A0 91 (Rev. 11/11) Cn'minal Complaint AUSA Katherine A. Sawyer (312) 697?4089 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS HVE EASTERN DIVISION - FEB 10 2117 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CASE NUMBER: THOMAS C. BRUTON v. UNDER SEAL CLERK. us. DISTRICT COURT IVAN REYES AZARTE, . 1 7 08 4 also knewnas ?La Reina? CRIMINAL I, the complainant in this case, state that the following is true to .the best of my knowledge and belief. From on or about September 1, 2016 to on or about December 31, 2016, at Chicago, in the Northern - District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and elsewhere, the defendant(s) Niolated: . Code Section Title 18 United States Code, Sections 371 and 1512(c) and Continued on the attached sheet O?'ense Description did conspire with others known and unknown to corruptly obstruct, in?uence, and impede any Of?cial proceeding, and attempt to do so, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371 and 1512(c)(2) and This criminal complaint is based upon these facts: WW I Sworn to before me and signed in my presence. Date: Februarv 10. 2.017 City and state: Chicago, Illinois R. ILDEIN Sp cial A ent, Drug EnfOrcement Administration . (D . ?ve/5W? Judges signature MICHAEL T. MASON. U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and Title MAGISTRATE JUDGE MASON . . -. 'errv?T COUNTY - SS STATE OF ILLINOIS .) I, John R. Gildein, being duly sworn, states as follows: I. Introduction 1. I am a Special Agent with the United States Department of 'Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, and have been so employed since September 2012. I am currently assigned to the Chicago Field Division. I have received training and have experience in investigating violations of federal narcotics and money laundering laws including, but not limited to, Title 21, United States Code, Sections . .841, .843, 846, 952, 959, and 963, and Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1956 and i 1957. I have-been involved in various electronic surveillance methods. I have also been involved in the debrie?ng of defendants, informants, and witnesses, as well as others who have knowledge of the - distribution, transportation, storage, and importation of controlled substances. I have been personallyinvolved in dozens of narcotics investigatiOns, and aslsuch I am familiar with the various means and methods used by narcotics traf?ckers to transport, store and distribute narcotics and narcotics proceeds, including through the use of corrupt government and law enforcement of?cials in foreign countries. I 2. This af?davit is made for the purpose of establishing probable cause in support of the issuance of an arrest warrant against the proposed defendant, as well as for the purpose of establishing'probable cause in support of acriminal complaint charging that, from in or about September 2016, to in or about December 2016..M Chicago, in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and elsewhere, IVAN REYES AZARTE (a/k/a ?La Reina?) (hereinafter did conspire with others, known and unknown to corruptly obstruct, in?uence, and impede any of?cial proceeding, and attempt to do so, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371 and 1512(c)(2) and i I have not included each and every fact known to me concerning this investigation. I have only set forth the facts necessary to establish probable cause that the defendant committed the offenses alleged in the complaint. - 4. The. investigation included the use of judicially authorized electronic intercepts and consensually recorded meetings. The summaries of recorded conversations in this af?davit do not include reference to all of the topics covered during the conversations. Further, quoted material as set out. in this af?davit is taken from draft summaries, not ?nal transcripts. In some of the paragraphs describing calls and/or meetings, I have included interpretations of the discussion in brackets. These interpretations include meanings attributed to coded language and vague references used by the 'speakers. My understanding and interpretation of the - conversations is based upon the content of the conversations, information provided by the con?dential informants, the context of both prior and subsequent intercepted conversations, my knowledge derived from this investigation, my training. and experience, and the training and-experience. of other lawenforcement agents, With narcotics 5.. Based on my training and experience, I am aware that DEA, the Department of Justice and other U.S. law enforcement agencies maintain formal and informal relationships with law enforcement of?cials in foreign c0untries in, order to foster c00peration and further U.S. e?orts at combatting narcotics traf?cking, money laundering, and other criminal activities which ultimately affect U.S. interests.1 Speci?cally, in Mexico, I am aware that DOJ and DEA maintain a . .relationship with Mexico?s Federal Police in which FP of?cers and agents. receive direct training from including training at training facility located in Quantico, Virginia. DEA, DOJ, and other law enforcement agencies also routinely share information in support of ULS. and Mexican investigations with U.S.- vetted FP personnel assigned to groups generally called Sensitive Investigative Units These-SIU personnel are responsible for multiple collaborative operations in which defendants are ultimately arrested in Mexico and extradited to the United States for prosecution. I am aware that the general security screening for FF SIU personnel. includes polygraph examinations administered by U.S. law enforcement personnel designed to ensure that SIU personnel do not engage in corruption by providing information to criminal enterprises or otherwise taking action in exchange for personal bene?t against the interest of U.S. and Mexican law enforcement interests. However, I am further aware that, at times, some senior-level FP 1 Speci?cally, I am aware that, in 1997, Congress authorized the DEA to initiate a vetted unit program in Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru through the passage of ?House Report 104'- 67 which accompanied the FY 1997 Omnibus Appropriations Act. The conceptual basis of this program, which later came to be called the Program,? was to identify and train security-screened DEA foreign counterpart personnel to work on sensitive bilateral investigations. I supervisory personnel have been exempted from the polygraph screening. 6. Based on DEA SIU records, from no later than 2008, through the present, REYES was a Mexican Federal Police Officer, at times assigned to the SIU. In particular, for several years, including the period of September 1, 2016 through November 1, 2016, REYES functioned as the Commander of the SIU, making him the highest ranking of?cer in the SIU: As explained in further detail below, beginning no later than September 2016, REYES was directly made aware of a pending investigation in the United States led by DEA 'which targeted narcotics traf?icliers operating in Mexico; REYES abused the position of trust within the SIU and directly shared information with the targets of a US. investigation in an effort to corruptly in?uence and warn the subjects of the investigation that they were being targeted. REYES was identi?ed as a member of the conspiracy to. obstruct the US. - investigation through judicially authorized intercepts, information provided by cooperating sources, and a voluntary statement during which REYES admitted to meeting-With a principal target of the investigation and discussing information that had been provided by a DEA agent to REYES in his capacity as the Commander of the SIU. II. Facts Supporting" Probable Cause A. Background of Drug Trafficking Investigation 7. In 2015, the United States Attorney?s Of?ce for the Northern District of Illinois Opened a- grand jury investigation into a drug trafficking and money laundering organization operating, in part, in Chicago (15? GJ 597) (the investigation?). During the course of that