-- ItApril 39. 197': 13/1 ZB:ng:29 Apr 77 {rats/9:121) meamn?m FEJR: I THE PRESIDENT FROM: . . 13322231531 - 5mm: - Ferdign Policy Overview and the Summit At the Summit yam: ma?agues will}. want ta learn 11mm yau, avail ii may?- Mara/tally. yum.- bm vim an faraigm policy; Accardingly. you may find it use?xl ta Emk at the preliminary statement of the pmpased-docmm y?m inure-year goals. Th1: atatam: cantaiua a. basis: gancept sanderlying U. 55. foreign policy, the i?anti?- (ma/an of ten central 3mm, as well as much larger number bi aingie- sentem de?ning the nee-?ed stem car specific targeta in: the attainment aim/1.1% magic/r abjac?vem- 7 - Tim appendix: on the nvaW'rEgional in?nanhiala also ctr/mains ?aps identifying how these gnaw reg/Ema}. in?uentials impinge on a: ran-late to either ?at/em. Th1: final mp behind the discus/aim Di and: individual regmnal pawn/.1! gravidea that [Jam/1:111:13 data. . 3 ET Declassi??d RAG Project . ESDN"vb-4 *1 No Objection To. De?/a??ifi?atidh 111 Full 2013/11/15 1- C5 for the next four years. "Ii No 2013/11/15 ORANDUM . . THE WHITE noose . or? . . . April 29, 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT . . Declassified FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ESDN: 12- 26- 6- 2- 2 Four- Year Goals: Preliminary Statement Purpos and Scope The memorandum which follows is an attempt to define your four-?year foreign policy goals. It is not meant to be a public [statement -- and its publication or revelation would be counterproductive. It would provide your critics with ammunition (both now and four yeai hence) and public disclosure would also make it more difficult to attain many of your goals. Moreover, in some ways any such statement is bound to be arbitrary and even simplistic but otherwise it would have to be a book, the explanations, elaborations, and nuances included. The document is not an interagency consensus statement. It Was prepared, on the basis of the conceptual framework which you and I have often discussed, by Sam Huntington and myself, with NSC staff inputs. (Sam is also coordinating the PRM 10 effort.) As of now, yen are the first con sumcr of this statement. It has not been cleared with the Secretary of State nor with any other members of the Cabinet. At this stage, the document is meant only fer your personal consumption. Once revised on the basis of your instructions and following a discussion with your p1 incipsl advisers, it should become a decision paper from the top down, rather than a consensual statement f11te1 ed upwards thiough the bureaucmcy. does not prescribe specific tactics but it does pioposc steps for the attain- ment of these ten central objectives, in addition to some others as well. I believe the four year objectives -- though ambitious ere realistic. In any event, they provide both stimulus and discipline for the development of specific policy choices for your decision. I should note that the second SECIETIT No Objection To Ful'l 2013/11/15 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11(15 : NLC-12-?6-6-2-2 -~ ·-,. ._) • . ~.~~ .. z.. 0£ these central objectives --- that we cultivate the new "regional influentials". -- is likely to be both controversial and possibly even occasionally in conflict with some 0£ the other goals. Yet I believe that American interests and global stability require that vve. nourish a better relationship with these key states. Not to do so is to ·deprive ours~lves 0£ potentially very <;onstr\1ctive relations.hips. Given the importance and sensitivity of this proposal, 1 atta"ch a special annex (TabIV), pertaining to these states. Basic Concept · r-·- (_~-. These ten central objectives are derived from a basic concept of wl:iat u. . foreign policy should be at this historical stage.· I want to stress to ou the im orb.nee of that concept. A foreign policy to be effective rnu$t rest on a reasonably accurate assessment of the basic.. historical need~ The Soviets periodically undertake a .very deliberate reappraisal of their foreign policy based on the question: what is the nature of our historical phase? Has that phase changed, and -- if so -- what al'e the implicati~ns fol". the Soviet foreign policy? We should be similarly alert to tb~ meaning of historical change. U. S. foreign policy in th6· past was relatively successful because the notions of Atlanticism and containment did correspond to the major needs of the late 40 1 s and early 50 1 s. Accordingly, this document is based on a unifying theme and you have to decide whether the defi!1ition of that theme -- in the section· called "Overall Concept" -- is congenial to you •. Action Accordingly I I would recommend: (1) that you review the document, make whatever changes you deem necessary, and give Il'l:e further guidance; (2) that following further l'evisions in the light of your directives, the document be \.ised as the basis for discussion with your principal advisers (sttch as the Secretary o£ State), and.possibly even with top -. _______________Co ng_r__e li.S io1\.al__l_e_a_de_rs_(tlumgh_p_e1'.h.~p_s_wi tho.uLad."1,1al __d is.tr-i bu ti on-).:--- -------------· - - (3) that you give a cornprehcnsive speech, maybe after the summit, . using largely the conceptual part in otdcr to educate the public and to convey. to all concerucd that yo·ul' various actions are part of an overall scherne (contrary to some criticisms that are now being voiced), Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/1~__'.Ji~C-12-26-6-~_::_? ' .,._Y. . ' Even then, the document should not be distributed except perhaps at a restricted NSC meeting itself. Please .indicate whether this approach meets with your approval • .APPROVE ----- DISAPPROVE; - - - raise Let me also here the possibility that you consider. using your Not:re Dame Univers1ty Address to develop the above approach. You might .remember that I proposed a few days ago that you give a conceptual speech, attempting to integrate Y,OUr overall policy, and follow it shortly thereafter by a town hall meeting specifically on foreign policy. The Notre Dame date comes roughly two weeks after the summit, and it might be· a good plac~ to summarize your basic conclusions, and then go on to deliver a more far-reaching and essentially conceptual statement on your :foreign policy. AP}lROVE ,-·-., ( ~.'. DISAPPROVE ----- ' Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11 /15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 a No Objectioh? Tobe/classification in? Full 2013/11/15 x15 TABLE: OF CONTENTS I OVERALL CONCEPT II - TEN CENTRAL OBJECTIVES CENTRAL OBJECTIVES AND SPECIFIC STEPS IV ANNEX ON REGIONAL WFLUENTIALS Declassified RACProject N0 Objection T0 Declass?i?cation in Full 2013/11/15 ESDN: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2_-2 . . tC~:... C~------·· (-;·" .. . \ Four .. Year .Foreign PolifY Objectlvef! . '···· .· I. OVERALL CONCEPT • U. S. foreign policy can be expressed in terms of several broad purposes. Though interrelated, these purposes imply, though not rigidly, a basic hierarchy. (At a specific level, choices are often necessary ... _ as ·in the exemption of South Korea 'on security grounds from aid cutoff on human rights grounds). These brc)ad purposes are: .t ... 1. To assure the security of the United States; Z, To enhance peace by reducing int·ernational tensions and the probability of war; 3. To promote the ptosperity of·the United States; 4~ To advance global w.ellbeing by creating an open, cooperaHve and equitable international economic order; 5. To expand fundamel'ltal human rights, The document which follows is designed to promote all 0£ these . broad purposes, and it attempts to translate them into more specific goals in the political, economic and Mense al'eas. ____ ------ The basic conceptual frame of reference for the more specific goals is a historical perspective, which sees the United States as having to play a creative role in world affairs, in some ways similar to the :i.·ole that the United States played following 1945. At that time, the United States in effect shaped a ~1cw international system, replacing the one that had collapsed during World War II. That new system then endured an_~_\Y_S>_!'_ls_c:i_c!__i~Q__J~e~!;::i..11;>\!.i~gg.n_ of 1·es_p_onsibHity to--the-r-cst of-mankind-- ... -. -·-----··----·----we will seek to deepen our collabor~.tion; z. With the en1~rging statest we will seek to develop close bilateral relations in same key cases, ai1d to widen and to institutionalize arrangements for more genuine global cooperation; Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To . De~lassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 (····· . . 3. With states with which we compete militarily and ideologically, we will seek through appropriate ari•ang ements to reduce the chances of war and to codify more precise rules of reciprocal resh'aint. - ... ' . ~. Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-2'6-6-2-2 NC2_QEj_~9tl9.!:!.I~ Declassifi9ation in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 ' . . . S~E~ I TEN CENTRAL OBJECTIVES II. ' With that basic concept as our point of departul"e, and in keeping with it, it is recommended that your foreign policy seek to attain during the coming four years these central ten goals (developed more ' . apecif'ically in the third part of this document): I. To engage Western Europe, Japan and other advanced democracies in closer political cooperation through the increasing institutionalization of consultative relationships, and to promote wider macro-economic coordination pointing towards a stable and open monetary and trade system. Genuine collaboration with these states is the foundation stone of U. S, policy, and we must seek to intensify and fo multiply our consultative links; " 2. To weave a worldwide web of bilateral, political and, where appropriate, economic cooperation with th"e new emerging regional 11 influentials 11 - - thereby widening, in ke~ ing with new historica.l circumstances, our earlier reliance on Atlanticism or, more lately, on tr~lateralism. These regionar influent.~als include Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, lndia, Indone·sia, in addition to our more traditional friends; 3, To exploit the _foregoing in the development of mol'e accommodating North-South relations, both political and economic, through such devices as the Global Development Budget, the institutionalization of CIEC, the shaping of links between OECD and OPEC, etc.;· · ;_,, r 4. To push U.S. ~Soviet strategic arms limitation talks into strategic arms reduction talks, using the foregoing as an entering wedge for am.ore stable U, S. ·Soviet relation.ship. At the same dine, we should seek to rebuff Soviet incursions, both by supporting our friends and by ameliorating the 'sources of conflict which the Soviets e:i.::ploi t. We should m_a t_c:h__.§9_y_i_gtj1t_gQl_ogica.Lexpan siGn--by a mo-re- -- ----~---arrrr-mativc--Al1~-eri~;~- posture on global h~man rights, while seeking consistently to make detcnte both more comprt"hensivc and mo.re reciprocal; 5. To normtilize U, S. -Chinese rclnti011s in order to preserve the U, S. -Chinese relationship as a major st:.i.bilizil1g factor in the global powei. t>al;:mcc, offsetting Soviet cotwcnlional supcl'iol'ity and preventing t:hc Soviet Union from conce11trnting its rcsourc<.