Mam
On Saturday, 'Jr'rne I7, 1972', police arrested ?ve men inside the Democratic National-
C-ornmittee of?ce fer breaking'andrenter'in g. The ensuing. FBI of that incident revealed
that thousands of dollars in checksti-ed to the Nixon re-election campaign had been deposited into

the burglars? bank accounts. After learning that the FBI had uncovered a connection between the

I -- - Watergate break-in and Nixon? campaign, several 'NixOIr. aides?including Maurice Stans,

the ?nance chairman for Nixon's car'npaign?began to express'concem over possible embarrassment
from this connection. Arguing-that Several of the arrested burglars had ties to the CIA, Nixon?s
White House Counsel, L. Patrick Gray, began voicing his concern to the FBI that ?further
investigation (if the Checks might uncover CIA operations.? Other White House staff similarly
urged the FBI to limit its investigation to avoid con?ict with potential CIA operations.

It later became clear that the 'Whjte House had misrepresented, at least to some degree, the
involvement in the Watergate break-in. -

In 1974, the House Judiciary Committee voted to recommendNixon?s impeachment-for
obstruction. Nixon. ultimately resigned before his impeachment. The Department of Justice had
additionally considered bringing charges for obstruction of justice against. a group of former White
House aides, based on the misrepresentation of CIA involvement in Watergate. The Justice
Department ultimately decided against pursuing those charges, citing the dif?culty of meeting its

burden of proof before a jury.2

 

Memorandum from Peter F. Rient to Richard Ben?Veniste, ?White House Interference with FBI
Watergate Investigation,? (Jan; 16, 1974) (on ?le with author). I

2 [d ..

Against this historical background, this article will reconsider the crime of obstruction of
justice in the context of Watergate scandal and the White House?s attempts to in?uence the 
Watergate investigation. It will ?rst describe the elements of obstruction of justice. It will then
consider the strength of possible obstruction charges against President Nixon, based on the law
goveming obstruction as it had developed by 1972, the year of the Watergate scandal. The article
concludes that the success of obstruction charges against Nixon would likely rest on the degree to
which Nixon knew of udicial. proceedings against him and/ or intended to impede those proceedings.

That is, Nixon?s role in efforts to thwart the FBI Watergate investigation, without more, would likely
have been insuf?cient to maintain obstruction charges against the. former president.
A Brief Introduction to Obstruction of Justice

Obstruction of justice is governed by sections 150 through 1517 of Title 18 of the United
States Code. The relevant sections of this Title are 18 U.S.C. 1503 which addresses interfering 
in judicial processes and 18 U.S.C. 1512?1513 which address witness tampering. Congress
enacted section 1 503 in largely modern form in 1948; Sections 1512 and 1513 were not enacted until
1982, after the Watergate scandal. Also of note is Section 1505, which deals with obstruction of
proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees, which was in effect at the time of
Watergate. This article will focus on Section 1503, as that is the primary vehicle for prosecuting
obstruction of ustice and is the Section under which Nixon would most likely have been prosecuted.

18 U.S.C. 1503: The ?Omnibus Clause?
Section 1503(a) provides in part that ?[w]hoever corruptly . . . in?uences, obstructs, or

impedes, or endeavors to in?uence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice? is guilty of

a criminal violation.3 Because of this clause?s general scope, the Supreme Court has interpreted it as
a catch-all or omnibus, intended to prohibit all obstructionist behavior.4 The omnibus clause was
designed, as its name suggests, to reach a variety of obstructive acts broader than those speci?cally
enumerated in the Section's other clauses.5 As one court has described it, the Section "was drafted
with an to ?the variety of corrupt methods by which the proper administration of justice may be
impeded or thwarted, a variety limited only by the imagination of the criminally inclined.?6 This
provision, among other things, protects jurors and judicial of?cers from threats and prevents the
alteration or destruction of documents. It also prohibits bribing of?cials, concealing information,
giving false testimony, and any other obstruction that affects witnesses?
Elements:

In most circuits, to obtain a conviction under Section 1503, the government must prove that:

(1) there was a pending federal judicial proceeding; (2) the defendant knew the of the proceeding;

and (3) the defendant corruptly interfered with or attempted to interfere with its

 

3 18 

4 See United States v. Aguilar, 515 US. 593, 598-99 (1995); see also United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d
1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 1997) omnibus clause is broad enough to cover any act committed corruptly, in an
endeavor to impede or obstruct justice") (internal quotation omitted)).