investigation,'law enforcement learned that people engaged in money laundering activities maintained connections to, among others, a transnational drug traf?cking organization led by an person named ANGEL DOMINGUEZ RAMIREZ, JR. (the operating out of Mexico. Through the use of wiretaps authorized in this district and in a related investigation pending in the Southern District of California (the the related DIL and SDCA investigations are referred to herein as the Investigation?) and information provided by con?dential sources, law enforcement- identi?ed a network of high-level members who operated the DTO, including ANGEL DOMINGUEZ RAMIREZ, JR. (a/k/a ?Don Emilianof ?Marcelo?) (hereinafter, Defendant (hereinafter "Def Defendant 2 (hereinafter "Def 8. Based upon ensuing judicially authorized electronic intercepts .and? information provided by con?dential sources, the BIL-investigation revealed that was a narcotics traf?cker and leader in the DOMINGUEZ DTO who operated from Mexico and, along with was responsible for negotiating and coordinating the purchase, transportation, and payment of loads of cocaine totaling 2 In connection with these investigations, -, - and DOMINGUEZ were . char ed in narcotics possession and importation conspiracies. Speci?cally, DOMINGUEZ and were char ed by indictment in the Southern District of California in the matter of I and was charged by indictment in the Northern District of Illinois in the matter of . DOMINGUEZ and_ were listed as unindicted co-conspirators (respectively anonymized as ?Individual and ?Individual in the charged NDIL conspiracy. . 5 multiple tons from Colombia to Mexico for ultimate distribution in the United States. 9. The NDIL investigation included the use of court-authorized interceptions of BBM conversations over various cellular telephones used and others (Target Devices 26, 36, 50, and 60). was identi?ed as the user of Target Devices 26, 36, 50., and 60 by a cooperating source who was directly in contact with over each of these devices.3 In known activities identi?ed through surveillance and consensually recorded conversations match the descriptions of activities transmitted by the user . of Target Devices 26, 36, 50, and 60.4 10. The SDCA investigation included the use, of court-authorized interceptions of BBM conversations over various cellular telephones 'used by. 8 has been cooperating with law enforcement since in or around 2010. CS- 1?s information has been found to be credible and reliable and has been independently corroborated by consensually recorded conversations, judicially authorized wire and electronic intercepts, and seizures of narcotics and narcotics proceeds. 1 has two previous arrests for drugs, but no convictions. is cooperating with. law enforcement for ?nancial compensation. To date, CS-1 has been paid in excess of $1,000,000 for his/her cooperation-CS-l has also received assistance from the government related to the safety of and his/her family. 1?s proactive cooperation in the investigation continued until in or about September 2016 when, as detailed below, law enforcement discovered that a member of the FP SIU with knowledge of this investigation informed of the investigation and disclosed the identity of to Dominguez DTO members. These disclosures gave rise to critical security concerns for the safety of CS- 1 and, as a result, agents evacuated CS- 1 from Mexico and CS- 1 ceased all. further proactive cooperation. 4 Speci?cally, Chief Judge Ruben Castillo or an Acting Chief Judge in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois authorized thirty-day interception periods from January 2016, through September 2016 for the following PINs: . 5EFEDC7 (?Target Device 7BB5542E (?Target Device 7BB1AEFF (?Target Device 5EF5F793 (?Target Device DOMINGUEZ, - and others (BBM-94, BBM-97, BBM-108, BBM-121, BBM 134, BBM 148, and BBM-193). 6 11. According to multiple cooperating sources (CS- 1, and was formerly a member of a Mexico-based transnational criminal enterprise 5 Speci?cally, the Honorable Michael M. Anello entered orders in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California authorizing thirty-day interception periods from October 2015, through November 2016 for the following PINS: - 2BFE8798 94?) 2BFE4A30 97?) 2C18637F 2C186302 2BF85507 20061B83 33600EBF 33600ECF 2C12CCA3 DOMINGUEZ was originally identi?ed as the user BBM-94 in the following manner: electronic communications intercepted over BBM-94 contained a photograph of the tombstone of an individual who the user of identi?ed as his father. In his United - States passport application, DOMINGUEZ provided identifying information for his father that was consistent with the information contained on the tombstone in the photo passed over BBM-94. Additionally, electronic communications intercepted over BBM-94, and subsequent devices, cooperator information, and information provided by DOMINGUEZ in his United States passport application all describe DOMINGUEZ as a disabled veteran who walks with a limp due to a combat-related injury. DOMINGUEZ was identi?ed as the user of each of the subsequent devices through a common call analysis and through communications that were consistent with those of previous communications over commonly-called the Beltran Leyva Organization '7 According to information provided independently from 08-1, CS-2, and CS-3, was principally responsible for overseeing the receipt and transportation of cocaine in Mexico from Central and South America, for ultimate distribution in the United States on behalf of the BLO and Sinaloa Cartel. Accordirig to 08-1, 08-2, and continued towork with the BLO after it split from the Sinaloa Cartel in approximately 2008. According to 08-1 and 08-3, and veri?ed by law enforcement and public source information, was arrested in Mexico in-approximately 2009. and released 6 08?2 began cooperating with law enforcement in or around 2012. 08-2 is a former Mexican law enforcement of?cial and high-level leader of the Beltran Leyva Organization. CS-2 was indicted in another district with narcotics traf?cking offenses, arrested, in Mexico or around 2010, and extradited to the United States in or around 2012. Prior to his/her arrest, CS-2 had regular, direct contact with Arturo Beltran Leyva and other leaders of the Beltran Leyva Organization and its allied criminal enterprises, including the Sinaloa Cartel before its split with the Beltran Leyva Organization in or around 2008. According to 08?2, as part of his/her role within the BLO, CS-2 had regular Contact with corrupt Mexican government and law enforcement of?cials. CS-2 pled guilty in the district in which he was charged and is cooperating in the hopes of receiving a lesser sentence. CS-2 has no other criminal convictions. CS-2 has provided signi?cant information that has proven reliable in the past and has been independently corroborated by consensually recorded conversations, judicially authorized wire and electronic intercepts, and seizures of narcotics and narcotics proceeds. 7 CS-3 began cooperating with law enforcement in or around 2012. 08?3 is a former high- ranking member of the Sinaloa Cartel. Prior to his/her arrest, CS-3 performed many leadership functions for the Sinaloa Cartel, including but not limited to overseeing: shipments of narcotics from Central and South America into Mexico; transportation of narcotics throughout Mexico and into the United States; distribution of narcotics to customers of the Sinaloa Cartel in the United States; and the collection and transportation of cash narcotics proceeds. Prior to his/her arrest in or around 2009, 08-3 had regular, direct contact with other leaders of the'Sinaloa Cartel, including Joaquin Guzman Loera (?Chapo?), Ismael Zambada Garcia and Arturo Beltran Leyva prior to the split from the Sinaloa Cartel. has been indicted and pled guilty in two federal districts with narcotics conspiracy charges. 