~s on a westward (Europe) 01· so1.tthwnrd {Middlc:.East. Alrka) expansionary drive: ~ET -~.. . ·Jimmy Carter Library Copy . . ·. · .... No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 ' No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 . SE~ I 6. To obtain a comprehensive Middle Eastern settlem~nt, · without whicq the further l"adicalization o! the Arab world and the reentry of the Soviet Union into the Middle East cannot for long be avoided, generating in turn serious consequences for Western Europe, Japan, and the United States; 7. · To set in motion a progressive and peaceful transformation of South Africa towards a biracial.democrac.y and to forge -- ·in connection with this process - .. a coalition of moderate black African leaders in order to stem continental radicalization and to eliminate the Soviet-Cuban presence from the continent; 8. To restrict the level of global armaments through international agreements limiting the excessive flow of ar.ms into the Third World (though with some consideration for goal No. 2), cooperative international restraints on nuclear proliferation, and a ·comprehensive test han on nuclear testing; 9. To enhance global sensitivity to human rights through actions designed to highlight U~ S, obscdvance of such rights and through multilateral and bilateral initiatives meant to influence other governments to give higher priority to such human rights; 1 O•. To maintain a defense posture capable of deterring the Soviet Union both on the strategic and conventional levels from hostile acts and ·from political pressure. This will require the U.S. to modernize, rationalize, and reconceptualize its defense postu1·e in keeping with the broad changes in world ~Hairs that have already been noted, to improve NATO military stren·gth and readiness, and to develop capab11ities to deter or to counter Soviet military intervention in the Third World. -·~---~-------·--- --- -- -------------- ------------- -----.----------------- -- Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No_9_bjection t~eclassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC~12-26-6.-2~2 ( '·· It sliould be noted in cormection with these broad objectives that the promotion o{ human rights is a goal that cross·cuts otn" relations with the Soviet Union, the developing countries, and particularly the new regional influentials. In all these cases, our leverage should be used discreetly to advance human rights but no specific targets can be p~es<:ribed precisely. · Moreover, the point to stresL;; is that human rights 'is a broad concept. These two words should mean much more than political liberty, the right to vote, and protection against arbitrary governmental action. Human rights, and this we should stress, means also certain basic minimum standards of social and economic existence, In effect, human rights refers to all three (political, social, and economic) and.this is why these words have such universal appeal, 'I Such.a bl."oader, and mol·e flexible definition would have several advantages: it would l'etain for us the desirable identification with a hum.an cause whose time has come, .·and yet it would avoid sorne of the rigidities that are potential in the narrower political definition. lt would give the freedom to point at the most glaring abuses (e. g~, political suppression in some cou.-,tries, or total social indifference in others), though leaving us the necessary margin of flexibility in dealing with most governments. In general, we should stress that achieving human rlghts is a process and that \Ve are watching carefully progress toward greater respect for human rights, realizing that thel."e is no single standard for all the conntries of the wo:rld •. us The ten central objectives are refined and time-targeted in the pages which now follow. Ii approved by you, all of the specific as well as broader objectives will bccome 1 at appropriate times, the subjc£i of action d.~l::Q...C!,i ~r;s frorr:i yot,t. requiring the pertinent department to submit rnore detailed studies and proposals for implementation. Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in i=ull 2013/11/15: NLC-12:26-6-2-2 No Objection fo peclassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 SE~ • -7- Ill.! CENTRAL OBJECTIVES AND SPECIFIC STEPS 1. RELATIONS WITH ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES ,Central Objective: To.engage Western Europe, Japan, and other advanced democracies in close political cooperation and wider macro·economic coordination· throllgh the increasing institutionalization of c9nsultative relationships. The purpose of thi~ closer relationship is to create a more stable and dynamic international economy, 'to be able to pursue a more comprehensive detent'e while maintaining our security and' to enlist the other industrialized nations in meeting our objective on global and north~south issues. ', A. Political Coordination: Improve coordination· among . the governments of the adv·anced ind_ustrial democracies by stren&_: thening existing ~,echani.sms .and adding some new ones. (l) Upgrade OECD by strengthening its staff and informally charging it with follo\ving up on agreem.ents made at Western .Summits (1977-78). . (2) Strengthen U.S. representation at the European Com- munity, including, among other things, appointing a senior Administration figure as Ambassador (1977). (3) Seek to regula.riZe summits. with EC representing smaller countries (1978). (4) Create standing secretariat and other coordinating consultative mechanisms for above, including a joint political staff of senior officials i·epresenting heads of governments to oversee the consultative ·process (1979). B. Cooperation with Europe. Improve U.S. -European cooperation and expand European invoi'vemcnt in NA TO. (1) Improve U, S, -European political coopcra tion. a. Express understanding for EC' s di.Hiculty in coming to political ngr<•cmcnt, especially on non-North Atlantic questions (1977). Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11 /15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11 /15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 -8- ( '· b, (2.) Support European W1ity and expansion 0£ EC to include Portugal and Spain, while recognizing that especially the latter may adversely affect U.S. economic {agricultural} inte:rests. (Expressions o! support, 1977). Expand and diversity involvement Of European countries in NATO. a.' Reach agreement on Spanish entry into NA TO as full or associate member (1978-79). b. Reintegrate Greece into NATO command structure (1978). " c. Make progress on structures for accommodating NATO needs to uncertain politics in Italy and other countries. For .instance: members or potential members might be permitted to choose diffel:'ent levels of participation, ranging from gcne:r:al commitment to the goals of NA TO but without any explicit commitment to fight, to full integration in NA TO command structures and standardization arrangements. There might also be varying levels of participation, tacit or formal, across different functions, based on the model of Portugal and NPG (1978), d. Review U.S. weapons production schedule to establish areas where U.S. purchases in Europ.c are feasible (1977-78), and develop a NA TO review of post-1985 weapons obsolescence with standardization an·a m.utual purchases in mind (1979). (See Sec. 9 .. c-(3),) ____ __ __ ___________________ j3)_ lm1~r_OYJLC.1.u:u_d_ina tion__of We s te r1Lc.c onomic__policic s_t oward s____ __ ___ ·--·----· -·- __ . the Soviet Union and East Europe. a. . Improve exchnngc of infonnation among the industrialized clcrnocracies about East-West economic developments, ·~ _s~J(' Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11 /15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 ~ .. ' l. .. b. c. Continue ongoing work within the OECD. and NATO on East-West economic issues to establish a factual basis for possible diplomatic initiatives at a later date. Propose ip the OECD an exchange of information on credit extension . and participation by Western firms in large~scale industrial projects in the USSR and East Europe {1977) • Seek to reach agreement among the Western. indus·trialized c'ountries on the appropriate use of economic leverage on the East (1978). Reduce harmful com:petition among Western leaders in their financial dealings with the East. l. Extend the pre sent "Gentlemen 1 s Agreement" on credit tel'Jns (1977). 2.: Seek an inform:il understanding on the overall ·volume of credits extended to the East (1979), d. ·Develop contingency planning on possible use of economic policy tools for non-economic objectives (e. g~, i11 the event of Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia) (1978). (4) Achieve a peaceful resolution of the outstanding issues concerning Cyprus and the Aegean between Greece and Turkey (1977 78). M ~ •. --rn-- -- Cooperation with Japan. Establish more effective mechanisms for U.S. -Japa!!_£JSC_£~operation on matters of. mutual interest a.1}_d. involve Japan in n1orc active colbbor<1 t.ion \vith the U, S. in dealing with global -----p-i•ohlems,- ------ ------ - --- -- ------------- - --------- - ----- ----~---- --·· ------------- (1) Establish joint U, S. -Japanese consultative nuclear planning group to explore means for coopcl·ation in developing safer, more efficient, a1 d cheaper nuclear technologies that can be applied worldwide on a 11011-discriminatory basis (late 1977). Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 20'13/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No _Obj,ection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: Nl.C-12-26-6-2-2 . -lo .. : ( ' (2} Deepen u. s ... Japan consultation and coo:rdination on military matters, particularly in connection with naval de!cnae (1978). {3) Engage Japan in efforts to convene a multilateral conference (including PRC, North Korea, South Korea) to work out a formal peace agreement for the Korean peninsula, including mutual diplomatic recognition of all parties (1979). (4) Encourage Japan to indicate to Peking that Tokyo has an interest in a peaceful evolution of Peking .. Taipei relations (i.e., nudge Japan to share the burden for the maintenance of the island) (1978). (5) Encourage Japan {in collabol"ation with other developed Pacific B:asin. countries) to play a more active role in suppol't of ASEAN (1978). (6) Encourage quiet security consultations 'Qetween Japan, Indonesia, and Australia (1978}. (7) Consult with and cooperate closely with Japan in working out multilateral solutions to global problems (monetary reform, MTN, law of the sea, North~South dialogue} (1978). (8) Induce Japan to provide stronger economic and political support for U.S. efforts to achieve Middle Eastern settlement, to promote progressive political change in South Africa, and to stl'engthcn weaker OECD economies (e.g. , support for Portuguese consortium) (1977). D. Economic Coordination, Develop improved coordination the industrialized democracies on domestic economic policies :;md balance of _paynwnt.s issues. an10n~ _(L)_D.eY_clo p-a n-a &-J:".