5 Andrea Kendall Kimberly Cuff, Obstruction ofJuStice, 45 AM. L. REV. 766, 768 (2008).

6 United States V. Grif?n, 589 F.2d 200, 206-207 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting Anderson v. United States, 215
F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1954)).

7 18 U.S.C. 1503; United States v. Moree, 897 F.2d 1329, 1333 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. London,
714 F.2d 1558, 1566?67 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Lench, 806 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Bar?eld, 999 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1993).

8 United States v. Bridges, 717 F.2d 1444, 1449 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 US. 1036 (1984);
United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 694 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Neal, 951 F.2d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Furkin, 119 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 851 (9th Cir.
1981); United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 387

3

(1 Pending Judicial Proceeding

The ?rst element of the offense requires that the obstruction occur at the time of a pending
judicial proceeding. Courts generally agree that obstruction of a government investigation that is not
connected to a judicial proceeding does not fall within the purview of Section 1503.9 Both the
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, however, have held that an ongoing judicial proceeding is not
necessarily required to prove obstruction, as the text of the Section, on its face, centains no such
requirement.?r 0

Although courts generally agree that only ?pending judicial proceedings? fall within the
purview of Section 1503, they disagree as to when a proceeding is actually "pending." The Third,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits11 have found that a proceeding is pending when an investigation is

undertaken to ?secure a presently contemplated presentation of evidence before the grand jury.?12

 

(6th Cir. 1997).

9 See, e.g. United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 105 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Fulbright, 105 F.3d
443, 450 (9th Cir. 1997) (?it is well settled that conviction under any portion of 18 U.S.C. 1503 requires the
government to prove the existence of a ?judicial proceeding?).

10 See United States v. Novak, 217 F.3d 566, 571-72 (8th Cir. 2000) (questioning whether this element is
necessary since it is not on the face of the statute); United States v. Vaghela, 169 F.3d 729, 734-35 (11th Cir. 1999)
(questioning requirement of pending proceeding and holding a conviction for conspiracy to obstruct justice could be
sustained where it could be shown that the conspiracy was ?directly intended to prevent or otherwise obstruct the
processes of a speci?c judicial proceeding in a way that is more than merely Kendall Cuff, supra
note 5, at 769 n.25.

See Kendall Cuff, supra note 5, at 769 n.25 (identifying circuit split).

12 United States v. Simmons, 591 F.2d 206, 208-09 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Messerlian, 332 F.2d
778 (3d Cir. 1987) (state trooper could be convicted of obstruction in connection with attempt to cover up death of
arrestee, even though federal judicial proceeding not yet pending, since the concealment of evidence was intended to
prevent a federal prosecution); United States v. Tackett, 113 F.3d 603, 612 11.6 (6th Cir. 1997) Torzala v. United
States, 545 F.3d 517 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that an FBI investigation only falls within the purview of the statute
when FBI undertakes investigation with intention of presenting evidence before grand jury); United States v. Macari,
453 F.3d 926, 937 (7th Cir. 2006) ("To establish that the FBI was acting as an arm of the grand jury, the government
must demonstrate that the FBI agents were ?integrally involved in the grand jury investigation . . . and that the 
investigation . . . was 'undertaken with the intention of presenting evidence before the grand jury??) (internal citations

4

Thus, in these circuits, prosecution on obstruction charges prior to the formal presentation. of
evidence, or even the emp aneling of a grand jury, would be possible. However, the obstruction must
still be connected to a judicial proceeding.13

On the other hand, the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that a grand
jury investigation alone constitutes a pending judicial proceeding.M Although this rule seems to
more clearly de?ne ?y?p ending judicial proceeding? than the approach adopted by the Third, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits, it still leaves some situations open for debate. For example, in United States v.
2111s,] 5 a Fifth Circuit district court declined to find pendency where an imp aneled federal grand jury
had not yet considered the investigation of the defendant, and had issued no subpoenas. The court
dismissed the indictment for obstruction. In doing so, the Court rejected the government?s argument
that ?an oral agreement between the United States Attorney?s office and a state investigative agency
was a sufficient act in furtherance of the case to a federal grand jury to establish a ?pending judicial

proceeding? under Section 1503.?16

 

omitted) (citing United States v. Fassnacht, 332 F.3d 440, 447 (7th Cir. 2003)); Kendall Cuff, supra note 5, at 769
n.25.

13 See United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (wiretap investigation not a pending
judicial proceeding).