08-3 is cooperating in the hopes of receiving a lesser sentence in the cases in which he/she has pled guilty. CS-3 has provided signi?cant information that has proven reliable in the past and has been independently corroborated by consensually recorded conversations, judicially authorized wire and electronic intercepts, and seizures of narcotics and narcotics proceeds. has also received assistance from the government related to the safety of 08-3 and his/her family. 8 sometime prior to 2016. According to and veri?ed by judicially authorized electronic intercepts, following his release from custody in Mexico, resumed his former role in overseeing the transpOrtation of cocaine fromCentral and South America to Mexico, for ultimate distribution in the United States. More speci?cally, according to 08?1, following -s release from custody, asked 08-1 to introduce him to Colombian cocaine suppliers who would be Willing to supply cocaine to on behalf of the Dominguez According to 08-1, and corroborated by judicially authorized intercepts and consensual recordings, in or around 2016, introduced to multiple sources of cocaine. supply in Colombia. To further a relationship with the suppliers, asked to bring the sources of supply to Cancun, Mexico to meet with and his associates in order to discuss future cocaine transactions. Under the direction and control of hislher handling agents and in furtherance of his/her cooperation, on or about April 15, 2016, arrived in Mexico City and subsequently traveled to Cancun to meet with and his associates. While in Cancun, attended a series of consensually recorded meetings with -, DOMINGUEZ, -, and multiple Colombian sources of cocaine supply during which they discussed the terms of potential futIire cocaine-transactions. According to and consensual recordings, a number of these meetings took place in public restaurants in Cancun and other meetings took place in private residences.8 In order to gather 8 As corroborated by consensual recordings and judicially authorized intercepts, these meetings resulted in multiple loads totaling several tons of cocaine being transported from - Colombia to the Dominguez control in Mexico. These transactionsform part of the basis for charges against DOMINGUEZ, -, and others in NDIL and SDCA. 9 additional evidence of these meetings in support of ultimate prosecutions in the United States, DEA agents based in Mexico requested that members of the FP SIU conduct surveillance .of the meetings in the Cancun area which occurred in public locations. FP members performed surveillance of the meetings as requested, including byitakingpictures of CS-1 and the people with whom .met at a restaurant in Cancun.9 B. Discovery of Leak Within Mexican Law Enforcement to 12. On or about September 9, 2016, judicially authorized interceptions over Target Device 50, used by -, revealed that a person believed to be REYES and using the screen-name ?Ayala? informed that was the target of a narcotics investigation.10 REYES expressly informed- that- needed to discard all communication devices implicated in the investigation. Speci?cally, on - September 9, 2016, beginning at approximately 4:42 the following conversation was intercepted between -, using Target Device 50, and Ayala, using PIN The government took all reasonable steps to conduct enforcement actions on the cocaine shipments, but ultimately did not possess enough information to seize the loads of cocaine in transit from Colombia to Mexico. 9 As explained in further detail below, a cropped version of one of the photographs taken by Mexican law enforcement during the surveillance of the April 2016 meetings was transmitted by REYES to in furtherance of an effort to obstruct the NDIL investigation. The photo was cropped by DEA in order to remove from the image. REYES later admitted to seeing the same cropped photograph in the possession of DOMINGUEZ, during a meeting between REYES and DOMINGUEZ which took place on or about November 1, 20 16' 1n Mexico City. 10 As explained in further detail below, based on .the totality of the evidence in this matter, I submit that there IS probable cause to believe that REYES was the user of PIN that transmitted a warning of the investigation pending against on September 9, 2016 10 (the ?Ayala PIN -: Hello, how are you? AYALA: Hello, good morning. -: Good morning. AYALA: .Good, good. -: That?s good, I?m glad. AYALA: How are you? - Good thank you. AYALA: That?s good that?s what matters. Listen. -: I?m here checking in. I?m listening. Regarding yesterday?s matter [apparent reference to a discussion which occurred prior to September Guess What? It?s you is the target of the US. Investigation]. -: Which device is it asked Whether one of his communication devices was being intercepted]? Should I get rid of them [discontinue the use of communication devices to avoid detection by law enforcement]?13 11 Throughout this Af?davit, I describe various conversations that were intercepted pursuant to court-authorized interceptions of electronic communications. These descriptions often include my understanding of what is being said during such conversations set forth parenthetically. This understanding and interpretation of the conversations is based on the. content and context of the conversations, (ii) my experience. and my fellow agents? experiences as law enforcement of?cers, including our experience observing written - conversations as a whole, and the investigation to date. The summaries of the intercepted conversations set forth in this Af?davit are based on draft not ?nal transcriptions completed by English/Spanish interpreters contracted by DEA and HSI. Finally, the summaries contained herein do not include all potentially criminal communications intercepted during the periods of interception, or all statements or topics covered during the course of the intercepted conversations. 12 No prior conversations between the Ayala PIN and were intercepted, therefore, any prior communication likely occurred over a different device or in person 13 Based on my training and experience, I am aware that narcotics traf?ckers frequently turn off or change their phones and mobile devices to avoid detection by law enforcement. 11 AYALA: Some ears around there have it I Def 1 communications were being intercepted]. - Oh, I see. - AYALA: Get rid of all instructed to discontinue the use of all communications devices to avoid detection by law enforcement]. -: Okay, all right. AYALA: Listen. Def 1 I?m listening. AYALA: [picture sentAYALA: AYALA: AYALA: AYALA: AYALA: It?s you Warned that law enforcement conducted surveillance of him as the target of an investigation by sending a photo taken by an FP SIU of?cer during the surveillance operation]. There?s a bad picture because it was taken from a computer. Yes, has it been a while [has the investigation been underway for a long time]? Yes, it?s been known since April supposedly [the US. Investigation of which is a target has been pending since 'at least April 2016]. I don?t know. I can?t identify the other two. They know you are here and they want to see who you hangout with law enforcement is aware that Def 1 was in Mexico City and sought to conduct surveillance of Def 1 in order to identify his co- conspirators]. Don?t talk at all [don?t talk on phones that can be intecepted] . I don?t talk to anyone [over the phone]. Only through messages directed Def 1 to communicate only through text message platforms that REYES believed could not be intercepted by law enforcement]. Okay, I?ll get. rid of all and get new ones I Def 1 intended to discard all of his communication devices and replace them with new devices to avoid detection by law enforcement]. Thank you. Yesterday a piece of audio [information obtained by law enforcement] arrived where one of the guys who was there said they were on the second level [as described below, this is a reference to information passed by a DEA agent to REYES the day before this communication with. -: When can we meet to talk about it [the investigation of Def 1 But AYALA: like I said I neVer wise the audio means of any phone. It couldn?t have been my audio [law enforcement could not have intercepted