{}ed-.in-te-.r'n-at-i on a1-c·on-s ul ta-tivepro c e $$----------for: identifying reasonable growth and inflation objectives for major industrialized nations~ identifying balance of payments implications of growth and inflation projc-ction.s; monitoring the progress of nations towards economic goals and sug!~esting policy adjustments; suggesting adjustment measures to reduce payl'ncnts irnbalanc:c.s, Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11 /15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 - - No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11115 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 ... . . . ' : •.' .' ( . -lo(l) Deepen u. S ... Japan consultation and coord.ination on military matters, particularly in connection with naval defense (1978). (3) Engage Japan in efforts to convene a multilateral conference (including PRC, North Korea, South Korea) to work out a formal peace agreement for the Korean peninsula, including mutual diplomatic recognition of all parties (1979). (4) Encourage Japan to indicate to Peking that Tokyo has an interest in a peaceful evolution of Peking.-Taipei relations (i.e., nudge Japan to share the burden for the maintenance of the island) (1978). (5) Encourage Japan (in collaboration with other developed Pacific B~sin countries) to play a more active role in support of ASEAN (1978). (6) Encourage quiet security consultations 'Qetween Japa11 1 llldonesia, and Australia (1978}. · (7) Consult with and coope1·ate closely with Japan in working out multilateral solutions to global problems (monetary reform, MTN, law of the sea, North~South dialogue) (1978). (8) Induce Japan to provide stronger economic and political support for U.S. efforts to achieve Midclle Eastern settlement, to prornote progressive political change in South Africa, and to strengthen weaker OECD economies (e.g., support for Portuguese consortium) (1977), · D. Economic Coordination, Develop improved coordination amonq the industriali7,ed democracies on domestic eco.12omic policies ,and balance of paynwnts issue~_. --·----·--·- _____ jL)___D_e_v_cLo_p_an_agr_eed-intcrnationalcon-sulta-t-i-ve-process for: identifying reasonable gi·owth and inflation objectives for major industrialized nations; identiiying balance of payl'n.<,m.ts implications of growth and infl.il.tion proj"ctions; monitoring the progress of nations towards economic goals and suggesting policy adjustments; suggesting adjustment measures to reduce payments imbalances. Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No QQj~ction T~ Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-~-2-2 ·.~. a. Use the Summit to underline the importance of such consultations and coordination (1977). b. Improve OECD (particularly its. Economic Policy Committee and Working Party Three) consultative process and establish a fra-mework within which appropriate growth and in!lation targets can be identiiied, progress monitored, payments implications assessed, and suggested change provided (1977). c. Use such mechanisms as are established to develop agreements on a. code.,of international economic co ordination (1978). · . (2) Hold :regularized mceti_ngs at Ministerial level to review major issues arising from these processes and develop agreed set of rules for economic coordination (1978- }. r· E. Recovery. Achiev·e sustained non-inflatio:i:i.ary growth in ,the United States and other industrialized democr<1;des with gi·owth rates .averaging over .5% and inflation rates below 5%. (1) Achieve relatively high gro\vth rates (averaging 6% in the U. s., Japan, and Germany without trig;ering new inflationary pi:essure s (1 977- }. (Z) Promote stabilization measures in weaker OECD economies in order to reduce or eliminate ·Current account deficits, reduce inflation; induce new investments, ari.d create productive new jobs{l977~ ). (3) Insure continued sti·ong growth among the Big __ ThKQ~--- _________ --- ----------:_'._ -- --- - -_--- -·· -- ---··---·--- ---- -----ecc:moJ'l?.ie-s-(1978)~---- (4) Provide additional stimulus for the weaker economics which achieved stabilization in. l 977 (l 978). (5) Maintain overall 5% rate of growth through -1980 without new inflationary pressures (1978 .. SO) •. . . Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection T~ Decl~ssification in Full 2of3711/15 : NLC-12--26-6-2-2 No_Qbje~_tJp_Q __}o Declassifi~9_tion in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-~-2-2 -1z .. ( ' F. Finance. Insure availability of adeguato financial re. J!Eurces to support countries attempting to stabilize their economies in cont>rmity with 1nternationally agreed conditions. (1) Make additional financial support available to the indu~trialized democracies to support their stabilization efforts through the IMF or through multilateral assistance with t:>'articipation of OPEC nations, Also increase the pool of contingent resources available to the IMF to back up its conditions· (e.g. 1 an· expanded General Arrangements to Bo:rrow). a. Secure agreement on details of IMF' resotll' ce expansion (1977)'. b. Discuss the types of conditions which should be requ\red by the IMF for financial assistance, e.g •• should conditions be loosened in recognition of the long-term nature of the structural imbalances resulting from high oil prices (1977). c. Develop a:i.-rangements to include the Saudis and other OPEC_ countries in expanded IMF arrangements (1977). d, Secure final agreement on expanded IMF arrangeM rnents (1978). '• G. Investment. Increase stability of intel:national economic system by establishing an international agreement setting out rule~ understandings on govc~rnment treatment of transnational investment. (1) investment, Conclude agreement on :r:ules govel'ning intcrna tional to the GATT on trade. simila~ - -~------~--~- ------------------~--- -- a. b. - -~--~~----- ~-------- ------·----------·--· Explore first with d(.'"v:clopcd and then developing countries concept of a 11 GATT for invostment; 11 agreeing on framework for negotiations {1977). Begin ncgotfotion of agl'ccment; develop schcdlllc for complctior1 (1978). c, Conclude agreement (_1979). Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 '--·---------- No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-~-2.-2 H. Trade. Secure a more open trading system based on rules f\nd understandir:gs which rrnvcrn. the degree and character of government intervention in international trade and establish orderly processes for s.ettling disEute s. (1) Successfully complete multilateral trade negotiations so as to produce a liberalized internatichal trading system with lower tariff barriers, reduced non-tariff barriers! and improved dispute settlement mechanisms. .. . o• ( . .. a. Launch· major U, S, effort to regenerate interest in the negotiations (eal'ly 1977), b. Launch major effort·within U. S, and among our trading partners to resist use of trade restrictive measures (early 1977). c. Initiate prompt consultations with major participants in MTN, primal'ily bilaterally, to reach c·onsensus on objectives for the negotiations and th'e best means 0£ attaining them (early 1977). d. Achieve agreement in principle on: (1) how to deal with agricultu:rej {2) a subsidy/countervailing duty co.de; (3) rules to reduce and regulate imposition of new non-tariff barl"iers (late 1977-1978). e. Make substantial progress toward agreement on a tariff cutting formula and exceptions (late 1977). f. Achieve agrcemc11t on special h:eattnent of developing country exports (late 1977), .. ' ' g. _I:I_?}d_1'!1 in :i_9 t c r i_a l _m e_e u·ng __to--id cmt-ify-p-r--i o-r it-i-e s-, -- -- --- ------------ ----- --- establish poUtic~l level consensu~ on objectives and lay basis for final agreement in 1978 (late 1977). -( h. Achieve final agreement on all the above points (ca.rly 1978). i. Sc.•c1.1rc i·atification of a~r.cemcnt by Congress and other pa l'liamcn.ts (1 ?78·1979), ·...._. Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-·12-26-6-2-2 No Qbjection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 'Ir . •• . SE~T . 2. RELATIONS WITH EMERGING REGIONAL ''INFLUENTIALS" • .~entral Obj ec:tlve: To weave a world· wide web of bilateral political and, where appropriate, economic cooperation with the new emerging regional ."influentials. 11 (It should be noted that many of oLir general policies - ~· g., proliferation, arms transfers, huma,n rights - run cou'nter to the interests of f • ."' these states. Given the importance o~ these countries, consequently, special efforts should be made to improve U.S. relations with them; Certain 'general steps and specific steps for individl1al countries follow,) .... A. Gt'peral Steps · '. (l) Make intensive efforts to consult with the governments of these countries on critical issues, particularly with a view to developing parallel or similar positions in multilateral negotiations on global or regional issues. (2) Undertake symbolic acts, such as high-level exchange of visits.-"President:ial letters, visits by members of the President 1 s faxnily, which will appeal to the sense which these governments have of the rising importance of their countries. (The 1'style 11 and "tone'' of U.S. attitudes and actions is critical for all these countries.) • (3) Refrain from taking actions on is sues which these governments view as absolutely critical and which would totally sour ·relations with these governments (e.g., India and arms sales to Pakistan; Nigeria and race relations in South Africa), (4) Exploit the gene1:al desire of these countries to benefit from U.S. advanced technology ( c. g., almost all of them are interested in use of satellites !or the improved domestic communication ·· · ----(T-V) o-s-sent-ial--to-t:he-intcgrati-on-·o-f-thei-r·-sociefiesr~--------- ··-··-··------ ~~---------- B. -Venc:rnela (1) Sectu·e repeal of exclusionary legislation so as to make Venczllela eligible for CSP ( 1977). (2) Arrange exchange o! Presidential visits (1977- 78). .S~ET ~ Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Obje~tion To Declassification in Full 2013/11 /15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 __N,o_Q~j_t::ction To Declassifi~_ation in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 ' - .. 