14 United States v. Brady, 168 F.3d 574, 578 (lst Cir. 1999); United States v. Genao, 343 F.3d 578, 585
(2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 26, 438 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Vesich, 724 F.2d 451 (5th
Cir. 1984) (steps taken by prosecutor to secure witnesses appearance before a grand jury were suf?cient evidence of
an ongoing proceeding); United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 1993); Kendall Cuff, supra note 5, at
769 n.25.



161d.at1453.

Ninth Circuit courts have generally considered a proceeding ?pending? where a complaint or
indictment has been ?led.? Nonetheless, some case law in that Circuit suggests that a complaint
need not yet be ?led, so long as its ?ling is imminent at the time of the offense conduct. In United
States v. Gonzalez?Mares, for instance, the Court of Appeals found it "immateria that-the complaint
was ?led-minutes after the defendant made-false statements to a probation of?cer, instead of minutes
before.18

Although there is no clear District of Columbia Circuit rule, the District Court for the District
of Columbia seems to agree with the majority of other circuits holding, for example, in United
States v. Smith that a proceeding was not pending for purposes of Section 1503 where there were no
criminal charges ?led and no grand jury investigation was pending.19 In Smith, the court additionally
held that judicial proceedings which were imminent (but had not yet commenced) did not sufficiently
support an obstruction charge.20

Despite disagreeing on when a proceeding is actually pending, courts are in general

agreement that a proceeding remains pending until the disposition of any direct appeal.21

 

7United States V. Washington Water Power Co., 793 F. 2d 1079,1085 (9th Cir. 1986). United States V.
Metcalf, 435 F. 2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1970); Kendall Cuff, supra note 5, at 769 n. 25.

13 752 F.2d 1485, 1491 (9th Cir. 1985). But see United States v. Thain, 960 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1991)
(providing false evidence to the FBI or IRS cannot constitute obstruction of justice).

?9 729 F. Supp. 1330, 1382-86 (D.D.C. 1990).

20 Id; see also Pyramid Secur., Ltd. V. 1B Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d_1114, 1119 (DC. Cir. 1991) (citing
Smith for the rule that there must be a ?pending judicial proceeding?); United States V. Brown, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 49169 (D.D.C. July 9, 2007) (same); Dooley V. United Techs. Corp, 1992 US. Dist. LEXIS 8653 (D.D.C.
June 16, 1992) (a grand jury investigation is a proceeding).

21 See United States V. Weber, 320 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2003); United States V. Fleming, 215 F.3d
930, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2000); United States V. Fernandez, 837 F.2d 1031, 1034 (11th Cir. 1988).

Additionally, re?ecting the broad scope of the provision, Section 1503 has also been used to
criminalize interference with ongoing civil matters.22
(2) Knowledge of Pending Judicial Proceeding

In those circuits that require a pending judicial proceeding all but the Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits the government must also prove that the defendant ?knew or had notice of [the] pending
proceeding??

To prove this element, the government must generally show not only that the defendant knew
of the pending investigation, but also that the defendant knew that the pending investigation was
connected to a judicial proceeding (usually a grand jury investigation). Courts generally distinguish
mere awareness of a federal investigation from actual knowledge of apending judicial proceeding.24
In United States v. rankhauser, the court considered evidence that the defendant took a number of
acts to cover up evidence while aware of a federal investigation and expected federal authorities to
return ?with a subpoena or search warrant.?25 Nonetheless, the court reversed the jury?s conviction,
?nding that ?there is no way to infer from this [statement] that [the defendant] knew that a grand jury

proceeding was underway, rather than a possibility for the future.?26

 

2 See, e. g, United States v. Lundwall, 1 F. Supp. 2d 249, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v.
Muhammad, 120 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 1997); Sneed v. United States, 298 F. 911 (5th Cir. 1924).

23 United States v. Frankenhauser, 30 F.3d 641, 650 (lst Cir. 1996).

24 United States V. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 237 (3d Cir. 1999) (?In order to violate 1503, a defendant must
have notice or knowledge of the pcndency of some judicial proceeding constituting the ?administration of justice?);
Vesich, 724 F.2d at 457 (?To ?nd a violation of the statute, there must not only be a pending judicial proceeding, but
the accused must have knowledge or notice of that fact?).

