DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 1155 DEFENSE PENTAGOV WASHINGTON, DC 20301--1 l55 AUG 0 5 2016 Ref: Dear Mr. Leopold: This is our final response to )our February 13. 2014. Freedom oflnformation Act (FOIA) request. a copy ot'wltieh is attached for )0ur convenience. received tour request on the same day it was submitted and assigned it case number l4-F-0454 for tracking purposes Mr. Hugh .Vl, Higgins. Director. Intelligence 8; Security' Defense Intelligence. Office of the Under of Defense for intelligence. has that some information. Including 58 pages in their entirety. pursuant to Exemption oftlte FOIA. 5 552(b)(l) because it is currently and properly classified in accordance \\irh EVecutii Order 13526. as amended. Section 1.4 which pertains to militan plans. ueapons. or operations. Additionally information is withheld pursuant to 5 U.S vtlticli pertains to pri\ ileged communications uithin or hetvteen agencies. including the Deliberative Process Privilege. and 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6). \thich pertains to information tlte release ofwltich ould constitute a clearly unwarranted inxasion personal privacy parties. Other information is pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 uliich applies to records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes during an open int estigation. the release could reasonably be expected to interfere with law enforcement proceedinns. lfyou are not satisfied \\itli this action. you tna) Contact our DOD Public Liaison. Jim Hogan. at 571472-0462 or by email at Allemalh cly. you have the right to appeal to the appellate authority, Ms. Joo Chung. Director efOVersight and Compliance. Office ofthe Secretary ofDel'ense. by \t "ting directl) to ODCMO Directorate for Oversight and Compliance. 4800 Mark Center Dru e. ATTN: DPCL FOIA Appeals. Mailbox# 24. Alexandria. VA 22350-1700. Your appeal must be postmarked within 90 calendar days of the date of this response. Alternatively. 30u may use the OSD FOIA request portal at or email )our appeal to @mail.tnil. ll'ynu use email. please include the words Appeal" in the subject uftlte ctnail. Please also reference case number 14- >>0454 in any appeal cotTespondence. Please note that the Office ome et'ntnent information Services (06R) offers sertices to requesters "ho have disputes with Federal agencies. lfyott have concerns about our handling of your request. please contact 0618 at: Of?ce of Government Information Services National Archives and Records Administration 8601 Adelphi College Park, MD 20740 E-mail: ogis@nara.gov Telephone: 202-741?5770 Fax: 202-741-5769 Toll?free: 1-877-684?6448 Additionally, please do not hesitate to contact your Action Of?cer, Megan Farrell at (571) 372-0409 or meganb.farre112.civ@mail.mil, if you have any questions about the foregoing. Sincerely Stephanie L. Carr Chief Enclosures: As stated APPENDIX ENCLOS lfthe initial inquiry and/or investigation into an unauthorized disclosure of classi?ed information via the media identi?es the person responsible for the mrauthorized disclosure, the Head of the Component shall answer to the fullest extent possible the standard questions in this appendix, whichc'omprisetheDoJMediaLeak Questiomraire, andsubmitthequestionnaire through seem-ity channels to the In coordination with the GC. the shall, when warranted, forward the information via letter to: Department of Justice, Criminal Division Attention: Chief, Internal Security Section Bond Building. Room 9400 1400 New York Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 a. What is the date and identity of the media source article, blog, television, or other oral presentation) containing classi?ed information? b. What speci?c statement(s) in the media source are classi?ed and was the information properly classi?ed? c. ls the classi?ed information disclosed accurate? d. Did the information come from a speci?c document, and if so, is the origin of the document and the name of the individual responsible for the security of the classi?ed data discussed? e. What is the extent of of?cial circulation of the information? Has the information been the subject of prior o?icial release? g. Was prior clearance for publication or release of the information sought from proper autimrities? h. Has the material, parts thereof or enough background data, been published of?cially or in the press to make an educated speculation on the matter possible? i. Will the information be made available for use in a prosecution, and ifso, what is the name of the person compaent to testify on its classi?cation? j. Was declassi?cation considered or decided on before the data appeared in the media? What effect might the disclosure of the classi?ed data have on the national defense? Do] OFFICIAL USE ONLY If need any assistance compiling, or would like an additional review of, the Media Leak Questionnaire Just let us is R, 0cm} S-?m?iwv. b\ ?31; Na? UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES (UD) BULLETIN October 28, 2013 ([DJointSta?Security Book Reviews 0 (U) Adana): 1880 was awaiting clari?cation on an issue ?om to which AFRICOM responded on 23 October 2013. 