15 .. /.;~-. If t \.......... (3) Create means (e.g., governmental corporation) for joint U.S ... Venezuelan development of technology necessary exploitation of Orinoco ta'rbelt (1978-79). · (4) Involve Venezuela in development of a comprehensive Caribbean Development Plan (1977-80). C. Brazil Promote negotiations on the international sugar agreement (1977), and consultations on peaceful nuclear e11ergy cooperation (1977-78). (1) (Z) Initiate process leading 'to resumption of military cooperation with Brazil (1978). . . (3) Make available space satellites for domestic communications, weather forecasting, and geological surveys (1978). (4) Wo:r,k with Brazil in developing proposals for han:iling debt problem through purchase by banks of World Bank .and IMF stock (1977). (5) Work with Brazil in developing rules on export sl1bsidies, colUltervailing dLtties, and expansion of coverage of GSP (particularly to sug~r) in MTN negotiations {1977), (6) Seek dir.ect contact between the two Presidents (1978). (7} Seek to develop U. S, ~Brazilian cooperation regarding Southwestern Africa and Southern Atlantic (1979). (8) Develop contacts with full spectrum of Brazilian _______________poli tics-as--a-hedg-e ag-a-i-n-st'--t-he--deG-l-h1c-0-£-th e--rni-Ht-a-ry-gover mnent-;---------·-· -~----- D. Nigeria Assure Nigeria that it will receive at least if not n10re than parity treatment \'.rith South Africa in receiving nuclear tech· nology and fuels (shott of getting its own fuel cycle) (1977). (1) (2) Assuming general limits arc establish<'d on. overall arrn.s ti·ansfcrs, assure Nigeria that U, S. will app1·ovc for transfer to ·~~ Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification In Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 . ... ..J 6.. . fl" Nigeria any weapons approved for·trans!er to other Africal'l states {i.e., Most. Favored Nation status on arms transfers) (1977). (3) Explore with Nigerians their needs for transport aircraft in order to play a· broader x·ole as a stabilizing force in Africa (l 977). (4) Advise Nige1'.ians on cQmmunications equipment which they will need and approve the sa.le of such· equipment to them (1977 ~ 78). (5) ·Consult with Nigeria on U.S. policy with respect to South Africa and actively involve them in efforts to promote peaceful and progressive transformation of South Africa~ society (1977). . (6) Consult with Nigeria on hu:rnan ri~hts problems in Africa, re-cognizing U.S. wl.11 have to speak out on deportations and political prisoners in South Africa before it can g·et Nigerian cooperation in dealing with Amin, and other black African violations of human rights (1977). (7) In ~ight of expressed Nigerian desire to play a more active rqle in OAU, have prior consultations with Nigeria before U.S. attempts to act through OAU (1977~ . ). '•t E. Saudi Arabia (1) Continue eiforts to bring Saudi Arabia into the international system as a more responsive participant and increase its vested interest in econornic and political stability including a more prominent role in IMF, etc. (2) Welcome and sL1pport Saudi proposal for an "Arab Ma1·shall Plan" financed by Saudi capital and using U.S. technology, aiming for early institutionalization of this idea, even before a peace . ____________ s_clt 1_ement_ ___ . _,.,__78) . __,_ _________________ _:_ ________ ------- ------------------------------ . --·--·-.. -- . (1977 (3) Acti.vcly participate with Saudis in large-scale development projects in Egypt and Sudan (l 978M 79). (4) initiate.discussions with Saudis of a. possible institutionalized 1·elation between OPEC and OECD ( 1977~ 78). (5) Support the Saudis in thcit search for stability in the Horn of Africa. (1977-78). Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No O_~i~ction To Decl_§l_ssification in Full 2013/1 !/15 : NLC-12-26-~-2-2 "· .. 11- •• (6) Encourage increased oil production by Saudi Arabia, along with Saudi agreement to resist oil price increases and oil embargoes (1977). • ;'. (7) Arrange for special Saudi role in Jerusalem after the settlement (1979) • ' .,,,• F. Iran (1) Arrange an exchange of high~level visits, beginning with an invitation to the Shah to visit U.S. late this year (1977-78) . .... (2) Develop mechanisms ~or continuing consultation with lran on inatters relating to Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean security {1977). . (3) Be prepared to play a mediating and moderating role in future Iranian-Arab tensions in the Persian Gulf (1977). (4) , E1;i.courage Iran to assume a stabilizing role regarding the secul'ity of Pakistan and Afghanistan (1978-79). G. . India (1) Ex pres S· quietly U.S. pleasure at recent developments in India and invite Desai to visit U.S. later this year (1977). . (2) Avoid military sales to Pakistan (particularly A-7' s), which would undermine all other effo:1:ts to improve relations. (Indians wo~ld prefer to sec Pakistan move down the nuclear road than acquire substantial numbers of sophisticated conventional weapons.) (1977). (3) Expand sL1pport for multilate!'_~Ja:ig__,C;,!J:(qxJ:_~_J_Q_Lndia_ --- --·-- ---------- ---(-W-o-rld-13-nse to PD/NSC-5). a. Secure satisfactory UNSC Declaration on Apartheid (April 1977 ). • ~ET Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2~2 . . . -31 .. · b. Convey U.S. views to South Africa at a high level· (May 1977) • . c. If' no satisfactory pr6gres s is made, vote in favor of Chapter VII sanctions {Fall 1977). · d.. Keep up broad range of pressure so that in by 1980 there is marked progress dismantling apartheid, creating equal. economic opportunity, development of a. fair electoral system, and aba.ndonment o:i:' radical restructuri:ri.g of the homelands concept. of e. If, by 1978/79, there is no clear indicatic.in progress in the areas listed in ( 4) above, deploy full range of econon1ic sanctions against RSA; if possible, however, this should be delayed until the Zimbabwe and Namibia situation a·re settled. B. Communist State Presence. Minimize Soviet, Cuban and Chinese involvement ~n African security affairs. (1) Seek negotiated agreement between arms supplier nations and African states limiting arms supply (1978), (2) lf possible> withdraw in parallel with the Soviets completely from the arms sales business in Africa (1978-79). (3) Convey to all African states (except for Equatorial Guinea and Uganda on human rights grounds) that we have no concern over their domestic political arrangements or external alignments as long as the latter are peac~ful. In short, we threaten nobody; hence~ there is no need for a:µybody to look for an outside p1·otector (ongoing). L. (4) If necessary., and if South Africa is cooperative (A •. 3 _____________:,~p_C?_Y_~l~ __ !>_~.~~-1Q__j_o:rg~1L.C.Pal.itJ.on_oLmoderate-Afdcan-state-s-to-r-e-s-i-st-----·----· ... _ - - - · foreign and radi:cal aspirations, perhaps under Nigerian-Moroccan.Egyptian leadership ( 1978). (5) Encoul"a.ge our European allies to take the leading roles in opposing the Soviets and Cubans while trying to normalize our relations with all states and offering economic cooperation. Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-2?-6-2-2 .. 32- 8. ARMS CONTROL ..... ,Ce!,ltrat Objective: To limit the level of global. armaments through restrictions on arms transfers and nuclear proliferation and achievement 0£ a comprehensiv·e test ban. A. Conventional Arms T:ransfers. .R,estrict U. ·s. arms tranafe_rs and act to secure agreeme~ among suEeliers and among recipients on limits on conventional arms transfers. (1) Develop int_eragency procedures to implement restraintoriented policy guidelines in a comprehensive manner (1977). ·· \. (2) Secure passage of a comprehensive Arms Export Control Act, integrating applicable sections of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Mutual .security Assistance Act (1978). (3) Implement policy guidelines designed to moderate the overseas sales efforts of U. S. weapons-ma.nufactul."ers (l 978-). r·· (4) Adopt the principle (1977) that the United States will not · be the first supplier to introduce into a re'gion an advanced weapons ~ystem which creates a new or significantiy higher combat capability, foliowed by mtlltilateral agreement among other suppliers to observe this principle (1978). (5) Prohibit commitment for sale of advanced weapons systems until the systems are operationally deployed with U. · s. forces (1977). (6) Implement strict guidelines contl'olling coproduction agreements and development of weapons solely for export (1977). .;.. (7) Establish classification system to differentiate weapons and weapons-related items from those which can be clearly identified as . -- -- -----nsn .:.mil-i-ta.-ry-item-s--and-s·ervi-ce s--(1-97-'7-)-;-·--~-----· ---· ---:-------------------'--··-·-..,-·-··---.--· (8) Reduce by fifteen percent in dollar volume (in constant FY 76 dollars) transfers of weapons and weapons-related items from the FY 76 total~ exempting tri[Lnsfers to NATO countries, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan (by 1980). (~ \ Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11 /15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-~ .· ,. .. 33_· (9) Establish a~ suppliers' group, including the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, and West Germany, which would seek restraint in arms tJ;"ansfers by agreeing to limit the number ·and type of weapons transferred, globally and regionally. I . a. Achieve initial agreements focussed on sophistisated aircraft (1978). . b. ' ., /"'"·. ... . Achieve a freeze on Middle East armament levels and limits on both the number and .degree of sophistication of aircraft sold in Latin America and Africa (1980), . . . (10) Promote development of regional agreements among recipient countries to reduce .arms purchases. In concert with efforts of . the suppliers' group, achieve: 1) a:i:ms limitation provisions as a key feature of an overall Middle East settlement; 2) implementation of the eight-colll1try South American agreement to limit the acquisition of offensive arms; and· 3) establishrnent of th_ree subregional agreements in Africa -- West Coast, Southern Africa, and the Horn (1980) • B. ,N1;1clear Proliferation. Redirect the ,::yor~d' s planned nuclear ,cycles away from those -- such as the ligui<;l_rnetal fast breeder reactor ·and plutonium reprocessing ~- which provide direct access to weapons-usable !?aterial~ toward new, alternative technologies which do not. ~el (1) Promote more effective cooperation among supplier nations .to restrict the export of nuclear facilities which co·uld be used for weapons purposes. a. Defer the planned construction of enric:lunent and reprocessing plants in Pakistan and Brazil ---------·-- --- __(~_?77). -·---------· ---- - ·-------------- -··--------- ---------·--- ·--L. .. - - · /·· b. Preserve the London Suppliers Group as a tlsuppliel.'s-only" forum in which the nuclear expol'ters can jointly agree on strong non~ proliferation guidelines (1977). c. Establish a global. mor?-toriurn on further exports of enrichment and reprocessing plants and other highly sensitive technologies (1977), • s~ Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 . -34- d. · Secu1"e unamimous supplier agreement requiring explicit commitment to full scope safeguards by all :r:-ecipient states (or NPT adherence) and similarly joint agr.eement on stiff sanctions against any violation of nuclear agreements (1978) .. {2) Secure the agreement of both suppliers and recipients on the sufficiency of uranium resources to meet the world's needs until 2000; the cons~quent lack of need £o.r and economic unjustifiability of reprocessing, and the desirability of promoting alternative teclnologies. a. Establish and operate an international fuel cycle . evaluation program including both supplier and recipient nations to stimulate and support research and accelerated development of alternative nonsensitive nuc~ear technologies (l.977-80). h. Create a U. s. program to provide technical aid and accelerated research in the various fr..rms of storage of spent {non-reprocessed) fuel (l 977). c. Create -- possibly through the international fuel cycle evaluation program -- an international forum in which recipient states can exer.cise some influenct~ over the formation of global nuclear power policies (1 978 ). d. Develop a global program of uranium. resource assessment including· both theoretical and physical studies, and involving all nations which participate in the international fuel cycle evaluation program and promote eventual agreement on·a set of numbers covering both nuclear power SUftRlY_~nci_g_~:tp.?,:mL ______ --- /' {· . . · . __ ____ --------------·---------------.