audio- communications because- does not talk on the phone]. Then they are listening to one of the guys who was with you [law . enforcement is intercepting one of -s associates who was 13 .present? at the April meeting in Cancun]. -: That?s possible. .AYALA: Yes, but you were the target I Def 1 is the target of the US. Investigation]. :Okay, very Well. Either way, I?ll get rid of them [communication devices] just to be on the safe side [avoid detection by law enforcement] . AYALA: Then be cautious and be on the lookout if you go out. Don? hang out with anyone in public the next few days. -: Very well. I?ll be here Whenever you are available to meet up. If you want, I?ll let you know tomorrow where, so I can let you know in detail [this message was sent the same day that REYES asked to meet with a DEA agent as set forth below]. i - Or do you recommend for me to leave [leave Mexico City to avoid law enforcement]? Okay, that?s ?ne. Let me know through May?s mom and I?ll give you a new one I Def 1 will provide REYES with anew PIN on which REYES can contact Def 1 AYALA: I recommend to wait a bit, get rid of all [communication devices], and if you can move from Where you are do it due to location of the phones you have now warned that he could be located . through his phones], so it?s not the same as the new ones and I?ll let you know early tomorrow. -: Okay, okay. Thank you. AYALA: [Take care and we?ll be in touch. No worries 13. I am aware that the photograph transmitted by REYES was taken in approximately April 2016 in Cancun, Mexico" by an of?cer assigned to an FP SIU at the'request of DEA agents in Mexico City. I am also aware that the people who appear 14 in the photograph, from left to right, are Individual and. The original version of the photograph also depicted who was present at the meeting, but was cropped out of the photo before it was provided to REYES by a DEA agent in order to protect CS-l?s identity. . C. Identification of IVAN REYES AZARTE as the Source of the Leak of the U. S. Investigation I 14. From no later than April 2016 through September 2016, REYES, in his role as the supervisor over the SIU, routinely had contact and worked collaboratively with DEA agents in Mexico City. According to multiple DEA and other US. law enforcement personnel interviewed in this investigation, REYES was the principal direct point of contact for information sharing between US. and Mexican- law enforcement personnel assigned to the SIU. At times, this resulted in REYES being provided with highly sensitive information obtained in US. investigations through multiple means, including judicially authorized intercepts and con?dential sources. As the leader'of the operational portion of the SIU, REYES oversaw operations which resulted in the arrest of numerous high-level members and associates of various organized criminal enterprises in Mexico, including multiple members of the Sinaloa Cartel. charged in this district. 15. I REYES was ?rst suspected as the source of the leak of the US. Investigation when. infOrmation shared with REYES in his capacity as the leader of the SIU appeared in judicially authorized intercepts occurring over the Ayala Pm in 14 Based on judicially authorized intercepts, information provided by and other inf01mation, I am aware that Individual A is a Colombian source of cocaine supply to the Dominguez DTO. 15 the form of warnings to regarding the US Investigation. The content of those communications mirroredcommunications that. REYES had with DEA agents assigned to the Mexico City Country Of?ce. Additional. judicially authorized intercepts between DOMINGUEZ and explicitly identify their source within Mexican law enforcement by the name ?Ivan.? Those same intercepts identify ?Ivan? as a person .who had historical ties to the BLO as a corrupt law enforcement of?cial. As set forth below, CS-2, who previously acted as a high-level leader within the BLO, identi?ed REYES as a corrupt Mexican law enforcement agent who received training in the United States and who worked closely with DEA agents. According to CS-2 was personally present when REYES provided sensitive information directly to .BLO leader Arturo BeltranLeyva, including information which identi?ed a DEA con?dential source who was Cooperating against the BLO who was. subsequently kidnapped and murdered based on the information provided by REYES. According to 08-2, REYES used his powers as a law enforcement of?cial to protect the interests and regularly-received. payments totaling millions of dollars in exchange for the corruptive services and informationihe provided. . 16. On or about February 2017, REYES submitted to a voluntary interview at the United States Embassy in Mexico City with DEA Agents and . Assistant United States Attorneys assigned to this investigation. During this interview, REYES admitted to meeting with DOMINGUEZ and another person. on or .- about November 1, 2016in Mexico City to discuss drug traf?cking activities in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas and to possession of the cropped photo 16 of which was provided by a DEA agent to REYES on or about September 8, 2016. The existence of this meeting is corroborated by judicially authorized intercepts from November 1, 2016 in which DOMINGUEZ had multiple conversations with his co-consPirators about meeting(s) with FP- o?icial(s) to receive information on the investigation targeting the Dominguez DTO. Communications between REYES and DEA Agents 17. On or about September 8, 2016, REYES engaged in a series of electronic communications with a DEA agent assigned to the Mexico City Country Of?ce (?Agent regarding the NDIL investigatibn of .. The Content of those communications was largely identical to the information that the Ayala PIN . transmitted to on September 9, 2016, as set forth above. 18. Speci?cally, on September 8, 2016, at approximately 6:18 the day before the Ayala PIN sent the above described'message to -, Agent A, who is assigned to the investigation into the Dominguez DTO, contacted REYES, using his of?cial FP SIU inobile device (which is separate and distinct from theiAyala PIN), to requesthis assistance in conducting surveillance of -. The agent provided REYES with -s location, as well as the cropped photo above, taken during the April Cancun surveillance, so that REYES could direct FP SIU agents/of?cers to conduct the surveillance armed with a photo of the person they were tasked to surveil. 15 Due to the safety risks associated with the work US. law enforcement personnel perform in Mexico, Agent A?s identity is not disclosed in this af?davit. l7 Agent A consensually preserved the following messages with Reyes:16 Agent A. They are meeting at Sanora grill [targets of the U. S. Investigation will be meeting at a restaurant in Mexico City] on the same street as the Audi, it?s next to the PF Change, they meeting soon Agent A. Sorry, that was in English [according to agents familiar with REYES, REYES largely understands English, however, agents primarily communicate with REYES in his native Spanish]. Agent A: The meeting will start at 6. - REYES: That?s ?ne. Agent A: Restaurante Sanora Grill close to PF changs Agent A: On the same street as the Audi dealership. REYES: 0k REYES: Ok. REYES: [Agent I?ve' already sent people and we?re going to do everything we can to get there. When these things come up please tell me. [Individual B, a subordinate to REYES within theFP is an analyst and they don?t do ?eld work.17 Agent A: Ok REYES: Do you know if they I Def 1 and others] are already meeting or if they are still there? Agent A: I think that they. are still there: REYES: Ok, the people are on their way. If you ?nd out anything else please 16 Reyes was identi?ed as the user of the communication device with which Agent A communicated based on multiple interactions between Agent A and other DEA agents assigned to the Mexico City Country Of?ce and REYES which occurred over that device for a period of multiple years. 