All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT DC. MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the ("ourt on the (?lovernment?s Hx Parte Submission 01'" _1nd Related Procedures, lix Parte Submission ofAmendcd Minimization Procedures, and Request for an Order Approving?1nd Procedures, ?led 0:1-2010 t- Submission?) pursuant to 50 use. 1881a. For the reasons stated below, the government?s request for approval is granted. I. BACKGROUND A. _nd the Prior 702 Dockets 'l?he -Sub1nission includes 702(g)? -iled by the government pursuant to Section 702 of the lioreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or the 50 II.S.C. 1881a. certi?cations were submitted by the government and approved by the Court in Docket Nos. Page 1 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ 16-CV-02041 Document 13, page 1 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. (collectively, the ?Prior 702 In addition to ?by the Attorney General and the Director oi?National Intelligence the - Submission includes supporting al?lidavits by the Director 01? the National Security Agency the Director of the Federal Bur *au oflnvestigation and the Director ol?the Central Intelligence Agency two sets oftargeting procedures, for use. by the NSA and FRI respectively; and three sets ofminimization procedures, For use by the SA, FBI, and CIA, respectively. mo)? and governs the collection ol? foreign intelligence information Like the acquisitions approved by the Court in all ofthe Prior 702 Dockets,? -li1nited to ?the targeting of non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.? LI. at 3. The Court?s IVlcmorandum Opinions in the Prior 702 Dockets are incorporated by re ference herein. Page 2 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ Document 13, page 2 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. ?handled subject to the same NSA, FBI, and CIA minimization procedures that have been submitted for use in connection with 702(g_ ?l"he Court has previously approved those minimization Procedures B. Problems l?Lll?gl?l Data Collected Under Prior 702 Certi?cations On -2010, the government ?led, pursuant to Rule lOtc) of this Court?s Rules of Procedure, a preliminary notice of compliance incident, reporting that ?previous data purges conducted to comply with Section 702 targeting and minimization procedures have not extended to at least one analytic database? 2010 Notice at 1. The government subsequently informed the Court that prior data purges had not reached other NSA systems, and that incompletely purged inl?orn'ration collected pursuant to Section 702 had been found in ?nished intelligence reports that were disseminated by NSA. See generally Letter from Kevin J. O?Connor, Acting Chief, Oversight Section, Office ofIntelligence, Department of Justice, to Hon. John I). Bates,?; Letters from David S. Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security, to Hon. John I). Bates? Page 3 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ Document 13, page 3 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. C. The Government?s Reliance on Certain Prior Representations 011-2010, the United States submitted the Government?s l'ix Parte Statement Concerning ?Submission?). In that submission, the government noted that the targeting and minimization procedures submitted with 702(g) ?re identical to the procedures that were submitted to and approved by the Cw? L-nl 2- The government asserted that ?with the exception of additional information concerning post? targcting analysis and a clari?cation regarding oversight,? it would be appropriate for the Court to rely upon the same representations regarding the operation ofthe targeting and minimization procedures that it had relied upon in approving the certi?cations? ?I_n 3. Regarding post-targeting analysis, the government revised some of its prior representations to the Court, which did not accurately describe the process used by 1?i- at 5?9- With respect to oversight, the government disclosed that due to a technical problem, NSA had not provided documentation ol?ccrtain targeting decisions to the Department ofJusticc (DOJ) and the Office ofthc Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), despite the government?s past representation to the Court that those entities receive ??all ofthe documentation concerning every single tasking Page 4 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ Document 13, page 4 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as othenNise noted. Approved for public release. decision that NSA has made.? I_d. at 9 (quoting Transcript of -2008? D. The Government?s Motion for an Extension of Time On -2010, the government tiled a motion seeking to extend until- 2010, the 30-day period in which the Court must otherwise complete its review 702(g) ?vhich was the? set to end on- 2010. Motion for an Order Extending Time Limit Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 188 at 2.3 The government noted in the motion that its efforts to address purging problems were still ongoing and that it expected corrective measures to be in place by th- - 2010. l_c_l, at 4. The government asserted that ?providing the Court with further details of the implementation of these corrective measures will aid the Court? in reviewing? _but that the government would not be able to supplement the record until after the -deadline. l_cL at 5?6. The government further asserted that granting the requested extension oftime would be consistent with national security, because, by operation of statute, the government?s acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning? 50 LISC. 188la(i)(1)(B) requires the