ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 CALENDAR: 02 PAGE 1 of 16 CIRCUIT COURT OF COUNTY, ILLINOIS IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY COOK CHANCERY DIVISION CLERK DOROTHY BROWN COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION    JOSEPH ACEVEDO, as an individual, and    CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT  on behalf of all others similarly situated,       Plaintiff and Class Representative,        v.      Case No.     THE COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S MERIT  BOARD, JAMES P. NALLY, Chairman,  BYRON BRAZIER, Vice‐Chairman, JOHN  J. DALICANDRO, Secretary, GRAY  MATEO‐HARRIS, Board Member,  VINCENT T. WINTERS, Board Member,  JENNIFER BAE, Board Member,  PATRICK BRADY, Board Member, AND  KIM R. WIDUP, Board Member, and  THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff of Cook  County, and the COUNTY OF COOK, a  unit of local government and indemnor,         Defendants.  Plaintiffs Demand Trial by Jury     COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, FOR REDRESS OF  VIOLATIONS OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION   AND FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF      Plaintiff Joseph Acevedo (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or “Acevedo”), individually and  on  behalf  of  all  those  similarly‐situated,  by  and  through  his  attorneys,  complains  against  Defendants  Thomas  J.  Dart  (hereinafter,  “Sheriff”),  in  his  official  capacity,  the  County  of  Cook  (hereinafter,  “County”),  the  Cook  County  Sheriff’s  Merit  Board  (hereinafter “Board”), and all other Defendants (hereinafter, “individual Defendants”),  in their official capacities, as follows:  1. INTRODUCTION    Plaintiff  brings  this  action  individually  and  on  behalf  of  all  those  similarly‐situated  seeking  a  declaration  that  Board  decision  terminating  his  employment  is  illegal,  null,  and  void  because  the  Board  was  improperly  constituted  with former Member John R. Rosales having been invalidly appointed under the Cook  County  Sheriff’s  Merit  Board  Act,  55  ILCS  5/3‐7001,  et  seq.  (hereinafter,  “the  Act”).   Plaintiff  further  brings  this  action  individually  and  on  behalf  of  others  similarly‐ ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 2 of 16 situated because such decision from an illegally‐constituted Board violated his rights to  Due Process and Equal Protection under Article I, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution.  Plaintiff  seeks  legal  and  equitable  relief,  including,  but  not  limited  to,  reinstatement,  back pay, and all other appropriate make whole relief.  2. On or about June, 2011, Defendant Sheriff, with the consent and approval  of  Defendant  County,  appointed  John  R.  Rosales  as  a  member  of  Defendant  Board  (hereinafter, “Member Rosales”), with a term to expire on March 19, 2012, after former  Board member Daniel Lynch left a vacancy.  3. Member  Rosales  served  on  the  Board  between  approximately  June  2011  and  early  2015.    In  that  role,  he  served  as  a  hearing  officer  over  Cook  County  sworn  officer  disciplinary  proceedings  leading  to  the  termination  and  suspension  of  sworn  officers, participated in the discussion and rendering of decisions in such cases, certified  promotions,  and  otherwise  participated  in  the  functions  of  the  Board  enumerated  2  within the Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board Act, 55 ILCS 5/3‐7001, et seq. (hereinafter,  “the Act”).  4. On  May  12,  2017,  the  First  District  Appellate  Court  of  Illinois  issued  an  opinion and judgment in Percy Taylor v. Thomas J. Dart, et al., 2017 IL App (1st) 143684‐B,  holding, inter alia, that the Sheriff’s Merit Board was illegally constituted at the time the  termination  decision  in  the  case  was  issued  because  Member  Rosales  was  not  validly  appointed consistent with the Act.  It further held that the decision at issue in the case,  ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 3 of 16 terminating Cook County Sheriff’s Police Officer Percy Taylor, was not valid and void  as  a  matter  of  law.  A  copy  of  the  First  District’s  Decision  is  attached  hereto  and  incorporated  by  reference  as  Exhibit  A  (hereinafter,  this  Decision  will  be  called  the  “Taylor Decision”).  5. The language of the Taylor Decision is broad and, on its face, would apply  to  all  of  the  Board’s  Decisions  that  were  issued  over the  duration  of  Member  Rosales’  appointment  and  that  terminated  or  suspended  employees,  which  time  period  is  approximately between approximately June, 2011 and April, 2015.  6. Plaintiff Acevedo is a former Cook County Correctional Officer who was  terminated  by  the  Defendant  Board  in  a  decision  dated  January  12,  2015.  Member  Rosales was a part of the deliberations on Acevedo’s termination decision, and signed  off  on  the  final  order  terminating  his  employment.  A  correct  and  complete  copy  of  Acevedo’s  termination  decision  is  attached  hereto  and  incorporated  by  reference  as  Exhibit B.  3  7. Pursuant  to  the  reasoning  in  the  Taylor  Decision,  the  Board’s  decision  terminating  Acevedo  is  equally  invalid  and  should  be  found  void  as  a  matter  of  law.   Plaintiff Acevedo is entitled to reinstatement, back pay, and make whole relief since the  date of his termination.  8. Since Member Rosales’ appointment, a great number of other officers have  been suspended and terminated by the Defendant Board.  All of these other current and  former officers are similarly‐situated to Plaintiff Acevedo, with the same issues of law  ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 4 of 16 and  fact  predominating  in  all  of  these  cases,  and  class  certification  should  be  granted  with  respect  to  these  individuals  because  they  are  so  numerous  as  to  make  joinder  infeasible.    JURISDICTION AND VENUE  9. This  Court  has  jurisdiction  over  Count  I  pursuant  to  735  ILCS  5/2‐701  of  the  Illinois  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  providing  that  the  Circuit  Courts  of  Illinois  have  the  power  to  issue  binding  declarations  of  rights,  having  the  force  of  final  judgments,  because  there  is  an  actual  controversy  between  Plaintiff  Acevedo,  the  putative  class,  and  Defendants  as  to  the  legal  validity  of  the  Sheriff’s  Merit  Board  decisions  terminating  and  suspending  sworn  officers  while  Member  Rosales  was  a  member  of  said Board.  10. This  Court  has  jurisdiction  over  Counts  II  and  III  pursuant  to  735  ILCS  5/2‐701  of  the  Illinois  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  pursuant  to  its  equitable  powers  at  common  law,  and  pursuant  to  Article  VI,  Section  9  of  the  Illinois  Constitution,  4  providing  that  the  Circuit  Courts  shall  have  original  jurisdiction  of  all  justiciable  matters, except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction. Counts  II  and  III  seek  a  declaratory  judgment  and  legal  and  equitable  relief  for  redress  for  violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Illinois Constitution.  11. Venue  is  proper  pursuant  to  Section  2‐101  of  the  Illinois  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  735  ILCS  5/2‐101,  because  all  events  giving  rise  to  these  causes  of  action  occurred  in  or  about  Cook  County,  Illinois,  and  because  all  Defendants  have  their  ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 5 of 16 principal  governmental  offices  and  operations  within  Cook  County,  Illinois.    Further,  the representative Plaintiff is located in Cook County, Illinois, and a significant portion  of the putative class members, on belief, are in Cook County, Illinois.  THE PARTIES  12. Plaintiff  Acevedo  is  an  adult  resident  of  Cook  County,  Illinois.    He  is  a  former Cook County Correctional Officer who was terminated by decision of the Board  effective January 12, 2015.  13. Defendant  Cook  County  Sheriff,  Dart,  is  a  local  elected  government  official.  14. Defendant  Cook  County  Sheriff’s  Merit  Board  is  a  nine‐member  Board  empowered under the Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board Act, 55 ILCS 5/3‐7001, et seq.   Inter alia¸ it renders final decisions terminating and/or suspending sworn Cook County  Sheriff’s Officers.  5  15. Defendant  Cook  County  is  a  unit  of  local  government  and  the  joint  employer  of  the  sworn  officers  who  are  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Defendant  Board.  The County generally indemnifies Defendant Sheriff.  16. The individual Defendants are all members of the Cook County Sheriff’s  Merit Board appointed by the Sheriff with the advice and consent of the Cook County  Board pursuant to the Act, 55 ILCS 5/3‐7002, et seq.  FACTS UPON WHICH ALL CLAIMS ARE BASED  ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 6 of 16 17. Defendant  Acevedo  was  appointed  a  Correctional  Officer  on  December  27,  1999.    He  held  that  position  without  issue  until  the  Board’s  termination  decision  issued on January 12, 2015.  18. By  Complaint  dated  January  30,  2014,  the  Sheriff  sought  Acevedo’s  termination  based  upon  allegations  that  Acevedo  incurred  too  many  unauthorized  absences between 2012 and 2013.  