17 As set forth elsewhere herein, this is a refe1ence to Individual who is the Mexican analyst who had worked on this case since its inception and as a subordinate of REYES. According to DEA records, Individual works in the same location REYES. 18 let us know. REYES: Thank you. Agent A: Copy. Agent A: Thank you. Agent A: And here?s the apartment for the targets. Agent A: Calle Lagos eucathel #12, c'olonia granada, apartment ?901 [address in Mexico City at which, based on information obtained in the US. Investigation, and resided] Agent A: The man in the middle [a reference to in the below photograph] and the one Who?s on his right live there. Agent A: [picture sent] 1-, . . Agent A: The photo of them isn?t from today, just so you know. Agent A: It?s from a few months ago in Cancun. Agent A: Then man'we know is there at the Sonora Grill now is the one in the middle I Def 1 is depicted in the middle of the photo] Agent A: White shirt in the photo REYES: Yes, my people in Cancun took that photo SIU agents/of?cers - under command performed the Cancun surveillance] Agent A: Siu [reference to the FP Agent A: ?Yes Agent A: Exactly Agent A: That same target lives here [Mexico City] now REYES: 0k REYES: [Agent do you know anything? Agent A: I think that they were in the restaurant on the second ?oor but I don?t know if they?re still there. REYES: 0k 19. According to judicially authorized intercepts, as set forth above?, much of the information provided to REYES was transmitted to by the Ayala PIN, including a reference to the fact that and his associates were seen on the second ?oor of the restaurant as relayed by the DEA agent to REYES in the messages set forth above. 20. In subsequent consensually preserved text messages exchanged with Agent A, between September 9, 2016, and September 13, 2016, REYES, using his SIU mobile device, continued to seek information. regarding the investigation 20 from his DEA contacts: September 9. 2016' 2 Agent A: Hello, good morning. up [Agent Agent A: How did the surveillance g0 last night? REYES: We didn?t manage to ?nd anyone. REYES: The truth is it took us over two hours to get there. REYES: When can get together to talk about the case? [the US. Investigation]? REYES: I would like to talk to you about his case and also the ?Palau? case. Agent A: Ok I Agent A: Can we get together next week? . REYES: Yes. I September 13, 2016 REYES: How?s it going, [Agent When can we meet? Agent A: Hi Ivan Good evening. REYES: Good'evening. Agent A: Sorry for the delayed response. Agent Are you available tomorrow? Agent A: Or Thursday? REYES: ?l?omorrow works. sound good to you? . REYES: Yes. I can go to the Starbucks [adjacent to the United States Embassy in Mexico City]. Agent A: 0k 21 REYES: To avoid the hassle getting in [avoid the security screening at the United States Embassy] Agent A: That sounds good. goOd. I?ll see you there. Agent A: Yes. I?ll'see you then; September 14L2016 Agent A: Hello. Good morning. REYES: Good morning. REYES: I?m almost there. Five minutes. Agent A: Are you there? . REYES: Yes, I?m still here. i 21. According to DEA agents and staff assigned to the US. Investigation in Mexico. City, prior to September 2016, REYES. had no direct role in and had never inquired as to the US. Investigation. Communications between and the Ayala PIN 22. Based on my conversations with DEA personnel assigned to the Mexico City Country Of?ce who have met with REYES on multiple occasions at his of?ce, I am aware that of?ceiis located in Mexico City in a building referred to as Between September 10, 2016, and September 14, 2016, Def 1 was intercepted in a series of communications with the Ayala PIN .1 Based on my training and experience, conversations with DEA. personnel assigned to the Mexico City . Country Of?ce Who are very familiar with the geography of Mexico City, and analysis 22. of the intercepted communications between and the Ayala PIN setting up an in person meeting, I believe that the user of the Ayala PIN was present in the - - building in which of?ce is located, and the user of the Ayala PIN I left directly from to attend a meeting with -. 23. For example, on September 12, 2016, beginning at approximately 4:42 p.m. -, using Target Device 50, was intercepted in contact with the Ayala PIN in the following conversation discussing a meeting between -, the user of the Ayala PIN and a third party, who would provide information to- regarding the NDIL investigation into the Dominguez DTO: - - AYALA: Good morning. How are you? AYALA: I have an answer for you already. -: Good morning. How are you? AYALA: Good, thank god. How are you all? -: That?s good. And what?s nextwhat time can we meet up, at 3:00 around where you told me? AYALA: I already talked to the guy [unidenti?ed third party].18 He agreed to have a talk approached the SIU member and he/she, agreed to provide information to regarding the U.S. Investigation]. GAMEZ: What does he [unidenti?ed third party] say? I told him [unidenti?ed third party] he would be supported [monetarily compensated], and he said it was ?ne. The thing is that he went out to work and he doesn?t know at what time he will be back. :Well, you tell me where and at what time we can meet. Yes, of course, don?t .worry about that. 13 Based on the totality of the circumstances, it is believed that the referenced third arty IS Individual B, an FP SIU intelligence analyst assigned to assist DEA with the investigation 23 AYALA: He asked me if it can be at night once we get out [as noted above . REYES and Individual work together at the same location which is consistent with the language used here]. -: Well, I will be awaiting on the time, if it can be today, if not, tomorrow. At any time you all want, there is no problem. Thank you. AYALA: What do you think if you go near the area around 9:30, and once we get out, we will send you a message, so we can sit down at a place? - I will be awaiting. That?s ?ne. AYALA: Another thing, he asked me for something very important. -: I will go around there. Go ahead. AYALA: Don?t say anything because he says that the information [about the investigation into Def 1 is coming from a source [con?dential source cooperating in the US. Investigation]. He tells me that the source was sitting with you, the day of the picture [a reference the fact that was cropped out of the photo that Ayala sent to on September 9, 2016 as set forth above]. Let?s be careful. He will explain it to you there, but he told me that 1n advance so that you are cautious. -: Okay, okay. Thank you very much.- AYALA: If anything, I will be awaiting. Have a good day. Take care. -: Likewise. Have a good day, 24. On September 13, 2016, beginning at approximately 1:38 using Target Device 50, was intercepted in the following converSation with the Ayala PIN: -: Good evening. Sorry to bother you. Are we going to meet today? I?m just asking so I can start getting closer. 19 According to judicially authorized interce ts over Target Phone 50, inanediately following this exchange with the Ayala PIN, attempted to contact (PID 6812695). Over the course of the next several da and weeks, judicially authorized intercepts revealed that -, DOMINGUEZ, and their co?conspirators became directly aware that was cooperating with the U.S..Investigation. 24 AYALA: Good evening. Yeah, around the area we had agreed on Same time you told me. . Okay. AYALA: We?ll text you when we leave, to see where you are. -: Yes, around that time. AYALA: Okay. I -: The thing is, it?s a little far for me. AYALA: Yeah, traf?c is heavy. Or however you want. We could do tomorrow at your call. Whatever is easier for you. :Could you come to Perisur [shopping area located near I really don?t like that area to be honest. But I?ll go that way. I?m the one who?s more interested. Ha ha. Don? worry, I?m going to be around the neighborhood. My brother 1s going to go with me [based on judicially authorized intercepts 1n the U. S. Investigation, Def shared an apartment with at this time and and Def 2 routinely referred to one another as brothers]. Just so you know he?s also concerned about it since he?s part of it as well is also part of the Dominguez DTO and has exposure to the U. S. Investigation]. I have to adapt to whenever you are able. AYALA: Ha ha- That?s ?ne. If you want, go to a place that you like and we ?11 see you there. -: To the shopping mall? Is that okay with you? AYALA: Yes. -: There is a store there that has a bar. It could be there if you want. The store where they sell everything. Haha. AYALA: All set, we?ll see you there. -: See you later. AYALA: Take care. -: Thanks. 