit. Submissions noted the complex organizational command structure and the multiplelevel decision-making process of police services involved in the G20. Systemic submissions The OIPRD was determined to ensure that the issues were investigated thoroughly and in a way that is accountable, transparent, efficient, and fair to the individual, the public and the police. The OIPRD also recognized that the public right to participate OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Appendices . 270 OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Appendix 1: G20 Complaint Statistics.. SUMMARIES OF COMPLAINTS Allan Gardens / Stop and Search. 11 10 11 9 Prisoner Processing Centre. OF COMPLAINTS SUMMARIES 80 75 80 70 SUMMARIES OF COMPLAINTS TOTAL COMPLAINTS (78) (78) TOTAL COMPLAINTS SUMMARIES OF COMPLAINTS TOTAL COMPLAINTS (11) TOTAL COMPLAINTS (11) 10 8 9 7 8 6 7 5 6 4 5 3 4 2 3 1 Bar chart showing Stop and Search complaints by type, allegation and police identified. 70 60 60 50 50 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 15 5 5 25 15 35 25 45 35 55 45 65 55 75 65 Bar chart showing Prisoner Processing Centre complaints by type, allegation and police identified and origin of arrest. 271 272 Breach Charter RightsRights Breach Charter Arrested and charged Arrested and charged Arrest, PPC, PPC, Arrest, Release no charge Release no charge Random stop stop Random and searchsearch and Property seized/ Property seized/ destroyed/damaged destroyed/damaged Service identified Service identified Officers identified Officers identified Eastern Ave. Ave. Eastern Conduct and service Conduct and service Queen & Spadina Queen & Spadina Directly affected Directly affected force Use ofUse of force Esplanade Esplanade Conduct Conduct Incivility Incivility Failure to identify Failure to identify Use Use of force of force Arrested and Arrested and charged charged Breach Charter Breach Charter Rights Rights no charge Detained,Detained, no charge 1 0 Property Property seized/ seized/ destroyed/damaged destroyed/damaged Officers Officers identifiedidentified Arrest, Arrest, release no release no charge charge Random stop Random stop and and search search Third party Third party Service Service identifiedidentified Directly Directly affected affected 0 TYPE OF COMPLAINT TYPE OF COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS POLICE IDENTIFICATION POLICE IDENTIFICATION TYPE OF COMPLAINT TYPE OF COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS POLICE IDENTIFICATION POLICE IDENTIFICATION ORIGIN OF ARREST ORIGIN OF ARREST ALLEGATIONS ALLEGATIONS RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION 11 10 11 9 RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION 80 80 70 75 65 75 Bar chart showing results of Stop and Search complaint investigations. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION TOTAL COMPLAINTS (78) (78) TOTAL COMPLAINTS RESULTS OF Bar chart showing results of PrisonerINVESTIGATION Processing Centre complaint investigations. TOTAL COMPLAINTS (11) TOTAL COMPLAINTS (11) 10 8 9 7 8 6 7 5 6 4 5 3 4 2 3 1 *Substantiated *Substantiated Unlawful Unlawful exercise exercise of of authority authority Unsubstantiated Unsubstantiated Discreditable Discreditable conduct conduct Complaint Complaint abandoned abandoned 70 60 60 50 65 55 50 40 55 45 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 5 15 5 25 15 35 25 45 35 Serious Serious Serious *Substantiated *Substantiated 1 0 Less serious 0 Less serious BREAKDOWN OF SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS BREAKDOWN OF SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS BREAKDOWN OF At Allan Gardens, 82 per cent of complaints dealt with random searches. Most of the complaints were unsubstantiated as often the complainant had consented to the search or, although the officers were misinformed of BREAKDOWN OF they were acting in their legal authority, SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS good faith. *Substantiated complaints may include more than one finding under the code of conduct. The majority of complainants at the PPC were arrested at Queen's Park/U of T, The Esplanade and Queen and Spadina where the mass SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS arrests occurred. Almost 90 per cent of the complainants were eventually released with no charge and most of the complaints were about the conditions within the detetention centre. 81 per cent of the complaints were substantiated and almost all were of a serious nature. *Substantiated complaints may include more than one finding under the code of conduct. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Unlawful exercise Unlawful exercise of authority of authority Discreditable Discreditable conduct conduct Unsubstantiated Unsubstantiated Complaint Complaint withdrawn withdrawn Complaint Complaint abandoned abandoned Neglect Neglect of duty duty of 2 0 Less serious Serious Less serious Allan Gardens Allan Gardens Third party party Third Detention Detention Centre issues issues Centre DeceitDeceit Queen's Park Park Queen's Conduct Conduct Incivility Incivility 2 0 Eastern Avenue. 4 The Esplanade. SUMMARIES OF COMPLAINTS 11 11 10 10 9 9 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 SUMMARIES OF COMPLAINTS SUMMARIES OF COMPLAINTS Bar chart showing Eastern Avenue complaints by type, allegation and police identified. 3 Bar chart showing The Esplanade complaints by type, allegation and police identified. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION The few complaints received regarding Eastern Avenue were about incidents that occurred surrounding the PPC. Of a total 4 complaints, all 4 (100%) were unsubstantiated. 2 273 TOTAL COMPLAINTS (11) TOTAL COMPLAINTS (11) TOTAL COMPLAINTS (4) 274 1 Arrest, detain, Arrest, detain, release, charge release, no no charge Failure identify Failure to to identify Breach Charter Rights Breach Charter Rights Property seized/ Property seized/ destroyed/damaged destroyed/damaged Service identified Service identified Unlawful exercise Unlawful exercise of of authority authority Transport and Release Transport and Release Breach Charter Rights Property seized/ destroyed/damaged Service identified Officers identified Detained no charge Directly affected Random stop and search Conduct Incivility Deceit 0 Detained, charge Detained, no no charge TYPE OF COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS POLICE IDENTIFICATION TYPE OF COMPLAINT TYPE OF COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS ALLEGATIONS POLICE IDENTIFICATION POLICE IDENTIFICATION RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION The few complaints received regarding Eastern Avenue were about incidents that occurred surrounding the PPC. Of a total 4 complaints, all 4 (100%) were unsubstantiated. TOTAL COMPLAINTS (11) TOTAL COMPLAINTS (11) Unsubstantiated Unsubstantiated Complaint Complaint abandoned abandoned *Substantiated *Substantiated BREAKDOWN OF SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS BREAKDOWN OF SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS These were individuals who were not arrested and sent to the PPC. The majority of these complaints were not regarding the kettling that took place Saturday evening. *Substantiated complaints may include more than one finding under the code of conduct. One complaint was referred and then ultimately retained. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Discreditable Discreditable conduct conduct 11 11 10 10 9 9 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION Bar chart showing results of The Esplanade complaint investigations. Serious Serious Officers identified Officers identified Directly affected Directly affected Use force Use of of force Third party Third party Conduct Conduct Random stop Random stop and search and search Incivility Incivility Queen and Spadina. 80 75 0 80 70 75 0 SUMMARIES OF COMPLAINTS SUMMARIES OF COMPLAINTS Queen's Park and Area.SUMMARIES OF COMPLAINTS 30 30 SUMMARIES OF COMPLAINTS TOTAL COMPLAINTS (29) TOTAL COMPLAINTS (29) TOTAL COMPLAINTS (74)(74) TOTAL COMPLAINTS 70 60 60 50 50 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 5 15 5 25 15 35 25 45 35 55 45 65 55 65 Bar chart showing Queen and Spadina complaints by type, allegation and police identified. 25 25 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 Bar chart showing Queen's Park and U of T complaints by type, allegation and police identified. 275 276 Breach Charter Rights Breach Charter Rights Arrest, detain, release, Arrest, detain, release, no charge no charge Property seized/ Property seized/ destroyed/damaged destroyed/damaged Service identified Service identified Failure to identify Failure to identify Breach Charter Rights Breach Charter Rights Arrested and charged Arrested and charged Conduct and service Conduct and service 0 0 TYPE OF COMPLAINT TYPE OF COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS POLICE IDENTIFICATION POLICE IDENTIFICATION Arrested and and charged Arrested charged Property seized/ Property seized/ destroyed/damaged destroyed/damaged Service identified Service identified Detained, no charge Detained, no charge Officers identified Officers identified Directly affected Directly affected Arrest, detain, Arrest, detain, release no charge release no charge Failure to identify Failure to identify ALLEGATIONS TYPE OF COMPLAINT TYPE OF COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS ALLEGATIONS POLICE IDENTIFICATION POLICE IDENTIFICATION RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION 80 80 70 75 RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION 30 30 RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION TOTAL COMPLAINTS (29) TOTAL COMPLAINTS (29) RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION TOTAL COMPLAINTS (74)(74) TOTAL COMPLAINTS 70 60 65 60 50 55 45 55 75 65 Bar chart showing results of Queen and Spadina complaint investigations. 