19. The matter was called for trial at the Defendant Board on August 5, 2014.   In  general,  the  Sheriff  introduced  time  cards  and  witness  testimony  claiming  that  Acevedo missed work without authorization on various dates between 2012 and 2013.  20. Acevedo testified at his hearing that significant medical issues prevented  him  coming  to  work  on  certain  days  in  those  years,  and  that  because  the  Sheriff  had  forced him out of the workplace on an improper fitness‐for‐duty leave prior to 2012 (for  which  he  was  found  fit),  he  could  not  meet  the  1,250  hour  requirement  to  qualify  for  leave under the Family Medical Leave Act.  6  21. While the Board acknowledged that “[Acevedo] had a history of medical  issues and was placed on disability leave for a period of time,” it ultimately concluded  that he had unauthorized absences, and terminated him.  22. Member  Rosales  participated  in  the  deliberations  on  Acevedo’s  case  and  ultimately signed off on his termination decision, dated January 12, 2015.  See Exhibit B,  p. 8.  23. Acevedo appealed his termination to the Circuit Court of Cook County in  ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 7 of 16 Case  Number  15‐CH‐02215,  but  the  Board’s  decision  was  upheld  under  the  Administrative Review Act in a decision entered on February 24, 2016.  24. The Taylor Decision forming part of the basis for this appeal constitutes a  new  development  in  the  law  and  new  circumstances  warranting  the  instant  action  in  behalf of Acevedo, as well as all other similarly‐situated current and former employees  who  were  terminated  or  suspended  by  the  Board  during  the  time  period  of  Member  Rosales’ unlawful appointment.  CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION IS NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE  25. Pursuant to Section 2‐801 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS  5/2‐801, et seq., Plaintiffs bring this class action and seek certification of the claims and  certain issues in this action on behalf of a Class defined as:  All  current  and/or  former  Cook  County  sworn  officers  (including  Sheriff’s  Police  Lieutenants,  Sergeants,  and  Officers;  Court  Services  Lieutenants,  Sergeants,  and  Deputies;  and  Cook  County  Correctional  Lieutenants, Sergeants, Investigators, Deputies, and Officers) who were  7  terminated  or  suspended  by  the  Cook  County  Sheriff’s  Merit  Board  while John R. Rosales was a member.    26. Plaintiffs  reserve  the  right  to  amend  the  Class  definition  if  further  investigation  and  discovery  indicates  the  Class  definition  should  be  narrowed,  expanded, or otherwise modified.  27. The  proposed  class  is  so  numerous  that  joinder  of  all  members  is  impracticable.  28. Questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class and any subclass  ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 8 of 16 exist  that  predominate  over  questions  affecting  only  individual  members,  including,  inter alia:  a. Whether  the  Board’s  decisions  terminating  and/or  suspending  individual  Cook  County  sworn  officers  are  rendered  without  jurisdiction,  illegal,  invalid,  void,  and/or  unenforceable  because  Member  Rosales  participated  in  hearing,  deliberations,  and/or  rendering of the final decision for each officer?  b. Whether  impacted  sworn  officers  suffered  violations  of  the  Due  Process  and  Equal  Protections  Clauses  of  the  Illinois  Constitution  as  a  result  of  orders  of  the  Board  terminating  and/or  suspending  them while Member Rosales was a member?  c. Whether impacted sworn officers are entitled to make whole relief,  including  reinstatement,  back  pay,  and  damages  for  at  least  the  8  period  of  time  wrongfully  terminated  and/or  suspended  by  the  unlawfully constituted Board?  29. Plaintiff  will  fairly  and  adequately  represent  and  protect  the  interests  of  the members of the Plaintiff Class and any subclass.  30. The  class  action  is  an  appropriate  method  for  the  fair  and  efficient  adjudication of the controversy.  31. Plaintiffs  have  and  will  retain  counsel  competent  and  experienced  in  ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 9 of 16 constitutional, due process, and class action litigation.  32. Absent a class action, it would be unlikely that the representative Plaintiff  or any other members of the Class or any subclass would be able to protect their own  interests.  33. Certification  is  also  appropriate  because,  given  the  large  number  of  impacted officers, allowing individual actions to proceed in lieu of a class action would  run the risk of yielding inconsistent and conflicting adjudications.  34. A class action is a fair and appropriate method for the adjudication of the  controversy,  in  that  it  will  permit  a  large  number  of  claims  to  be  resolved  in  a  single  forum  simultaneously,  efficiently,  and  without  the  unnecessary  hardship  that  would  result  from  the  prosecution  of  numerous  individual  actions  and  the  duplication  of  discovery,  effort,  expense  and  burden  on  the  courts  that  individual  actions  would  engender.      9  COUNT I  DECLARATORY JUDGMENT  35. Plaintiffs  restate  and  reallege  by  reference  paragraphs  1  through  34  as  if  fully set forth herein against all Defendants.    36. In  light  of  the  First  District’s  ruling  in  the  Taylor  Decision,  Plaintiff  Acevedo, on behalf of himself and all others similarly‐situated, seeks a declaration from  this  Honorable  Court  that  the  Board’s  decision  terminating  his  employment  as  a  ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 10 of 16 Correctional Officer is rendered without jurisdiction, null, invalid, and void due to the  fact  that  Member  Rosales  participated  in  and  deliberated  on  the  decision,  and  ultimately signed same.  37. All  other  sworn  officers  similarly‐situated  to  Acevedo  should  have  a  similar  declaration  of  their  rights,  to  wit,  that  the  Board’s  decisions  terminating  or  suspending  their  employment  with  the  Cook  County  Sheriff’s  Office  are  rendered  without jurisdiction, null, invalid, and void.  38. Plaintiff  Acevedo,  individually  and  on  behalf  of  all  others  similarly‐ situated, seek a declaration of entitlement to make‐whole relief, including reinstatement  and  back  pay,  for  at  least  the  period  of  time  they  were  wrongfully  terminated  or  suspended by an improperly constituted Board.  WHEREFORE,  Plaintiff,  on  behalf  of  himself  and  all  others  similarly‐situated,  prays for relief as follows:  10  A. For an order certifying that the action may be maintained as a class action,  certifying  Plaintiff  as  representative  of  the  Class,  and  designating  his  counsel as counsel for the Class;  B. For  a  declaratory  judgment  that  the  Board’s  January  12,  2015  Decision  terminating  Acevedo’s  employment  is  illegal,  null,  and  void,  and  that  such decisions for similarly situated employees are illegal, null, and void.  C. For  a  declaratory  judgment  that  Plaintiff  Acevedo  is  entitled  to  ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 11 of 16 reinstatement, back pay, and all other appropriate make whole relief, and  that similarly situated employees are entitled to similar such relief.  COUNT II    DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF FOR  VIOLATIONS OF DUE PROCESS PURSUANT TO   ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 OF THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION    39. Plaintiffs  restate  and  reallege  by  reference  paragraphs  1  through  38  as  if  fully set forth herein against all Defendants.    40. Article  I,  Section  2  of  the  Illinois  Constitution  provides  that  “No  person  shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. . . .”  41. The  Due  Process  Clause  of  the  Illinois  Constitution  protects  the  fundamental  right  of  a  person  to  a  fair  hearing  before  a  competent  tribunal  having  jurisdiction, including, in the case of an administrative forum created by state statute, to  a forum legally constituted pursuant to the statute.  11  42. By subjecting Plaintiff Acevedo and all of those similarly‐situated to him  to  disciplinary  proceedings  before  an  improperly  and  illegally  constituted  Board,  the  Defendants  have  deprived  Plaintiff  and  other  sworn  officers  of  due  process  of  law,  including  the  right  to  a  hearing  before  a  properly,  legally  constituted  Board,  and  the  right  to  deliberations  from  decisionmakers  validly  appointed  by  law  to  serve  such  function.  43. By  continuing  to  hear  disciplinary  cases,  deliberate  upon  disciplinary  ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 12 of 16 matters,  and  issue  decisions  terminating  and  suspending  officers  with  the  full  knowledge  of  the  pendency  of  the  Taylor  litigation,  the  Defendants  have  acted  with  willful,  wanton,  and  malicious  disregard  for  the  legal  and  constitutional  rights  of  Plaintiff Acevedo and those similarly‐situated.  