Office of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice

Audit of the United States
Marshals Service Contract
No. DJJODT7C0002 with
CoreCivic, Inc., to Operate the
Leavenworth Detention Center
Leavenworth, Kansas

Audit Division 17-22

April 2017

 AUDIT OF THE UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE
CONTRACT NO. DJJODT7C0002 WITH
CORECIVIC, INC., TO OPERATE THE
LEAVENWORTH DETENTION CENTER
LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In January 2007, the Office of the Federal Detention Trustee (OFDT)
awarded, on behalf of the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), contract
no. DJJODT7C0002 to Corrections Corporation of America, now known as CoreCivic,
Inc. (CoreCivic), to provide comprehensive detention services at the Leavenworth
Detention Center (LDC) in Leavenworth, Kansas.1 This contract is a sole-source
acquisition that includes a 5-year base period with three 5-year option periods and
has a total estimated value of $697 million. Actual contract costs through January
2017 were $252 million.
The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted
this audit to assess USMS’s and CoreCivic’s administration of, and compliance with,
contract terms and conditions in the areas of: (1) contract management, oversight,
and monitoring; (2) staffing requirements; and (3) billings and payments. The
audit time frame focused on, but was not limited to, October 2010 through
May 2015.
As an initial matter, we determined that the OFDT’s justification for issuing a
sole source contract did not include all of the language and supporting
documentation required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).2 Additionally,
the USMS was unable to provide evidence, as required by the FAR, that the OFDT
obtained competition to the maximum extent practicable and ensured the best
overall value to the government. Specifically, the OFDT restricted contract
performance to the city of Leavenworth, thus potentially limiting the pool of
offerors, but it could not provide the required evidence that it had a sufficient
justification for this restriction.
We also concluded that the USMS failed to provide sufficient oversight of the
LDC and that this failure resulted in several significant issues with LDC operations
going unaddressed for extended periods of time. In our judgment, the USMS was
inherently reactive: instead of actively monitoring LDC operations to identify
CoreCivic was previously named Corrections Corporation of America, or CCA. CoreCivic
announced its renaming decision in October 2016.
1

2

Prior to its merger with the USMS in October 2012, the OFDT was a separate Department of
Justice component responsible for, among other things, acquiring housing for federal detainees in
USMS custody. Therefore, the OFDT solicited and awarded the LDC contract on behalf of the USMS.
Due to the merger, OIG recommendations pertaining to past OFDT processes are directed to the
USMS.

i

 discrepancies and thwart potential incidents, the USMS often became aware of
incidents after they occurred. Of particular concern, the USMS Contracting Officer’s
Representative (COR), who was responsible for monitoring CoreCivic’s performance
at the LDC on a day-to-day basis, was located offsite, had no previous contract
oversight experience, and received no formal guidance and negligible
detention-related training. The COR maintained an infrequent onsite presence at
the LDC, did not document the inspection activities performed, and did not develop
an inspection program or monitoring procedures. Furthermore, in our judgment,
the USMS’s lack of effective continuous monitoring at the LDC presents risks that
may extend throughout all its other contract detention facilities. Upon learning of
these potentially systemic weaknesses in the USMS’s contract oversight, the OIG
issued a Management Advisory Memorandum to the USMS so it could take
immediate action to address them. In response, USMS officials stated that their
goal was to improve contract monitoring by establishing an onsite detention
contract monitoring program at all private detention facilities. This program would
be staffed by full-time professional Contract Administrators under the supervision of
the USMS’s Prisoner Operations Division. The OIG Memorandum and the USMS’s
responses to it are detailed in the body of this report and attached as appendices.
Insufficient oversight by the USMS allowed several problems at the LDC to
persist over a significant period of time. Among the issues affecting the safety and
security of the LDC that we identified was its periodic understaffing. We found that
from October 2012 through September 2014, the LDC’s staffing was generally
consistent with the facility-wide staffing plan thresholds. However, from
October 2014 through September 2015, the LDC’s staffing levels deteriorated and
the facility-wide average vacancy rate more than doubled to 11 percent. This was
primarily driven by correctional officer vacancies, which reached as high as
23 percent. These correctional officer vacancies led to several problems in 2015,
including the LDC’s long-term use of mandatory overtime, which LDC personnel
said led to lower morale, security concerns, and fewer correctional officers available
to escort medical staff and detainees to and from the health services unit.
LDC’s vacancies led to the closure of security posts and reassignment of
personnel, sometimes to the detriment of detainee services. Many of the closures
occurred at posts that had been designated by CoreCivic as “mandatory,” meaning
they were required to be filled on each shift in order to run the facility in a safe and
secure manner. The problem of post closures was especially acute from February 1
through March 31, 2015. During this period, the LDC closed at least one security
post in all 118 shifts and closed an average of 7 posts per shift. LDC’s vacancies
also led to Unit Management personnel being assigned to security posts instead of
performing their normal job duties, which included assisting detainees with
casework and transitional services, developing individual detainee program plans,
and delivering services and programs to detainees, among other duties.
Rather than take steps to address understaffing, both USMS and CoreCivic
took actions that exacerbated the problem. For example, CoreCivic did not utilize
all available staffing options to remedy the understaffing problem, such as by
requesting temporary staff from other CoreCivic facilities. In fact, during a period
ii

 when the LDC was understaffed, CoreCivic temporarily transferred LDC personnel to
other CoreCivic facilities, which in one instance led to a significant reduction in the
size of the LDC’s already shorthanded Special Operations Response Team,
weakening its ability to operate effectively and fulfill its mission in the event of a
significant incident. We also found that the USMS allowed CoreCivic to contract
with a local government to house non-federal detainees at the LDC – at a rate
below that being paid by the USMS – without considering the staffing implications
of the arrangement.
We also learned during our audit that, unbeknownst to the USMS, LDC
officials had uninstalled beds prior to an American Correctional Association (ACA)
inspection in 2011 in order to conceal from ACA that the LDC was triple bunking
detainees. Following the OIG’s discovery of this issue, CoreCivic conducted an
internal investigation, which revealed that similar conduct may have occurred prior
to the 2005 and 2008 ACA audits and that a former CoreCivic divisional Managing
Director was aware of these efforts. CoreCivic told the OIG that in response to this
finding, its Ethics & Compliance office instituted an ethics liaison program and
completed training at LDC on employees’ duty to report misconduct, options for
reporting misconduct, and CoreCivic’s non-retaliation policy for employees who
report misconduct. We were informed by ACA that it had decided not to take any
action against CoreCivic, in part because the senior officials involved were no longer
with CoreCivic. Our audit further determined that the USMS has issued conflicting
guidance on the allowability of triple bunking by its contractors, and that it should
clearly specify in its new and existing contracts the rules and procedures governing
this practice.
Additionally, we found that the USMS did not detect several weaknesses in
CoreCivic’s contractually-required quality control program at the LDC, which our
review determined had significant shortcomings. For example, the LDC Quality
Assurance Manager received minimal instruction and guidance on how to conduct
facility reviews; there was insufficient evidence proving that the LDC inspection
review steps were conducted; the LDC’s plans of action did not properly address
deficiencies and did not provide viable long term correction; and the LDC had
insufficient evidence proving that plans of action were implemented.
Despite the LDC’s staffing deficiencies and the other instances of
non-compliance with contract requirements, we determined that the USMS had not
used available contractual mechanisms to hold CoreCivic accountable. According to
the contract and USMS policy, the USMS may issue contract price reductions for
contractors’ significant or repeat deficiencies, failure to fill essential staff positions,
and having an unacceptable number of vacancies. Yet we found that, from
March 2006 through January 2017, the USMS had not proposed or issued any
contract price reductions for any of its 15 contract detention facilities, including the
LDC. We further found that the COR for the LDC contract had never seen the
USMS’s price reduction guidance, and USMS officials were unable to provide us with
evidence that such guidance was sent to any of the current USMS District CORs
responsible for the other 14 USMS contract detention facilities. Additionally, the
USMS was not entering contractor past performance evaluations into the
iii

 government-wide electronic evaluation reporting system, as required by the FAR, or
conducting Performance Evaluation Meetings as required by the contract.
Finally, the OIG determined that one of CoreCivic’s employee fringe benefits
called the “sick account” contained excess funds that could be interpreted as “cash
equivalents” that should have been paid to employees on a regular basis. Because
CoreCivic’s benefits administrator withheld these funds for months or years before
disbursement to employees, it is questionable whether the sick account is compliant
with applicable labor standards for federal service contracts. We believe the USMS
should work with the Department of Labor, and as necessary CoreCivic, to address
the issue. CoreCivic also improperly requested – and the USMS improperly paid –
$103,271 in salaries and benefits for commissary positions not funded through the
LDC contract. These unallowable payments have a compounding effect over time
because they are incorporated into each monthly invoice until the contract ends. In
March 2017, the USMS issued a contract modification to CoreCivic to recover the
unallowable price adjustments and to modify the Monthly Operating Price to reflect
the proper monthly price.
This report makes 24 recommendations to assist the USMS in improving
contractor operations and enhancing the USMS’s monitoring and oversight at the
LDC.

iv

 AUDIT OF THE UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE
CONTRACT NO. DJJODT7C0002 WITH
CORECIVIC, INC., TO OPERATE THE
LEAVENWORTH DETENTION CENTER
LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1 
Background ........................................................................................ 1 
USMS Contract Administration, Monitoring, and Oversight ................ 3 
CoreCivic, Inc. ............................................................................ 5 
Leavenworth Detention Center...................................................... 6 
OIG Audit Approach ............................................................................. 7 
Prior OIG Reports ................................................................................ 7 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................... 9 
Sole Source Justification ..................................................................... 10 
Inadequate Analysis to Determine Price Reasonableness ................ 12 
USMS Quality Assurance Program ........................................................ 12 
USMS Monitoring of the Leavenworth Detention Center ........................... 14 
Inadequate District COR Experience and Detention-Related
Training.......................................................................... 14 
Insufficient Continuous Monitoring Processes at the LDC ................ 15 
USMS Did Not Adequately Monitor Internal, External, and QAR
Audit Results ................................................................... 19 
Insufficient USMS Continuous Monitoring May Be Widespread ......... 21 
Insufficient Quality Assurance Documentation ............................... 22 
USMS Did Not Use Available Mechanisms to Hold Contractors
Accountable .................................................................... 23 
CoreCivic Quality Control .................................................................... 26 
Inadequate LDC Oversight and Monitoring .................................... 27 

 LDC’s QAM Needs Additional Quality Assurance Guidance ............... 32 
USMS Detainee Mortality Reporting Processes ........................................ 33 
Observation of LDC Video Security Surveillance ..................................... 35 
Staffing Requirements and Triple Bunking ............................................. 36 
LDC Understaffing Led to Security Post Closures ........................... 38 
LDC Did Not Promptly Address Facility Understaffing ...................... 43 
USMS Did Not Adequately Monitor and Hold CoreCivic Accountable
for Understaffing ............................................................. 44 
Impact of LDC Understaffing ...................................................... 46 
Personnel-Related Decisions Increased LDC Understaffing .............. 49 
LDC Officials Concealed Use of Triple Bunking from the American
Correctional Association .................................................... 51 
USMS Contracts Do Not Contain Clear Guidance on the Use of
Triple Bunking ................................................................. 53 
USMS Did Not Evaluate the Implications of Wyandotte County’s
Use of the LDC ................................................................ 55 
Comparison of USMS and BOP Contract Staffing Requirements ........ 58 
Billings and Payments ........................................................................ 59 
Service Contract Labor Standards Statute .................................... 60 
CoreCivic’s “Sick Account” May Be Non-Compliant with Federal
Labor Standards .............................................................. 62 
Unallowable Commissary-Related Service Contract Labor Standards
Price Adjustments ............................................................ 65 
Transaction Testing of CoreCivic Invoices and Commissary
Expenditures ................................................................... 66 
Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System (JPATS)
Transactions ................................................................... 66 
Conclusion ........................................................................................ 67 
Recommendations ............................................................................. 69 
STATEMENT ON INTERNAL CONTROLS ........................................................... 72 

 STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS ......................... 73 
APPENDIX 1: USMS PRIVATELY-MANAGED DETENTION FACILITIES AS OF
FEBRUARY 2017 ................................................................................ 74 
APPENDIX 2: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY................................. 75 
APPENDIX 3: OIG MANAGEMENT ADVISORY MEMORANDUM TO THE USMS ON
OVERSIGHT OF DETENTION SERVICE CONTRACTS ................................. 79 
APPENDIX 4: USMS’S RESPONSE TO THE OIG’S MANAGEMENT ADVISORY
MEMORANDUM .................................................................................. 86 
APPENDIX 5: USMS’s RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT AUDIT REPORT ...................... 88 
APPENDIX 6: CORECIVIC’s RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT AUDIT REPORT ............... 95 
APPENDIX 7: OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY
OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT ................................ 109 

 AUDIT OF THE UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE
CONTRACT NO. DJJODT7C0002 WITH
CORECIVIC, INC., TO OPERATE THE
LEAVENWORTH DETENTION CENTER
LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
INTRODUCTION
The Department of Justice (Department) Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) audited the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) Contract
No. DJJODT7C0002 awarded to Corrections Corporation of America, which is now
known as CoreCivic, Inc. (CoreCivic), to provide comprehensive detention services
at the Leavenworth Detention Center (LDC) in Leavenworth, Kansas.1 This
sole-source acquisition, effective January 2007, has a 5-year base period and three
5-year option periods. If the USMS exercised all three options, the contract would
be effective through 2026 and have an estimated cost of nearly $697 million. As of
January 2017, costs incurred were approximately $252 million. Table 1 contains
the LDC contract’s estimated and actual costs.
Table 1
LDC Contract Costs
Contract No. DJJODT7C0002
CONTRACT PERIOD
Base Period
Option Period 1*
Option Period 2
Option Period 3

FROM
1/01/2007
1/01/2012
1/01/2017
1/01/2022

TO
12/31/2011
12/31/2016
12/31/2021
12/31/2026

ESTIMATED COST
$ 143,965,195
552,617,714

Total
$696,582,9092
*Includes actual cost data through January 2017

ACTUAL COST
$ 115,536,848
134,334,026
2,190,840
N/A
$252,061,714

Source: USMS

Background
USMS’s core mission is to safeguard the federal judicial process by protecting
federal judges, prosecutors, and court personnel; providing physical security in
courthouses; protecting witnesses; transporting and producing prisoners for trial;
executing court orders and arrest warrants; apprehending fugitives; and managing
and disposing of seized property. In addition to its core mission, the USMS

1 The contract number is also referred to as ODT-7-C-0002. Throughout the report this
contract is referred to as the “LDC contract.”
2 Table 1’s estimated costs for the Base Period and Total differ from cost estimates that the
Office of the Federal Detention Trustee was required to report to the publicly accessible Federal
Procurement Data System (FPDS), which were overstated in FPDS due to a calculation error.

1

 manages the housing, transportation, and care of federal detainees in 15 privately
managed detention facilities, including the LDC.
The Department’s Office of the Federal Detention Trustee (OFDT) awarded
the LDC contract to CoreCivic in early 2007. At the time, the OFDT was responsible
for acquiring the housing and care of federal detainees in USMS custody, and
managing and monitoring federal detention programs and services. OFDT was
established in September 2001 in response to growing concerns about federal
detention and to centralize the management of detention activities within the
Department. OFDT acquired detention bed space through several different methods
including: (1) federal detention facilities owned and operated by the federal
government, such as Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) institutions;
(2) intergovernmental agreements (IGA) with state and local jurisdictions with
available bed space; and (3) privately managed detention facilities. From 1994
through 2011, the USMS’s average daily detention population grew from 18,282 to
61,719. The increased demand for bed space, coupled with fewer available federal
and IGA beds, led to the OFDT’s increasing reliance on privately managed detention
facilities.
In February 2012, the Department proposed the merger of the OFDT into the
USMS, stating that it would align the accountability of resources with the
responsibility of operations, eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic layers to the
financial process, achieve cost savings, and allow OFDT personnel to continue their
mission under a single command and control structure within the USMS hierarchy.
The merger was completed in October 2012, effectively transferring the OFDT’s
detention resources into the USMS’s Federal Prisoner Detention (FPD) appropriation
and shifting OFDT’s detention services and oversight responsibilities to the USMS’s
Prisoner Operations Division (POD). The FPD appropriation was a significant
addition to the USMS’s overall budget and in fiscal year (FY) 2017 the USMS sought
more funds for its FPD account than for its core mission, as shown in Figure 1.

2

 Figure 1
USMS Budget
FYs 2013 through 2017
(In millions)
$1,800
$1,600
$1,400
$1,200

$1,533

$1,534

$1,122

$1,195

$1,504
$1,205

$1,246

$1,258

$1,285

$1,000
$800
$600
$307

$400
$200
$0
2013

2014

2015*

CORE MISSION

2016

2017 [Request]

FPD

*In 2015, DOJ funded $1.1 billion of the FPD account via excess unobligated balances
from the Assets Forfeiture Funds, thereby fully funding the account.

Source: USMS Budget Records

USMS Contract Administration, Monitoring, and Oversight
USMS’s administration, monitoring, and oversight of detention programs and
operations are shared by the POD and the USMS District Office responsible for each
of the 15 privately managed detention facilities.3 POD’s mission is to preserve the
integrity of the federal judicial process by establishing national detention policy,
national strategies, and programs that provide for processing, housing,
transportation, and care of federal detainees in a safe, secure, and cost effective
manner. In FY 2015, POD managed an average daily detention population of
51,862 detainees of which over 10,000 were housed in the 15 privately managed
detention facilities.4 USMS District Offices are organized around the operational
programs of judicial security, prisoner services, fugitive investigations, execution of
court orders, asset seizure and forfeiture, and administrative functions. They are
also responsible for ensuring that all non-federal detention facilities in their
jurisdictions are inspected annually and that contractual agreements are being met.

3

See Appendix 1 for a list of the USMS’s 15 privately managed detention facilities.

4 Of the 51,862 detainees, 31,603 were in state and local facilities (operated under USMS’s
approximately 1,800 intergovernmental agreements); 10,248 were in private contract facilities, 9,774
were in BOP facilities, and 237 were in non-paid medical facilities.

3

 The LDC contract is administered by a Contracting Officer located in
Arlington, Virginia, who is responsible for directing or negotiating any changes in
contract terms, and whose authorities include increasing or decreasing the contract
amount, modifying or extending the period of performance, authorizing payment
under the contract, and taking formal action for unsatisfactory contractor
performance. Two Contracting Officer’s Representatives (COR) were designated to
assist the Contracting Officer with technical monitoring and administration. One
COR is a Detention Facilities Program Manager within POD, located in Arlington,
Virginia. This individual oversees contractual compliance, contractor quality of
work, and ensures that a Quality Assurance Review (QAR) is conducted at least
annually. The second COR is a Contract Oversight Specialist located in the USMS
District of Kansas and is responsible for the continuous, day-to-day monitoring of
the contractor.
During this audit we primarily interacted with POD’s Office of Detention
Services, which is responsible for administering POD’s acquisition process;
monitoring compliance with federal detention standards; and evaluating detention
facilities to ensure they operate in a safe, secure, and humane fashion.

4

 Figure 2
USMS Organizational Chart5

Source: USMS

CoreCivic, Inc.
CoreCivic is a Maryland corporation that was founded in 1983 and
headquartered in Nashville, Tennessee.6 CoreCivic specializes in owning, operating,
and managing prisons and other correctional facilities and providing residential,
community re-entry and prisoner transportation services for governmental
agencies. As of December 2015, CoreCivic had the capacity to house
approximately 88,500 offenders and detainees in 77 facilities. According to
CoreCivic, it is the fifth largest corrections system in the nation, behind only the
federal government and three states, and in 2015 earned approximately $1.8 billion
in revenue and $222 million in net income. According to the Federal Procurement
Data System, CoreCivic was the Department’s No. 1 contractor in terms of dollars
obligated for 7 of the last 10 years, spanning FYs 2006 through 2015.
This organizational chart does not provide a comprehensive view of all USMS
subcomponents.
5

CoreCivic was previously named Corrections Corporation of America, or CCA. CoreCivic
announced its renaming in October 2016.
6

5

 CoreCivic derives a significant amount of its revenues from the federal
government. According to CoreCivic financial statements, contracts with the USMS
alone accounted for approximately $283 million, or 16 percent, of CoreCivic’s
revenue in 2015, while overall payments by federal correctional and detention
authorities – the USMS, BOP, and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
– accounted for $912 million, or 51 percent, of CoreCivic’s total revenue in 2015.
Leavenworth Detention Center
CoreCivic owns and operates the LDC, which was opened in 1992 and
declared by CoreCivic to be the first maximum-security facility managed by a
corrections company under direct contract with a federal agency. LDC is a
maximum security facility with a 1,120 bed capacity that houses both male and
female detainees. Detainees stay at the facility on average for less than 1 year and
the detainee population primarily consists of individuals charged with federal
offenses that are detained while awaiting a hearing, trial, or sentencing. LDC is led
by a Warden and Assistant Warden and operated by approximately 270 employees.
LDC’s mission is to maintain and manage the facility in accordance with applicable
federal and state laws, court orders, and American Correctional Association (ACA)
standards.7
USMS’s current contract is its third award to CoreCivic to operate the LDC.
The first two contracts were awarded in 1990 and 1998; the latter had a 5-year
base term, followed by the USMS’s exercise of several extensions including a bridge
contract in 2005 to continue services for 24 months while the current contract was
negotiated.8 LDC’s current contract was awarded in January 2007 and is a sole
source acquisition that allows Department components, including the USMS
Districts of Kansas, Nebraska, Eastern Missouri, Western Missouri, South Dakota,
and Iowa; the BOP; and non-Department entities such as the U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement to house detainees at the facility.9 USMS requested the LDC
contract because the District of Kansas needed additional support from private
entities for the housing, care, and security of detainees because the number of
detainees in the district exceeded the available detention space in existing facilities.

7 The American Correctional Association (ACA) develops national standards and an
accreditation process that address services, programs, and operations essential to effective
correctional management.
8 According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), a “bridge contract” is an
extension to an existing contract beyond the period of performance (including option years), or a new,
short-term contract awarded on a sole-source basis to an incumbent contractor to avoid a lapse in
service caused by a delay in awarding a follow-on contract. GAO, Sole Source Contracting, Defining
and Tracking Bridge Contracts Would Help Agencies Manage Their Use, GAO-16-15 (October 2015), 4.
9 A sole source acquisition is a contract for supplies or services that is proposed or entered
into by an agency after soliciting and negotiating with only one source.

6

 The LDC contract requires CoreCivic to provide comprehensive detention
services including receiving and discharging detainees, facility security,
transportation and outside guard services, food service, and healthcare service. In
addition to housing federal detainees, CoreCivic entered into a separate contract
with the Unified Government of Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas
(Wyandotte County) to house up to 220 non-federal detainees at the LDC.
OIG Audit Approach
The objective of this audit was to assess USMS and CoreCivic administration
of, and compliance with contract terms and conditions in the areas of: (1) contract
management, oversight, and monitoring; (2) staffing requirements; and (3) billings
and payments. Our audit timeframe focused on, but was not limited to,
October 2010 through May 2015.10
To assess USMS and CoreCivic compliance with contract management,
oversight, and monitoring, we examined the USMS’s Quality Assurance Surveillance
Program (QASP) to ensure the USMS monitored the quality of LDC services and that
the contract requirements were defined and satisfactorily met. We also reviewed
the OFDT’s justification for issuing a sole source contract and its determination that
the contract price was fair and reasonable. We then reviewed CoreCivic’s quality
control program (QCP) to determine if CoreCivic provided and maintained an
inspection system that enabled it to demonstrate positive performance and identify
areas of non-compliance before the level of performance became unsatisfactory.
To determine if the USMS and CoreCivic followed staffing requirements, we
evaluated the LDC’s staffing policies, procedures, budgeted and actual figures, and
shift rosters; compared the USMS’s contract staffing provisions to the BOP’s; and
interviewed facility staff to gain an understanding of the facility’s staffing levels and
conditions. Lastly, to ensure compliance with contract requirements regarding
billings and payments, we assessed the accuracy of USMS payments for monthly
invoices, and examined CoreCivic compliance with Service Contract Labor
Standards (SCLS) and regulations addressing the payment of prevailing wages and
benefits to staff based on locality.
Prior OIG Reports
In January 2013, the OIG issued an audit report on the Department’s
oversight of non-federal detention facility inspections.11 During this audit, the
USMS and OFDT were still separate Department components operating independent
10 According to court documents, on August 5, 2016, the Federal Public Defender for the
District of Kansas (FPD) learned that meetings between detainees and their attorneys had been video
recorded by LDC staff, and at times provided to the government by request. The FPD subsequently
alleged that phone calls between LDC detainees and their attorneys had also been recorded. These
allegations were all made after we had completed our field work and after we had substantially
completed this audit, and as such were not within the audit’s scope.
11 U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the U.S. Department of
Justice’s Oversight of Non-Federal Detention Facility Inspections, Audit Report 13-06 (January 2013).

7

 inspection programs. The audit found that while the Department employed basic
standards to evaluate the conditions of non-federal detention facilities, the OFDT
and USMS applied these standards inconsistently, depending on the type of
inspection being conducted. For example, an OFDT review typically took 3 days to
complete and was more thorough than a USMS review that took on average only
2 hours to complete. The audit also found that the OFDT and USMS used separate
processes to determine which non-federal detention facilities to review during a
given fiscal year. Neither process incorporated a risk-based assessment to ensure
that the facilities most in need of review were prioritized.12 Lastly, the report noted
a lack of coordination on the resolution of deficiencies identified during inspections.
In August 2016, the OIG issued a review of the BOP’s monitoring of contract
prisons, which included CoreCivic.13 It concluded that in comparison to federal
facilities, CoreCivic contract prisons had the highest rates of inmate fights and
inmate assaults on other inmates.
In December 2016, the OIG issued an audit report on the BOP’s contract with
CoreCivic to operate the Adams County Correctional Center in Natchez, Mississippi.
In May 2012, an inmate riot at the facility resulted in a correctional officer’s death
and injuries to approximately 20 staff and inmates. A BOP after-action report found
deficiencies in staffing levels, staff experience, communication between staff and
inmates, and CoreCivic’s intelligence systems. The OIG audit found that 4 years
after the riot, the facility was plagued by the same significant deficiencies in
correctional and health services. In 19 of the 38 months following the riot,
CoreCivic staffed correctional services at an even lower level than at the time of the
riot in terms of actual post coverage. Moreover, between December 2012 and
September 2015, the Adams County facility was staffed with only a single physician
for 434 days (43 percent of the time) and a single dentist for 689 days (69 percent
of the time).14

12 OFDT continued to conduct annual inspections of all privately contracted facilities (as
opposed to using a risk-based approach that would review some of the private facilities) to comply
with the FAR’s quality assurance requirements. After the 2012 OFDT merger, USMS continued to
conduct these annual reviews at its privately contracted facilities.
13 U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Review of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons’ Monitoring of Contract Prisons, Evaluation and Inspections Report 16-06 (August 2016).
14 U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons’ Contract with CoreCivic, Inc., to Operate the Adams County Correctional Center in Natchez,
Mississippi, Audit Report 17-08 (December 2016).

8

 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We identified weaknesses in the OFDT’s sole source justification for the
award of this contract to CoreCivic and determined that the USMS
failed to provide sufficient oversight of the LDC and that this failure
resulted in several significant issues with LDC operations going
unaddressed for extended periods of time. Of particular concern, the
USMS Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR), who was responsible
for monitoring CoreCivic’s performance at the LDC on a day-to-day
basis, was located offsite, had no previous contract oversight
experience, and received no formal guidance and negligible
detention-related training. The District COR maintained an infrequent
onsite presence at the LDC, did not document the inspection activities
performed, and did not develop an inspection program or monitoring
procedures. We also found that the USMS did not use available
mechanisms to hold CoreCivic and other contractors accountable, such
as evaluating past performance and issuing price reductions for
contractors’ failure to perform required services. USMS’s lack of
effective continuous monitoring presents risks that may extend beyond
the LDC to its 14 other contract detention facilities. In addition to
other USMS oversight and monitoring-related discrepancies, we
identified weaknesses in CoreCivic’s quality control program, and
identified a potential improvement to the USMS’s detainee mortality
reporting process.
In the area of staffing, correctional officer turnover and vacancies led
to the LDC’s long-term use of mandatory overtime, the closure of
security posts, and diversion of Unit Management staff from their
regular job duties to filling security posts. We also found that LDC
officials concealed the facility’s use of triple bunking from the ACA in
what appears to be an effort to receive a higher accreditation score,
and that the USMS has issued conflicting guidance on contractors’ use
of triple-bunking for USMS detainees.
Lastly, we found that CoreCivic’s administration of its “sick account”
benefit was questionable because CoreCivic contributed excess funds
that could be interpreted as “cash equivalents.” Because CoreCivic
withheld these funds for months or years before disbursement to
employees, its “sick account” may not be compliant with the applicable
labor standards for federal service contracts. CoreCivic also
improperly requested and the USMS improperly paid $103,271 in
wages and fringe benefits that CoreCivic was not entitled to receive.

9

 Sole Source Justification
USMS initially contracted with CoreCivic to design, build, and operate the
LDC in 1990 when it issued the first award. In 1998, the USMS awarded CoreCivic
a second contract that contained a 5-year base term and was followed by the
USMS’s exercise of several contract extensions, including a 24-month extension
effective in 2005 through 2006 while the OFDT negotiated a new contract. The
process culminated in the OFDT’s February 2006 decision to award the current sole
source contract to CoreCivic, effective January 2007.15 We reviewed the award
process and found that some actions taken by the OFDT for the justification and
price reasonableness of this contract award were not in accordance with the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), as described below.
FAR Part 6, Competition Requirements, states that Contracting Officers shall
not commence negotiations for a sole source contract without justifying such an
action in writing, certifying the accuracy and completeness of the justification, and
obtaining agency approval of the justification.16 OFDT completed a Justification for
Other Than Full and Open Competition (justification) and fulfilled some FAR
requirements such as describing the nature of the services being approved, citing
the statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition, and
obtaining the appropriate agency approvals. However, the OFDT did not obtain
competition to the maximum extent practicable, the justification’s narrative did not
support its conclusions, and the justification was missing the Contracting Officer’s
certification that its contents were accurate and complete to the best of the
Contracting Officer’s knowledge.
OFDT sought to award the LDC contract using other than full and open
competition in accordance with a FAR provision stating that an agency may use
noncompetitive procedures when the supplies or services needed are available from
only one responsible source and no other type of supplies or services will satisfy
agency requirements.17 In January 2006, the OFDT issued a “sources sought
notice” to gain knowledge of potentially qualified sources. The notice said the OFDT
was “in search of [an] existing secured detention facility located within the
geographic boundaries of Leavenworth, Kansas. . .” to house persons in USMS
custody. Interested offerors were required to respond to this notice and the OFDT
received one response from the incumbent contractor, CoreCivic.

15 As previously noted, prior to the October 2012 merger with the USMS, the OFDT was a
separate DOJ component responsible for acquiring the housing and care of federal detainees in USMS
custody. Therefore, the solicitation and award of the LDC contract was performed by OFDT on behalf
of the USMS. Due to the merger, OIG recommendations based on past OFDT processes are directed
to the USMS.
16 FAR Subpart 6.3, Other Than Full and Open Competition, 6.303, Justification, 6.303-1(a),
Requirements.
17 FAR Subpart 6.3, Other Than Full and Open Competition, 6.302, Circumstances Permitting
More than Full and Open Competition, 6.302-1, Only One Responsible Source and no other Supplies or
Services will Satisfy Agency Requirements.

10

 We asked why the OFDT’s sources sought notice restricted performance to
the city of Leavenworth, thus potentially limiting the pool of offerors, instead of
allowing a broader area of performance such as in the District of Kansas (which
covers the entire state) or within a reasonable distance from a U.S. District
Court. USMS officials responded that the OFDT specified the city of Leavenworth
because the LDC was the only available facility in the State of Kansas and the OFDT
was prohibited from contracting for the construction of a new facility to address its
detention-space needs. USMS officials said OFDT reached this conclusion by
contacting CoreCivic’s competitors including The GEO Group (GEO), Cornell
Corrections (later purchased by GEO), and the Management and Training
Corporation, and confirmed that these vendors had no existing facilities in Kansas
and were therefore not qualified sources. However, the USMS could not provide
evidence of these OFDT communications, and a description of these
communications was not included in the justification documents. USMS officials
also could not provide FAR-required market research documentation, which also
may have contained such information.18 The justification instead stated that an
award to a source other than CoreCivic was likely to result in substantial duplication
of cost to the Government that was not expected to be recovered through
competition. However, this reasoning was not accompanied by an estimate of the
cost of duplication and how that estimate was derived, as required by the FAR.19
A senior POD official involved in the acquisition said the OFDT had considered
issuing a competitive solicitation but thought it was improper knowing the OFDT
would receive only one proposal. This official said he understood how it could
appear that the OFDT was limiting competition, but that it was not the intent and
had there been an existing facility elsewhere in the District of Kansas, the OFDT
would have pursued it to maximize competition. USMS officials also said that one
of the impediments to expanding competition was a federal statute that requires
the USMS’s privately contracted facilities be located in the district of need.20
Because the USMS’s private detention contracts are lengthy (lasting up to 20 years)
and costly agreements, we believe it is important that the USMS maximizes
competition during the acquisition process to attain the best overall value without
compromising its ability to transport detainees to court, medical facilities, or other
locations in a timely fashion. USMS should also better document its justifications
for awarding any detention-related sole source contracts and maintain such records
in the contract file as required by FAR Subpart 4.8, Government Contract Files.
Therefore, we recommend that the USMS establish acquisition procedures to ensure
that future detention pre-solicitation and solicitation notices include the widest
place of performance practical, and that sole-source justifications are fully
documented, maintained in the contract file, and include all FAR-required language.
This language should include the certification that the justification was accurate and
complete to the best of the Contracting Officer’s knowledge.
18

FAR Part 10, Market Research, 10.002(e), Procedures.