25 25 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 Bar chart showing results of Queen's Park and U of T complaint investigations. 50 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 15 10 0 5 5 25 15 35 25 45 35 Serious Serious Less serious Less serious Complaint Complaint withdrawn withdrawn Unsubstantiated Unsubstantiated *Substantiated *Substantiated Discreditable Discreditable conduct conduct Complaint Complaint abandoned abandoned Unlawful exercise Unlawful exercise of authority of authority Neglect Neglect of duty duty of Serious Serious Less serious Less serious Unlawful exercise Unlawful exercise of authority of authority Unsubstantiated Unsubstantiated *Substantiated *Substantiated Discreditable Discreditable conduct conduct 5 0 0 0 The substantiated complaints deal with the kettling that took place at Queen and Spadina on Sunday afternoon and evening. The remaining complaints took place over the course of the weekend and involved other incidents. None of these complainants were sent to the PPC. *Substantiated complaints may include more than one finding under the code of conduct. BREAKDOWN OF SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS BREAKDOWN OF SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS BREAKDOWN OF SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS BREAKDOWN OF SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS These complaints largely deal with incidents that occurred at Queen's Park on Saturday, but also involve areas in and around the University of Toronto including random searches that occurred between June 21 and June 28, 2010. *Substantiated complaints may include more than one finding under the code of conduct. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Officers identified Officers identified Detained Detained no charge no charge Directly affected Directly affected Random stopstop Random search and and search Incivility Incivility Use Use of force of force Third party Third party Use of force force Use of Random stop stop Random and search and search Detention Detention Centre issues Centre issues Detention Detention Centre issues Centre issues Transport Transport and release and release party Third Third party Conduct Conduct Incivility Incivility Conduct Conduct Deceit Deceit Deceit Deceit 0 Referred Complaints. 80 80 70 75 75 SUMMARIES OF COMPLAINTS SUMMARIES OF COMPLAINTS Screened Out. 80 75 SCREENED OUT COMPLAINTS TOTAL COMPLAINTS (76) TOTAL COMPLAINTS (76) 70 60 65 60 50 55 50 40 45 40 30 35 30 20 25 15 20 10 15 5 10 0 5 25 35 45 55 65 Bar chart showing Referred complaints by type, allegation and police identified. TOTAL COMPLAINTS (73) Bar chart showing Screened Out complaints by category. 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 277 278 30 25 20 15 10 Breach Charter Rights Breach Charter Rights Arrested and charged Arrested and charged Property seized/ Property seized/ destroyed/damaged destroyed/damaged Service identified Service identified Conduct and service Conduct and service Officers identified Officers identified Directly affected Directly affected Use of forceforce Use of Random stop stop Random and search and search party ThirdThird party Conduct Conduct Incivility Incivility Arrest,detain, Arrest,detain, release no charge release no charge Failure to identify Failure to identify Detained, Detained, no charge no charge Detention Detention Centre issues Centre issues Deceit Deceit 0 5 Frivolous No jursidiction Better dealt with under another act or law Third party not met Not in public interest TYPE OF COMPLAINT TYPE OF COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS ALLEGATIONS POLICE IDENTIFICATION POLICE IDENTIFICATION 80 75 80 70 75 65 70 60 65 RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION Bar chart showing results of Referred complaint investigations. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION TOTAL COMPLAINTS (76) TOTAL COMPLAINTS (76) 60 50 55 55 45 50 40 45 35 40 30 35 25 30 20 25 15 20 10 15 5 10 0 Unlawful exercise Unlawful exercise of authority of authority Unsubstantiated Unsubstantiated *Substantiated *Substantiated Complaint Complaint withdrawn withdrawn Insubordination Insubordination 0 Discreditable Discreditable conduct conduct BREAKDOWN OF SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS BREAKDOWN OF SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS Informal Informal resolution resolution Neglect Neglect of duty duty of 5 Less serious Less serious Referred complaints are those that were sent to a police service for investigation. The majority of complaints were regarding Toronto Police Service. *Substantiated complaints may include more than one finding under the code of conduct. A total of 73 complaints were screened out (not investigated) for various reasons. The vast majority were not directly affected by the incident and did not meet the criteria for a third party complaint. In many cases they had seen the incidents on the TV or read about them in the paper. The Police Services Act sets out criteria for what constitutes a complaint. No jurisdiction means that one or more of the crtieria was not met and the OIPRD does not have the authority to investigate. Screened out complaints also include duplicates. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD Other 0 Appendix 2: Terms of reference. Overview The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) is an independent agency of the Ministry of the Attorney General. It is established under the Police Services Act (Act). The role of the OIPRD is to maintain the public confidence in police oversight and make sure that public complaints against police in Ontario are dealt with fairly, efficiently and effectively. Pursuant to s. 57 of the Act, the OIPRD will be conducting a review (Review) of issues of a systemic nature that have been the subject of public complaints pertaining to the policing of the 2010 G-20 summit in Toronto. Members of the public have made complaints to the OIPRD regarding the conduct, policies and services of police during the G-20 summit including allegations of discreditable conduct and unlawful or unnecessary exercise of authority. Process The Review will gather information, review complaints, conduct investigations and invite submissions from key stakeholders, including selected public and police organizations asked to participate, regarding their view on the policing practices employed during the G20 summit. The Review will examine and consider: 1. Public complaints filed Appendix 3: Disclosure request summary. The Office of the Independent Police Review Director received operational plans, policies and procedures, training materials, organizational charts, meeting minutes, Incident Command scribe notes, senior officer scribe notes, officer interviews or statements, officer notes, closed-circuit television (CCTV) video and other video, occurrence reports, officer duty rosters, arrest records, arrest photos, and booking videos. Most of the disclosure required by the OIPRD was from the Toronto Police Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Ontario Provincial Police. Disclosure was required for both systemic review purposes and OIPRD conduct investigations, and each stream had its own methods for obtaining the disclosure. Over the course of the review, the OIPRD received thousands of documents and photos, and interviewed more than 600 officers and 200 civilian witnesses. In addition, the OIPRD received several thousand hours of street level video and aerial video from the TPS, the RCMP and the OPP. TPS also provided tens of thousands of hours of closed circuit TV video taken from the Prisoner Processing Centre (PPC) at 629 Eastern Ave. August 6, 2010 August 23, 2010 August 24, 2010 September 17, 2010 November 19, 2010 December 14, 2010 December 23, 2010 January 5, 2011 January 28, 2011 The OIPRD did not receive disclosure items from the detailed list sent to TPS on August 24, 2010, until October 22, 2010. The OIPRD received the items on compact discs, but the items received were limited in scope and, in many cases, were not what were requested. For example the OIPRD requested all CCTV footage from the public domain and from inside the PPC. In response, TPS sent the locations of the CCTV cameras in the public domain and in the PPC, but no footage. (The footage was eventually provided in February 2011.) The issues with disclosure were consistent throughout the process. Disclosure requested was not received in a timely manner. Not only were items omitted, but the lack of organization of the items made it a tedious task to sort and identify. The disclosure logs that were included were not adequate. The naming conventions in the log did not match up to the file names, making it difficult to determine if the correct items had been included in the disclosure package. In some cases, items were included in the disclosure package but not identified on the log. In other cases items were listed on the disclosure log but not included in the package. In most cases, the CD contents were not labelled and the reader had to search the enclosed folders to determine the contents. Bulk disclosure was received on the following dates: Part 1 disclosure -- October 22, 2010 Part 2 disclosure -- November 15, 2010 Part 3 disclosure -- November 24, 2010 Part 4 disclosure -- December 1, 2010 Part 5 disclosure -- December 4, 2010 Part 6 disclosure -- December 9, 2010 Part 7 disclosure -- December 10, 2010 280 279 2. The