25 25. On September 13, 2016, beginning at approximately 2:55 -, using Target Device 50, was intercepted in the following conversation with the Ayala PIN: - Hello. I?m already here where we agreed to meet. I?ll wait for you inside. .AYALA: We?re [believed to be REYES and Individual heading out [from- We?ll see you in about 15 [this is consistent with the approximate travel time from to the meeting location] -: Don?t worry, I?ll have a drink here AYALA: Okay. 26. On September 13, 2016, beginning at approximately 3:21 -, using Target Device 50, was intercepted in the following conversation with the Ayala PIN: -: I?m putting up with it so I can corroborate it. We?ll meet here in Peri [Perisur shopping area], at the mall in Samborns [department/convenience store] at the bar. Am I right? AYALA: No, we?re at the one at La Zona [different location near Perisur]. - So, all the way there where I was this morning? I thought you were taking too long. That?s why I called you. Let me go there. AYALA: We?re on the way. -: Are you coming over here? So I?ll wait for you? AYALA: Yes. i Thank you. AYALA: Your welcome. -: I apologize for so many inconveniences. 26 AYALA: Don?t worry; Def 1 Well, I?m here. I?m going to wait for you. Communications between DOMINGUEZ and identifying ?Ivan? as a corrupt law enforcement of?cial 27. In judicially authorized intercepts obtained in the US. Investigation, DOMINGUEZ and discussed the status of obtaining information regarding the investigation into the Dominguez DTO, including the identity of the person supplying the information. identi?ed the source of the information as ?Ivan,? and explained to DOMINGUEZ that Ivan previously provided information to the BLO. For example, on October 17, 2016, at approximately 11:42 DOMINGUEZ, using PIN 2BE013AD, was intercepted in the following conversation with - who wasusing PIN 201200143 (PID: 17175): i Ivan is Paloma?s people [reference to Ivan having a relationship with another Mexican law enforcement of?cial] - That?s why wethoughtof him. Def 2 The man that we saw already [reference to a previous meeting regarding the investigation into the Dominguez asked ivan for a -meeting [to discuss the investigation of the Dominguez DOMINGUEZ: But who is Ivan? - The boss [of the FP DOMINGUEZ: Theirs [the FP SIU supervisor]? 28. On October 20, 2016, at approximately 10:31 DOMINGUEZ, using PIN 2BE013AD, was intercepted in the following conversation with -, who 27 was using PIN 17175): It seems Ivan is attending a class -: That?s why he has not seen you [Ivan was then unavailable to meet with 29. Also on October 20, 2016, at approximately 10:32 DOMINGUEZ, using PIN 2BE013AD, was intersepted in the following conversation with- who-was using PIN (PID 35851): i If the guy doesn?t want to With Lik?s [slang for ?licenciado,? which is Spanish for attorney] help -.We can screw ivan [the Dominguez DTO has leverage to ensure that REYES remains loyal to them because the Dominguez DTO possesses information about past acts of corruption] Because he comes up in the Bel ?les referenced as a corrupt of?cial in law enforcement investigative ?les related to the .20 - But with a code [the references to REYES are to a codename] .21 :As soon as some assholes declare that as his code, we?ll make shit out of him would be exposed as being corrupted by the BLO by the release of his codename] -: If they single him out, that he is that code; and the one who received the check received payment from the BLO in exchange for his acts to protect-BLO interests], he?s fucked . 20 As detailed below, previous involvement with the Beltran?Leyva Organization is corroborated by 08-2. currently incarcerated in Houston and cooperating with'the DEA. 21 Based on my conversations with DEA agents who have worked with the FP SIU and other ?Mexican law enforcement and military entities that handle cases targeting cartels, I am aware that Mexican law enforcement and military of?cials routinely use code names in an effort to shield their identities and prevent retaliatory action. According to DEA agents who have worked directly with the. FP SIU, REYES routinely used the code name ?La Reina? in connection with his SIU activities. 28 DOMINGUEZ: He?s fucked - DOMINGUEZ: With that -: Oh, okay, well the only. thing that my friend told me is that they are checking both apartments. Mine and ?bufalin?s [a corrupt Mexican law enforcement of?cial passed information regarding the location of the residences of and another Dominguez DTO af?liate; as described above, Agent A passed information regarding two apartments in Mexico City to REYES, including an apartment jointly occupied by- and -1 - And What we already knew, that you are the primary objective but they want the old man ?rst is the primary target of the DEA investigation, but DEA is ?rst targeting - They just con?rmed What we had concluded [corrupt Mexican law enforcement of?cials con?rmed information regarding the US. Investigation] DOMINGUEZ: Yes, all they have is the dirt bag [reference to erroneous belief that the US. Investigation is predicated solely on the cooperation of . ., - That?s right DOMINGUEZ: He doesn?t have anything else - Because of everything the white boys have over there, no one singled you out as it being yours [reference to the belief that no potential cooperators other than CS- 1 had identi?ed DOMINGUEZ as the head of the Dominguez -: Even if they know :That?s Why they need the old man so they can tie you in directly [reference to the need to the S. Investigation to tie DOMINGUEZ to through the cooperation of 1] 30. On October 23, 2016, at approximately 9:00 DOMINGUEZ, using PIN 2BE013AD, was'intercepted in the following conversation With Who was. using PIN ZCIZCCAS (PID 44985): 29 DOMINGUEZ: What other news[?] -: Everything is calm. Let?s see if pata can ?nally see? ivan this week [to discuss the US. _Investigation] DOMINGUEZ: Oh that?s good DOMINGUEZ: Yes, let?s see, they?re very calm :The thing is that he was at a course and gave vacation to lots [reference to the delay in meeting with 31. On October 26, 2016, at approximately 2:28 DOMINGUEZ, using 2BE013AD, was intercepted in the following conversation with who was using PIN (PID 55687). Based on this conversation and other evidence obtained in the case, I believe that DOMINGUEZ and used inforrnation provided by REYES to determine the identity of 08-1 and discussed methods of causing to retract his/her cooperation or otherwise be discredited in the US. Investigation: DOMINGUEZ: Look, I?m sending you the photo of the mp who has the case [reference to the Mexican federal prosecutor assigned to the Mexico-based investigation of the Dominguez . then sent the following image to_ which depicts the identi?cation credential of a Mexican federal prosecutor; PGR is the Mexican equivalent of the US. Department of ustice]22 22 Based on my training and experience, I am aware that FP SIU investigations conducted in concert with US. law enforcement, at times also involve a specialized unit of PGR intended to target organized crime referred to as SEIDO. 