19 FAR Subpart 6.3, Other Than Full and Open Competition, 6.303, Justification, 6.303-2,
Content, 6.303-2(b)(9)(ii).
20

18 U.S.C. § 4013 (2017).

11

 Inadequate Analysis to Determine Price Reasonableness
Having completed its justification and fulfilled other FAR requirements, a
contracting agency can commence negotiations with the offeror. FAR Subpart 15.4,
Contract Pricing, prescribes cost and price negotiation policies and procedures that
require Contracting Officers purchase supplies and services from responsible
sources at “fair and reasonable prices.” For the LDC acquisition, the OFDT was
required to use price analysis to determine whether the agreed-to price was fair
and reasonable. OFDT made its determination by comparing the offeror’s proposed
price to the price of the prior contract. To justify use of this technique, the OFDT
had to demonstrate that the services were the “same or similar” and that it
considered factors affecting comparability, and that the prior price was a “valid
basis for comparison.” OFDT documented its determination of price reasonableness
and noted that CoreCivic was providing the same services at the same location as
the prior contract.
We compared the previous and current contract statements of work and
found that the proposed services generally met the “same or similar” requirement
contained in the FAR. However, the OFDT did not assess whether market or
economic factors changed during the approximately 8 years between acquisitions.
Additionally, the OFDT’s determination of price reasonableness included data on a
wide range of BOP and USMS facility per diem rates, but lacked an explanation of
their relationship to CoreCivic’s proposed price.
OFDT next compared the previous contract’s annual per diem and rates of
increase to those of the current offer and concluded that CoreCivic’s proposal would
yield substantial savings over a 20-year period, compared to the previous contract.
However, the OFDT’s explanation did not indicate whether the historical price was
itself fair and reasonable. The FAR states that “if the reasonableness of the prior
price was uncertain, then the prior price may not have been a valid basis for
comparison.” USMS officials could not locate or recall whether a price
reasonableness analysis of the previous contract had been performed. Although
the new contract included a smaller annual rate of increase than its predecessor, if
the prior contract’s price was not fair and reasonable, it would not be an adequate
basis to assess the fairness and reasonableness of the current contract. Therefore,
we recommend that USMS establish policies and procedures to ensure that, when
its price analysis is based on a comparison of historical prices paid, it establishes
the prior price as a valid basis for comparison.
USMS Quality Assurance Program
Private prison contracts are among the Department’s most expensive and
present unique challenges because of the government’s obligation to provide a safe
and secure environment for detainees, staff, and the public. Contract quality
assurance, or monitoring, is a critical element of federal contracts, as it enables the
government to determine whether a contractor has fulfilled contractual obligations
pertaining to quality and quantity. FAR Subpart 46.4, Government Contract Quality
Assurance, requires that federal agencies perform contract quality assurance at
12

 such times and places as may be necessary to determine that the services conform
to contract requirements. Federal agencies articulate these requirements through
quality assurance surveillance plans (QASP), which specify all work requiring
surveillance and the method of surveillance.
USMS’s QASP for the LDC contract states that each phase of the services
rendered under this contract is subject to USMS inspection during both the
contractor’s operations and after completion of the tasks. USMS inspection includes
two primary activities: (1) the Quality Assurance Review (QAR), which is an annual
evaluation conducted at all USMS contracted facilities; and (2) continuous
monitoring performed by staff in the USMS District responsible for the detention
facility. The QAR is a 3-day review conducted by experienced POD and contracted
staff. The purpose of the QAR is to assess contract facility compliance across
several functional areas in accordance with the Federal Performance-Based
Detention Standards (FPBDS) and concludes with the issuance of a final report and
overall facility rating.21 The QAR is performed at least once annually and on a more
frequent basis if facility performance is found to be substandard.
To understand the QAR process, we observed the majority of the 2015 QAR
performed at the Aurora Detention Facility in Aurora, Colorado.22 Based on our
observation of the Aurora Detention Facility and analysis of the QAR results at the
LDC from FYs 2011 through 2015, we determined that the QAR was well structured,
comprehensive, and adequately documented deficiencies in the final reports. We
also concluded that POD had maintained supporting documentation to justify its
findings, and obtained and approved CoreCivic’s plans of action (POA) to remedy
the deficiencies.
While the QAR is an important component of the USMS’s inspection process,
it is inherently limited by its infrequent nature and if used alone could leave a
significant monitoring gap between its annual occurrences. USMS can fill this
monitoring gap by continually reviewing contractor operations for adherence to
contract terms and conditions. FAR 52.246-4, Inspection of Services – Fixed Price,
provides the USMS with such authority, stating that (the OIG’s emphasis in italics)
“the government has the right to inspect and test all services called for by the
contract, to the extent practicable at all times and places during the term of the
contract.” However, as detailed below, USMS has not established an adequate
continuous monitoring program.

The Federal Performance Based Detention Standards (FPBDS) are the criteria used by the
USMS to assess contractor compliance with contract terms and conditions. It is based on ACA
standards and is designed to establish the performance level required by the government to meet the
detention contract requirements.
21

22 We could not observe the LDC’s 2015 QAR because it was conducted in May 2015, before
the initiation of our audit.

13

 USMS Monitoring of the Leavenworth Detention Center
With respect to continuous monitoring, the USMS’s QASP requires payment
of the contractor’s monthly invoice after “services provided for each billing cycle
[are] determined, based on performance, to be ‘acceptable’.” The Contracting
Officer’s Representative (COR) is responsible for reviewing CoreCivic’s monthly
performance and verifying compliance with contract requirements which are divided
into 6 functional areas (administration and management, healthcare, security and
control, food service, safety and sanitation, and services and programs) that
collectively contain 46 standards areas derived from the FPBDS. For the USMS to
assess the acceptability of monthly contractor services, it needs a robust,
well-defined, and organized continuous monitoring program. However, we
determined that the USMS’s continuous monitoring efforts at the LDC were not
adequate to sufficiently monitor contractor performance of a detention services
contract valued at nearly $700 million. We identified several problems, including:


inadequate District COR experience and detention-related training;



insufficient continuous monitoring processes at the LDC;



inadequate monitoring of internal, external, and QAR audit results;



insufficient quality assurance documentation; and



insufficient mechanisms to hold contractors accountable.

Furthermore, because several of these problems appear to be inherent in the
USMS’s overarching continuous monitoring approach, we believe they may also be
occurring at the USMS’s other 14 contract detention facilities. Given the
significance of our concerns, in February 2016 the OIG issued a Management
Advisory Memorandum to the USMS, advising it of these matters. In March 2016
USMS responded to our memorandum by proposing several actions. We believe the
USMS’s suggested actions demonstrate a commitment to improving its contractor
oversight. In addition to both memoranda being included in Appendix 3 and
Appendix 4 of this report, the following subsections detail information discussed in
the memoranda and provide additional OIG analysis and recommendations.
Inadequate District COR Experience and Detention-Related Training
The FAR and Justice Acquisition Regulations require that CORs meet
minimum eligibility standards by completing a basic COR course and obtaining
ethics training.23 CORs must receive and maintain certification and be properly
designated to a contract. We found that the USMS District of Kansas COR (District
COR) met these basic requirements. However, the District COR did not meet the
23 The Justice Acquisition Regulations provide procurement regulations that supplement the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).

14

 FAR requirement that CORs be qualified by training and experience commensurate
with the responsibilities to be delegated in accordance with agency procedures.24
The District COR was appointed in March 2011, only 3 weeks after attaining the
COR certification. Prior to certification, the District COR had no contracting
experience and this almost $700 million contract was the first assignment received.
Furthermore, the District COR did not have experience in detention services, and
relied significantly on the expertise of a Deputy U.S. Marshal to conduct LDC
inspections. USMS failed to provide training to sufficiently bolster the COR’s
knowledge of detention services and monitoring and oversight. From this District
COR’s March 2011 appointment through August 2015, the only formalized
detention-related training provided by the USMS was a 60-minute lecture on the
roles and responsibilities of the COR during the pre-solicitation and post-award
phases of the contract.
USMS officials agreed that COR training was a weakness across all districts
responsible for detention facilities and that weakness needed to be addressed.
USMS officials said options included obtaining training from organizations
specializing in detention operations or coordinating with the BOP on a training
exchange program. In response to the Management Advisory Memorandum, USMS
officials said they would develop a training program for CORs assigned to detention
and transportation contracts. In addition to addressing basic COR training and
certification requirements, the training program would cover detention facility
inspections, contract monitoring instruments, reporting requirements, and POAs.
USMS officials said that each private detention facility contract would have at least
one COR with a Federal Acquisition Certification for Contracting Officer’s
Representative (FAC-COR) Level II certification.25 We recommend that the USMS
continue to develop a training program for CORs monitoring and overseeing its
detention-related contracts that ensures CORs receive and maintain a level of
training and experience commensurate with their responsibilities.
Insufficient Continuous Monitoring Processes at the LDC
Maintaining a continuous onsite presence at a detention facility enables a
more proactive approach to monitoring because the COR can witness events unfold
in real-time instead of being informed of incidents after they occur. The LDC
contract indicated that the USMS would have a continuous onsite presence at the
facility, stating that “the government anticipates a nominal number of staff will be
onsite to monitor contract performance and manage other government interests
associated with operation of the facility. The contractor shall provide an onsite
enclosed office space for the USMS’s staff.” This USMS contract language was
FAR Subpart 1.6, Career Development, Contracting Authority, and Responsibilities, 1.602,
Contracting Officers, 1.602-2, Responsibilities, 1.602-2(d)(3).
24

The purpose of the Federal Acquisition Certification-Contracting Officer's Representative
(FAC-COR) is to establish general training, experience, and development for CORs in civilian agencies
that reflect the various types of contracts they manage. Level II is the mid-level certification
generally appropriate for contracts of moderate to high complexity.
25

15

 nearly identical to BOP private prison contracts, whose quality assurance staff is
permanently located onsite. However, the USMS neither stationed staff at the LDC,
nor did the contractor provide USMS staff any dedicated space within the LDC.26 In
fact, USMS did not co-locate staff at any of its contract detention facilities.
The responsibility for continuous monitoring was held by the District COR,
located approximately 30 miles southeast of the LDC. The District COR performed
onsite inspections at the LDC on a very infrequent basis. From January 2014
through September 2015, a period encompassing 21 months, the District COR
visited the facility 17 times for a total of approximately 41 hours. Approximately
37 percent of this time was spent observing the QAR team’s annual reviews. If
these QAR-related hours are removed, the District COR spent 26 hours conducting
inspections from January 2014 through September 2015, or approximately
1.2 hours per month. USMS officials agreed that this was not a sufficient amount of
onsite inspection time, and said there was no standard operating procedure or
formal expectation of how much time District CORs should be performing onsite
inspections. For context, we compared elements of the USMS’s continuous
monitoring program to those of the BOP’s monitoring program.
Table 2
Comparison of Federal Detention Agencies’
Continuous Monitoring Efforts

NO. OF PRIVATE
CONTRACT FACILITIES
NO. OF
DETAINEES/INMATES27
MONITORING TEAM
LOCATION
NO. OF MONITORING
TEAM STAFF PER
FACILITY
TYPICAL COMPOSITION
OF MONITORING TEAM

U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE
(USMS)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS (BOP)

15

13

9,296

22,646

Offsite
(USMS District Office)

Onsite

1

3

1 COR28

2 CORs;
1 Contracting Officer

Source: USMS and BOP

As shown in Table 2, the USMS’s continuous monitoring generally consisted
of one COR located offsite for each detention facility. BOP officials told the OIG that
its monitoring teams are located onsite at all 13 private contract facilities and that
26 As of the OIG’s fieldwork in September 2015, the District COR did not have a dedicated
workspace at the LDC. However, in early 2016 the District COR requested and was granted an office.
27

This data was current as of April 2016.

28 The District COR received periodic assistance from a Deputy U.S. Marshal that was also a
COR. USMS also designates a second COR to its private detention contracts, but they are not
responsible for continuous monitoring and are therefore not included in this table.

16

 the teams consisted of three staff, including 2 CORs and an administrative
Contracting Officer that spend the entire workweek performing contract-related
tasks. Prior to 2001 the BOP had been structured similarly to the USMS, when its
private facility administration and day-to-day oversight fell under a regional office.
However, in an effort to ensure consistency in contract administration on a national
basis, the BOP centralized the oversight and monitoring of private facilities under
the Privatization Management Branch. When its centralization initiative was
approved in 2001, BOP housed approximately 13,000 inmates in private contract
facilities.
The District COR was responsible for monitoring CoreCivic’s contractual
compliance through inspections of the LDC in the areas of security and control,
health services, personnel, training, religious services, food services, prisoner
transportation, safety and emergency plans, sanitation and hygiene, prisoner
rights, and other areas. To accomplish this, the COR was required to develop a
project plan to define the scope of the inspection work and develop monitoring
instruments. Neither of these duties was performed. Instead, the District COR
utilized two USMS instruments to conduct annual inspections: (1) the Detention
Facility Review (DFR) and (2) the Field Report.29 The DFR was not designed for
private contract facilities inspections, and the Field Report was not designed for
inspections at all. Specifically, USMS Policy Directive 9.7, effective March 2014,
stated that the DFR was designed to review jail practices at IGA facilities to verify
basic, minimum requirements were met. The Chief of the USMS’s Detention
Standards and Compliance Branch said POD created the DFRs to provide Deputy
U.S. Marshals, who are generally not detention experts, some cursory instructions
when inspecting IGAs. This official said the DFRs were much less comprehensive
and arduous than the annual QAR. In addition, DFRs were not to be used in lieu of
potentially more intense or focused reviews, and according to USMS Policy
Directive 9.7, “are not certifications, accreditations, or compliance approvals of any
sort. The information obtained during DFRs is for internal USMS use only.” USMS
Policy Directive 9.7 did not identify Field Reports as a facility review mechanism as
they were not inspection tools but generic incident reporting forms intended to
document prisoner incidents such as prisoner deaths, sexual assault allegations,
tactical equipment failures, vehicle accidents, and significant activities related to
courtroom and facility incidents.
We analyzed the USMS District of Kansas’s inspection results from FYs 2011
through 2015 to assess the breadth and depth of reviews and to consider the utility
of DFRs and Field Reports as compared to the QARs. The District COR completed
DFRs in 2011 and 2015 and we found they were broad in nature and primarily
contained “yes/no” conclusions with minimal explanation of the work performed.
The depth of review for DFRs was substantially less than that of the QAR. In 2015
the DFR was completed in approximately 4 hours by a Deputy U.S. Marshal while

29 Detention Facility Reviews (DFR) were conducted using Form USM-218, Detention Facility
Monitoring Report. Field Reports were conducted using Form USM-210.

17

 the QAR took nearly 3 days to complete by a team of 6 staff.30 The QAR process
was significantly more detailed than the DFR; for example, the QAR’s review of
facility “Administration and Management” consisted of 162 unique review steps,
while the DFR focused on only 12 steps.31 The QAR contained 134 unique reviews
steps in “Security and Control” while the DFR covered 14. The QAR included
42 review steps to assess CoreCivic compliance within the Special Housing Unit
while the DFR had 1 review step. The DFRs also did not assess CoreCivic
compliance with the contract’s quality control requirements. When asked about
other USMS contract facilities, a senior USMS official explained that other District
CORs also used the DFRs to conduct their inspection work, while some developed
their own inspection program. Overall, there was no standardized process for
districts conducting contract facility inspections.
The District COR completed Field Reports in 2012 through 2014, and we
found that they were even less suited for contract facility inspections than the
DFRs. Field Reports did not contain any review steps or detail on USMS areas of
inspection. Aside from reporting some facility statistics, Field Reports contained at
most a single paragraph vaguely describing the results. In 2014, a Deputy U.S.
Marshal completed the Field Report-driven inspection in 1 hour.
Based on our review of the DFR and Field Report results, we concluded that
the USMS’s continuous monitoring of the LDC was insufficient. That these
inspections comprised the District’s only formalized and documented evidence of
continuous review of the LDC from FY 2011 through mid-2015 was highly
concerning and the primary impetus for the OIG’s issuance of a Management
Advisory Memorandum to the USMS in February 2016. However, we also believe it
was unrealistic for the District COR – who lacked detention experience and proper
training, was located offsite, was responsible for performing numerous other duties,
and relied on a Deputy U.S. Marshal to perform the formalized inspections - to
establish and maintain a comprehensive continuous monitoring program for an
almost $700 million private detention contract without the POD and District of
Kansas providing significant guidance and monitoring tools. In fact, the POD did
not provide any formal guidance and only a negligible amount of training on how to
conduct adequate oversight and monitoring to the District COR and CORs in other
districts overseeing USMS’s 15 contract facilities, nor had it corrected the District
COR’s continued use of improper monitoring tools. In contrast, the BOP’s
Privatization Management Branch, which managed and oversaw the operation of its
contract facilities, disseminated operating procedures to all its onsite monitoring
teams to “provide consistent guidance for staff involved with the oversight of
correctional facilities under contract with the Bureau.”
A senior USMS official explained that while there was currently no standard
to judge the sufficiency of District COR-led inspections, their thoroughness should
30

At the time, the Deputy U.S. Marshal was COR-certified.

31

In some instances, the QAR and DFR contained similar or identical review steps.

18

 fall somewhere between the DFR and the QAR. USMS officials said they do not
have the personnel resources or staff experience to perform reviews similar to the
QAR on a continuous basis and that QAR teams were composed of subject matter
experts with about 20-plus years of collective detention-related experience and
often specialized in areas such as health services, safety and sanitation, or security
and control. We agree that District CORs may not have the QAR team’s knowledge
and expertise, and may require guidance and assistance from subject matter
experts to conduct QAR steps such as in the area of healthcare. However, we
believe that given appropriate training, District CORs can conduct many QAR review
steps and therefore the USMS should ensure its District CORs perform inspections
that approximate the rigors of the QAR to the maximum extent possible.
USMS officials agreed with the need to improve its monitoring processes and
tools to facilitate its oversight responsibilities. In response to the Management
Advisory Memorandum, USMS officials said they would develop standard operating
procedures and contract monitoring instruments similar to those used by the BOP.
USMS officials also said they would establish an onsite detention contract
monitoring program staffed by a full-time professional Contract Administrator (CA)
at each private detention facility. The CA would be responsible for continually
monitoring the conditions of confinement for USMS detainees to ensure compliance
with applicable detention standards. In March 2016, the USMS finalized the
position description for the CA positions, which detailed the major duties and
requirements of the position, including extensive knowledge of detention-related
policies, programs, and procedures. The CA position also requires maintaining a
FAC-COR Level III, the highest certification available. We commend the USMS for
taking immediate action to enhance its continuous monitoring and recommend that
the USMS continue developing and implementing inspection guidance, monitoring
tools, and its new onsite contract monitoring initiative for use at all of its privately
contracted facilities, and ensure that its continuous monitoring efforts incorporate
QAR steps, to the maximum extent practicable.
USMS Did Not Adequately Monitor Internal, External, and QAR Audit Results
The contract states that when CoreCivic is advised of any unsatisfactory
condition, they shall report internal and external audit results to the COR
addressing the corrective action taken and the COR must assess CoreCivic’s
performance and document any non-compliance.32 Internal audit results are
generated via monthly security inspections; informal inspections; quarterly facility
self-monitoring audits; corporate operational audits; and the mock ACA audit,
which assesses the facility’s readiness for the actual ACA accreditation audit.
External audit results are from accreditation reviews conducted by the ACA and
National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC). We found that the
USMS did not request and review these records. We believe the USMS’s tracking of
internal and external audit results could help identify areas of risk and determine if
32 For the purpose of this discussion, internal audits refer to monitoring conducted by
CoreCivic. External audits refer to reviews conducted by outside agencies.

19

 LDC officials succeeded in addressing deficiencies in an effective and timely
manner. USMS’s Chief of Detention Standards and Compliance Branch agreed, and
said tracking such results would help the COR and QAR team better monitor and
conduct follow-up work for identified deficiencies. During the OIG’s 2015 audit of
the Reeves County Detention Center, we identified BOP inspection procedures for
monitoring internal and external audit results that the USMS should consider
implementing.33 BOP’s Privatization Management Branch required its onsite
monitors track the completion and review the results of internal and external audits
to determine if corrective action plans to address deficiencies were completed.
One example of the benefit of monitoring a contractor’s internal and external
audit results occurred in September 2015 when the USMS issued a memorandum to
CoreCivic prohibiting the housing of three persons to a cell (hereafter referred to as
“triple bunking”), when the physical design, square footage and unencumbered
space was constructed for 2-person occupancy. If the USMS had monitored
CoreCivic headquarters’ mock ACA audit from January 2014, it may have identified
and remedied this triple-bunking issue earlier. Specifically, CoreCivic’s 2014 mock
ACA audit cautioned the LDC that “the ACA auditors may voice a recommendation
that the facility utilize [vacant housing pods] to eliminate the triple bunking, given
that this practice impacts approximately one third of the facility’s inmate
population.”34 We recommend that the USMS, as part of its plans to develop
contract monitoring instruments, begin requesting and incorporating internal and
external audit results and POAs into its quality assurance program to ensure each
identified deficiency was adequately resolved.
Next, our audit found weaknesses in the USMS’s continuous monitoring of
QAR-identified deficiencies. At the conclusion of a QAR, the USMS will request
contractors provide POAs to address deficiencies contained in the report. USMS’s
Detention Standards and Compliance Branch will review the contractor’s submitted
POAs and if acceptable will consider the QAR report closed. However, the USMS did
not have any policies or procedures to ensure that the QAR-identified deficiencies
were continuously monitored between closure of the current QAR and the next
year’s QAR to assess whether the previously deficient processes were operating
effectively. To determine if the USMS conducted any such continuous monitoring
during the approximately 1-year interim period between QARs, we judgmentally
selected 10 QAR-identified deficiencies from 2009 through 2014 and requested the
USMS provide evidence that each deficiency was monitored. POD and the District
COR could not provide any documentary evidence of such continuous monitoring
having occurred for any of the 10 QAR-identified deficiencies.

33 U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons Contract No. DJB1PC007 Awarded to Reeves County, Texas, to Operate the Reeves County
Detention Center I/II, Pecos, Texas, Audit Report 15-15 (April 2015)
34 Further detail on the LDC’s triple-bunking and efforts to conceal the facility’s use from the
ACA is described later in this report.

20

 For example, the 2014 QAR found that during a detainee count, LDC security
staff intentionally left some cell doors unsecured to allow detainees to leave their
cells to perform orderly duties throughout the housing unit. A senior USMS official
said this action was a violation of facility procedures and a potential safety and
security issue as it could enable orderlies to distribute contraband. In response to
the QAR finding, CoreCivic created a POA to remedy the matter. POD reviewed and
deemed this POA acceptable, and closed the QAR. However, subsequent to this
closure, the USMS - particularly the District COR - did not document any continuous
monitoring of the matter, such as observing counts, reviewing CoreCivic’s quality
control results in this area, reviewing documents and logs, or viewing surveillance
video. Such follow-up could demonstrate whether or not the POA remained
effective throughout the year. Instead, the USMS did not formally reevaluate this
deficiency until the next year’s QAR was conducted in May 2015, nearly 300 days
later. Senior POD officials agreed that the USMS needs to conduct better oversight
and monitoring of QAR identified deficiencies and to better document those efforts.
We recommend that the USMS create policies and procedures requiring CORs
to conduct continuous oversight and monitoring of QAR-identified deficiencies to
ensure that the completed POAs are operating effectively and that the CORs
document this follow-up work and communicate the results to POD.
Insufficient USMS Continuous Monitoring May Be Widespread
We believe the USMS’s lack of effective continuous monitoring presents risks
that may extend throughout all 15 of its contract detention facilities. Systematic
deficiencies include insufficient detention-related training; the lack of POD-issued
oversight guidance; and the inadequate monitoring of CoreCivic’s internal and
external audit reviews and QAR results. While the adequacy of other Districts’
onsite presence is currently unknown, potential problems likely exist, including
insufficient staff at other locations. For example, in Texas, one COR is responsible
for the oversight of three contract facilities – the Webb County, Rio Grande, and
Willacy detention facilities - which house up to approximately 2,100 USMS
detainees and are operated by three different contractors. The latter two facilities
are located approximately 165 miles apart.35 In California, one COR is responsible
for the continuous oversight of the Western Region Detention Facility and Otay
Mesa Detention Center, which together house up to approximately 1,100 USMS
detainees. In Arizona, one COR oversees the Central Arizona Detention Center and
Florence Correctional Center, which together house up to 5,100 USMS detainees.36
Additionally, in October 2014, a senior district official overseeing a contracted
facility in the southwestern U.S. shared concerns with POD about USMS’s lack of
35 USMS officials said that the COR in Texas receives assistance from Deputy U.S. Marshals in
their collateral role as Jail Inspectors, but as previously described, the DFRs performed by Jail
Inspectors are not rigorous enough for privately contracted facilities.
36 The Florence Correctional Complex, while a separate entity than the Central Arizona
Detention Center (CADC), is part of the CADC contract.

21

 continuous monitoring. This official said his district needed additional oversight
staff and that the current monitoring was severely limited, placing the USMS at
risk. In late 2015, following a medical incident at a contract facility in his district,
this senior official said the incident further demonstrated the need for additional
staff to monitor day-to-day services.
Because of the USMS’s decentralized approach to continuous monitoring, the
adequacy and consistency of inspections performed across the 15 USMS contract
facilities are unknown. The District of Kansas COR told us that she was not aware
of how other district CORs operated and that they did not communicate with one
another or share best practices. POD officials agreed that there was no
standardization for how districts develop and execute their inspection programs and
believed this is partly due to district ownership of the COR positions, instead of the
positions belonging to the POD. They explained that the districts specialize in law
enforcement, not facility management, and are not best positioned to oversee
continuous monitoring and manage the COR positions. POD officials also said the
POD maintains the organizational knowledge and experience to create, formalize,
and implement a continuous monitoring strategy.
In the OIG’s February 2016 Management Advisory Memorandum to the
USMS, we encouraged the USMS to reassess the organizational placement of the
COR positions to determine if the POD is better suited to provide guidance, training,
monitoring, and responsibility for the COR positions in a manner that enhances the
USMS’s continuous monitoring of private detention facilities. In its March 2016
response, USMS officials stated that its goal was to improve its contract monitoring
by establishing an onsite detention contract monitoring program staffed by full-time
professional Contract Administrators under the supervision of POD at all private
detention facilities.37
Insufficient Quality Assurance Documentation
FAR Subpart 4.8, Government Contract Files requires the establishment,
maintenance, and disposition of contract files, including a contract administration
office file containing quality assurance records. The District COR was responsible
for developing and maintaining a document control system and ensuring that
quality assurance-related documentation was included in the official contract file.
However, with the exception of the annual inspections, the District COR did not
document her quality assurance-related activities. Also, instead of maintaining an
official contract file as required by the FAR, the District COR stored contract records
in a manner that did not effectively document contract actions and was not readily
accessible to principal users. As a result, the District COR could provide little
evidence of conducting monitoring and oversight at the LDC. The USMS Chief of
the Detention Standards and Compliance Branch acknowledged that some districts,
including the District of Kansas, had not been sufficiently documenting their work
37 In October 2016, the USMS announced the deployment of a newly hired Contract
Administrator at the LDC.

22

 and the District COR agreed, stating that additional training in this area would be
beneficial.
Subsequent to our audit fieldwork, the District COR began documenting
inspections and using a monthly log to track contract-related communications and
activities. While this represents a process enhancement, we believe further
improvements could be made by developing a more formalized document to record
identified weaknesses; contractor POAs; and COR monitoring efforts, including the
date of work, comments addressing the effectiveness of the contractor’s corrective
actions, and dates for closing the POA.
In its response to the Management Advisory Memorandum, USMS officials
said they would develop standard operating procedures similar to those used by the
BOP. We recommend that the USMS include in its new standard operating
procedures COR requirements for developing and maintaining a document control
system and for retaining quality assurance-related documentation. Standard
operating procedures should also include COR guidance on formally documenting
inspections that include tracking deficiencies and contractor POAs.
USMS Did Not Use Available Mechanisms to Hold Contractors Accountable
According to the Congressional Research Service, the federal government
has several legal mechanisms it can use to hold contractors accountable without
resorting to judicial proceedings.38 Two of these mechanisms are equitable
reductions in price and past performance evaluations. The first mechanism allows
contracting agencies to hold contractors accountable for failure to meet contract
requirements through a reduction of the contract price. Specifically, FAR 52.246-4,
Inspection of Services – Fixed Price, states that if any services do not conform to
contract requirements, the government may require the contractor to perform the
services again in conformity with contract requirements, at no increase in contract
amount. When the defects in services cannot be corrected by re-performance, the
government may reduce the contract price to reflect the reduced value of the
services performed. The LDC contract broadly described the USMS’s right to reduce
CoreCivic’s invoice for failure to perform required services and POD guidance stated
that contract price reductions should be considered for repeat deficiencies and
significant findings.
We found that the USMS had not proposed or issued any contract price
reductions during the life of the LDC contract, and had not issued reductions for any
of its other 14 contracted detention facilities from October 2011 through July 2015.
In contrast, during this timeframe the BOP issued nearly $24 million in contract
price reductions. The last time the USMS issued a contract price reduction to a
private contractor was in March 2006 when it delivered a nearly $119,000 invoice
38 U.S. Congressional Research Service. Selected Legal Mechanisms Whereby the
Government Can Hold Contractors Accountable for Failure to Perform or Other Misconduct (R44202;
Sept. 23, 2015), by Kate M. Manuel and Rodney M. Perry.

23

 reduction to The GEO Group due to a detainee escaping from the Western Regional
Detention Facility in San Diego, California. Table 3 contains a comparison of the
BOP’s and USMS’s invoice reduction information.
Table 3
Comparison of Department Detention Agencies’ Invoice Reductions
FYs 2011 through July 2015

No. of Private Contract
Facilities
No. of
Detainees/Inmates39
Contract Reduction
Amount
Justification for Contract
Reductions

U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE
(USMS)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS
(BOP)

15

13

9,296

22,646

$0

$23.6 million

Not Applicable

Repeat deficiencies, significant
findings, vacancies over
120 days, non-compliance with
staffing thresholds, failure to fill
essential positions, cure notices.

Source: USMS and BOP

A senior USMS official said the LDC had not been issued an invoice reduction
because there had never been an incident at the LDC where withholding money was
justified.40 Judging by the LDC’s annual QARs from FYs 2011 through 2014, this
statement was correct insofar as the QAR team did not identify any repeat
deficiencies or significant findings. However, this does not explain the broader
disparity in price reduction amounts between the USMS and BOP. Both Department
components use the same contractors, offer similar programs and services, and
operate facilities in accordance with standards promulgated by the ACA. Our
review indicates that the USMS’s contract price reduction amount of $0 through
July 2015 may be due to two factors. First, the USMS’s insufficient continuous
monitoring of the LDC and potentially other privately contracted facilities limited its
ability to identify deficiencies that result in contract price reductions. A
comprehensive continuous monitoring program would require a greater scope and
depth of review that would potentially yield more inspection results and findings.
For example, the OIG’s 2015 audit of the Reeves County Detention Center (RCDC)
found that BOP onsite staff generally provided comprehensive monitoring and
oversight. From 2008 through 2013, BOP issued 17 invoice reductions to RCDC, six
of which were identified through BOP’s continuous monitoring efforts.
39

This detainee/inmate data was current as of April 2016.

40 A USMS official provided this explanation in July 2015. In October 2015, the USMS
proposed a contract price reduction to the LDC for approximately $763,000 due to CoreCivic’s
non-compliance with FPBDS in the areas of correctional supervision, detainee accountability, and
control of contraband. In February 2017, the USMS finalized and submitted the $763,000 contract
price reduction to CoreCivic. This was the USMS’s first contract price reduction issued to a private
contractor since March 2006.

24

 Second, the District of Kansas COR had never seen the USMS’s detailed price
reduction guidance and POD officials had no evidence that the guidance was sent to
any of the current district CORs responsible for the other 14 facilities.41 USMS’s
Chief of the Office of Detention Services said that even without the guidance,
district CORs were aware of the Contracting Officer’s ability to issue contract price
reductions for unacceptable contractor performance. While this may be the case,
we found that the price reduction guidance, though outdated, provided helpful
detail on what constituted unacceptable contractor performance subject to an
invoice reduction.
USMS officials also explained that contract price reductions were the option
of last resort and that the superior method to encourage contractor accountability
was through the assessment of contractor performance, which can affect a
contractor’s ability to secure future contracts with the federal government. The
Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) is the
Government-wide electronic contractor evaluation system used to ensure that
current, complete, and accurate contractor performance information is available for
use in procurement source selections. The FAR requires that federal agencies
collect and submit performance information into CPARS at least annually, which are
automatically transmitted to the Past Performance Information Retrieval System,
where USMS and other contracting entities can use that information to make
informed business decisions when awarding federal contracts.
Despite the USMS’s recognition of the importance of evaluating contractor
performance, it was not entering performance assessment reports into CPARS for
the LDC contract or any other detention contracts, as required by the FAR.
Consequently, USMS procurement officials and agencies that also contract for
services from private prison operators such as U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and the BOP would not be able to view past performance information
on USMS contracts during their source selection processes. This matter was
described in the OIG’s February 2016 Management Advisory Memorandum. As of
February 2017, the USMS had incorporated new CPARS-related language into its
request for proposal template and created a draft CPARs template. We recommend
that the USMS continue to input performance assessment reports for its active
contracts into CPARS, and finalize policies and procedures to ensure that contractor
performance data on future detention contracts is entered into CPARS.
Next, the contract required the USMS to conduct Performance Evaluation
Meetings on a regular basis as determined necessary by the Contracting Officer.
Performance Evaluation Meetings are an element of USMS’s contract that aim to
assess and discuss with the contractor any performance-related issues and how
best to resolve them. USMS adopted this process from BOP private prison
contracts. For example, BOP’s Reeves County Detention Center in Pecos, Texas,
held formalized performance meetings each month that included the BOP’s
41 After OFDT merged into the USMS in 2012, USMS continued to use OFDT’s contract price
reduction guidance. However, in 2016 the USMS issued updated price reduction guidance.