25 Id. at 651.

26 Id.

(3) Intent

The intent element requires that the defendant either corruptly and intentionally act to
obstruct a proceeding or the due administration of justice or ?endeavor? to interfere with an ongoing
proceeding.27 The intent element is often referred to as the ?nexus? requirement.28

Prior to the Supreme Court?s 1996 holding in United States v. Aguilar, courts were divided on
how close the ?nexus? between the alleged conduct and the obstruction needed to be.29 The Aguilar
Court resolved this division somewhat, explaining that a defendant must possess the ?knowledge that
his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding.?30 The Court wrote that the defendant?s
actions ?must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of
justice.?31 In so holding, the Court adopted a relatively narrow interpretation of the nexus
requirement. As a result, simply proving interference with an ongoing proceeding is not enough 
rather, the government must prove that the defendant?s conduct had the ?natural and prob able effect?

of . interfering with the judicial proceeding.32

 

2? See United States v. Aguilar, 515 us. 593, 599 (1996).
28 .
Aguilar, 515 US at 599.

29 Compare United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 1934) (holding that government
must only establish ?that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that the natural and probable consequence of
the success of his scheme would [obstruct the due administration of with United States v. Williams, 874
F.2d 968, 977 (5th Cir. 1989) (?the defendant must have acted corruptly with the speci?c intent to obstruct or impede
the proceeding in its due administration of justice?); see also United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 679 n.12 (3d
Cir. 1975) (taking middle position); United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 696, 696 (10th Cir. 1993) (same).

30 Aguilar, 515 US. at 599.
31 1d. (internal quotations omitted).

32 See United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002) (reversing convictions where there was no
showing that a defendant knew that false statements made to federal investigators would be repeated to a grand jury,
even where the defendant hoped such statements would be) Vaghela, 169 F.3d at 734 (?the government must
therefore show that the actions the defendant agreed to take would themselves violate 1503, that is, would have the

8

 Corruptly and Intentionally

As to the first method for proving intent by showing that the defendant corruptly and
intentionally acted to obstruct a proceeding there is some division among the circuits over how to
apply the requirement that a defendant must act ?corruptly.? This division. in authority is of
longstanding origin.33 In 1893, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Pettibone, held that the
?corrupt? element ofthe offense required a showing of speci?c intent thus, the obstruction must
have been the goal of the action.34 Since Pettibone, however, circuit courts have interpreted this
prong differently.35 In the First, Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits, courts have held that the
defendant must be prompted by a corrupt motive.36 By contrast, the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth circuits have held that ?cerruptly? means only that obstruction of justice must be a
3?

reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant?s actions.

Despite this split, courts wi 11 applying the ?corruptly and intentionally? prong will generally

 

natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice in a way that is more than merely
speculative?) (quotations omitted); United States v. Joiner, 418 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 2005) (?the act must have a
relationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceedings?).

33888 Kendall 86 Cuff, supra note 5, at 769 n.25 (identifying origin of division).
34148 US. 197, 206-07 (1893).
35868 Kendall Cuff, supra note 5, at 772-73 (identifying split).

36 United States v. Brady, 168 F.3d 574 (lst Cir. 1999); United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 125 (2d
Cir. 2007) (de?ning corrupt as ?having an improper purpose?); United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 493 (3d Cir.
1997) (corrupt conduct must be culpable conduct); United States v. Bar?eld, 999 F.2d 1520, 1524 (11th Cir. 1993);
Kendall Cuff, supra note 5, at 772?73. -

37United States v. Bashaw, 932 F.2d 168, 170 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Johnson, 657 F.2d 604, 608
(4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 536 (9th Cir". 1988); United States v. Machi, 811 F.2d 991,
998 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 238 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Jackson, 607 F.2d
1219, 1221 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 1273-74 (4th Cir. 1979); Kendall 8.: Cuff,
supra note 5, at 772-73.

?nd the element met if the defendant ?knowingly and intentionally undertook an action from which
an obstruction of justice was a reasonably foreseeable result.?38
Endeavor

Instead of proving that someone acted with corrupt intent, the government may instead satisfy -
Section 1503's intent element by showing that the defendant ?endeavored? to obstruct justice. The
term ?endeavor? has traditionally been de?ned as ?any effort or assay to accomplish the evil purpose
the section was. enacted to prevent.?39 Endeavor is a lower threshold than attempt, and the
government must only prove that the natural and probable consequence of the endeavor is to obstruct
justice.?40

Courts have allowed convictions on a wide variety of theories where those actions were
designated an ?endeavor,?41 regardless of whether the endeavor ultimately achieved its desired

result.42

 

3? Kendall a. Cuff, supra note 5, at 773.
39 United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 133, 143 (1921).
40 See Ruse?, 255 U.S. at 143; United States v. Neal, 951 F.2d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 1992).