------------ -----------~----grob a:uy.-(r9-78T~---~----- ---------e. / .. Establish unilateral U .. S. (1977) and multilateral program (1979) to guarantee access to low enriched (:nonsensitive) nuclear fuels thl:'ough a variety of means, possibly including establishment of regional enrichrn.ent centers. ' ~ET <:: Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Deciassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 . '.• -35- ( • . (3) Increase the reliability and efficiency of existing procedures and technologies for utilizing uranium for nuclear energy purpose!?. by, among other means, accelerating research and development· efforts · concerned with the current generation of fisaion reactors. (4) Preserve and strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty and secure l"atification (or' equivalent commitmen~s) from·those key nations Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, Israel, South Africa, etc. -- which have not sign~d it {1977~). C. .Compreh~nsive Test Ba~.· Negotiate and ratify agreements to stop all nuclear testin[! (1) Ratify the TTB/PNE Treaties (1977). ·, (Z) Seek to negotiate and tatify a bilateral C TB agreement with the Soviets -(1977-78). ( (3) Once agreement is reached with the Soviets and UK on key elements, complete negotiations on a multilateral basis in the CCD (1978-79), encouraging participation by :r""rance and China -- but not to the point of undermining our bilateral relationship. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - ------ ----- -- - - - - - - - - - - ( Jimmy Carter Library Copy No ,Objection To Declassificati'on in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 ---~-- -- - No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-1.2-26-6-2-2 -36- ( 9. HUMAN RIGHTS ... Central Objective: To e~ance global sensitivity to human rights through actions designed to highl~ght U.S. observance of such rights aI;1.d through multilateral and bilateral initiatives meant to influence othe·r governments to give higher priority to human rights. A. Multilateral Action. Promote s.ooperative .action .!,n supEort of human rights by strengtl}ening intern~ional organizations concerned with human rights an9 by e?SPanding U.S. partkiEation in such organizations. \ (1) Complete U.S. adher.ence to five major international human rights treaties. a. Sign and ratify the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights ( 1977). b. Sign and ratify the International Covenant on Civil a~d Political Rights (1977). r··. c. Ratify the International Genocide Convention (1977). d. Ratify the International Treaty on the Elimination of All F~rms of Racial Di~crimination {1977). e, Sign and xatify the American Convention on Human Rights (1977). (2) Strengthen UN machinery for dealing with ~uman rights. issues. .. ___ _________ - - - - ,. ·- - - - - a. Promote greate1· activity (including more frequent meetings by the UN Human Rights Commission (1978) • - - --- - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - ----·-----------------------------------------------·---------- - - - - - - b. Transfer Human Rights Commission back to UN headquarters in New York (1978). e. Create the post 0£ UN Commissioner for Human Rights (1978). . . d. Improve UN complaint procedures with respect to human rights (1978). ( ·~~T . . '• --As it moves toward developed nation status, Iran will become an increasingly important trading partner of the United States. ___________ ,...-_Ir~ri- wil~_ <;:o!!_t:_i._n_u~ __ i:;9__ ne~(l (J_. r:;_.__111_i__l_it.ar_y__ aid __and _____ ---- technology to maintain its military strength. Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 Declassified RAC Project ESDN: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 ..,,,.::·.. ~,.~1··.. ,.,..-~.\,'..~.·, ... ,11.>,....,,...;~; •.;,.,,,,, ~: () ~ .. , • "' • . ,,· r . ' . I ' --It has, however, recently imported some military equipment from the USSR, and it has an important economic tie to the Soviet Union. ...:.. ' '' (It exports large quantities of natural gas through a j?intly constructed ' pipeline.) B. Regional Importance --With its military p~wer and strong government, Iran is a stabilizing influence in the Persian Gulf region. --It has close ties ~ith Pakistan, another pro-West state in the South Asia area. --The.country has a very influential voice in determining . (~~) OPEC's policies: c. Militcg_y --The Iranian armed forces are capable of defending against any regional enemy except the Soviet Union. --Military expenditures for fiscal year ending 20 March 1977 were 34.9 percent of the central government budget. -----~ ------ -~--· -----!JJ-l1e-----A-rmy -h-a-s-~1-7 0-,--(JO-(J-men-;---t-he · -A±r--- -Fo-rce·----i-o~--;--0 o-o-;---- -- - the Navy 21,000; and public security forces 74,000 for a total of 369,0oo, Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11 /15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 -----~-­ No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-1?_--26-6-2-2 • . -·Ground military equipment includes 1,840 tanks, 2,360 armored personnel carriers, 1,835 field. artillery pieces, 26 surface-to-air missile. battalions/batteries, 1,260 anti-aircraft pieces. --Military aircraft includes, 374 fighters, no bombers, 135 transports, 820 helicopters~ --The Navy has 7 major combatants; 14 minor combatants, 14 auxiliaries and no submarines. o. NU£lear Weapo~ Potential --Iran has ambitious plans for nuclear power plants but will have no capability to develop a weapon or 0 explosive device for many years. . E. Economx --Iran 1 s economy percent per is moving forward at a rate of 11 ~ear. Its 1976 GNP was $66 billion and per capita income was $1,900. Industry now accounts for less than 20 percent of the Gross Domestic Product despite the expansion of recent years. Future plans call for particularly large- -----·----------- -s-ca:1e-ex-pa-rision of ~·., the-s-feeT anc1~-PeErocilemica1-- ------- - industries. -3- ~ Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 -~- No Objection To Declassification in Fu_ll 2013/11/15 :. NLC-12-26-6-2~2 • --The country is rich in minerals. Aside from petroleum, the most important are iron ore, copper, coal, chromite, lead and zinc. Iron mining is being. developed for the domestic steel industry and the country will be a major exporter of copper by the mid-1980s. --Agricultu~e lags behind indust:r;Y, in modernization although the present 5-year plan emphasizes agricultural development. Main products are: wheat, barley, rice, sugar beets, cotton, dates, raisins, tea and tobacco. --Iran 1 s infrastructure is inadequate given its current rate of growth. ·_.Q.· . ·. . There are 4~509 kilometers of standard gauge railroad, 43,442 kilometers of highways, 904 kilometers of inland waterways and 2,639 kilometers of pipelines. There are 162 usable airfields, 64 with permanent surface and 7 major and 6 minor ports. --Iran has the most advanced telecommunications system in the Middle East. There are 805,602 telephones, 2 .million radio and L 7 million TV receivers; 31 AM, 1 FM and 67 TV stations. - - ---- ----- - - - - - - - - - - ----------- ------- The country also has a -----~-~ -------------~-~------ -- ------ -- -- - - - - - - -------~---- satellite ground conununications station. ·(- ') -~ -4- ~T Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 -- --------- ----------~--- - No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11 /15 : NLC:~.?-26-6-2-2 F. Energy --Tran's current production of crude oil is in excess or 6.2 million barrels per day. --Natural gas reserves are huge. Recent gas discoveries indicate reserves on the order of 600 trillion cubic feet. ~~tural gas is c~rrently'the largest non-oil export and ~ill grow in importance in the early 1980s. --Electrical capacity currently exceeds 5 million kilowatts, three-quarters of which is fueled by oil and gas, G. 0 . is hydro-electric. one~quart'er Land and People --Area: 1,647i240 square kilometers; 14 percent agricultural~ 11 percent fb~ested, 16 percent cultivable with adequate irrigation, 51 percent desert, waste or urban, 8 percent migratory grazing. --Population: 34,455,000; average annual growth rate 2.9 percent. --Ethnic divisions: percent other Iranian, 18 percent Turkic, 3 percent ·,. ,. 63 percent ethnic Persians, 13 ., ·-------- ---~~-----·Ku.ras;--3-·-perce-nt.-xr-ab --Literacy: :--------·---- -----~--- -- --------------~-~- about 37 percent of those over 7 years of age. --Government leader: I\ '--) Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. - 5 - Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 --------------- ---- - - - ----- No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 ;'). ,: ~: • ·.. ' '•I April 29, 1977 Japan Factsheet Overview Japan is the leading industrial power in East Asia and the third largest industrial producer in the world (after the United States and the USSR) • Its industrial health, however, is based very heavily on imported raw materials and on its continued ability to sell manufactured goods throughout the world. Factors that may limit Japan's continued growth are those related to energy and raw material resource availability. Since it is heavily dependent upon foreign sources, any disruption in supplies due to cartel actions, Third World national chauvinism, or worldwide economic conditions could endanger its regional, as well as global, position, A. Importance to the U.S. --Japan is an important, generally conservative voice in East Asia and among the industrialized western nations. --It is the United States•s strongest political ally in Asia. --Japanese shipping carries much of the seaborne freight moving between U.S. and Asian ports. --Japan is a substantial.market 'for u.s. agricultural products, raw materials, and high technology manu- factured goods. ( Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Fuil 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 Declassified RAC Project ESDN: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 .~ B. Regional Importance --Japan serves as the regional storehouse and well-. spring of investment capital, capital equipment, technology and managerial expertise. --Japan acts as a major source of technology, capital, . and market opportunities for both the Republic of China (Taiw~n) and South Korea. --Japan has led other Asian nations on the diplomatic front by eslablishing formal relations with the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. --Not· C. ;,:,, .only· have diplomatic relations been normalized with communist nations, but substantial economic ties have been established, usually involving sale ~1·. of raw materials to Japan and corresponding purchases from Japan of manufactured goods, capital equipment, and the technical and managerial expertise needed to use them. c. Military --The Japanese Self Defense Force is capable of containing a limited conventional attack, but would need outside assistance against a large, well equipped force. -2- ?,.i Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2Q13/1 ..1_!15 : ~LC~12-26-~=2-2 ··) ... .. . \ ., . ' --Japan's defense industry potential is large and has the capability to produce the most sophis.ticated equipment. current production includes small arms, artillery, armored vehicles, jet and propeller driven aircraft, surface and submarine vessels, and small amounts of all types of army material. --About 6 percent of the national budget is spent on the armed forces. ' --The Army has.154,000 men; the Navy 44,000; the Air Force 41,000; and the paramilitary forces 191,000 -for a total of 430,000. .,,.