WHEREFORE,  Plaintiff,  on  behalf  of  himself  and  all  others  similarly‐situated,  prays for relief as to Count Two as follows:  A. For an order certifying that the action may be maintained as a class action,  certifying  Plaintiff  as  representative  of  the  Class,  and  designating  his  counsel as counsel for the Class;  B. For  a  declaratory  judgment  that  the  actions  of  the  Board  in  terminating  Plaintiff  and  in  terminating  and/or  suspending  similarly  situated  sworn  officers violates the Due Process Clause of the Illinois Constitution;  C. For an award of legal and equitable relief at least as follows:  12  i. For  an  order  reinstating  all  sworn  officers  terminated  by  the  illegally constituted Board.  ii. For an order requiring Defendants to pay back pay to all sworn  officers  terminated  and/or  suspended  by  the  illegally  constituted Board.  iii. For actual damages to be determined at trial;  iv. For  all  compensatory,  special,  and  consequential  damages  as  ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 13 of 16 allowed by law;  v. For reasonable attorneys’ fees;  vi. For an award of costs;  vii. For  any  other  relief  this  Court  deems  just,  appropriate,  or  proper; and  viii. For pre‐ and post‐judgment interest on any amounts awarded.  COUNT III    DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF FOR  VIOLATIONS OF EQUAL PROTECTION PURSUANT TO   ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 OF THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION    44. Plaintiffs  restate  and  reallege  by  reference  paragraphs  1  through  43  as  if  fully set forth herein against all Defendants.    45. Article  I,  Section  2  of  the  Illinois  Constitution  provides  that  “No  person  shall . . . be denied the equal protection of the laws.”  13  46. The  Cook  County  Sheriff’s  Merit  Board  Act,  55  ILCS  5/3‐7001,  et  seq.,  creates a fundamental, substantial right for Cook County sworn employees to a full and  fair  opportunity  to  be  heard  in  their  defense  before  a  competent  Board  with  proper  jurisdiction  in  disciplinary  proceedings  on  charges  brought  against  them.    See,  e.g.,  55  ILCS  5/3‐7011,  3‐7012.    Even  if  it  does  not  create  a  fundamental,  substantial  right,  the  statute must be applied even‐handedly to similarly‐situated individuals.  47. By subjecting Plaintiff Acevedo and all of those similarly‐situated to him  ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 14 of 16 to  disciplinary  proceedings  before  an  improperly  and  illegally  constituted  Board,  the  Defendants have deprived Plaintiff and other sworn officers of equal protection of the  laws  as  guaranteed  by  Article  I  of  the  Illinois  Constitution,  to  wit,  by  holding  disciplinary  proceedings  and  issuing  such  decisions  while  the  Board  was  improperly  and illegally constituted, but whereas all other sworn officers were given the benefit of  a  properly  constituted  Board  for  their  disciplinary  proceedings  when  John  R.  Rosales  was not a member.  48. The  decision  terminating  Acevedo,  and  like  decisions  for  those  similarly  situated,  discriminates  against  Acevedo  and  others  because  it  was  rendered  by  an  illegally  constituted  Board,  and  all  other  sworn  officers  subjected  to  disciplinary  proceedings when Member Rosales was not on the Board proceeded before a properly  constituted Board.  49. There  is  no  rational  basis  or  adequate  justification  for  such  irrational  differentiation  and  discrimination  received  by  Plaintiff  and  those  similarly  situated,  14  and,  therefore,  the  decision  terminating  his  employment  violated  his  right  to  equal  protection of the law.  WHEREFORE,  Plaintiff,  on  behalf  of  himself  and  all  others  similarly‐situated,  prays for relief as to Count Three as follows:  A. For an order certifying that the action may be maintained as a class action,  certifying  Plaintiff  as  representative  of  the  Class,  and  designating  his  counsel as counsel for the Class;  ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 15 of 16 B. For  a  declaratory  judgment  that  the  actions  of  the  Board  in  terminating  Plaintiff  and  in  terminating  and/or  suspending  similarly  situated  sworn  officers violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Illinois Constitution;  C. For an award of legal and equitable relief at least as follows:  i. For  an  order  reinstating  all  sworn  officers  terminated  by  the  illegally constituted Board.  ii. For an order requiring Defendants to pay back pay to all sworn  officers  terminated  and/or  suspended  by  the  illegally  constituted Board.  iii. For actual damages to be determined at trial;  iv. For  all  compensatory,  special,  and  consequential  damages  as  allowed by law;  v. For reasonable attorneys’ fees;  vi. For an award of costs;  15  vii. For  any  other  relief  this  Court  deems  just,  appropriate,  or  proper; and  viii. For pre‐ and post‐judgment interest on any amounts awarded.  JURY DEMANDED    Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury.    Respectfully submitted,  ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 16 of 16             Attorney No. 43132      Dana Kurtz, Esq.  Heidi Sleper, Esq.  KURTZ LAW OFFICES, LTD.   32 Blaine Street  Hinsdale, Illinois 60521  Phone: (630) 323‐9444  Fax: (630) 904‐9444  Email: dkurtz@kurtzlaw.us  Email: hsleper@kurtzlaw.us    Attorney No. 61254  Cass T. Casper, Esq.  TALON LAW, LLC  32 Blaine Street  Hinsdale, Illinois 60521  Phone: (312) 351‐2478  Email: ctc@talonlaw.com      JOSEPH ACEVEDO, individually and  on behalf of all of those similarly‐ situated to him      /s/Dana L. Kurtz   ________________________________  Attorneys for Plaintiffs               16  ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 CALENDAR: 02 PAGE 1 of 30 CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS CHANCERY DIVISION CLERK DOROTHY BROWN EXHIBIT A ?3 be? 1 series m. 9, or . . um 34m 53?, 2017 IL App (lst) 143684-B aPe?lm?nrRaheat-rga . - It. mm m. FIFTH DIVISION - - May 12, 2017 N0. 1-14-3684 PERCY TAYLOR, Appeal from the - - Circuit Court of .Plain??-Appellee, Cook County. CH 26319- THOMAS DART, Sheriff of Cook . The Honorable County, and THE COOK COUNTY MERIT BOARD, Neil Cohen, . Judge Presiding. - Defendants-AppellantsJUSTICE HALL delivered the judgment of the?court, with opinion. (g Presiding Justice Gordon and Justice Lampkin concurred in the judgment and opinion. I .- . a gig OPINION The defendants, Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff of Cook?County (Sheriff Dart), and the county Sheriff?s Merit Board (Merit Board). (collectively, the defendants) ?led interlocutory appeal pursuant, to Illinois Supreme'Court Rule 3.08 (eff. Feb. :26, 2010). The circuit court certi?ed the following questions for our review: ?Is a Cook' County Sheriff?s Merit Board member was appointed on June 2, 2011 to serve a term which expired on March 19, 2012, a law?illy appointed member of the Merit Board when he presided over jPercy Taylor?s Merit Board Hearing on I. ,February 201_3? If the Merit Board member was not lawfully appointedto the I Merit Board, does the decision of October. 30, 2013 remain valid or is it rendered I void?? .12 DJ 5/18/2017 2:19 PM PAGE 3 0f 30 ELECTRONICALLY FILED 2017-CH-07092 ?4 15 $6 No. 1-14-3684? On September 23, 2016, this court issued its opinion in this case. In answer to the ?rst certi?ed question, we concluded. that the October 30, 2013, decision of the Merit Board was void because-the Merit Board was illegally constituted at the time of the decision to terminate "the plaintiff?s employment. In answer to the second certi?ed question, we concluded that the October 30, 2013, decision of the Merit Board not .valid because it is void. Taylor v. . Dart, 2016 IL App?(lst) 143684, 1] 47. We found that the Board forfeited its argument that any defect with the appointment of John R. Rosales was cured by the Board?s subsequent rati?cation of his appointment. aylor, 2016 App (lst) 143684, 1] 46. The defendants ?led 'a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. On January 25, 2017, the Hlinois Supreme Court denied-the defendantQ petitidn for leave to appeal. Taylor v. Dart, No. 121507 (Ill. Jan. 25, 20.17). In exercise?of its supervisory authority, the supreme? court ordered this to vacate portion of the opinion which this court declined to consider whether the Cook County Board of Commissioners had home rule authority to approve interim appointments-to Merit Board. The supreme court further directed this court to address that iSsue and determine whether a different outcome was warranted. BACKGROUNB I. The Statute . Section 3-7002 of the Counties Code (Code) provides in pertinent part as follows: ?I?There is created the Cook County _Sheri??s Merit ?Board, hereinafter called the 6 Board, consisting of 7 members appointed by the with the advice and consent . of the. county board,? except that on and after-the effective date of this amendatory Act I No. 1-14?3684 .of 1997, the Sheriff may appoint 2 additional members, with the advice and consent of the county board; at his or her discretion. Upon the expiration of the terms of of?ce of those ?rst appointed (including the additional members ?rst appointed- under authority of amendatory Act of 1991 and under the authority of this amendatory Act of the ?9lst General Assembly), their respective successors shall be appointed to hold o?ice ?'om the third Monday in ?Marcher: the year of their respective appointments fer a term .of 6 years and until their I successors are appointed and quali?ed for {a like term. additional members are appointed under authority of. this amendatory Act of. 1997, their terms shall be set to - be staggered consistently with the terms oi? the existing Board members. No more E?gg than 3 members of the Board shall be af?liated the same political party, except that as additional members are appointed by the Sheriff under. authority of this i; gig amendatory Act of 1997 and under the authority of this amendatory Act of the 9lst .. LE) General Assembly, the political af?liation of the Board shall be such that no more than One-half of the members plus one additional member may be af?liated with the same political party. No. member shall have held or have been a candidate for an. elective public of?ce within one year preceding his or her appointmen 55 ILCS 3/3-7002 (West 2012).' 