41 See United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1314 (7th Cir. 1989) (object of illegal in?uence was
undercover agent); United States v. Bar?eld, 999 F.2d 1520, 1525 (11th Cir. 1993) (af?rmed conviction where
defendants giving of false information to attorney led to government dropping one criminal charge); United States v.
McComb, 744 .2d 555 (7th Cir. 1984) (including false documents in document production for grand jury); United
States v. Osborn, 350 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1978) (telling third party to offer a bribe to a potential juror); United States
v. Bucey, 691 F. Supp; 1077 (ND. 111. 1988) (counseling an individual to lie).

42 See United States v. Erickson, 561 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647
(11th Cir. 1990); United States V. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Collis, 875 F. Supp. 398,
400 (ED. Mich. 1995) (sending forged letter to court, even if it did not in?uence sentence or ?nding of guilt).

10

(4) Application of Section 1503 to Specific Conduct Interference with Investigation

By 1972, the year of the Watergate break?ins, federal courts had consistently upheld
application of Section 1503 to charges of obstruction of or interference in grand jury proceedings.43
Importantly, in United States v. Perlstetn, the Third Circuit addressed obstruction charges in the
conspiracy context. There, the Court of Appeals found that where a conspiracy to obstruct the
administration. of justice had started before, but continued into, a period when judicial proceedings
occurred, the co-conspirators could be charged with obstruction under Section 1503.44 Under the
case law as it had evolved up to 1972, then, if the evidence indicated that Nixon sought or conspired
to withhold information from or distort information before the grand jury, charges could likely have
been brought against him under Section 1503.

It is unclear, however, whether charges under Section 1503 could be maintained against
Nixon based solely on his attempts to in?uence the investigation. By 1972, courts considering
Section 1503 in the context of investigations alone had generally held that conduct impeding such

5

investi ations was not covered the Section.4 In United States v. Scoretow, for instance, the
3?

District Court for the Western District of noted that the FBI ?is an investigating rather

 

43United States V. Cohn, 452 F.2d 881, 884 (2d Cir. 1971) (obstruction of justice includes concealing
information from a grand jury that is relevant and germane to its function); United States v. Cohen, 202 F. Supp.
587, 590 (D. Conn. 1962) (interference with grand jury investigation); United States v. Bonnano, 177 F. Supp. 106,
114 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (obstruction of grand jury investigation); United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812, 814

(S.D.N.Y. 195 6) (obstruction includes the destruction of documents prior to subpoena but after grand jury
investigation has started). 

44United States v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789, 796 (3d Cir. 1942).
45See United States v. Metcalf, 435 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1970) (Section 1503 ?not applicable until, at the

earliest, a complaint has been ?led with a United States Commissioner).

11

than a judicial arm of the government.?46 As such, the court held, interference with an FBI
investigation did not constitute obstruction of ?the due administration of ustice? as contemplated by
Section 1503 .47

Similarly, in United tates v. Ryan, the Ninth Circuit applied the coratow court?s reasoning
to an IRS investigation obstruction charge. In considering the destruction of documents relevant to
an IRS investigation, the Ryan court held that ?an investigation by the Internal Revenue Service or by
any other governmental agency would not constitute a judicial proceeding.?48

Nixon? attempt to in?uence the FBI Watergate investigations is dif?cult to distinguish from
the non?j udi ci a1 activity in Scorarow or Ryan. Though the White House?s misrepresentations of the
interest in the FBI investigation may have occurred while a grand jury Was generally
convened, it is unclear whether Nixon ultimately sought to obstruct any current or future judicial
proceedings by impeding the investigation. Without such knowledge or intent, obstruction charges
against Nixon would likely fail.49 Such result would also likely occur today, where, post-Aguilar,
courts have generally held that a defendant must at least be aw are that his actions will likely impede
grand jury proceedings.

Thus, only if the evidence suggested that Nixon knew of grand jury prOceedings against him

(or knew of impending proceedings against him), and his actions would likely derail those

 

46United States v. Scoratow, 137 F. Supp. 620, 621?22 (wn. Pa. 1956).
?at.
48United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728, 733 (9th Cir. 1971).

49869 Petribone, 148 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1893) (the ?corrupt" element of the obstruction offense requires
proving a defendant's speci?c intent to impede the administration of justice).

12

proceedings, would obstruction charges against Nixon likely be successful. Though by 1972 some
courts had distinguished Scoratow and construed the omnibus provision of the statute to ?embrace[]

?50 courts still required, as they do

the widest variety of conduct that impedes the judicial process,
today, a showing of the defendant?s knowledge of and intent to obstruct proceedings that are ?rmly

judicial in nature.

 

50United States V. Rosner, 352 F. Supp. 915, 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see also Solow, 138 F. Supp. at 814.

13