Court to complete its review of? and accompanying targeting and minimization procedures and issue an order under su )SCCilon 1881a(i)(3) not later than 30 days atter the date on which the certification and procedures are submitted. Pursuant to subsection 1881a(i)(1)(C), the same time limit applies to review 0! or amended procedures. However, 50 .S.C. l881a(j)(2) permits tie ourt, by order for reasons stated, to extend ?as necessary for good cause in a manner consistent with national security,? the time limit for the Court to complete its review and issue an order under Section l88la(i)(3). Page 5 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ 16-CV-02041 Document 13, page 5 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. could continue pending completion ofthe Court?s review. at On -2010, the Court entered an order granting the government?s motion. Based upon the representations in the motion, the Court found that there was good cause to extend the time limit for its review of?to-ZOI O. and that the extension was consistent with national security. -2010 Order at 4. H. The Hearing and The Government?s Supplemental Submissions Orr-2010, the Court held a hearing during which the government provided additional information about efforts to address its purging problems and about the post? targeting review and oversight issues raised in the -trbmission. During the hearing, the government also disclosed another issue regarding proces? ?s discussed in more detail below, targeting and minimization procedures require NSA to routinely monitor available information for signs that a targeted facility is being used from within the United States, to immediately cease collection when it is determined that a target is in the United States, and, subject to certain exceptions, to destroy any communications acquired during any period during which a target was in the United States. Page 6 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ 16-CV-02041 Document 13, page 6 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. ?1 1 I 1 a During the hearing, the government revealed that some alerts are not reviewed so and that, as had a backlog 'l'l?ansm?ipt Hearing (- lrg. at 71 . Oil?and- 2010, the government made supplemental submissions providing additional and updated information regarding the purging and post-targeting review issues. In addition. representatives ol'the government met with the Court on-2OI 0. to discuss the same issues. ii. mzvuiw 0i? The Court must review a certification submitted pursuant to Section 702 of ?to determine whether [it] contains all the required elements.? 50 U.S.C. An amended certi?cation is subject to review under the same standard. S_e_e 50 USC. The Court?s examination o?liat: (l)?)een made under oath by the Attorney General and the DN1, . muimii ii U-ic- each of?the attestations required by 50 (3) as required by 50 SC by the applicable targeting procedures? and minimization proceduresf? 5 See Procedures Used by NSA for 'l?argcting Non-United States Persons Reasonably Page 7 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ Document 13, page 7 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. (4) - supported by the af?davits of appropriate national security of?cials, as described in 50 U.S.C. and (5) -an effective date for the authorization in compliance with 50 U.S.C. 1 Regarding the amendment, the Court has previously determined that 702(g) eh he e_e. April 7, 2009 Memorandum Opinion at 8-9. Like?the amendment was executed under oath by the Attorney General and the DN1, as required by 50 U.S.C. Believed to be Located Outside the United States to Acquire Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of I: ISA, as Amended Targeting Procedures") (attached as Exhibit Procedures Used by the FBI for 'I?argeting Non-United States Persons Reasonably Believed to be Located Outside the United States to Acquire Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of PISA, as Amended Targeting Procedures?) (attached as Exhibit C). 6 Minimization Procedures Used by the NSA in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of FISA, as Amended Minimization Procedures?) (attached as Exhibit Minimization Procedures Used by the FBI in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of PISA, as Amended Minimization Procedures?) (attached as Exhibit Minimization Procedures Used by the CIA in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of FISA, as Amended Minimization Procedures?) (attached as Exhibit E). 7 Af?davit oth. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, U.S. Army, Director, NSA (attaehet 't Tab Af?davit of Robert S. Mueller, Director, FBI (attached at Tab Af?davit of Leon Panetta, Director, CIA (attached at Tab 3). 8 The statement described in 50 U.S.C. is not required here because there has been no ?exigent circumstances? determination under Section 1881a(e)(2). g? Ii Page8 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ 16-CV-02041 Document 13, page 8 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. 1 ?Pursuant to Section 1881a(g)(2)(A)(ii), the amendment includes the attestations 01" the Attorney General and the DN1 that the accompanying NSA, l?lil, and CIA minimization procedures meet the statutory definition of minimization procedures and have been approved by this Court in prior dockets. l_d. at 3 n4. The amendment includes an effective date that complies with 50 U.S.C. 188 and l881a(i)(2). All other aspects 0? including the attestations originally made therein in accordance with subsection 188 the targeting procedures submitted therewith in accordance with subsection and the af?davits executed in support thereof" in accordance with subsection 1881a(g)(2)(C) are unaltered by the amendment. Accordingly, the Court ?nds tha? ?each ?containH all the required elements.? 