Lake Oroville Spillways Emergency Recovery

Board of Consultants Memorandum No. 3 – March 31, 2017
Prepared by the California Department of Water Resources

Summary & Response
Question 1
The BOC response for Question 1 continues the discussion from BOC Memorandum No. 2 regarding the
ongoing exploration. The BOC describes the exploration program and resulting findings as they were
described to them by DWR. Seismic geophysical lines are part of the exploration program which
provides engineers and geologist insight into the quality of the foundation rock. Preliminary geologic
information described by the BOC will eventually be used in the design of the new features, in addition
to help with construction procedures.
Question 2
The BOC response for Question 2 continues the discussion from the BOC Memorandum No. 2 regarding
the design criteria. DWR proposed a maximum flow criteria of 270,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) for the
upper chute of the gated spillway, which is significantly higher than the record flow.
Complete repair of the emergency spillway is not anticipated by November 1, 2017. However, work will
continue on the emergency spillway to ensure it can safely pass the original design flow criteria by
November 1. It should be noted that the emergency spillway design flow of 371,000 cfs is in addition to
the capacity of the gated spillway. The priority is to complete the work on the gated spillway.
The BOC describes the Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis, MCE (Maximum Credible Earthquake) and
other earthquake parameters as they were described to them by DWR. These terms which refer to the
level of design for the potential earthquake loads that will be used to design the various concrete
structures. The BOC considers the earthquake parameters proposed by DWR reasonable and
appropriate.
Question 3
Responses to Question 3 are consistent with comments made by the BOC and in most cases, are a
repeat of what has already been documented in Memorandum No. 2.
DWR is proposing to completely reconstruct the lower chute area. However, the BOC notes the all work
may not be completed by November 1, 2017, and therefore describes various techniques that can be
used as back-up plans. Many of these techniques will depend on the amount of work that can be
completed by November 1. If the entire gated spillway chute cannot be completed by November 1, the
end of the gated spillway chute where damage occurred will be buttressed with concrete the spillway
can be used. There are other intermediate steps that can be taken depending on the progress of the
work. In all cases, the spillway will be able to be used for all expected flows by November 1, 2017.

BOC MEMO SUMMARY #3   RELEASED APRIL 24, 2017

 Question 4
Self-Explanatory
Question 5
Question 5 relates to many construction methods and details that could be considered to complete the
project in a timely manner.
Question 6
Naturally occurring asbestos is present in various parts of the state, and is monitored on many large
earth-moving projects. DWR continues to monitor air quality to ensure that it is safe for workers and
nearby residents. The BOC recommends continued air quality monitoring.

###

BOC MEMO SUMMARY #3   RELEASED APRIL 24, 2017

 OROVILLE EMERGENCY RECOVERY – SPILLWAYS
Board of Consultants Memorandum
DATE:

Friday, 3/31/2017

TO:

Mr. Ted Craddock, Project Manager
Oroville Emergency Recovery – Spillways
California Department of Water Resources

FROM:

Independent Board of Consultants for
Oroville Emergency Recovery – Spillways

SUBJECT:

Memorandum No. 3

INTRODUCTION
On March 30, 2017, the Independent Board of Consultants (BOC) met at offices of the
California State Department of Water Resources (DWR) at 1:00 pm for a presentation of
design criteria, further development of design concepts by DWR and the status of
Construction Contracts No.1 and No. 2. The presentations continued on March 31st and
the meeting ended with a reading of the BOC’s report at 4:15 pm. An agenda for the
meeting is attached. All BOC members were present. The BOC met with
representatives of DWR Engineering Division, DSOD, FERC, and industry consultants
that are working on the Oroville Spillway Recovery project; the attendees at the meeting
are shown on the attached attendance lists.
The BOC has reviewed the status of past comments and recommendations in the log
and this is included in the attachments.
QUESTIONS FOR THE BOC
1.

Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the field
exploration program?
Response
The field exploration program, tasked with providing geological and geotechnical
information to support the Oroville spillway mitigation, is ongoing with exploratory
boreholes still being drilled in the areas of the Flood Control Outlet (FCO)
spillway chute (aka – Gated Spillway) and above the slope left of the FCO Chute.
The seismic geophysical lines were planned to begin this week. Detailed
Contains Critical Energy Infrastructure Information
DO NOT RELEASE

1

 Oroville Emergency Recovery – Spillways
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 2

Ted Craddock
March 31, 2017

comments regarding the FCO spillway, left slope above the FCO Chute, and
Emergency Spillway are listed below.
FCO Chute spillway: The presentation discussed findings of the concrete coring
in the chute floor that is investigating the rock/concrete interface. While
preliminary, since the drilling is not yet completed, this is important information
that may shed light on the piping potential of material the concrete was placed
upon. Initial drill coring results show slab thickness varying from 2.0 to 3.2 ft. It
should not be inferred that this thickness is indicative of the entire slab thickness.
Analysis of historical construction photographs continue to show that the
concrete slab was placed on a variety of materials that ranged from clean, hard,
bedrock to highly weathered rock that appeared soil-like. These borings are
being drilled to depths of 15 to 30 feet to determine the depth to fresh rock and,
hence, the required depth of the new anchor embedment.
Left slope above the FCO Chute: Exploratory borings are being drilled on top of
the unstable slope on the left of the FCO Chute. These 100-ft-deep-borings are
for determining depth of soil, and rock weathering zones that will be used in
stabilizing this slope. These borings will be converted into monitoring wells and
inclinometers. This slope must be stabilized before work to mitigate the scour
hole can commence.
Emergency Spillway: Field investigations for the Emergency Spillway have yet to
be completed; only the seismic geophysics is in progress. However, the
identification of a preferred mitigation alternative (i.e., downstream cutoff wall,
RCC buttress, and RCC splash pad) was discussed and this may impact the
future field investigations. Even though anchors drilled through the ogee
monoliths may not be pursued, it is still prudent to obtain geotechnical
information about the weir’s foundation conditions; and, although the RCC
foundation is planned to be taken to the same depth, the adequacy of this
foundation must nonetheless be verified.
The northern 800+feet of the Emergency Spillway approach and weir foundation
were created by excavating a 50-ft-high bedrock hill. Thus, some of the exposed
ground surface in this area is on rock that varies in its weathering

If the DWR recommended design option moves
forward then knowledge of rock weathering depths all along the weir and cutoff
wall alignment should be determined in advance of finalizing the design.
Contains Critical Energy Infrastructure Information
DO NOT RELEASE

2

 Oroville Emergency Recovery – Spillways
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 2

Ted Craddock
March 31, 2017

If the seismic geophysical lines prove useful in determining rock weathering
depths, then consideration should be given to extending geophysics to provide
coverage to the northern 800 feet of the Emergency Spillway and also to provide
some information on weathering depth downstream of the cutoff wall.
2.

Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the Design
Criteria?
Response
In its previous two reports, the BOC provided comments and recommendations
on draft copies of the Design Criteria Memoranda. The BOC has reviewed the
revised drafts (dated March 20 and 27, 2017) and generally concurs with the
revised documents as addressing earlier comments provided by the BOC.
In summary, the BOC understands that the design objectives for the “Oroville
Emergency Recovery – Spillways” Project are: a) for the “Interim Repairs” to
allow the Flood Control Outlet (Gated Spillway) chute to pass a peak routed
outflow of 270,000 cfs based on the anticipated first year hydrologic criteria; and
b) the long-term repairs are to allow the chute to pass its portion of the Probable
Maximum Flood (PMF) peak outflow of 300,000 cfs.
The Emergency Spillway’s “Interim Repairs” are designed to allow the spillway to
pass peak flows of 30,000 cfs, with a peak reservoir elevation overtopping the
spillway weir crest by about 3.3 feet. The long-term repairs are designed to allow
the Emergency Spillway to pass peak a PMF flow of 371,000 cfs.
The BOC concurs with the Project’s flood design criteria, but notes that while the
FCO spillway chute can be designed to pass its portion of the extremely rare
PMF flows, the Emergency Spillway repairs may not be capable of passing a 16foot-overtopping and a peak flow of 371,000 cfs without significant erosion
damage downstream.
The structural design criteria Memo indicates that: “Interim repairs will be
designed based on a Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) with a 144year return period. Permanent restoration structural features will be designed to
the Median (50th percentile) MCE with a maximum water surface elevation of 901
feet. The targeted seismic structural performance criteria will be essentially linear
elastic structural behavior; no instabilities, minimal cracking, and no permanent
deformations.
The BOC considers these criteria to be reasonable and appropriate.
Contains Critical Energy Infrastructure Information
DO NOT RELEASE