-.... --Grou_nd military equipment includes 760 tanks, 770 armored personn~l carriers, 950 field artillery ~: pieces, 5 NIKE groups, 8 HAWK groups, and 400 antiaircraft artillery pieces. --Naval forces include 30 major and 40 minor combatants, 16 submarines, 356 auxillary vessels and an air wing designed primarily for anti-submarine and reconnaissance operations. --Military aircraft include 536 fighters, 66 transports, 4IO~-helicopters, and 304 coastal patrol and recon- naissance planes. ( -3- ~ Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11 /15 '._~_L_s:;-12-26-6-2-2 s~ . ')' :·) \.. . D. Nuclear Weapo~ --Japan has a clear capability to produce nuclear weapqns, but the preponderance of public and private opinion in the country is strongly against doing so. E. Economic --Japan is .the world's third largest producer of steel aluminu~, and primary the world leader in shipbuilding, and a major producer of electronic goods and automobiles. --GNP is appr'oximately $488 billion ($4,400 per capita) and grew at an average annual rate of 6.3 percent during the 1970-75 period. --Total exports for 1975 amounted to $54.8 billion, and. imports $49.7 billion. --The labor force is comprised of 53.8 million persons, of whom about one million (2 percent) are unemployed. --Japan i~ the world's largest importer of raw materials and must rely on imports for most of the raw materials that it uses. --About three-fourths of its food need~ are met through domestic production, but it must import to make up for shortages in meat, wheat, a~d feed grains. --Japan has a well developed transportation system that includes 28,912 kilometers of railroads and -4- l . ' Jimmy Carter Library Copy .. No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Ful\ 2013/11/15 : NLC-~2-26-6-2-2 1,059,000 kilometers of highways, 29 perce?t of which are paved. --53 major seaports and 35 airfields with runways 1,830 meters (6,000 feet) or more .in length serve both domestic and international transportation needs. --Japan is an international transshipment hub for air and seaborne cargo moving to and through Asia. "-521 AM and 303 FM radio stations and 3,976 TV .stations broadcast to 25 million radio and 25.2 million television receivers. Two satel~ite ground stations and submarine cables linked to 38.7 million telephones provide excellent domestic and international service. F. ~nergy --External energy supplies are critical to the Japanese economy since only 11 percent of its needs are met from.domestic sources. ~ --Japan is the world's largest importer of coal and .i ----~---~-- the second largest -----------------~----~------- ___of~_o_il, __consuming-the----- imp~:ftei; ------- - -~----~--~---- oil eguivalent of 6.7 million barrels of oil each --As early as 1974 the Japanese began placing increased ( -S- SE~ Jimmy Carter Library Copy ~·o Objection To ~eclassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11 /15 : NLC~12-26-6-2-2 ~· • emphasis on coal as an energy source, contracting for foreign supplies and moving to improve the domestic coal mining industry~ --More recently Japan has undertaken development of foreign gas fields to assure access to enough natural gas to meet anticipated 'domestic demands. --Offshore ex~loration for oil and gas continues in the Sea of Japan and East China sea area between Kyushu and Okinawa. --Eight nuclear electric generating plants are in operation, and 15 more are under construction. --Jap~n possesses a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, has a second under construction, and has just begun .. operation of an experimental fast breeder reactor. G. Land and People --Area: 370,370 square kilometers, (about the same as the state of Montana); 16 percent cultivated; 12 percent in urban uses and wasteland; 3 percent is grassland; and 69 percent of the area is forested. _________________ -- Popula tiQrrt~l.J._3_,k62 ,_Q_QQ_,_ -average-annua-1- -growth-------------• -!-----~---~--:------------ rate of 1.1 percent. --Ethrtic divisions: 99.2 percent Japanese; Koreans are only significant minority. -6• ~T Jimmy Carter Library Copy ~o Objection To Declassification' in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15_:_ NLC-12-26-6-2-2 --Literacy: 97.8 percent of the population 15 years of age and over. --Government leader: ( Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda. -7- ~Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11 /15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 :_t:-JLC-12~26-6-2-2 \~ ......-_J 0 . April 29, 1977 Nigeria Factsheet Overview Nigeria is Africa's moat populous. nation and, based on abundant oil deposits, potentially one of its wealthiest. Tribal and regional rivalries have contributed to a · turbulent history since 1960 -- a history of military coups, assa.ssinations, and the Biafran civil war in which tens of thousands died. The present government, although still. faced with serious domestic problems, is working for internal reconciliation. If successful, a stable Nigeria could influence the course of events not only in Black Africa but in emerging majority governments in southern Africa as well. (~) A. Importance to the U.S. --Nigeria ranks second only to Saudi Arabia as a supplier of crude oil to the u.s. The u.s. imported 1,120,000 barrels a. day --or about 15 percent of its total oil imports -- from Nigeria in 1976. --U.S. investment in Nigeria has increased steadily in recent years. U.S. companies invested $1.2 billion in Nigeria in 1976, mostly in joint production ·af petroleum. --------·----- ----~-- --NTgeria as_p_ires -to be--a--!eadi~g;p~k~srnan for Black Africa. --Free from commitments to any world ideological bloc, . Nigeria could develop ·- lev~rage for encouraging independent courses for its neighbors. s~ Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 Declassified RAC Project ESDN: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 0 B. ~e9:ional Importance· --Its large population, .economic pre-eminence, and ·political non-alignment give Nigeria a leadership role in Black Africa. --Nigeria has been vocally active in support of southern.African liberation rnov.e~ents and has provided limited funds and some military equipment. --Top Nigerian officials have·met with leaders of Zaire and Angola and offered to mediate the dispute between those two countries over the Katangan invasion of Zaire's Shaba Region. ~-Nigeria has encouraged other ~frican states to support the Soviet- and Cuban-backed MPLA in Angola. --rt has promoted regional economic cooperation among its West African neighbors and has given some unilateral economic assistance to those states. c. Military --The armed forces are the largest in West Africa. ,, ;· They provide a substantial power base for the nation's . leaders_l}_i_p__a.ncLamp1e protection-aqains-t-outs±ae---att:aclc -----~----~-~-~-------~---- - • I except by a major power. --Nigeria spent 16 percent of its 1976 national budget on the armed forces. -2- . . ~ Jimmy Carter Library Copy ~o Objection To Declassifi~ation in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 . --The Army has 250,000 men; the Air Force 5,600; the .' ~. Navy 3,700 -- for a total of 259,300. '~ ·.::1 --Ground equipment includes 55 light tanks, 192 wheeled t .'l armored vehicles, 225 field artillery.pieces, and 158 anti-aircraft weapons. --The naval inventory of 20 ships includes 1 destroyer .escort, 2 fast patrol boats, 8 patrol gunboats, and 1 mine warfare craft. '· --The Air Force has 137 aircraft, including 6 C-130s, 25 MiG-21 and 15 MiG-17 jet fighters, and 5 MiG-15 jet trainers. D. Nuclear Weapons Potential --Nigeria will have no facilities capable of producing fissionable materials in the foreseeable future. E. Economy --Estimated 1976 GDP was $27 billion. GNP are'not available.) (Statistics on The real growth rate. from 1970 through 1976 averaged 6.7 percent annually. ------------------- capita income wa!?___9b~~j; ___ ~j_Q_Q_.___ ,, __ - ---------------- ·----------- -------------~ Per ---------------------~----------~-------- - . --Nigeria is the free world's seventh leading producer of petroleum and fifth leading exporter. Production in 1976 was about 2,070,000 barrels a day, of which -3- ~T Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 ----------- --- ---- No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 .. ~··... . . . 2,000,000 barrels were exported. ' Petroleum accounts for 95 percent of the value of exports and 35 percent of the GDP. ' ] --Despite impressive oil earnings, benefits from the ·1 '1·1 national wealth have not reached the average Nigerian. --World re~essior1, slow growth of·the agricultural sector, and unchecked imports led to a trade deficit in the mid-1970s despite the oil boom. The.present •, gov~rnment has called for budget~ry cuts and expansion of the agricultural and industrial sectors to correct the deficit. --The manufacturing sector, the largest in Black Africa, JI!'#"'-·. provides only 7 to 8 percent of the GDP. --Tenders have been circulated to Western companies for an iron and steel complex. The Soviet Union had originally offered to design, run, and finance the plant but has dragged its feet. If constructed, completion is not expected before the mid-1980s. --The barely adequate transport system is a major constraint to the count~y's economic development. --There are nearly 90,000 kilometers of road (about 15, 000 of them paved)·, more than 3, 500 kilometers of railroads, and 8,500 kilometers of navigable waterways~ ( \ -4- s~ Jimmy Carter Library Copy i . No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 .. ' 3/11/15:NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Oeclassif1cat1on in Full 201 . S~T . --The country has 91 airfields, 15 of them with permanent-surface runways. --The. teleconuuunications network includes 1 satellite ground station, 111,500 telephones, and 31 radio stations and 8 TV stations to serve. 5 million radio and 100,000 TV receivers. F. p.:nergy --of its total petroleum production, Nigeria consumes only about 70,000 barrels a day domestically. The single oil refinery, however, does not permit selfsufficiency in refined products. --Nigeria has the only workable coal deposits in West Africa. Current annual production is abo~t 200,000 tons~ --Thermal power plants generate about half of the country's electrical· energy with most of the rest supplied by hydroelectric power. The latter is expected to become a more important power source in the 1980s. G. Land and People --Area: 925, ooo square ki_lQrrH;:;_ter-s;~l-3--percent-uiider-- ~~-~ ~--~-------~ --~~-------- __ . ------.