50 U.S.C. 1881a(i)(2)(A). REVIEW ll lli 'l?ARti?lj'l?th AND PROCEDURES The Court is required to review the targeting and minimization procedures to determine whether they are consistent with the requirements of 50 U.S.C. l881a(d)(1) and 50 U.S.C. 5t) U.S.C. l88la(i)(l)(C) (providing that amended procedures must be reviewed under the same standard). Section 1881a(d)( 1) provides that the targeting procedures must Page 9 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ Document 13, page 9 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. be ?reasonably designed? to "ensure that any acquisition authorized under [the certi?cation] is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States? and to ?prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to which the sender and all known recipients are known at the time oi?the acquisition to be located in the United States.? Section 188la(e)(2) requires that the minimization procedures ?meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 1801(h) or 1821(4) of [the Act].? Most notably, that de?nition requires ?speci?c procedures, which shall be adopted by the Attorney General, that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular surveillance [or physical search], to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpubliely available information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to 182 1 (4). Finally, the Court must determine whether the targeting and minimization procedures are consistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 50 .S.C. 188 The government represents that the targeting and minimization procedures included as part of the - Submission are identical to the corresponding procedures that were submitted to the has reviewed each of these sets of procedures and con?rmed that this is the case. The Court found ?hat the same targeting and minimization procedures were consistent with the requirements of 50 U.S.C. 188 and with the Fourth Amendment. Page 10 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ Document 13, page 10 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. See- 2009 Memorandum Opinion at 8-14_ 2009 Memorandum Opinion at 8- 14. Implicit in the requirement that the government maintain procedures that satisfy the statutory standards is a requirement that it comply with those procedures. purging and post-targeting review problems implicate this requirement. Since identifying purging and post-targeting review problems, however, the government has adopted enhanced measures to remedy those problems and to ensure prospective compliance with the applicable procedures. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that those measures adequately address purging and post- targeting review problems and provide a basis for again ?nding that the targeting and minimization procedures are consistent with the requirements of 50 U.S.C. and with the Fourth Amendment. A. Purging Problems 1 . Background As discussed above, acquisitions pursuant to Section 702 must be limited to targeting non- United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.10 As part of the 50 U.S.C. 1881a(b) provides that ?an acquisition authorized under [Section 702]?: (1) ?may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States?; (2) ?may not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States?; (3) ?may not intentionally target a United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States?; (4) ?may not intentionally acquire any Page 1 1 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ 16-CV-02041 Document 13, page 11 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. June 13, 2017, Public Release Approved for public release. EFF v. DOJ 16-CV-02041 Document 13, page 12 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. targeting procedures separately require NSA to report to DOJ and ODNI within ?ve business days ot?learning ofany incident involving the intentional targetingofa United States person or a person inside the United States, and to purge any resulting collection from its databases. NSA Targeting Procedures at 8. 2. Discovery and Investigation of the Purging Problems The government discovered ir- 2010 that although it was reasonably certain that data subject to purge under the Section 702 targeting or minimization procedures was in fact being purged from some oi" the collection stores that NSA uses to store unminimized data, purge Processing did not extend t?Systems- ?ubmission, Attachment at 2-3. Subsequent investigation and testing has revealed the existence of incompletely purged data in a number of -systems. See-Submission at 4?5. Investigation has further revealed the existence of a number of disseminated signals intelligence reports that were possibly based on Section 702 information that should have been purged. See- Submission, Attachment at 2?3. 3. Remedial Measures Since discovering the purging problems i- 2010, NSA has taken substantial steps to NSA also sometimes purges Section 702 information for other reasons that are unrelated to FISA, such as pursuant to 2010 Letter at 3-4. The Court is concerned here only with purges that are requirec under re ct or by Court- approved procedures. Page 13 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ 16-CV-02041 Document 13, page 13 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. address the problem and to ensure prospective compliance with its Section 702 targeting and minimization procedures. ice-Submission at l; - Submission, Attachment at 4-6. The government has provided the Court with detailed information about the measures being implemented during th- hearing and in a number oi" written submissions. the following is a description ol?the essential elements process for prospectively ensuring that Section 702 communications will effectively and expeditiously be purged when purging is required. '3 NSA has developed ?0 describe the ?ow of information through its systems and the ste )8 it has taken to rented the 3111? 