1880 anticipates completion of the review and submission October 2013. (U) Joint IED Defeat Organ?mation (JIEDDO) Serious Security Incident (mm b\ From: Sent: i To: Cc: Subject: FW: Secrecy News -- 12/17/12 FYI a 0 cy upport Security Directorate --Orlginal Message-m- aroon: Steven Aftergood [malitozseftergood?lfasorgl {b Subject: Secrecy News - 12/17/12 Format Note: If you oannot easily read the text below, or you prefer to receive Secrecy News In another format, please reply to this email to let us know. SECRECY NEWS from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy Volume 2012, Issue No. 126 December 17, 2012 Secrecy News Blog: AND THE LEAK REFERRAL PROCESS GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION, AND MORE FROM CR5 AND THE LEAK REFERRAL PROCESS ?Crimes reports? are of?dal noti?cations that are sent by us. intelligence agencies to the Department oflustice when an unauthorized disclosure of classi?ed information (or another potential federal crime) is believed to have occurred. Crimes reporting is required by statute, by executive order, and by interagency agreement beMeen the Attorney General and the heads of intelligence agencies. "We file crimes reports every week,? said GeorgeJ. Tenet in a discussion of leaks during his 1997 con?rmation hearing to be Director of Central intelligence. 0 ?Say again?? said Sen. Robert Kerrey, who may have been unfamiliar with the term used by Mr. Tenet. 't ?We file crimes reports with the.Attorney General every week about leaks,_ and we're never successful in litigating one,? Mr. Tenet said. . In general, information or allegations concerning criminal activity by government employees should be reported to the Attorney General pursuant to .28 U.S.C. 535, ?Investigation of crimes Involving Government officers and employees." .More particularly, Executive Order 12333 (section 1.6) on United States intelligence Activities requires the heads of intelligence agencies to ?report to the Attorney General possible violations of Federal criminal laws by employees and of speci?ed Federal criminal laws by any other person as provided in procedures agreed upon by the Attorney General and the head of the department, agency, or establishment . The unusual term ?crimes reports? derives from those procedures, which are set forth in a 1995 "Memorandum of Understanding (MOU): Reporting of Information Concerning Federal Crimes,? signed by Attorney General Janet Reno .and the heads of six other agencies. Though it is rarely cited in public discussions of leak poliqr, this MOU provides the structural framework for intelligence .community reporting to the Justice Department regarding leaks of classi?ed information, among other potential crimes. ?This Agreement requires each employee ofthe Agency to report to the General Counsel or lG facts or circumstances that reasonably indicate to the employee than an employee of an intelligence agency has committed, is committing, or will commit a violation of federal criminal law.? Then, "if a preliminary inquiry reveals that there is a reasonable belief for the allegations, the General Counsel will follow the reporting requirements? for submissiOn of "crimes reports." Intelligence agency employees are also required to report to the General Counsel of their agency information about certain violations of criminal law that are committed by persons who are not employees of an intelligence agency? speci?cally including "unauthorized disclosure of classi?ed information." Crimes reports in such cases are to be submitted to the Department ofJustice, mulch "shall maintain a record of all special crimes reports received from the Agency.? If, in addition, the agency determines that no public disclosure of classi?ed information would result from further investigation or prosecution of the matter, then it is also to be reported to the appropriate federal irwestigative agency. l'During the last several years, we have received roughly 50 crime reports each year of leaks to the media of classi?ed information," said Attorney General Janet Reno in June 2000 testimony before a closed hearing ofthe Senate intelligence Committee. (Although she said "crime report?, the preferred locution seems to be ?crimes report?) "Because of the large number of leaks and the recognition that the Department and the FBI have limited investigative resources, intelligence agencies do not request criminal investigations of every unauthorized disclosure of classi?ed information," she said. "Instead, they request investigations of the most damaging leaks, usually around 20-25 cases a year for the last several years. We have opened investigations rnto almost all of the leaks requested by the victim agencies." However, AG Reno explained, "before opening a criminal investigation, the Criminal Division generally requires the agency requesting the investigation to submit the answers to eleven speci?c questions regarding what was leaked and who had access to We believe that the eleven questions are essentially the equivalent of ?ling a police report. They provide the information we need to determine whether a criminal investigation is likely to be productive and, lfso, where to start.? . A copy ofthe Dol Media Leak Questionnaire with the eleven questions is available