No. __________________
_____________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_____________________________________________
LEDELL LEE,

Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF ARKANSAS,

Respondent.
_____________________________________________
CAPITAL CASE
EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 20, 2017 AT 8:15 PM CST
_____________________________________________
APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION
_____________________________________________
Cassandra Stubbs 1
ACLU CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
PROJECT
201 W. Main St., Suite 402
Durham, NC 27701
(919) 688-4605
cstubbs@aclu.org

Lee D. Short
SHORT LAW FIRM
425 W. Broadway, Suite
North Little Rock, AR 72114
(501) 766-2207
leedshort@gmail.com

Nina Morrison
THE INNOCENCE PROJECT
40 Worth Street, Ste. 701
New York, NY 10013
(212) 364-5357
nmorrison@innocenceproject.org

Attorneys for the Petitioner
Ledell Lee

1

Counsel of Record for Petitioner, Ledell Lee

Dated: April 20, 2017

 TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................... ii
REQUEST FOR STAY OF EXECUTION ..................................................................... 1
PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................................................................................ 2
RELIEF SOUGHT ......................................................................................................... 3
STANDARDS ATTENDANT TO GRANTING OF A STAY OF EXECUTION ........... 4
FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS APPLICATION AND REQUEST FOR STAY............ 4
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................ 11
I.

THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD THAT MR. LEE WILL
SHOW THAT THE COURT WOULD CONSIDER THE UNDERLYING
ISSUE SUFFICIENTLY MERITORIOUS FOR A GRANT OF
CERTIORARI .................................................................................................... 11

II.

THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT POSSIBILITY THAT THIS COURT
WOULD REVERSE THE DECISION BELOW. .............................................. 13

III. DELAYS IN RAISING THE ISSUE OF DNA TESTING ARE NOT THE
FAULT OF THE DEFENDANT ....................................................................... 14
IV. THERE IS A LIKELIHOOD IRREPARABLE HARM WILL RESULT
IF THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW IS NOT STAYED ................. 14
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................... 16

i

 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) .................................................................. 4, 11
District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne,
557 U.S. 52 (2009) .................................................................................. 11, 12, 13, 14
Lee v. State, 2008 Ark. LEXIS 447 (2008)..................................................................... 9
Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011) ............................................................... 11, 12
STATUTES
U.S. Const. amend. V..................................................................................... 1, 3, 10, 11
U.S. Const. amend. VIII ................................................................................ 1, 3, 10, 11
U.S. Const. amend. XIV .................................................................................. 1, 3 10, 11
28 U.S.C. § 2101(f) ..................................................................................................... 1, 3
Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-201, et seq. ............................................................... 2, 10, 12
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Innocence Project: Robert Clark (https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/robertclark/) ........................................................................................................................ 6
Innocence Project: Eugene Bibbins (https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/genebibbins/)....................................................................................................................... 6

ii

 REQUEST FOR STAY OF EXECUTION
Petitioner Ledell Lee, applies to this Court for a stay of his execution,
currently scheduled for April 20, 2017 at 8:15 PM CST pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2101(f). The Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision denying Petitioner the stay for
execution to provide him an opportunity to conduct post-conviction DNA testing is
in Ledell Lee v. State of Arkansas, CR-17-315 (April 20, 2017), and is attached to the
Application as Appendix A. The Motion to Stay Execution is attached hereto as
Appendix B. The decision of the Circuit Court of Pulaski County, Arkansas, Fourth
Division, Case Number CR1993-1249 (April 18, 2017) from which Petitioner
appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court is attached to the Application as
Appendix C. Petitioner’s Motion for Post-Conviction DNA Testing Pursuant to
Arkansas Code §§ 16-112-201, et seq. and Request For Hearing is attached as
Exhibit D.
Mr. Lee has consistently asserted his innocence and denied any involvement
in the 1993 murder of Debra Reese. Today, probative biological evidence currently
in the custody and control of the State of Arkansas may now be able to provide—
through the use of modern, cutting edge DNA testing technologies—confirmation of
the veracity of Mr. Lee’s innocence claim. On April 17, 2017, Mr. Lee filed a Motion
for Post-Conviction DNA Testing pursuant to Arkansas law and the Fifth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution seeking to have
sophisticated DNA testing performed on hair found at the scene and blood located
on Petitioner’s tennis shoes. That motion was denied by the Circuit Court and its
1

 decision was affirmed by the Arkansas Supreme Court, CITE. Petitioner hereby
moves this Court for a stay of his execution and says:

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.