117 9 II. Facts 1] 8 On lVIay 5, 201.1, Sheri? Dart requested approval ?om the Cook County Board to appoint a John R. 'Rosales to the Merit Board to ?ll the vacancy of Commissioner Daniel whose term on the Merit Board was to expire on March 19, 2012. The county board approved the Rosales appointment on June 1, 2011. After the expiration of Commissioner term on No. 1-14?3684. March 19, 2012, Sheriff Dart did not reappoint Rosales to the Merit Board, and he has I continued to serve as a member of the Merit Board. I - {l9 - On October 20, 2011, Sheriff ?led'a complaint against the plainti?', alleging I misconduct and seeking to terminate his' employment. as a Cook County sheri??s police of?cer. On li?ebruary 2.7, 2013, Mr. Rosales presided over the hearing held on Sheri?? Dart?s complaint against the On. October 30, .2013, the Merit Board issued its decision, tennina?ng the plainti??s employment. The October 30, 2013, order was signed by Rosales and seven Merit Board members. 11 10 . 'The plainti? ?led a ?complaint for administratiye review of the Merit Board?s decision. on May 7, 2014, the circuit court issued a memorandum and order, a?irming' the Merit E?gg Board?s decision terminating the plaintiffs employment. The plaintiff moved for I i reconsideration of the order arguing, inter cilia, the appointment of Mr. Rosales to the Egg; Merit Board was invalid because he was not appointed to a six-year as required by Em section 3-7002 ofthe Code (55 ILCS 5/3?7002 (west 2012)). 1} 11 The circuit court granted, the motion. ?for reconsideration, ?nding that the $poiritinent of Commissioner Rosales was invalid because he? was appointed to less than a six-year term. "The court rejected the defendants? argumentthat the decision of the Merit Board remained valid because seven. Iavirful members voted to terminate the plaintiifs employment. The court found that the Merit Board Was not law?'illy constituted at the time it - rendered its decision, and therefore, its decision could not be given effect. The circuit court I: .vacated the Merit Board?s October .30, 2013, decision, terminating the plainti??s= employment, and remanded the case for a new hearing on the charges against the plaintiff No. 1?14?3634 . before a legally constituted Merit Board. The court denied the defendants? motion for reconsideration. 1] 12 Following the circuit court?s certi?cation of the questions for review, the defendants ?led their request for leave to appeal, which was granted by this court On December 23, 2014. 1113 - ANALYSIS 1114 - . . 1. Standards ofReview 1] 15 Rule 308 requires that the certi?ed questions presented to this court for review be questions? of law. Therefore, our review is de nevo. Ziatev v. Miilette, 2015 IL App (lst) 143173, 11.17. This case also requires this court to construe section 3-7002 of the Code, which is also a question of law to which the de?novostandard of review applies; Majid v. Retirement Board of the Policemen ?s Annuity Bene?t Fund, 2015 1L App (1 st) 132182, 13. 307092 of30 11. Discussion 6&18/2015 2:19 PM 3.017- PAG ?Theifundamental principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the . ELECTRONICALLY FILED . intent of the legislature.? Gilchrist it; Human Rights ?Comm 312 111. App; 3d 597, 602 (2000). The court looks ?rst at the statutory language, as it is the best indication of the intent of the dra?ers. Mcy'id, 2015 IL, App (lst)-132182, 11-16. Unless de?ned therein, the . words in the statute are to be'giveii?their plain. and ordinary meanings: Majid, . 1L App 132182, 1[ 16. The statute must be? applied so no. part is rendered super?uous. Mty'id, 2015 IL App (1 st) 132182, 1[ 16. ?Courts must also consider the reason I and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied and the purpose to be achieved.? Mojid, 2015 IL App (lst), 132182, 1116 (quoting DiFiore v. Retirement Board of the Poiicernen ?3 Annuin Bene?t Fund, 313 Ill. App. 3d 546, 551 (2000). 1118' :19 PM 7092 PAGE 7 0f 30 2017-C ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/20130 .1122 No. 1443684 As an administrative body, the Merit Board obtains its power to act ?'om the_?legislation Creating it, and its power to is strictly con?ned to that granted in the enabling. statute. - Gilchrist, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 601. Administrative agencies have no general or common-lam powers. Daniels. v. Industrial Comm 201 Ill. 2d 160, 165 (2002). Where administrative body acts outside of its speci?c statutory authority, it aets without jurisdiction, and 'actions? are void and a nullity ?-or?n their inception. Daniels, 201 Ill. 2d at 165. Where an agency?s action is void, it may be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly .or collaterally. Daniels, '201.Ill. 2d at 166. With these principles in mind, we address the ?rst certi?ed question. . A. Is the Appointment ofian to the Merit Board for Less-Than a Six-Year Term Valid? - From the plain language of the statute, we glean that the purpose of section 3-7002 is to select individuals .to serve on the Merit Board the goal of achieving an experienced and politically balanced Merit Board. In order to achieve the statute requires that the experienced members and limiting the number of members from any one political party. . Section 3?7002 provides that members and their respective successors ?shall be appointed to hold; o?ice for a term of ?6 years and until their successors are appointed and quali?ed 3 for a like term.? 55 ILCS 534002 (West 2012). The term ?shall? in a statute indicates a mandatory obligation, unless the context indicates otherwise. Newkirk v. Bigqrd, 109 Ill. 2d 28,. 33 (1985). ?[S]hall? will not be given a permissive meaning where it is used with reference to any right or bene?t to anyone, and the right and bene?t depends upon giving a madam meaning to. the word.? Nanakmembers? terms be staggered, insuring that the Merit Board would always contain some 1123 '1124' ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/48/2017 2:No. 1-14-3684 Under the plain language of the statute, an individual appointed to serve as a member of the-Merit Board?has the right to be appointed ?tora six?year term. This ivould be in keeping the statutory goals of experience and political balance, which would be compromised if the sheriff could appoint a member i'or less than the six?year term provided the statute. I i The supreme court?s analysis in Vuagniawr bepartment of Pro?ssional Regulation, 208 111. 2d 173 (2003), is instructive. In that case, the department brought a complaint against the plainti? before the Medical Disciplinary Board (Board). The department adopted the discipline recommended by the Board. On administrative review, the circuit court set aside the Board?s decision and dismissed the department?s complaint against the plainti?', ?nding - that the appointment of one Board memb?er'was not authorized by law. Vuagniawc, 208 Ill. 2d :at 184. In a?irming the decision of the circuit court, the supreme court noted that section of the :Medical?Practice Act of 1987 (Practice Act) (225 ILGS (West 1998)), required that allBoard members be appointed by and. their?vacancies?lled f?by the Governor by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.? (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vuagm?awc, 2:0? 2d at'185. While the Governor was authorized to. act without the Senate whenthe Board recommended the removal of a member. for misconduct or to make a vacancy appointment, the court determined that ?participation by the. Governor is always required.? Vuagniazcr, 203 Ill. 2d at Neither the Practice 'Act nor the Illinois Constitution of 1970 - permitted the appointment or involuntary removal of Board members without gubernatorial - action. Vuagniizux, 208 111. 2d at 186. 1126 1127 - ELECTRONICALLY FILED sea/2917 2:19 PM mum-07092 PAGE 9 of 30 1129 No. 1?14-3684 We also ?nd Daniels instructive. In Daniels, the plainti??s case was as?signed to a three- r'nemb?er panel of the Indus?ial Commission (Commission), but before the case could be heard, One of the panel members was elevated to COrnmission chairman. Another member-of the panel resigned following a medical leave of absence. The new Commission chairman I appointed individuals to ?ll his own vacancy and?that- of the resigning member. Daniels, 201 Ill. 2d at 163. On review, the supreme court found that the vacancies were not ?lled ?in accordance with section 13 of the workers? Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/13 (West 1992)). I. Daniels, 201 111. l2d at 163. Section 13 provided that the' Governor was vested with the responsibility of ?lling Commission vacancies by and with the consent of the Senate. While . the Governor was empowered to make a temporary appointment until the next meeting of the Senate, he then must nominate some person to ?ll the position. Daniels, 201 111.'2d at 163. The court in Daniels ?rrthe'r determined that the statutory. procedure for ?lling vacancies was consistent with the purposes of the Act. The fcourt noted that the law ?carefully designed to that the Industrial Commission represents a balance of interests.? Daniels, I 201 2d at 164. Under the Act, the Governor to make his appointments the Commissic'm in'such a way. that the interests of employers, workers, and impartial citizens were equally represented. No more four. members could be of the same political party. i i The supreme court noted that arbitrators appbinted to be ?acting commissioners? were - not subject to the partisanship restrictions and were. deemed to be representative of citizens not identifying with employers or employees. The court recognized the risk to the goals of the Act, explaining'as follows: 1130' 2017-CH-07092 - ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM PAGE 10 0f 30 1131 1132 No. 1-14-3684 I ?Accordingly, if arbitrators could be'designated as commissioners even a?er - the commissioners whose workload they were handling left of?ce, there would be no i - mechanism to insure that the balance of interests contemplated by the Act would be preserved. Through contrived designations and inaction by the Governor, the departure of?ce of sitting commissioners could be_ exploited to pack the - Commission with members of the Governor?s political party or representatives of economic class the Governor favored. such a result would be directly . contrary to the Act?s objectivesf? Daniels, at 164-65. The supreme court vacated the decision of the Commission and. remanded for a new hearing before a legally panel. Daniels, Ill. 2d at 1.67; see Gilchrist, 315111. App. 3d 597 (Human Rights CommissiOn?s decision based on the administrative judge?s . recommended order and decision was vacated the case remanded for a new hearing, where the Commission had no statutory authority to: accept the recommended order and I decision of the administrative law judge since the judge had not presided over the public hearing as reuuired by the Illinois Human Rights Act). II Like section 13 of the Act, section 3-7002 of Code is designed to ensure the goals of experienced membership and political balance are. met. Like section 13, there -is no provision for assuring that those goals are met where the appointment is for less than the six- year term required by the statute. In this case, once an appointrnent to a'shorter term is made, the statute requires that the successor be appointed ?for a like term.? In the long run, such shorter terms put at risk the makeup of the Merit Board as contemplated by section 377005. -The defendants Contend, next, that the statute implicitly gives the sheriff the power to appoint members to less than six-year terms. ?The agency?s authority must either arise from 8i 2017-CH-0709 PAGE .11 of 30 ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2 19 PM 1134 Ne. 1-14-3684 the express language of the 'statute or ?devolve by fair implication and intendment from the express provisions of the. [statute] as an incident to achieving?the objectives for which the [agency] was- created.? Vuagm'aux v. Department? of Professioer Regulation, 208 Ill. 2d -. 173, 188 (2003) (quoting Schulz v. McHemy County Sheriff?s Department Merit Comm 113 111. 2d 193, 202-03 (1986)). The defendants point out that 'at least four members are necessary for the Merit Board to' perform its duties..See\ 55 ILCS .513-7005 (West 2012) (?the . . . number of members that must be present to constitute a quorum shall _be the number of . members that constitute at least 40% of the Boar The defendants argue that the authority to ?ll vacancies'must be implied in the statute in order for the Merit Board to continue to conduct its business. anyagniaux, the supreme court rejected a-snnilar argument. The court concluded that a i?the removal of a Board member ?om participation in a speci?c disciplinary action does not empoWer the remaining Board members to sidestep the statutory nomination and con?rmation process and invite? another doctor to join them as a substitute.? Vuagniazrr, 208 i ll]: 2d. at 188-89. The- Practice Act? required onlyr four of the seven voting members to constitute a quorum and provided that a vacancy did not impair the right of the quorum to Conduct business. Vuagniawc, 208 Ill. 2d at? 188. -The court concluded that the power to appoint temporary members to the Board could not be implied from the statute as incident to achieving the Board?s statutory purposes. Vuagm'aztx, 208 111. 2d at 189. In the present case, under section 3-7005 of the Code (55 ILCS 5/3-7005 (West 2012)), four Merit Board members are required to constitute a quorum to transact the'business of the Board.- Since there was-no need to ?ll an unexpired term in order for the business of the- 10 ELECTRONICALLY FILED 1135 age 275?s :59 8&3 sag V) '1137 No. 1?14-3684 Merit Board to continue, the authority of the sheriff to appoint an individual to an unexpired term cannot be implied as necessary to the Merit Board perform its duties. . Phoenix Bond Indemnity Co. v. Pappbs, 309 Ill. App. 3d 779 (1999), relied on by the l- . defendants, is distinguishable. In that case, the reviewing court held that the legislative grant to the county collector to hold auctions necessarily implied the authority to make rules to dealwith the conduct of the auction. Phoenix Bond Indemnity Co., 309 Ill. App. 3d at 784. 1 In the'present case, other than a quorum requirement, which was not challenged, nothing else was required for conducting the business of the Merit Board. Therefore, there was no need to statutory authority for the appointment of individuals for less than the six-year term in order for the business of the Merit Board to proceed. reject the defendants? argument that we should defer to the Merit Board?s determination that section 3-7002 permits appointments and that interim members ?i have the power to act until they are replaced. deference to an agency?s interpretation of, its 'own rules is normally given, the court is not bound by an agency?s interpretation that con?icts with the statute, is unreasonable .or? is :erroneous. Critrenden v. Cook County . C5525 ?n on Human Rights, 2013 IL 114376, 11 19'. I I ::We answer the ?rst certi?ed question in the negative. Section of ?the Code does I notsauthorize the Sheriff of (3001; County either esplicitly or by implication to appoint an individual to the Merit Board for less than a six-year term. We now address the second certi?ed question. 11. 1138 1139 ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2 19 PM PAGE 13 0f 30 1141 No. 1-14-3684 - B. Ifthe Merit Board Member Was Not Lawfuuy Appointed to the Merit?Board, Does the Decision of October 30, 2013, Remain Valid or Is It Rendered Void? - decision rendered by an administrative agency which lacks jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power to'make or enter the decision involved, is void and may be attacked at any time or in any court, either directly or collaterally.? Board ofEducatz'on of the City' of Chicago v. Board of trustees of the Public. School: Teachers Pension Retirement Fund, 395 App. 3d _73 5, 739 (2009). In contrast, 1? voidable judgment is a judgment entered erroneously by a court having jurisdiction.? I Babcock v. Wallace, 2012 IL App (lst) 111090, 1! 14'(quoting v. Flores, 334 Ill. App. 3d 122, 126 (2002). The defendants rely .on Peabody Coal Co. Industrial Comm 349 Ill. App. 3d 1023 I (2004). Inthat case, Paul Rink was appointed 'by the Governor to ?ll an unexpired term of Commissioner Robert -Madigan who resigned. Commissioner Madigan?s tenn ran until 12,2005, but Mr. Rink?s appointment expired On December 31, 2002. The Governor also appointed Diane Ford to Mr. Rink?s position, commencing on January 17, 2003 .I The" senate approved both appointments. The employeeis case was heard by a three-member panel, including Mr; Rink. The decision was issued by two commissioners from the original Commission panel, and Ms. Ford, who had replaced Mr. Rink. Peabody Coal 349 Ill; App. 3d at "1026-27. I I On appeal, the Industrial Division of the Appellate Court sua sponte raised the validity of - the commission?s decision; The court determined that there was no authority under section 13 of the Act permitting the Govemor to limit the term of a? commissioner.. Once the Senate approved appointment, there was no longer any vacancy to'which Ms. Ford could 12' (J ELECTRONICALLY FILED s42- 2017-CH-07092 5/18/2017 2:19 PM PAGE 14 of 30 1143 No. 1-14-3684 be appointed. Therefore, Ms. Ford was never validly appointed as a member of the commission. Peabody Coal ?0,349 Ill. App. 3d'at 1028. i I Ndnetheless, the court in Peabody Coal Co. found the Commission?s decision voidable rather than void, declining to follow DanieIs. 'I'he'court noted that Daniels was a_plurality Opinion. See Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp, 224 Ill. 2d 247, 269 (2007) (recognizing that I plurality opinions are not binding precedent); Roar]: v. Macoupin Creek Drainage District, 316 .111. App. 3d 335, 945 (2000) "[P]lura1ity decisions. of a state supreme court, it which no. majority agrees to the reasoning, are not under the doctrine of stare decisis.? (quoting 5 Am; Jur. 2d Appellate Review 602, at 298 (1995)?. Of the four concurring justices in Daniels, only two held that the Commission?s decision was void because of the illegality of the the two participating commissioners. Peahoafy Coal 349 Ill. App. 3d at 1028 (citing Daniels, 201 Ill. 2d at 165-67). The two specially concurring justices, as well as the three dissenting justices, would ?nd that the commission?s decision - vids'oot void. Peaboafy Coal Co., '349 111. App. 3d at 1028-29.1 Hep-1g determined that the Commission?s decision was voidable' rather than void, the in Peabody Coal Ca, considered whether the . defacto oi?cer doctrine applied. Peabody Coal Ca, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 1029." Under the defacto of?cer doctrine, an individualwho is performing the duties of an oases under eoiot oftitle is considered to be an - of?cerfaeto, and'the acts of the individual as an of?cer are valid so far as the public and interested third parties are concerned. Peabody Coal Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d at 1029 (citing ?Vuagniaux, 208 Ill. 2d at 186-87); compare Daniels, 201, D1. 