25

 Contracting Officer and onsite monitoring team, and contract staff at the prison,
including the Warden. During the meeting they discussed general items, areas of
concern, POAs, partnering matters, inmate grievances, incident reports, and several
other topics. The meetings concluded with the contractor documenting and
submitting the meeting minutes to the BOP for inclusion in the contract file.
USMS never conducted Performance Evaluation Meetings at the LDC. USMS
officials believed such meetings were intended to be informal, though the contract
clearly describes a structured process comprised of detailing the meeting’s
participants, the purpose of the meetings, and a requirement for a record of the
discussion. In light of our previously described findings, we believe it is critical that
USMS conduct and document these meetings as stated in the contract, and
therefore recommend that the USMS begin conducting Performance Evaluation
Meetings, as required by the contract, at the LDC and other detention facilities as
applicable.
Lastly, the District COR did not evaluate and report on CoreCivic’s
performance from October 2010 through October 2015, even though this
responsibility was documented in the District COR’s position description. The
contract also required the LDC’s performance be assessed monthly, stating that the
USMS pay the contractor’s invoice after “services provided for each [monthly]
billing cycle [are] determined based on performance to be acceptable.”
Furthermore, the FAR states that services “shall ordinarily not be accepted before
completion of government quality assurance actions.”42 The District COR thought
this requirement was unnecessary because the QAR already assessed the LDC’s
performance. However, the QAR assessed contractor compliance annually while
USMS accepted contractor services monthly. We believe that the BOP’s invoice
review process represents a best practice. Each month upon receipt of the
contractor invoice, BOP’s Contracting Officer and onsite District COR were required
to verify via a jointly signed memorandum that services were satisfactorily
performed. This determination was based on its continuous monitoring efforts,
including performance evaluation meeting minutes, oversight monitoring checklists,
and other written assessments. We recommend that during USMS’s development
of standard operating procedures and contract monitoring instruments, it ensures
that the District COR complies with contract and USMS District requirements to
evaluate contractor performance prior to the payment of monthly invoices.
CoreCivic Quality Control
The LDC contract and FAR 52.246-4 require CoreCivic to provide and
maintain an inspection system or Quality Control Plan (QCP) to ensure that all
contract requirements are met, to identify and prevent defects in the quality of
services performed, and to maintain records of inspections and any corrective or
preventative actions taken. CoreCivic’s QCP consisted of several inspection
mechanisms performed by the LDC or CoreCivic headquarters, as shown in Table 4.
42

FAR 46.501, Acceptance - General.

26

 Table 4
CoreCivic
QCP Inspection Mechanisms43
INSPECTION
MECHANISM
Informal Inspections

CONDUCTED

DESCRIPTION

BY

CoreCivicLDC

Quarterly
Self-Monitoring Audit 

CoreCivicLDC 

Monthly Security
Inspections

CoreCivicLDC

Annual Operational
Audit 

CoreCivicHQ 

Triennial Mock ACA
Audit 

CoreCivicHQ 

Inspection via informal means (facility walkthroughs,
individual department inspections, and inspections
by local facility staff) that are not conducted on a
predetermined schedule.
Formalized audit conducted quarterly by LDC quality
assurance staff using subsets of CoreCivic’s
comprehensive audit tool.
Monthly inspection of all physical plant security
elements, conducted by the Warden and Chief of
Security.
Formalized annual audit performed by an
experienced team from CoreCivic’s corporate Quality
Assurance Division, using CoreCivic’s comprehensive
audit tool.
CoreCivic Quality Assurance Division’s contracted
auditors assess LDC compliance with ACA standards
prior to the official ACA audit.

Source: CoreCivic

LDC’s Quality Assurance Manager (QAM) administers the facility-level QCP by
conducting periodic informal inspections and quarterly self-monitoring audits, and
helping the Warden and Chief of Security complete monthly security inspections.
The QAM assigns inspection steps to facility staff, documents deficiencies in the
quality assurance tracking system, creates and maintains quality assurance files,
annually reviews LDC policies and procedures, and coordinates with the CoreCivic
Facility Support Center’s (FSC) Quality Assurance (QA) Division.44 The QA Division
is led by a Managing Director who reports to the Company’s Executive Vice
President and General Counsel and is responsible for a team of full-time auditors
and staff with corrections experience. The QA Division conducts the annual
operational audit and coordinates the triennial mock ACA audit that is performed by
consultants. We focused our review of CoreCivic’s QCP on the LDC’s informal
inspections and quarterly self-monitoring audits because they were intended to
provide the most persistent facility oversight.
Inadequate LDC Oversight and Monitoring
Our goal was to determine if the LDC’s periodic informal inspections and
quarterly self-monitoring audits were properly completed, supported by
documentary evidence, accurately input into the appropriate information system or
tracking log, generated appropriate POAs to remedy deficiencies, and monitored the
43

Other inspection mechanisms include external audits conducted by the ACA and NCCHC.

44 The Facility Support Center (FSC) is CoreCivic’s headquarters, located in Nashville,
Tennessee.

27

 POAs to ensure they were implemented and operating effectively. To complete our
analysis, we judgmentally selected 51 records from January 2011 to June 2015,
comprised of 25 quarterly self-monitoring audit findings and 26 informal inspection
findings. We found that the LDC conducted the quarterly self-monitoring audits
within the established timeframes and that the results were properly input into the
contractor’s quality assurance information system and tracking log. However, the
quarterly self-monitoring audits and informal inspections contained several
weaknesses, including insufficient evidence that audit steps were conducted and
POAs that did not sufficiently address deficiencies and did not provide viable
long-term correction of the deficiencies. Also, the LDC often did not request and
retain audit and inspection-related results, and had insufficient evidence that POAs
were implemented, closed, and subsequently monitored to identify recurrences. A
summary of our results is included in Table 5, followed by detail of each weakness.
Table 5
OIG Analysis of LDC Quarterly Self-Monitoring
and Informal Inspection Results45
QTR. SELFMONITORING
AUDIT

TOTAL

(OUT OF 26
INSTANCES)

(OUT OF 51
INSTANCES)

8

13

21 (41%)

5

10

15 (29%)

3. POAs did not provide a
viable long-term correction of
the deficiency

20

22

42 (82%)

4. Did not retain the original
corrective action worksheet

13

17

30 (59%)

5. Insufficient evidence that
POAs were implemented

19

24

43 (84%)

WEAKNESS
1. Insufficient evidence that
review steps were conducted
2. POAs did not sufficiently
address deficiencies

(OUT OF 25
INSTANCES)

INFORMAL
INSPECTIONS

Source: CoreCivic

Insufficient Evidence to Support that Review Steps were Conducted
CoreCivic Policy 1-15, Retention of Records requires the QAM maintain copies
of all audits and documents produced as a part of the audit process. The QAM
conducts and coordinates informal inspections and quarterly self-monitoring audits
using the Corrections Corporation of America Audit Tool (CCAAT), which is an
auditing document containing over 1,600 audit steps across all areas of facility

45 Although the OIG did not review POAs generated as a result of CoreCivic’s annual
operational audits, we believe weaknesses 2 through 5 are applicable because the annual operational
audits are subject to similar POA requirements as the quarterly self-monitoring audits.

28

 operations.46 As shown in Table 5, item no. 1, for 21 of the 51 audit steps
reviewed, the LDC’s QAM did not maintain sufficient evidence that quality assurance
personnel conducted the requirements within the audit step. The auditors’ results
often did not describe the work performed, files and records reviewed, or interviews
conducted. For example, LDC correctional officers are required to conduct irregular
checks of detainees in the special housing unit (SHU). The audit step requires the
auditor interview SHU officers on check procedures, observe the facility video
security system, and review the daily segregation activity report or logbook for
each detainee’s checks. While the auditor concluded that SHU officers were not
conducting the irregular rounds in a timely manner, there was neither
documentation on the frequency of the deficiency, nor was there evidence that SHU
officers were interviewed. There was also no information identifying the dates or
timeframes for observing video or for reviewing activity reports or logbooks.
We also identified many audit steps that auditors rated “satisfactory” without
providing sufficient information to support their conclusions. For example, one
audit step was to assess Central Control’s inventory of keys; this required the
auditor examine the key control log book and daily inventory records, conduct a
key inventory, and interview staff.47 The auditor concluded that Central Control’s
key inventory was satisfactory, but there was no evidence to support his or her
conclusion. The LDC’s QAM agreed that there was often insufficient supporting
documentation to corroborate audit conclusions, and suspected that facility staff
sometimes reported satisfactory ratings without conducting the work. However,
the QAM had neither followed up on this suspicion, nor had the QAM ensured that
staff began providing evidence to support their conclusions. A consequence of this
lack of documentation is that the LDC’s QAM may be receiving inaccurate or
incomplete results and would not have sufficient information to re-perform and
validate the auditor’s work. We recommend that the USMS ensure that LDC’s QAM
request and retain supporting audit documentation to ensure audits are properly
conducted and conclusions are supported.
Insufficient Plans of Action
CoreCivic policy requires that deficiencies identified through both informal
inspections and quarterly self-monitoring audits are corrected in an effective
manner. Upon identifying a deficiency, the QAM coordinates with the affected
department head to formulate a POA containing a description of the noncompliance,
and the strategies and action steps that provide a “viable long-term correction of
the deficiency.” Department heads formulate the POAs using a corrective action
worksheet and normally have 10 business days to prepare and provide them to the
The audit areas cover General Administration, the Prison Rape Elimination Act, Finance,
Human Resources, Learning and Development, Health Services, Security and Control, Safety and
Sanitation, Vehicle Management, Physical Plant, Food Service, Laundry, Classification and Unit
Management, and Inmate Programs and Services.
46

47

located.

Central Control is where the LDC’s master controls for electronic security systems are

29

 QAM, who ensures the corrective action worksheet is adequate and approves the
POA. At this stage, the processes for the informal inspections and quarterly
self-monitoring audits begin to differ. For the informal inspections, the QAM
monitors and updates results within the Log of Informal Findings. For the
self-monitoring audits, the QAM enters the POA into the quality assurance tracking
system which allows the QAM to generate the Plan of Action Form and monitor
corrective action progress. Lastly, the Warden reviews and approves the Plan of
Action Form (Warden’s approval is not required for POAs identified via informal
inspections).
As shown in Table 5, item nos. 2 and 3, the LDC’s POAs did not sufficiently
address the deficiency in 15 instances (29 percent) and did not provide a viable
long-term correction of the deficiency in 42 instances (82 percent). CoreCivic’s
Quality Assurance Managing Director said the formulation of a viable long-term
correction requires identification of the root cause. Although the quality assurance
tracking system provides a field to track “root cause(s)” and CoreCivic considers its
use a best practice, CoreCivic does not require its use. In practice, the “root
cause(s)” field was rarely used. Together, these discrepancies contributed to the
LDC’s insufficient POAs. For example, one LDC quarterly self-monitoring audit
determined that Case Managers were not in every housing unit to address
detainees’ daily needs. The POA stated that “Case Managers will be in their units
daily.” This is not a sufficient POA. It merely states the desired outcome without
identifying the issue’s root cause. In another instance, an LDC informal inspection
identified a deficiency with weekly chemical inventory levels; some inventories
showed zero when product was in stock. The POA stated that the Safety Manager
would speak to the Maintenance Supervisor, who would then speak to his staff
about properly filling out inventory information. Only 10 days later this same
deficiency was again identified and a new POA generated that prescribed strategies
and action steps that were almost identical to the previous POA. This POA was not
sufficient, as it failed to prevent recurrence of the deficiency and did not identify the
root cause of why the inventory records differed from the actual count of product in
stock.
The LDC’s QAM and Warden share responsibility for certifying the adequacy
and completion of the POAs.48 The LDC’s QAM was dissatisfied with the quality of
the POAs submitted from department heads and acknowledged that she sometimes
did not require they remedy the insufficient POAs, and she did not offer instruction
or guidance to department heads on how to develop a sufficient POA, such as
providing copies of the Strategies/Action Steps Worksheet.49 Furthermore, several
senior LDC officials said the LDC’s prior warden had not recognized the importance
of the facility’s quality control process, treating it more as a guideline than a
48 As previously noted, CoreCivic policy requires the Warden approve POAs for the quarterly
self-monitoring audits but not the informal inspections.
49 LDC policy contains a Strategies/Action Steps Worksheet (CoreCivic Appendix 1-22AA)
instructing staff to consider the required resources, expenditures, training, changes to post orders or
procedures, and practical timeframes necessary to correct a deficiency.

30

 requirement and not holding department heads accountable for providing
insufficient POAs. The LDC’s QAM agreed that the LDC needed a more concerted
effort to reinforce the requirements for a properly completed POA and to encourage
department heads to identify and address the root causes of deficiencies.
CoreCivic’s Quality Assurance Managing Director told us that the “root cause(s)”
field was intended as a best practice tool and potential resource rather than as a
requirement.50 However, we believe that requiring identification of the root cause is
a critical step in “formulating a viable long-term correction,” as required by
CoreCivic policy, and could help department heads formulate POAs that identify and
correct the underlying cause to prevent future occurrences, instead of simply
addressing symptoms of the deficiency.
Next, as shown in Table 5, item no. 4, the LDC’s QAM often did not ensure
that department heads provided and retained the corrective action worksheets
necessary to prepare the POAs, as required by CoreCivic policy. In 30 instances
(59 percent) the LDC’s QAM could not provide copies of these corrective action
worksheets. For the quarterly self-monitoring audits, the LDC’s QAM had previously
discarded some corrective action worksheets after they were input into CoreCivic’s
compliance tracking system. For the informal inspections, the LDC’s QAM
sometimes did not require department heads complete the required corrective
action worksheet, but instead entered corrective actions directly into the informal
tracking log. CoreCivic’s Quality Assurance Managing Director told us that the
informal tracking log was not designed as a replacement for the corrective action
worksheet. By not requiring that department heads complete and provide POAs
using the required corrective action worksheet, the LDC’s QAM may not be
adequately reviewing POAs prior to department heads implementing their corrective
action.
To remedy the aforementioned issues, we recommend that the USMS ensure
that the LDC enforces existing CoreCivic policies and procedures for generating and
approving comprehensive POAs, including: (a) drafting POAs that sufficiently
address the deficiencies and requiring that department heads identify the
deficiencies’ root causes; (b) ensuring the LDC’s QAM and Warden provide
instruction and guidance to department heads on the contents of a sufficient POA,
and only approve fully compliant POAs; and (c) ensuring that department heads
complete and the LDC’s QAM retain the corrective action worksheets.51
Plans of Action were Inadequately Implemented
As shown in Table 5, item no. 5, the LDC’s QAM could not provide
documentary evidence that POAs were implemented by LDC staff in 43 instances
(84 percent). According to CoreCivic policy, after the QAM and Warden review and
50 In March 2017, CoreCivic provided documentation indicating that the QAM has started to
incorporate improvements to POAs.
51

audits.

This recommendation applies to both the informal inspections and quarterly self-monitoring

31

 approve the content of the POAs, the QAM is responsible for monitoring
implementation by confirming and documenting that the POA’s strategies and
action steps were completed. The LDC’s QAM told us that she would sometimes
follow up on an informal basis, such as by email or phone, but failed to retain
evidence to document those efforts. Without sufficient evidence supporting the
LDC’s QAMs efforts to confirm and document that action steps were implemented,
there is no assurance that the LDC’s QAM monitored the implementation of
corrective actions to resolve the deficiency. To remedy the aforementioned issue,
we recommend that the USMS ensure that the LDC enforces existing CoreCivic
policies and procedures by confirming and documenting that POA strategies and
action steps were implemented.
LDC’s QAM Needs Additional Quality Assurance Guidance
CoreCivic policy in the area of quality assurance primarily focuses on
processes after the identification of findings, such as the generation, tracking,
correction, and closure of POAs.52 While the CCAAT provides the QAM with detailed
criteria and audit steps, we found that the LDC’s QAM received minimal instruction
and guidance on how to conduct the facility reviews to identify deficiencies and how
to continuously monitor closed POAs. CoreCivic policy does not address the
frequency and breadth of reviews (e.g., developing an audit schedule); the
establishment of a sample size when one is not already specified in the CCAAT; the
maintenance of requisite qualifications, technical expertise, and accountability by
personnel supporting the QAM’s efforts; the appropriate documentary evidence
necessary to validate the auditors’ conclusions and enable re-performance if
necessary; methods for proper retention of documentary evidence; the approval
and monitoring of the LDC’s inspection and audit methodologies by the FSC; and
the establishment of contingency plans for conducting quality assurance-related
work should the QAM be unavailable.
CoreCivic policy also does not provide guidance for QAMs to conduct
continuous monitoring of a deficiency after the QAM determines that a POA’s
strategies and action steps are completed. During our analysis of quarterly selfmonitoring and informal inspections we requested the LDC’s QAM provide
documentation to support monitoring efforts after closure of a POA. The LDC’s QAM
could not provide documented evidence for any of the 48 deficiencies we
reviewed.53 Therefore, the LDC’s QAM was not proactively assessing the
effectiveness of POAs until the occurrence of the next audit or inspection, which
sometimes was several months later. We believe that CoreCivic can address this
issue by providing QAMs additional guidance to monitor deficiencies after
implementation and closure of a POA. As CoreCivic’s Managing Director suggested,
continuous monitoring efforts can be driven by a risk-based assessment; for
example, POAs for deficiencies that impact facility security and control or detainee
52

CoreCivic Policy 1-22, Plan of Action.

53 Three of the 51 instances (2 informal inspections, and 1 quarterly audit) were not
applicable since completion consisted of purchasing or repairing an item.

32

 and staff safety should receive additional monitoring to ensure that those actions
are effective. Also, intermittent monitoring of previously non-compliant areas
would be more effective than repeatedly reviewing areas already deemed
compliant.
The LDC’s QAM told us the CCAAT and training had provided some helpful
instruction on how audits should be conducted, but not the comprehensive
guidance (i.e., a procedure manual) necessary to perform day-to-day operational
duties. Instead, the LDC’s QAM primarily relied on the contents of her position
description to describe her roles and responsibilities. We reviewed the position
description and found that it was generic and contained little useful information on
how to perform her QAM operational duties. This resulted in an unclear,
inconsistent, and questionable approach to performing informal inspections.
Specifically, the LDC’s QAM informed us that when conducting informal inspections,
she would sometimes request staff complete the entire CCAAT (i.e., over 1,600
detailed audit steps) in a single month. In our judgment, this was not an efficient
and effective use of the CCAAT or personnel resources, and the LDC’s QAM agreed
it was causing employee burnout. CoreCivic’s Managing Director for Quality
Assurance said the informal inspections should not attempt to complete the entire
CCAAT in a month, but should follow a risk-based approach.
In addition, the LDC’s QAM believed she could not conduct many of the
healthcare-related quality assurance steps due to Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) requirements.54 However, CoreCivic officials said there
are no HIPAA requirements that prevent the LDC’s QAM from accessing information
to conduct audits or to follow up on findings as a result of those audits. We believe
additional guidance provided to the QAM through use of an Audit Procedure Manual
or other mechanism could better clarify the QAM’s job responsibilities and help
ensure that facility audits and inspections are performed in an effective and efficient
manner. Therefore, we recommend that the USMS ensure CoreCivic creates an
Audit Procedure Manual or some other mechanism or process to provide the LDC’s
QAM with comprehensive guidance on how to properly conduct facility audits and
continuously monitor closed POAs. Such guidance should, at a minimum, address
the areas listed on page 32 and receive USMS approval.
USMS Detainee Mortality Reporting Processes
In the event of a detainee death, the LDC contract requires CoreCivic
immediately notify the COR and submit a written report to the U.S. Marshal within
24 hours. USMS Policy Directive 9.32, Death of Federal Prisoners contains
requirements for the USMS district responsible for the detention facility to perform
in the event of a detainee death, including notifying POD’s Chief of Detention
Operations and ascertaining whether the detainee death was from natural causes or
54 HIPAA was enacted on August 21, 1996. The HIPAA Privacy Rule aims to define and limit
the circumstances in which an individual’s protected health information may be used or disclosed by
covered entities.

33

 the result of negligence or foul play. Additionally, within one week of the detainee’s
death the district is required to provide a report to POD’s Chief of Detention
Operations that includes the circumstances surrounding the detainee’s death and
relevant medical information, such as treatments provided, dates of visits to the
detention facility’s health services unit or hospital, and the cause of death. Lastly,
the U.S. Marshal must provide to the POD a coroner’s report or medical examiner’s
findings; an autopsy report, if conducted; and a death certificate.
Additionally, the National Commission on Correctional Health Care requires
that all detainee deaths be reviewed to determine the appropriateness of clinical
care; to ascertain whether changes to policies, procedures, or practices are
warranted; and to identify issues that require further study.55 All deaths are to be
reviewed within 30 days; and a death review is to include an administrative review,
clinical mortality review, and a psychological autopsy in the event of a suicide.
We determined that the USMS and LDC complied with these requirements for
the seven detainee deaths occurring during the period of our review. However, we
identified a potential BOP best practice that we suggest the USMS consider
implementing. Specifically, the BOP is required to conduct reviews of all inmate
deaths at its contract facilities to determine if medical management of the inmates’
condition was in accordance with BOP policies and standards of care. According to
BOP officials, the BOP uses an independent contract physician to review the
contractor mortality reports and provide written recommendations to the
contractor. BOP officials said the purpose of this independent review is to identify
weaknesses in care provided to inmates at its contract facilities, determine the root
cause of any unexpected or sudden death, obtain lessons learned to avoid repeat
mistakes, and bolster its internal controls.
In contrast, the USMS does not conduct a review of the contractor-provided
mortality reports to independently assess their accuracy and completeness.
USMS’s Office of General Counsel said USMS policy does not require such a process.
POD’s Chief of the Detention Standards and Compliance Branch said that while
USMS’s annual QAR evaluates clinical and chronic care areas, it does not ensure
that detainees who died received proper medical treatment prior to their deaths.
This official was receptive to the BOP’s process and explained that if adopted, the
QAR team possesses the technical knowledge and experience necessary to conduct
independent reviews of detainee deaths and assess whether contract medical staff
followed all medical protocols. We believe that conducting such a review would
help USMS ensure that the contractor’s medical management of detainee conditions
prior to death was in accordance with USMS policies and standards of care.
Accordingly, we recommend that the USMS consider implementing policies and
procedures similar to those of the BOP that independently evaluate
contractor-provided detainee mortality reports.

55

NCCHC standard J-A-10, Procedure in the Event of an Inmate Death.

34

 Observation of LDC Video Security Surveillance
We reviewed the LDC’s video security footage to determine whether the
facility complied with its policies related to facility security, detainee recreation, and
irregular checks of detainee cells within the SHU.56 Our review found that
correctional officers in the SHU complied with LDC policy that requires detainees
pass through metal detectors on the way to the recreation yards, and conducted
irregular checks of SHU detainee cells twice per hour. However, we observed three
instances where correctional officers in the SHU did not follow LDC policy requiring
detainees walk out of their cells backwards.57 Not requiring detainees to walk
backwards places the correctional officer at increased risk of a detainee assault. In
addition, we found that LDC recreation correctional officers were not completing
thorough searches of all recreation areas, including all fences, gates, fasteners,
walls, windows, bars, storm drains/manholes, locking devices and doors prior to
and upon completion of each recreation period as required by CoreCivic policy and
post order for outdoor recreation. Specifically, we found that in 10 of the 12
recreation periods the LDC correctional officers had not conducted thorough
searches of all recreation areas, thereby increasing the risk that LDC officers would
not detect instances of compromised yard security, including the potential
introduction or attempted transfer of contraband items.
In early 2016, CoreCivic updated LDC policies and procedures to address
these matters and improve the facility’s quality assurance processes. First,
CoreCivic updated the LDC’s post orders to require Shift Supervisors and Assistant
Shift Supervisors to observe recreation yard searches and detainee movement in
the SHU on a daily basis and to perform a weekly review of the LDC’s video security
footage. Secondly, CoreCivic updated LDC policy to formally grant the LDC’s QAM
access to the facility’s security system, enabling the LDC’s QAM to observe
recreation yard searches and detainee movement in the SHU. USMS approved
these changes, which became effective in April 2016. We reviewed the changes to
LDC policy and post orders and believe the POA should provide LDC officials the
necessary oversight to ensure that the identified weaknesses are resolved.
However, given the LDC’s difficulties implementing POAs, we recommend that the
USMS monitor LDC compliance with the new CoreCivic policies and post orders
related to recreation yard searches and detainee movement in the SHU, to ensure
they are operating effectively.

56 Our review of the LDC encompassed judgmentally selected periods between August 3
through September 6, 2015, for the SHU and August 3 through August 13, 2015, for the recreation
yard.

CoreCivic-LDC Post Order 23 states that once the SHU cell door is opened, detainees are to
be backed out of their cells. At no point are the detainees to exit the cell facing forward. The three
instances were identified during a 75 minute review period on August 19, 2015. In total we reviewed
approximately 22 hours of SHU video.
57

35

 Staffing Requirements and Triple Bunking
According to the Department’s National Institute of Corrections (NIC), staff is
the most indispensable, important, and expensive resource in corrections.58
Consistent with that statement, staffing dominates corrections operating budgets at
both government and privately operated facilities. The LDC contract requires that
CoreCivic maintain a USMS-approved staffing plan (USMS plan) throughout the
term of the agreement. The purpose of the USMS plan is to identify all personnel
necessary for CoreCivic’s performance of the contract and to provide the number,
type, and distribution of staff throughout the facility.59 USMS, however, was not
the only government entity using the facility. In July 2009, CoreCivic contracted
with Wyandotte County, Kansas to confine and supervise up to 220 detainees. As a
result, in addition to the USMS plan, CoreCivic maintained a facility-wide staffing
plan (Facility plan). The Facility plan assesses the LDC’s overall staffing needs and
includes both the USMS’s and Wyandotte’s detainees. Unless otherwise stated, the
following OIG staffing analysis was based on the Facility plan, which had a higher
staffing level than the USMS plan. This was done because the USMS and
Wyandotte shared personnel resources extensively; specifically, 165 of the Facility
Plan’s 234 FTEs (71 percent) were shared between USMS and Wyandotte.
Furthermore, CoreCivic sometimes updated the Facility plan to include USMSexclusive positions that were not always contained within the USMS plan.
We determined that the LDC’s overall staffing levels from October 2012
through September 2014 were generally consistent with the Facility plan
thresholds, with the monthly facility-wide vacancy rate averaging 5 percent.
However, from October 2014 through September 2015, LDC staffing levels
deteriorated and the average monthly facility-wide vacancy rate more than doubled
to 11 percent. LDC’s increased vacancy rates were primarily driven by turnover in
correctional officer positions. Correctional officers are integral to the safe and
secure operation of detention facilities. They supervise the activities of detainees,
enforce rules and maintain order, inspect facilities, monitor detainee movement,
and constantly interact with detainees. While the LDC averaged only a 4 percent
monthly vacancy rate for correctional officers from October 2012 to
September 2014, that rate more than tripled from October 2014 through
September 2015, reaching as high as 23 percent in March 2015, as shown in
Figure 3.

The National Institute of Corrections is a component of the BOP that provides training,
technical assistance, information services, and policy/program development assistance to federal,
state, and local corrections agencies.
58

59 The USMS plan provides the number of positions needed per shift and the number of total
staff, measured in full-time equivalents (FTE), necessary to cover posts on a continuous basis. The
USMS plan is organized into the following seven sections: (1) management/support,
(2) security/operations, (3) unit management, (4) maintenance, (5) programs, (6) services, and
(7) health services. If CoreCivic pursues any change to the USMS plan, it must request USMS’s
approval prior to implementation.

36

 Figure 3
LDC Monthly Vacancy Rates
October 2012 through September 2015
25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%
Oct 2012 Feb 2013 Jun 2013 Oct 2013 Feb 2014 Jun 2014 Oct 2014 Feb 2015 Jun 2015
All Staff

Correctional Officers

Source: CoreCivic

The consensus among LDC staff was that high correctional officer turnover
began because of regional job opportunities that offered higher pay and benefits.
Our review of LDC exit interviews from January through December 2015 confirmed
this, finding that 6 of the 12 respondents sought alternative employment for
reasons including compensation and benefits.60 Furthermore, when the exit
interviews asked for common areas of improvement and what they liked least about
working at the LDC, 8 of 12 respondents mentioned understaffing. According to
NIC, vacancies can dramatically affect the availability of staff to cover posts, and
regaining coverage of posts can be delayed by the processes of recruitment,
training, and orientation. When problematic turnover becomes a regular
occurrence, morale suffers, word spreads, vacancies occur, and recruitment
becomes difficult.
In the following sections, we assess CoreCivic compliance with staffing
requirements stipulated by the contract and facility policies and procedures, as well
as the USMS’s efforts to monitor the LDC’s staffing. We analyzed the LDC’s staffing
levels and vacancy rates, evaluated the LDC’s staffing policies and procedures,
selected a sample of shift rosters to determine if the LDC was filling its security
posts, reviewed the USMS’s contract staffing provisions and compared them to the
BOP’s, and interviewed LDC staff to gain an understanding of the facility’s staffing
levels and conditions. We found that correctional officer turnover led to several
60

Because exit interviews were optional, participation was limited.

37

 problems in 2015, including the LDC’s long-term use of mandatory overtime, the
closure of a large number of security posts considered mandatory by CoreCivic, and
the diversion of unit management staff from their normal job duties to filling
security posts. We also found that CoreCivic was slow to react to the understaffing
and did not utilize all available staffing options to remedy the problem. Finally, we
found that LDC officials concealed the facility’s use of triple bunking from the ACA in
what appears to be an effort to receive a higher accreditation score.
CoreCivic’s 2015 Annual Report noted that staffing salaries and benefits
comprised approximately 59 percent of its operating expenses. As a for-profit
corporation, CoreCivic and other private prison operators have a financial incentive
to control staffing costs, which creates a critical need for the USMS to provide
adequate oversight of the facility’s staffing levels and composition. We identified
two significant deficiencies concerning USMS oversight of facility staffing. First, the
USMS did not conduct sufficient monitoring to ensure that the LDC maintained
appropriate staffing levels. Secondly, the USMS failed to hold CoreCivic
accountable for its significant understaffing throughout 2015. In fact, the USMS
contributed to staffing deficiencies by authorizing CoreCivic to transfer a small
contingent of its contracted LDC staff to open a U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement facility in Texas during a time of significant understaffing at the LDC.
Additionally, the USMS allowed CoreCivic to enter into a separate contract with
Wyandotte County, Kansas to house non-federal detainees at LDC at a discounted
rate without first considering the impact on USMS’s contracted staffing resources
and the LDC contract price. As a result, staffing resources originally dedicated to
the USMS detainees became shared with Wyandotte County, and Wyandotte County
housed its inmates at a significantly lesser contract per diem rate than the USMS.
Ultimately, USMS received little or no discernible benefit - financial or otherwise –
from this arrangement.
LDC Understaffing Led to Security Post Closures
According to CoreCivic’s technical proposal, the USMS plan ensures that a
sufficient number of officers will be posted within all housing units for prompt
response to emergencies or inquiries from all detainees and to ensure
accountability. LDC must generate and maintain daily correctional staff assignment
rosters (shift rosters) that reflect the facility’s coverage needs and list the
scheduled and actual assignments by shift and post. Shift rosters are essential to
the security of an institution and the posts listed in the shift roster should mirror
the facility’s staffing plan. For example, if the staffing plan requires three
correctional officers per day to address detainee recreation, the daily shift roster
should contain three recreation posts. LDC’s shift rosters assign various personnel
across multiple 12-hour and 8-hour shifts per day. On weekdays, the LDC typically
has 64 posts on the first shift (AM shift) and 29 posts on the second shift (PM shift).
Weekends require fewer posts because certain functions, such as transportation,
are only performed on weekdays.
We selected a sample of shift rosters to determine if the LDC had filled its
security posts. If not, we counted the number of and length of post closures,
38

 counted the posts most often closed, and described any other discrepancies. For
our limited review, we chose shift rosters during two periods which we refer to as
the Winter and Summer Timeframes. The Winter Timeframe was from February 1
through March 31, 2015, and consisted of 59 days and 118 shifts. The Summer
Timeframe was from July 1 through August 15, 2015, and consisted of 46 days and
92 shifts.
We found that during the Winter Timeframe, the LDC closed at least one
security post in all 118 shifts (100 percent) and closed approximately 7 posts per
shift, which accounted for nearly 65 hours of correctional officer work that went
unperformed per shift. During the Summer Timeframe, the LDC closed at least one
security post in 85 of 92 shifts (92 percent) and closed approximately 7 posts per
shift, which accounted for nearly 55 hours of correctional officer work that went
unperformed per shift. Many of the post closures occurred at “mandatory” posts.
According to CoreCivic, facility managers typically identify “mandatory” posts within
their institution as those that must be filled on each shift in order to run the facility
in a safe and secure manner. Mandatory posts are identified within LDC shift
rosters and it is the responsibility of LDC’s Shift Supervisors and Assistant Shift
Supervisors to ensure that all mandatory posts are staffed. LDC’s most frequently
closed mandatory posts included Central Control, Pod Control 5, Housing Unit Y,
Outdoor Recreation, and Utility/Search and Escort, each of which is described
below.61


Central Control – Central Control is where the LDC’s master controls for
electronic security systems are located. Central Control officers are tasked
with controlling access in and out of the facility; tracking internal movement
within the facility; monitoring the general safety and welfare of individuals
and areas of the facility via video camera; responding to emergencies;
handling the issuance, receipt, and inventory of key rings and equipment;
and performing several other duties. According to the LDC contract, Central
Control has a critical impact on the institution's orderly and secure operation.
The facility-wide staffing plan requires four posts, two on both shifts, which
are generally denoted as “mandatory” posts on the LDC shift rosters.
The closures were most prevalent during the Winter Timeframe when the
LDC closed at least one of four posts on 52 days (88 percent) for a total of
619 hours, or a 22 percent vacancy rate. During the Summer Timeframe,
the LDC closed at least one of the four posts on 19 days (41 percent) for a
total of 215 hours, or a 10 percent vacancy rate. Furthermore, the LDC
closed at least one Central Control post for an entire 12-hour shift on 42 of
58 days during the Winter Timeframe and 9 of 46 days during the Summer
Timeframe.
One Central Control officer we interviewed said it was necessary to have two

61 The USMS contract and staffing plan do not differentiate between mandatory and
non-mandatory posts. USMS does not play any role in identifying mandatory posts.

39

 correctional officers in Central Control at all times due to the large number of
responsibilities. By closing one of the Central Control posts, the remaining
Central Control officer’s responsibilities double. Furthermore, if Pod Control
posts are closed throughout the facility, those post’s duties are typically
transferred to Central Control, further increasing Central Control’s workload.
As described below, this did occur with the closure of certain Pod Control
posts.


Pod Control 5 – Pod Control maintains the internal security of the detainee
housing units by continually monitoring the housing area and housing
officers.62 LDC has seven pod control posts throughout the facility, each
located adjacent to two or more housing units.63 Pod Control officers observe
detainees, visitors, and staff on the premises to guard against escape, injury,
theft, and damage to property.
During the Winter Timeframe, the LDC filled the seven Pod Control posts
93 percent of the time, as measured in hours, and during the Summer
Timeframe filled those posts 96 percent of the time. When closures did
occur, it was most often in Pod Control 5, which was vacant 23 percent of the
time during the Winter Timeframe and 10 percent of the time during the
Summer Timeframe. On August 9, 2015 - one of the most understaffed days
we reviewed - the LDC closed five of seven Pod Control posts in both the
A.M. and P.M. shifts, which accounted for 72 hours of closure out of the
168 hours (43 percent) required for correctional officers to cover all seven
Pod Control posts that day. Pod Control posts were denoted as “mandatory”
on LDC shift rosters.
LDC’s former Warden said the LDC closed Pod Control 5 because it monitored
detainees with a lower security level than the other Pod Control posts. When
Pod Control posts close, monitoring responsibilities are typically transferred
to Central Control, which as described above, was also frequently
understaffed. Two LDC staff we interviewed said the closure of Pod Control
posts was unnerving to Housing Unit officers. Specifically, staff expressed
concerns that, were an incident to occur on the floor, Central Control officers
may take longer to react than a Pod Control officer because they had
assumed Pod Control duties in addition to their existing responsibilities, and
also do not have the continuous direct line of sight into the housing units that
Pod Control officers have.