Petitioner was charged with the capital murder of Debra Reese on

February 9, 1993.
2.

On October 4, 1994, at a capital trial, the Circuit Court granted a

mistrial after the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict on petitioner’s
guilt/innocence.
3.

At his second trial on October 12, 1995, petitioner was found guilty of

capital murder and was sentenced to death on October 16, 1995.
4.

His conviction and sentence have been affirmed on direct appeal and in

subsequent habeas proceedings.
5.

On February 27, 2017, Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchinson scheduled

Petitioner’s execution for April 20, 2017.
6.

On April 17, 2017, Petitioner filed a Motion For Post-Conviction DNA

Testing Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated §§ 16-112-201, et seq. and Request
for Hearing seeking an order from the Court directing forensic DNA testing of
biological evidence collected during the investigation of Petitioner.
7.

The Circuit Court of Pulaski County, Arkansas, Honorable Herbert T.

Wright, Jr., judge presiding, held a hearing considering only oral argument on April
18, 2017. The Circuit Court denied the motion on the same date.

2

 8.

On April 19, 2017, Petitioner appealed the ruling of the Circuit Court

to the Arkansas Supreme Court and filed a Motion to Stay Execution.
9.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas denied the Motion to Stay Execution

on April 20, 2017.
RELIEF SOUGHT
10.

Mr. Lee seeks an Order from this Court for a stay of execution

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f), which provides in part:
In any case in which the final judgment or decree of any
court is subject to review by the Supreme Court on writ of
certiorari, the execution and enforcement of such
judgment or decree may be stayed for a reasonable time to
enable the party aggrieved to obtain a writ of certiorari
from the Supreme Court.
11.

Mr. Lee asks this Court to stay his presently scheduled execution to

allow him to timely file a petition for writ of certiorari, which will present the
following issues:
a. Did the Arkansas Supreme Court’s application of Arkansas’s postconviction DNA statute denying petitioner access to test biological
evidence in the State’s possession in order to prove his innocence
violate the Due Process clause of the United States Constitution?
b. Did the Arkansas Supreme Court’s application of Arkansas’s postconviction DNA statute denying petitioner access to test biological
evidence in the State’s possession in order to prove his innocence
violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause of the United
States Constitution?

3

 STANDARDS ATTENDANT TO GRANTING OF A STAY OF EXECUTION
12.

A stay of execution is governed by this Court’s decision in Barefoot v.

Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), which requires applicants to show a reasonable
probability that four members of the Court would consider the underlying issue
sufficiently meritorious for a grant of certiorari, a significant possibility the Court
would reverse the decision below, and a likelihood that irreparable harm will result
if that decision is not stayed. Id. at 895.
FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS APPLICATION AND REQUEST FOR STAY
13.

Mr. Lee was tried twice for the murder of Debra Reese, both times

pleading not guilty and offering a misidentification defense. So weak was the
State’s largely circumstantial case against Mr. Lee that despite the horrific nature
of the crime, and the fact that Mr. Lee was an African American male on trial for
the brutal murder of a white female in her home, Mr. Lee’s first trial resulted in a
hung jury. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Lee v. Hobbs, No. 5:01-cv-0377 (E.D.
Ark. Nov. 2, 2002), ECF No. 1 at 3. In closing, the State referred to Mr. Lee, an
African American defendant charged with the murder of a white woman, as a
“hunter” whose “prey were the people of Jacksonville.” Defense counsel did not
object. Mr. Lee’s second trial in October 1995 resulted in conviction and a sentence
of death.
14.