here: The ?gure of 50 crimes reports per year noted by the Attorney General in 2000 is consistent with George Tenet?s 1997 statement that crimes reports on leaks were being ?led "every week.? But a CIA inspector General report in 2000 (on the handling of classi?ed information by CIA director John Deutch) said that "Records of the Of?ce of General Counsel indicate there were an average of 200 written crimes reports submitted to 001 each year for the period 1995-1998.? if that is correct, then presumably the larger figure includes reports of federal crimes other than unauthorized ,disclosures. Between September 2001 and February 2008, the Federal Bureau of investigation initiated and closed the investigation of 85 reported leaks of classi?ed intelligence Information, ?all of which concerned unauthorized disclosures of classified inforrnatlon to the media,? Director Robert S. Mueller ill told the Senate intelligence Committee in 2008. "None of these cases reached prosecution,? he said. But as of February 2008, ?21 such cases are [still] under investigation." ("Classified intelligence Leaks, 2001-2008," Secrecy News, July 15, 2009). Between ?lls and 2009, US. intelligence agencies submitted 183 'referrals" to the Department ofJustlce reporting unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence. Based on those referrals or on its own initiative, the FBI opened 26 leak investigations, and the investigations led to the identi?cation of 14 suspects. Found 14 Leak Suspects in Past Five Years," Secrecy News, June 21. 2010). Though It Is hard to be certain, the most sustained andprolific leaking of Top Secret and compartmented information may have occurred during the late 19903 when such leaks appeared every few days in the reporting of Washington Times reporter Bill Gertz. ?It's getting a little tiring to see this constant source of leaks to the Washington Times of classified intelligence documents," State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns told the Weekly Standard in an otherwise admiring profile of Mr. Geri: in 1996. ("He Drives Them Crazy? by Matthew Rees, December 1, 1996.) No arrests or prosecutions resulted from that "constant source of leaks," though it eventually diminished. Meanwhile, the current Congress is still considering new constraints on disclosure of classified information that go well beyond anything the executive branch has requested or considers prudent. 3 0 Robert lit, the general counsel of the Of?ce of the Director of National Intelligence, recently expressed some criticism of the congressional anti-leak initiative. "We have discussed with the Intelligence Committee our concern that some of the proposals in their legislation really would not have any deterrent impact or punitive impact on leaks, and might in fact have an adverse impact on the free ?ow of information to the American peOple,? Mr. Litt told an American Bar Association meeting last month. But it is not clear whether the Senate Intelligence Committee, which has not held an open hearing in almost a year, would be moved by appeals to "the free flow of information to the American people." GUN CONTROL AND MORE FROM CRS The broad spectrum of policies relating to gun control is surveyed in a ally timely, updated report from the Congressional Research Service, which also provides statistics on the prevalence and use of ?rearms in the United States. See Gun Control Legislation, November 14, 2012: [32842.pdf Other new and updated CR5 reports that Congress has not made available to the public include the following. Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees: Major Court Rulings, December 11, 2012: Women in Combat Issues for Congress, December 13, 2012: intelligence Identities Protection Act, December 13, 2012: Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: issues for Congress, December 10, 2012: Outside Employment, 'Moonlighting,? by Federal Executive Branch Employees, December 12, 2012: Follow-On Biologics: The Law and Intellectual Property Issues, December 6, 2012 Nuclear Energy: Overview of congressional Issues, December 11, 2012: Fatherhood Initiatives: Connecting Fathers to Their Children, December 7, 4 2012: Emergency Assistance for Agricultural land Rehabilitation, December 11, 2012: . Bee Health: The Role of Pesticides, December 11, 2012: Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergocd and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: To . on email your request to saftergood@fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: Support the PAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation: Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: email: voice: (202) 454-4691 twitter: @saftergood (bjl?) From: Sent: "an: mmvmammu'm trauma; To: Cc: Subject: FW: Secrecy News -- RTE-12 Interesting read on. "can disclosure of classi?ed information be authorized" Information Security Policy Support Security Directorate 0 SD inteili Dill Message-w- tFrom: Steven Aftergood [mailtozsaftergood @fas.org]1 AM 6C3 Format Note: if you cannot easily read the text below, or you prefer to receive Secrecy News in another format, please reply to this email to let us know. SECRECY NEWS from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy Volume 2012, issue No. 127 December 19. 