Housing Unit Y – LDC detainees are housed in multiple-occupancy cells
within the facility’s 22 housing units, or “pods.” Housing Unit officers
monitor activities within the pods, report any suspicious behavior, perform
random cell searches and security checks, conduct counts, and perform other
62

Pod Control units are also referred to as Housing Control or a “Bubble.”

63 Of the LDC’s seven Pod Control posts, six are exclusive to USMS detainees and one is
exclusive to Wyandotte County detainees.

40

 duties. There are 23 daily Housing Unit officer posts located throughout the
facility, and most were continuously manned. The exception was Housing
Unit Y, which consisted of five Housing Unit officer posts in segregation and
general housing pods.
During the Winter Timeframe, the LDC closed at least 1 of 5 Housing Unit Y
posts on 46 days (78 percent) for a total of 476 hours, or a 13 percent
vacancy rate. During the Summer Timeframe, the LDC closed at least one
post on 43 days (94 percent) for a total of 819 hours, or a 30 percent
vacancy rate. All Housing Unit posts were denoted as “mandatory” on LDC
shift rosters.
A senior LDC official said LDC closed posts in Housing Unit Y because of
declining detainee populations throughout 2015. These declines resulted in
the LDC not needing space in Housing Unit Y’s general housing pod.
However, as described later in the report, the LDC was also able to close
these posts in part because CoreCivic officials were triple-bunking detainees
elsewhere throughout the facility.


Outdoor Recreation – CoreCivic policy and ACA standards require
detainees receive access to exercise opportunities, including at least 1 hour
daily of physical exercise outdoors when weather permits.64 The facility-wide
staffing plan and shift roster require three security posts during the A.M. shift
to administer detainee recreation.
During the Winter Timeframe, the LDC closed at least 1 of the 3 recreation
posts on 55 days (93 percent), and the posts were vacant for a total of
1,401 hours, or a 66 percent vacancy rate. During the Summer Timeframe,
the LDC closed at least 1 of the 3 recreation posts on 41 days (89 percent),
and posts were vacant for a total of 706 hours, or a 43 percent vacancy rate.
Recreation posts were denoted as “mandatory” on LDC shift rosters.
Nearly half of the post closures during the Winter Timeframe occurred due to
inclement weather and facility shakedowns, which are physical or visual
searches of a specific area of the facility.65 LDC’s former Warden said that
during the most significant understaffing in 2015, LDC staff felt relief when
inclement weather arose, as they could justify closing all three recreation
posts for the entire day, even if the bad weather soon subsided, and did not
have to vacate other facility posts to run the recreation yard. During the
Summer Timeframe, LDC began to start recreation 3 hours later than usual
because, as a senior LDC official explained, they had insufficient staff early in

64 CoreCivic Policy 20-100, Inmate/Resident Services and Programs; and ACA Standard 4ALDF-5C-01.
65 CoreCivic policy states that all outdoor recreation areas will be closed whenever the outside
temperature falls below zero degrees Fahrenheit or if there is lightning, snow, ice, freezing rain, or
other conditions that create an increased risk of injury to staff or detainees.

41

 the morning and had to wait for more personnel to come onboard. Our
review of shift rosters found that of 29 instances where recreation started
late (excluding instances where recreation was closed entirely), in only 5
instances were recreation schedules extended to compensate for the delay.
As a result, detainees began receiving less recreation time. Eight of the nine
detainees we interviewed said they received less than one hour of outdoor
recreation per day, and that it often lasted only 30 minutes. During our
review of LDC security video surveillance, we noted that detainees only
received an average of 37 minutes of recreation on August 13, 2015.
Conversely, one correctional officer expressed frustration with detainees
being granted outdoor recreation during a period of chronic understaffing,
and wondered why a Housing Unit officer should risk his or her safety to
accommodate detainee recreation. For example, a Housing Unit officer might
lose his or her respective Pod Control Officer, who could be forced to vacate
the Pod Control post to fill a recreation post.


Utility/Search and Escort – Utility/Search and Escort posts temporarily
assume or assist in the general supervision of security posts within the
facility. They may provide relief to correctional officers, provide backup
support during any detainee disturbance, respond to any detainees in
distress or being harmed, escort detainees throughout the facility, and
provide additional assistance throughout the facility.
During the Winter Timeframe, the Facility plan required four Utility/Search
and Escort posts per day and during the Summer Timeframe, the Facility
plan required five Utility/Search and Escort posts per day. For both
timeframes, these posts provide coverage 24 hours per day, 7 days per
week. In the Winter Timeframe, LDC closed at least one of the
4 Utility/Search and Escort posts on all 59 days (100 percent) for a total of
1,704 hours, or 60 percent of the time. In the Summer Timeframe, the LDC
closed at least one of the five Utility/Search and Escort posts on
41 days (89 percent) for a total of 1,203 hours, or 44 percent of the time.
Utility/Search and Escort posts were generally denoted as “mandatory” on
LDC shift rosters.
CoreCivic officials explained that these Utility/Search and Escort posts are
buffers to address the very understaffing that occurred at the LDC. During a
time of need, they would expect this post to close first, as the Shift
Supervisor would need to transfer correctional officers to a different post.

LDC’s persistent closure of security posts meant that CoreCivic could not
provide all of the personnel deemed necessary for the performance of the LDC
contract. Furthermore, because many of these posts were considered “mandatory,”
or required continuous staffing, the LDC’s failure to consistently fill these posts
compromised its ability to run the facility in a safe and secure manner. In the
following sections we describe how LDC did not promptly address the facility’s
understaffing problems which led to the post closures, and how the USMS did not
adequately monitor and hold CoreCivic accountable for the understaffing.
42

 LDC Did Not Promptly Address Facility Understaffing
CoreCivic facilities can address chronic understaffing through several means
including use of overtime, use of temporary personnel from other CoreCivic facilities
or a security service company, and adjustment to its recruiting and hiring practices.
FSC officials explained that the first management strategy for addressing
understaffing is the use of voluntary and mandatory overtime, and that facilities
must balance their overtime use to ensure it is not leading to staff burnout,
underperformance, and low morale. According to these officials, if a Warden and
his or her management team begin to encounter such indicators, they can submit a
request to FSC for temporary personnel from other CoreCivic facilities. FSC officials
also said CoreCivic has begun hiring temporary correctional officers from a security
service company. This could be a future option for the USMS to consider when
addressing understaffing, though CoreCivic officials said this choice was limited by a
scarcity of hirable staff with correctional officer experience.
Another strategy to address understaffing is to adjust recruitment and hiring
practices, such as providing increased pay and benefits. FSC officials said this was
not necessary because the LDC historically had few problems hiring staff, had
maintained low turnover, and offered among the highest correctional officer wages
of CoreCivic’s institutions. They said that the LDC’s understaffing in 2015 was an
isolated incident. LDC could also bolster its hiring and recruitment by requesting
CoreCivic authorization to hire more correctional officers than its staffing plan
allowed. Specifically, the LDC requested and obtained an additional
two correctional officer FTEs in June 2015 and four more correctional officer FTEs in
September 2015. FSC officials said this was intended as a temporary option to
allow the LDC to hire a larger class of correctional officers than would be necessary
under stable staffing conditions, in order to compensate for any further correctional
officer turnover occurring between the hiring and deployment of staff. However,
this action was taken after several months of LDC understaffing and had a less
immediate impact than obtaining temporary personnel from other CoreCivic
facilities that could be deployed quickly. As the former Warden noted, the
recruitment, training, and deployment of correctional officers is a lengthy process.
Despite the LDC’s efforts, understaffing and post closures continued.
In our judgment, LDC was too slow and reactive in addressing facility
understaffing, which began in late 2014 and continued for most of 2015. We
determined that the LDC did not utilize the staffing options available to help
mitigate the understaffing, such as requesting temporary personnel from other
CoreCivic facilities. While the LDC had temporarily transferred its staff to other
CoreCivic facilities in Texas and Louisiana (as described later in this report), it had
not requested such assistance to address its own understaffing in 2015. FSC
officials believed that the LDC’s former Warden did not request such help because
the former Warden “believed he and his management team were managing post
coverage appropriately with the staffing resources at [their] disposal, including
utilization of voluntary and mandatory overtime….” An FSC official said that had
the LDC requested temporary staff, FSC would have considered it. LDC’s former
Warden strongly disagreed, saying that while he could ask FSC for temporary staff,
43

 it was unrealistic that he would receive it. However, the LDC’s former Warden
could not provide any evidence to validate this assertion such as documentation
showing he had requested temporary staff or that FSC officials rejected or were
dismissive of such requests.
Furthermore, the LDC’s former Warden said that a request for temporary
staff should not have been necessary because FSC knew of the LDC’s understaffing.
Our interviews of FSC staff and review of CoreCivic documents and reports
confirmed this. These interviews and documentation indicated that FSC officials
reviewed facility statistics on overtime and turnover, inquired about the existence
of understaffing at the LDC and its causes, and were made aware of the LDC’s
understaffing. However, FSC officials said they had not reviewed the LDC’s
completed shift rosters, which would have shown that the LDC was consistently
vacating its security posts, and we did not encounter any evidence indicating
otherwise. Regardless, nothing precluded FSC from requesting and viewing the
LDC’s completed shift rosters.
LDC’s former Warden and his management team were ultimately responsible
for ensuring that their facility was adequately staffed, as they had the greatest
visibility of the extent of the understaffing and its repercussions. We believe the
LDC should have requested FSC assistance when its correctional officer staffing
levels deteriorated and led to continuous post closures. However, we believe that
FSC also bears responsibility for independently monitoring the LDC’s staffing
situation, and that this is best accomplished through the review of completed shift
rosters. A properly completed shift roster provides important detail on how the LDC
is managing and allocating its personnel to fill its posts. Therefore, we recommend
that the USMS ensure that CoreCivic establishes policies and procedures that
prevent the closure of mandatory posts at CoreCivic’s USMS contracted facilities
and require FSC to assess completed shift rosters to determine if facilities are
adequately filling their security-related posts.
USMS Did Not Adequately Monitor and Hold CoreCivic Accountable for Understaffing
USMS’s District COR and QAR team were responsible for monitoring CoreCivic
compliance with the contract’s staffing requirements. The District COR was
required to collect vacancy and staffing complement reports on a quarterly basis
and to ensure that the LDC generated POAs to address personnel vacancies.66 The
District COR had collected quarterly vacancy reports, which broadly depicted the
LDC’s increasing correctional officer vacancies during 2015. Vacancy reports alone,
however, were not sufficient to fully assess the LDC’s staffing and post coverage.
Other than touring the facility, the District COR’s best means to determine if the
LDC had adequate personnel to fill its security posts was through reviews of shift
rosters. However, the District COR could neither provide any evidence that she
66 QAR team responsibilities included ensuring that the LDC conducted an annual
comprehensive staffing analysis. We did not identify any discrepancies in the QAR team’s annual
staffing analysis.

44

 reviewed shift rosters, nor did she maintain a log of when such reviews were
conducted.67
The first documented evidence that the District COR became aware of the
LDC’s post closures was after an April 2015 visit by a Deputy U.S. Marshal who
observed vacant control pods. By the time the USMS identified this matter,
understaffing and security post closures had already been occurring for months,
with correctional officer vacancies increasing in each of the preceding 4 months and
peaking in March 2015 at 23 percent. In response, the District COR sought
corrective action from the LDC and referred the matter to the QAR team. In
May 2015 during its annual review, the QAR team reviewed the LDC’s housing plan,
shift rosters, and vacancy reports and concluded that LDC staffing was deficient,
stating that:
“[CoreCivic] LDC has attempted to compensate for the shortage of
correctional officers by mandating correctional officer[s] report to work
on their regularly scheduled days off; however, a review of actual shift
roster records reveals [CoreCivic] LDC still has to routinely vacate
correctional posts which are identified in their 2015 staffing analysis
due to a shortage of correctional officers."
The report also noted that “an overtly confrontational prisoner spirit
suggest[s] [that] the ongoing shortage of correctional officers is having an impact
on the facility’s operational climate.” We found that when responding to the
USMS’s staffing-related findings, the former Warden said that the LDC was in the
process of recruiting and deploying new correctional officers. However, the LDC’s
POAs failed to provide immediate relief and the understaffing and post closures
resumed. In one instance, the LDC failed to fulfill a component of its POA that may
have provided immediate relief. Specifically, in a July 2015 memorandum, the
LDC’s former Warden said that if overtime was insufficient to ensure that all posts
were filled, the LDC would “temporarily deploy staff from other [CoreCivic] facilities
until new hires are able to assume posts.” LDC continued to close security posts
into September 2015, yet did not request temporary staff from other CoreCivic
facilities to cover posts. USMS did not hold CoreCivic accountable for its failure to
comply with this provision of the corrective action plan.
In October 2015, the LDC’s Contracting Officer proposed an invoice reduction
to CoreCivic for approximately $763,000 due to CoreCivic’s non-compliance with
FPBDS in the areas of correctional supervision, detainee accountability, and control
of contraband. USMS determined that the LDC’s significant staffing shortages
during 2015 had contributed to the non-compliance. Before finalizing the invoice
reduction, CoreCivic was provided the opportunity to respond, to which it disagreed
and requested the USMS reconsider the reduction amount. USMS formally issued
67 The accuracy and completeness of the shift rosters can be assessed by comparing them to
timekeeping records and observing whether or not personnel on the shift roster are on the required
posts.

45

 the $763,000 price reduction in February 2017, or 16 months later. A senior USMS
official involved in the invoice reduction process said that the longer the USMS
takes to decide on whether to apply a reduction, the more it harms the USMS’s
credibility in administering its contracts and holding contractors accountable. USMS
officials said they could shorten the processing period by incorporating milestones
into its price reduction guidance to ensure more efficient and expedient submission
of its final price reductions decision to its contractors.
In response to the February 2016 OIG Management Advisory Memorandum,
USMS said it will improve contract monitoring by establishing an onsite detention
contract monitoring program and developing standard operating procedures and
contract monitoring instruments. We recommend that USMS’s contract monitoring
program include staffing-related procedure steps that help District CORs assess
facility staffing trends and determine if post closures are occurring. We also
recommend that USMS incorporate milestones into its price reduction guidance.
Lastly, we recommend that the USMS ensure that during periods of chronic
understaffing, contractors utilize all available options, including the provision of
temporary staff.
LDC’s closure of posts also represents a loss of contracted value to the
USMS. Using Wage Determination information, we calculated the value of security
post closures based on the minimum wage and benefit rates for a correctional
officer.68 For the Winter Timeframe, the post closures amounted to $171,817 in
services not received by the USMS. For the Summer Timeframe, this figure
amounted to $113,308.
Impact of LDC Understaffing
CoreCivic officials explained that when staffing declines, the LDC requests
volunteers to work overtime by posting a sign-up sheet. If there are not enough
volunteers, the LDC uses mandatory overtime. In September 2014, the LDC began
“drafting,” or requiring employees work overtime to cover posts. Facility
management could give no less than a 2-hour advance notice of the need to draft
the employee and once the employee worked their draft shift, they would be
rotated to the bottom of the draft list. In February 2015 the LDC switched to using
a “mandate list.” Under the mandate list, all security employees were scheduled to
work a maximum of 12 hours of mandatory overtime on one of their days off, which
was scheduled approximately a month in advance to provide employees earlier
notice. LDC used the mandate list from February 2015 through June 2016, but the
extent of the overtime worked varied. For example, in June 2015, each correctional
officer worked an average of three mandate shifts (each shift was for 12 hours)
that month. By July 2016, facility staffing had improved and each correctional
officer averaged less than 1 mandate shift for the month.

68

inmates.

These calculations exclude the posts that were meant exclusively for Wyandotte County

46

 Understaffing throughout 2015 had a significant impact on the LDC’s use of
overtime. LDC’s use of overtime increased 93 percent from 2014 to 2015 and
nearly tripled in April 2015 and July 2015 as compared to the prior year, as shown
in Figure 4. In both years, security personnel accounted for at least 94 percent of
facility overtime use, primarily by correctional officers.
Figure 4
LDC Overtime Utilization
January 2014 to December 2015
7,000
6,000

Hours

5,000
4,000
3,000

2014

2,000

2015

1,000
0

Source: CoreCivic

LDC personnel shared several examples of the impact of understaffing,
including: (1) lower morale, due in part to frustration with understaffing;
(2) security concerns; (3) fewer correctional officers available to escort medical
staff and detainees to and from the health services unit; (4) fewer staff available to
assist the LDC’s QAM in conducting quality assurance audits, and (5) not being able
to perform regular job duties while placed on security posts.
Correctional officer understaffing led the LDC to utilize members of its Unit
Management Teams (Unit Team) to cover security posts instead of, or in addition
to, performing their regular job duties. Unit Teams are responsible for familiarizing
and communicating with detainees, which enables them to address and resolve
detainee concerns and reduce the likelihood of incidents or disputes. They also
streamline the delivery of services and programs to detainees in their assigned
units. The Facility plan includes three Unit Teams, each consisting of one Unit
Manager, two Case Managers, and two Correctional Counselors.69 Unit Managers
69 In other words, the Facility plan includes three Unit Managers, six Case Managers, and six
Correctional Counselors. However, the USMS plan only includes two Unit Managers, five Case
Managers, and five Correctional Counselors.

47

 supervise the Correctional Counselors and Case Managers and ensure staff
members are performing their duties. Case Managers provide case management,
classification, and transitional services to detainees; develop individual detainee
program plans; and help detainees adjust socially to their environment.
Correctional Counselors are uniformed, security-trained staff responsible for
resolving daily detainee issues before they become significant matters, incidents, or
grievances. They are responsible for making daily rounds through assigned units,
ensuring that services and programs are delivered to detainees, and conducting
1-on-1 meetings with detainees. Case Managers and Correctional Counselors must
be accessible to detainees every day.
To determine the amount of time that Unit Team members (specifically Case
Managers and Correctional Counselors) were assigned to security posts instead of
their intended job duties, we selected a judgmental sample of shift rosters and
timekeeping data over 33 days between July 20 and September 6, 2015. During
this timeframe, Unit Team members were unable to exclusively perform their
intended duties for an average of 29 hours per day, or 37 percent of their time,
because they were occupying a security post. When measured in dollars over the
33-day period, the LDC’s customers (primarily the USMS but also Wyandotte
County) lost 832 hours of Unit Management-dedicated work worth approximately
$19,972.70
LDC staff said that assigning Case Managers and Correctional Counselors to
security posts meant that Unit Managers assumed their subordinates’
responsibilities to prevent work-related backlogs. On some days, Unit Managers
would lose most of their team, and one Unit Manager commented that when this
occurred, she would have to perform the work of five individuals. On July 20, 2015
- one of the worse days encountered - 9 of 11 Case Managers and Correctional
Counselors working that day were assigned to security posts. Their normal job
duties were assumed by their respective Unit Managers. These duties included a
variety of detainee management and program functions including counseling
services, handling detainee requests, and the development of individual program
plans and life skills for successful re-entry into the community. We also found that
some Unit Team staff were assigned to security posts on a lengthy full-time basis.
In early July 2015, we observed a Correctional Counselor that was assigned to the
A.M. front lobby security post on a full-time basis and this individual anticipated
remaining there until the end of August 2015. Another Correctional Counselor was
consistently covering the P.M. front lobby security post from July through
August 2015.

70 Calculated as the sum of: (1) Case Managers’ 266 hours on security posts multiplied by
the $24.46 wage and benefits rate, and (2) Correctional Counselors’ 565 hours on security posts
multiplied by the $23.80 wage and benefits rate. The difference is due to rounding.

48

 Personnel-Related Decisions Increased LDC Understaffing
Despite the LDC’s staffing struggles throughout 2015, CoreCivic temporarily
transferred LDC personnel to other CoreCivic facilities in two instances, thereby
increasing the facility’s understaffing. First, in late 2014 CoreCivic requested USMS
approval to temporarily transfer staff from LDC and USMS’s other contracted
facilities to the South Texas Family Residential Center in Dilley, Texas, a U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement contracted facility. CoreCivic needed
temporary staff to operate the facility until it could hire permanent employees.
CoreCivic told the USMS that this initiative would not adversely affect LDC’s
operations or required staffing levels and that transferees’ assignments and
responsibilities would be backfilled by existing personnel, using overtime as
necessary.71
USMS approved CoreCivic’s request on the conditions that no more than
5 percent of each CoreCivic-managed facility’s total staff were transferred at any
given time and that the required security posts be staffed throughout the period.
From December 2014 through July 2015, LDC transferred seven staff, consisting of
six correctional officers and one shift supervisor. The start dates, end dates, and
length of assignment varied, but lasted on average four months per person.
Because the initiative included a small proportion of LDC’s total staff, the number of
LDC transferees never exceeded 5 percent. However, the arrangement occurred
during an 8-month period when LDC correctional officer vacancy rates ranged from
11 to 23 percent, and LDC was consistently closing mandatory operational posts, as
previously described in this report. LDC personnel told the OIG they were
frustrated by CoreCivic’s decision to transfer staff because they were already
shorthanded and working mandatory overtime. LDC’s former Warden, when asked
why he transferred staff despite facility understaffing, said that he did not have a
choice because FSC did not request his input or approval on the matter. He also
suggested that there was immense pressure to comply because the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement contract was highly lucrative.72 A senior
FSC official acknowledged that CoreCivic did not explicitly ask Wardens for
approval, but told us that its expectation was that Wardens would provide staff
unless unable to satisfy the request. Ultimately, the LDC’s former Warden could
not provide evidence that he objected and by sending staff, FSC considered this an
implicit agreement.
Despite the USMS’s general awareness of the LDC’s understaffing and having
witnessed routine post vacancies during the initiative, the USMS did not hold
CoreCivic accountable for failing to staff security posts, in violation of the
agreement. The LDC continued to vacate security posts and the transfer
71 The BOP and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement also temporarily transferred
personnel to the South Texas Family Residential Center.

72
According to CoreCivic’s 2015 Annual Report, the South Texas Family Residential Center
accounted for nearly $245 million in revenue or approximately 14 percent of CoreCivic’s total revenue
in 2015.

49

 arrangement continued unchanged. This is likely because the Contracting Officer
and District COR - who were best suited to monitor and address non-compliance
with this agreement’s conditions - said they were unaware that the agreement even
existed.
In the second instance of personnel transfers, CoreCivic temporarily
transferred five LDC staff to the Winn Correctional Center in Winnfield, Louisiana
from March 6 through March 31, 2015.73 The purpose of this transfer was to
“provide an enhanced security response … due to immediate concerns regarding
population unrest [at the Winn Correctional Center] and threat of potential
violence.” These five staff members were selected because they were members of
the LDC’s Special Operations Response Team (SORT). According to CoreCivic
guidance, SORT is an integral part of an institution's structure and the main
response force in the event of a major disturbance that cannot be resolved by onduty staff. CoreCivic transferred these five staff during March 2015, a month when
the LDC had a 20 percent vacancy rate in correctional services. This was the
highest monthly vacancy rate from January to August 2015.
Unlike the assignment to the South Texas Family Residential Center,
CoreCivic failed to request USMS approval for transferring staff to the Winn
Correctional Center. CoreCivic officials said this was because of the emergency
nature and short duration of the assignment. USMS’s Chief of the Office of
Detention Services said CoreCivic should have notified the USMS, which would have
wanted to ensure that the LDC’s SORT was sufficiently staffed. CoreCivic had
authorized the LDC to maintain a 15-member SORT, in part due to its isolated
geographical location and lack of other CoreCivic facilities in close proximity.
CoreCivic officials told us that this 15-member allotment was not a requirement.
Instead, the LDC’s Monthly Security Inspection document indicated that the
facility’s SORT be “at least 80 percent of the established allotment,” or a minimum
of 12 SORT members.74 Prior to transferring LDC staff to the Winn Correctional
Center, the LDC had nine SORT members and after the transfer only four SORT
members remained.
A fully staffed 15-member SORT is generally comprised of a commander, an
assistant commander, 2 squad leaders, and 11 team members. It may not always
be necessary to deploy the full SORT as the strength of the deployment will depend
on the nature and scope of the incident. From March 6 through March 31, 2015,
the LDC’s four SORT members consisted of the SORT commander, a squad leader
and two team members. CoreCivic’s technical proposal stated that SORT’s mission
is to “take prompt and decisive action to ensure public safety, protect life and
property, and preserve order and control of the facility”; that it is “ready to be
quickly mobilized for any emergency situation”; and that it “provide a quick
73 The five staff were two Senior Correctional Officers, one Case Manager, one Correctional
Officer, and one Maintenance Worker.
74 Monthly Security Inspections – which are internal audits described in CoreCivic’s technical
proposal - provide monthly inspections of all physical plant security elements.

50

 reaction force.” We believe that by transferring the majority of the LDC’s existing
SORT to the Winn Correctional Center, CoreCivic not only further understaffed the
LDC and failed to maintain the requisite size of the SORT, but compromised the
SORT’s ability to operate effectively and fulfill its mission in the event of a
significant incident.
To address the issues within this section, we recommend that the USMS
establish policies and procedures for assessing and approving contractor requests
to transfer staff out of USMS contracted facilities, and: (1) obtain reasonable
assurance from the facility Warden and FSC officials that such a transfer will not
compromise the facility’s ability to comply with contract requirements and CoreCivic
policy; (2) independently assess whether the proposed transfers may jeopardize
facility staffing requirements and operational readiness; and (3) ensure that the
Contracting Officer and COR approve and continuously monitor the arrangement,
respectively.
LDC Officials Concealed Use of Triple Bunking from the American Correctional
Association
CoreCivic must operate the LDC in accordance with the ACA’s PerformanceBased Detention Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities (ALDF). The ALDF
contains standards, practices, and outcome measures that enable administrators
and practitioners to monitor facility activities and measure the outcomes of their
efforts. As part of the ACA’s accreditation process, the LDC undergoes standards
compliance audits performed every 3 years by ACA auditors. The facility must
attain 100 percent compliance with the 60 mandatory standards and at least
90 percent compliance with 325 non-mandatory standards, if applicable. Several of
the standards address the facility’s conditions of confinement, including usable
space and living environment. Compliance with these standards is dependent in
part on the physical design of cells; for example, LDC detainees are housed in
multiple occupancy cells – designed for 2, 8, or 10 beds. However, from at least
2005 through late 2015, LDC staff often affixed a third bed to the floor of many
cells that were designed for two (hereafter referred to as “triple bunking”).
Figure 5 is a USMS simulation of a triple-bunk configuration at a non-CoreCivic
contract facility.

51

 Figure 5
Triple-Bunk Configuration at Leavenworth Detention
Center

Source: CoreCivic

During our audit, we received information from an LDC official indicating that
LDC staff intentionally concealed their use of triple bunking from ACA auditors in
what appears to be an effort to avoid non-compliance with three ALDF
non-mandatory standards related to usable space in multi-occupancy cells, usable
space in the dayroom, and sufficient ventilation within the cells.75 Upon further
review, several other LDC officials corroborated this account, telling the OIG that in
advance of an ACA accreditation audit, LDC staff uninstalled the third beds bolted to
the floor of several cells designed for two and removed them from the facility.
Doing so was intended to increase the amount of usable space and improve air
circulation, thereby averting the associated ACA findings. Thus, ACA auditors were
unaware of the LDC’s use of triple-bunking. After the ACA auditors completed their
work and departed the facility, LDC staff would reinstall the beds. The OIG referred
this matter to its Investigations Division and to CoreCivic’s General Counsel. In
April 2016, CoreCivic’s internal investigation concluded that:
75 The three ACA standards are: (1) 4-ALDF-1A-10, Multiple-Occupancy Rooms/Cells;
(2) 4-ALDF-1A-12, Dayrooms; and (3) 4 ALDF-1A-19, Environmental Conditions. They state that
multi-occupancy cells and dayrooms should provide a specific amount of usable space per occupant
and that the facility’s ventilation system should supply adequate air circulation throughout each cell,
per occupant.

52

 “Third bunks were removed from cells originally designed for two
inmates prior to the 2011 ACA Audit, intentionally to conceal the
practice of triple-bunking from the ACA Audit Team in order to meet
the unencumbered space requirements in general population cells.”
The CoreCivic investigation revealed that this may have also occurred prior to
the 2005 and 2008 ACA audits. Interviewees stated that the LDC’s Warden at the
time directed LDC staff to utilize detainee labor to assist the LDC staff in the
removal of approximately 100 beds from the LDC and store them at a rental facility
or in a shipping container.76 Furthermore, one of CoreCivic’s former divisional
Managing Directors, who was assigned oversight of the LDC and other facilities in
multiple states from 2002 through 2014, was aware of this effort. Interviewees
said that even though the three ALDF standards were non-mandatory, they wanted
to attain the highest possible ACA score. We reviewed the LDC’s ACA results for
2008 and 2011 (2005 was unavailable) and determined that had the ACA found the
LDC non-compliant with the three non-mandatory standards, it still would have
easily surpassed the 90 percent compliance threshold.77 However, ACA
accreditation rules state that an “intentional misrepresentation of facts [and] lack of
good faith” could have subjected the LDC to a revocation hearing before its
Commission on Accreditation for Corrections. CoreCivic said it was extremely
disappointed to learn this had occurred and reported the results of its investigation
to CoreCivic’s executive staff and Board of Directors. CoreCivic said its Ethics and
Compliance office completed training at the LDC on employees’ duty to report
misconduct, options for reporting misconduct, and CoreCivic’s non-retaliation policy
for employees who report misconduct. CoreCivic did not take disciplinary action
against the former Wardens and Managing Director involved because they were no
longer employed by CoreCivic. Officials from both CoreCivic and OIG Investigations
discussed this matter with the ACA’s Deputy Executive Director who decided not to
take action against CoreCivic in part because the individuals involved were no
longer at the LDC.
USMS Contracts Do Not Contain Clear Guidance on the Use of Triple Bunking
Triple bunking is not uncommon throughout the federal prison system and is
often associated with addressing overcrowding. BOP said that its private prison
contractors are allowed to triple bunk as long as the area utilized meets the
applicable ACA standards for inmate space requirements. USMS’s Chief of the
Office of Detention Services said that triple bunking is acceptable to address an
operational necessity on a temporary basis. This official said the operational
necessity could arise from a sudden influx of detainees to a facility or if there was a
disturbance that led to the closure of some housing units. What is not acceptable
to the USMS, he noted, is when triple bunking is used for cost reduction purposes.
76

LDC had two different Wardens from 2005 through 2011.

77 For the 2014 ACA audit, the LDC attained a score of 100 percent compliance, despite its
use of triple bunking throughout the facility.

53

 This happened at the CoreCivic-operated Northeast Ohio Correctional Center
(NEOCC) in Youngstown, Ohio. Specifically, in 2015 the QAR team determined that
NEOCC was triple bunking USMS detainees despite the availability of 1,500 empty
beds elsewhere in the facility. USMS determined that CoreCivic had done this for
cost-reduction purposes. By triple bunking USMS detainees, CoreCivic had avoided
opening and staffing another unit.78 This instance contributed to the USMS’s
issuance of a September 2015 memorandum to all its private prisoner operators
that prohibited triple bunking.
CoreCivic’s investigation of LDC triple bunking stated that there was “no
evidence to definitively conclude that inmates were moved to housing units opened
specifically to facilitate the concealment of triple bunking practices from the ACA
audit team.” This statement alludes to the question of why the LDC had
triple-bunked detainees in the first place and whether triple bunking had allowed
the LDC to close and not staff other housing units within the facility. LDC’s use of
triple bunking was not temporary. Instead it had generally been a permanent
measure, as the third beds were regularly bolted to the floor, from at least 2005
until September 2015, with infrequent exceptions. CoreCivic officials told the OIG
that triple bunking at the LDC was necessary to meet its customer’s needs in a
highly stratified environment where detainees are separated by one or more of the
following: security level, adjudication status, customer (i.e., USMS detainees are
separate from Wyandotte County detainees), and gender. Some detainees, such as
material witnesses, must also be kept separate. CoreCivic officials further said that
triple bunking offers flexibility during times of high fluctuation in the detainee
population, noting that triple bunking allows the LDC the capability to accommodate
its customer needs if the demand for beds suddenly increases.
However, senior LDC officials also said triple bunking provided staffing
flexibility and cost-savings. One senior LDC official told us that by using triple
bunking it could consolidate detainee living space to specific locations throughout
the facility and LDC officials could then close remaining detainee housing locations,
thereby eliminating the need to staff the closed locations. While CoreCivic’s
investigation may not have “definitively” determined that this happened in 2005,
2008, and 2011, a senior LDC official told us that when the USMS prohibited triple
bunking in September 2015, the LDC had to reopen and staff Y-Pod, a
multi-purpose unit that had previously been closed intermittently. We analyzed
LDC housing and detainee transfer records and confirmed that on September 10,
2015, the LDC responded to the USMS prohibition on triple bunking by relocating
107 detainees from a third bunk to other locations throughout the facility. During
this relocation process, 52 detainees were transferred to the recently reopened
Y-Pod. LDC’s former Warden said that after the USMS prohibited triple bunking,
there was less overall tension in the affected units, that detainee incidents
decreased and staff was calmer.
78 In response to the 2015 QAR, the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center (NEOCC) ceased
triple bunking. However, a year later (during the 2016 QAR) the USMS found that the NEOCC had
resumed its use, again for cost reduction purposes.