1e )roblem. Se Submission, Attachment at 6. ?2 The government is continuing to work on locating and deleting past acquisitions that should have been, but were not, purged. Se ?ubmission at 3-5. The Court?s focus in tltis 9 ii i ns that will 3 made )ursuant t( )roceetli i Page l4 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ 16-CV-02041 Document 13, page 14 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. Page 15 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ 16-CV-02041 Document 13, page 15 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. Page 16 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ 16-CV-02041 Document 13, page 16 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. 4. Process for Purging Section 702 Communications ls Consistent With its Targeting and Minimization Procedures improved process for purging Section 702 information is consistent with its targeting and minimization procedures. As noted above, minimization procedures require that ?domestic communications? be destroyed upon recognition? unless the Director determines that one of several enumerated exceptions applies. NSA Minimization Procedures at 5- 6. In the absence of such determination by the Director, NSA complies with this requirement by deleting communications that are determined to be domestic communications from the NSA will also purge ?any copies of raw communications that are determined to be domestic communications. The government asserts, and the Court agrees, that because there is a clear connection between a copy and the underlying communicz'ttion, once a communication is recognized as being subject to purge, any copy that is traceable to that communication is simultaneously ?recognized? as being subject to purge. Se Submission at 4. Page 17 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ 16-CV-02041 Document 13, page 17 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. h: light of improved procedures, the agency?s past purging problems do not preclude the Court from finding that targeting and minimization procedures now before the Court meet the '4 improved process for purging coinmunieatitms is also consistent with the separate purging provision ofits targeting procedures. As noted above, that provision requires NSA to report to DOJ and ODNI within ii ve business days of learning ol?any incident involving the intentional targeting 0th United States person or a person inside the United State. and to purge any restiiting collection limit its databases. S_ec_ NSA Targeting Procedures at 8. Page 18 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ 16-CV-02041 Document 13, page 18 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. applicable statutory requirements and are consistent with the l?ourth Amendment.? R. Review Rackim; . Background During the-hearing, the government inlei'med the Court ol? an issue relating to post?targeting review process. \lSA?s targeting procedures require it to conduct post- targeting analysis, a process that is ?designed to detect those occasions when a person who when targeted was reasonably believed to be located outside the United States has since entered the United States," and ?to prevent the intentional acquisition ol? any communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States, or the intentional targeting ofa person who is inside the United States.? NSA targeting The Court understands that the FBI and CIA have not experienced similar systemic problems in purging Section 702 collection. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that purging:J problems do not preclude the Court From again finding that the FBI 'l'argeting Procedures, the l9 Bl Minimization Procedures, and the CIA Minimization Procedures satisfy the requirements of the Act and the Amendment. Page. 19 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ 16-CV-02041 Document 13, page 19 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. As discussed above> \lSA?s Minimization Procedures require that ?any con'irnunications acquired through the targeting ol?a person who at the time ol?the targeting was reasonably believed to be located outside the United States but in tact is located inside the United States at the time such communications were. acquired? be destroyed upon recognition" unless the Director determines in writing that one ofseveral exceptions applies. NSA Minimization Procedures at 4?6. In prior proceedings under Section 7027 the government has described the process used by NSA to ful?ll its obligation under the targeting procedures to ?routinely? monitor for indications that tasked electronic communications accounts are being used from inside the United States. - 2. Disclosure ofthe Alert Backlog In its -Submission, the government disclosed that its prior representations about the post?tasking review process were not completely accurate. See- Submission at 5-9. The ?age 20 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ 16-CV-02041 Document 13, page 20 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. Page 21 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ 16-CV-02041 Document 13, page 21 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. 