--- ----<;ili.i.~~ tion; 11 percent arable but unused; 35 percent forested; and 41 percent in desert, waste, urban, or other use. ( -s- \ ~ Jimmy Carter Library Copy '1 • •• ' . ~. ~o Objection To Oeclassif\cat1on in Full 2013 I • /11 /15 ; NLC-12-26-6-2-2 . 013/11/15 · NLC-12-26-6-2-2 . . No Objection To Declassification m Full 2 . s~ •· --Population: 66,000,000; annual growth rate 2.9 percent. --Ethnic divisions: of the more than 250 tribes, the Hausa and Fulani of the north, the Yoruba of the south, • and the Ibos of the east comprise 60 percent of the .. total population. --Literacy: Only 27,000 are non-African . Estimated 25 percent. --Government Leader: Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo. ,. . ••• -------~ - -6- s~ Jimmy Carter Library Copy . . • . r No Objection To Declassification in Full 2 013/11 /15 · NLC-12-26-6-2-2 . No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 S~T () April 29, 1977 China Factsheet Overview China clearly has the long-term potential to be a global power, and will strive mightily to move closer to that status in coming years. The country has just emerged,· however, from a year of extraordinary domestic upheaval and uncertainty (deaths of both Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou En-lai), a devastating series of earthquakes, and the rise of a previously little known political figure, Hua Kuo-feng, to the helm. Presently occupied with consolidating his political power, Hua appears to emphasize economic issues and advocate long-term policies to modernize agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. The problems he faces, however -- both in achieving political stability and modernizing .the coun~ry -- are extremely difficult, and it is not possible to predict how much progress China will make in solving them in the next decade. 0 A. Importance to the u.s. --The PRC is no direct military threat to the continental United States, but it does pose a latent threat to U.S. forces deployed on the Korean Peninsula. --China's presence and its influence, either direct --- ---------~·--- - or potential, over other Asian nations is often -~11-------- - - --· ----- - -----important factor affecting U.S. relations with those -~------ -----~--- - --· countries. --The dispute with the Soviet Union ties down sizable 0 Jimmy Carter Library Copy -..--·- · -· ··· -· ,...• · - No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12~26=6=2~-2- Declassified RAC Project ESDN: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objectio!l_}o Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 .·() Soviet forces on the Asian flank of the USSR that might otherwise oppose U.S. and other NATO forces . i i .1 in Europe. li China's policies toward the U.S •. ,l' The dispute also directly influences --China is making vigorous attempts to·capture the leadership of the Third World by projecting itself in such a role in international fora and in the world press'. . B. Regional Importance --Politically .and militarily, China is the dominant power in East; Asia. ,.,~.. Other than the .Soviet Union, China is the only Asian nation with a nuclear deterrent and regional strike capability. --Economically, China is subordinate to Japan in regional and world markets but possesses potential for sizable domestic growth and foreign trade. --China has a .legacy of cultural influence beyond its borders, particularly in Vietnam, Korea, and Japan. 1- ---------- --~------e-.-Mi-lita:ry------ ------------------ ----- · --China's nuclear and conventional forces far exceed those of any other country in Asia, except for -2-. ( Jimmy Carter Library Copy ~o Objection To Declassification.in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 s~ () . the Soviet Union • --The Army has 3,500,000 men; the Navy 300,000; and the Air Force 400,000 -- for a total standing force of 4,200,000. --The armed services are reinforced by a reserve and initial troop mobili~ation base of 7 million lightly armed troops from the militia and the Production and Construction Corps; in addition, a large but only partially armed militia constitutes an additional paramilitary base. --The Army is a predominantly infantry force; ground force military equipment incL1des 9, 000 tanks, ··_) 2,000 arrnor~d personnel carriers, 26,000 field artillery pieces, 75 battalions of surface-to-air missiles and 11,500 anti-aircraft guns. --The Navy ;Ls principally a coastal defense force and includes 26 major and 980 minor surface combatants, 86 submarines, and 900 auxiliaries. --The Air Force has not developed much beyond a limited air defense force but_E~-s~~~_s s_Qm~g:i::_q_un.d_attack_ ---- capability; military aircraft include 4,800 fighters, 500 bombers, 500 transports, and 350 helicopters. --The military-industrial base supports a comprehensive -3- iI i Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 I l No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 ~T 0 and integrated modern weapons program but presently is subject to serious economic and technical constraints that forestall a rapid weapons modernization program. D. Nuclear Weapons Capability --China has a small nuclear force 'of 65 to 70 strategic missiles and a bomber delivery force~ Both pose a limited strike threat, principally to the Soviet Union and the Asian area. E. Economy --Agriculture is the pivotal sector of the economy and employs 80 ~o 85 percent of the labor force. --The major. economic problem is to sustain agricultural output, supplemented by comparatively small ·imports, to feed a growing population, provide.raw materials for consumer goods industries, and supply surpluses to support invGstment in other sectors of the economy. --GNP was an estimated $324 billion in 1976; the real growth rate averaged 2 percent annually from ------l-9-5-7--'7-0-and--the---growttr"rare-"in-T97r=76-fias 6 percent. ave-r-aged Per capita income was $340 in 1976. --China is not a major industrial power, but it has -4-...;,..... Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassificatio.n in Fuil 2013111115: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 -·--------~-· No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 . ·. ·c··' made impressive progress and is .,_/ ~n important producer of steel, machine tools, transportation equipment, chemical fertilizer, cement, and consumers. goods. --China has also redirected efforts toward a.small plants program distinguished by simple technology, rural location, production in direct support of agriculture, dependence on local labor and raw materials, and local administration. --China has an unbalanced and poorly distributed 'transportation system with 50,000 kilometers of railroads concentrated in the eastern half of the country and 800,000 kilometers of low-grade roads, about one-eighth of which are paved. --China has recently installed nationwide high capacity t··. ;I telecommunications trunk lines of microwave radio relays and buried coaxial cables, a common-users system serving military, government and civilian personnel. F. Energy ... -All of. Chi~_a_~~--=-11~er9y _Ee~~~ -~-;'~Jl'let _f:r;:_ozn___d9ID~-9.tic_ -··---------------·- - ·------ - - - - - - sources. --coal supplies the largest share of present energy consumption, about 65 percent, and additional coal is exported. ( ~· ....... -5- S~ Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 --China is self-sufficient in petroleum and petroleum products, and a small quantity is exported, mainly to Japan. --The major source of electric power in China is from thermal plants which account for about 75 percent of the total output. --The potential for hydroelectric power is very great, but little has been developed because of high costs and because the Chinese have chosen to put their limited resources- into thermal plants which can be built more quickly. --China has no nuclear power facilities, but it has () expressed some 'interest in purchasing such facilities in the West. G. Land and People --Area: 9,560 1 000 square kilometers; 11 percent cultivated, 78 percent desert, waste or urban; I· 8 percent forested: 2-3.percent inland water. --Population: 950,000,000 (estimated); average annual growth rate 1.5 perc:_~~t. --Ethnic divisions: Chuang, Tibeta~, 94 percent Han Chinese; 6 percent Uighur and other Turkic peoples, Mongol, and numerous lesser nationalities. () -6- s~ Jimmy Carter Library Copy ~o Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 .. ,. No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 ._{. s~ --Literacy: 60 percent of the population have a ·primary education and are at least marginally literate. --Government leader: Hua Kuo-feng (Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party) • '. -7- i . . . ' Jimmy Carter Library Copy . . No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11 /15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 a; .. rqi?r N0(Dmeo?ohlliDeCMSs?ma?onin "Fun 2013/1 1/15 Emitti- fl,- Mr,? April 29. 1977 Saudi Arabia Factsheet Overview I Saudi Arabia is and will be for the foreseeable future an important force in the international community, This pro-west country is stability and seeka to mega because of enormous wealth rom petroleum resources. committed to world economic te communist and radical Arab socialist influence in the Middle East. It will continue A. Importance to the-U.S ~~Saudi Arabia ie an irreplaceable source of oil for the U.S. and an important supplier for U.S. allies in Western Europe and for Japan. belts commitment to the economic stability of the West and a desire to cooperate closely with the U.S. in both economic and political matters, make it the major influence for pricing restraint in OPEC, ~?Saudi Arabia plays an important role in U.S. efforts to solve the dilemma. ?:Its conservativeeoutlooki? ??et?rminatiaa??a??i??i? the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East, and financial leverage on neighboring states enable 6 No Objection To Declassificat SE ion HIFUH2013FFH15: RAC Project i I i Declassi?ed I ESDN: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 3 1 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : _NLq-12-26-6-2-2. SE~ ~ ~ it to strengthen existing moderate states and encourage extremist states to adopt less radical policies. --Saudi Arabia's financial reserves are vital to the.health of the international community. --Its ambitious development program, heavily dependent on Western, especially U.S., expertise, make it a key market for u.s. exports which, along with U.S. military ·sales to Saudi Arabia, are primary contributors to the u.s. balance of payments . . B. 0 Regiorial Imeort~nce --Saudi Arabia has been working to translate its wealth into leverage to promote its policies in the Middle East; key states in the area, notably Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the more moderate leadership of the Palestine Liberation organization, are all to some degree economically dependent on the Saudis. _________.".".'_::-_As _a __ result,--Saudi Ar-ab-ia has becrome--a.