54

 The OIG’s review of the LDC contract found that it contained no specific
language on contractor use of triple bunking that fell outside of ACA standards.
Furthermore, in late 2015 the USMS issued separate memoranda on triple bunking
that conflict with one another. Specifically, the September 2015 memorandum
prohibited all triple bunking. However, approximately 3 months later, the USMS
issued a memorandum approving the Central Arizona Detention Center’s use of
triple-bunking in limited circumstances. Because of the conflicting nature of these
memoranda, we believe it is important that the USMS clarify its position on the
allowability of triple bunking. Therefore, we recommend that USMS clearly specify
in its new and existing contracts the circumstances under which triple bunking is
allowed, and what rules, procedures, and ACA standards apply to the practice.
USMS Did Not Evaluate the Implications of Wyandotte County’s Use of the LDC
When USMS entered into the contract with CoreCivic Leavenworth, the LDC’s
design capacity was 767 beds. In May 2008, the LDC underwent a facility
expansion that increased the design capacity to 1,033 beds. Design capacity
measures the number of beds (and therefore detainees) each facility is designed to
accommodate. CoreCivic allows facilities housing detainees on a short-term basis
to exceed the original design capacity; at the time of our audit, the LDC had a
1,120 total bed capacity. Because the USMS’s contract with CoreCivic was not to
exceed 922 beds, except in emergency situations, the expansion left CoreCivic with
approximately 200 non-contracted beds throughout the facility. To fill these extra
beds and gain additional revenue, in July 2009 CoreCivic entered into a 3-year
contract with Wyandotte County, Kansas to confine and supervise up to 220 adult
minimum to medium security male detainees at the LDC.79 USMS’s Chief of the
Office of Detention Services said that sharing its contracted facilities with another
entity was common because the USMS does not always contract for the maximum
number of beds in the facility.
USMS did not assess the staffing implications of the CoreCivic-Wyandotte
arrangement. While the USMS-approved staffing plan (USMS plan) specified the
number of personnel resources (measured in FTEs) necessary to fulfill contract
requirements, the CoreCivic-Wyandotte contract did not establish Wyandotte
County’s respective staffing needs. Instead, pursuant to the Wyandotte contract,
LDC staffing resources that previously worked exclusively with USMS detainees
were now characterized as “shared staff” that addressed both USMS’s and
Wyandotte’s detainees. CoreCivic created a facility-wide staffing plan (Facility plan)
to account for both the USMS and Wyandotte, as shown in Table 6.

79

In 2012 this arrangement was extended through August 2017.

55

 Table 6
Leavenworth Detention Center Staffing Plans
as of June 22, 2015
CORECIVIC POSITION
GROUPS
Management/Support
Security Operations
Unit Management
Maintenance
Services
Health Services
Programs
TOTAL
SUBCONTRACTED
HEALTH SERVICES STAFF
Physician
Dentist
Psychologist
TOTAL

FACILITY PLAN
USMS PLAN
DIFFERENCE
(FTES)80
(FTES)
18.00
18.00
0.00
81.70
79.00
2.70
105.00
84.00
21.00
5.00
4.00
1.00
4.00
4.00
0.00
17.95
16.68
1.27
2.00
2.00
0.00
233.65
207.68
25.97
FACILITY PLAN
USMS PLAN
DIFFERENCE
(HOURS)
(HOURS)
16 hours/week
16 hours/week
0
27 hours/week
27 hours/week
0
32 hours/week
32 hours/week
0
75 hours/week 75 hours/week
0

Source: CoreCivic

As shown in Table 6, the Facility plan had approximately 26 more FTEs than
the USMS contract. This did not mean that CoreCivic added 26 FTEs to
accommodate the Wyandotte County contract. Of the 26 FTEs, approximately
9 FTEs were Wyandotte-specific correctional officers, 9 FTEs were USMS-specific
correctional officers, and approximately 8 FTEs were designated as “shared.”81 This
meant that while the Wyandotte contract accounted for up to 220 beds, or
20 percent of the LDC’s rated capacity, Wyandotte’s exclusive positions accounted
for only 4 percent of overall facility positions. The number of FTEs across the areas
of Management/Support, Services, and Programs were unchanged, and other areas
such as Security/Operations, Maintenance, and Health Services received marginal
FTE increases.82 In June 2015, the number of facility-wide Health Services
personnel was approximately 1.3 FTEs greater (8 percent) than the amount
required in the USMS plan. A senior LDC Health Services official recalled receiving
no additional resources when the Wyandotte detainees entered the facility and
noted that Wyandotte’s detainees have a lesser length of stay on average than
USMS detainees. Wyandotte’s highly transient population, coupled with the LDC
requirement to evaluate all detainees admitted to the facility means that Wyandotte
detainees require a large share of health services resources. For example, in 2015
The Facility plan assesses the LDC’s overall staffing needs and includes both the USMS’s
and Wyandotte’s detainees.
80

CoreCivic officials said they excluded the nine USMS-specific FTEs from the USMS plan
because these FTEs were not required by the USMS contract and added to the facility’s staffing at
CoreCivic’s own expense.
81

82 Management/Support includes the Warden, Assistant Warden, Safety Manager,
Investigator, and Mailroom Clerk; Services consists of Warehouse and Laundry Staff; and Programs
consists of a Program Facilitator (USMS-exclusive) and Chaplain.

56

 Wyandotte’s detainees accounted for 1,285 of the facility’s 3,887 admissions, or
33 percent. Moreover, as also shown in Table 6, the LDC subcontracted its
physician, dentist, and psychologist, in accordance with the USMS plan. The
execution of the CoreCivic-Wyandotte contract did not result in an increase in hours
for these subcontracted staff, who assumed the care of Wyandotte’s detainees,
potentially diminishing the availability and value of these positions to the USMS,
which funded the positions.
We also found that USMS had not assessed the cost implications of the
CoreCivic-Wyandotte arrangement and therefore did not ensure it received the best
possible value. While the USMS’s contracted per diem ranged from $85 to $98 per
detainee per day from 2009 through 2015, Wyandotte’s contracted per diem ranged
from $50 to $58 during the same timeframe. Both Wyandotte and the USMS
followed the same ACA and Federal Performance Based Detention Standards and
provided detainees the same recreation, work programs, transportation,
programming, disciplinary action, rights, and commissary. CoreCivic officials said
that Wyandotte County received a lower per diem rate because CoreCivic based its
calculation on the incremental (variable) cost of adding detainees to the LDC.
Therefore, its per diem rate did not include salaries and benefits, electricity, gas,
overhead, and several other fixed costs that were included in USMS’s per diem rate.
In our judgment, the USMS contract subsidized Wyandotte County’s lesser per diem
rate.
Ultimately, while the CoreCivic-Wyandotte agreement provided favorable
outcomes to both CoreCivic and Wyandotte County, the USMS received little or no
discernible benefit, financial or otherwise. USMS allowed another facility user to
share its contracted positions without obtaining reimbursement or a change to its
negotiated per diem rate in return. POD’s Chief of the Office of Detention Services
said this type of arrangement was a common business practice and that USMS’s
primary concern was that CoreCivic covered the necessary security posts and
provided quality care.83 However, he agreed that the USMS should have pursued a
reduced per diem rate. In addition, POD’s Chief of the Detention Standards and
Compliance Branch said that USMS’s contracts do not contain language on how to
apportion shared services. The USMS-CoreCivic contract allows other federal
agencies such as BOP and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to use
the facility, but does not describe facility use by non-federal customers. We
recommend that the USMS specify for its contractors, in their contracts or in some
other appropriate manner, the use of multi-user arrangements at its existing and
future contract facilities to ensure the USMS maximizes its value and assesses the
impact, if any, on the USMS’s contracted staffing, facility safety and security, and
other institutional matters.
83 POD’s Chief of the Office of Detention Services said it is not unusual for state and local
governments to obtain cost savings and buying efficiencies through federal contracts, referring to the
General Services Administration’s (GSA) Cooperative Purchasing Program. However, GSA’s
Cooperative Purchasing Program specifically applies to the purchase of information technology and law
enforcement products and services, not detention services.

57

 Comparison of USMS and BOP Contract Staffing Requirements
USMS and BOP private detention performance work statements share many
of the same or similar staffing-related contract provisions and requirements. Both
require that contractors hire and retain key personnel necessary for performance of
the contract; maintain and update staffing plans that convey the personnel
necessary for the performance of the contract; and require that contractors provide
periodic reports on the facility’s actual staffing levels and vacancies. However, we
found that USMS’s contracts contain less specific and less actionable staffingrelated language than the BOP’s, resulting in fewer contractual options for the
USMS to hold its contractors accountable for failures to adequately staff facilities.
Specifically, BOP may issue staffing-related invoice reductions to its contractors
under three conditions: (1) staffing levels fall below a specific percentage for
2 months in any 3 month period; (2) any individual position is not filled within
120 days of vacancy; or (3) any essential positions become vacant. We consider
the BOP’s staffing requirements a best practice because it establishes facility
staffing expectations and enables the BOP to hold contractors accountable for
non-compliance.
For the first condition, BOP private prison contracts contain language
requiring that staffing levels “not fall below a monthly average of 90 percent for
Correctional Services, 85 percent for Health Services, and 85 percent for all other
departments of the BOP approved staffing plan.” If a contracted prison facility
failed to meet these thresholds, the BOP could levy monetary reductions through
the contractor’s monthly invoice. Conversely, USMS’s LDC contract does not
include staffing percentage thresholds. A senior POD official said this was because
incorporating a threshold could reduce the contractor’s incentive to staff a facility
above that threshold. This official said the USMS’s expectation is that contractors
attain 100 percent post coverage; he explained that when vacancies arise, the
contractor needs to fulfill the responsibilities of those positions, even if it requires
temporarily assigning staff from one of a contractor’s other facilities or entering into
local contracts until a replacement can be brought onboard. However, this
expectation was not reflected in the LDC contract or definitively stated in USMS’s
other private detention contracts. This expectation was also not reflected in the
LDC’s actual staffing conditions, especially during 2015.
Because of the need to adequately cover posts, it is critical that vacancies be
kept to a minimum and addressed in a timely fashion. The LDC contract required
that CoreCivic submit quarterly vacancy reports to the USMS that listed the vacant
positions, a POA to address each vacancy, and target fulfillment dates. However,
unlike BOP contracts which stipulated that invoice reductions may be assessed if
essential vacancies are not filled immediately and if non-essential vacancies are not
filled within 120 days, the LDC contract did not define an acceptable timeframe to
fill essential and non-essential vacant positions. Instead, the contract’s language
on contractor non-compliance was ambiguous and unrelated to staffing conditions
at the facility. Specifically, the contract states that “the contractor’s failure to
submit to the COR their [quarterly] vacancy status report … may result in a
58

 deduction on the invoice.” This language only enabled the USMS to issue an invoice
reduction due to the contractor’s failure to submit the vacancy report. This was an
arbitrary and inadequate basis for assessing an invoice reduction because it was
contingent on an administrative task (i.e., submission of a report) instead of on
qualitative or quantitative metrics that are representative of a facility’s actual
staffing conditions.
Furthermore, we identified several USMS contracts with different and often
more specific and quantifiable vacancy-related requirements than what is contained
in the LDC contract. USMS officials agreed that its LDC contract contained unclear
staffing-related language and that there was a need to standardize the language
across all facilities. In May 2016, the USMS issued a contract modification for the
LDC and all other contract facilities that incorporated staffing thresholds and
vacancy requirements similar to those of the BOP. Because this action addresses
our concerns, we are not issuing a recommendation.
Billings and Payments
USMS’s contract with CoreCivic is a fixed-price contract. According to the
FAR, this type of contract places upon the contractor maximum risk and full
responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss and provides maximum
incentive for the contractor to control costs and perform effectively. USMS’s
monthly payments to CoreCivic are primarily based on the Monthly Operating Price
(MOP) and the Fixed Incremental Unit Price (FIUP). The MOP ensures that the
contractor receives a minimum payment, regardless of the facility’s actual
population, and was negotiated with the understanding that USMS detainees would
occupy at least 75 percent of the accepted number of contract beds.84 The MOP
provides contractors a guaranteed revenue stream, and USMS officials said it is also
critical to ensure facilities maintain a consistent level of staff during periods of
fluctuating detainee population.
The FIUP pricing component is a separate unit price per detainee that only
applies when the daily detainee population exceeds 75 percent of contract beds in a
payment period, up to 115 percent of contract beds. Although this 115 percent
rate may create the impression that USMS is overpopulating the institution, at the
LDC it represents the maximum number of beds allowed under the contract
(922 detainees) barring an emergency, and not the LDC’s total 1,120 bed capacity.
Table 7 provides examples of the LDC contract’s pricing scheme for January 2015
based on three different contract bed numbers.

84 The number of “contract beds” is synonymous with the number of federal detainees housed
in the facility.

59

 Table 7
Examples of the LDC Contract
Monthly Pricing Structure for January 201585
NO. OF
CONTRACT
BEDS
602
802
922
1,03386

PERCENT OF
CONTRACT
BEDS
75%
100%
115%
N/A

MONTHLY OPERATING
PRICE (MOP)
$1,868,767 Per
Month
$1,868,767
$1,868,767
$1,868,767
$1,868,767

FIXED INCREMENTAL
UNIT PRICE (FIUP)
$97.60 Per
detainee day
Not applicable
$605,120
$968,192
$1,304,034

TOTAL MONTHLY
PRICE
MOP + FIUP
$1,868,767
$2,473,887
$2,836,959
$3,172,800

Source: USMS

If USMS detainees occupied 602 contract beds, CoreCivic would bill the USMS
the MOP amount of $1.9 million. However, if USMS detainees instead occupied
922 contract beds, in addition to receiving the MOP of approximately $1.9 million,
the FIUP rate would be applied to the number of detainees above 75 percent
occupancy (922 – 602), which would total $968,192.87 CoreCivic would then bill
USMS for about $2.8 million.
Service Contract Labor Standards Statute
The Service Contract Labor Standards statute, formerly known as “the
Service Contract Act of 1965” or “SCA,” requires that employees working on federal
service contracts in excess of $2,500 not be paid less than the monetary wages and
fringe benefits required by law, and serves to prevent contractors from being able
to underbid each other by reducing wages or fringe benefits for service employees.
Since the LDC contract exceeds the minimum award threshold, CoreCivic
must provide its employees the minimum wages and fringe benefits stipulated
within the applicable wage determination schedules (wage determination) issued by
the Department of Labor (DOL).88 Wage determinations list the minimum wage and
fringe benefit rates for different classes of laborers, which are often adjusted over
the term of a service contract. If an adjustment results in additional compensation
owed to contractor employees, the contractor is entitled to request a price
adjustment, that is, a request for compensation from the USMS.

Differences in the total amounts in the tables in the report are due to rounding. The sum
of individual numbers prior to rounding may differ from the sum of the individual numbers rounded.
85

USMS’s use of more than 922 beds would be allowable in an emergency situation as
declared by the USMS.
86

87 For detainee occupancy at 115 percent, the FIUP amount is the difference between the
75 percent and 115 percent detainee occupancy, multiplied by 31 days in January and the FIUP of
$97.60.
88 The LDC contract’s wage determination rates are shown in “SCA No. 05-2307.” Rate
changes become effective at the beginning of each contract year, which for the LDC is January 1.

60

 Table 8 is an example of wage and fringe benefit rates for three occupational
codes from the DOL-issued wage determination used by CoreCivic. In the wage
determination, fringe benefits such as health insurance, life insurance, sick leave,
and retirement are referred to as “Health & Welfare benefits.” The Health &
Welfare benefits rate is the amount employers must provide as fringe benefits to
their employees and is based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. As
shown in Table 8, this particular DOL wage determination requires that CoreCivic
provides its employees Health & Welfare benefits costing no less than $4.02 per
hour.
Table 8
DOL Wage Determination89
OCCUPATION CODE
01011
27008
12312

TITLE
Accounting Clerk I
Corrections Officer
Registered Nurse II

WAGE RATE PER HOUR
$13.97
$18.89
$27.27

HEALTH & WELFARE PER
HOUR*
$4.02

*The Health & Welfare benefits rate of $4.02 per hour is equivalent to $160.80 per week or $696.79
per month.
Source: DOL, Wage Determination No. 2005-2307, Revision No. 15.

CoreCivic officials, upon receipt of a new wage determination, ensure
compliance with the SCLS wage rates by comparing all positions and actual pay
rates with rates shown in the new DOL wage determination. CoreCivic makes these
comparisons in order to determine which positions require wage and fringe benefit
increases, the amount of additional compensation to provide eligible employees,
and the appropriate increase to the MOP to recompense CoreCivic for the required
increases to employee wages and fringe benefits. CoreCivic compliance with
Service Contract Labor Standards fringe benefit requirements is administered by
the Boon Group, a full service employee benefits company which allocates and
tracks CoreCivic employees’ fringe benefit contributions. Boon Group officials said
these contributions are held in an irrevocable trust for the benefit of the employees.
In order to verify that the Boon Group and CoreCivic correctly calculated
salary and fringe benefit costs and made adjustments in accordance with
DOL-issued wage determinations, we selected a judgmental sample of 10 CoreCivic
LDC positions. For each position we reviewed Boon Group fringe benefit reports
and CoreCivic employee payroll records to verify that employees under each
position type were paid salaries and benefits that met or exceeded the rates
prescribed in the DOL wage determinations. We determined that CoreCivic
employees were generally provided salaries and fringe benefits that met or
exceeded wage determination requirements. However, we determined that
CoreCivic may not have complied with Service Contract Labor Standards that
89 For presentation purposes, this figure lists three occupation codes, titles, and wage rates.
The actual wage determination would contain hundreds of occupational codes that span several pages.

61

 require payment of any cash in lieu of fringe benefits in a timely manner. In
addition, during our commissary transaction testing, we learned that CoreCivic had
requested and the USMS paid $103,271 in unallowable price adjustments for
Commissary Worker positions and needed to correct future invoices to ensure that
it did not pay CoreCivic any unnecessary additional funds should the contract
continue through December 2026. These matters are described below.
CoreCivic’s “Sick Account” May Be Non-Compliant with Federal Labor Standards
CoreCivic’s Health and Welfare benefits for Service Contract Labor Standards
non-exempt employees include health insurance, life insurance, a 401(k) retirement
account, and sick leave. According to CoreCivic’s Benefits Handbooks, eligible
employees accrue 1.54 hours of sick leave per bi-weekly pay period, up to
maximum of 40 hours for 2015. The Boon Group, as part of its effort to ensure
that CoreCivic employees are paid the required amount of fringe benefits, tracks
the monetary cost of CoreCivic employees’ sick leave. Typically, a contractor
calculates the cost of employees’ annual sick leave by multiplying their respective
pay rates by the maximum amount of earnable sick leave.90 This did not occur.
Instead, the Boon Group calculated contributions to the employee “sick account” by
first aggregating the cost of other employee benefits - health insurance, life
insurance, and 401(k) retirement - then subtracting this cost from the Health &
Welfare benefits required by the wage determination. The Boon Group allocated
the difference to the sick account. In essence, CoreCivic contributions to the sick
account are a “plug” or reconciling figure and not based on CoreCivic’s actual cost
of providing sick leave.
For example, in March 2015 CoreCivic had to provide employees benefits
costing $643 to comply with the wage determination.91 CoreCivic provided many of
its full-time correctional officers with insurance and retirement benefits costing
$558, and then allocated the remaining $85 to these employees’ sick accounts.
However, during this timeframe these correctional officers only accrued 3.08 hours
of sick leave (1.54 hours per pay period x 2 pay periods) valued at $58. The
difference of $27 represents a contribution of funds to the sick account in excess of
CoreCivic’s actual monetary cost of providing usable sick leave to its employees.
CoreCivic officials confirmed that the 1.54 hours of sick leave earned per pay period
represents the sick leave available to employees, regardless of the amount of funds
contained in the Boon Group sick account. In other words, correctional officers
could exhaust all of their accrued sick leave, yet still have a positive balance in their
Boon Group sick account. To further demonstrate the inconsistency, we selected a
judgmental sample of 18 employees and compared their accrued sick leave
balances maintained by CoreCivic, to their respective sick account balances

For example, in 2015 a full-time correctional officer would earn 40 hours of sick leave
valued at $755.60 (40 hours x $18.89 pay rate).
90

91

In March 2015 there were two pay periods.

62

 maintained by the Boon Group.92 As shown in Table 9, the Boon Group’s sick
account balances were greater than the actual accrued sick hours for 16 of 18
employees, and the 18 employees’ Boon Group sick account balances contained on
average 131 more hours of sick leave, worth $2,511, than their CoreCivic accrued
sick leave balances.93
Table 9
Differences In CoreCivic Accrued Sick Leave
and Boon Group Sick Accounts (Dollars & Hours)

N O.

EMPLOYEE POSITION

1
2
3
4
5
6

Case Manager
Corr. Officer
Sr. Corr. Officer
Sr. Corr. Officer
Corr. Officer
Corr. Officer
Warehouse/
Comm. Worker
Corr. Officer
Corr. Officer
Corr. Officer
Corr. Officer
Corr. Officer
Corr. Officer
Licensed Practical
Nurse
Case Manager
Corr. Counselor
Sr. Corr. Officer

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Corr. Officer
AVERAGE

CORECIVIC
ACCRUED
SICK LEAVE
BALANCE
(HOURS)
168
30
254
266
177
164

BOON
GROUP
SICK
ACCOUNT
BALANCE
(HOURS)
312
143
464
412
335
325

DIFF.
(HOURS)
144
113
210
146
158
161

CORECIVIC
ACCRUED
SICK LEAVE
BALANCE
($)
$ 3,328
559
5,032
5,271
3,338
3,102

BOON
GROUP
SICK
ACCOUNT
BALANCE
($)
$ 6,199
2,709
9,178
8,156
6,332
6,135

DIFF.
($)
$ 2,871
2,150
4,146
2,885
2,994
3,033

2
27
357
174
7
120
31

186
19
573
386
195
249
229

184
(8)
216
212
188
129
198

48
506
6,747
3,295
140
2,259
577

3,588
355
10,831
7,288
3,693
4,704
4,326

3,540
(151)
4,084
3,993
3,553
2,445
3,749

18
715
31

26
688
112

8
(27)
81

348
14,616
604

512
14,063
2,215

164
(553)
1,611

415
5

473
193

58
188

8,214
100

9,360
3,646

1,146
3,546

165

296

131

$3,227

$5,738

$2,511

Source: CoreCivic Employee Leave Statements and Boon Group Fringe Benefit Reports

Excess funds accumulate within the Boon Group sick accounts and are not
available to CoreCivic personnel until their termination, transfer to a non-SCLS
This comparison required the OIG convert the Boon Group’s sick account balance from
dollars to hours. Included in this sample are 12 individuals who have since left CoreCivic.
92

In some instances, CoreCivic employees’ accrued sick leave balances were greater than
their Boon Group sick account balances (e.g., Table 9, nos. 8 and 15). CoreCivic officials said this
may be applicable to long-tenured employees with accrued sick leave balances prior to the
establishment of the Boon Group sick account. Specifically, when the Boon Group sick account was
established in 2004, employees’ accrued sick leave balances were not transferred into it. Therefore
long-tenured employees could maintain more accrued sick leave than what is contained in their Boon
Group sick accounts.
93

63

 facility, or upon a change in status from a non-exempt SCLS position to an exempt
position. At this time, employees are issued a check for the sick account balance.
For example, one of the Correctional Officers that ended his employment at
CoreCivic in 2015 (Table 9, no. 11) departed with an accrued sick leave balance of
7 hours, and in addition to receiving the cash value of this 7 hours, also received a
payment of $3,553, the equivalent of 188 additional hours, based on the balance in
the Boon Group sick account.
Given CoreCivic’s methodology, its characterization of the sick account as a
“bona fide” fringe benefit appears inconsistent with federal requirements because
the primary purpose of the excess funds does not appear to be to provide
systematically for the payment of benefits to employees.94 Furthermore, to be
considered a “bona fide” fringe benefit, the provision of the benefits plan must be
specified and communicated in writing to the affected employees.95 After reviewing
CoreCivic’s Employee Benefits Handbooks and speaking with LDC’s Human
Resources official, we concluded that CoreCivic had not adequately communicated
the “sick account” benefit to its employees. CoreCivic Policy 3-5-1, Paid Leave
Benefits (SCA Employees) states that employee sick leave balances are maintained
by a third party administrator, but neither provides the Boon Group’s name or
contact information, nor does it explain the Boon Group’s process for calculating the
sick account contribution or that the contribution contains funds greater than the
value of accrued sick leave that are paid upon an employee’s termination, transfer,
or upon a change in SCLS-status. LDC’s Human Resources official said all LDC
employees have access to an employee portal which gives their accrued sick leave
balance/used, paid time off balance/used, holidays used, and projected leave
amounts for the year. However, the employee portal does not provide employee’s
sick account balances, as maintained by the Boon Group, and the LDC’s Human
Resources administrator was not aware of it.
We believe that the Boon Group’s sick accounts likely represent a
combination of sick leave and what could be interpreted as “cash equivalents.”
Federal regulations state that fringe benefit obligations may be discharged by
paying employees a cash amount per hour instead of fringe benefits. Importantly,
such cash equivalents must be paid to employees on their regular payday. Because
CoreCivic withheld these funds for months or years before disbursement to
employees, its sick account may not comply with 29 C.F.R. § 4.177(c)(1),
Furnishing Cash Equivalents.96 This appears to be a systemic issue as CoreCivic
uses this process at all its USMS and BOP-contracted facilities.
CoreCivic officials disagreed with the OIG’s concerns and provided a DOL
memorandum dated August 2003 that CoreCivic believed justified its methodology
94

29 C.F.R. §4.171(a)(2) (2013).

95

29 C.F.R. §4.171(a)(1) (2013).

96 This requirement is also described in 29 C.F.R. § 4.165(a)(1) (2013), Wage Payment and
Fringe Benefits – in General.

64

 for contributing funds to its sick account.97 The memorandum stated that the
Service Contract Act and accompanying regulations permitted use of a sick leave
policy provided that the policy meets several conditions. One of the conditions was
that [OIG emphasis in italics] “the amount contributed by the contractor
approximately represents the actual rate of costs or contributions required to
provide paid sick leave benefits to each participating employee.” CoreCivic officials
acknowledged that their methodology to calculate and allocate funds to the sick
account may not be the most accurate, but contended that it approximates the
actual cost and is therefore compliant. However, we noted that the 18 employees
we sampled had Boon Group sick account balances with an average of 131 more
hours of sick leave than was accrued and usable; an 80 percent difference. We do
not agree that significant differences such as these meet a reasonable definition of
“approximate.”
To remedy this matter, we recommend that the USMS work with DOL, and as
necessary CoreCivic, to determine whether placing funds that are significantly in
excess of the actual cost of employees’ accrued sick leave balances into a “sick
account,” and not making the excess funds available to employees on their regular
payday, is a proper fringe benefit practice. We also recommend that the USMS
ensures that CoreCivic properly communicates the “sick account” benefit to its
employees.
Unallowable Commissary-Related Service Contract Labor Standards Price
Adjustments
As stated earlier, if a change in the LDC’s wage determination results in
additional compensation owed to CoreCivic employees, CoreCivic is entitled to a
price adjustment from the USMS equal to the amount of additional wages and
benefits CoreCivic was required to pay its employees. This price adjustment is
applied to CoreCivic’s monthly invoice by increasing the MOP.
One of CoreCivic’s obligations under the LDC contract is to operate a
commissary. CoreCivic employs two to three commissary workers and recovers
their staffing costs from commissary revenue. Therefore, these commissary
workers’ salaries and benefits were not priced into the LDC contract’s MOP and
CoreCivic is not eligible to request price adjustments for those positions. However,
CoreCivic had been incorrectly requesting price adjustments for these commissary
worker positions dating back to 2008 and the USMS approved these unallowable
price adjustments and increased the LDC’s MOP. Accordingly, from June 2008 to
April 2016, CoreCivic received $103,271 in unallowable price adjustments.
CoreCivic officials stated that requesting price adjustments for these commissary
worker positions was a mistake.

97 The memorandum was issued by the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division to the Contractors
Employee Benefits Association, Inc., dated August 8, 2003.

65

 Unless the MOP is reduced, the unallowable commissary-related price
adjustments will continue to be reflected in CoreCivic’s monthly invoices from
May 2016 through the end of the contract in December 2026, assuming all options
are exercised. To determine the necessary MOP reduction, we analyzed the 9
contract modifications containing improper commissary-related price adjustments
and calculated their cumulative increase to the MOP, which totaled $1,597 per
month (our methodology to calculate the MOP and the questioned costs are
contained in Appendix 2). In March 2017, the USMS issued a contract modification
to CoreCivic to recover unallowable price adjustments and modify the MOP to
reflect the proper monthly price. Therefore, we do not make any recommendations
relating to the unallowable commissary-related SCLS adjustments.
Transaction Testing of CoreCivic Invoices and Commissary Expenditures
To ensure that CoreCivic’s billings were accurate and complete, we reviewed
the invoices in a sample consisting of 15 months within the scope of the contract.
We found that contractor invoices for housing were generally calculated accurately,
invoiced, authorized, and supported by proper documentation.
Also, in order to test the controls put in place for commissary funds we
reviewed the expenditures recorded in the commissary accounting records. We
selected a judgmental sample of 15 transactions to test the controls in place for the
commissary checking account as well as to ensure that expenses for commissary
operations and detainee welfare were appropriate.98 We determined that the
transactions were accurate, based on supporting documentation, and properly
approved and received.
Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System (JPATS) Transactions
At the beginning of our audit, CoreCivic informed us that it was conducting a
review of transportation services provided to USMS under the LDC contract. After
the USMS raised questions about discrepancies in mileage figures recorded on a
CoreCivic transportation invoice, CoreCivic discovered that it had been charging the
USMS for guard hours and mileage while in transit from their duty station in
Tennessee to the LDC, which did not involve the transfer of detainees. CoreCivic
was only supposed to charge the USMS for guard hours and mileage associated
with the transportation of detainees to or from the LDC.
To resolve the matter, CoreCivic provided what it believed was the total
overpayment and correct amounts for mileage for transfers of detainees from the
LDC to applicable BOP facilities.99 We assessed the adequacy of the mileage
Since the control of the detainee accounts is handled at the corporate level, we did not feel
it would be appropriate within the scope of our audit to review the controls in place regarding detainee
funds or movement of individual detainee's accounts.
98

99 For our sample, we did not assess what the adequate amount charged for guard hours and
for mileage since this issue is under negotiations between CoreCivic and USMS. We determined that it
would not be appropriate to attempt to assess the accuracy of charges for these services.

66

 reported for the transactions in our original sample of CoreCivic invoices to
determine if this discovery could have been made sooner. Using web tools
available online, we were able to assess the accuracy of the mileage reported by
CoreCivic in its invoices to USMS.100 Specifically, in 11 of the 13 months in our
billings sample that included JPATS transactions, there was a significant difference
between the mileage CoreCivic reported and the mileage we calculated using
applications commonly available online.
We asked the District COR what steps are taken to review transportation
transactions, and how the information in those transactions is used. The District
COR said each USMS district verifies its trips, which include detainee information
and their destination, were taken by comparing the trip reports included in the
invoice to the scheduling in the Justice Detainee Information System (JDIS), which
includes information on each detainee and the facility they are located in. This
information is submitted to the District COR. The District COR reviews each
District's submission to verify hours of travel and to ensure there are no
duplications between districts; the COR then submits an invoice directly to JPATS.
JPATS officials then confirm that services have been received, review the invoice for
accuracy, and sign and return the invoice to the District COR. After receiving the
signed JPATS invoice, the District COR also verifies the scheduled trips in the
invoice to information in JDIS. The District COR also stated that they had recently
changed the requirements of the invoice content because of this issue. The invoice
now includes the starting and ending times and odometer reading for each trip,
which the District COR confirms using a matrix of travel distance and times
between transfer locations during her verification process.
In order to verify the adequacy of the matrix used by USMS, we selected
three JPATS transactions from our initial CoreCivic billings sample. We then
compared the appropriate mileage for these transactions using the matrix to the
amounts calculated by OIG auditors. The mileage totals using USMS’s matrix were
not materially different from what OIG auditors had approximated using web tools
available online. We also obtained a CoreCivic invoice sent after the start of our
fieldwork and confirmed that the mileage matrix ensured that the invoice mileage
was accurate. Therefore, we do not make any recommendations relating to the
controls for JPATS transactions.
Conclusion
Our audit determined that the USMS failed to provide sufficient oversight of
the LDC and that this failure resulted in several significant issues with LDC
operations going unaddressed for extended periods of time. We believe the USMS’s
oversight of the LDC was inherently reactive: instead of actively monitoring LDC
operations to identify discrepancies and thwart potential incidents, the USMS often
became aware of incidents after they occurred. Oversight by the USMS and quality
control efforts by CoreCivic were particularly hampered by lack of detention-related
100

The web tools that we used in our assessment can be found at www.google.com/maps.

67

 training and formal guidance for USMS and CoreCivic personnel. Of particular
concern, the USMS COR had no previous contract oversight experience, received no
formal guidance and negligible training, and was located offsite, and LDC’s internal
quality assurance staff also received minimal instruction and guidance, failed to
conduct sufficiently thorough reviews, and failed to address deficiencies with
corrective action. In our judgment, deficiencies in the USMS’s monitoring at the
LDC present potentially systemic weaknesses and risks that may extend throughout
all of its other contract detention facilities.
Stronger oversight may have allowed the USMS to prevent or more quickly
mitigate the impact of LDC’s understaffing. Specifically, from October 2014
through September 2015, the LDC’s staffing levels deteriorated and the
facility-wide average vacancy rate more than doubled to 11 percent. This was
primarily driven by correctional officer vacancies. This understaffing led to several
problems in 2015, including the LDC’s long-term use of mandatory overtime; the
closure of security posts, many of which were designated by CoreCivic as
“mandatory”; and Unit Management personnel being assigned to security posts
instead of performing their normal job duties, sometimes to the detriment of
detainee services. The absence of strong monitoring and oversight was further
demonstrated by LDC officials’ decision to intentionally conceal the facility’s use of
triple bunking, unbeknownst to the USMS, from the ACA in what appears to be an
effort to receive a higher accreditation score by uninstalling the third beds bolted to
the floor of several cells designed for two.
We also determined that CoreCivic was slow to react to the understaffing and
did not utilize all available staffing options to remedy the problem, such as by
requesting temporary staff from other CoreCivic facilities. CoreCivic instead
exacerbated LDC understaffing by temporarily transferring its personnel to other
CoreCivic facilities, which in one instance led to a significant reduction in the size of
the LDC’s already shorthanded Special Operations Response Team, weakening its
ability to operate effectively and fulfill its mission in the event of a significant
incident. The USMS also contributed to the LDC’s staffing deficiencies by
authorizing CoreCivic’s request in 2014 to transfer a small contingent of LDC
personnel to Dilley, Texas, to help CoreCivic operate the then recently opened
South Texas Family Residential Center. If staff is indeed the most indispensable,
important, and expensive resource in corrections as noted by the Department’s
National Institute of Corrections, CoreCivic’s and the USMS’s efforts to adequately
staff the LDC should reflect that.
These issues and the others we identified in this report – such as those
relating to sole sourcing, “sick accounts,” and invoice deductions – should be
promptly addressed.