2012 Secrecy News Biog: CAN DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFO BE RISING ECONOMIC POWERS, AND MORE FROM CRS IMAGERY DECLASSIFICATION PREPARATIONS CONTINUE JASON ON PRESSIVE FOR DOD SENSORS CAN DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFO BE It is plainly true that executive branch of?cials will sometimes disclose classi?ed information to reporters and other uncleared individuals. But this practice is not explicitly authorized in any of?cial statement of classi?cation policy. in fact, with an exception for life-threatening emergencies, it is usually understood to be prohibited. 1 How can the obviously ?exible practice and the seemingly prohibitive policy be reconciled? A newly updated report from the Congressional Research Service presents a close reading of the relevant rules and regulations in search of some wiggle room for authorized disclosures of classi?ed information. ?Nothing in the Executive Order addresses an informal procedure for releasing classi?ed information [to reporters]. 13526 section 1.1 provides that '[cllassified information shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any ?unauthorized? discloSure of identical or similar information,? but does not address what happens in the event of a disclosure that was in fact authorized,? the CRS report observes. "By de?nition, classified information is designated as such based on whether its *unauthorized? disclosure can reasonably be expected to cause a certain level of damage to the national security. This may be read to suggest that disclosures may be authorized under such circumstances when no damage to national security is reasonably expected." (But under those circumstances, it might be noted, the Information shOuid be declassi?ed.) The CR5 report, written by legislative attorney Jennifer K. Eisea, continues: "Nothing in the order provides explicit authority to release classified information that exists apart from the authority to declassify, but it is possible that such discretionary authority is recognized to release information outside the community of authorized holders without formally deciassifying it.? Indeed, this appears to be an accurate characterization of actual practice. in any case, ?there is little to stop agency heads and other high-ranking of?cials from releasing classified information to persons without a security clearance when it is seen as suiting government needs." Again, an accurate description- particularly since "the Attorney General has prosecutorial discretion to choose which leaks to prosecute." See ?The Protection of Classi?ed information: The Legal Framework," updated December 17, 2012: . 4 Overall, "Executive Branch policy appears to treat an official disclosure as a declassifying event, while nonoattributed disclosures [to reporters or others] have no effect on the classi?cation status of the information,? the author writes. "For example, the Department of Defense instructs agency of?cials, in the event that classi?ed information appears in the media, to neither can?rm nor deny the accuracy of the information. The Under Secretary of Defense for intelligence is then advised to 'consult with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and other of?cials having a primary interest in the information to determine if the information was of?cially released under proper authority.? But, the CR5 report astutely notes, the relevant regulation ?does not clarify what happens in the event the disclosure turns out to have been preperly authorized." And so it seems that the regulation offers the conceptual space for an authorized disclosure of classi?ed information. (As if to provide an ironic illustration of the point, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence himself - lVilchael Vickers - was repertedly cited in a referral to the Department of Justice for disclosing potentially restricted information oonceming the pursuit of Osama bin Laden to ?lmmakers. See "Bin Laden film leak was referred toiustlce; leaker top Obama official? by Marisa Taylor and Jonathan S. La nday, McCiatchy Newspapers, December 17, 2012. In a statement last night, the Department of Defense confirmed that Mr. Vickers is a subject of a pending Inspector General investigation. But it said the information in question was unclassi?ed in its entirety.) 2 The CRS report naturally does not constitute an authoritative interpretation of the executive order, and in some respects it may be in error. The report mistakenly states (at footnote 51) that the 001 Media Leak Questionnaire that agencies must complete when a referring a leak for investigation is part of a Memorandum of Understanding concluded between the Department of Justice and elements of the Intelligence Community.? But a review of the Memorandum, described in Secrecy News earlier this week, shows that that supposition is incorrect. The two are separate documents. See ?Crimes Reports and the Leak Referral Process," Secrecy News, December 17, 2012: legislation that is pending in the Senate would require executive branch of?cials to record all authorized disclosures of classified intelligence to the