overall governance of the planning and implementation of policing the G-20 summit 3. Procedures, lawful authorities and police policies regarding major protests 4. Police command structure and the overall role of the Integrated Security Unit 5. Operational decision making processes, such as, giving of orders and directions to officers as well as overall supervision 6. Training of officers Objectives. The Review will identify issues and make recommendations to specifically address the policing of large protests and the maintenance of public order and to generally enhance public confidence and trust in police and policing. Such issues may include: o tops and searches S o rrests A o se of force U o etention centre issues D o ncivility I o lanning and implementation P o ontainment policies and practices C o ommunication processes, and C o ther issues that may arise or may be identified. O 7. The operational application of Regulation 233/10 (made under the Public Works Protection Act) 8. Evidence collected, including videos, print and audio media and documents provided by both police and the public, and 9. Written submissions from invited participants. The OIPRD will prepare a final report summarizing the findings of the Review and outlining recommendations regarding major protests and advice for the overall improvement of police practices in relation to the public complaints system. This final report will be in a form appropriate for release to the public, pursuant to the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. Toronto Police Service. The disclosure process initially encountered delays from TPS. The Independent Police Review Director (IPRD) made his initial request for G20 disclosure on August 23, 2010, with a detailed list of items and documents required provided on August 24, 2010. The OIPRD did not begin to receive disclosure until October 22, 2010. The IPRD corresponded directly with TPS on major disclosure-related issues on the following dates: OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD 281 Part 8 disclosure -- December 15, 2010 Part 9 disclosure -- December 17, 2010 Part 10 disclosure -- January 5, 2011 Part 11 disclosure -- February 14, 2011 Part 12 disclosure -- February 16, 2011 Part 13 disclosure -- March 2, 2011 Part 14 disclosure -- March 16, 2011 Part 15 disclosure -- June 23, 2011 Part 16a disclosure -- June 24, 2011 Part 16b disclosure -- June 24, 2011 Part 17 disclosure -- August 17, 2011. As OIPRD investigations into G20 conduct complaints progressed, the disclosure process became very large and labour intensive and required a tracking mechanism. In January 2011, the OIPRD and TPS agreed to exchange a weekly spreadsheet that itemized the disclosure that had been requested and the items received within the weekly reporting period. This measure greatly improved the disclosure process. However, even as the disclosure process became streamlined, the naming conventions were still inadequate and disclosure logs were not always included. This process continued until November 2011. It took just over one year for the OIPRD to receive complete disclosure from TPS on G20 matters. Video footage which was critical to the investigation was not received until February 2011. At that time the OIPRD received the following from TPS: Street level video (approximately 8,000 hours) PPC CCTV video (approximately 21,000 hours) Mobile video (CD format) Approximately 800 PPC booking videos (CD format) The Independent Police Review Director interviewed senior officers from TPS as well as other police services, specifically for the systemic review. Beginning in May 2011, the IPRD interviewed 21 senior TPS officers, two civilian members, and Chief Blair. on November 9, 2010. This request itemized 32 documents and other items. As a result of that request, the IPRD received one document, the "C2," on February 22, 2011. The IPRD met with the RCMP on numerous occasions to address concerns over the lack of disclosure and also wrote to the RCMP to convey concerns. Eventually a protocol for disclosure was agreed on and the process was set up for the OIPRD to receive disclosure. Correspondence dates (IPRD to RCMP): November 9, 2010 February 22, 2011 March 29, 2011 April 13, 2011. Meeting dates (IPRD and RCMP): March 7, 2011 March 18, 2011 July 13, 2011 July 19, 2011 July 27, 2011. On August 10, 2011, the RCMP attended the OIPRD office with disclosure to be reviewed by OIPRD legal counsel and investigators. OIPRD legal counsel and investigators attended the RCMP offices on the following dates: August 17, 2011 August 30, 2011 August 31, 2011. As a result of the correspondence and meetings, disclosure flowed to the IPRD beginning in July 2011 and was fully satisfied on October 14, 2011. Batches received: RCMP disclosure July 8, 2011 RCMP disclosure July 11, 2011 RCMP disclosure July 14, 