68

 Recommendations
We recommend that the USMS:
1.

Establish acquisition procedures to ensure that future detention
pre-solicitation and solicitation notices include the widest place of
performance practical, and that sole source justifications are fully
documented, maintained in the contract file, and include all FAR-required
language. This language should include the certification that the
justification was accurate and complete to the best of the Contracting
Officer’s knowledge.

2.

Establish policies and procedures to ensure that, when USMS price analysis
is based on a comparison of historical prices paid, it establishes the prior
price as a valid basis for comparison.

3.

Continue to develop a training program for CORs monitoring and overseeing
its detention-related contracts that ensures CORs receive and maintain a
level of training and experience commensurate with their responsibilities.

4.

Continue to develop and implement inspection guidance, monitoring tools,
and its new onsite contract monitoring initiative for use at all of its privately
contracted facilities, and ensure that its continuous monitoring efforts
incorporate QAR steps, to the maximum extent practicable.

5.

Request and incorporate internal and external audit results and POAs into
the USMS’s quality assurance program to ensure each identified deficiency
was adequately resolved.

6.

Create policies and procedures requiring CORs to conduct continuous
oversight and monitoring of QAR-identified deficiencies to ensure that the
completed POAs are operating effectively and that the CORs document this
follow-up work and communicate the results to POD.

7.

Include in the USMS’s new standard operating procedures COR requirements
for developing and maintaining a document control system and for retaining
quality assurance-related documentation. Standard operating procedures
should also include COR guidance on formally documenting inspections that
include tracking deficiencies and contractor POAs.

8.

Continue to input performance assessment reports for its active contracts
into CPARS, and finalize policies and procedures to ensure that contractor
performance data on future detention contracts is entered into CPARS.

9.

Conduct Performance Evaluation Meetings, as required by the contract, at
the LDC and other detention facilities as applicable.

69

 10. Ensure that the District COR complies with contract and USMS District
requirements to evaluate contractor performance prior to the payment of
monthly invoices.
11. Ensure that the LDC’s QAM request and retain supporting audit
documentation to ensure audits are properly conducted and conclusions are
supported.
12. Ensure that the LDC enforces existing CoreCivic policies and procedures for
generating and approving comprehensive POAs, including: (a) drafting
POAs that sufficiently address the deficiencies and requiring department
heads identify the deficiencies’ root cause; (b) ensuring the LDC’s QAM and
Warden provide instruction and guidance to department heads on the
contents of a sufficient POA, and only approve fully compliant POAs; and
(c) ensuring that department heads complete and the LDC’s QAM retain the
corrective action worksheets.
13. Ensure that the LDC enforces existing CoreCivic policies and procedures by
confirming and documenting that POA strategies and action steps were
completed.
14. Ensure that CoreCivic creates an Audit Procedure Manual or some other
mechanism or process to provide the LDC’s QAM with comprehensive
guidance on how to properly conduct facility audits and continuously monitor
closed POAs. Such guidance should describe: (a) the frequency and
breadth of reviews; (b) the establishment of a sample size when one is not
already specified in the CCAAT; (c) the maintenance of requisite
qualifications, technical expertise, and accountability by personnel
supporting the QAM’s efforts; (d) the appropriate documentary evidence
necessary to validate the auditors’ conclusions and enable re-performance if
necessary; (e) methods for proper retention of documentary evidence;
(f) the approval and monitoring of the LDC’s inspection and audit
methodologies by the FSC; (g) and the establishment of contingency plans
for conducting quality assurance-related work should the QAM be
unavailable. Lastly, this guidance should obtain both FSC and USMS
approval.
15. Consider implementing policies and procedures similar to those of the BOP
that independently evaluate contractor-provided detainee mortality reports.
16. Monitor LDC compliance with the new CoreCivic policies and post orders
related to recreation yard searches and detainee movement in the SHU, to
ensure they are operating effectively.

70

 17. Ensure that CoreCivic establish policies and procedures that prevent the
closure of mandatory posts at CoreCivic’s USMS contracted facilities and
require FSC assess completed shift rosters to determine if facilities are
adequately filling their security-related posts.
18. Include in its contract monitoring program staffing-related procedure steps
that help District CORs assess facility staffing trends and determine if post
closures are occurring.
19. Incorporate milestones into its price reduction guidance to ensure a more
efficient and expedient submission of final price reduction decisions to its
contractors.
20. Ensure that during periods of chronic contractor understaffing, contractors
utilize all available options, including the provision of temporary staff.
21. Establish policies and procedures for assessing and approving contractor
requests to transfer staff out of USMS contracted facilities, and: (a) obtain
reasonable assurance from the facility Warden and FSC officials that such a
transfer will not compromise the facility’s ability to comply with contract
requirements and CoreCivic policy; (b) independently assess whether the
proposed transfers may jeopardize facility staffing requirements and
operational readiness; and (c) ensure that the Contracting Officer and COR
approve and continuously monitor the arrangement, respectively.
22. Clearly specify in its new and existing contracts the circumstances under
which triple bunking is allowed, and what rules, procedures, and ACA
standards apply to the practice.
23. Specify for its contractors, in their contracts or in some other appropriate
manner, the use of multi-user arrangements at its existing and future
contract facilities, to ensure USMS maximizes its value and assesses the
impact, if any, on USMS’s contracted staffing, facility safety and security,
and other institutional matters.
24. Work with the Department of Labor, and as necessary CoreCivic, to
determine whether placing funds significantly in excess of the actual cost of
employees’ accrued sick leave balances in a “sick account,” and not making
the excess funds available to employees on their regular payday, is a proper
fringe benefit practice, and that CoreCivic properly communicates the “sick
account” benefit to its employees.

71

 STATEMENT ON INTERNAL CONTROLS
As required by Government Auditing Standards, we tested, as appropriate,
internal controls significant within the context of our audit objectives. A deficiency
in an internal control exists when the design or operation of a control does not
allow management or employees, in the normal course of performing their assigned
functions, to prevent or detect in a timely manner: (1) impairments to the
effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2) misstatements in financial or
performance information, or (3) violations of laws and regulations. Our evaluation
of the U.S. Marshals Service’s (USMS) administration of Contract
No. DJJODT7C0002 awarded to CoreCivic, Inc. (CoreCivic), and CoreCivic’s
compliance with the contract requirements to operate the Leavenworth Detention
Center (LDC) was not made for the purpose of providing assurance on these
entities’ internal control structures as a whole. USMS’s and CoreCivic’s
management are responsible for the establishment and maintenance of internal
controls.
As noted in the Findings and Recommendations section of this report, we
determined that the USMS’s continuous monitoring efforts at the LDC were not
adequate to sufficiently monitor contractor performance of a detention services
contract valued at nearly $700 million. This determination was based on several
problems including:


inadequate District Contracting Officer’s Representative experience and
detention-related training;



insufficient continuous monitoring processes at the LDC;



inadequate monitoring of internal, external, and Quality Assurance Review
audit results;



insufficient quality assurance documentation; and



insufficient mechanisms to hold contractors accountable.

Because several of these problems appear to be inherent in the USMS’s
overarching continuous monitoring approach, we believe they may also be
occurring at the USMS’s other 14 contract detention facilities. However, because
we are not expressing an opinion on the USMS’s internal control structure as a
whole, this statement is intended solely for the information and use of the USMS.
This restriction is not intended to limit the distribution of this report, which is a
matter of public record. Given the significance of our concerns, in February 2016
the OIG issued a Management Advisory Memorandum to the USMS, advising it of
these matters. In March 2016 USMS responded to our memorandum by proposing
several actions. We believe the USMS’s suggested actions demonstrate a
commitment to improving its contractor oversight.

72

 STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE
WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS
As required by Government Auditing Standards we tested, as appropriate
given our audit scope and objectives, selected transactions, records, procedures,
and practices to obtain reasonable assurance that the USMS’s and CoreCivic’s
management complied with federal laws and regulations for which noncompliance,
in our judgment, could have a material effect on the results of our audit. USMS’s
and CoreCivic’s management are responsible for ensuring compliance with federal
laws and regulations. In planning our audit, we identified the following laws and
regulations that concerned the operations of the auditees and that were significant
within the context of the audit objectives.


Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
o
o
o
o
o

FAR
FAR
FAR
FAR
FAR

Subpart 4.8, Government Contract Files
Part 6, Competition Requirements
Subpart 15.4, Contract Pricing
Subpart 46.4, Government Contract Quality Assurance
52.246-4, Inspection of Services – Fixed Price



Justice Acquisition Regulations



29 C.F.R. § 4, Labor Standards for Federal Service Contracts

Our audit included examining, on a test basis, the USMS’s and CoreCivic’s
compliance with the aforementioned laws and regulations that could have a
material effect on USMS’s and CoreCivic’s operations. We interviewed auditee
personnel, assessed internal control procedures, and examined accounting records
and performance reports. As noted in the Findings and Recommendations section
of this report, we determined that the USMS’s continuous monitoring efforts at the
LDC under FAR Subpart 46.4, Government Contract Quality Assurance, were not
adequate to sufficiently monitor contractor performance of a detention services
contract valued at nearly $700 million.
Furthermore, we concluded that the Boon Group’s sick accounts represent a
combination of sick leave and what could be interpreted as “cash equivalents.”
Because CoreCivic withheld payment of these funds sometimes for months or years
before disbursement to its employees, its sick account may not comply with federal
regulations. Specifically, 29 C.F.R. § 4.177(c)(1), Furnishing Cash Equivalents
states that [OIG emphasis in italics]: “fringe benefit obligations may be discharged
by paying to the employee on his regular payday, in addition to the monetary wage
required, a cash amount per hour in lieu of the specified fringe benefits, provided
such amount is equivalent to the cost of the fringe benefits required.”103
This requirement is also addressed in 29 C.F.R. § 4.165(a)(1), Wage Payments and Fringe
Benefits – in General.
103

73

 APPENDIX 1
USMS PRIVATELY-MANAGED DETENTION FACILITIES
AS OF FEBRUARY 2017

FACILITY NAME
Aurora Detention Facility
Catholic Charities
Webb Co. Detention Center
Central Arizona Detention Facility
Crossroads Correctional Center
Leavenworth Detention Center
Northeast Ohio Correctional Center
Nevada Southern Detention Center
Otay Mesa Detention Center
Queens Private Correctional Facility
Rio Grande Detention Center
Robert A. Deyton Detention Facility
West Tennessee Detention Facility
Western Region Detention Facility
Willacy Co. Regional Detention
Facility

LOCATION
Aurora, Colorado
San Diego,
California
Laredo, Texas
Florence, Arizona
Shelby, Montana
Leavenworth,
Kansas
Youngstown, Ohio
Pahrump, Nevada
San Diego,
California
Jamaica, New York
Laredo, Texas
Lovejoy, Georgia
Mason, Tennessee
San Diego,
California
Raymondville,
Texas

CONTRACTOR104
GEO

USMS
POPULATION105
48

USMS
MAXIMUM
CONTRACT
BEDS
325

CCS

21

15

CoreCivic
CoreCivic
CoreCivic

269
3,587
89

300
5,100
96

CoreCivic

681

922

CoreCivic
CoreCivic

572
622

600
750

CoreCivic

301

400

GEO
GEO
GEO
CoreCivic

215
1,092
645
281

222
1,228
768
500

GEO

574

708

MTC

537

600

9,535

12,534

TOTAL
Source: USMS

104 In addition to the LDC, USMS detention contracts were also awarded to The GEO Group,
Inc., Management & Training Corporation, and the Catholic Charities Diocese of San Diego.
105 The difference between the total USMS population and the sum of the individual figures is
due to rounding.

74

 APPENDIX 2
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
Audit Objective
The objective of this audit was to assess U.S. Marshals Service (USMS)
administration of, and CoreCivic, Inc.’s (CoreCivic) compliance with contract terms
and conditions in the areas of: (1) contract management, oversight, and
monitoring; (2) staffing requirements; and (3) billings and payments.
Scope and Methodology
We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
This was an audit of USMS Contract No. DJJODT7C0002, awarded to
CoreCivic to provide comprehensive detention services at the Leavenworth
Detention Center (LDC) in Leavenworth, Kansas. Our audit generally covered, but
was not limited to October 2010 through May 2015.
To ensure compliance with contract management, oversight, and monitoring,
we reviewed the OFDT’s justification for issuing a sole source contract and for
determining the contract price to be fair and reasonable. We examined the USMS’s
Quality Assurance Surveillance Program to ensure the USMS monitored the quality
of LDC services and that the contract requirements were defined and satisfactorily
met. We reviewed CoreCivic’s quality control program to determine if CoreCivic
provided and maintained an inspection system that enabled it to demonstrate
positive performance and identify areas of non-compliance before the level of
performance became unsatisfactory.
To determine if USMS and CoreCivic followed staffing requirements, we
reviewed the contract’s staffing provisions and compared them to the BOP’s,
evaluated the LDC’s staffing policies, procedures, budgeted and actual figures, and
shift rosters; and interviewed facility staff to gain an understanding of the facility’s
staffing levels and conditions.
Lastly, to ensure compliance with contract requirements regarding billings
and payments, we assessed the accuracy of USMS payments for monthly invoices
and examined CoreCivic compliance with Federal Acquisition Regulation
requirements related to the payment of prevailing wages and benefits to staff based
on locality.

75

 Transaction Testing for Billings and for Commissary Expenses
During our audit, we noted that from January 2007 through May 2015
CoreCivic submitted 225 invoices to the USMS, totaling $224,646,247. We selected
37 invoices in a sample of 15 months totaling $36,400,230. When selecting our
invoices for testing, we selected the 8 months that had the highest total and
judgmentally selected another 7 months and tested all invoices to USMS in those
months. We employed this judgmental sampling design to obtain a broad exposure
to numerous facets of the contract reviewed, such as dollar amounts, invoice or
deduction category, and risk. However, this non-statistical sample design does not
allow a projection of the test results for all invoices or internal controls and
procedures. We also selected a judgmental sample of 15 expenditures noted in the
commissary records from January 2014 through June 2015 to test the controls in
place for commissary funds as well as to ensure that what is being purchased for
the commissary or detainee welfare is appropriate.106 Our sample selection
methodology for reviewing commissary expenses was not designed with the intent
of projecting our results to the population from which the samples were selected.
Service Contract Labor Standards-Related Calculations and Analysis
We assessed CoreCivic’s compliance with rules and regulations related to the
Service Contract Labor Standards to determine if it properly accounted for and paid
the requisite wages and Health & Welfare benefits to its employees; to ensure that
the requests for price adjustment were accurate and justified; and to assess
whether the USMS reviewed, approved, and monitored CoreCivic’s requests for
reimbursement. To accomplish this we obtained: (1) payroll records containing
service employees’ actual wages, (2) information on the cost of Health & Welfare
benefits offered to employees, (3) the DOL wage determinations containing the
minimum wages and benefits; and (4) CoreCivic’s request for reimbursement sent
to the USMS. For wages, we compared new rates from the wage determination to
payroll records. If employees were entitled to a wage increase, we verified that
they began receiving additional pay effective as of the beginning of the contract
year, that CoreCivic accurately calculated its reimbursement from the USMS, and
that the request for reimbursement was justified.
In order to verify that the Boon Group and CoreCivic correctly calculated
salary and fringe benefit costs and made adjustments in accordance with
DOL-issued wage determinations, we selected a judgmental sample of 10 CoreCivic
LDC position types (e.g., correctional officer, accounting clerk). For each position
type we reviewed Boon Group fringe benefit reports and CoreCivic employee payroll
records to verify that employees under each position type were paid salaries and
benefits that met or exceeded the rates prescribed in the DOL wage
determinations. This was a judgmental sample of positions, so if over the course of
106 Since the control of the detainee accounts is handled at the corporate level, we did not feel
it would be appropriate within the scope of our audit to review the controls in place regarding detainee
funds or movement of individual detainee's accounts.

76

 a single year a position switched from one employee to another, we included the
latter in the next portion of our sample.
In our analysis, we determined of the span of 8 years, all of CoreCivic’s wage
determinations resulted in improper price adjustments related to Commissary
Worker positions. To identify the cumulative costs, we multiplied each wage
determination’s annual improper costs by the amount of proceeding years in which
the costs repeated, ending at our cutoff date of May 1, 2015. For example, if there
was an annual price adjustment of $10 for these commissary positions, this $10
cost would be repeated in every subsequent year throughout the life of the
contract. Therefore, by the end of May 2015, the cumulative cost of this price
adjustment would be $80 ($10 annual cost times 8 years).
For our analysis of CoreCivic’s sick leave trust, we selected a sample of 18
employees. We selected 12 of the 18 employees as employees who were no longer
working at the LDC, 6 of those were selected for the highest dollar value in each
year reviewed and the remaining 6 were judgmentally selected. We then
judgmentally selected the remaining 6 employees who were still employed at the
LDC as of May 2015, focusing on including positions that were not already selected
by our previous methods. For our detailed review, we judgmentally selected three
of the employees that were still employed at the LDC as of May 2015 and compared
CoreCivic sick leave information to Boon Group sick information from October 2010
through May 2015. Our sample selection methodologies were not designed with
the intent of projecting our results to the populations from which the samples were
selected.
Shift Roster and Unit Team Analysis
During our examination of shift closures, we selected a sample of shift
rosters to determine if the LDC had filled its security posts. If not, we counted the
number of and length of post closures, the posts most often closed, and described
any other discrepancies. For our review, we chose shift rosters during two periods
which we refer to as the Winter and Summer Timeframes. The Winter Timeframe
was from February 1 through March 31, 2015, and consisted of 59 days and
118 shifts. The Summer Timeframe was from July 1 through August 15, 2015, and
consisted of 46 days and 92 shifts. We compared the closure information to
applicable facility-wide staffing plans to note that required posts are filled.
For our Unit Team analysis, we judgmentally selected 33 days from July 20
to September 6, 2015. For each day selected we reviewed the timesheet
information for all Correctional Counselors and Case Managers at the LDC as well as
the AM and PM shift rosters. First, we used the timesheet information to note the
amount of time each Unit Team member clocked in at the LDC on each of our
sampled days. Second, we reviewed the shift rosters of our sampled days in order
to identify when Unit Team members were on post. During our analysis we made
the assumption that while a Unit Team member was assigned to a post, they were
not able to perform their Unit Team duties. Third, for each Unit Team member that
was clocked in for each sampled day, we subtracted the amount of time on the shift
77

 roster from the amount of time noted in the timesheet data to determine the
amount of time that each Unit Team member did not spend on a post (and
therefore spent on Unit Team Duties.) Fourth, once we determined the amount of
time that each Unit Team member did not spend on a post, we compared these
times to the amount of work hours referred in the staffing plan for these positions.
We used this comparison to show how many hours the Unit Team members should
have spent on their duties instead of working on post, when referencing the
required staffing plan as well as calculating the value lost to the USMS based on
price adjustment information submitted by CoreCivic. For example, if a
Correctional Counselor spent 3 hours of their 8 hour workday not on a post, we can
conclude that they spent 5 hours on post and did not spend those hours on their
duties as required by the staffing plan.

78

 APPENDIX 3
OIG MANAGEMENT ADVISORY MEMORANDUM TO THE USMS ON
OVERSIGHT OF DETENTION SERVICE CONTRACTS

79

  

 

QASP for its LDC contract primarily consists of two components:
Quality Assurance Reviews which are multi~day reviews conducted
annually at contracted facilities; and continuous monitoring activities
. performed by staff in the USMS District responsible for the detention facility.
This memorandum focuses on the continuous monitoring componentl
QASP states that ?the contractor shall he paid on a basis as
such services provided for each billing cycle must be determined based on
performance to be The Contracting O?ice'r's Representative
is responsible for verifying CCA compliance with contract requirements,
which are divided into 6 functional areas that contain 46 standard sections
derived from Federal Performance-Based Detention Standards 

Durhtg our ongoing audit, we are finding that the continuous
monitoring efforts are not adequate to suf?ciently monitor contractor
performance of a contract that could potentially cost million. We
identi?ed several. problems with the continuous monitoring of the LDC,
including a limited onsite presence; inadequate COR experience and
detention-related training; insufficient continuous monitoring procedures; a
lack of oversight gtndance; failure to monitor internal and external audit 
reviews; and failure to use the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting
System as required by the FAR. Furthermore, in light of what we have
learned during the audit, we have reason to believe these discrepancies are not
isolated to the LDC but are occurring, to an unknown extent, at the 
other contract detention facilities. Given that the continuous monitoring
issues described in this memorandum are potentially systemic across all DBMS
contract detention facilities, we are notifying you immediately so you can
consider what corrective actions are necessary to remedy the issues as
expeditiously as possible.

Limited Dnsite Presence

The LDC contract suggested that the USMS would have a continuous
onsite presence at the facility, stating that ?the government anticipates a
nominal number of staff will be onsite to monitor contract performance and
manage other government interests associated with operation of the facility.
The contractor shall provide an onsite enclosed office space {or the 
staff.? The USMS used contract language similar to that found in the Bureau
of Prisons? private prison contracts, whose enlalitjyr assurance staii's are

 

1 The purpose of the Quality Assurance Review is to evaluate facility compliance
across several functional areas in accordance with the Federal Performance-Based Detention
Standards. The QAR is a headquarters-managed. finely review that is conducted by
experienced USMS and contract staff. The QAR process concludes with an annual final report
and overall facility rating. We analyzed the LDC's reports and observed the performance
of a QAR at the Aurora Detention Facility. Thus far, we have not identi?ed any de?ciencies
associated with the GAR process.

 

80

 

 

permanently located onsite. However, we have found that the USMS neither
stations staff at the LDC does not co-loeate staff at any of its contract
detention facilities], nor does the contractor provide any dedicated space at the
LDC. Rather, the responsibility for continuous monitoring is held by a USMS
COR located in the USMS District of Kansas of?ce {District COR),
approximateiy 30 miles southeast of the LDC. We found that the District COR
performed onsite inspections at the LDC on a very infrequent basis. From
January 2014 through-September 2015, a period encompassing 21 months,
the District COR visited the facility times for approximately 41 hours.
Approximatciy 37 percent of this time was spent observing the QAR team?s
annuai reviews, and if these QAR?related hours are removed, the District 
spent 26 hours conducting inspections from titration,r 20% through

September 2015, or apprescind-ate13.r 1.2 hours per month. During the audit,
USMS of?cials acknowledged that this was not a suf?cient amount of onsite
inspection time, and told us that there was no standard operating procedure or
formal expectation of how much time District CORs should be performing
onsite inspections.

We also identi?ed a potential LDC effort to circumvent jail standards that
We believe the USMS could have detected eariier with a greater onsite presence
at the LDC. Specifically, in 2005, 2008, and 2011, LDC of?cials may have
concealed from the American Correctional Association its use of three
beds in a ceii designed for two ?triple booking} in an effort to avoid behig
found non?compliant with three ACA standards.2 Several LDC staff told. us
that prior to the ACE reviews in those years, third beds bolted to the floor were
uninstalled, removed from the faciliw, and subsequently reinstalled after the
RCA concluded its review. We are currently engaged in discussions with 
Of?ce of General Counsel and a CCA Investigator on this ongoing matter.

Inadequate COR Emerita-rice and mining

- The District COR was appointed in March 2011, only 2 weeks after
attaining her CUR Certification. Prior to certi?cation, the District CUR had no
contracting experience and this almost $700 contract was her ?rst
assignment. Furthermore, the District COR did not have experience in
detention services and relied on the expertise of a Deputy 0.8. Marshal to
conduct inspections. We found that the USMS failed to provide suf?cient
training to the District COR to bolster her knowledge of detention services and
monitoring and oversight. From this District March 201 appointment
through August 2015, her oniy formalised detentionnrelated training was a

 

3 The cone-act requires CCA perform in accordance with the most current edition of the
Performanoce?ased Detention Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities. The three
RCA standards, all non?mandatory, were: 
Rooms,r Cells, 12, Dayrooms, and Endronmental Conditions.

81

 

 

- oil-minute lecture on the roles and responsibilities of the COR during the
pressolicitation and post-award phases of the contract.

USMS of?cials acknowledged during our audit that COR training is a
weakness across all Districts responsible for detention facilities that must be
addressed, and said that options to address the issue include obtaining
training from organizations specializing in jail operations or coordinating with
the BOP on a training exchange program. USMS of?cials also noted that 
oversight arrangement was unique because COR duties were assigned to an
administrative staff member instead of a Detention Management Inspector
as is done in other Districts. mills are Deputy US. Marshals that in
addition to serving as the COP: - are the District?s criminal investigator
responsible for investigating prisoner deaths, assaults, escape attempts, and to
facilitate and enforce minimum conditions of con?nement standards.

Insn?'icient Continuous Monitoring Hcoedures

The District COR is required to ?monitor contractual compliance through
inspections of [the but there was no guidance on what a suf?cient
inspection would entail or how often it should he performed. The District
only documented evidence of inspections was an annual Detention
Facility Review conducted by the District COR and a Deputyr LLB.
Marshal in his capacity? as a Jail Inspector. However, [conducted using
Form 13, Detention Facility Monitoring Report} were not intended for use
on. privately contracted facilities but for facilities operated under an
Intergovernmental Agreement A USMS of?cial from the Detention
Standards and Compliance Branch con?rmed that are not the proper
instrument to review the LDC or an},r other contracted facility, and are much
less comprehensive and arduous than an annual OAR. USMS Policy Directive
93?, effective March 2614, states that the DFR is designed to review jail
practices at lGa facilities to veril?}r basic, minimal requirements are met. In
addition, DFRs are not to he used in lieu of potentially more intense or focused
reviews, and ?are not certifications, accreditations, or compliance approvals of
art}.r sort.? The Chief of USMS Prisoner Operations Division?s Of?ce of
Detention Services said a suf?cient inspection should entail monitoring
- prooedures more rigoroua than DFRs but less than QARs.

The District COR indicated that she also performed periodic, informal
inspections while onsite at the LDC, but these inspections were not
documented, nor were the}r administered in an organized and systematic
fashion. We also found that several requirements listed in the District 
job description were not being performed, such as developing monitoring
instruments andostahlishing a document control system. In addition, the
District COR did not evaluate the performance of the LDC and prepare reports
on its performance, as required. Lastly, the COR and her supervisor were

 

82

 

 

required to develop a project plan to define the inspection ?tori; to be performed
and the scope of the work. This too had not been completed.

Lack of Giddonoefor Oversight

We believe it is unrealistic to expect a single District COR - who lacked
detention experience and proper training, was located offsite, and was
responsible for performing numerous other duties to establish and maintain,
a comprehensive continuous monitoring program of an almost $?l?0il million
private detention contract without the USMS P013 or District of Kansas
providing signi?cant guidance and monitoring toois? USMS of?cials con?rmed
that aside from the BER procedures, which were not intended for use at private
facilities, the POD did not provide the District CORs formal guidance on hon:r to
conduct adequate oversight and monitoring at contract facilities. in contrast,
the Privatization Management Branch disseminated operating
procedures to all its onsite monitoring teams to ?provide consistent giodance
for stall involved with the oversight of correctional facilities under contract with
the Bureau.? The Privatization Management Branch operating procedures
contain oversight staii? responsibilities; the contract monitoring strategv and
activities; and monitoring methods such as checklists, logs, written
evaluations, and perfonnance meetings. The LDC contract requires the USMS
to conduct formal performance evaluation meetings? on a regular basis as
determined necessaryr by the {Contracting Of?cer]?, but we determined that
none of these meetings were conducted.

Failure to Monitor intemol and Err-enrol Audit Results

We also found that the USMS did not request LDC-conducted
internal audit results or corrective actions to identify areas of risk and ensure
that LDC of?cials addressed de?ciencies in an effective and timely manner. For
the USMS to conduct proper oversight, We believe it should, at a minirnum, he
requesting and incorporating into its quality assurance program all connector
internal and external audit results and corrective actions taken to ensure each
identi?ed de?ciency was adequately resolved. This matter is not just particular
to the LDC, but applicable to all Districts monitoring USMS contract facilities.

?ne example of the benefit of monitoring a contractor?s internal and
external audit results is the triple?bunking issue. in September 2015 the
USMS issued a memorandum to CCA stating that detainees; prisoners
will not be housed three persons to a cell, in which the physical design, square

 

3 The Dish-let cons additional duties included overseeing seven facilities in
Kansas, including their inspections, and processing invoices and medical prerauthorisations.

The Privatization Management Branch is located within Correctional ngran?ts
Division and its responsibilities include managing the operation of secure contract facilities.

 

83

 

 

footage and unencumbered space is constructed for 2?person occupancy.? If
the USMS had monitored the internal audit results it may have
identi?ed this triple-bunking problem in January 2014, rather than over a year
later, pursuant to CCA headquarters? Mock ACE Review, which cautioned that
the ace auditors may voice a recommendation that the facilitgr utilize
{vacant housing pods] to eliminate the triple given that this practice
impacts approximately oneathird of the facility?s inmate population.?

Insa?cient USMS Continuous Monitoring may be Widespread

We believe that CCA Leavenworth is not the only GEMS-contracted
facility with a problematic approach to continuous monitoring. As detailed in
this memorandum, several problems with the continuous monitoring
efforts are applicable to all USMS Districts overseeing contract detention
facilities including the lack of detention-related training: lack of POD-issued
oversight guidance; and failure to monitor internal and external audit
reviews. The adequate},r of other Districts? onsite presence is currentlj.r unknown
but potentially problematic, as some District CORs have oversight
responsibilities for more than one facility. For example, in Texas, a single COR
is responsible for the oversight of the Webb County, Rio Grande Detention, and
Willacy detention facilities, which have a combined capacity of erased}:r 3,009
USMS beds, and the latter two facilities are located approximately 165 miles
apart. Furthermore, in California a single COR is responsible for the
continuous oversight of the Western Region Detention Facility and Gray Mesa
Detention Center, 1ctrhich together houae approximately 2,309 detainees. USMS
of?cials said that the COR in Texas receives assistance from [Deputy 0.3.
Marshals in their collateral role as Jail Inspectors, but as previoust described,
the DFRs performed by Jail Inspectors are not rigorous enough for privately
contracted facilities.

Because of the decentralized approach to continuous monitoring,
the adequacy and consistency,r of inspections performed across the 15 USMS
contract facilities are also unknown. The District COR told us that she is not.
aware of how other District CORs operate and they do not communicate with
one another or share best practices. USMS officials agreed that there is no
standardisation in how districts develop and execute their inspection programs
and believe this is part3}r due to district ownership of the COR positions. The};
explained that the districts specialize in law enforcement, not facility

management and are not in the best position to oversee continuous monitoring
and the COR positions. The}: said that POD maintains the organisational
knowledge and experience to create, formalize, and implement a continuous
monitoring strategy.5 We agree and believe the USMS should reassess the

 

5 USMS of?cials' comments referred to the continuous monitoring of privately:
contracted facilities and not facilities operated under IGns.

 

84

 

 

organizational placement of the COR positions to determine if POD is better
suited to provide guidance, training, monitoring, and responsibility for the CGR
positions in a manner that enhances the continuous monitoring of
private detention facilities.

USMS is not Using CPARS as required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation

We found that the USMS was not entering past performance evaluations
into (SPARS for any of its detention contracts, including the LDC contract,_ as
required by FAR Bubpart 4115.5 Consequently, agencies such as US.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and BOP {which also contract for
services from private prison operators) are not be ableto View past performance
on USMS Contracts during their source selection processes in the Past
Performance Information Retrieval SystemF

We are providing this information so that USMS can assess the potential
systemic nature of our preiin'iinary ?ndings and take appropriate corrective
action. Please advise us ?teen 30 days of the date of this memorandum of any
actions the USMS has taken or to take regarding the issues discussed
herein. We are continuing our audit of the USMS contract for the Ravenworth
Detention Center and intend to incorporate in our ?nal audit report any
corrective actions USMS takes in reeponse to this memorandum. If you hare
an},r questions or would like to discuss the information in this memorandum,
please contact me at {202] 514-3435 or Jason R. Madmen-om, Assistant
inspector General for Audit, at [262} 616-4633.

oc: Carlos Uriarte
Associate Deputy Attorney General

Andrew Barker

Assistant Chief Inspector

External audit Liaison

Gilles of i?rofessional Responsibility-Compliance Renew
United States Marshals Service

Richard P. Thcis

Assistant Director

Audit maison Group

Internal Review and Evaluation 
Jostice Management Division

 

5 {in January 20 16, a USMS of?cial told us that the USMS had just started entering
past perfonoanoe evaluation information into CPARS.

5' in May ED 10, the Past Performance Information Retrieval System-was designated as
the goremrnent-wide single repository of cmtractor past performance data.

 

85

 

APPENDIX 4

RESPONSE TO THE OI MANAGEMENT ADVISORY
MEMORANDUM

 

Department of Justice


Utilted Slates Marshals 

Office of the Director

 

DC ZUSJU-MKH

March ll. an?

MEMORANDUM TO: Michael E. Horowitx
Inspector General

FROM: David 1.. Harlow AQW

Deputy Director

SUBJECT: Potential SySIemic De?ciencies in US. Marshals Service
Continuous Oversight of?Contracts for Detention Services

On February II. it}! 6. the United States Marshals Service received your
memorandum. entitled Potential .?ijstemt'c Deficiencies in LES Sandro Continuous
Hindsight Detention Services. advising of signi?cant issues that may be
affecting the abitity ot'lhe USMS to adequateiy monitor contractor performance on its contracts
for detention services.

Your of?ce identi?ed several areas ofconcern arising out ofits ongoing audit ot'thc
Leavenworth Detention Center with regard to the continuous monitoring of contractor
performance. including a limited onsite presence: inadequate Contracting Officer's
Representative experience and detention-related training: insuf?cient continuous
monitoring procedures: a lack of oversight guidance; failure to monitor the contractor's internal
and external audit reviews: and failure to use the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting
System (CPARS) as required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation. You further expressed
concerns that the issues identi?ed at LDC may be systemic across all USMS private contract
detention facilities.

The USMS takes its oversight responsibilities seriously. and has taken. or will take. the
following steps to address these issues:

1. The USMS will improve its contract monitoring by establishing an on-site detention
contract monitoring program staffed by full-time professional contract administrators
(CA) for private detention facilities used In house USMS prisoners. The CA5 will serve
as CDRs under the supervision of the Prisoner Operations Division. The first CA will be
assigned to the LDC in ?scal year (F EDI 6. The CA5 will complement existing and
future operational Detention Management inspectors (DMls). The USMS W'lil see}:
additional positions for the remaining facilities Lhrough the appropriations process.