2d at 176-77 (McMorrow, J., 1Justice Kilbride concurred in Chief Justice opinion holding that the Commission?s t: decision was void. Justice McMorrow Specially concurred, joined by Justice Freeman. Justice Fitzgerald dissented, and Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Justice Fitzgerald and Justice Gar-man. 13 1144 2017-CH-07092 ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM PAGE 15 of 30 1145 .No. 1-14-3684 Specially concurring, joined by Freeman, J.) (defacta of?cer doctrine did not apply where the worker raised the validity of the Commission?s decision on direct review, but it should apply to preserve the validity of the decisions rendered by the Commission); see also Vuagm'awc, 208 2d at 186-87 (defacto of?cer doctrine did not apply where the plaintiff raised the validity of the member?s appointment in the disciplinary proceeding). The court in Peabody Coal concluded the defacto of?cer doctrine applied to prevent theinvalidation of Ford?s acts. Peaboiafy. Coal Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d at 1029. The - court noted that the plaintiff never challenged the validity of the Commission?s decision based on the participation of an illegally appointed panel. member. The issue was raised I sua' sponte by the reviewing court Since the decision?of the Commission was not void, the held that ?any attack on [the decision?s] validity by reason of [Ms] Ford?s participation has been waived by reason of [the plaintiff?s] failure to raise the issue.? Peabody Coal 349 Ill. App. 3d at 1029. However, even if the Merit Board?s decision was voidable, the defacto o?icer doctrine would not apply in'this case because the raised the illegality of Mr.. Rosales?s appointment to the Merit Board on direct review, not in a collateral proceeding. See Vuagm'awc, 208 Ill. 2d at 187. I The defendants also rely on Max Shepard, Inc. v. Industrial Comm 348 Ill. App. 3d 893 (2004). However, in that case, the reviewing court found that Mr. Rink?s temporary appointment was made in accordance-with the sitarute, and the court stated that it need not address the Commission?s authority to make appointments for less than the unexpired term of a. commissioner, the issue in the case before us. ?Mar Shepard, Ill. App. 3d at 899- 900; 14 ?l 1146? -l 43. 00 5458/2017 2:19 PM a ELECTRONICALLY FILED 16 of 30 1150 No. 1?14-3684 ?In the present case, section 3?7002 of the Code did not authorize Sheriff Dart to appoint Mr. Rosales to.1ess than a six-yearterm. His participation'in the hearing ,and the decision of the Merit Board in this case requires that the Merit Board?s decision be vacated. and -, remanded for a?hearing before a legally constituted. Merit Board as the circuit court ordered. . Se?e Vuagniaux, 208 Ill. 2d at 189 (causes remanded to administrative agencies when original agency decisions were found to have been made by or with the participation of public of?cers, whose appointments were not authorized by statute,?citing Daniels and Gilchrist). C. Issue on Remand 5. The supreme court?s supervisory order directed court to address the following issue: whether the Cook County Board of Commissioners had home rule authority to approve . interim appointments to the Coolt County Sheri??s Merit Board. - There is no dispute that the County of Cook is' a home rule unit of government. Article .. section 6 of the Illinois Constitution provides in pertinent part: . .,?Except as limited by this Section, 3 home rule? unit may exercise any power and perform any ?mction pertaining to its govemment'and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.? IlLConst. 1970, art. VII, I ?Home rule is based on the assumption that municipalities should be allowed to address problems solutions tailored to their local needs.? Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass ?72, 2013 IL 110505, ?11 29. Section 6(a) was intended to give home rule units the broadest powers possible, and their powers and -functions_were to be construed . liberally. Paini, 2013 IL 110505, 30; Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, lhe legislature may 15 No. 1?14-3684- provide that the State has?exclusive authority to act in an area, but the statute must contain an express statement that it is a limitation or denial of home rule powers. Palm, 2013 IL 110505, . 113 In the absence of such provision, a municipal ordinance and a state statute may Operate concurrently. Ill. Coast. 1970, art. VII, 11 51 . i I The defendants rely on American Health Care froviders, Inc. v. County of Cook, 265 . App. 3d 919 (19941). In that case, this court held that, as-a home rule unit, the County was exempt from the competitive bidding requirements contained in Counties Code. The court determined that the County?s procurement method Was a matter pertaining to its. government and affairs under sectiOn 6(a) and that the legislature had not enacted the express language required by? ?section 6(11) that the State was taking exclusive controlvover the County?s home - 1 rule power to procure contracts. American Health Care Providers, Inc, 265 Ill. App. 3d at i I 9225, 923-29; see 111. Coast. 1970, art. vu, 601). Unlike the present case, American Health 2017-CH-Q7092 PAGE .17 of 30 Care Providers, -Jnc., did not involve a void action taken by an administrative agency, but ELECTRONICALLYFILED 5/18/2017 2 19 PM . rather the' con?icting requirements tior contract procurement. 11 52 The plaintiff relies on Stroger v. Regional ?Transportation Authority, 201 Ill. 2d 508 i (2002). ?In that case, the plaintiffs argued that the provision in the Regional Transportation Authority Act (Act) (70 ILCS 36158.01 (West 1998) for the appointment of members to the Regional Transportation Board (RTA Board) violated section 6(f) of article VII of the Illinois - Constitution (Ill. Const, art. VII, it?changed the form of government of a home rule unit ?without conducting a referendum. The court in Stroger rejected the argument that the o?ice of president of the Cook County board. was similar to the ?of?ce of governor.- .Tlierefore, the chairman exercised the same powers as the governor to ?nominate and appoint all o??icers whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for.? Stroger, 16 ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 am. 2017-CH-0709oi PAGE 18 of 36" 1154 1-1155 No. 1-14-3684 201 Ill.?2d at 526?; Ill. C'onstul970, art. V, The court noted that ?[T]he power to appoint to of?ce is not inherent 'in the executive departrnent unless conferred by the constitution or the legislature[.] [1?]he creation of of?cers, the delegation and regulation of- the powers and duties of of?cers and the prescribing of the' manner of their appointment or . election are legislative ?mctions, which are restrained only by the Cdns?m?om? Strogerj, 201 111. 2d at 527 (quoting People ex rel. Gullett v. McCullough, 254 111. 9, 16 (1912)). The . court rejected the plaintiffs? home rule argument, holding that since the president of the Cook County board had no inherent power to appoint directors of the RTA, the legislature was within its.authority to establish the and provide ior its governance. Stroger, 201 111. 2d at 528. ?i Like the RTA Board, the Merit Board is an administrative agency. As we earlier observed, administrative agencies have no general or common?law powers. Daniels, 201 2d_ at 165. In the present case, the sheriff has .no powers conferred by the Illinois Constitution, and there are no provisions in. section 3?7002 of the Code for the making of I interim appointments. In the absence of any constitutional, statutory, or inherent power, the Cook County board had no home rule authority to approve Sheri?' Dart?s interim appointment of Mr. Rosales to the Merit Board. CONCLUSION In answer to the ?rst certi?ed question, the Odtober, 30, 2013, decision of the Merit Board was void because the. Merit Board was illegally constituted at the time of the decision to . ?terminate the plaintiff?s employment. In answer't'o the second certi?ed question, the October. 30, 2012, decision of the Merit Board is not valid because it is void. Finally, we hold that_the - 17. - 1!56 115% 2017-CH-07092 . .ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM PAGE .19 of 30 No. 1-14-3684 Cook County Board of-ComrnissiOners did not have home rule authority to approve Sheriff Dart? s. interini appointment of Mr. Rosales to the Cook County Sheriff?s?Merit Board. Certi?ed questions answered; the circuit court judgment is af?rmed. '18 ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 20 0f 30 EXHIBIT ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 21 0f 30 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY CHANCERY DIVISION Joseph Acevedo, Plaintiff, V. Case No. 15-CH-02215 Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart, at Defendants. Calendar 8 OPINION AND ORDER This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff Joseph Acevedo?s (?Plaintiff?) petition for review of a decision by Defendants Sheriff Thomas J. Dart the Cook County Sheriff?s Office (the and the Cook County Sheriffs Merit Board (the ?Board?) (collectively, the ?Defendants?). This action stems from a final order issued on January 12, 2015, by the Board, ?nding that Plaintiff had violated several sheriffs? orders and general orders, and approving Plaintiffs termination for cause. Compl. Ex. Answ. pp. 357-364. This Court has received and reviewed the Administrative Review Complaint (?Complaint?), the Answer (consisting of the complete record of the underlying Board decision), the Plaintiffs Brief in Support (?Plaintiff Memorandum?), the Defendant?s Response in Opposition to Complaint for Administrative Review (?Response?), and the Plaintiff 3 Reply to Defendant?s Response (?Reply?). This Court has also reviewed and considered relevant case and statutory law, and oral arguments made before the Court. For the reasons that follow, the petition is denied. Background This case arises from the Board?s decision to follow the Sheriff?s Of?ce of Professional Review?s (the recommendation to terminate Plaintiff for unauthorized absences. Answ. ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 22 of 30 pp. 193-197, 357-364. This decision was articulated in a ?nal order by the Board, with the effect of terminating Plaintiff? 3 Employment with the CCSO as of January 31, 2014. R. p. 2.1 The OPR issued its recommendation of termination of employment, dated October 17, 2013, after Attendance Review Unit Sergeant John McHugh submitted a Complaint Register on April 24, 2013. Answ. pp. 193, 197, 204. The OPR reviewed the evidence obtained by interviewing Plaintiff and Medical Unit Manager, Renee Carrion, in making its recommendation to terminate Plaintiff. Answ. pp. 193?194. Counsel for Dart lodged his complaint with the Board on January 30, 2014, requesting that the Board approve termination of Plaintiff for violation of the attendance policy. Compl. 4; Answ. p. 6. That complaint stated that Plaintiff violated the following rules and regulations: Sheriff?s Order Sheriff?s Order General Order General Order Sheriff?s Order and Board Rules and Regulations Article X, Sheriffs Order 11.4.1.1(11) states the policy of the CCSO is ?to prohibit CCSO employees from incurring Unauthorized Absences,? and articulates that ?even if an employee . . . has some . . . reasonable excuse for being absent, the employee must obtain an appropriate Authorized Status prior to or immediately after the need for the absence.? Answ. pp. 8-9. Sheriff?s Order states more Speci?cally that any covered CCSO employee ?who incurs ten (10) days or eighty (80) hours of Unauthorized Absences . . . in a rolling 365-day period will be recommended to the Merit Board for termination.? Answ. p. 9. Sheriffs Order clarifies that all CCSO employees are considered to have performed unsatisfactorin by taking absence without leave. Answ. p. 10. Finally, the Board?s Rules and Regulations Article X, paragraph 8(3) forbids The order was issued in 2015, but was given retroactive effect by the Board. 2 ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 23 0f 30 certain CCSO employees from violating ?any of the general orders, special orders, directives, or rules and regulations of the Cook County Sheriff?s Of?ce.? Answ. pp. 10-11. The Board held a hearing on this matter on August 5, 2014. Compl. 1[ 5. The Board ?rst heard the testimony of Printiss Jones (?Jones?), the Superintendent of Administration. Answ. p. 32. Jones testi?ed that she issued several disciplinary action forms and written reprimands for absences taken without compensatory time available on December 23, 2012, April 10, 2013, and April 13, 2013. Answ. pp. 39-40. She admitted that the collective bargaining agreement governing Plaintiff?s employment with the CCSO only allowed an employee Supervisor to submit a complaint to the OPR for absences when an of?cer has 80 or more hours of unauthorized absence. Answ. p. 50. Reading a report from the OPR ?le, Jones testi?ed that Plaintiff was given a reprieve for four days of unauthorized absences from September 1 to September 4, 2012, because he had dif?culty receiving his clearance for duty from the CCSO medical unit at that time. Answ. pp. 76, 193. Deputy Director of Human Resources and Labor Relations for the CCSO, Sharon Little (?Little?), testi?ed next at the hearing. Answ. p. 80. She reviewed the timecard and attendance documents related to Plaintiff, and testi?ed that from December 4, 2011 through November 30, 2013, Plaintiff took a total of 160 hours of unauthorized leave time. Little observed that Plaintiff was approved for ordinary disability leave from February 4, 2012, through August 29, 2012, during which time he was not charged with any unauthorized leave time. Answ. p. 60. She also testi?ed that federal law requires an employee to have worked for 1250 hours during the 12 months prior to the start of leave in order to qualify for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act Answ. pp. 84, 88. She ?nally testi?ed that the time sheets for Plaintiff re?ected L13 ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 24 of 30 that Plaintiff?s absence on September 15, 2013 was an excused absence taken with adequate accrued sick leave time. Answ. pp. 92-93. The next testimony heard was from Norelis Olavarria (?Olivarria,?) who acted as an investigator for the Of?ce of Professional Review She authored the recommendation that Acevedo be terminated. Answ. pp. 97-98. She testi?ed that she was aware of Plaintiff? 3 medical issues, and his attempts to take leave under the FMLA. Answ. p. 99. She also acknowledged that Acevedo was granted a reprieve for his 32 hours of unauthorized leave on September 1-4, 2012. Answ. p. 103. Olivarra admitted that, while the OPR may consider mitigating factors when conducting an investigation, it did not consider Plaintiff doctor?s notes explaining his medical condition to be a mitigating factor in the instant case. Answ. pp. 118-119. Finally, Plaintiff testi?ed on his own behalf. He stated that he was a correctional of?cer for the CCSO for 15 years, working at the Central Kitchen assignment as of the dates at issue. Answ. p. 136. Plaintiff primarily testi?ed as to the details of his medical condition?kidney stones?stating that he had had about 17 operations since November of 2012, which left him with crippling pain on each occasion. Answ. pp. 141-142. He attributed all but one of his unauthorized absencesw?excluding his absence on September 19, 2012?to these operations and related complications. Answ. p. 143. Plaintiff admitted he was required to take time off for a fitness for duty evaluation in February, 2012, continuing until September 5, 2012, because he had been ticketed for driving while intoxicated. Answ. pp. 146, 172. Plaintiff also stated that he was denied leave under the FMLA when he applied for it on April 22, 2013, because he had only worked 960 hours in the preceding 12 months, rather than the 1250 required by law. Answ. p. 157-158. However, he was granted FMLA leave when he re-applied for it in July 2013. Answ. p. 158. ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 25 of 30 The Board issued its decision to terminate Plaintiff on January 12, 2015. Answ. p. 364. In its decision, the Board restated much of the testimony presented before it, and provided a chart listing the hours of unexcused leave allegedly taken by Plaintiff from September of 2012 to September of 2013, totaling 128 hours. Answ. p. 362. After making its ?nding of facts, the Board ultimately concluded that Plaintiff ?was absent from scheduled work shifts and the absences were unauthorized for a total of 120 hours (corrected at trial by the Petitioner from 128 hours) . . . between September 19, 2012, and September 15, 2013.? Answ. p. 363. Although the Board noted that Plaintiff ?had a history of medical issues and was placed on disability leave for a period of time prior to the dates of the unauthorized absences,? they nonetheless found him ?in violation of standing Orders.? Answ. p. 363. Plaintiff now seeks administrative review of this decision before this Court. He filed his Complaint on February 9, 2015, alleging the Board?s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence, clearly erroneous, unconstitutional, arbitrary and capricious, unrelated to the requirements of service, based on trivial allegations, and not based on sufficient cause for discipline. Compl. 