3

 Oroville Emergency Recovery – Spillways
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 2

Ted Craddock
March 31, 2017

Deterministic ground motions at the dam site, as reported in the Supporting
Technical Information Document (STID), were estimated at the 50th percentile
level from a magnitude 6.5 earthquake on the Cleveland Hills fault. The peak
ground acceleration (PGA) was estimated at 0.57g. The Cleveland Hills fault is
reported to have a low slip rate of about 0.05 mm per year. The Division of Safety
of Dams (DSOD) provides a “Consequence Hazard Matrix” that uses the
consequence of dam failure and probability of earthquake hazard (described by
the slip rate on the controlling seismic source) to select the appropriate statistical
level for deterministic ground motions. The Consequence Level for a dam is
defined by the Total Class Weigh (TCW), which is a function of the dam height,
the reservoir capacity, and the downstream consequences of failure. The TCW
for Oroville Dam is 36, which classifies it as “Extreme Consequence.” According
to DSOD’s Consequence Hazard Matrix, for an “Extreme Consequence” dam
and a seismic source with a low slip rate of less than 0.1 mm per year, ground
motions should be selected between the median (50th percentile) and 84th
percentile levels. The choice of what statistical level to use is guided by the
results of probabilistic seismic hazard analyses (PSHA). To guide this selection,
the USGS hazard maps from the 2014 National Seismic Hazard Mapping
(NSHM) Project were queried for the Oroville Dam site, with a site Vs-30 (the
shear wave velocity in the upper 30 meters of rock foundation underlying the
dam) of about 1,200 meters per second. It should be noted that the actual Vs-30
of the foundation rock underlying the dam, based on recently measured velocities
is about 2,400 meters per second. The value of 1,200 meters per second used to
query the USGS hazard curves was because the ground motion prediction
equations (NGA West-2) used in the hazard analyses all have a maximum limit of
1,200 meters per second for Vs-30. According to the USGS 2014 NSHM, the
median PGA of 0.57g from the Cleveland Hills fault has a return period of greater
than 10,000 years. Thus the BOC judges that selection of the median level of
ground motions for the long-term design of repair measures that are related to
dam safety is considered reasonably conservative and appropriate.
The BOC considers the geologic and geotechnical criteria for the appropriate
excavation and preparation of foundations for the various project features to be
reasonable and appropriate.
The BOC considers the use of a 28-day concrete strength of 5,000 psi, and
reinforcing steel fy of 60,000 psi to be appropriate. The use of rock anchors and
dowels with PTI Class I corrosion protection for all permanent features is
considered a requirement.
Contains Critical Energy Infrastructure Information
DO NOT RELEASE

4

 Oroville Emergency Recovery – Spillways
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 2

3.

Ted Craddock
March 31, 2017

Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the
Alternatives Analysis or selection?
Response
FCO Upper Chute: The BOC concurs with DWR’s recommendation to remove
and replace the FCO's upper portion of the chute and training walls. It is,
however, doubtful that the entire length of upper chute all the way to Sta. 28+00
can be replaced in the first construction season, and therefore the portion that is
not replaced must be strengthened as necessary to serve through the first winter
flood season. Construction contract package 2 should have language specifying
a minimum length to be completed and stating that this must be located at the
start of the chute immediately downstream of the FCO structure. Provisions to
prevent the demolition of the existing concrete chute from getting too far ahead of
the concrete placement should be added. It is vital that a continuous concrete
replacement chute in this upper portion of the spillway be completed and
available at the start of the flood season.
It was pointed out that it will be necessary to protect the downstream end of the
upper chute where it drops off into the first erosion hole. This could be protected
with a conventional concrete or RCC buttress to prevent any further back cutting
in the event the first flood season’s discharges must be routed down the eroded
gully. This work will be coordinated with the construction being done for
restoration measures of the lower portion of the FCO Chute channel.
FCO Lower Chute: The BOC agrees with DWR’s recommended concept for the
FCO’s lower chute restoration which contemplates completing the reconstruction
of the foundations for the continuation of the reinforced concrete chute to connect
with the terminal energy dissipater. This RCC emplacement would also be built
up at the sides of the channel to support the retaining walls.
The DWR is recommending that the upper scour hole be left open during the
RCC construction until it can be confidently determined that the entire lower
spillway chute length would be completed before the November 1 deadline. This
would be considered a fallback position for discharging flow down the eroded
gully if the channel is not ready by the onset of the flood season. The BOC
believes that the possibility of needing to route discharge down the gully is small.
The BOC anticipates that the filling of the upper scour hole with RCC to restore
the chute channel will take care of the requirement that the end of the upper
chute must be protected.