At the time of his arrest, at his trials, and to this day, Mr. Lee has

denied involvement in the murder of Debra Reese. At trial, the State introduced no
confession or admission that tied Mr. Lee to the murder of Ms. Reese; nor did the

4

 State identify any biological material at the scene as Mr. Lee’s. None of the lifted
prints from the crime scene matched the defendant; indeed, several prints foreign to
Mr. Lee, and from an unidentified source, were found at the scene.
15.

Instead, the State convicted Mr. Lee largely on the inconsistent and

unreliable testimony of three eyewitnesses, one who testified that Mr. Lee was the
man they saw exiting the victim’s home and two others who assert they saw him in
the general vicinity of her home on the day of the murder. Yet several other
eyewitnesses interviewed by police did not identify Mr. Lee as the perpetrator; and
those few who did testify for the State gave often-inconsistent and contradictory
accounts. 2 The State also offered evidence purporting to show that several hours
after the murder, Mr. Lee presented a local store with a $100 bill that bore a serial
number in the same series of bills as monies possessed by the victim and her
husband; however, the defense argued that the State had not established that Mr.
Lee (who, by his own admission, had used and purchased illegal drugs in the

For example, one eyewitness, Mr. McCullough, said the person he identified
as Mr. Lee came to his house to borrow tools. They talked for 10-15 minutes, face-toface. He is positive that this person was not wearing a jacket, positive that he had
no ball cap on, and says he believed he was wearing a short-sleeved shirt. Mr.
Gomez, on the other hand, said the man he saw entering and leaving Ms. Reese’s
house was wearing a ball cap and dark jacket. But Mr. Gomez admits he was taking
Vicodin for pain at this time. Still another witness, Ms. Pruitt, who did not claim to
have seen Mr. Lee at or near the victim’s home but only in the general area where
the crime occurred, at trial said she wasn’t sure about the clothing but, at another
hearing testified she believed he had on a red plaid shirt. She admittedly was a
daily marijuana user and initially reported seeing Mr. Lee at 11am –before the
murder even occurred.
2

5

 neighborhood) had obtained this bill from Ms. Reese’s home, as opposed to after the
fact. 3
16.

No DNA evidence was presented to the jury; indeed, DNA testing was,

at that time, in its relative infancy. To strengthen the weak circumstantial
evidence, the State introduced what its trace evidence expert described as “Negroid”
hair found in Ms. Reese’s home, which prosecutors argued had been left by the
perpetrator during the struggle. The State also presented evidence of two extremely
small “pinpoints” of human blood found on Mr. Lee’s Converse tennis shoes at the
time of his arrest. Even though the State’s experts admitted that none of the
testing they performed could identify the source of the blood or hair, the State relied
heavily on this limited forensic evidence to ask the jury to find Mr. Lee guilty of
murder.
17.

With respect to the hair evidence, Donald E. Smith, a criminalist,

testified that he had microscopically examined the hair to compare its features to
Mr. Lee’s – a method of analysis that has long since been discredited and disproven
by DNA analysis. Specifically, he analyzed one “intact Negroid head hair” and
several Negroid hair fragments. He also indicates the intact hair has a root
present. (“And I saw some clearing of the pigments because from the root to the

Indeed, numerous wrongly convicted defendants who were later exonerated
through DNA testing were convicted in part on evidence that they possessed
property from the crime – yet DNA testing later proved the truth of their claims
that the property came into their possession only after the real perpetrator stole it
from the scene and either discarded or sold the items. See Innocence Project: Robert
Clark (https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/robert-clark/) and Eugene Bibbins
(https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/gene-bibbins/).
3

6

 shaft there sometimes gets a clearing of this pigmentation. That’s not apparent if
you don’t have roots.”) Mr. Smith admitted that “hair is not a science so precise that
you can define a hair as uniquely coming from an individual, saying that no other
individual has hair like another person.” After an examination of these hairs, Mr.
Smith told the jury he found nothing that was “inconsistent” with Petitioner’s hair;
the prosecution went on to argue in summation that the hairs were fully
“consistent” with Mr. Lee’s.
18.