press, and to notify Congress when they occur (cf. sections 501 and 502 of Title of the FY 2013 intelligence authorization bill). These provisions, which may prove unworkable in practice, are presumably intended to enable Congress to publicly comment on classi?ed intelligence matters with the same freedom that agency officials already do. But the public interest concern raised by the noti?cation provisions is that if they are strictly imposed, they may discourage all authorized disclosures of classi?ed intelligence, yielding a net reduction in public access to government information. RISING ECONOMIC POWERS, AND MORE FROM CR5 New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that Congress has directed CRS not to release to the public include the following. Rising Economic Powers and 0.5. Trade Policy, December 3, 2012: Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United States: Estimates Since 1986, December 13, 2012: DOD Alternative Fuels: Policy, Initiatives and legislative Activity, December 14, 2012: Federal Land Ownership: Current Acquisition and Disposal Authorities, December 13, 2012: The Controlled Substances Act: Regulatory Requirements, December 13, 2012: IMAGERY DECLASSIFICATION PREPARATIONS CONTINUE intelligence community of?cials have been meeting with representatives of the National Archives to discuss the anticipated declassification and release of intelligence imagery from the KH-9 satellite dating between 1971 and 1984. Of?cials have been negotiating the transfer of the original negatives from the KH-S system and the provision of finding aids, according to a newly released but heavily redacted report from the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, dated June 2012. Multiple releases of declassified imagery are planned over the coming year ?with final delivery of Imagery scheduled far September 2013." See "Intelligence Imagery Set to be Disclosed in 2013," Secrecy News, October 22, 2012. JASON ON FOR DOD SENSORS The latest report from the elite JASON science advisory panel is devoted to the subject of "compressive sensing." This term generally refers to the use of sensors for imaging (or other sensing) of an object in a manner that uses a limited subset of the available data in order to improve efficiency or conserve resources. ?Compressive sensing involves intentionally under-sampling an object or image, typically in a random manner, and then using a companion process known as sparse reconstruction to recover the complete object or image the JASON report says. ?Compressed sensing can conceivably lead to reductions in data link requirements, reductions in radar resources needed for radar image formation (thereby providing the radar more resources for its other functions such as target detection, target tracking, and ?re control), increased angular resolution without commensurate increases in array costs, and increased fields of view without degradation in "Compressive sensing is not a ?free lunch',? the report cautions, ?but always involves a tradeoff; reduced data may save measurement resources, but it also means a lower signal-to-noise ratio and possibly other artifacts, such as side lobes or false alarms." A copy of the new JASON report was obtained by Secrecy News. See "Compressive Sensing for Sensor Systems," November 2012: Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to on email your request to saftergood@fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecv with a donation: Steven Afteraood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: email: aftermOdeasmg voice: (202) 454-4691 twitter: @saitergood is?" Sent: To: Subject: Wi? RE: Follow-up on CRS's - - - - ecy ?ews Got it. I will discuss and circle back with comments, Frorr CC: Ramsey, Theresa Ms omosoouso??zg? Subject: FW: Follow-up on CRS's ?Authorized Disclosures" Report and Secrecy News - 12/19/12 1. Thanks to all for your comments/ideas on this one! in anticipation/socne-setter for a meeting and I are having with 000 IG on 25 JAN relative to their "Authorized Disclosure? project, a quick, general assessment of subject CR5 report, and various issues for U0 Team consideration: .. This report is very unhelpful, as it dabbles in what-ifs about the thinking or motives of leakers, and thus whether 3 UD was "authorized" or not. This plays right into the hands ofthe anti-secrecy crowd, and needlessly inserts confusion about policy when there is none. - At page 11 onward there is a very murky discussion of Deciassi?cation vs. Leaks, and "Instant Deciassi?cation." The thinking here is that there seems to be some trade space in E0 13526 that permits an authorized disclosure of classi?ed information, via leaking, if the ieakers' motives are pure. There simply is no such space in 13526; the author has constructed this little Potemkin village, without consideration of other critical aspects, such as the requirement for a clearance, a need-to-know. and legitimate access. Simply put?no one may legitimately leak classi?ed information. This is not that hard or mysterious. - In general, there?s a sense in reading the report that this is an interesting little area of study. when in fact It is a huge problem that has many second and third-order effects across the security system. Bottom linewwhat is this dabbling all about/what isthe CBS team?s purpose here? It appears from the Summary at the front of the report that there may be ongoing Congressional interest, but I'm not sure. 2. Recommendation: engage the CRS attorney to explore the thinking behind this project, the outcomes arrived at, smoke them out on any next steps? i guess if we have a couple of more ?doozy" events, there could be some kind of action. At the very least, we could be heading back to see the staffers. 