Contains Critical Energy Infrastructure Information
DO NOT RELEASE

5

 Oroville Emergency Recovery – Spillways
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 2

Ted Craddock
March 31, 2017

Lining of the RCC chute channel with reinforced concrete and the construction of
the training walls will be accomplished during the second construction season.
The flood discharges during the next flood season will therefore pass from the
reinforced concrete paving in the upper chute portion onto an RCC surface on
the lower channel section. The BOC has previously stated that RCC can
probably withstand flow without extensive damage. However, the discharge
velocities in this lower part of the chute are over 100 fps
If allowed to progress, a portion of the
newly placed chute could be lost. The BOC believes some surfacing means
should be used on the top lift of RCC that can provide a smooth surface.
Transverse joints in the top lift of RCC will need to be carefully formed to avoid
disturbance to flow. The BOC suggests that the RCC test pad include some
preparation and testing of surface preparation to obtain a hard, smooth finish free
of bug holes, tracks and undulations.
The BOC is pleased that the measures recommended for restoring the FCO
Chute during this initial restoration to accommodate the interim criteria will serve
for the long-term restoration as well.
Emergency Spillway: The BOC supports the Recommended Alternative EM-2A
(RCC Buttress, RCC Splash Pad and D/S Cutoff Wall) as the mitigation option.
One advantage of this measure is that it can be installed in phases with the
1,700-ft-long downstream cutoff and the replacement of the 800-ft-long small
overflow weir being the only elements required by November 1, 2017. The
addition of the RCC buttress downstream of the larger ogee monoliths and the
RCC splash pad (that covers the area between the weir and the downstream
cutoff wall) can be installed later; it is conceivable that this RCC work could occur
after November 1. The BOC recommends continued analysis of the scour
potential for flow downstream of the northern 800 feet of the cutoff wall.
4.

Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on Construction
Contract No. 1?
Response
The BOC has the following comments on Construction Contract No. 1. This
contract was recently awarded to Teichert Construction and they are presently
mobilizing to the site. The purpose of this contract will be to improve site access
to the spillway areas and perform local site preparation. There was discussion
about possibly making changes to this contract to address unforeseen issues as
they arise. Given the necessity of getting a contractor operational in the field,
Contains Critical Energy Infrastructure Information
DO NOT RELEASE

6

 Oroville Emergency Recovery – Spillways
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 2

Ted Craddock
March 31, 2017

perhaps before a few elements were fully investigated and designs completed, it
is no surprise that some needed changes have arisen. The BOC believes that
shifting as much work to this contract as possible is prudent if it can further
expedite work in the subsequent Contract No. 2 that has yet to be awarded.
A major element of Contract No. 1 addresses stabilizing the eroded slope on the
left side of the lower FCO Chute. Once the slope is stabilized, workers in
Contract 2 can safely work beneath the stabilized slope to clean out debris and
perform any foundation preparation for concrete backfill activities. It is important
to expedite analysis of the near vertical slopes that abut the left side of the chute
in the Station 29+00 to 31+00 area. If blasting and shaping (or even if removal is
deemed necessary) of this rock monolith is determined to be necessary then
adding a blasting task to Contract No.1 and performing that work immediately
may provide more options for contract 2 in regard to scour hole mitigation.
Another related issue is the cleanup and stabilization of the unstable eroded area
on the right side of the upper scour hole; currently this is not included in Contract
2, but thought should be given to cleaning and exposing the geological conditions
in this area as soon as possible, as it will also be part of the scour hole backfill
foundation.
The aggregate testing and mix design analysis being performed as part of
Contract 1 is an extremely important aspect of determining the future production
rates of RCC. As this could be a critical path item to some of the proposed
options in Contract 2 (e.g., complete versus partial backfill of the scour hole), we
endorse these efforts.
5.

Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on Construction
Contract No. 2?
Response
The BOC can well understand the opinions expressed by Contractors when
shown the scope of work in the draft Construction Contract No. 2 that there are a
lot of “priorities” for completion before November 1 in this job. Contract No. 2 as
written, attempts to cover all the needed work to restore the FCO Chute to full
operation. It should be recognized that this will likely require two or more work
seasons and some clarifications will no doubt be needed in the contractual
language to explain this.
During the meeting, the question was raised as to whether the grade line of the
spillway chute could be raised by the additional slab thickness to avoid having to
Contains Critical Energy Infrastructure Information
DO NOT RELEASE

7

 Oroville Emergency Recovery – Spillways
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 2

Ted Craddock
March 31, 2017

excavate an additional thickness of foundation for the thicker slab. The BOC is of
the opinion that this would be possible and would not be difficult to achieve with a
short transition and a vertical curve. However, the thickness of the original
concrete chute slab appears to vary widely from the specified thickness, and the
condition and suitability of the underlying foundation will not be known until the
concrete is removed. It would be premature to change the line and grade at this
time.
In general, the BOC believes the details of the chute concrete, anchorage,
drainage and reinforcing are well conceived as shown on the drawings. It was
noted by the BOC that some of the RCC construction details shown on the draft
plans are appropriate for dam construction but unnecessary for building up the
new foundation for the chute.
It appears that making the initial placement of concrete in the upstream scour
hole may be hazardous for workers because of the danger of rock falls. The BOC
agrees that flowable concrete can be used in the bottom and that the large rock
pieces that ended up on the bottom of the scour hole can be left in place and
incorporated in the fill. Plum stones might also be used. When the level of
concrete placement reaches a height at which suitable space becomes available
for safe RCC placement, the operation can be changed.
The issue of drainage under the backfill behind the training walls was discussed.
If the replacement of the chute and training walls is only partially finished before
November, the outfall from these new drains needs to be determined.
The under drainage planned for the slab is, in general, satisfactory. Slabs are
planned as approximately 30-ft by 30-ft panels and will be placed in
checkerboard fashion to allow proper curing time prior to pouring of adjacent
slabs. Loads used in the structural design include full dynamic pressure under
the slabs. Both transverse and longitudinal joints will be provided with water
stops. Water stops between slabs were apparently not included in the design of
the original spillway and the lack of them was no doubt an important factor in the
February failure of the slab on the FCO Chute. It will be very important to have
constant construction inspection when slab concrete is poured to assure proper
imbedding of the water stops.
There are differences between treatment of construction-joints on Drawings S401 and S-403.

Contains Critical Energy Infrastructure Information
DO NOT RELEASE

8

 Oroville Emergency Recovery – Spillways
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 2

Ted Craddock
March 31, 2017

Drawing S-401 shows no features for drainage between the leveling concrete
and the chute slab. For some designs it may be desirable to consider installation
of some form of drainage in this location. Some typical designs use a wrapped
half-round slotted drain for such an application. It is not clear whether leveling
concrete as shown on Drawing S-401 will be used for the upper chute since the
condition of the foundation is not fully understood. The BOC is not in favor of
introducing this additional interface and prefers the slab concrete to be placed on
the properly prepared rock surface.
For the final construction of the reinforced concrete chute slab on the lower
portion where the slab will be placed on RCC, a drainage system design could be
considered. It was stated that undulations in the surface of the RCC would
apparently be limited to 2 inches in depth. This limitation in the surface of the
RCC would be rougher than useable for installation of drainage pipes as well as
greater than desirable for the flow velocities anticipated. The BOC does not
advocate the use of an under drainage system where the chute slab is placed on
the RCC foundation portion of the lower spillway section.
Considerable discussion regarding under drainage design for spillway chutes
took place.
The
idea was not supported by the BOC for the upper chute restoration. Although
many cracks developed in the original slabs, the new slab will be thicker, panel
dimensions will be much smaller, and will be more heavily reinforced. These
provisions will make the slab much less prone to developing such shrinkage or
temperature cracks.

Contains Critical Energy Infrastructure Information
DO NOT RELEASE

9

 Oroville Emergency Recovery – Spillways
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 2

6.