2011 RCMP disclosure July 18, 2011 RCMP disclosure July 21, 2011 RCMP disclosure July 27, 2011 RCMP disclosure July 28, 2011 RCMP disclosure August 5, 2011 RCMP disclosure August 15, 2011 RCMP disclosure August 30, 2011 RCMP disclosure September 1, 2011 RCMP disclosure September 6, 2011 RCMP disclosure September 14, 2011 RCMP disclosure September 26, 2011 RCMP disclosure October 3, 2011 RCMP disclosure October 4, 2011 RCMP disclosure October 14, 2011 (last batch). POU video was also provided by Barrie Police Service and London Police Service. This disclosure was received in a timely manner. Appendix 4: Other reviews and investigations. This review is one of several reviews resulting from the events taking place during the G20 summit. The OIPRD has to the extent possible taken into consideration the work of these other reviews in carrying out its own systemic review. 282 Disclosure / RCMP Commission for Public Complaints (systemic review and conduct matters). Meeting date: July 14, 2011. Canadian Civil Liberties Association. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association and the National Union of Public and General Employees held public hearings into the police activities during the G20 summit and released a report called Breach of the Peace in February 2011. Ontario Provincial Police. The OIPRD met with the OPP to discuss bulk disclosure on March 8, 2011, at OPP Headquarters in Orillia. All requested disclosure was received on March 30, 2011, at the OIPRD offices. The disclosure requested from the OPP was large and similar in nature to the material requested from TPS and the RCMP. It was provided to the OIPRD in a neatly indexed bin, separated by category and nature of the material. Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP (CPC). The Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP (CPC) launched a public interest investigation into specific aspects of the 2010 G8 and G20 summits. The Commission acted on a complaint lodged by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA), which made a number of allegations about the conduct of unidentified RCMP members. The CPC examined four issues and incidents and the degree to which RCMP members were involved: G8/G20 planning (including the location of the security fences); infiltration and surveillance (if any) of individuals or groups before and during the summits; use of force, detentions, and arrests during the summits; and conditions at the Eastern Avenue detention facilities in Toronto. The review conducted by the CPC has been completed. Other police services. The IPRD sent a G20 survey to the Calgary Police Service on February 23, 2011, requesting information about its involvement in the G20. The Calgary Police Service provided a response to this letter on April 15, 2011. As part of the systemic review, the IPRD interviewed senior officers from the Barrie Police Service, Durham Regional Police Service, Halton Regional Police Service, Hamilton Police Service, London Police Service, Montreal Police Service, Ottawa Police Service, Peel Regional Police Service, Waterloo Regional Police Service, and the York Regional Police Service (in addition to the OPP and the RCMP). RCMP. The RCMP is a federal police service and does not fall under the jurisdiction of the OIPRD. The IPRD made his initial request to the RCMP for disclosure Federal parliamentary committees. Two parliamentary committees have also looked into certain aspects of the G20 summit. On October 25, 2010, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security began an OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD examination of issues surrounding the security at the G8 and G20 summits. On October 19, 2010, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates looked into the effectiveness, management, and operation of the expenses incurred for the G8 and G20 summits. The Standing Committee on Public Safety and Security presented its report to the House of Commons on March 25, 2011. The committee found, in light of the evidence heard, no question that "errors in the planning of these events, especially the summit's security operations, contributed to violation of the rights of many protestors during the summits The Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates also presented its report to the House of Commons in March 2011. The committee reported that, in mid-March, 2011, it was unable to obtain the final costs of both summits, but made two recommendations to help Parliament better examine expenses, and one recommendation to allow businesses that suffered damage following events organized by the federal government to more easily claim compensation. "conferred unnecessary and constitutionally suspect police powers in the volatile and confrontational context of inevitable public protest." Appendix 5: Other significant