9. The Defendants filed their answer consisting of the record of the administrative proceedings, and the parties proceeded to brief this issue before the Court. This Court now decides whether Plaintiff has pleaded and proven facts allowing this Court to reverse or remand the decision of the Board to terminate Plaintiff based on unauthorized absences. Standard of Review In reviewing administrative actions Such as the one at issue, the apprOpriate standard of review depends on whether the question being reviewed is one of fact, law, or a mixed question of fact and law. City ofBelvz'dere v. Ill. State Labor Relations Bd. 181 Ill.2d 191, 205 (1998). If ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 26 of 30 the question is one of fact, an administrative decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Abrahamson v. Dep ?r of Prof Reg, 153 Ill.2d 76, 88 (2d Dist. 1992). The mere fact that an opposite conclusion is reasonable or that the reviewing court might have ruled differently does not justify reversal of the administrative ?ndings. Id. It is particularly within the province of the administrative agency to resolve any factual con?ict presented by the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Fagiano v. Police Bd. of Chicago, 123 Ill. App. 3d 963, 974 (lst Dist. 1984). Mixed questions of law and fact are subject to the ?clearly erroneous? standard. V171. of Maryvz'ZZe v. 11!. Labor Relations 8621, 402 Ill. App. 3d 369, 373 (5th Dist. 2010). An agency?s decision is clearly erroneous when, ?after reviewing the entire record, the reviewing court is left with the de?nite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.? Kilparrick v. 112. Dep ?r ofEmpZoyment Sec, 401 Ill. App. 3d 90, 93 (lst Dist. 2010). Plaintiff argues that the Board?s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence, and therefore implies that the questions to be decided here are questions of fact. Abrahamson, 153 Ill.2d at 88. The Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the issues here present a mixed question of law and fact. The Defendants therefore argue that the decision may only be overturned if the Board?s decision to terminate was clearly erroneous. Vill. of 402 111. App. 3d at 373. Analysis Plaintiff in his Memorandum argues first that the Board lacked authority to terminate Plaintiff because the Administrative Review Unit should not have lodged its complaint to OPR in ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 27 of 30 April of 2013. Plaintiff argues that, because the 32 hours of work from September 1?4, 2012,2 were later deemed authorized rather than unauthorized, the Administrative Review Unit violated Sheriff?s Order and the collective bargaining agreement governing employee relations by recommending Plaintiff?s termination when he had accrued less than 80 hours of unauthorized absences. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants unlawfully placed Plaintiff on ??tness for duty? leave ?in order to prevent [Plaintiff] from meeting the ?hours of service? requirement of the Pl?s Memo. p. 12. He argues that the evidence adduced by the Board indicated that Plaintiff would have qualified for at least three additional months of leave under the FMLA, but for the effort ?to remedy their staffing issues by hindering an employee?s right to utilize Pl?s Memo. p. 12. Finally, Plaintiff argues that he was discharged without cause, because his absences were due to an uncontrollable medical condition rather than a mere desire to avoid work. The Defendants ?rst respond that unauthorized absences are sufficient cause to dismiss CCSO employees, and that it is not a defense to such absences that the officer has a medical condition necessitating the absences. Second, the Defendants argue that Plaintiff indisputably did not qualify for FMLA leave as of April, 2013 because he had not accumulated the 1250 hours worked to be eligible for FMLA leave. They distinguish the case cited by Plaintiff, Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2004), by citing to Pimm v. United States Postal Service, 542 F.3d 202 (7th Cir. 2008), where the court held that a plaintiff? subjective belief that her suspension was unlawful did not render that suSpension unlawful under the FMLA. Additionally, Defendants note that this federal case law is not controlling on this issue in the Circuit Court of 2 This Court notes that Plaintiff asserts he was excused for five days, or 40 hours, of absences from September 1-4, 2012. Pl?s Memo. p. 10. However, this is cleariy a misstatement, as all other evidence put forth indicates that Plaintiff was absent for 32 hours from September 1?4, 2012. 7 ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 28 of 30 Cook County. Finally, Defendants note that ?cause? for termination is a very broad term, and that violation of even one rule or regulation may be considered cause. The Plaintiff attempts to distinguish the case law cited by Defendants in making his Reply. However, this attempt to distinguish the mandatory precedent put before this Court is unavailing in light of Plaintiff?s lack of factual support for his position that Plaintiff was unlawfully kept from qualifying for leave under the FMLA. This Court can discern absolutely no support for Plaintiffs accusation that the CCSO was ?unlawfully interfering with Acevedo?s ability to use Pl?s Reply p. 4. The parties agree that Plaintiff? placement on ??tness for duty? evaluation from February to September 5, 2012, prevented him from working the 1250 hours required to qualify for FMLA leave. However, the record indicates that Plaintiff was placed on fitness for duty leave as part of CCSO procedure because of Plaintiffs DUI arrest, and not because of any intent to force Plaintiff to work more hours. Answ. p. 143. In fact, Plaintiffs testimony corroborates that Plaintiff took disability leave during this period of absence, thereby undermining Plaintiff assertion that he would have worked sufficient hours to qualify for FMLA leave by April of 2013. Answ. pp. 143-144; 29 USCS 2611(2)(A)(ii). The FMLA requires a person to have actually worked for 1250 hours in a rolling calendar year before qualifying, and therefore his taking of disability leave would have reduced his number of hours worked regardless of his ??tness for duty? status at the time. 29 USCS 2611(2)(A)(ii). More pertinently, this Court must af?rm the Board?s decision if there is any evidence in the record supporting the Board?s decision to terminate. Franciscan Inc. v. Homer, 2012 IL App (2d) 110431, 1] 38.The Board can terminate an employee for violation of even a single rule. Cruz v. Cook County Sherf??s Merit Bat, 394 Ill. App. 3d 337, 342 (lst Dist. 2009). The Board?s Rules and Regulations Article X, paragraph forbids Plaintiff from violating ?any of ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 29 of 30 the general orders, special orders, directives, or rules and regulations of the Cook County Sheriff?s Office.? Answ. pp. 10-11. The Board had ?cause? to fire Plaintiff for any ?substantial shortcoming which renders [the employee?s] continuance in his of?ce or employment in some way detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service.? Marzano v. Cook County Sheri??s Merit Bat, 396 Ill. App. 3d 442, 446 (1st Dist. 2009) (quoting Walsh v. Bd. of ire Police Commissioners, 96 Ill.2d 101, 105 (1983)). Consequently, the Board has cause for termination and ?may ?re an employee for unexcused absences when they become excessive,? regardless of the underlying cause of the absences. Id. at 447; see also Cruz, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 342 (actual sickness did not excuse absences taken without available sick leave). Even if this Court were to assume, without any factual basis, that Plaintiff should have quali?ed for FMLA leave as of the time of his request in April, the record indicates that Plaintiff had already taken six days (48 hours) of unauthorized leave by the time he submitted that FMLA leave request. Answ. p. 362. Additionally, by that point, Plaintiff had been reported for having more than 80 hours of unauthorized absences in the rolling calendar year. Case law does not de?ne precisely when unexcused absences become excessive, and this Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the Board. Marzano, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 446. Even these 48 hours of unexcused absences, which Plaintiff could not under any circumstances have excused under the FMLA or otherwise, constitute evidence that Plaintiff violated the rules and orders of the CCSO, and this violation constitutes cause for termination. Cruz, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 342. Therefore, Plaintiff?s argument that he was wrongfully put on fitness for duty leave to prevent him from obtaining FMLA leave would not make the Board?s decision to terminate clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion, and this Court cannot reverse or remand the case under the Administrative Review law. Vill. ofMaryvz'lle, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 373. ELECTRONICALLY FILED 5/18/2017 2:19 PM 2017-CH-07092 PAGE 30 of 30 This Court can ?nd no basis in the record or Plaintiff arguments to overturn the decision of the Board in this case. The Board?s decision to terminate was based on Plaintiff? taking of leave time without having leave time available. The Board found as a matter of fact that Plaintiff took 120 hours of unexcused leave time in a calendar period of September 19, 2012 to September 23, 2013. Answ. p. 362.3 This ?nding of fact is amply supported by the testimony of the witnesses before the board, and corroborated by the testimony of the Plaintiff. Taking of unauthorized leave violates the rules of the Board and the standing orders of the CCSO. Sheriff?s Order General Order General Order Sheriff?s Order Board Rules and Regulations Article X, 11 Violation of these rules and orders is in turn grounds for termination of employment. Cruz, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 342. This Court therefore affirms the decision of the Board, and denies Plaintiff petition for administrative review. Conclusion (1) Plaintiff?s petition for administrative review is deniedORDERED JUDGE MOSHE litmus: as. FEB 24 2015 i i . . ,QGPiQi-iji?t? ?irt ,craat? or- rna clscurr sons ti. 1 Judge Moshe acobius Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois County Department, Chancery Division 3 The decision issued by the board erroneously identi?es the time span in the written summary as covering the period of ?September 9, 2012 to September 23, 2012.? However, it is clear from the contents of the chart immediately beiow that this is a typographicai error, and the period referred to is actually September 19, 2012, to September 23, 2013. 10