3. Additionally and again .. we and the entire 056 would be well served by having the issue a note to clarify this entire topic. This would follow up on and D/isoo e-mail from a couple of months back on this very topic, the issue of UD prevention, 4. At your disposal to discuss Thank you! Subject: FW: Secrecy News - 12/19/12 Interesting read on, "an disclosure of classi?ed information be authorized" orma on cy upport Security Directorate ODUSDilntellmence My), inal Message?- Fro teven Aftergood 2 AM Subject: Secrecy News 12/19/12 Format Note: Ifyou cannot easily read the text below, or you prefer to receive Secrecy News in another format, please reply to this email to let us know. SECRECY NEWS from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy Volume 2012, Issue No. 127 December 19, 2012 Secrecy News Blog: CAN DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFO BE RISING ECONOMIC POWERS, AND MORE FROM CR5 IMAGERY DECLASSIFICATION PREPARATIONS CONTINUE JASON ON FOR DOD SENSORS CAN DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFO BE It is plainly true that executive branch of?cials will sometimes disclose classi?ed information to reporters and other uncleared individuals. But this practice is not explicitly authorized in any of?cial statement of classi?cation pohcy. in fact, with an exception for life-threatening emergencies, it is usually understood to be prohibited. How can the obviously ?exible practice and the seemingly prohibitive policy be reconciled? A newly updated report from the Congressional Researdt Service presents a close reading of the relevant rules and regulations in search of some wiggle room for authorized disclosures of classi?ed information. "Nothing in the Executive Order addresses an infome procedure for releasing classi?ed information [to reporters]. E.O. 13526 section 1.1 provides that '[cllassi?ed informa?on shall not be declassi?ed automatically as a result of any ?unauthorlzed? disclosure of identical orsirnilar information,? but does not address what happens in the event of a disclosure that was in fact authorized," the CRS report observes. "By definition, classi?ed information is designated as such based on whether its ?unauthorized disclosure can reasonably be expected to cause a certain level of damage to the national security. This may be read to su-est that disclosures may be authorized under such circumstances when no damage to national security is reasonably expected." (But under those circumstances, it might be noted, the information should be declassi?ed.) The CR5 report, written by legislative attorney Jennifer K. Eisea, continues: ?Nothing in the order provides explicit authority to release classi?ed information that exists apart from the authority to declassify, but it Is possible that such discretionary authority is recognized to release information outside die community of authorized holders without formally deciassifying it." Indeed, this appears to be an accurate characterization of actual practice. in any case, "there is little to stop agenq heads and odrer high-ranking of?cials from releasing classi?ed informa?on to persons without a security clearance when it is seen as suiting government needs.? Again, an accurate descriptiono- particularly since ?the Attorney General has prosecutorlal discretion to choose which leaks to prosecute.? See "The Protection of Classi?ed Information: The Legal Fra meworlt," 3 updated December 17, 2012: Overall, "Executive Branch policy appears to treat an of?cial disclosure as a declassifying event, while disclosures [to reporters or others] have no effect on the classification status of the information," the author writes. ?For example, the Department of Defense instructs agency of?cials, in the event that classified information appears in the media, to neither confirm nor deny the accuracy of the information. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is then advised to 'consult with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and other officials having a primary interest in the information to determine if the information was of?cially released under proper authority.? But, the CRS report astutely notes, the relevant regulation ?does not clarify what happens in the event the disclosure turns out to have been properly authorized." And so it seems that the regulation offers the conceptual space for an authorized disclosure of classi?ed information. (As if to provide an ironic illustration of the point, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence himself - Michael chers - was reportedly cited in a referral to the Department of Justice for disclosing potentially restricted information concerning