3. Remedial Measures The government reports that since. it disclosed the existence oi" the alert backlog to the Court 011-20 0, NSA has dedieated additional resources to the alert review process and adopted timing requirements for alert resolution. S_e-St1bmission at 3--Suhmission at 2. 'l?he government has orally represented that as had reduced its backlog of unrcvimd alm? Page 22 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ 16-CV-02041 Document 13, page 22 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. 4. Improved Process for Iandling Alerts is Consistent With its and Minimization Procedures The Court concludes that l?or reducin the alert baeklo and for )ros )ectivel I handling unreviewcd and unresolved alerts is consistent with the requirements of its targeting and minimization procedures. Application o?hat process wt? Few? 1? ?to ?routine? monitming? ?With respect to minimization, improved alert?review process substantially reduces the risk that its recognition oi?data subject to purge will be delayed tor periods 01? time. in light ol?NSA?s improved alert review process and the reduction of its backlog, the Court is satis?ed that alert backlog does not preclude it from renewing, its prio? _argeting and minimization procedures that are now before the Court meet the applicable statutory requirements and are consistent with the liourth Amendment. '6 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ 16-CV-02041 Document 13, page 23 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. C. Problems Providing 'l?argeting-Related Documentation t0 DOJ and__OD_I_?l__l In its -ttbmi33i0n, the government reported another issue relating to targeting determinations. -Submission at 9-10. At the time of targeting, NSA are required to ?documen? information that led them to reasonably believe that a targeted person is located outside the United States.? NSA Targeting Procedures at 7. This documentation facilitates latcr oversight of how the procedures are implemented. Sc_e id. Internally, NSA oversight personnel ?conduct periodic spot checks of targeting decisions.? at 8. In addition, personnel from DOJ and ODNI conduct reviews of implementation ofits targeting procedures ?at least once every sixty days.? l_gL In prior representations to the Court, the government has stated that DOJ and ODNI receive documentation for ?every single tasking decision that NSA has made? pursuant to Section 702. Submission at 9. The government reported in the-Submission, however, that, in light ol?a software problem, NSA was unable to provide such documentation to DOJ and ODNI for a number of taskings. ?he government has informed the Court that NSA has corrected the problem, and that DOJ and ODNI are now receiving documentation for all NSA targeting decisions- IIrg. Tr. at 75-76. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that the hour]. resolved documentation problem does net preclude a ?nding that the targeting and minimization Procedures accompanying 702? Page 24 June 13, 2017, Public Release EFF v. DOJ Document 13, page 24 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as othenrvise noted. Approved for public release. ?satisfy the statutory requirements and com port with the Fourth Amendment. '7 IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds, in the language ofSO U.S.C. l881a(i)(3)(A), that?and amendment submitted in the above-captioned dockets "in accordance with [Section 1881a(g)] contain[] all the required elements and that. the targeting and minimization procedures adopted in accordance with [Section are consistent with the requirements of those subsections and with the Jourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.? Orders approving? the amendment, and the use of the accompanying procedures are being entered cotiteinporaneously herewith. ENTERED this 010? MARY A. .4cLA?ooi Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court '7 The government has provided the Court with notice of a number of additional compliance incidents. The Court has considered these incidents, many of which are discussed more l?ully in recent reports to Congress and the Court. In light ot'the steps taken by the government to address these incidents and prevent similar occurrences, the Court is satis?ed that they do not preclude ?nding that the targeting and minimization procedures accompanying? _atls ?0 0 ?6 statute and the Fourth Amendment. I 1 r' eputy Clerk Page 25 is document - I . exempt under b(6) exempt under b(6) cert: . is a. true and carrot: Jun?idltg?liir?tl EFF v. DOJ Document 13, page 25 of 26 pages. All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) except as otherwise noted. Approved for public release. sili?112E7l1 UNl'l'El) STATES FOREIGN lN'l'liLLlCiljiVCli SURVEILLANCE COURT ORDER For the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion issued contemporaneously herewith, and in reliance on the entire record in this matter, the Court finds, in the language of 50 U.S.C. l881a(i)(3)(A), that the above-captioncc_submitted in accordance with [50 USE. the required elements and that the targeting and minimization rnoeedures adopted in accordance with [50 .S.C. are consistent with the requirements ofthose subsections and with the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Accordingly, it is hereby Bl), pursuant to 50 U.S.C. that - _and the use oi?sueh procedures are approved. 2010 at jail/1:) A .Uri astern lime. 7 a ?ux/?w (ll 11 lN Judge, United States i oreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ENTERED thi. exempt under N6) )eputy Clan: SEGR 19:1: FISC, certily that. this; document EFF v. DOJ 16-CV-02041 Document 13, page 26 of 26 pages.