protests. Protests at international gatherings. Protests, some involving relatively small groups of violent protesters causing significant damage, have been associated with many past international gatherings. International summits that involve multilateral meetings between economic and political leaders are highly visible and symbolic opportunities for protesting. The international summit therefore acts as a social and political venue to voice a wide range of grievances from traditionally marginalized groups that have mobilized in large crowds of protesters. Such mass protests became increasingly common following the events surrounding the 1999 World Trade Organization's Ministerial Conference in Seattle. Police Services After Action Reports. The TPS conducted an assessment of its G20 security plans and operations after the G20 summit. This report, released on June 23, 2011, contained recommendations addressing, among other issues, TPS planning, training, and prisoner management. The "After Action" acknowledged several deficiencies in planning and training while also noting that the scope and intensity of the disorder experienced throughout the weekend were without precedent in the history of the TPS. In response, the police were ordered to fall back behind the fence as the crowd approached. This move was unexpected by protesters, and a few of them began to climb on the fence, which quickly collapsed because of inadequate construction. Perceiving a loss of control, police responded with pepper spray and made several arrests. The Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP examined preparations for the APEC summit event along with the conduct of police and protesters throughout the event. The recommendations of the APEC Report focused on areas of training, planning, and communications 283 284 Previous G20s. Violent protests have occurred at two of the G20 summits held just before the one hosted by Toronto. The 2009 G20 summit in Pittsburgh saw almost 200 arrests. The 2009 G20 summit in London, England, resulted in the arrest of over 100 individuals and the death of a newspaper vendor who, on his way home, got caught up in the violent protests. The OPP. The OPP has completed an After Action Report. World Trade Organization. The RCMP. The RCMP has completed an After Action Report. The protests during the 1999 World Trade Organization's ministerial conference in Seattle, and the police handling of them, continue to offer many host jurisdictions insight into errors, issues and challenges associated with policing protests. Those protests led not only to a disruption of the conference, but also to significant police use of force, personal injury and property damage. Several reviews were initiated regarding the Seattle Police Department's response to the protests. Although the reviews differed in some of their findings and recommendations, they are largely consistent in their finding that the Seattle Police Department was not fully prepared to deal with the protests. Special Investigations Unit. Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services: review of the Public Works Protection Act. Ontario launched an independent review of the Public Works Protection Act (PWPA) by the Honourable R. Roy McMurtry. His report, released on April 28, 2011, recommends repeal of the Act after the Province has considered potential policy and security gaps resulting from the repeal. The Special Investigations Unit investigated a number of allegations of serious injuries to civilians resulting from the policing of the G20 summit. The unit's mandate is to cause criminal charges to be laid against police officers following its investigations where there are reasonable grounds to do so. Pittsburgh. On September 24 and 25, 2009, the world's financial representatives and leaders came together to discuss economic policies and the global financial crisis in Pittsburgh. The event was held in downtown Pittsburgh and was chaired by U.S. President Barack Obama. The venue was set with approximately only three months' preparation time. Thousands of protesters were expected during the week of the summit. Security was coordinated by the U.S. Secret Service, working in conjunction with the Pittsburgh Police. Officers from other police services, such as New York City, Baltimore, and Chicago, were also in attendance. All officers, regardless of department, were under the command of the Secret Service for the event days. An estimated $50,000 in damage was reported to the city. At least a dozen Pittsburgh police cars were vandalized. Police used pepper spray and smoke canisters to halt a march to downtown by anarchists. The city purchased four long-range acoustic devices Toronto Police Services Board Review into Matters Relating to the G20 Summit. On September 23, 2010, the Toronto Police Services Board appointed the