the pursuit of Osama?bin Laden to ?lmmakers. See ?Bin uden film leak was referred to Justice; ieaker top Obarna of?cial? by Marisa Taylor and Jonathan S. Landay, McClatchy Newspapers, December 17, 2012. In a statement last night, the Department of Defense confirmed that Mr. Vickers is a subject of a pending Inspector General investigation. But it said the information in question was unclassi?ed in its entirety.) The CRS report naturally does not constitute an authoritative interpretation of the executive order, and in some respects it may be in error. The report mistakenly states (at footnote 51) that the Media Leak Questionnaire that agencies must complete when a referring a leak for investigation is part of a Memorandum of Understanding concluded between the Department of Justice and elements of the Intelligence Community.? But a review of the Memorandum, described in Secrecy News earlier this week, shows that that supposition is incorrect. The two are separate documents. See ?Crimes Reports and the Leak Referral Process,? Secrecy News, December 17, 2012: Anti-leak legislation that is pending in the Senate would require executive branch officials to record all authorized disclosures of classi?ed intelligence to the press, and to notify Congress when they occur (cf. sections 501 and 502 of Title of the FY 2013 intelligence authorization bill). These provisions, which may prove unworkable in practice, are presumably intended to enable Congress to publicly comment on classified intelligence matters with the same freedom that agency of?cials already do. But the public Interest concern raised by the notification provisions is that if they are strictly imposed, they may discourage all authorized disclosures of classified Intelligence, yielding a net reduction in public access to government information. RISING ECONOMIC POWERS, AND MORE FROM CR5 New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that Congress has directed CR5 not to release to the public include the following. Rising Economic Powers and U5. Trade Policy, December 3, 2012: 4 Unauthorized Aliem Residing in the United States: Estimates Since 1986, December 13, 2012: DOD Alternative Fuels: Policy, Initiatives and legislative Activity, December 14, 2012: Federal Land Ownership: Current Acquisition and Disposal Authorities, December 13, 2012: The Controlled Substances Act: Regulatory Requirements, December 13, 2012: IMAGERY PREPARATIONS CONTINUE Intelligence community of?cials have been meeting with representatives of the National Archives to discuss the anticipated deciassi?cation and release of intelligence imagery from the Ki-l-s satellite dating between 1971 and 1984. Officials have been negotiating the transfer of the original negatives from the lei-9 system and the provision of ?nding aids, according to a newly released but heavily redacted report from the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, dated June 2012. Multiple releases of declassi?ed imagery are planned over the coming year ?with final delivery of imagery scheduled for September 2013.? See "Intelligence Imagery Set to be Disclosed in 2013," Secrecy News, October 22, 2012. JASON 0N FOR DOD SENSORS The latest report from the elite JASON science advisory panel is devoted to the subject of ?compressive sensing." This term generally refers to the use of sensors for imaging {or other sensing) of an object in a manner that uses a limited subset of the avaiiabie data in order to improve ef?cienCy or conserve resources. ?Compressive sensing involves intentionally under-sampling an obiect or image, typically in a random manner, and then using a companion process known as sparse reconstruction to recover the complete object or image the JASON report says. "Compressed sensing can conceivably lead to reductions in data link requirements, reductions in radar resources needed for mdar image formation (thereby providing the radar more resources for its other functions such as target detection, target tracking, and ?re control), increased angular resolution without commensurate increases in array costs, and increased ?elds of view without degradation in resolution" ?Compressive sensing is not a 'free lunch?,? the report cautions, "but always involves a tradeo?; reduced data may save measurement resources, but it also means a lower signal-to-noise ratio and possibly other artifacts, such as side lobes or false alarms.? A copy of the new JASON report was obtained by Secrecy News. See "Com pressive Sensing for Sensor Systems,? November 2012: Secrecy News is written by Steven A?ergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to bscribehtml OR email your request to saftersood@fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation: b. at Steven Aftersood ?305? Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: email: saftergood@fas.org voice: (202) 454-4691 twitter: @saftergood This email message is for the sole use of the intended reclpient(s) and may contain con?den?al infarmation. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. lfyou are not the intended redolent, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies of the original message. Pages 20-77 are denied in their entirety pursuant to and