 

 

 

86

 

 

Memorandmn from Deputy Director Harlow Page 2
Subject: Potentiai Systemic De?ciencies in ELS. Marshals Service Continence Oversight of
Contracts for Detention Services

2. The USMS will devalue standard orienting nrocedto'ca andoontract monitoring
monuments, aimiiar to those currentty by the Bureau ofPrieoris, to assist CA5 and
DMIS in monitoring detention service contract compiiance.

3. The USMS will develop arraining program for contract adminiaoatoraiCGRa assigned to
detention and transportation contracts. In addition to baeic training. and certi ?caticn
requirements, the program will cover detention facility inepections. contract moratoring
immanents. mooning requirements, and concotive action piano.

4. The USMS will conduct a Quaiity Aasuranoe Review (QM) at the LDC in Mayr 2916,
and an additionei unannounced QAR in FY 2cm.

5. USMS Contracting Officers have con?rmed that moi: private detention incility contract
has at least one COR with a Federal Acquisition Certi?cation for Contracting Of?cer?s
Repreaentativea Level ii certi?cation.

6. Effective December 2015, ali active private detection contracts by the USMS
were tended into CFARS, and contractor perfonnanee infonnation is being entered into
the system.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on tome important modern. I look forums! to
reviewing your ?nai audit report.

cc: Car-tea Uriarte
Associate Deputy Attorney Genera!

Richard P. ?i?hcie

Assistant Director

Audit Liaison Group

intcmat Review and Evaluation Of?ce
Justice Management Division

Eben Morales

Assistant Director

Operations Division
United States Mai-chair Service

Andrew Barker

Assistant Chief {tweeter and External Audit liaison
??iee cf Pm?ssionai 

United States Marshals Sande:

 

87

 

APPENDIX 5

RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT AUDI REPORT

 

 

v.5. Department anustice

United States Marshais Service

 

Office (White Ut't'ecnn's'

 

ll itshiugrnn. .va 

April 6. 3017'

MEMORANDUM TO: Jason R. 
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Office ofthe Inspector General

William I). Snelson LOLLMW i) . MW

Associate Director For Operations

SUBJECT: Response to Draft Audit Report: United States Marshals Service
Contract No. with CorcCivic. toe. to Operate 
Leavenworth Detention Facility

This memorandum is in response to correspondence from the Office ot?lhe Inspector
General requesting comment on the recommendations associated with the subject dralt audit
report. The United Slates Marshals Service appreciates Ihc opporttutitv to review the Report and
concurs with the recommendations therein. Our response to each ol'the recommendations is
attached.

Should you have any questions or concerns regarding this response. please contact
Andrew Barker. Audit Liaison. at res?74n?aoss.

Attachment

cc: Scott Schools
Associate Deputy Attorney General

Gary Barnett
Counsel to the Deputy Attornej.r (.iencral

Richard P. Theis

Assistant Director

Audit Liaison Group

Internal Review and Evaluation Ui??cc
Justice Management Division

Andrew Barker
External Audit Liaison
United States Marshals Service

 

 

88

 

 

USMS Response to DIG Draft Report
US. Marshals Service Contract No. with Core-Civic, Inc. to Operate
the Leavenworth Detention Facility

Recommendation: Establish acquisition procedures to ensure that future detention
pre-solicitation and solicitation notices include the widest place of performance
practical, and that sole source justi?cations are fully documented, maintained in the
contract ?le, and include all Federal Acquisition Regulations (FARfHequired language.
This language should include the certification that the justification was accurate and
complete to the best of the Contracting Of?cer?s knowledge.

Response (Concur): We have redesigned our Sources Sought to provide speci?c geographic
information to ensure the widest area is included while maintaining compliance with IE USC
4013 which requires the private provider must be located in the District of need.

Additionally, we new store all Market Research electronically, as well as by paper in the
contract ?le. We understand there was missing information from the 200? justi?cation.
Unfortunately, we did not save in electronic format and the paper ?le was not located to provide
the Audit Team clear supporting information for the sole source decision. Since the Of?ce of
the Federal Deter-lion Trustee (OFDT) merged with the United States Marshals Service
(USMS) we have followed the existing USMS Procurement Policies which provide speci?c
procedures for all acquisitions.

We can provide samples of actual Sources Sought announcements to provide documentation of
compliance with this recommendation. Additionally. we have issued a new Scurces Sought for
the District of Kansas to determine if conditions have changed since our original determination

of 200?.

Establish policies and procedures to ensure that, when USMS price
analysis is based on a comparison of historical prices paid, it establishes the prior price as
a valid basis for comparison.

Response (Concur): Since zoo? we have developed a number of tools to assist both
Connecting Of?cers (CO) and Intergovertonental Agreements Specialists to detennine
fair and reasonable pricing. In 2008, we developed the Core Rate which is a method to
determine a schedule of fair per diem reimbursement rates with private, state, and local agencies
that provide bed space to house federal prisoners.

We teamed with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and Immigration-s and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) to develop the Pricing Analysis Guide in 3003, which is updated biannually.
It compiles pricing information from these contracts and IGAs, creating the average baseline
per-day rate paid by Federal organizations. This document is meant to be used as a pre?
negotiation guide for price analysis only and to help specialists determine if a proposed per-day
rate is fair and reasonable in accordance with FAR Part 15.4044.

 

89

 

 

 

W: Continue to develop a training program for monitoring
and overseeing its detention-related contracts that ensures CORs receive and maintain
a level of training and experience commensurate with their responsibilities.

Response {Cousin}: The USMS will continue to develop a training program for CORE
monitoring and overseeing its detention-related contracts that ensure CORs receive and
maintain a level oftrai ning and experience conuncnsurate with their responsibilities.

WA: Continue to develop and implement inspection guidance, monitoring
tools, and its new onsite contract monitoring initiative for use at all of its privately
contracted facilities, and ensure that its continuous monitoring efforts incorporate Quality
Assurance Review (OAR) steps, to the maximum extent practicable.

Response {Concur}: The USMS will continue to develop and unplemern inspection guidance,
monitoring tools, and its new onsite connect monitoring initiative for use at all of its privatelyr
contracted facilities, and ensure that its continuous monitoring efforts incorporate QAR steps, to
the maximum extent practicable.

Request and incorporate internal and external audit results and
PDAs into the quality assurance program to ensure each identi?ed de?ciency,r
was adequately resolved.

Response (Cot-tour}: The USMS has updated the Performance Work Statement to require
mitten responses of internal and external audits, and Plan of Actions are provided to the CD
and COR within 30 days of completion.

Create policies and procedures requiring to conduct
continuous oversight and monitoring of de?ciencies to ensure that
the completed mills are operating effectively and that the CURs document this
followiup work and communicate the results to POD.

Response (Concur}:111c USMS has developed an on- -sito Standard Operating Procedure
requiring and providing oversight tools to CURE

W: Include in the nevir standard operating procedures CUR
requirements for developing and maintaining a document control system and for
retaining qualityl assurance-related documentation. Standard operating procedures
should also include COR guidance on formally;r documenting inspections that include
tracking de?ciencies and contractor 

Response {Concur}: The USMS has developed an on-site Standard Operating Procedure
requiring and providing oversight tools to CUES.

 

90

 

 

 

W: lContinue to input performance assessment reports for its
active contracts into (SPARS, and ?nalize policies and procedures to ensure that
contractor performance data on future detention contracts is entered into (SPARS.

Response (Concur): All existing Detention Service Contracts have been loaded into the
Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System and we have incorporated
this requirement into our Quality Assurance Program (QAP) to match the (SPARS rating system
(see attached), and to include the reporting through the Past Performance Information Retrieval
System (PPIRS) and the Federal Awardce Performance and Integrity System through
CPARS.

We are currently processing the three reports for three of our detention services contracts.
We will provide DIG copies of the reports once they have been processed through CPARS.

W: Conduct Performance Evaluation Meetings, as required by the
contract, at the LDC and other detention facilities as applicable

Response (Concur): The USMS has developed an on?site Standard Operating Procedure that
requires Performance Meetings.

WM: Ensure that the District COR complies with contract and USMS
District requirements to evaluate contractor performance prior to the payment of
invoices.

Response (Concur): The USMS has developed an on-site Standard Operating Procedure
requiring and providing oversight tools to CDRs.

W: Ensure that the QAM request and retain supporting audit
documentation to ensure audits are properly conducted and conclusions are supported.

Response (Conant): The USMS will review and approve contractors QAM and require any
changes to be approved by USMS.

W: Ensure that the LDC enforces existing CoreCivic policies and
procedures for generating and approving comprehensive POAs. including: drafting
that suf?ciently address the de?ciencies and requiring department heads identify
the de?ciencies? root cause; ensuring the QAM and Warden provide
instruction and guidance to department heads on the contents of a suf?cient POA, and
only approve fully compliant and ensuring that department heads complete
and the 0AM retain the corrective action worksheets.

Response (Censor): The USMS will review and approve contractors QAM and ensure it is
managed by the contractor appropriately.

 

91

 

 

 

WM: Ensure that the LDC enforces existing CoreCivic policies and
procedures by confirming and documenting that strategies and action steps were
completed.

Response (Concur): The USMS will review and approve contractors QAM and ensure it is
managed by the contractor appropriately.

W: Ensure that CureCivic creates an Audit Procedure Manual or
some other mechan'mm or process to provide the QAM 1with comprehensive
guidance on how to properly conduct facility audits and continuoust monitor closed
POM. Such guidance should describe: the frequency and breadth of reviews; the
establishment of a sample size when one is not already speci?ed in the the
maintenance of requhite quali?cations, technical espert?ne. and accountability by
personnel supporting the efforts; {It} the appropriate documentary evidence
necessary to validate the auditors? conclusions and enable re-performance if necessary;
methods for proper retention of documentary evidence; the approval and
monitor-mg of the inspection and audit methodologies by the (El and the
establishment of contingency plans for conducting quality assurance-related work
should the QAM be unavailable.

Lastly, this guidance should obtain both F813 and USMS approval.

Response [Concur): The USMS will review and approve contractor?s QAM and require any
changes to be approved by USMS.

W: Consider implementing policies and procedures similar to those of
the BOP that independently evaluate contractor-provided detainee mortality reports.

Response {Concur}: The USMS will consider implementing policies and procedures similar
to those of the BOP that independently evaluate contractor-provided detainee mortality
reports.

WM: Monitor LDC compliance with the new CoreCivic policies and
post orders related to recreation yard searches and detainee movement in the SHU. to
ensure they are operating effectively.

Response (Concur): The USMS will review and approve contractor?s QAM and ensure it is
managed by the contractor appropriately.

W: Ensure that CoreCivic establish policies and procedures that
prevent the closure ofmandatory posts at CoreCivic?s USMS contracted facilities and
require FSC assess completed shift rosters to determine it't'acili?es are adequately ?lling
their security- related posts.

Response {Comer}: The USMS will update detention contracts and the Performance Work
Statement to ensure shift rosters are reviewed adequately.

 

92

 

 

 

W: Include in its contract monitoring program staf?ng-related
procedure steps that help District CDRs assess facility staffing trends and determine if
post closures are occurring.

Response {Concur}: The USMS has developed an on-site Standard Operating 
requiring and providing oversight tools to CUES.

W: Incorporate milestones into its price reduction guidance to ensure a
more ei?cient and expedient suhm-sion of ?nal price reduction decisions to its
contractors.

Response (Censor): We have updated our Reduction Review Manual to include milestones for
the process.

W111: Ensure that during periods of chronic contractor understafl'mg.
contractors utilize all available options. including the provision of temporary staff.

Response {Conant}: The USMS has updated the Perfonnance Work Statement to address this
recommendation.

WM: Establish policies and procedures for assessing and approving
contractor requests to transfer staff out of USMS contracted facilities, and: obtain
rcasonahle assurance from the facility Warden and FSC of?cials that such a transfer will
not compromise the facility?s ability to comply with contract requirements and
CoreCivic policy; independently assess whether the proposed transfers may
jeopardize facility staf?ng requirements and operational readiness; and ensure that
the Contracting Officer and CUR approve and continuously monitor the arrangement.
respectively.

Response (Concur): The USMS has updated the Performance Work Statement and on-site
Standard Operating Procedm-es to ensure both CO and COR approve all contractor staff

W2: Clearly specify in its new and existing contracts the circumstances
under which triple bunking is allowed, and what rules, procedures, and ALGA standards
apply to the practice.

Response (Concur): The USMS contract already requires compliance with ADA Standards
concerning Multiple Occupancy Cells; however, we have updated the Performance Work
Statement to require USMS approval prior to housing prisoners outside of the ACA Standard:

?The Contractor shall maintain full compliance with ACA ALDF standards pertaining to:
Physical Plant; Inmate Housing; Single Occupancy Cells; (4) Multiple
Docuponcy Cells; Cell Room Furnishings; Dayrooms; Washbasins; Bathing
Facilities; and Toilets. Under no circumstances will the contractor fail to comply with
the unencumbered space requiremcms. a practice commonly referred to as Triple Bunting.
without prior approvtii ofthe Contracting Q?ieer and the District ?3 hief Deputy U. S.
Marshal. 

 

93

 

 

 

W: Specify for its contractors. in their contracts or in some other
appropriate manner, the use of multl-user arrangements at its existing and future
contract facilities, to ensure USMS maximises its value and assesses the impact, if any,
on contracted staf?ng, facility safety and security, and other institutional
matters.

Response (Concur): The USMS will readers existing law and regulations to determine any
actions we can specify in our multiple users' contracts. We will take appropriate action if any
impact affects the services USMS has contracted.

W: Work with the Department of Labor. and as necessary CoreCivic,
to determine whether placing funds signi?cantly in excess of the actual cost of
Imployees? accrued sick leave balances in a ?sick account,? and not making the excess
funds available to employees on their regular payday, is a proper fringe bene?t practice,
and that CoreCivic properly communicates the ?sick account? bene?t to its employees.

Response (Cancer): The USMS will work with the Department of Labor, Wage and Hour
Division, to determine if CoreCivic is in compliance with the Service Contract Act requirements.

 

94

 

APPENDIX 6

CORECI VI RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT AUDI REPORT

 

 

CoreCivic

?155.51! v'v'uezaal?
Vice President. Partnership Developmem

April 5. 20] 7"

Jason R. 

Assislant Inspector General for Audit
I425 New York Avenue. NW

Suite SDU

Washington, DC 20533

Dear Mr. 

CoreCivic, Inc. (CoreCivic or ?the Company?), formerly Corrections Corporation of
America, appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the Draft Audit Report of the
United States Department ofJustice (DOJ) Of?ce of the Inspector General (OIG) in relation to its
audit of the United States Marshals Service (USMS) contract with CoreCivic to operate the
Leavenworth Detention Center (Leavenworth or LDC). The stated goals of the OIG were ?to
assess USMS and CoreCivic administration of. and compliance with, contract terms and conditions
in the areas of: (1) contract management, oversight, and monitoring; (2) staf?ng requirements; and
(3) billings and payments.? Draft Audit Report at i. The draft audit report focuses on, but is not
limited to, the time frame of October 2010 through May 2015.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment upon the dra? audit report and the revisions
that the 016 has made to its working draft audit report in response to the issues we raised during
the exit conference. This response addresses those areas where we believe the audit would bene?t
from further explanation and provides an update on our efforts to meet USMS expectations and
address many of the ?ndings in the report. To brie?y summarize:

- CoreCivic has increased training for its Quality Assurance Managers (QAMs) and
signi?cantly enhanced its Quality Assurance policies and procedures to ensure
greater effectiveness in monitoring and improving operational performance.

- CoreCivic has worked to provide greater visibility into the staf?ng at LDC for its
partners, and we have incentivized employees to recommend quali?ed staff in an
effort to further strengthen recruitment.

- For nearly 15 years, CoreCivic has relied on The Boon Group, a leading employee
bene?ts company specializing in government contracts, to administer our sick leave
trust in full compliance with Department of Labor rules and regulations.

 

 

95

 

 

as: Addendum
Apr? 5, 231?
Page .3 91"?

I. Overview
A. Our Record of Compliance at MIC

CoteCivic provides a diverse range of government solutions and has worked in close
partnership with the USMS at LDC for over 25 years, supporting the need to securely
and safely house individuals criminally-charged with violating federal laws. in doing so, the safety
and security of our liscility, staff, and those entrusted to our care has consistently been our top
priority. Farthennore, we are committed to meeting all relevant contract requiremenm as Well as
the USMS Federal Perfonnance-Based Detention Standards (FPBIJS) and appiicahle sensational
industry accreditation standards.

USMS Quality Assurance Reviews which have been conducted at LDC since
Zilli?, have found facility operations acceptabie every time but once, and those ?ndings were
quickly addressed and corrected, resulting in a return to an ?acceptable" rating.

In January the USMS conducted its most recern QAR of LDC and also rated the
facility?s Operations as satisfactory oversli. indeed, as assessed against the LDC received
satisfactory evaluations in every ?mc?onal area, including secmity, safety and services, and for
nearly every standard.

Other recent reviews cfim include:

In the most recent American Correctional Association (ACA) review conducted in
March LDC received a preliminary score of ltl?ii on both mandatory and
non-mandatory standards. in August 201?, LDC appear before the ABA
Commission on Accreditation nitere we anticipate that the facility will receive
accreditation. LDC previously appeared before the ACA Commission on
Accreditation in August 2014, at which time LDC aiso received accreditation with
a score of mitt-i on hot]: sundries-y and non-mandatory standards

- In March 201?, LDC widen-rent an audit to assess its compliance with the Prison
Rape Elimination Act {PREA}Con1rnissicn standards. The oil-site portion of the
audit was completed on March 22, hat a ?nal report has not yet been received.
Previously, LDC a PREA audit in January 2015 and was found to be in
mm compliance.

I- Also in EMS, the National Commission on Correctional Health Care 
whose mission is to improve the quality of corrections! health services and assist
correctional facilities with providing effective and efficient care, accredited LDC
with the facility meeting 109% of the Whirl health service standards applicable
to LDC and 100% of the impo?arrt health service scandards applicable to the
facility.

Our partnership with the USMS is importers to us, and accordingly, we respect the {316?s
audit process as one ofthe rnany oversight and audit tools that the Government employs to monitor

 

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Mi: Main-isomer
April 5. 2m 7
Page 3 of .l 

contract performance and advance overall contracting processes and procedures. As a responsible
partner that strives to meet expectations and learn from the feedback we receive ti-orn our
customers, the DIG, and accreditation organizations, we appreciate the draft audit report?s
identi?cation of areas for improvement. Below, we provide our response and identity actions we
have taken to enhance our performance at LDC and elsewhere.

B. Our Commitment to Enhancing Dar Partnerships and Performance

CoreCivic Was founded in l983 to establish publiceprivate partnerships for the
management and operation ofconectional facilities. Today, the Company, a publicly-untied real
estate invesmrent trust, is a diversi?ed government solutions company offering high quality
corrections and detention services, innovative real estate solutions, and a network of residential
reentry centers to help tackle America?s recidivism crisis. Core?ivic is proud of its decades?long
record of partnering with the Government to meet the mission.

CoreCivic strives to deliver services in a way that honors our values of having PRIDE in
all we do: i'rofessionalism, Respect, integrity, Duty, and Excellence. We take seriously our
obligations as a responsible federal contractor and desire to serve the USMS and our omcr Federal
government customers as a reliable, dependable partner.

Toward mess ends, we have an established ethics and compliance program and system of
internal compliance controls, including those administered by our Quality Assistance Division, and
we have made investments in technology to permit CoroCivic to be more responsive to the needs
and requirements of our government painters. We believe recent hivestrnents in these areas, some
of which are discussed at greater length in this response, address several of the 016's stated
concerns and, together with management changes at the facility, continue to improve operations
at LDC.

In recent years, the Company initiated signi?cant enhancements to its ethics and
compilmrce, investigations and quality assurance tirnctions. Ethics and compliance became a
stand-alone ?mction within the Company, reporting directly to CorcCivic?s President and Chief
Executive Of?cer. In addition CoreCivic arrangement initiated an ?slides liaison" program at
each of CoreCivic?s secure facilities to bolster our commitment to integrity, reporting and non?
rctaliation. Moreover, the Company?s investigations function was enhanced to improve
management?s ability to prevent. detect and respond to allegations of employee misconduct. The
Quality Assurance Division is making improvements to its processes for auditing compliance with
government painter contract requirements, initiating policy changes to improve facility-level
quality cornrol functions, and redesigning processes for resporrding to internal and external audit
findings to improve their effectiveness and din-ability. From a technology perspective,
management has invested in a new Workforce Management System to better manage, monitor,
and report on facility staffing levels. Together, niece investments demonstrate the Company?s
proawve efforts to promote a strong culture of ethics and compliance, meet our contractual
commitments and provide high quality, efficient services to our government partners.

 

97

 

 

 

Miriam
April 5, so}?
Page 4 qr?

Quality Control

prides itself on nmintaining a comprehensive Quality Control Plan at
LDC, administered lay an ran-site, Full time Quality Assurance Manager Nonetheless, as
part ofour focus on continuous improvement, the Company always welcome: the to
improve its operations and quality assurance processes and appreciates the 0113?s ?ndings and
recommendations.

As noted in me draft audit EDGE CoreCivic?s is ofa comprehensive multi?
tieretl approach to internal compliance monitoring at the facility. The procedtn?es utilized by
CoreCivic to monitor compliance at include annual operational audits performed by full-time
auditors, staff and inmate climate surveys, quarterly self-monitoring audits, security
inspections, ad hoct'inforrnal inspections, and ACA and PREA mock audits.

The DIG chose to focus its review solely on infonnal inspections and quarterly self-
mcnitoring audits. Braid Audit Report at 28. With respect to these two monitoring procedures,
the draft audit report identi?ed areas for improvement in our processes. For example, the report
observes that udtlt respect to salinmonitoring and informal inspections, CoreCivic could do a better
job of documenting its audits and managing its Plans of Action (POM) to address
identi?ed shortcomings. The audit also ?etmd that 0AM would bene?t ?'orn additional
gtddance.

We acknowledge that LDC's audits can be improved. As part of CoreCivic's ongoing
commitment to improving continuously our quality asstnance processes across the organization,
we have implemenmd a ntunber of improvements and enhancements relevant to an evaluation of
our Leavenworth program. Below is a of the improvements and enhancements we have
initiated to date.

1- Root Cause analysis Training. Between July and September of 2016, we provided our
facility QAMs and some depahnent heads With refresher ?Root Cause Analysis Training?.
This training provided instruction on the importance of and methods for determining the
root cause of a de?ciency and provided several realaworld, corrections-based examples.
Afterwards, QAMs ?tore provided with a copy of the nothing motorists and W313
ettcotnaged to share the training with the dcparonent heads in their facilities. Going
forward, root came analysis refresher training will be provided annually to all facility
levls. Facility overdone, Administrative Duty Of?cer (ADD) stall?, and departs-tent 
also will be encouraged to participate in this trait-ring.

I Plan ofAetion Training. In OctoberandNovernher 20m, CoreCivic?s Quality deem-mice
Division also provided training to {2th on developing and dra?ing e?'ective POAS. This
training focused on the overall FDA process (identify the de?ciency, determine root cause,
develop the FDA, implement the PDA, documentt'validate FDA. implementation, and
verify POA e??ectiveness}, the QAM's role in developing and processing FOAs, key
components of effective Poss, and tips for drafting effective POM Like the re?eeiter
training discussed above, the training covered several real-world, corrections~based

 

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Mr. Mormon

April 5, 26?! 
Pagejofl'd

examples. A?er attending the training, QAlvls received copies of me training materials
and were encouraged to share the training with department heads and others at their
facilities. Going forward, refresher training on developing and writing e??ective i'DAs will
be provided armaaliy to all facility QAMs. Facility wardens, ADD staff, and department
heads also will be encouraged to participate in this training.

Enhancement of Quality Assurance Felicia and Procedures. CorcCivic is in the
process of substantially revising and enhancing its FDA policy and renaming it tlteAedr?tr.
dupes-?fiend and Comedic Action policy. We believe that the revised Audits, Impatiens,
and Corrective Action policy, which we expect to ?nalize on or before May 1, 2131?,
addresses many of the recommendations outlined in the draft audit reporL Once ?nalized,
LDC will submit the revised policy to the USMS for review and approval. The
catchments in this policy address doctnnentaticn, root cause analysis, development of
POAs, and monitoring ofP?DAa, as described in. greater detail below:

First, under the revised Audits. Inspections, wad Corrective Action policy, QAMs
will he required to capture Specific audit-related information for each internal audit,
including the date of the audit, the department or ?inctional area audited, a detailed
description of each de?ciency identified, including, where applicable, the physical
location of the de?ciency Day Room of Housing Unit Alpha); the name or
description of any audited or inspected Medication Administration
Record); the deans) or date range of any record{s} audited or inspected; the
description and date(s) and, when applicable, time{s), of any activity or
perfomrance measure audited or inspected (13.3., ?observed day-shi? the drill on
January 11 29?? or ?interviewed four evening-shi? C05 on January E, 21317?).

0 Second, the re?ned policy will provide speci?c instructions to department heads
for the developmn of POM, requiring identification of the root cause and the
inclusion of detailed corrective action steps. The instructions require identifying
the title of the person(s) responsible for completing each corrective action step, and
the date each corrective action step ?as completed or is targeted to be completed.
In addition, department heads are encouraged to consult with Facility Support
Center (FSC) subject matter experts when developing draft POM. Once the FDA
is drafted, it must be reviewed by the facility QAM, who is tasked with assessing
whether the POA effectively addresses each component of the de?ciency, appears
to provide a Iongaterm viable solution, is clear and concise, and includes all ofthe
irri?onnation listed above. In addition. the GAME is responsible tin working with the
department head to obtain clari?cations and make revisions or to the
FHA prior to submitting it to the Warden for review and approval. Finaily, the
Warden must review and approve all POAs.

0 Third, the revised policy will improve the FDA validation process at LDC. Under
the revised policy, depots-treat heads must provide the QAM widt evidence (Le,

 

99

 

 

 

Mr. Mommas
April 5. Z?i IF
Page a of 14

proof of practice) of completion of each action step in the FDA. Such evidence
may consist of docmnentation training records, updated policies or post
orders, or work orders}, photographs, or other evidence demonstrating that the
corrective action steps were properly and hilly completed. The QAM reviews the
evidence and assesses whether it substantiates completion of the FDA. if so, the
0AM submits the evidence to the Warden and will request closure of me POA. if
the evidence does not satisfactorily substantiate completion of the PDA, the QAM
is required to obtain additional infonnation from the department head. Once both
its QAM and Warden are satis?ed that they have received sufficient evidence to
substantiate cornpletiou of the FDA, the Warden will approve closure of the FDA
in uniting (or electronically}, and the (EM will upload the evidence and Warden?s
written approval to the Quality America: data system.

Fourth, the revised policy Will require LDC to monitor the effectiveness of PDAs
on a or quarterly basis. Under the revised selfanouitoring program, if a
FDA is completed for a repeat de?ciency, the QAM is required
to audit the applicable motdremenv?audit indicator at least once per month for a
period of six months. if the requirement is found de?cient during any of the
self-monitoring audits, the QAM is required to reopen the FDA, work With
the department head to reevaluate the root cause, and develop and implement a
revised POA to address lite de?ciency. Once the revised FDA is closed, the QAM
is instructed to monitor the reqtdrernentl'audit indicator on a basis a
repeating the process until an effective longnterrn solution is implonented and
success?rlly monitored.

Fifth, under the revised Audits, Inspections. and Corrective Action policy,
department heads will no iongcr be primarily responsible for conducting facility
self-monitoring audits. instead, the QAM will have primary responsibility for
facility self-monitoring audits, with dependent heads assisting the
QAM with audits in their Operational areas as requested. This change will not only
help that only trained personnel conduct audits, but it also should provide
more coreisteney in the audit process across all operational areas. To carport this
change, in May 291?, CoreCivic?s Quality Assurance Division will provide QAlvis
with training on conducting selflmonitoring audits e?'ectivoly. This training will
focus on how to conduct and document self-?monitoring audits properly using both
CoreCivic and customer audit tools re?'esher training on conducting
self-monitoring audits will be provided annualiy to all facility QAMs.

Sixth, pissiiant to CoreCivic?s revised audit policy, Warden must de?ance:
an emiployee to serve as the back-up in the event of an extended absence or
vacancy by the QAM.

 

100

 

 

 

Mr. Maturation
April 5. 2t? 1?
Page Fafi?ii

Enterpr'Be?Wide Sottware Enhancement. To assist CoreCivio?s Quality Asstnamce
Division and facility (2th with tracking and monitoring each of the POAs, CorreCivio
is acquiring a new enterprise?wide software system. This system will allow CoreCivic
to more effectively and ef?ciently manage internal audits, track and catalog internal
and external audits, and develop, catalog, track, and monitor POAs. The software
system has been purchased is currently in development with facility roll-out
projectedtooecurby?re endonDl?i.

QAM Job Description. In April 2016, we revised the QAM job description. The
updated job description provides more extensive details regarding the primary
mponsibilities of the position as well as the speci?c essential ?mctions the position is
expected to perform. In part, the Updated job description states:

The Manager, Quality Assmance is responsible for managing
all areas of Quality Assurance to include conducting regular
audits and inspections. Develops, reviews, edits and oversees
the implementation of facility policies, procedures and
corrective action plans, by gathering and maiyzing data
related to the operation and management of the facility.
Ensures ongoing facility compliance in accordance with
established omnpany policies and procedures and contractual
requirements.

Manages and conducts audits and inspections of overall
fasility operations and maintenance to make improvement
recommendations affecting the, ef?ciency and quality of the
facility organization, security, operations, services, programs
and budget. Coordinates and assists department heads with
deveioping, reviewing, hopiermnting, and validating

and corrective actions are e?eetive.

I- Audit Procedures Manual. We agree with the DIG that in addition to the training and
the revision to our dorms. {reparations and Corrective Action policy discussed shove,
it oornprehensive Audit Procedure Manual mold be bene?cial to our QAMs and heip
ensure the use of consistent auditing procedures across the Company. In respome to
one of the reconunendations in the report, the Audit Procedure Manual will provide
gen-Brat instructions for establishing a sample size when one is not speci?ed in tire
CoreCivic audit tool or the USMS audit tool. Our Quality Asstnance Division has
started development of such a manual and anticipates distribution of an initial version
to all QAMs by raid-2017'.

 

101

 

 

 

Mr. 
April 5. 201? i"
Page 8 of 14

Staf?ng

The draft ataiit report notes that CoreCivic?s staffing at LDC between October 2012
through September 2t)? generally met the requirements of the facility plan thresholds, but that
there was a higher vacancy rate timing the period from October 2014 through September 2915.
As mentioned in the draft audit report, this higher vacancy rate was likely due to other regional
jets opportunities at that time. We recognize that attracting and retaining quali?ed sta?? is a
challenge within the corrections industry as a whole. At lt'ltnretitivic, we continue to explore ways
to tackle this industry-wide issue. We, atong with the USMS. have initiated several efforts to
provide greater visibility into staf?ng and staff? vacancies. We are also pursuing measures to tecruit
additional staff. These efforts include the following:

. Shift Roster Veri?cation Process. Under this process, the on-shift supervisor
indicates on the original roster any postreessignments orvacated occur
throughout the shiit so that the roster is a ?real-time? record. Within 24 hours of
the next scheduled work day, the Chief of Scarcity or the Chief of Unit
Management is required to review the completed shift roster(s} hem the previous
day(s}. Each week, the Master Scheduler is required to review md verify three shift
rosters from the previous neck using the original rosters. in addition, the Duty
Of?cer (a management nnployee serving a weekly rotational assignment to
monitor overall facility operatiom) perfonns one live review of meters each week.
During this review, the Duty Of?cer receives a copy ofthe cturent shift roster item
the oil-duty supervisor and physicaiiy visits each post to con?rm that the roster
accurately re?ects current postings. At the end of each week, the verified and
signed rosters that document reviews by Shift Supervisors, Chiefs, and Master
Schedulers, along with any supporting documentation, are forwarded to the
scheduled ADO {an upper management employee serving a. weekly rotational
assignment that assmnes the duties and responsibilities of the Facilityr Warden
daring non-business hours}, who conducts a. ?nal review. Ail of this doctnnentation
is retained at the facility, and veri?ed shift rosters for each week are uploaded into
the Quality Mmme data system within it} working days of ADD review. To
measure compliance with these procedures, our Quality Assurance organization
audits the shift mater management process as part of?te annual facility audit.

a Workforce Management System. We are investing more than $9 million in a
Workforce Management (W system. The system is developed by Kronos, a
global lmder in workforce management solutions that are used by other corrections
entities inclwiing the California Deparunentof Corrections and Rehabilitation. Our
objective is to improve into facility-level staf?ng for ourselves, including
FSC management, and partners such as the USMS and to enhance our ability to
malts necessary staf?ng adjustments. At a high level. the WFM system is intended
to automate the application of policies and procedures that guide the roster
management process. This automation will connect Company crupinyees to our
rosters and to employee timecattis in real time; provide an alert when mandatory
posts are not ?lled; manage post and employee certi?cationsdicenses by providirm
alerts when a certi?cation or iicensc is nesting expiration; provide transparency in

 

102

 

 

 

Mr. Whom
?lpn'i 5. 29!?
Page 5' of 14

scheduling to include overtime assigtunent and poet te-assigtuocnt; improve
reporting to partners and establish audit trails for compliance; automate the
different leave types {such as personal time off, family and medical leave, and sick
leave); and generally provide supervisors width the tools to better manage sta?' day
to day and empower employees with infomration to manage work-life balance. We
are tentatively scheduled to launch our ?rst pilot of the system in the third quarter
of this year. After amusing the results of the pilot and making any responsive
adjustments to the system, we will identifyr facilities for a second round of piloting.

a Shift Roster Management Training. Shift roster management is a core
component training for the Chief of Sectuity and Master Scheduler.
Shift Supervisors are also crrconraged to attend this training. The training includes
an examination of key elements of the detailed shift roster review process that is
conducted 
completed and posts are properly ?lled. During a previous training session, Shift
Supervisors, Master Schedulersand Chiefs of Security were provideda sample shift
roster that must be posted in their allies for reference.

I Enhanced Reporting of Vacancies. Pmsuantto Modi?cation ltl3 of our contract
with the USMS, effective July l, 2016, CorcCivic is providing additional reporting
ofstaff vacancies. Speci?cally, every month, CoreCivic submits to the Contracting
O?icer the current average vacancy rate, by deperttnont, will indicatoa any
individual positions that have been vacant for more than 3t] days.