Honourable John W. Morden to conduct a review of matters relating to the G20 summit. The issues to be examined in this review include the role the board played with respect to the summit; the role played by the Toronto Police Service; and whether the plans developed and implemented were adequate and effective for policing of the summit. The review being conducted by Justice Morden had not been completed at the time of publication of this Report. Ombudsman of Ontario. The Ontario Ombudsman announced on July 9, 2010, the launch of an investigation into the provincial government's development and its subsequent communication of Regulation 233/10, made under the PWPA. The Ombudsman's investigation concluded with the release of its report on December 7, 2010. This report found that the regulation APEC. In Canada, an important report on how police dealt with protesters at an international meeting was issued following the 1997 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Conference in Vancouver. One of the largest conflicts between protesters and police at the APEC summit occurred along the security fence. This area was the site of a protest march involving between 2,500 and 3,000 individuals. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD (LRADs), to engage unlawful protesters. Protesters complained to media about police using heavyhanded tactics, harassment and intimidation tactics. Acknowledgements. I would like to acknowledge and thank everyone who cooperated with the OIPRD's investigations into the events related to the G20 summit and those who took the time to make submissions to the OIPRD about those events. This report would not have been possible without their contributions. I would also like to acknowledge and thank all my staff, those who participated directly or indirectly in this review, for their hard work and professionalism throughout this project. Each and every one of them contributed to my ability to carry out this review in an accountable, fair and transparent manner. In particular I would like to thank the following people for their combined contribution to my systemic review and to this report: Investigations: Ken Cormier, Rodney Braun, Hema Nagar, Evelyn Wayne, Grant Wilkinson, Claude Blake, Joseph Hebert, Barbara Hirst, Laurie Ioannou, Daniel Jordan, Lucie Molinaro, Paul Nadeau, John Rae, Robert Smith Legal counsel: Sylvana Capogreco, Carla Goncalves, Jean Iu, Miriam Saksnajder Communications: Allison Hawkins, Rosemary Parker, Richard Beatty Operations: Nenita Simmonds, Michael Mamo, Roberta Ross, Nicole Stalker, Brenda Osman Report writing team: Rosemary Parker, Allison Hawkins, Carla Goncalves, Roberta Ross, and contributions from John Lee Gerry McNeilly Independent Police Review Director London. Unlike the Pittsburgh G20 summit, the police response to the violence occurring at the G20 summit in London in April 2009 was the subject of considerable analysis. This operation was one of the largest security events for the Metropolitan Police Service. As in the case of other G20s, London security services faced a number of challenges. An estimated 35,000 protesters rallied on the streets of London, and during the course of the event the police made 122 arrests. Although the vast majority of protesters were peaceful, some extremist elements among them engaged in violence and vandalism. Events escalated when protesters and several marches converged at the Bank of England. The police responded by attempting to disperse the crowds through police cordons. This action unfortunately led to the tragic death of Ian Tomlinson, a news agent who was on his way home and got caught up in the protest. The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) confirmed that Tomlinson had been pushed back by police officers minutes before he collapsed and died of a heart attack. Following the London summit, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) prepared two reports on policing. The first dealt with policing the G20 specifically and the second dealt with public order policing generally. Reports were also prepared by the House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, the Metropolitan Police Authority Civil Liberties Panel, and the Independent Police Complaints Commission. The HMIC report Adapting to Protest -- Nurturing the British Model of Policing (the British Model Report) examined how the British police have operated in policing public order events and ways for the police to adapt to the modern demands of public order policing. 285 286 ALL PHOTOGRAPHS USED WITH PERMISSION. OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR OIPRD To contact us by mail or visit us in person: Office of the Independent Police Review Director 655 Bay Street, 10th Floor Toronto, Ontario M5G 2K4 www.oiprd.on.ca OIPRD OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR