75021110051 April 29, 2016 From: Lee-Harold: Family of Cromwell, bene?ciary, Trustor, and Secured-party to the Social To: Security Cestui que Trust LEE HAROLD CROMWELL Without prejudice 124 Salem Road Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 The Trustees and their principals: William-T.: Family of Jones and William-T.: Family of Jones d/b/a Trustee1 of the Social Security Cestui que Trust LEE HAROLD CROMWELL and d/b/a WILLIAM JONES Clerk of the Trust business entity titled SESSIONS COURT, CLINTON 100 N. Main Street, Suite 309 Clinton, Tennessee 37716 Certi?ed mail, return receipt requested 7003 1680 0001 2029 1329 Bruce-D: Family of Fox and Bruce-D: Family of Fox de/a Trustee of the Social Security Cestui que Trust LEE HAROLD CROMWELL and d/b/a BRUCE FOX O?icer-of-the- Tribunal of CIRCUIT COURT OF ANDERSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE FOX FARLEY 310 North Main Street Clinton, Tennessee 37716 Certi?ed mail, return receipt requested 7003 1680 0001 2029 1336 Donald-R: Family of Elledge and Donald?R: Family of Elledge dfb/a Trustee of the Social Security Cestui que Trust LEE HAROLD CROMWELL and d/b/a DONALD ELLEDGE O?icer?of?the-Tribunal of CIRCUIT COURT OF ANDERSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE 100 North Main Street, Suite 301 Clinton, Tennessee, 37716 Certi?ed mail, return receipt requested 7003 1680 0001 2029 1343 Michael: Family of Eldridge and Elizabeth: Family of Eldridge 110 Potomac Circle Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 37830 Certi?ed mail, return receipt requested 7003 1680 0001 2029 1350 With Completion of Service and designation of Witnesses To: 5. Loretta-E: Family of and Loretta-E: Family of d/b/a Trustee of the Social Security Cestui que Trust LEE HAROLD CROMWELL dfb/a LORETTA United States Attorney General 1 Public of?cial is a ?duciary toward the public, including in the case of. a judge, the litigants who appear before him and if he deliberately conceals material information from them he is guilty of fraud,? US. Holzer 816 F. 2d 304, 307 (1987). Public of?cials are also ?trustee[s] and servant[s] of the people,? Georgia Department v. Sismmk 291 SE. 2d 524, 526 (1982). ??Public office? is a public trust or agency for the bene?t of the people to be administered under legislative control in the interest of the people.? State ex rel Nagle v. Sullivan 40 P. 2d 995, 997, Supreme Court of Montana (1935). Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. 36LA0051 Page 1 of 27 United States D.O.J. 10m& Constitutional Avenue, NW. Washington, DC. 20530 Certi?ed mail, return receipt requested 7003 1680 0001 2029 1367 6. Herbert 111: Family of Slatery and Herbert 111: Family of Slatery d/b/a Trustee of the Social Security Cestui que Trust LEE HAROLD CROMWELL d/b/a HERBERT SLATERY 111, Tennessee Attorney General 425 5th Ave #2 Nashville, Tennessee 37243 Certi?ed mail, return receipt requested 7003 1680 0001 2029 1374 Re: ELDRIDGE and wife, ELIZABETH ELDRIDGE vs. LEE H. Account No. B6LA0051 Lee-Harold: Cromwell vs. William-T.: Jones; Bruce-D.: Fox; Donald-R: Elledge; Michael: Eldridge; Elizabeth: Eldridge; the Trust business entity CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANDERSON COUNTY, et al. Conditional Acceptance of your security-instrument Offer served upon me, Lee-Harold: Cromwell, the human and the human bene?ciary of the Social Security Cestui que Trust LEE H. CROMWELL, which Trust is the alleged ?Defendant? in this case, which alleged service came through the Trustees of the Anderson County Sheriff Of?ce from the Trustees, listed supra, acting in their human being and as human Trustees, wherein the Trust business entity corporation Anderson County security guards titled Sheriff Deputies touted as ?Law Enforcement Of?cers? allegedly served a security-instrument in an attempt to get me to commit myself as the acting Trustee when the people addressed herein are, in fact, the Trustees, knowing full well that as the human bene?ciary I have no authority to make any decision/s for said Trust in this Admiralty Jurisdiction Maritime law Tribunal whose standard is the yellow fringed flagl, and wherein I as the human bene?ciary have no ?duciary responsibility for said Trust; Conditional Acceptance of your for you to prove negligence per your claim by my actions and thoughts, if the COMPLAINT was directed to me, in the incident addressed in the COMPLAINT [hereinafter Conditional Acceptance]. 2 You display a militagy ?ag as your jurisdiction, see Title 4 United States Code Services, Lawyers Edition, 1 INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS ?Placing of ?-inge on national discretion of President as Commander-[n-Chief of Army and Navy. (1925) 34 Op Atty Gen 483.? In addition, ?Pursuant to U.S.C. Chapter 1, 2, and 3; Executive Order No. 10834, August 21, 1959, 24 FR. 6865, a military flag is a ?ag that resembles the regular flag of the United States, except that it has a Yellow Fringe, bordered on three sides. The President of the United states designates this deviation ?'om the regular ?ag, by executive order, and in his capacity as COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF of the Armed forces.? Moreover, the Congress willfully and knowingly overstepped its power, to wit: in 1845 Congress passed an act saying Admiralty-law could come on land. The bill may be traced in Cong. Globe, 28th Cong, 2d. Sess. 43, 320, 328, 337, 345 (1844-45), no opposition to the Act is reported. Congress held a committee on this subject in 1350 and they said: ?The committee also alluded to ?the great force? of ?the great constitutional question as to the power of Congress to extend maritime jurisdiction beyond the ground occupied by it at the adoption of the - H.R. Rep. No. '72 3lst Cong, Sess. 2 (1850).? Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. Page 2 of 27 Dear William, Bruce, Donald, Michael, Elizabeth, Loretta, Herbert, and To Whom It May Concern: I am Lee?Harold: Family of Cromwell [hereinafter Lee-Harold: Cromwell, I, me, my], a freeman, Sui uris, Appearing 'm Admiralty jurisdiction Maritime law tribunal Specially, Not Generally Or Voluntarily, and In propria persona and as human bene?ciary of the Social Security Cestui que Trust LEE HAROLD CROMWELL aka LEE CROMWELL, never as the Trustee. That William, Bruce, Donald, Loretta and Herbert are d/b/a Trustees of the Trusts LEE CROMWELL, MICHAEL ELDRIDGE and ELIZABETH ELDRIDGE and are taxpayers? I serve this ?Conditional Acceptance? upon The Trustees, their principals and the humans Michael and Elizabeth: Eldridge. Be It Known: The ?Conditional Acceptance? to Your Offer establishes a Common Law- contract4 between us under the Postal rule, which states: ?The postal rule (also known as the mailbox rule or "deposited acceptance rule") is a term of common law-contracts which determines the timing of acceptance of an 9% when kid] is contemplated as the medium of acceptance. The general principle is that a contract is formed when acceptance is actually communicated to the offeror. The mailbox rule is an exception to the general principle. The mailbox rule provides that the contract is formed when a properly prepaid and properly addressed letter of acceptance is posted. One rationale given for the rule is that the offeror nominates the post of?ce as implied agent and thus receipt of the acceptance by the post of?ce is regarded as that of the offeree. The main effect of the mailbox rule is that the risk of acceptance being delivered late or lost in the post is placed upon the offeror. If the offeror is reluctant to accept this risk, he can always require actual receipt before being legally bound.? I. Pertinent Law(s): American Jurisprudence, Volume 11, Commerce to Constitutional Law, Copyright 1940, 11 AmJur ?329 Constitutional Law, 2. Liberty, Paragraph 4, ?Personal liberty largely consists of the right of locomotion?to go where and when one pleases?only so far restrained as the rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The right of a citizen to travel 3 .. Every taxpayer is a cestui que trust having suf?cient interest in preventing abuse of the trust to be recognized in the ?eld of this court?s prerogative jurisdiction as a reiator in the proceedings to set sovereign authority in motion by In re Bolens 135 NW. Rep. 164 (1912) supreme Court of Wisconsin. 4 Constitution for the United States of America, Article 1, Section. 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. (Emphasis added by me.) Though if the title Esquire is not a form of a ?Title of Nobility? I am at a loss as to what would be. Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. Page 3 of 27 upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horse-drawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but a common right which he has under his right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this constitutional guaranty one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another?s rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct.? (Emphasis added by me.) American Jurisprudence, Volume 25, Guardian and Ward to Highways, Copyright 1940, IX. Use of Way, A. In General, 25 AmJur ?163 Generally; Right to Use?Streets and highways are established and maintained primarily for purposes of travel and transportation by the public, and uses incidental thereto. Such travel may be for either business or pleasure. Highways may also law?illy be used for purposes other than travel and transportation, which are conducive to the public convenience, tend to make them of greater utility and convenience to those who legally have a right to their use, and are not inconsistent and incompatible with the reasonably free passage over them of whoever has occasion to travel upon them. The extent of the public right depends, in some degree at least, upon the needs of the public. The use of highways for purposes of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental right, of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived. The rights of the public to the use of highways cannot be encroached upon by private individuals or corporations. Moreover, streets and highways are for the use of the public in general for passage and traf?c without distinction, and all persons have an equal ?gm to use them for purposes of travel by proper means, and with due regard for the corresponding rights of others. The whole community have an equal interest and right to all the privileges and advantages of the highways. The mere fact that the burden of the construction and maintenance of streets and highways and the right to control and manage them rest with the municipal and quasi-municipal corporations in which they are situated does not give to such corporations, or to their inhabitants, any peculiar privileges therein. The right of use is not in the citizens of the corporation alone, even under such circumstances, but remains in the public at large, and the entire public still has an equality of right therein, subject to such limitations as the municipalities are authorized by law to impose. Furthermore, as to the rights of the public, there is no substantial difference between streets in which the legal title to the fee is in private individuals and those in which it is in the public. The right to make a particular use of a highway, which would otherwise be unlawful or improper, cannot be conferred by the consent or petition of abutting owners or citizens generally. The general rule is that a charge or toll cannot be exacted for the use of a highway for the purpose of travel or transportation in the ordinary modes, in the absence of legislative authorization. Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. B6LA0051 Page 4 of 27 25 American Jurisprudence ?165 Mode and Manner of Use?The public easement includes every kind of travel and communication for the movement or transportation of persons or property which is reasonable and proper in the use of a public highway, or of a particular portion thereof, with all means of conveyance which can be introduced with a reasonable regard for the safety and convenience of the public, and without in?icting up_on the owner of the fee an inigry differing in kind from that imposed by use and improvement for ordinary public travel, and embraces all public travel, not prohibited by law or by dedicatorv restriction. on foot, ir_ carriggi?1 omnibuses, stages, sleighs, or other vehicles, including motor vehicles. as the wants and habits of the public demand. The public is not con?ned to the use of vehicles in use at the time when the streets or highways were established, but may use such other reasonable means or conveyance as may be discovered in the future, provided they do not exclude the proper use of the highway by other modes or kinds of vehicles, or then to destroy it as a means of passage and travel common to all. The use of such new and improved means of locomotion must be deemed to have been contemplated when the highways and streets were laid out or dedicated, whenever it is found that the general benefit requires it, and such new means of locomotion cannot be excluded therefrom or be deemed unlawful merely because their use may tend to the inconvenience or even to the injury of those who continue to use the highways and streets by former methods. Where sidewalks or footways are provided, they are ordinarily intended for the use of pedestrians, to the exclusion of animal and vehicular traffic, except in the case of certain small vehicles. The rights of the users by any proper mode or means are equal, neither enjoying any superior rights over another, except under regulations governing the movement of traffic, and if the use of one mode of travel or means of conveyance results in injury to the user of another, the latter?s right of action will depend on the question of negligence. Any person has a right to transport over the highway elephants and animals, or machinery, or loads of goods, which, from their height or appearance, or the noise made in transport, are liable to frighten horses or other animals. But while this right is undoubted, it must be so exercised as not to endanger the lives or property of others who have equal rights upon the highway, and as in other cases of the use of a dangerous article, that required degree of care increases with the danger to be apprehended from the use of it and from exposure to it. While highways are constructed and intended for ordinary use, in an ordinary manner, necessity may justify the use of a street for the purpose of transporting things in an unusual manner, or of transporting such things as necessarily obstruct the street for a time, and such uses are not necessarily illegal. Articles of this character may not, however, be unnecessarily permitted to remain stationary in the street, in an improper and dangerous position, or for a longer time than is reasonably necessary for the mere purpose of transportation. The allocation of portions of the way to particular uses is discussed in a subsequent section.? (Emphasis added by me.) Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. - Page 5 of 27 II. De?nitions: Negligence. The omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those ordinary considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do. Negligence is the failure to use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use under similar circumstances; it is the doing of some act which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under similar circumstances or failure to do what a person of ordinary prudence would have done under similar circumstances. Amoco Chemical Corp. v. Hill, Del.Super., 318 A.2d 614, 617. Conduct which falls below the stande established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm; it is a departure from the conduct expectable of a reasonably prudent person under like circumstances. Pence v. Ketchum, La., 326 So.2d 831, 836. The term refers only to that legal delinquency which results whenever a man fails to exhibit the care which he ought to exhibit, whether it be slight, ordinary, or great. It is characterized chie?y by inadvertence, thoughtlessness, inattention, and the like, while "wantonness" or "recklessness" is characterized by willfulness. The law of negligence is founded on reasonable conduct or reasonable care under all circumstances of particular case. Doctrine of negligence rests on duty of every person to exercise due care in his conduct toward others from which injury may result. Black?s Law Dictionary. 17% Edition Statute - Anderson on the UC. C., Text; Cases and Commentaries, ?l-103 :6 statute should be construed in harmony with the common law unless there is a clear legislative intent to abrogate the common law.? And further, ?The Code cannot be read to preclude a common law action.? Hence, statutes are anti-law and merely corporation policies; and, the right to travel is a common law-right, wherein ?The Code cannot be read to preclude a common law action. Facts and Events anent the incident and subsequent parties involved: 1. That on July 2015 C.E. I went to an area in Oak Ridge, Tennessee that is identi?ed as the ?Midtown Community Center,? located at 102 Robertsville Road, Oak Ridge, Anderson County, Tennessee to watch the ?reworks. 2. That the ?reworks were to start at dark. 3. That cars were parked on both sides of the parking lot, so I pulled down to the very edge of the parking lot about ten minutes before the ?reworks were to begin. 4. That I parked in the middle between the cars. 5. That while I was still in the truck a woman came up to my window and said, ?You will be blocking traf?c when the ?reworks are over.? 6. That I told her, promise I will not block traf?c, I will leave as soon as the ?reworks end.? 7. That she stated she thought that was rude. 8. That nearly everyone was outside, and I would have been also, but keeping my promise in mind to not block anyone from leaving, I sat through out the ?reworks display in my truck so Lee?Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. B6LA0051 Page 6 of 27 I could be the ?rst one out so as not to block anyone. 9. That I could see the ?reworks shoot off, but had a very bad View of them exploding. 10. That at the ?reworks ?nale, I immediately started up my truck, looked around and slowly started to back up. 1 1. That I was very much aware of all of the little children present as well as all of the other people present. 12. That the people present seemed to have enjoyed the ?reworks as much as I did. 13. That there were numerous adults along with their children who were watching the ?reworks, and most of them were outside their vehicles. 14. That being aware of all the people present, I started to back up very, very carefully for about 70-75 feet. 15. That I had my truck under total control as I was backing up, when all at once, I heard a loud shrill noise, and it sounded like spinning tires on wet payment, and immediately I was shot backwards as a rocket that is propelled, and the truck seemed as though it was going backwards at full speed. 16. That at that moment, I had no control of where the truck went. 17. That I felt myself bouncing off of other vehicles, one after another, and all the while I was trying to hit my brakes and get stopped. 18. That my truck ?nally stopped when it hit a vehicle, and I had both feet on the brakes, as I did not know what had gone wrong. 19. That this happened so quickly that I was in shock from being battered in the truck when it was careening off other vehicles. 20. That I was overwhelmed with fear of what had happened in this crowded area. 21. That I went from total control of my truck to total lack of control in a fraction of a second. 22. That my truck door on the driver?s side was approximately 18 inches from another vehicle and I couldn't get out, so I could not understand what all had happened until I got help to get out. 23. That I immediately turned the engine off and waited for help. 24. That Ben Higgins [hereinafter Ben] came up to the driver?s door, and began to question me. 25. That I told him I believed the throttle had stuck. 26. When Ben asked me if I had any identi?cation, I gave him a copy of an expired TVA identi?cation card. 27. That I also gave him a constructive notice that consists of 4?pages. 28. That he asked if I had a driver?s license, and I told him that I had rescinded my signature on the license. 29. That knowing that I have the right to travel on the public highways, and such is declared under Constitutional Law, see 1 1 AmJur ?329 and being familiar with 25 AmJur??163 and 165, Ben and since Dave: Clark was there, they both were responsible to protect these rights. 30. That he asked me if I was a sovereign citizen, which meaning of his question still puzzles me considering the Tennessee?Constitution, Bill of Rights land 2 supra; therefore, I would have to answer ?Yes,? to his query. Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. Page 7 of 27 That I also performed this taskThat I was still in shock, not realizing what had just happened or why it had happened. . That Ben asked me, ?Have you been drinking?? . That assuming he meant alcohol I told him, have never drank in my entire life.? . That if it was a trick question and he meant any beverage then I must respond yes, I drink water, coffee, tea, fruit juice, etc. on a regular basis. . That I wasn't sure what had happened, but I told him I thought my throttle had stuck. . That Ben wanted to give me an eye-?nger coordination test. . That I presume that Ben was attempting to discern if I had suffered from a stroke or some other immediate impairment. . That being concerned as to what happened I submitted to the test. . That then First responders checked with me to see if I was hurt. . That I told them that I wasn't hurt. . That I told them I was a type 2 diabetic. That they checked my blood sugar, and I believe it was 178 but I do not know for certain. That they also took my blood pressure, and I believe it was 168/85, to the best of my memory. That my wife had heard the sirens, and called me to see if I was okay. That I explained to her that 1 had been in a tragic accident. That I didn't know until much later (several hours) the scope of what had happened, such as how many vehicles were hit and if any people were injured. (which there was one). That Ben asked me about insurance, and while Ben was standing there 1 called my wife again to get the information on my insurance. That, ?nally, Ben asked, ?Can you get out on the passenger side.? That Ben knows, or should know, that a private automobile is not a ?passenger? (car for hire) automobile, so apparently he was attempting to create an adhesive contract between me and the Trust business entity STATE OF TENNESSEE in my confusion and shock. That I did climb across the seat and got out on the other side of my truck. That Ben then performed the eye-?nger movement for the second time. That he also wanted me to walk the white line and count to nine, then turn around and walk back and count to nine. That being concerned about my health 1 did this with great haste. That 1 was then commanded by Ben to say my ABC's from through Q. That then he wanted me to hold my head back and see if I could tell when 30 seconds had passed. That 1 did this and he said it was 18 seconds but never supported his claim by showing me his stop watch. That later I was asked if I would do a blood test. That my confusion about the tragic incident prompted me to agree. . That we, Ben and I, went to the emergency room at The Oak Ridge hospital in Ben?s car and I gave blood. Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. Page 8 ot?Z?I 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. That I asked how long it would be before the results came back. That Ben said it might take 6 months. That I mentioned that I knew the hospital could have the results by the morning. That Ben agreed that they could if I wanted to pay for it. That I was taken to the police station, and Ben and Jenkins were in a room with me. That the sign on the door read something like "interview in progress.? That I told him, have nothing to hide, it was an accident.? That this was all I said, as I remember. They said I was free to go home, and I called my stepdaughter to come and get me. That my stepdaughter came to get me and I got home approximately 2:00 am. That then on July 7, 2015 Jenkins and Johnson (I believe about both names) came by to serve a search warrant to get the electronic data box, drug inducia, alocohol inducia, and any distraction like a GPS or a telephone. That neither Ben, Jenkins nor Johnson gave me any information about the blood test to qualify their search, nor any other information to qualify any such search of my automobile. That the 4-page notice I gave Ben on the 4th of July was a constructive notice claiming all of my rights at all times, and waiving none of my rights at any time, along with numerous supreme court decisions, stating I had a right to travel without a license, and that public officials were not immune when acting outside the law and under the color of law. That on the 7th of July when Jenkins and Johnson came by my house to serve the security- instrument titled ?search warrant,? I ask if I could get my personal property from the truck. That Jenkins promised that they would release the truck to me the following day (July 8th) and I could receive my personal property then. That Jenkins left his business card to me to call to get my truck back. That on Tuesday, July 14; Wednesday July 15; Thursday, July 16; and Friday, July 17 I did call the number on the business card that Jenkins gave me to inquire about my personal propertyvoice recording, stating they were not available, and to leave a message. That on Monday, July 20, and Tuesday, July 21, I again called the same number to the police station, and again I got a voice message stating they were out of the of?ce and to leave a message. That I left a message on their recorder each time I called, and they never did return my call. That on Wednesday, July 22, I got a call from someone at the police station, stating they wanted me to come down to the police station, and sign some search warrant papers. That I was a bit confused so I went there to determine what was going on. That my wife took me there, thinking we were going to sign search warrant papers to ?nd out what had happened to the truck and its linkage in order to get to the bottom of what happened. That the cops immediately told me they have warrants for my arrest (1 7 I believe). That they gave me another search warrant almost identical to the ?rst one of July That the search warrant has the earmark of a ?shing expedition. Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. Page 9 of 27 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. That they ?ashed the stack of warrants at me, intentionally not giving me time to read them, and refused to give me a copy. That they demanded I sign them, and I signed them all: ?Lee-Harold: Cromwell, beneficiary.? That these cops willfully, knowingly and maliciously refused to give me the warrants to read so that I would have a clue as to what was happening. That the search warrant issued and signed by Roger-A.: Family of Miller [hereinafter Miller] on the 21St of July was, to the best of my knowledge, the same information on the warrant that was signed by Miller on July That Grant: Gouldie [hereinafter Grant] is the signatory of the security-instrument titled OF TENNESSEE COUNTY OF ANDERSON, APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH That Grant placed as his alleged ?probable cause? the following: 0 Electronic Crash Data contained within the electronic components located within the 2006 Dodge Ram 0 Any and all evidence related to the fatality traf?c crash that occurred on July 4, 2015, in the parking lot of the Midtown Community Center, 102 Robertsville Road, Oak Ridge, Anderson County, Tennessee, in which the 2006 Dodge Ram 1500 was involved, including, but not limited to the following: 0 Any indicia of alcohol, controlled substances, or other intoxicant; any indicia of distracted driving, including cellular phones and global positioning equipment; and, any indicia of a medical condition or medical event 0 Any other evidence or items that would be used to package, conceal the foregoing, or prevent its discovery 0 Inspection of the throttle body system pertaining to the stated above vehicle. That Grant then wrote in his paragraph, ?Therefore, considering the foregoing, I believe based on my knowledge, training, and experience that Lee Cromwell?s truck contains certain evidence pertaining to the cause of the fatality crash that occurred on July 4, 2015, in the parking lot at the Midtown Community Center, formerly known as the Wildcat Den, located at 102 Rogersville Rd., Oak Ridge, Anderson County, Tennessee. I also believe based on my training, prior experience, previous investigations, and by having become familiar with impaired driving laws, with the ways in which to detect the impairment of impaired drivers, and basic crash investigations, that I have probable cause to believe that the maroon-colored 2006 Dodge Ram 1500, VIN ID7HA18K96J 159166, bearing Tennessee license plate 607BCQ, owned by Lee Cromwell, contains certain evidence pertaining to violations of Tennessee Code Annotated 39-13-201, Criminal homicide, and Tennessee Code Annotated 39-13-103, Reckless endangerment.? That Grant then, in his RETURN AND SUMMARY INVENTORY OF PROPERTY wrote, ?The within warrant came to hand and was executed on this 21 Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. Page 10 M27 93July, 2015, by searching the maroon-colored 2006 Dodge Ram 1500, VIN 159166, bearing Tennessee license plate 607BCQ, owned by Lee Cromwell, and taking from it the following evidence which was seized: The stated above vehicle, was inspected by technician, Dave Carey, of Secret City Dodge (Oak Ridge). Carey inspected the mechanical cable lineage from the pedal to throttle body, pedal, throttle body, throttle valve operation, AIS motor, throttle position sensor, and attachment points. Carey also conducted a diagnostic check of the electrical system. All inspections and checks showed no indications of malfunction pertaining to the throttle body system.? That, moreover, Grant wrote, ..Due to the type of impact in this crash, one method to assist in determining the impact speeds for Cromwell?s truck is the truck?s Crash Data Retrieval System. The Crash Data Retrieval System will contain vital information such as change in velocity at the time of the crash. The Crash Data Retrieval System will also contain information about other systems in operation on the truck that may determine whether or not Cromwell attempted to apply the truck? 3 brakes at any time during the crash. Additionally, the vehicle needs to be examined for other evidence that can help determine the cause of the crash, including any indicia of alcohol, controlled substances, or other intoxicants, any indicia of distracted driving, included cellular phones and global positioning equipment, and any indicia of a medical condition of the driver or the occurrence of a medical event.? That Grant declared that he had ?probable cause? for his search warrant but produced no history or evidence to support his claim such as a history of drug/alcohol abuse or a business selling drugs or alcohol; he merely conjectured, and produced no evidence relating to the ?Electronic Crash Data contained within the electronic components located within the 2006 Dodge Ram? to support his alleged facts for the warrant, witnessing his fraud regarding his witch hunt. That, however, Grant produced no incriminating evidence whatsoever per his declaration in the RETURN AND SUMMARY INVENTORY OF PROPERTY That Roger knew, or should have known, that Grant gave no substantive evidence supporting his ?facts? for the search warrant, also Roger knew this search warrant would be issued from an Administrative Of?cer under Admiralty jurisdiction maritime law, and that he was acting willfully, knowingly and maliciously against Constitutional law, the common law and Trust law in relation to me. That, additionally, Roger knew, or should have known, the severe con?ict of interest in having someone with a vested interest to declare a no-fault with the truck ?lineage,? though I am ba?led as to the use of this word, unless Grant meant linkage, and then Roger?s conspiracy to deny the truck for inspection and investigation of a disinterested party timely supports a conspiracy between him and the Oak Ridge Police Department in obstruction. That the security-instrument titled ?search warrant? had nothing of fact written as to why it was issued, merely conjecture by a vested party of?cer of the City and was a ?shing expedition and a solicitation of a criminal conspiracy with Roger. 99. That since the search warrants of July 7th and July 21St were redundant this action could support Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. B6LA0051 Page ot?27 a conspiracy to fabricate evidence. 100. That the other thing they listed on the search warrant of July 21St was a folder I had in my truck concerning a security-instrument titled CITATION issued on May 14, 2014, and how I responded by special appearance with a written demurrer that should have been distinguished by Miller at that time. 101. That since no response to the contrary of the facts was received my Miller, this should have been a moot issue. 102. That this folder (notebook) was seen when the ?rst warrant was served. 103. That on July 22, 2015 while at the police station I was handcuffed with my hands behind my back. 104. That the handcuffs were so tight that when they delivered me to their jail, and when they were taken off, my circulation was cut off for approximately three (3) hours. 105. That two men, one named Grant and the other one named Boucher was present at the police station. 106. That I then discovered that the original phone call to me was from Grant. 107. That I was frisked at the police station before I was taken to the county jail by Grant. 108. That the jail is in Clinton, Tennessee. 109. That when I got to the jail, I was frisked again for the second time. 110. That I was booked into the county jail, my picture was taken, my ?nger prints were taken, and my DNA was taken without my consent. 1 11. That I objected to this procedure, and told them I had not been convicted. 112. That I was told by the officer that this is their policy. 113. That Steakley was the one who told my private property Gnhotos, ?ngerprints, DNA). 114. That under the tyranny guise of ?policy? my property was stolen to be placed into a data bank, and this was my private property, and a price cannot be placed on my property that was stolen at this booking and Amendment IV of the Constitution for the United States of America and Article I, {57 ?Searches and seizures; warrants? of the Tennessee-Constitution was over thrown. 115. That, to date, I have never been justly compensated for the stolen private property. 116. That, moreover, the Trust business entities City of Oak Ridge and the County of Anderson receive a net worth increase when I was kidnapped and falsely arrested and imprisoned and the human Trustees of both Trust business entities set the stage to plunder the Social Security Cestui que Trust LEE HAROLD CROMWELL by falsely making me the pseudo-Trustee and placing ?duciary responsibility on me knowing full well that I am the human bene?ciary and cannot be both bene?ciary and Trustee of the same Trust at the same time, and the charging people are the Trustees. 117. That I was given jail clothes and was told to go inside the bathroom that was in plain sight of the booking-desk. 118. That I was denied my privacy, as this unknown man went into the bath room with me, and gawked at me while I was changing from street clothes to jail clothes. Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. Page [2 of 2? 119. That I was taken in to a cell 2, pod 5 and there were 16 jail cells in this pod. 120. That eight were upstairs, and eight were downstairs. 121. That I was told that cell one and cell two were the only two cells on this pod that were for solitary con?nement. 122. That I was on the ground ?oor on the left side across from the desk which was about 20' away. 123. That the cell I was in was approximately 12' 15'. 124. That it had metal bunk beds with a mattress about 3" thick with a sink/commode combination. 125. That also a table of about 2' fastened to the wall with a small metal unpadded seat on each side that was fastened to the wall. 126. That conspiratorially my one-hour free time from the cell was late at night, and this was the only time I could use the phone, knowing everyone was probably in bed. 127. That my wife came to visit on Saturday and it was by closed circuit telephone. 128. That I was on total lockdown for 23 hours a day. 129. That my hour outside the jail cell was between one and two o'clock am. 130. That this was my only time to take a shower. 131. That while I was outside the jail cell, they would come into my cell and search it daily. 132. That I am still wondering what they hoped to ?nd, and I made the statement to them, "You had better pray to your god that you don't ?nd anything as I had not been out of the cell except for one hour a day, and had no visitors.? 133. That when I was given jail clothes, I was not given socks. 134. That I was given socks that night when I took a shower. 135. That when I was booked into the jail, I was given a wool blanket, something that looked like a table cloth that I doubled several times to make a very hard pillow, which was about one inch thick. 136. That when I took a shower, there was no wash cloth available, as they said there was a shortage of them. 137. That, however, I know that the Sheriff? 5 department charges the alleged taxpayers and also ?les a Treasury form 1099-A, Acquisition or Abandonment of Secured Pr0perty, and charges the Trust LEE CROMWELL [hereinafter Trust LEE CROMWELL or Trust receive unjust enrichment and double, triple or more dipping. 138. That I had told booking that I was a type 2 diabetic and I needed my medicine twice daily. 139. That through their criminal negligence I didn't get my medicine that night, and I began to tremble very badly and common sense dictates that through all this trauma I would be affected by the diabetes. 140. That I called for the guard at approximately 12:00 a.m. and I asked him what time it was. 141. That I told him I had not had my medication, and they went and got a lancet and took my blood sugar, and gave me some medicine. 142. That I don't remember what my blood sugar reading was. 143. That when I was placed in the jail, besides the blanket and the tablecloth pillow, I was given Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. B6LA0051 Page 13 of 27 a plastic cup, small bottle of shampoo about 2 inches high, a tooth brush about 2" long, small stick of deodorant, a small tube of fresh mint about 2" long that doubled for tooth paste, and a small box with a lid that I don't know what it was for. 144. That it looked like a pill box, but our medicine was given to as twice a day. 145. That I was denied my vitamins that my family had brought to the jail. 146. That it was very noisy throughout the night, with very loud racket coming from different cells. 147. That I even heard screaming from other cells. 148. That the lights were dimmed about ten o?clock, but never turned off. 149. That jail doors were slammed all night long, and keys rattling, people talking real loud, and the phone would occasionally ring from other guards. 150. That their walkie-talkie radios were turned up and sounded wide open. 151. That they appeared to have no regard for the inmates. 152. That most days for lunch I had peanut butter sandwich or baloney sandwich, along with a carton of milk. 153. That the peanut butter was so thick, that it would choke you. 154. That dinners and breakfast were much better than lunch. 155. That the intent of the Trustees is to keep me disoriented and feed me sugar and other health disruptive meals, along with lack of sleep and emotional distress of 23-hour con?nement so that my mind would not be clear with their alleged arraignment and the Trustees could fraudulently make me the pseudo-Trustee to forward their scheme to steal assets from the Trust and from the alleged ?taxpayers.? 156. That, further, these Administrative Of?cers write three (3) bonds they sell on the market regarding these cases supporting that we are being used as their chattel and we are not free humans. 157. That on Thursday July 23 I had to appear before a close circuit TV for a so-called arraignment before Miller and, considering that I was never given the charges to read in order to see if they were/are understandable, I stated I did not understand the charges, and asked to be released on my own recognizance. 158. That Miller denied my release. 159. That there was no assistance-of?counsel present, or any witnesses present in that I was given no opportunity to contact anyone, or delivered to an open forum so that someone could be there, only two o?icers for the principal, a woman named Steakley and a Shertley and conspiratorially I was given no writing instruments to keep notes. 160. That by the language assistance-of-counsel I do not mean an attorney, an attorney is a ?ction of law and an alleged of?cer-of-the-tribunal; therefore, they work for the opposing side and act merely as a negotiator, to our demise. 161. That I was at this alleged arraignment and was denied due process of law. 162. That I had never been arrested or in jail in my entire life, so this experience was very nerve- racking to me. Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. Page 14 of 27? 163. That Miller declared that he was entering a plea of not guilty, thereby attempting to make me the Trustee to forward his scheme to plunder the Trust LHC along with his cohorts. 164. That I objected, since I didn't understand the charges nor had ever read them, and since the charges applied to the Cestui Que Trust LHC, he, as Trustee, then acted for the Trust making himself liable. 165. That he set bail for the Trust LHC at $202,500 and ordered its bene?ciary held as the ransom. 166. That a bond hearing was set for Tuesday, July 28th at Oak Ridge, Tennessee at 1:00 pm. 167. That before going to the bond hearing, I was given peanut butter sandwich and milk. 168. That there were eight of us loaded on a bus like vehicle with handcuffs in front of us, waste chains, and leg irons and we were paraded into the tribunal setting. 169. That my family had obtained an attorney and the ?rst time I saw him was for about ten minutes before the tribunal hearing. 170. That I told him I was under extreme duress. 171. That the bond was lowered from $202,500 to $100,000. 172. That at the bond hearing Ben testi?ed that I said I was a sovereign citizen. 173. That I objected to this, and stated that I had never claimed to be a sovereign citizen. 174. That Ben never de?ned what he meant as a sovereign citizen. 175. That Victoria: amin of Bannach d/b/a Trustee for the Social Security Cestui que Trust LEE HAROLD CROMWELL d/b/a Asst. District Attorney, kept saying that I claimed to be a sovereign citizen. 176. That they were trying to use the paper work from a CITATION of May 14, 2015, which never stated anywhere that I was a sovereign citizen. 177. That, however, again referring to the Tennessee?Constitution I am. 178. That Ben lied, because at the wreck when He asked if I was a sovereign citizen, in my confused state I stated 179. That Ben admitted that I gave him more paperwork on July 4th. 180. This was the 4-page Constructive Notice of supreme court decisions stating that I had the right to travel without a license or fee, and traveling was an inalienable right, not to be regulated by government. 181. That Miller declared that I had been de?ant at the arraignment, meaning, I suppose, that if one declares that he or she does not understand the nature and cause of the accusation and declares themselves as their rightful position of bene?ciary of the charged Trust he or she is considered de?ant. 182. That we were taken from the jail to Oak Ridge and back to the county jail by Ball and Sitizery where again I was in 23 hours? lockdown from Wednesday, July 22 until Tuesday July 28. 183. That I was released about 7:00 pm. on July 28 on $100,000 bond. 184. That when I signed all papers, I signed "bene?ciary" after my name, and I signed "without prejudice" above my name. 185. That I was made to sign a electronic keypad, creating a perpetual autograph for the Trustees to fraudulently use anytime. Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. B6LA0051 Page 15 of 27 186. That the Trustee officer would not let me sign "without prejudice" above the electronic- signature knowing that such reservation of rights would not allow unrestricted use of my autograph. 187. That she said I could sign below my name, but not above it, supporting a foreknowledge of the use and restrictions. 188. That on the night of the accident, the district attorney, Dave Clark was riding with a police man, and was on the scene with a District Attorney jacket on. 189. That the charges are as follows; Aggravated assault 12, reckless endangerment vehicle homicide, driving on suspended or revoked, murder reckless homicide, murder criminally negligent homicide. The docket numbers are 15G82118, 15G82119, 15GS2I20, 15G8212l, 15082122, 15G82123, 15682124, 15G82125, 15G82126, 15G82127, 15G82128, 15G82129, 15082130, 15G82131, 15682132, 15G82133 and 190. That on November 23, 2015, I was told by a friend that used to work at the Y-12 plant that he thought my truck was at the Y-12 impound yard. 191. That I still have not seen the truck, as only people with special clearances can access the impound yard. 192. That the information I have is that Victoria: Bannoch was/is prosecuting the case. 193. That on January 15, 2016 I was ordered back to the tribunal to see if they had evidence to send to the grand jury. 194. That at this hearing, Ben said his training showed that I was a sovereign citizen, as compared with his ?rst testimony at the bond hearing that I told him I was a sovereign citizen. 195. That this being so, Ben gave testimony that I am, in fact, a sovereign citizen and, as such, I claim all of my rights. 196. That, to reiterate, at no time except at the arraignment hearing was I asked if I understood the charges, and at the arraignment hearing I was given nothing to read in order to even begin an understanding of these statutes. 197. That I also told the attorney to challenge jurisdiction, but he never did so. 198. That I found out January 15, 2016 at the tribunal hearing that my truck had been taken to the Secret City Jeep Dodge RAM Dealer in Oak Ridge, Tennessee for investigation. 199. That the Secret City Dodge Dealer has a vested interest for the Company to falsify their tests considering that the Company, the principal of Secret City Jeep Dodge RAM Dealer, could be responsible for the death, injuries and repair of the parties and property if there is a faulty drive linkage, or some other mechanical or system fault which were contributory to the incident and/or negligence was a factor. 200. That, further, my insurance company informed me that they offered to pay their private investigator $27,000.00 to investigate my truck and the police would not let them have access to my truck. 201. That, therefore, the Accused have criminally conspired through obstruction to deny access of my truck for forensic evaluation and investigation to determine whether there was a faulty drive linkage, or some other mechanical or system fault which were contributory to the incident Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunai Account No. B6LA0051 Page 16 of 27 and/or negligence was a factor which caused the incident. 202. That Miller, an interested party to the action, then gave an opinion that there was enough evidence to go to a grand jury. 203. That The Accused secretly empanels grand juries and pleads their case for indictment(s). The grand jury is under the control and direction of the Accused and the hearing(s) is/are ex parte in favor of the Accused, or party empaneling the grand jury. The grand jurors are, in great proportion, government of?cers, agents or people licensed in some way through the Accused principal, the corporate United States, and, therefore, are biased for the corporate government. Furthermore, the hearing being ex parte the jurors are easily swayed by the persuasion of the Accused. The Accused used and uses negative human nature, a proclivity to always think badly of someone, to ?'audulently lead jurors to accept the one sided persuasions and brainwashing of the Accused in order to obstruct right?ruling and to overthrow the Constitution for the United States of America [hereinafter Constitution], the rights of the American People, and the American system of justice. 204. That The Accused sets forth a scheme knowing that: Modern Criminal Procedure, Cases- comments-questions, Tenth Edition, Chap. 15, C, Evaluating the Grand Jury?s Performance, 1. The debate. ?The grand jury is independent only in the sense that it is not formally attached to the prosecutor?s o?ice, though legally free to vote as they please, grand jurors virtually always assent to the recommendations of the prosecuting attorney, a fact borne out by available statistical and survey pervasive prosecutorial in?uence re?ected in such statistics had led an impressive array of commentators to endorse the sentiment expressed by United States Judge William Campbell, a former prosecutor: ?Today, the grand jury is the total captive of the prosecutor who, if he is candid, will concede that he can indict anybody, at any time, for almost anything before any grand jury.? California Supreme Court, Hawkins v. Superior Court (described in Note 7, p. 910). 205. That the police report was written by Wesley Carroll, badge number 4722 and approved by someone with the badge number 4128. 206. That this report declared that alcohol and drugs were present. 207. That I cannot argue this, in that any of the Trustees could have placed alcohol, drugs or anything else in the truck after they stole it from me. 208. That the toxicology report came back and said I was free of drugs and alcohol. 209. That the police report was dated 7/5/2015. 210. That additionally Roger, Dave and Victoria are BAR Association Attorneys, which BAR Association is a monopoly in Tennessee inasmuch as they profess to have a license to practice law and that such license is required to practice law in Tennessee. 211. That when asked to produce said license 1 have never had an attorney produce such a license, only a BAR card issued from a private trust/corporation whose principle is the corporations UNITED STATES or OF 212. That considering that the BAR Association is the only place someone can get this alleged ?license? and the BAR Association is a private trust/corporation, Article of the Constitution Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. Page 17 of 27 for the United States of America has been and is being overthrown and a state of Treason and Conspiracy to commit Treason has been committed and is still being committed by Roger, Dave and Victoria. 213. That Roger, Dave and Victoria support that his and her being a member of the monopolistic private trusthorporation BAR Association and licensed through it that the Tennessee-State is no longer a ?free government.? 214. That there is nothing in the Constitution for the United States of America that requires the Judiciary to be licensed and that the word license is de?ned as, ?The permission by competent authority to an act which, without such permission, would be illegal, a trespass, or a tort.? Black ?3 Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition. That so being, Roger, Dave and Victoria have declared that they are doing something that is illegal, a trespass or a tort. 215. That the BAR Association and its monopolistic control over the judiciary is not only Treason and Conspiracy to Commit Treason as an overthrow of the Constitution for the United States of America, Article but also in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act,u~1 July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 209, 15 U.S.C. and since this act requires the United Federal government to investigate and pursue companies and organizations suspected of violating the Act why is it not prosecuting the BAR Associations and its Attorney members? It is a Federal statute to limit cartels and monopolies, not encourage them wherein the alleged judiciary itself is a monOpoly. 216. That the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT is a Tribunal under the Constitution for the United States of America, Article I, Section 8. ?The Congress shall have Power. . . To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,? inasmuch as Roger and all other alleged judges have their pay diminished; see Constitution for the United States of America, Article Section. 1. ?The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Of?ces during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Of?ce,? and his pay is diminished through ?ling and payment of taxes to one of his principals, the Department of the Treasury Internal Revenue Service. 217. This means that you, Roger, are merely an administrative of?cer of the Legislature wherein you enforce their statutes; Statute Anderson on the U.C.C., Texts, Cases and Commentaries, ?1-103:6 statute should be construed in harmony with the common law unless there is a clear legislative intent to abrogate the common law.? And further, ?The Code cannot be read to preclude a common law action.? 218. That the District Attorney is supposed to be in the Executive Branch of government yet they are considered ?of?cers of the court,? (wearing con?icting hats) which is a con?ict of interest. Moreover, a judge, if there were any lawful judges in this country, has authority over them and, contrary to the separation of powers, can sanction them if they do not bend to his/her will. 219. That as you know, or should know, there are at least Eighty-seven (87) types of law and at lease thirty-one (31) arenas of jurisdiction, to wit: Absolute law, 2. Adjective law, 3. Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. Page 18 of 27 1. Administrative law, 4. Admiralty law, 5. law of Arms, 6. Antitrust laws, 7. Bankruptcy Act, 8. Blue law, 9. Blue-sky law, 10. Canon law, 11. Case law, 12. Civil law, 13. Commercial law, 14. Common Law, 15. Conclusion of law, 16. Constitutional law, 17. Consuetudinary law, 18. Conventional law, 19. Criminal law, 20. Customary law, 21. Divine law, 22. Decree-law, 23. Ecclesiastical law, 24. Edict, 25. Enabling statute, 26. Enacted law, 27. Environmental Law, 28. Equity law, 29. Ex post facto law (though this type is supposed to be un-Constitutional), 30. Federal law, 31. Forest law, 32. Forfeiture law, 33. Fundamental law, 34. General law, 35. Higher law, 36. Imperative law, 37. Immigration law, 38. Internal law, 39. International law, 40. Judicial decree, 41. Judicial opinion, 42. Law arbitrary, 43. law of Citations, 44. law of Evidence, 45. law of Marque, 46. Law merchant, 47. Law of Mosheh (Moses)-Torah, 48. laws of Oleron, 49. law of the Road, 50. Local law, 51. Maritime law, 52. Martial law, 53. Mercantile law, 54. Military law, 55. Moral law, 56. Municipal law, 57. Natural law, 58. Napoleonic law (in Louisiana), 59. Ordinance, 60. Organic law, 61. Parliamentary law, 62. Penal law, 63. Permanent law, 64. Positive law, 65. Private law, 66. Probate, 67. Procedural law, 68. Prospective law, 69. Public law, 70. Remedial law, 71. Retrospective law, 72. Revenue law, 73. Roman law, 74. Securities law, 75. Special law, 76. law of the Staple, 77. State law, 78. Statute law, 79. Substantive law, 80. Sumptuary law, 81. Tacit law, 82. Tax Law, 83. Trust- Law, 84. United States law, 85. Unwritten law, 86. Usury laws, or 87. Written law, and each one would require a different approach when addressing issues of their respective disciplines. In addition, there are many jurisdictions to consider, for instance: 1. Admiralty, 2. American Common Law, 3. American Equity-Law, 4. Ancillary, 5. Appellate, 6. Concurrent, 7. Contentious, 8. Continuing, 9. Coordinate, 10. Criminal, 11. Equity, 12. Exclusive, 13. Foreign, 14. General, 15. International, 16. Legislative, 17. Limited, 18. Jurisdiction in personam, 19. Jurisdiction in rem, 20. Jurisdiction quasi in rem, 21. Military, 22. Original, 23. Pendent, 24. Plenary, 25. Primary, 26. Probate, 27- Special, 28. Subject~matter, 29. Summary, 30. Territorial, or 31. Voluntary; hence, for the record, any proceedings in relation to this cause is under the common law and under American Common Law jurisdiction. IV. Yol_1r_Declarations and your Offer, additional facts relevant to this Civil Complaint: That the security-instrument titled SUMMONS has the language THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANDERSON COUNTY, and has written, ?You are hereby summoned and required to serve upon Plaintiff?s attorney, whose address is 310 North Main Street, Clinton, Tennessee 37716, an Answer to the Petition herewith served upon you within thirty (30) days after service of this Summons and Complaint upon you, exclusive of day service. If you fail to do so, Judgment by Default can be taken against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint.? That this is executed by an of?cer, Deputy Clerk, of the human William T. Jones dfb/a Clerk wherein the Trust business entity COURT FOR ANDERSON by and through the human William-T: Jones d/b/a William T. Jones Trustee of the Social Security Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. B6LA005I Page 19of27 10. II. 12. Cestui que Trusts LHC, MICHAEL ELDRIDGE [hereinafter Trust and ELIZABETH ELDRIDGE [hereinafter Trust and is the agent for the Trustee Bruce-D: Fox d/b/a Trustee of the Trust parties listed and dfb/a urn-Constitutional title of nobility Esquire who is an alleged of?cer-of?the-tribunal. That Trustee William then assigned or solicited Donald-R: Family of Elledge d/b/a Trustee Donald R. Elledge of the three (3) Trusts as his of?cer/agent to manipulate the hearing process creating a cash-cow to the Trustees. That the language ?You are? is plural and does not designate any speci?city as to any particular party, e. g. human or Trust or person, etc. but is a general statement that could mean anyone or anything, but the SUMMONS was directed at me the human and the human bene?ciary of Trust LHC by the Sheriff deputies. That you did not complete service inasmuch as there is no service to any other Trustee besides yourself and since an alleged ?Answer? was instructed to be sent to you then you are the primary ?duciary for all three Trusts in this case and it would appear that you are fraudulently manipulating the Trusts whereby the bene?ciaries assume a position of pseudo-Trustees, a scheme to create Trusts with no bene?ciary, so that through them you can access the assets/corpus of the Trusts to you and your cohorts bene?t and unjust enrichment. That your Offer references the parties as all capital letter titles and these designations are of the Social Security Cestui que Trusts referenced. That you wrote ?Jury Trial Demanded? knowing full well that the word-?Jury? in this phrase would be an adjective and as such means ?makeshift,? meaning you intend to make this up as you go. That you declare that the Trust LHC resides at 124 Salem Road, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 knowing full well that this Trust, a piece of paper, is located at the Social Security Administration. That you title a ?Lee H. Cromwell? as a ?ction of law termed ?Defendant? and a H. also as a ?Defendant,? and then you have your security-instrument sent to me, a human, presenting confusion as to who or what is the real party/ies in interest. That you declare that this ?Lee H. Cromwell? is a ?citizen 0_f Anderson County? [Emphasis added by me] meaning ?of belonging to a Trust business entity titled Anderson County giving witness that your action cannot be against me in that I am a human and the human bene?ciary of the Trust LHC and de?nitely not property of or ?belonging to? the referenced Trust business entity; moreover, the SS. card declares it is property of the Social Security Administration, no language declares it is property of Anderson County so I am confused. That your facts reference the titles Plaintiff and Defendant and, per the parties in the upper left comer of your COMPLAINT, these are ?ctions of law and Trust entities so your facts present confused or up real parties in interest in this action. That you produced no evidence that these Trusts were even on the scene, much less responsible for the incidents thereto. Lee-Harold: Cromwell - Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. B6LA0051 Page 20 of 27 13. 14. 15. l6. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. That your COUNT I: NEGLIGENCE again relates to these Trusts and you declare that a Trust Defendant that was not there was guilty of failure to exercise due care; b. failure to keep his vehicle under proper control; and, c. failure to keep a proper lookout.? That however you are gender speci?c in that you wrote that the Trust was a and we all know that only a Trustee can act for the Trust and your speci?city designates the Trustee to be a male but you did not include his name for service or that service was made to him. That in your COUNT II: NEGLIGENCE PER SE again you relate to a Trust Defendant that to my knowledge was not there and you wrote: ?Plaintiff would show that at the time and place set forth herein, the Defendant was operating his vehicle in violation of the following sections of the Tennessee Code Annotated, constituting negligence per se. a. Tenn. Code Ann. 55-8-136, ?Due Care? b. Tenn. Code Ann. 55-8-163, ?Limitations on backing? That you presented no document of contract that I or the Trust LHC through its Trustee has with the Trust business entity STATE OF TENNESSEE or ANDERSON COUNTY whereby either would be subject to the Trust business entity statutes copyrighted in the Term. Code Ann. That in your CAUSE OF INJURIES AND DAMAGES [hereinafter you declare as a broad statement the following, ?Plaintiff Michael Eldridge would show that as a result of the negligence of the Defendant as set forth herein, he has suffered serious bodily injury, pain and fear and fright, grievous and permanent injuries, loss of enjoyment of life, medical expense, mental anguish, and loss of capacity to earn.? That further in your CAUSE you declare that as a broad statement the following, ?Plaintiff Elizabeth Eldridge would show that she witnessed the injuries to her husband, Michael Eldridge, and was also injured and that as a result of the negligence of the Defendant as set forth herein, she has Suffered injury to her leg, fear and fright and mental anguish.? That further in your CAUSE you declare that as a broad statement the following, ?As a direct and proximate result of the acts, omissions, breaches, failures and/or conduct of Defendant, Lee H. Cromwell, as speci?cally pled herein above, Michael Eldridge and Elizabeth Eldridge, have suffered, and will continue to suffer in the future: bodily injury, permanent injury, and medical expenses.? That on the last page of your COMPLAINT you have a whereby you have the language ?We hereby acknowledge ourselves as sureties for the costs of this cause for all costs, taxes, and damages, in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. 20-12-120.? That since you incorporate the word-?taxes? knowing full well that taxpayer is a cestui que trust. . see Footnote #3 supra, you qualify that this is a Trust-action. That this COST BOND is autographed by both Michael and Elizabeth Eldridge and allegedly witnessed by the human and human Trustee Bruce D. Fox through him and his Trust business entity FOX FARLEY and, as such, Bruce, et al. have acquired an open end security- instrurnent meaning that Bruce and his Trust business entity FOX FARLEY and the other Trustees have a blank check to tap the Trusts Michael and Elizabeth Eldridge are the bene?ciaries of wherein they conspiratorially made Michael and Elizabeth Eldridge pseudo- Lce-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. B6LA0051 Page 21 of27 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. Trustees in order to perpetuate this scheme, and/or are tapping Michael and Elizabeth Eldridge in their human beings andfor are tapping both the humans and the Trusts. That Bruce and his cohorts know that this COST BOND opens the door for Bruce, et al. to tap Trusts ME and EE for any amount he chooses or they choose in that no limit was placed on the Bond as a cap. That I, as the human and human Trustgr/Settlor and the human bene?ciary, accept that the humans Michael and Elizabeth: Eldridge and the Trusts ME and EE are sureties for this case in reference to me and request the Trustee/s to do the same in order to protect my bene?cial interest and to act in their ?duciary capacity in a lawful, prudent and intelligent manner or Show Cause why they did not if funds are taken from my bene?cial interest that is due and owing to me at maturation of the Trust. That, additionally, the humans Michael and Elizabeth: Eldridge were attending a ?reworks display, meaning that their visual, auditory and olfactory senses were stressfully stimulated immediately before the incident combined with the foreknowledge that they had to ?ght the traf?c departing the parking lot and travelling to their next destination knowing that the Trust business entity police could stop them and write a citation or arrest them for any of the myriad statutory traf?c infractions fraudulently issued in violation of 11 Ame ?329 and 25 AmJur 163 and 165 addressed supra. That we all know that if this were legit that you, as the Trustee for all three Trusts, could simply ?le a Treasury Form 1099-A and collect the sum sought from the Trust LHC and pay the bene?ciaries of the Trusts ME and EE immediately, but as the Trustee you would not be permitted to charge Michael and/or Elizabeth a fee percentage inasmuch as that is your ?duciary responsibility as an alleged Public of?cial titled That, however, when one follows the money, as it were, the action you have ?led creates a cash-cow in that you attempt to make the bene?ciary of the Trust LHC ?duciary of this Trust and you proceed to bankrupt the human and human bene?ciary to pay the bene?ciaries Michael and Elizabeth and charge them a considerable fee and ?le the Treasury Form 1099-A against the Trusts ME and EE, receiving and pocketing the sum ?led for. That, moreover, Trustee Donald R. Elledge secretly creates and sells three (3) plus bonds wherein he enriches himself unjustly and since he is the Administrative Of?cer he can manipulate the case to maturity of the bonds protecting this unlawful vested interest. That William ?les these securities with the DTC (Depository Trust Company) which increases the net worth of the Trust business entity CIRCUIT COURT OF ANDERSON COUNTY TENNESSEE. That William can now ?le bonds and/or a Treasury Form on these securities whereby he collects his unjust enrichment from the Trusts, and so on and so forth. That Bruce is presenting this Trust-Law-Case in an Admiralty jurisdiction Maritime Law arena while declaring his case to be a Common Law-case which is, at best, absolute chaos and all the while ?ling not a shred of evidence with his agent William to support his claims. Lee?Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. B6LA0051 Page 22 of 27 We all know that logic and common sense support that it is impossible to prove your claim, even if it were in relation to humans, of fear and fright, grievous and permanent injuries, loss of enjoyment of life, mental anguish, and loss of capacity to earn? and ?fear and fright and mental anguish? as a direct and only result of an alleged negligence unless, of course, you have invented a means to tap into their minds at the time and instance of the incident and beyond, and can prove that in the rest of their lives they will never get well or can never enjoy life, proving that they were enjoying li?z to begin with specifically quali?/ing what is meant to ?enjoy li?z,? and that there is nothing Michael can do to earn a livelihood under his present condition, while all the while having the burden of proof that negligence in fact was committed. For example, there are people who are quadriplegics who have conducted a business and are earning a living thereby having the capacity to earn. Your claim would be difficult to prove as stated even on the physical injuries unless proof was established that immediately beforehand they were each in perfect health. However, by construction your COMPLAINT is ?led for the Trusts ME and EE and against the Trust LHC of which you, Bruce and your cohorts, are the Trustees of all three Trusts, and you know a Trust cannot sustain such injuries as is claimed making your claims criminally fraudulent by construction and action. However, your claim to prove negligence is conditionally accepted by me as the human and the human beneficiary. if it was/is intended to relate to me, with the following conditions: V. Conditional Acceptance of Your Offer Conditions: As Trusth/Settlor to the Trust LHC I conditionally accept Your Offer Trustees, who are the living and breathing human People of The Trustees and your principals, meaning that I will ask you, the Trustees, if you will make payment from the assets/corpus of the Trust LHC to Michael and Elizabeth Eldridge of One million Dollars for damages from my bene?ciary-interest therein, if you ful?ll the following conditions, to wit: Note: It is understood that as the human bene?ciary I can only the Trustee/s to make payment, I cannot require such action in that as the bene?ciary I have no authority to make a decision for the Trust LHC. Within ?fteen (15) days of the date of this Conditional Acceptance sent certi?ed mail return receipt requested you deliver to me the following: A. Since on your SUMMONS you have written the language ?You are. . which is plural, you have a multiplicity of alleged parties and no speci?c real party in interest, therefore, precisely who or what is/are the real party/ies in interest in this case; B. Produce substantial and irre?itable evidence that Michael Eldridge suffered . .. fear and ?ight, grievous and permanent injuries, loss of enj oyment of life, mental anguish, and loss of capacity to earn? as a direct and only result of the incident you claim as alleged negligence; Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. B6LA0051 Page 23 of 2? C. Produce substantial and irrefutable evidence that Elizabeth Eldridge suffered fear and fright and mental anguish? as a direct and only result of the incident you claim as alleged negligence; D. Disambiguate what is meant by your use of the word-negligence and precisely what you can prove were my, as a human, actions or inactions where negligence would apply anent the incident or surrounding the incident; . Since through a conspiracy between the Oak Ridge Police Department and some of its human Officers and Roger-A: Family of Miller and Roger-A: Family of Miller d/b/a Trustee of the Social Security Cestui que Trust LHC and d/b/a ROGER A MILLER Administrative Officer of the Trust business entity GENERAL SESSIONS COURT DIVISION 11, et al., I have been denied access to my truck and the evidence has been contaminated, as in tampered with, by a vested interest party, that there was not a mechanical fault which caused the incident that was completely out of my control and such would be attributable to and the full responsibility of the Corp.; . Produce substantial evidence that I, as the human and only one in the truck to my knowledge, if this issue was intended to relate to me, did not do everything in my power to prevent the incident; G. Produce substantial evidence that contrary to information I found on the internet there have not been other vehicles that have had a similar or the same ?aw whereby there is a fault with the linkage or other mechanical defect which was or could have been the cause of the incident; H. Produce substantial evidence that the Oak Ridge Police Department and its human Officers, along with the human Roger-A: Family of Miller are not culpable in that they obstructed justice by setting the events whereby the evidence could be tampered with by having a vested interest party investigate the mechanical aspects of the truck to my and the Trust LHC injury all the while refusing access to the truck of a forensic investigator from the insurance company; If this is a legitimate action, Show Cause why you as the and a Trustee did not merely ?le a Treasury Form 1099-A and collect the alleged damages if you can prove the Trust committed the actions you declare and bypass all this hoopla and stage show of a civil suit (I, as a, in your language, layperson, know this process so I am sure as an alleged professional you do or you would be incompetent); Produce what de?nition you are using when you declare the language ?citizen of Anderson County, Tennessee? in relation to the word ?citizen;? in other words, are you meaning a human being or a fiction of law such as a: ?rm, labor organization, partnership, association, corporation, legal representative, trustee, trustee in bankruptcy, receiver, of?cer, agent, broker or intermediary; K. Produce substantial evidence that I, a human, am a citizen 0_f (belonging to, property of chattel Anderson County, Tennessee and precisely what is meant by the language ?Anderson County, Tennessee? written in your in other words, is this language meant as: a Trust business entity and/or the body politic We the People and/or a geographical Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. BGLAOOSI Page 24 of 27 designation and/or a ?rm andlor a labor organization/s andlor a partnership and/or an association and/or a corporation and/or a legal representative and/or a trustee or many trustees and/or a trustee in bankruptcy and/or a receiver or receivers and/or an of?cer and/or an agent and/or a broker and/0r intermediary, or any other designation; L. Produce substantial evidence that since the humans Michael and Elizabeth: Eldridge were attending a ?reworks display, meaning that their visual, auditory and olfactory senses were stressfully stimulated immediately before the incident, that they did not suffer some of their alleged injuries/complaints as a result of their heightened stimulation and that absolutely no fear or anxiety they claim to have received from the incident was intensi?ed as a direct result of this stressful stimulation beforehand combined with the foreknowledge that they had to ?ght the traf?c departing the parking lot and travelling to their next destination knowing that the Trust business entity police could stop them and write a citation or arrest them for any of the myriad statutory traf?c infractions fraudulently issued in violation of 11 Ame ?329 and 25 AmJur 163 and 165 addressed supra; M. Produce substantial evidence that the humans Michael and Elizabeth: Eldridge were not physically, emotionally and/or impaired such as, but not limited to, having drugs or alcohol in either or both of their bodies, that would aggravate their homeostasis before the incident clarifying that all the alleged injury they claim is a direct and only result of the incident; N. Produce substantial evidence of what Michael?s ?enjoyed life? consisted of before the incident with detailed facts of what is considered ?enjoyment of life,? supporting that he had full and complete enjoyment of life before the incident and what absolute restrictions have been created by the incident restricting such enjoyment of life for the rest of his life; 0. Produce substantial evidence that Michael will need medical attention for his alleged injuries/complaints for the rest of his life with irrefutable evidence that it is the incident and only the incident that caused the alleged injury and precisely what medical treatment he will require, that could be treated and healed by no other healing modality; P. Produce a sworn notarized document that neither you nor the other Trustees have ?led bonds or a Treasury Form 1099-A, or any other security?instrument creating an enrichment for you and/or the other Trustees and that you do not plan on ?ling any bond/s or a 1099-A (meaning that you have already been paid and, perhaps are waiting to receive more unjust enrichment); and, Q. Since this case combines Trust-Law through Admiralty jurisdiction and Maritime Law when styled as a Common Law?action provide precisely what law and jurisdiction was intended in this action upon its ?ling; It is possible that I may have other conditions based on the satisfaction of the conditions listed herein, so I reserve the right to amend this Conditional Acceptance if your responses are opaque or ambiguous so that we may be precise in our contractual language. Moreover, if you do not understand any of the conditions notify me in writing so that I can clarify what is intended. Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. B6LA0051 Page 25 of 27 Again, since, logic and common sense dictate that you would not have caused this alleged service without already having this information supra readily available; you have ?fteen (15) days from the date herein to have the information presented to me. Moreover, you moved in the name of a Trust business entity corporation in your principal?s Admiralty tribunal and not in a ?Court of Law? involving an issue on land and not on the high seas. You, The Trustees and your principals, therefore hold responsibility for these actions you executed for the Trust corporations along with the Trusts involved. This Conditional Acceptance gives witness to your actions. As physical witnesses I also served the following: Loretta-E: Family of and Herbert-H. 111: Family of Slatery in their freeman status and d/b/a status as witnesses to these facts. If, on the other hand, you, the Trustees and your principals, cannot satisfy these conditions in the time allotted, allowing for a reasonable extension if requested in writing stating the speci?c time needed, and since your documentation witnesses, amongst other facts addressed in this Conditional Acceptance of Your Offer that you, the Trustees and your principals, willfully, knowingly and maliciously were seeking to commit fraud against me and deprive me of my rights and property both against me and the Social Security Cestui que Trust LEE HAROLD CROMWELL, you hereby contract to the following: 1. For any injuries to me, the bene?ciary, the Trustees and their principles are indebted to me for Four million and no cents (4,000,000.00) Dollars each in the money of account of the United States of America, Constitution for the United States of America, Article 1, Section 10, and if the money of account is not available I would ?receive without prejudice? payment in lieu of the money of account of ?Federal Reserve-Notes,? a ?Bank-Draft,? or the like. Furthermore, witnessed through this Conditional Acceptance if you willfully and knowingly injure me I have authority to create a Claim of Lien against you each and ?le a ?nancing statement against you each supporting my lien as 1 deem necessary to protect me, my property and my rights if needed at any time. Additionally, in order to facilitate my rights under this Conditional Acceptance and Security-Agreement you agree that I have your Power of Authority/Attorney to ?le anything to bring about the ?payment? of this debt and protect me, my property and my rights and that you have no right of action or recourse in any action at law, action in equity or Admiralty or any other law herein written or implied against me or my ?lings. Additionally, you agree that you grant your Power of Authority/Attorney to me, Lee-Harold: Cromwell, so that I am able to collect the damages through a liens, UCC-3, Treasury-Forms 1040- and 1040, and 1099-OID. Additionally, you agree that every year an additional set of liens can be ?led with the Treasury if such injury to me persists on a yearly basis. It is understood that even though an IRS Form 1040 is for a Tax Class 2 and the 1099-A and 1099- 5 "The ability to place a lien upon a man's property, such as to temporarily deprive him of its bene?cial use, without any judicial determination of probable cause dates back not only to medieval England but also to Roman times." United States Supreme Court, 1969, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp_., 395 US 337, 349. Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. B6LA0051 Page 26 of 27 OID are a Tax Class 5, I do not know any other way of ?ling this debt for collection other than to use these forms, so I use them ?without prejudice.? 2. That I may be ordered through your and the other Trustees scheme to continually appear at this tribunal under threat of arrest and imprisonment, therefore any such appearance is as stipulated supra and subject to those conditions. Avouchment I, Lee-Harold: Cromwell, do hereby avow that based upon my ?rsthand knowledge and information relayed to me from research, this ?Conditional Acceptance,? is true, accurate and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief and conveys the conditions set forth as intended by me. if Cufibro?: actuate?, Le Lee-Harold: Cromwell, bey?ciary I Tennessee-State av. Anderson-County Subscribed and sworn to before me this Month: 251' Day: 2016: Current Era. My commission expires: 07123ij . mm CMIWOWJ 0 Public Written signature Seal ?autumn,? sausagqagga, 54? 911,, ?It OF TENNESSEE . ?mom: 91,, Lee-Harold: Cromwell Conditional Acceptance of your Offer to appear at your Admiralty Tribunal Account No. Page 27 of 27