Ted Craddock
March 31, 2017

Does the BOC have any other recommendations or comments for the
Design Team?
Response
The BOC has comments on other items as listed below.
Provisional Air Slot: In previous meeting comments, the BOC suggested that it
could be advisable to add a designed air slot near the beginning of the steep
slope. Although cavitation was probably not the root cause of the slab failure, it
may have aided in the progress of the slab failure. Adding air could aid in
aerating the flow on the steep slope and dampening the added damaging effects
of cavitation. It may be advisable for these air slots to be analyzed in the
hydraulic model tests that are currently taking place.
Asbestos: About two weeks ago, the local Air Quality Management District at
Oroville discovered the occurrence of asbestos in an air quality sample. The
amount was small, but this finding has produced concern about this potential
health hazard to construction workers and nearby residents. Initial site
investigation reports indicate that the amphibolite metamorphic rocks at the site
are not a significant source of asbestos. We understand that DWR is conducting
their due diligence study of this issue. This study should include testing of air
samples in the crushing and borrow handling areas as well as any areas where
rock excavation or rock handling is planned.

BOC RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY
M3-1

The BOC concurs with the Project’s flood design criteria, but notes
that while the FCO spillway chute can be designed to pass its
portion of the extremely rare PMF flow, the Emergency Spillway
repairs may not be capable of passing a 16-foot-overtopping and a
peak flow of 371,000 cfs without significant erosion damage
downstream.

M3-2

The BOC considers the structural design criteria based on 144-year
return period ground shaking for interim repairs, and median
deterministic ground motions for long-term repairs to be reasonable
and appropriate.

M3-3

The BOC considers the deterministic median peak ground
accelerations estimated for the design of long-term dam safetyContains Critical Energy Infrastructure Information
DO NOT RELEASE

10

 Oroville Emergency Recovery – Spillways
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 2

Ted Craddock
March 31, 2017

related features to be reasonably conservative and appropriate
considering the very long return periods associated with these
deterministic levels.
M3-4

The BOC considers geologic and geotechnical criteria for the
excavation and preparation of foundations for the various project
features to be reasonable and appropriate.

M3-5

The BOC concurs with the proposed strength criteria for the
concrete and reinforcing steel elements, and for the use of
corrosion protection for rock anchors.

M3-6

The BOC recommends that rock-weathering depth be determined
for all elements of the Emergency Spillway (monolith section, 800-ft
long weir section, and 1,700-ft cutoff wall) prior to the design being
finalized. Weathering depth and, hence, scour potential
downstream of the northernmost 800-ft of the cutoff should be
estimated.

M3-7

The BOC concurs with the restoration methods recommended by
DWR for the upper chute section.

M3-8

The Contractor should be made aware that the length of upper
chute that is restored by Nov. 1 must connect with the portion still to
be replaced to operate during the flood season.

M3-9

M3-10

The BOC concurs with the plans recommended by DWR for
restoration of the chute channel in the lower spillway chute portion.

M3-11

The surface of the RCC channel which will be subject to high
velocity flow needs to be smooth
It is suggested that the RCC test pad
provides a means to investigate surfacing methods.

M3-12

The BOC has no objection to changing the line and grade of the
upper chute lining if this offers an advantage.
Contains Critical Energy Infrastructure Information
DO NOT RELEASE

11

 Oroville Emergency Recovery – Spillways
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 2

Ted Craddock
March 31, 2017

M3-13

The BOC points out that under drainage provisions for the lower
chute slab on RCC foundation has yet to be designed.

M3-14

The BOC does not favor the use of a leveling concrete course
below the reinforced concrete spillway chute slab.

Respectfully submitted,

John J. Cassidy

Eric B. Kollgaard

Faiz Makdisi

Kerry Cato

2884 Saklan Indian Drive
Walnut Creek, CA 94595
Tel (925) 933-5994

4820 Eagle Way
Concord, CA 94521
Tel (925) 798-9475

1 Kaiser Plaza, Ste.1125
Oakland, CA 94612
Tel (510) 529-8110

P.O. Box 891930
Temecula, CA 92589
Tel (951) 834-2619

jjcassidyhydro@comcast.net

ebkollgaard@astound.net

fmakdisi@sageengineers.com

kerry@catogeoscience.com

Contains Critical Energy Infrastructure Information
DO NOT RELEASE

12