I Employee Referral Program. In an e??ort to hire and retain quali?ed employees,
LDC also ins approved a Correctional Of?cer Referral Plan. The mutant plan
began 27, 231?. Under the plan, the facility will pay referral awards to
employees who refer an iratividu? who is hired, completes training, and romaine
actively employed at the ?cilhy as a Correctional Officer for a continuous period
of six months. An eligible employee who refers a candidate will receive a total
award of $1,000, payable in ?ve installments.

The draft audit report also discusses the implications of Wyandotte County?s use of the
LDC. Our ability to ?exibly and cost-effectively meet the needs of our government partners is
one of our greatest Because of our long-standing partnership, CoreCivio understands
that the USMS will have signi?cant population variability over the life of a facility. Speci?cally,
at the LDC, the population has ranged from ill! to led over the last it) years. We believe that
housing supplementary populations in facilities that otherwise house USMS populations as an
anchor provides the ability to smooth that variability while the USMS retains me ?rst right to all
of the beds in the facility. if the USMS population increases, other populations are displaced. This
approach enables CoreCivic to provide a high-quality service to the USMS that meets their
changing needs at a cost that provides value for taxpayers.

For backgrotmd. the initial pricing for a correctional facility considers both the likely
population and the cost to construct a facility to adequately meet its needs, among other factors.
At Ieavenwortb, there is a fixed payment from the USMS that covers the cost to house 602

 

103

 

 

 

Mr. Melanoma
Apr-ti 20!?
Page rustle

inmates, which falls significantly below the amount needed to cover the risk of constructing and
operating the will capacity facility over its life. Rather than having to hire or lay off staff in
response to charges in USMS populations, requesting an increase in the fixed payment, or
modifying the tier pricing structure to signi?cantly shift the population risk to the USMS when
populations decline, CoreCivic has traditionally sought other permers in need of capacity to
supplenent the USMS when its populations are town. This suitcase helps CoreCivic continue to
offer the USMS a competitive price while continuing to be able to safety and attentively operate
the facility when the USMS does not have a need for the available capacity for extended periods
of time.

IV. Billing and Payments (Particularly Administration of Sick Leave}

Aldrongh the DIG concluded that ?connector invoices for housing were generally
calculated accurately, invoiced, audioriacd, and supported by proper documentation,? the draft
audit report did include observations regarding compliance with the McNamara-
O?Hara Service Contract Act ot?1965 41 (1.5.0. ?'l?tll et seq. In particular, the report
questions whether service employees at LDC have received sick leave bene?ts that satisfy the
criteria for ?tons ti fringe bene?ts.

As an initial matter, we appreciate the dratt audit report?s recognition that CoteCivic
complies with its SEA obligations. As the draft audit report states, ?CoteCivic of?cials, upon
receipt ofa new ravage determination ensure compliance with the wage rates by comparing
all positions and actual pay rates with rates shown in the new DBL wage determination.? Dta?:
Audit Report at 62. Even where the report disagrees with compliance e?orts, the draft audit report
re?ects a limited impact because ?CoreCivic employees were generally provided salaries and
fringe bene?ts that met or exceeded wage determination reouirements." The draft audit report
does not suggest that CoreCivic contributed less dean the required Health at: Welfare 
amounts to the trust. and there is also no suggestion that service employees rcocivcd or will receive
less than the 14er bene?ts that they have canted Although the dra? audit report acknowledges
that CoreCi?c has consistently incurred the cost of SCA wage and fringe bene?ts that meet or
exceed the required minimum aroma-us, the report nevertheless suggests that the
administration of the company?s sick leave bene?t needs improvement.

CoreCivic maintains that the plan under which the sick bene?t is provided is consistent
with written guidance ?'Dl'll the US. Department ofinhor (DBL) in 2993.! In that guidance, DBL
dctemtincd that a plan with the same feattnes as CorcCivic's sick leave bene?t plan would qualify
as a bona fide fringe bene?t under the DBL regulations at 2? BER. Since than,
CoreCivic has relied on The Boon Group, a nationally recognizad leader in managing SEA
bene?ts, to minister CoreCivic?s sick leave tlucugh a trust in accordance with the gu?dance
provided in DDL's 2903 letter.

 

DBL directed the written guidance dated August 3, 2993, to Conn-nouns Employee Berte?ts Assn-await, inc,
which CoreCivic understands is the Eraser more of Boon Administrative Services, Inc, a subsidiary of?Ihe Boon
?rm. Inc.

 

104

 

 

Mb. Massimo:
April 5. 
Page ii of?

Speci?cally, as CoreCivic previously advised the in 2033, The Boon Group received
Written guidance on administering sick leave through an irrevocable trust. We have
enclosed letter with this response. The letter described a sick leave package very similar to
the leave available at Leavenworm: service employees receive a set number of sick leave days per
12-month period hmded by contributions from the employer to The Boon Group.

In the letter, DOL advised that the SBA and its regulations ?would permit a sick leave
policy provided that? me satis?ed ?ve criteria speci?ed in the letter. Since that
time. the Boon Group has administered CoreCitic?s sick leave bene?ts consistent with all ?ve

 

criteria:

 

i

i DBL Clitoris

The Boon Group-Administered Trust

 

?[Tlhe contractor cannot recapture any of the
contrihtuions paid in, or in any way divert the
funds to its own use or bone?t {29 CFR



The Boon Group maintains CoreCivic?s
contributions in an irrevocable trust.
CoreCivic is not and has never been able to
access the funds for its own use or bene?t.

 

?{I?Hee contractor makes payments to the sick
leave plan cu a periodic basis that is not less
o?enthan quarterly {29 CFR 

The Boon Group receives CoreCivic?s
contributions on a bwis.

 

?who amotmt contributed by the contractor
approximately represents the social rate of
costs or contributions required to provide paid
sick leave bene?ts to each participating
employee {29 

The amounts contributed by CoreCivic to the
irrevocable trust approximate the costs to
provide sick leave to the covered service

1 employees. 'l'he differences, as measured by

comparing empioyees? wage rates to the
composite rate that The Boon Group uses in
its adn?nistration, are consistent widt DUI.
guidance. The differences that rernain in the

service employees, such that they remain

 

plan"

costs incurred by CoreCivic without
forfeiture 0r recapture.
?[Sjick leave contributions are hilly vested Service employees are hilly vested in the sick
for each service employee [swarming in the leave bene?ts, with the full contribution

amounts provided as sick leave andfor cashed
out following any of the events speci?ed in
?re next below.

 

?{T]he unused sick leave balance amounts in
individual employee accounts are paid no
later than at the conclusion of the contract or
tennination of employment, whichever comes
first.?

 

 

The Boon Group cashesout the unused
balances when a service employee terminates
employment, ends performance on SCA-
covereti contracts, or changes duties to
become an SEA-exempt employee.

 

 

105

 

 

 

 

M. Minimum
am: s. .201?
Page 12 of?

It appears to us that the dra? audit report dieing-cos with regulationsand written
guidance. Since the EOL is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to provide interpretive guidance
under the SCA. we are compelled to adhere to DBL guidance in these matters. For excerpts, the
draft audit report questions whether The Boon Group?s trust administration satis?es the 010?s
interpretation of guidance. in out?elder. based on calculations involving a small
?judgmental sample" reviewed for the report, Draft Audit Report at 63., the report claims that The
Boon Grouphasadnrinistered the trustinsuchawaythat, accordingtothe dra? report, the new
credit calculated for the sick leave does not ?meet a reasonable de?nition of ?approximate?" wheat
compared to the alleged cost ofprovidiug the sick leave. id. at 66.

Yet, guidance expressly recognized that di?'ercnces might arise in methods of
calculating sick leave by the contractor and by the bene?ts trustee. (CoreCivic undamtands that
that issue is what prompted the inquiry to DOL in the ?rst place.) D01. certainly anticipates
differences will arise, and only DBL can whether di??ering calculations can reasonably
?approximate" each other. DDL has not provided CoIcCivic or The Boon Group further guidance
on what constitutes calculations that ?approximate? each other. CoreCivic is unaware of any
published guidance on that point, ei?ier. Given this, we do not believe that the fact that funded
arnounts in the trust do not notch accrual rates (or the cost credited against the fringe rate}
can call into question whether the sick leave is a bona ?de fringe bene?t.2

Furthermore. the draft audit report appears to question on. timing ofthe trut?s payment of
unused sick leave and states that the trust should he required to provide ?pay outs? of mused sick
leave prior to the date employees cease working on an SEA-covered contract or upon termination
of employmeru. The draft audit report also claims that unused sick leave must he ptoidded as a
?cash equivalent? payment on ?re employee?s payday. Recognizing that this is an issue for
the DBL to resolve, the Company nonetheless does not believe there is support in DOL regulations
or interpretive guidance for such a rule regarding contributions made to an irrevocable SEA trust.3
Moreover, we believe that the 20GB DOL letter directly contradicts the draft report?s conclusion
on the timing of payment of unused sick leave. Notably, the 2033 letter states that 
compliance would most certainly be achieved? if payment of unused sick leave amounts are made
?no later than at the conclusion of the connect or termination of employment, win'chever comes
?rst." It does not. state that mused sick leave arnoimts must be paid to SEA-covered employeea
as a cash equivalent on the employees? next payday. The Boon Group?s administration of sick
leave satis?es this express guidance because CoteCivic service employees receive cash payouts at

 

1 Notably; DBL mam-s have hm identi?ed any approximations of sick leave bene?ts by The Boon
Group during the eight SEA audits performed on CoreCivic?s SEA compliance some 21105.

3 Cot?eCivic also notes that the United States Court Ofl'lml??l? for District oE'CoIln'nhia Circuit has expressiy denied
the claim that an employee hour bani: which inchuies over hustled fringe conoibudcns to a hinge bene?t plan
must he points: cashin an employee?s paycheck stole time the employee earns it. Tom errant at Sons. Inc. v. Reich.
54 F.3d 9m {1143- Cir- 1995). In Martini. the 11C. Circuit decermincd that an hour bank fancied odds remaining frhige
Wbutions {to satisfy Davis-Bacon Act requirements) massed the assemble relationship test for a bmtan?de ?'iltge
bene?t plan became cvn'yelnpleycc received the full value ofthe ?'inge conciliation endeavor cornea-essay this
the earplugs?? received the bene?t ofcvery staffer at the riots that it was earned. Under CoreCivic's plan, every
enmloyoe will receive the full valueofaii ofthe hinge connihutiuu made on the mployces? behalf, uhetha?tlnough
use of paid sick leave or as a cash payment 11pm employment tin-urination or stun the employee sums working on
SOs-covered connects.

 

106

 

 

 

Mr. Morrow
April 5. 30}?
Page f3 oft-ti

employment termination or iftl'tev stop working on SEA?coveted contracts. In fact. The Boon
Group?s administration is more generous than 301?s guidance requires: unused sick leave is also
cashed out when service etnpioyees change duties such that they become SEA exempt.

At bottom, CoteCivic incurs the costs for service employees bona ?de fringe bene?ts as
required by the SEA. DOL regulations provide for measuring Hazlitt bene?ts by the cost of those
bene?ts to the contractor. See generally 29 {117.11. 4.1?2, DOL also recognizes that
third parties o?aen administer fringe benefits on contractors? behaif. Under the regulations,
connectors ?may dispose ofoertairt ofthe fringe bene?t obligations . . . by irrevocably paying the
speci?ed contributions for fringe bene?ts to an independent trustee . . . pursuant to an existing
?hona ?de? fund, plan, or program" for the service employees working on a covered contract. 29
C.F.R. rare}. Further, ?Health and Welfare . . . payments to a ?bona ?de? trust program may
be made on a periodic payment basis which is not less often than quarterly.? 29 GER.


CorcCivic believes that it not only meem but exceeds that requirement. On a basis,
CorcCivic contributes amounts to the irrevocable trust equal to service employees HEW bene?ts
earned during the month. These contributions encompass the costs that CoreCivit: incurs for sick
leave. Core-Civic cannot recover those hands once contribtned, so they are properly considered a
cost of the company at that point. 'I?ltus, based on this timing, CoreCivic satis?es its new
obligations by incurring the cost tier the hinge bene?ts to be provided?biolode sick leave,
contributions to The Boon Group-admir?stered trust. Overall,
CoreCivic incurs costs as required by the SEA so that The Boon Group can administer sick leave
in a manner dictated by written madame?With unused leave cashed out when DOL requires
or even earlier!i

 

Ai?vough CoeeCivie disagrees with the drait slit-lit report?s ?ndings, the Company has nonethelem taken certain
aetionintesponsetothent Most 
how The Boon Group ministers service empioyees? sick leave. CoreClvic also agrees on an mortal basis to review
the balance in each enqiloyee?s paid sick ieave account to review wb?her theme is an messenable creme and. lfso,
ms :1on best address any such ovetoges fortiteemptoyees so attested. In addition, ?te European.r understands
diet it m?jri?lwdto assess inmates forprovitling fringe bene?ts to SCA-ooveredserviee employees as amultof
die recent ?nal rules requiring sick leave. As the BIG is tittety aware. Executive Order 137% and inn-stemming rates
now require paid sick leave for my employees p?'?t?'lnl?g on or in support of man)-r SEA-covered prime contracts
solicited starting Jenner-3tr t, son, or awarded outside the solicitation process starting on diet date. CoreCivic and The
still assessingneittsteps in connection with these 
DIG apprised to die totem an}.r clauses attesting the sick leave plan are nestle.

 

107

 

 

 

Mr. 
,4er 5. an: 
Page I of 4

V. Conclusion

For more than three decades, the Company has been an innovative. dependable parmer for
government and we appreciate the audil's efforts to identi ?r areas 1' or improvement in the execution
and administration ofthc Leavenworth contract in the Future. We remain committed to continued
parmership with Ihe USMS to enema the safe and effective delivery ol?services to the prisoners in
our care.

Sincerely.

MM 

Natasha Metealf 

Enelos ure

 

108

 

APPENDIX 7
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this audit report
to the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), CoreCivic, Inc. (CoreCivic), and the Boon
Group. USMS’s and CoreCivic’s responses are incorporated into Appendix 5 and
Appendix 6, respectively. The Boon Group elected not to provide a formal
response. CoreCivic did not explicitly agree or disagree with many of our
recommendations but provided comments that were applicable to some. In those
comments, CoreCivic disagreed with our analysis of how certain employee “sick
accounts” have been administered. We describe and, where appropriate, reply to
these responses in the applicable recommendation below. The following provides
the OIG analysis of the responses and summary of actions necessary to close the
report.
Recommendations to the USMS:
1. Establish acquisition procedures to ensure that future detention
pre-solicitation and solicitation notices include the widest place of
performance practical, and that sole source justifications are fully
documented, maintained in the contract file, and include all Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) required language. This language
should include the certification that the justification was accurate
and complete to the best of the Contracting Officer’s knowledge.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation and stated that it had
redesigned its sources sought notice to ensure the widest geographic place of
performance while maintaining compliance with a federal statute that
requires the USMS’s privately contracted facilities be located in the district of
need. For example, the USMS issued a new sources sought notice for the
District of Kansas to determine if market conditions have changed since its
original determination in 2007. USMS also said it now stores market
research information electronically and by paper in the contract file.
This recommendation can be closed when the USMS provides us with
samples of actual sole source announcements that demonstrate compliance
with this recommendation, and evidence that USMS Procurement Policy
ensures that future detention pre-solicitation and solicitation notices include
the widest place of performance practical, and that sole source justifications
are fully documented, maintained in the contract file, and include all
FAR-required language.

109

 2. Establish policies and procedures to ensure that, when USMS price
analysis is based on a comparison of historical prices paid, it
establishes the prior price as a valid basis for comparison.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation and stated that since
the contract was awarded in 2007, it has developed tools to assist its staff
when determining fair and reasonable pricing. One of these tools is the
“Core Rate” model, which establishes a baseline for negotiating per diem
reimbursement rates with private, state, and local agencies that provide bed
space to house federal prisoners. USMS also stated that it worked with the
Federal Bureau of Prisons and Immigration and Customs Enforcement in
2008 to develop a Pricing Analysis Guide which compiles pricing information
from contracts and intergovernmental agreements to create an average
baseline per diem rate paid by federal agencies. USMS said this guide is
meant to be used for price analysis and to help specialists determine if a per
diem rate is fair and reasonable.
This recommendation can be closed when the USMS provides evidence that
USMS policies and procedures require the use of the aforementioned tools,
and provides an example of their application to the USMS’s more recent
private detention contracts.
3. Continue to develop a training program for Contracting Officer’s
Representatives (COR) monitoring and overseeing its detentionrelated contracts that ensures CORs receive and maintain a level of
training and experience commensurate with their responsibilities.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the USMS
developed a training program for CORs monitoring and overseeing its
detention-related contracts that ensures CORs receive and maintain a level of
training and experience commensurate with their responsibilities.
4. Continue to develop and implement inspection guidance, monitoring
tools, and its new onsite contract monitoring initiative for use at all
of its privately contracted facilities, and ensure that its continuous
monitoring efforts incorporate QAR steps, to the maximum extent
practicable.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the USMS
developed and implemented inspection guidance, monitoring tools, and its
new onsite contract monitoring initiative for use at all of its privately
contracted facilities, and ensure that its continuous monitoring efforts
incorporate QAR steps, to the maximum extent practicable.
110

 5. Request and incorporate internal and external audit results and Plans
of Action (POA) into the USMS’s quality assurance program to ensure
each identified deficiency was adequately resolved.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation and stated that it had
updated the Performance Work Statement to require written responses to
internal and external audits and that POAs are provided to the Contracting
Officer and COR within 30 days of completion.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive the updated
Performance Work Statement and evidence that internal and external audit
results and POAs are incorporated into the USMS’s quality assurance
program to ensure each identified deficiency was adequately resolved.
6. Create policies and procedures requiring CORs to conduct continuous
oversight and monitoring of QAR-identified deficiencies to ensure
that the completed POAs are operating effectively and that the CORs
document this follow-up work and communicate the results to POD.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation and stated that it has
developed an onsite Standard Operating Procedure requiring and providing
oversight tools to the CORs.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive the Standard Operating
Procedure and evidence that CORs are conducting continuous oversight and
monitoring of QAR identified deficiencies to ensure that the completed POAs
are operating effectively and that the CORs document this follow-up work
and communicate the results to POD.
7. Include in the USMS’s new standard operating procedures COR
requirements for developing and maintaining a document control
system and for retaining quality assurance-related documentation.
Standard operating procedures should also include COR guidance on
formally documenting inspections that include tracking deficiencies
and contractor POAs.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation and stated that it has
developed an onsite Standard Operating Procedure requiring and providing
oversight tools to CORs.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive the Standard Operating
Procedure and evidence that LDC’s onsite COR is maintaining a document
control system, retaining quality assurance-related documentation, and
formally documenting inspections that include tracking deficiencies and
contractor POAs.

111

 8. Continue to input performance assessment reports for its active
contracts into the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting
System (CPARS), and finalize policies and procedures to ensure that
contractor performance data on future detention contracts is entered
into CPARS.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation and stated that all
existing detention service contracts have been loaded into CPARS, and the
CPARS rating system has been incorporated into the USMS’s Quality
Assurance Program. USMS also said that it was currently processing reports
for three of its detention services contracts and will provide the OIG with
copies of the reports once they have been processed through CPARS. As
noted in the report, as of February 2017, the USMS had incorporated new
CPARS-related language into its Request for Proposal template and created a
draft CPARs template.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive copies of the three
CPARS-generated reports and the finalized CPARs template that was
incorporated into the USMS’s Quality Assurance Program.
9. Conduct Performance Evaluation Meetings, as required by the
contract, at the LDC and other detention facilities as applicable.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation and stated that its
onsite Standard Operating Procedure requires Performance Meetings.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive the Standard Operating
Procedure and evidence that LDC is now conducting Performance Evaluation
Meetings (e.g. meeting minutes).
10. Ensure that the District COR complies with contract and USMS
District requirements to evaluate contractor performance prior to the
payment of monthly invoices.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation and stated that its
onsite Standard Operating Procedure requires and provides oversight tools to
CORs.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive the Standard Operating
Procedure and evidence that LDC’s COR is evaluating contractor performance
prior to the payment of monthly invoices.

112

 11. Ensure that the LDC’s Quality Assurance Manager (QAM) request and
retain supporting audit documentation to ensure audits are properly
conducted and conclusions are supported.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation and stated that it
would require that any contractor changes to policies or procedures be
approved by the USMS.
CoreCivic did not agree or disagree with this recommendation but
acknowledged that there is room for improvement for the LDC’s audit
documentation. CoreCivic stated that it was in the process of revising its
POA policy, which will be renamed the Audits, Inspections, and Corrective
Action policy. This revised policy will require better documentation of facility
inspection efforts and results. Facility QAMs will need to capture specific
audit-related information for each internal audit, including the date of audit,
department or functional area audited, a detailed description of the
deficiency, the name or description of the record reviewed, description of any
activity or performance measure reviewed, and other pertinent information.
CoreCivic anticipates finalizing this revised policy on or before May 1, 2017.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive a copy of CoreCivic’s
USMS-approved Audits, Inspections, and Corrective Action policy and
evidence that the LDC’s QAM is now requesting and retaining supporting
audit documentation to ensure audits are properly conducted and conclusions
are supported.
12. Ensure that the LDC enforces existing CoreCivic policies and
procedures for generating and approving comprehensive POAs,
including: (a) drafting POAs that sufficiently address the deficiencies
and requiring department heads identify the deficiencies’ root cause;
(b) ensuring the LDC’s QAM and Warden provide instruction and
guidance to department heads on the contents of a sufficient POA,
and only approve fully compliant POAs; and (c) ensuring that
department heads complete and the LDC’s QAM retain the corrective
action worksheets.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation.
CoreCivic did not agree or disagree with this recommendation but
acknowledged that LDC’s audits can be improved and provided a summary of
improvement initiatives, including additional training, enhancements to
policies and procedures, and the acquisition of a new software system. Each
is briefly described below.
CoreCivic stated that it is providing annual root cause analysis training to
facility QAMs and some department heads, and providing annual POA training
to QAMs on developing and drafting effective POAs. Senior facility staff will
be encouraged to participate in these trainings. Additionally, CoreCivic plans
113

 to provide annual training to facility QAMs on effectively conducting
self-monitoring audits.
CoreCivic also stated that that its upcoming Audits, Inspections, and
Corrective Action policy will: (1) provide specific instruction to department
heads on the development and review of POAs, including requirements to
identify the root cause of a deficiency and generate detailed corrective action
steps; (2) require the QAM and Warden obtain sufficient evidence to
substantiate completion of the POA; (3) transfer primary responsibility for
conducting facility self-monitoring audits from department heads to the QAM,
with department heads instead providing assistance to the QAM, based on
their operational areas of expertise; and (4) designate an employee to serve
as the QAM’s backup in the event of an extended absence or vacancy by the
QAM. CoreCivic anticipates finalizing this revised policy on or before May 1,
2017.
CoreCivic also stated that it is acquiring a new enterprise software system to
allow CoreCivic to more effectively and efficiently manage internal audits,
track and catalog internal and external audits, and develop, catalog, track,
and monitor POAs. Software roll-out is projected to occur by the end of
2017.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive a copy of CoreCivic’s
USMS-approved and implemented Audits, Inspections, and Corrective Action
policy and evidence that the LDC’s QAM attended root cause analysis training
and Plan of Action (POA) training in 2016.
13. Ensure that the LDC enforces existing CoreCivic policies and
procedures by confirming and documenting that POA strategies and
action steps were completed.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation.
CoreCivic did not agree or disagree with this recommendation but
acknowledged that the LDC’s audits can be improved. CoreCivic stated that
its upcoming Audits, Inspections, and Corrective Action policy will require the
LDC to monitor the effectiveness of POAs. Specifically, if a POA is completed
for a partner-identified deficiency, the QAM will be required to audit the
applicable requirement/audit indicator at least once per month for a period of
6 months. If the requirement is found deficient during this timeframe, the
QAM is required to reopen the POA, work with department heads to
reevaluate the root cause, and develop and implement a revised POA to
address the deficiency. Once the revised POA is closed, the QAM must
monitor it monthly until they reach an effective long-term solution. CoreCivic
anticipates finalizing this revised policy on or before May 1, 2017.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive a copy of CoreCivic’s
USMS-approved and implemented Audits, Inspections, and Corrective Action
114

 policy that contains updated procedures for confirming and documenting that
POA strategies and action steps were completed.
14. Ensure that CoreCivic creates an Audit Procedure Manual or some
other mechanism or process to provide the LDC’s QAM with
comprehensive guidance on how to properly conduct facility audits
and continuously monitor closed POAs. Such guidance should
describe: (a) the frequency and breadth of reviews; (b) the
establishment of a sample size when one is not already specified in
the CCAAT; (c) the maintenance of requisite qualifications, technical
expertise, and accountability by personnel supporting the QAM’s
efforts; (d) the appropriate documentary evidence necessary to
validate the auditors’ conclusions and enable re-performance if
necessary; (e) methods for proper retention of documentary
evidence; (f) the approval and monitoring of the LDC’s inspection and
audit methodologies by the Facility Support Center (FSC); (g) and the
establishment of contingency plans for conducting quality assurancerelated work should the QAM be unavailable. Lastly, this guidance
should obtain both FSC and USMS approval.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation.
CoreCivic agreed with this recommendation, stating that a comprehensive
Audit Procedure Manual would be beneficial to its QAMs and help ensure the
use of consistent company-wide auditing procedures. CoreCivic said that the
Audit Procedure Manual will provide general instructions for establishing a
sample size when one is not specified in the QAM’s audit tools, and that its
Quality Assurance Division has begun development of the Audit Procedure
Manual and anticipates distribution of an initial version to all QAMs by
mid-2017. Also, CoreCivic stated that it revised the QAM job description to
provide more detail on the QAM’s primary responsibilities and the essential
functions they are expected to perform.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive a copy of CoreCivic’s
Audit Procedure Manual that contains comprehensive guidance on how QAMs
are to conduct facility audits, evidence that CoreCivic distributed the manual
to facility QAMs, and a copy of the QAM’s updated job description.
15. Consider implementing policies and procedures similar to those of
the BOP that independently evaluate contractor-provided detainee
mortality reports.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the USMS
considered implementing policies and procedures similar to those of the BOP
that independently evaluate contractor provided detainee mortality reports.
115

 16. Monitor LDC compliance with the new CoreCivic policies and post
orders related to recreation yard searches and detainee movement in
the SHU, to ensure they are operating effectively.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the USMS
monitors LDC compliance with the new CoreCivic policies and post orders
related to recreation yard searches and detainee movement in the SHU, to
ensure they are operating effectively.
17. Ensure that CoreCivic establish policies and procedures that prevent
the closure of mandatory posts at CoreCivic’s USMS contracted
facilities and require FSC assess completed shift rosters to determine
if facilities are adequately filling their security-related posts.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation and stated that it will
update its detention center contracts and the Performance Work Statement
to ensure shift rosters are reviewed adequately.
CoreCivic did not agree or disagree with this recommendation, but stated
that the USMS and CoreCivic initiated efforts to provider greater visibility into
staffing and staffing vacancies, and recruit additional staff. Specifically,
CoreCivic’s efforts include: (1) a shift roster verification process that
requires facility management review completed rosters and perform a live
examination of rosters each week to confirm that the roster accurately
reflects current postings, uploading the appropriate documentation into the
Quality Assurance Data system, and CoreCivic’s Quality Assurance Division
reviewing the shift roster verification process as part of its annual facility
audit; (2) a more than $9 million investment in a workforce management
system that would improve visibility into facility-level staffing, and provide
several features such as an alert when mandatory posts are not filled and
tools for supervisors to better manage daily staffing [this system is
tentatively scheduled to launch its first pilot in the third quarter of 2017];
(3) shift roster management training; (4) enhanced reporting of vacancies
pursuant to a USMS-issued contract modification requiring that CoreCivic
submit to the USMS the current average monthly vacancy rate, by
department, and identification of any individual positions that have been
vacant for more than 30 days; and (5) LDC approval of a Correctional Officer
Referral Plan that will pay rewards of $1,000 to employees that refer an
individual who is hired, completes training, and remains actively employed at
the facility as a Correctional Officer for 6 continuous months.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that CoreCivic
established policies and procedures that prevent the closure of mandatory
posts at CoreCivic’s USMS contracted facilities and that FSC assesses
completed shift rosters to determine if facilities are adequately filling their
security-related posts.
116

 18. Include in its contract monitoring program staffing-related
procedure steps that help District CORs assess facility staffing trends
and determine if post closures are occurring.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation and stated that its
onsite Standard Operating Procedure requires and provides oversight tools to
CORs.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive the USMS’s Standard
Operating Procedure and evidence that it includes staffing-related procedure
steps that help District CORs assess facility staffing trends and determine if
post closures are occurring.
19. Incorporate milestones into its price reduction guidance to ensure a
more efficient and expedient submission of final price reduction
decisions to its contractors.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation and stated that it has
updated its Reduction Review Manual to include milestones.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive the USMS’s updated
Reduction Review Manual, and evidence of its distribution, that contains
milestones to ensure a more efficient and expedient submission of final price
reduction decisions to its contractors.
20. Ensure that during periods of chronic contractor understaffing,
contractors utilize all available options, including the provision of
temporary staff.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation and stated that it has
updated the Performance Work Statement to address this matter.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive the updated
Performance Work Statement that ensures that during periods of chronic
contractor understaffing, contractors utilize all available options, including
the provision of temporary staff.
21. Establish policies and procedures for assessing and approving
contractor requests to transfer staff out of USMS contracted
facilities, and: (a) obtain reasonable assurance from the facility
Warden and FSC officials that such a transfer will not compromise
the facility’s ability to comply with contract requirements and
CoreCivic policy; (b) independently assess whether the proposed
transfers may jeopardize facility staffing requirements and
operational readiness; and (c) ensure that the Contracting Officer
and COR approve and continuously monitor the arrangement,
respectively.
117

 Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation and stated that it has
updated the Performance Work Statement and onsite Standard Operating
Procedures to ensure both the Contracting Officer and COR approve all
contractor staff transfers.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive the updated
Performance Work Statement and onsite standard Operating Procedures that
assess and approve contractor requests to transfer staff out of USMS
contracted facilities, and meet the other conditions contained in this
recommendation.
22. Clearly specify in its new and existing contracts the circumstances
under which triple bunking is allowed, and what rules, procedures,
and ACA standards apply to the practice.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation and stated that while
the LDC contract already requires compliance with ACA standards, its
updated Performance Work Statement requires that contractors obtain USMS
approval prior to housing prisoners outside of the ACA Standard. It states
that “under no circumstances will the contractor fail to comply with the
unencumbered space requirements, a practice commonly referred to as
Triple Bunking, without prior approval of the Contracting Officer and the
District’s Chief Deputy U.S. Marshal.”
This recommendation can be closed when we receive the updated
Performance Work Statement which describes the circumstances under which
triple bunking is allowed, and what rules, procedures, and ACA standards
apply to the practice; and evidence that the new Performance Work
Statement has been incorporated into the USMS’s new and existing contracts
23. Specify for its contractors, in their contracts or in some other
appropriate manner, the use of multi-user arrangements at its
existing and future contract facilities, to ensure USMS maximizes its
value and assesses the impact, if any, on USMS’s contracted staffing,
facility safety and security, and other institutional matters.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation and stated that it will
review existing laws and regulations to “determine any actions we can
specify in our multiple users’ contract.” USMS stated that it would take
appropriate action if multiple-user arrangements affect contracted services.
CoreCivic did not agree or disagree with this recommendation but shared its
perspective on the benefits of housing supplementary populations in facilities
that otherwise house USMS populations. CoreCivic said that such
supplementary populations help smooth the USMS’s significant population
variability. CoreCivic added that by seeking other partners in need of
capacity, it can avoid “having to hire or lay off staff in response to changes in
USMS populations, requesting an increase in the fixed payment, or modifying
118

 the tier pricing structure to significantly shift the population risk to the USMS
when populations decline.”
We disagree with CoreCivic’s contention that the arrangement benefitted the
USMS. While the USMS’s contracted per diem ranged from $85 to $98 per
detainee per day, Wyandotte’s contracted per diem ranged from $50 to $58.
In our judgment, the USMS contract subsidized Wyandotte County’s lesser
per diem rate and the USMS received little or no discernible benefit, financial
or otherwise. We also disagree with CoreCivic’s suggestion that this
arrangement helped avoid the possible modification of the USMS pricing
structure. The LDC contract is a firm-fixed-price contract, which according to
FAR 16.202-1 “provides for a price that is not subject to any adjustment on
the basis of the contractor’s cost experience in performing the contract.” In
other words, CoreCivic is not entitled to an increase in the fixed payment
under this contract just because the USMS detainee population declines.
Further, CoreCivic is not allowed to modify the tier pricing structure to shift
risk to the USMS. In fact, the opposite is true; FAR 16.202-1 states that (the
OIG’s emphasis in italics) “this contract type places upon the contractor
maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss.”
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the USMS
specifies for its contractors, in their contracts or in some other appropriate
manner, the use of multi-user arrangements at its existing and future
contract facilities, to ensure USMS maximizes its value and assesses the
impact, if any, on USMS’s contracted staffing, facility safety and security, and
other institutional matters.
24. Work with the Department of Labor, and as necessary CoreCivic, to
determine whether placing funds significantly in excess of the actual
cost of employees’ accrued sick leave balances in a “sick account,”
and not making the excess funds available to employees on their
regular payday, is a proper fringe benefit practice, and that CoreCivic
properly communicates the “sick account” benefit to its employees.
Resolved. USMS concurred with our recommendation and stated that it will
work with the Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, to determine if
CoreCivic is in compliance with Service Contract Labor Standards.
In its response to the draft report, CoreCivic disagreed with the
recommendation and maintained that its sick account was consistent with the
Department of Labor memorandum dated August 2003. We note that
CoreCivic’s response does not accurately characterize the OIG’s report in
certain respects (for instance, in suggesting that the OIG “disagrees with
DOL’s regulations and written guidance”). However, these inaccuracies in
CoreCivic’s response are not critical to the resolution of the OIG’s
recommendation, which can be closed when we receive evidence that the
USMS worked with the Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, to
119

 determine if CoreCivic is in compliance with Service Contract Labor
Standards.

120

 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General
(DOJ OIG) is a statutorily created independent entity
whose mission is to detect and deter waste, fraud,
abuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and
to promote economy and efficiency in the Department’s
operations. Information may be reported to the DOJ
OIG’s hotline at www.justice.gov/oig/hotline or
(800) 869-4499.

 
 
 
 

Office of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice
www.justice.gov/oig