-aomlnant - ----~--·------------· voice in decision-making on Arab-Israeli issues, promoting the current search for a peaceful settlement .. - 2 - s~ Jimmy Carter Library Copy '' No Objection To Declassification.in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 s~ . ·1·· 11 ) --It has traditionally regarded the Arabian Peninsula .. I as its particular sphere, but it is also attempting I to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa. --Along with Iran, it dominates OPEC. C. Mil~ tary, --The Saudi armed forces are incapable of conducting coordinated combat operations against a modern military force .. --The Army has 45;000 men; the Air Force 15,000; the Navy 1,500; and public security forces 35,000 -for a total of 96,500. --Ground military equipment includes 305 tanks, 205 4'.. 1 J armored personnel carriers, 545 field artillery pieces, 10 batteries of surface-to-air missiles, and 260 anti-aircraft artillery guns. --Military aircraft include 105 fighters, 59 transports, and 42 helicopters. --The Navy has only 6 minor combatants and 2 auxiliaries. D. Nuclear Weapons Potential ----------------------.;;;-'.;;;;saudl-Arabia11as no faci-li ties ·capable of producing fissionable materials now and will not have any for some years to come. ,.,,.-. ... - 3 - s~ Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 ·~ .:! I > I I " ':.1 --It has traditionally regarded the Ar·abian Peninsula as its particular sphere, but it is also attempting to expand its inf luen.ce in the Horn of Africa. --Along with Iran, it dominates OPEC. c. Military --The Saudi armed forces are incapable of conducting .coordinated combat operations military ~gainst a modern force~ --The Army has 45,000 men; the Air Force 15,000; the Navy 1,500; and public security forces 35,000 -- for a total of 96,500. --Gr0und military equipment includes 305 tanks, 205 armored personnel carriers, 545 field artillery pieces, 10 batteries of surface-to-air missiles, and 260 anti-aircraft artillery guns. --Military aircraft include 105 fighters, 59 transports, and 42 helicopters. --The Navy has only 6 minor combatants and 2 auxiliaries. D. Nuclear Weapons Potential .--·------------ --~----­ --.------·-----.---------;,;-~aTiCil-Arabia has no-facilities ·capable of producing fissionable materials now and will not have any for some years to come. ,,,.-.. , - 3 - SE~ Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 s~ 0 E. Econoll'\Y --Saudi Arabia 1 s GDP for 1976 was an estimated $44.4 billion, and per capita income was $7,400. (Statistics on GNP are unavailable) • --The real growth rate for the non-oil private sector was 15 percent. --Saudi Arabia is the world's largest producer of crude oil, and current production exceeds 8.5 million barrels per day. --Other important industries, not related to oil, include cement produ-ction, a steel-rolling mill, and a few light consumer goods factories -- which ) all together account for les.s than 5 percent of the GDP. --The country's main agricultural products are dates, grains, dairy products, and poultry, but more than 70 percent of domestic food needs must ,. be imported. --Saudi" Arabia's mineral resources consists largely of undeveloped deposits of gold, phosphates, iron ore, and uranium. - 4 - ~ Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 SE~ --Saudi Arabia has 17,BSO kilometers of roads, of which 60 percent have bituminous surfaces. --There are 107 airfields and 20 major civil aircraft. --Railroads total only 575 kilometers. ~n.ergy F. --Saudi Arabia is totally self-sufficient in energy resources, and even provides over 95 percent of its own needs in refined petroleum products. --It ranks sixth in the world in natural gas reserves with about 63.5 trillion cubic feet. --The country has an eie'ctric power capacity of about 1:5 million kilowatts. --...... ...,_,, G. Land and Pe~le --Area: 2,331,000 square kilometers; 1 percent agriculture, 1 percent forested, 98 percent desert, water, or urban. --Population: 7,517,000, average annual growth rate 3.1 percent. --Ethnic divisions: 90 percent Arab, 10 percent ----------- ------------A.fto-As-i--a-n.--------------------------~-------------------------- --Literacy; 15 percent (estimate). --Government leader: King Khalid. - 5 - '-. ··· ~ I . Jimmy Carter Library Copy . . No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC~12-26-6-2-2 - ~-------------·---,.---·-·---- 0 No Objection To Deciassi?cation'in r??uu 2013/11/15 -: SE Lei? April 29. 1977 i Venezuela Factsheet OVerview As an oil producer and exporter, Venezuela's importance in the next several years will continue to grow with world energy demands. An increasingly independent and activist foreign policy based on influence derived from its oil wealth will be maintained. The government's commitment to large development programs designed to diversify the economy will require enbetantial external technioel assistance. Democracy,-remarkebly successful in Venezuela since 1958 when the Perez Jimenez dictatorship was overthrown, will continue to flourish there as long as the military remains content. A. Importance to the U.S. ~?Venezuela is our sixth largest trading partner overall, end the third largest supplier of crude oil and yetroleue producte, for 13 percent of total U.S. oil imports. It is the second largest foreign supplier of iron ore to the 0.5. *?Despite the nationalization of the oil industry in 1976. in the industry; and because of ite limited technical capabilities Venezuela needs U.S. expertise to maintain production and conduct exploration.. SE ET Declassi?'ed RAG Project ESDN: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 s~~ --In its development programs, veriezuela plans to devote major attention to mining, shipbuilding, petrochemical production, steel production, and agriculture. Ta the extent that U.S. firms participate in design and engineering services for these industries, the necessary. capital goods will .. probably be.purchased from the U.S. --Venezuela is strongly anti-communist and leans to the West, though it is sensitive to any suggestion that it · B. may be by the u.s. Regional Importance --Ven~zuela .,_.,,,· do~inated has the financial resources, leadership, and prestige in Inter-American fora to exert sub~ stantial influence on other Latin American states. --In other parts of the Third World, Venezuela also has influence through its membership in OPEC, its support of raw material producers, and the position of its Minister of International Economic Affairs as co-chairman of the Conference of International Economic Cooperation (CIEC). -----------·-·-------- ~-------------------------.------ ~---~------------ - 2 - . Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 ______.. · .. ,.W,..:.~-..-:.r.-~·~. No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 ··~ '.,~ ...~·. c. • • • • ". • . , Military --Venezuela's armed forces could defend the country only against minor attacks. The military is poorly organized and officered by standards of the leading South American armed fqrces. A~quisition of modern equipment since 1970, however, has improved Venezuela's capability to maintain internal security. --The ·Army has 27,000 men; the Navy 12,000; the Air Force 5,200t and paramilitary forces 13,500 -- for a total of 57 1 700. --Ground military equipment includes 120 tanks, 110 armored person~el carriers, 150 field artillery pieces, and 40 anti-aircraft weapons. --Naval ships include 8 major and 16 minor combatants and 3 submarines. --Military aircraft include 30 fighters, 20 bombers, . --·· D. 90 transports, and 40 helicopters • ...- Nuclear Weapons Potential --Venezuela has no facilities capable of producing ___________________ _ ---------------------- fissionable materials now nor will it have them for some years to come. - 3 ' . . . . Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To D~classification in F 13/11 /15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11 /15 : NLC-12-26-6-2-2 • . ~ E. Economy --Venezuela's GNP ranks third in Latin America at $3.0 ~illion; 7,0 percent. the real growth rate in 1976 was The country leads all other Latin American nations in per capita income, $2,380. ~-Industry accounts for 17 percent of GNP and is dominated·by petroleum refining. Other industries provide basic consumer goods, textiles, and auto- mobiles (assembly). Agriculture contribu.tes little to GNP but is important because it employs about one-fourth of the labor force. Main products are sugarcane, corn, coffee, and rice. ·o;· . ... . --Total exports for 1976 amounted to $8.9 billion -petroleum accounting for $8.4 billion and iron· ore and coffee most of the remainder. --The United States furnishes 70 percent of Venezuela's $2.0 billion foreign direct investment, 98 percent of which is allocated to manufacturing. --All major cities in Venezuela are accessible by road, but only inland waterways and trails provide transpor~~!ion _l.? some remotE?__~re_a_s_..________.----------·-·-----·--·-·---- ---··--·---------- - - - - - - - - · - - - ~-Venezuela has only 373 kilometers of railroads but there are 65,700 kilometers of roads, 19,600 of which are paved. 't •,· • Jimmy Carter Library Copy I t I No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11 /15 : NLC-12_~26-§-2-2 I "0 --Airfields number 292 with 104 having permanent surfaces. --The country's modern and expanding telecommunications I system includes a ·satellite ground station; 609,400 telephones1 207 radio stations serving 3.2 million receivers; and 43 television stations serving 1.3 million receivers. F. .!!!nerg;y --In 1976, Venezuela's petroleum production was 2.3 million barrels per day, making it the world's fifth largest producer and exporter. ( ,) --The country•s 14 billion barrels of conventional oil reserves will last only 17 years at current production rates. (Large additional reserves of heavy crude oil in the Orinoco Tar Belt may one day be exploited but pose· technological problems.) The government plans to limit output to 2.2 million barr.els per day from 1977 through 1980 to conserve its reserves. --Vene z_µ e la_has__ab..undan-t--but--1-a*ge-l-y---u-n-t-a-f)ped---hyd-ro---------------------- - - - · ---------------- electric and coal resources, the exploitation of wh~ch must be increased to meet the growing demands - 5 .~J' Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 :- No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/1,Jf~ 5.: NL_C-12-26-6-2-? {~ .. . . ·..... () : . of its steel industry. cons~rvatively . Hydr6electric potential is estimated at 40 million kilowatts; coal reserves are estimated at 800 million tons. G. Land and Peo2le --Area: 911,680 square kilometers; 4 percent cropland, 18 percent pasture, 21 percent forest, 57 percent urban, waste, and other. --Population: 12.6 million, average annual growth rate 3.1 percent. --Ethnic divisions; 67 percent mestizo, 21 p~rcent white, 10 percent Negro, 2 percent Indian. (."') ' .,_.. ·--·---·· --Literacy: 74 percent (estimate). --Government leader: ----------------------- --- - - -- -- --- President Carlos Andres Perez. --------~- - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - -- - ---- ------------·---·------ - 6 - () Jimmy Carter Library Copy No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15: NLC-12-26-6-2-2 --~--- ---- -- -----