With respect to the blood evidence, the State offered the testimony of

Kermit Channell, then a serologist with the Arkansas Crime Laboratory. Mr.
Channel testified that he found two extremely small spots of blood on the pair of
tennis shoes that Mr. Lee was wearing upon his arrest (which occurred
approximately three hours after Ms. Reese was killed). He was unable to make any
determination as to the source of the blood, other than to confirm that it appeared
to be “human blood.” And despite the extremely grisly nature of the crime, with
blood spattered across Ms. Reese’s walls and floors as a result of the repeated
beating inflicted by her killer, Mr. Channell found no other traces of blood anywhere
on the shoes, shirt, pants, or other items that Mr. Lee was alleged to have worn to
commit the murder. Nor was any blood or foreign material detected under Mr.
Lee’s fingernails, which were swabbed by the State upon his arrest, and later
submitted to the Crime Lab for forensic analysis.
19.

Despite the limited nature of the serologist’s blood testing, and the

notable absence of blood elsewhere on the shoes or any other item seized from Mr.

7

 Lee, the prosecution relied heavily on the positive test for human blood on these
drops. At summation, the State argued that the detection of this blood on the
defendant’s tennis shoes in fact “puts the defendant at the scene.” Yet the State
never explained how Mr. Lee could have possibly committed this close-range, brutal
murder, but somehow left the rest of his tennis shoes, clothing, and person wholly
untouched with the victim’s blood.
20.

There is no question that the DNA testing he seeks was unavailable to

him at trial. Nor is there any dispute that such testing can now establish (1) that
the rudimentary non-DNA evidence the State used to convict him in 1995 (serology
and hair microscopy) were incomplete or inaccurate, and misled the jury into
concluding that hair and blood evidence from the scene inculpated him in the
murder; and (2) that he is actually innocent of this crime, which he can show not
just through favorable results of the testing, but through a search of the national
DNA database in order to identify another individual as the real perpetrator of Ms.
Reese’s murder.
21.

Mr. Lee suffers from a profound intellectual disability, which,

combined with his indigence and lack of access to competent counsel, has long
hampered his ability to seek and obtain the DNA testing that he has maintained
would exonerate him. Indeed, the State imposed additional barriers on his ability
to challenge his wrongful conviction and death sentence for more than two decades
by repeatedly appointing him inadequate and conflicted post-conviction counsel to
present his claims – one of whom was so visibly intoxicated during Mr. Lee’s first

8

 post-conviction hearing that the State’s counsel felt compelled to put that fact on the
record, and ask the court to order that Mr. Lee’s attorney be ordered to take a drug
test. Despite these impediments, for more than two decades, Mr. Lee nonetheless
diligently attempted to avail himself of any and all means of securing DNA testing
and a meaningful investigation into his claims of actual innocence, including
writing to national legal organizations for assistance, begging investigators who
came to visit other inmates on death row to refer him to competent counsel, and
asking the courts to appoint new and competent counsel to assist him.
22.

Mr. Lee attempted to enlist the help of the Arkansas Supreme Court to

have testing done on these items years ago by filing a pro se pleading with the Court
alleging that his then-counsel were ineffective for, inter alia, failing to have
scientific testing done on the forensic evidence. Lee v. State, 2008 Ark. LEXIS 447 at
*2 (2008). On September 18, 2008, the Supreme Court of Arkansas denied the
motion on the grounds that the defendant, having accepted appointment of counsel,
was not entitled to accept appointment of counsel and also proceed pro se. Id. at *3.
23.

At no time prior to this month did any of Mr. Lee’s assigned counsel

accede to his request to ask the Courts to order a simple DNA test that has the
power to prove his actual innocence, and to which Mr. Lee was statutorily entitled
under a DNA testing statute enacted by the Legislature in 2001, and amended in
2005, whose stated purpose was to afford persons such as Mr. Lee access to evidence
that could exonerate him.

9

 24.

It was just months ago that Mr. Lee finally was granted the

appointment of undersigned post-conviction counsel Lee D. Short, Esq. Mr. Short,
despite the substantial number of other meritorious claims and evidence that he
needed to review and present to the Courts prior to Mr. Lee’s hastily scheduled
execution, examined and recognized the potential merits of Mr. Lee’s claims for
access to DNA evidence.
25.

New counsel proceeded to secure the pro bono assistance of the

Innocence Project and the ACLU Capital Punishment Project to assist him in
evaluating the viability of Mr. Lee’s DNA testing claims. These volunteer attorneys
in turn secured the consultation of a qualified DNA expert, in order to examine the
potential claims in more detail and provide a supporting affidavit to his State
petition for testing.
26.

Finally equipped to bring his claim to the courts, earlier this week, Mr.

Lee, via his new counsel, filed his first and only petition for DNA testing under the
Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-201, et seq., of the Arkansas Code of Criminal Procedure.
That petition was summarily denied by the Circuit Court of Pulaski County the
following day --without an evidentiary hearing, expert testimony, or any
proceedings for consideration of the merits, other than brief oral argument by local
counsel.

10

 ARGUMENT
I.

THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD THAT MR. LEE
WILL SHOW THAT THE COURT WOULD CONSIDER THE
UNDERLYING ISSUE SUFFICIENTLY MERITORIOUS FOR
A GRANT OF CERTIORARI.
There is a reasonable probability that four members of the Court would

consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for a grant of certiorari.
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
In District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557
U.S. 52 (2009), this Court “granted certiorari to decide whether Osborne’s claims
could be pursued using sec. 1983, and whether he has a right under the Due Process
Clause to obtain post-conviction access to the State’s evidence for DNA testing.”
557 U.S. at 61. In Osborne, this Court could only speculate as to how the Alaska
court would have applied its procedures for obtaining post-conviction access to DNA,
because Osborne “attempt[ed] to sidestep the state process through a new federal
lawsuit” and had “not tried to use the process provided him by the State or
attempted to vindicate the liberty interest that is now the centerpiece of his claim.”
557 U.S. at 70-71. The Court concluded that the Alaska procedures were “adequate
on their face, and without trying them, Osborne can hardly complain that they do
not work in practice.” 557 U.S. at 71.
Subsequently, in Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011), this Court noted
that “the merits of Skinner’s federal-court complaint assailing the Texas [postconviction DNA testing] statute as authoritatively construed, and particularly the
vitality of his claim in light of Osborne” were “not ripe for review.” 562 U.S. at 531.
11

 Skinner did not challenge the state court decisions themselves, but instead
“target[ed] as unconstitutional the Texas statute they authoritatively construed.”
562 U.S. at 532. Further, had Skinner challenged state court decision in federal
district court, he would not have succeeded because this Court held that the statecourt decision was not reviewable by the lower federal courts. Id.
Thus, this Court in Osborne and Skinner eschewed questions of substantial
importance as to when and under what circumstances a state court’s actual
application of a state post-conviction DNA testing statute might violate the
procedural due process rights of a state prisoner seeking to prove his innocence.
Those questions are raised here. Mr. Lee’s case presents an excellent vehicle for
this Court to examine whether the State Court’s interpretation of its law to deny
access to biological evidence for purposes of DNA testing, where that testing could
prove his innocence and save him from execution, violates the Due Process and
Cruel and Unusual Punishment clauses of the Constitution. Mr. Lee will raise this
claim in a petition for certiorari from the denial of relief by the Arkansas Supreme
Court, and therefore there is no procedural obstacle as there was in Skinner to this
Court’s review of the application of the DNA testing statute by the Arkansas courts.
Unlike in Osborne, the Arkansas state courts have fully examined and rejected Mr.
Lee’s plea for access to the biological evidence for purposes of post-conviction DNA
testing pursuant to the United States Constitution and Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112201, et seq.

12

 II.

THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT POSSIBILITY THAT THIS COURT
WOULD REVERSE THE DECISION BELOW.
Mr. Lee can show that the Arkansas DNA post-conviction statute, as applied

by the Arkansas courts, is “fundamentally inadequate to vindicate the substantive
rights provided.” Osborne, 562 U.S. at 69.
This Court has recognized the defendant’s liberty interest in proving his
innocence with new evidence under state law:
Osborne does, however, have a liberty interest in
demonstrating his innocence with new evidence under
state law. As explained, Alaska law provides that those
who use “newly discovered evidence” to “establis[h] by
clear and convincing evidence that [they are] innocent”
may obtain “vacation of [their] conviction or sentence in
the interest of justice.” Alaska Stat. §§ 12.72.020(b)(2),
12.72.010(4). This “state-created right can, in some
circumstances, beget yet other rights to procedures
essential to the realization of the parent
right.” Dumschat, supra, at 463, 101 S.Ct. 2460; see
also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556–558, 94 S.Ct.
2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
Osborne, 562 U.S. at 68. This Court recognized reduced liberty rights in postconviction proceedings, but held nevertheless that federal courts may upset a
State’s post-conviction relief procedure “if they are fundamentally inadequate to
vindicate the substantive rights provided.” 557 U.S. at 69.
In Mr. Lee’s post-conviction proceeding, the State of Arkansas applied its
post-conviction DNA testing statute in such a manner as to deny him discovery,
deny him an evidentiary hearing, and deny him the tools necessary to satisfy the
criteria of the state statute. The State courts further required Mr. Lee to meet
criteria not listed in the state statute. In short, the Arkansas statute, as applied,
13

 was “fundamentally inadequate to vindicate the substantive rights provided.”
Osborne, 562 U.S. at 69. For this reason, there is a significant possibility this court
would reverse the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court.
III.

DELAYS IN RAISING THE ISSUE OF DNA TESTING ARE NOT THE
FAULT OF THE DEFENDANT.
Given Mr. Lee’s difficulties communicating with his visibly drunk post-

conviction lawyer and the other well-documented lapses by his assigned postconviction counsel over the previous two decades, Mr. Lee could demonstrate at an
evidentiary hearing good cause as to why he waited until shortly before his
execution date to request post-conviction DNA testing. Mr. Lee sought vigorously to
challenge all the State’s evidence against him, but those efforts were thwarted by
the deficient performance of post-conviction and habeas counsel. The court below
refused to provide an evidentiary hearing at which Mr. Lee could present evidence
showing his consistent and persistent efforts to obtain scientific testing of the
physical evidence used against him at trial. This was another reason why the
Arkansas post-conviction statute, as applied, was “fundamentally inadequate to
vindicate the substantive rights provided.” Osborne, 562 U.S. at 69.
IV.

THERE IS A LIKELIHOOD IRREPARABLE HARM WILL RESULT IF
THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW IS NOT STAYED.
Mr. Lee will be executed if the decision of the court below is not stayed. The

State of Arkansas will risk executing an innocent man, when two simple tests could
reveal whether his claim of innocence is valid.

14

 CONCLUSION
Given this record, a stay of execution and full and fair review are appropriate
here.
Dated: April 20, 2017
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Cassandra Stubbs
CASSANDRA STUBBS
Counsel of Record for Ledell Lee
ACLU Capital Punishment Project
201 W. Main St. Suite 402
Durham, NC 27701
(919) 688-4605
/s/ Nina Morrison
NINA MORRISON
Innocence Project
40 Worth Street, Suite 701
New York, NY 10013
(212) 364-5340
/s/ Lee D. Short
LEE D. SHORT
Short Law Firm
425 W. Broadway St. A
North Little Rock, AR 72114
(501) 766-2207
Counsel for Petitioner, Ledell Lee

15

 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
has been furnished by electronic mail to the below this the 20th day of April, 2017:
Valerie Fortner
Leslie Rutledge
Attorney General
/s/ Cassandra Stubbs

16