30 - Pata called yesterday and said all was well, that Ivan ?s secretary said it was still over there with the ?gueros? [reference to the pending U.S. Investigation] -: that everything is calm'right now DOMINGUEZ: And'What does that mean? DOMINGUEZ: Everything alright? DOMINGUEZ: And I think USB wanted to get money out of us :That he checked in and that upon arrival he?ll see you; that he hasn?t been able to ?nish up DOMINGUEZ: But that dirt bag is over there has been talking shit 1 is providing cooperation to the US. Investigation] DOMINGUEZ: That?s all Iknow . -: Who located the mp [Mexican federal prosecutor] for you? DOIVIINGUEZ: [reference to a Dominguez DTO associate, ?Individual - That is where the'man?s [investigative] ?le is at . DOMINGUEZ: With-this mp [prosecutor] 31 DOMINGUEZ: [Individual is going to see him [the prosecutor] tonight DOMINGUEZ: See what he wants. But the number for the investigation doesn?t come up anywhere buddy [reference to the secrecy of an investigation targeting the Dominguez DOMINGUEZ: Unless it?s high impact con?dential To ask for a copy of the entire investigation [corruptly obtain the entire investigative ?le of the Dominguez DOMINGUEZ: Well that?s what we 'want DOMINGUEZ: On another note, the prosecutor from seido that investigated On his own said they no longer use that format DOMINGUEZ: And that when the Americans [reference that the US. Investigation proceeds independent of any investigation] Def 2 Because Ivan could have more but what?s impertant is what?s at the mp may possess more information than what is in the investigative ?le] DOMINGUEZ: They call them, they don?t explain anything and they just arrest you [reference to a belief that the US. law enforcement does not generally share information with Mexican law enforcement and instead simply seeks to obtain and execute provisional arrest warrants in Mexico based on S. charges] DOMINGUEZ: Okay DOMINGUEZ: What they do have fucked is the man not us as much but the scum bag is not helping That?s why we need to see the [investigative] ?le ?rst DOMINGUEZ: If the dirt'bag retracts everything [retracts statements made in CS-l?s cooperation], that?s the only way we can make this work DOMINGUEZ: Ivan should be there waiting for the proceSs, that way he can come with the ?gueros? law enforcement] to do the work [reference to access to US. law enforcement] DOMINGUEZ: It could be that the jury doesn?t see enough evidence 32 against us from the scum bag DOMINGUEZ: They won?t be able to proceed [the U.S. government will not be able to charge DOMINGUEZ, - and in the. U.S. Investigation] DOMINGUEZ: Do you understand? DOMINGUEZ: And since there isn?t anything that is seized [reference to an erroneous belief that the U.S. Investigation did not result in seizures of narcotics or narcotics proceeds] DOMINGUEZ: They are fucked [the targets of the U.S. Investigation will not be successfully prosecuted] . DOMINGUEZ: The American ju1y needs DOMINGUEZ: To press charges in order for them to proceed over here [reference to the need to obtain an indictment from a U.S. grand jury before the U.S. government can seek provisional arrest warrants in Mexico] -: That?s What I wanted to talk to lik [attorney] about Def :We should process the scum bag over here [attempt to force 1 to retract his/her cooperation] . Def 2 That someone they catch or is arrested with product and weapons should declare it all belongs to him [reference to inserting a fall person to take credit for any seized narcotics or narcotics proceeds to shield the leadership targets of the U.S. Investigationprocess then his statements are worthless [reference to discrediting CS-l?s cooperation in the U.S. Investigation] Information Provided by 08-2 Regarding Historical Connections to- the Beltran Leyva Organization and the Murder of a Con?dential Source 32. On or about January 19, 2016, law enforcement met with in a custodial facility in the United States. During this interview, CS-Z identi?ed a photograph of REYES from an array of more than 10 photographs as a corrupt FP of?cer who previously provided direct support to the BLO. Speci?cally, according to 33. he/she first met REYES in approximately 2008 or 2009. During this time, 2 worked directly for and with Arturo Beltran Leyva as a high?level leader within the BLO. According to (IS-2, was present for meetings between Arturo Beltran Leyva and other leadership?level BLO members, including Mario and Alberto Pineda Villa}8 and high?ranking Mexican government and law enforcement of?cials, including, at times, REYES, Individual D, Individual E, Individual F, and Individual G. According to 08-2, at these meetings Arturo Beltran Leyva paid millions of dollars to those officials, including to directly to REYES, in order to secure the corrupt of?cials loyalty in protecting the interests of the BLO, including by providing information on US. and Mexican law enforcement investigation-'34 33. According to 08-2, in" approximately 2008, Individual was the operational head of the Mexican Federal Police who acted as an intermediary between the BLO and corrupt Mexican government and law enforcement of?cials. At the time, - Individual was a high ranking member of the Mexican Federal Police who reported to Individual and who often met with'BLO leaders on behalf of corrupt" members of the Federal Police. According to 08-2, he/she attended multiple meetings during which either Arturo Beltran Leyva or one of the Pineda Villabrothers paid Individual in exchange for Individual F?s efforts to protect the interests of the'BLO. According to 08?2, Individual was generally accompanied by two other high-ranking members 23 Arturo Beltran Leyva, Mario Pineda Villa, and Alberto Pineda Villa were all separately killed 1n Mexico 1n approximately 2009. 24 CS 2?s information regarding the positions held by Individuals D, E, F, and is corroborated by public source information and DEA records. 34 of the Federal Police who also provided assistance to the. BLO in exchange for payment. identi?ed photographs of REYES and Individual as the two corrupt Federal Police officers Who generally accompanied Individual to meetings with the BLO and who provided information and protection to Arturo Beltran Leyva and the BLO in exchange for regular payments, which were directly witnessed by According to CS-2, Individual worked together}? stated that he/she was aware that either REYES or Individual went by the nickname of ?La Reina,? but was not sure which ?of the two Specifically used that name since . 2 generally saw both REYES and Individual together. According to (ES-2, when meeting with REYES and Individuals and Gt, Arturo Beltran Leyva and other members of the BLO overtly talked about narcotics traf?cking such that REYES and Individuals and were directly aware that the payments they received from the BLO constituted narcotics proceeds and that the payments were made with the . express understanding that REYES and Individuals and accepted the narcotics proceeds in order to further a narcotics traf?cking conspiracy. i 34.. CS-2 further identified REYES by stating that REYES infermed os?2 directly that REYES had received training from the US. government at a facility in Virginia?6 According to REYES, knowing that was himself a former 25 According'to DEA agents and other US. law enforcement personnel who worked directly with the FP SIU, REYES and Individual did in fact work together on many issues and investigations. 26 Based on. DEA records and interviews with DEA agents and other U. S. law enforcement personnel who worked directly with the FP SIU, REYES has attended training seminars at academy located 1n Quantico, Virginia. 35. Mexican Federal Police Of?cer, discussed with how his position enabled him to have regular contact with DEA agents and other?U.S. law enforcement of?cials. 35. CS-2 further provided speci?c details regarding a meeting that took place sometime in or around 2009 in Cuernavaca, Mexico between Arturo Beltran Leyva, Alberto Pineda Villa, and Mario Pineda Villa on behalf of the BLO, and REYES, and Individuals and on behalf of the Mexican Federal Police. According to CS-2, Arturo Beltran Leyva convened the meeting because he was concerned about a series of seizures of multi-ton loads of cocaine. According to C32, Arturo Beltran Leyva believed that 'his organization had been infiltrated by a Colombian individual who was working as an informant to the DEA. 36. According to. C32, during this meeting, Individual produced a photograph of a person and accompanying documents bearing a DEA or U. S. government seal and informed Arturo Beltran Leyva that the person in the photograph was cooperating with the DEA. According to Individual informed Arturo Beltran Leyva that the information regarding had been obtained by REYES and Individual Gr. According to REYES and Individual then further discussed the investigation involving CS-4, including REYES and Individual G?s access to DEA agents and information. Speci?cally, according to CS-2, REYES . explained that CS-4 had been arrested in a DEA case in Miami and began c00perating' immediately thereafter, including by providing DEA with information to facilitate the seizure of maritime shipments of cocaine from Colombia to the control in 36 Mexico?7 37. According to 08?2, after receiving this information from REYES and Individuals and G, Arturo Beltran Leyva, in the presence of REYES and Individuals and G, ordered Mario Pineda Villa to have CS-4 kidnapped, tortured, and murdered. According to CS-2, REYES and Individuals and were then paid approximately $3,000,000 in exchange for the information that ?theyprovided to the I BLO about CS-4. According to CS-Z, was directly aware from his subsequent conversations with Arturo Beltran Leyva and others that was in fact kidnapped, tortured, and murdered in accord with Arturo Beltran Leyva?s orders. D. Admission from REYES a Meeting with DOMINGUEZ 38. With the concurrence of the Mexican Federal Police, on or about February 2, 2017, DEA agents and Assistant United. States Attorneys assigned to the US. Investigation conducted an interview of REYES in the United States Embassy in Mexico City. Prior to be being asked any questions, REYES was informed by an assigned AUSA that he was not under arrest, that he was free to leave at any time, that he was not required to talk to the agents and AUSAs at all, and that he could 27,1 am aware that Arturo Beltran Leyva and multiple co?conSpirators were indicted in this district in the matter of 09 CR 672 (Guzman, .). Based on my discussions with AUSAs and agents assigned to the Beltran Leyva investigation, the information provided by 08?4 was instrumental in securing Arturo Beltran Leyva?s indictment. The information provided by 08?2 is consistent with evidence obtained in the Beltran Leyva investigation regarding 4?s kidnapping and murder after being discovered as a cooperator against the BLO. The 09 CR 672 indictment alleged non?speci?ed acts of violence as means and methods in furtherance of the conspiracy. Had Arturo Beltran Leyva proceeded to trial in this district, the government intended to prove the death of CS 4 by a preponderance standard outside the presence of the Jury in order to establish that, pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), Arturo Beltran Leyva forfeited his ability to object on the ground of hearsay to the introduction of recordings made by CS 4 of unmonitored conversations between 4 and Arturo Beltran Leyva. 37 refuse to answer any individual question. REYES expressly acknowledged that the interview was entirely voluntary and agreed to talk with the agents and AUSAs. Although he was told he was free to leave at any time, REYES was also informed during the interview that he could consult with an American defense attorney and REYES was provided with the. number to the Federal Defender?s Of?ce in Chicago. At no time during the ensuing interview did REYES state that he wished to end the interview or to consult'with antattorney before proceeding. 39. . Prior to being asked substantive'questions, REYES was confronted with portions of the evidence described in this complaint and directly informed that he was a target of the investigation. REYES denied being the user of the Ayala PIN or I otherwise being the source of the leak of the US. Investigation. REYES conceded that he was the sole point of Contact for the FP SIU regarding the information received from Agent A regarding the September 8 surveillance, including being the only FP SIU member who directly received the version of the photograph of that had been cropped to remove the image of . 40. REYES admitted to .an in?person meeting with DOMINGUEZ and a person REYES only knew as ?Lobe? in a neighborhood of Mexico City on November 1, 2016. REYES stated that the meeting was set up by an FP of?cer who was killed during an arrest operation a few weeks later. According to REYES, REYES did not know in advance that the meeting would be and that REYES believed that the meeting was to discuss reducing violence in the state of Tamaulipas. REYES further ?admitted that, based on his conversations with Agent A, at the time 38. of the meeting, REYES was aware that DOMINGUEZ was a principal target of the US. Investigation. According to REYES, during the November 1 meeting, DOMINGUEZ informed REYES that DOMINGUEZ could provide information to FF to facilitate the arrest of the ?plaza bosses? [cartel leaders who control a speci?c city or area] in Tamaulipas so that DOMINGUEZ could replace them with less Violent plaza bosses who would be more willing to work with FP. Without providing context, REYES further admitted that DOMINGUEZ showed REYES the crapped version of the photo of above that REYES received from Agent REYES acknowledged that possession of this photo demonstrated that there was a leak within the FP SIU, but REYES denied any knowledge of how DOMINGUEZ received the photo. When asked why REYES did not inform Agent A or any other DEA agents or REYES superiors in FF about the leaked information or the meeting with DOMINGUEZ, REYES stated that he wanted to ?rst investigate the leak on his (own and was then placed on leave by FP a few days after his meeting with DOMINGUEZ. 41. admitted meeting with DOMINGUEZ matches with judicially authorized intercepts from ?the US. Investigation which revealed that, on November 1, 2016, DOMINIGUEZ and his associates discussed meeting with an FP of?cial to obtain a case ?le. For example, on November 1, 2016, beginning at approximately 1:21 DOMINGUEZ, using Target Device BBM 193, Was intercepted in the following conversation FNU LNU talk/a ?Juan Jimenez?), who was using PIN 2BD 17 DBA: 39 JIMENEZ: But very productive JIMENEZ: To inform you that next week they will give me a time and date regarding the exam for the guys DOMINGUEZ: Oh perfect. - JIMENEZ: I?m waiting for information/updates from the pf [waiting to receive information from the Mexican Federal Police] .JIMENEZ: And in'the mix with friends from the police [a Mexican Federal Police of?cial is bringing information], buddy DOMINGUEZ: The thing with the ?le has been resolved for the most part [reference DOMINGUEZ already being generally aware of the contents of the Mexican Federal Police ?le; believed to be a reference to prior knowledge of the US. Investigation] DOMINGUEZ: I?ll tell you about it [the Mexican Federal Police ?le] once I see you - 42. In addition, on November 1, 2016, beginning at approximately 7:32 DOMINGUEZ, using Target Device BBM 193, had a conversation FNU LNU (a/k/a ?Jessica Fernandez?), who was using PIN 7 B760897 FERNANDEZ: Good evening buddy and I apologize DOMINGUEZ: Tell me buddy you don?t have to apologize. I FERNANDEZ: It?s because the tech has a USB where he has all of the information for the unit [possibly a reference to obtaining information on the US. Investigation from a member of the FERNANDEZ: You asked for DOMINGUEZ: I am here with my guy in charge that understands all of that [possible reference ?to DOMINGUEZ being with the head of the FP SIU, REYES, who can help facilitate acquiring information]. . DOMINGUEZ: We are here' DOMINGUEZ: I?ll greet him shortly 4O FERNANDEZ: Oh 0k. It?s because he said they asked him for it but he didn?t know Whether to give you are there then it?s ?ne DOMINGUEZ: Yes I am going to?greet him here DOMINGUEZ: I already sent for him FERNANDEZ: Oh okay buddy. Eyerything about the [teamyou keep it don?t let anyone make a copy so that nobody has the system you are going to have . DOMINGUEZ: Yes, calm down, the idea is for him to stay permanent With us FERNANDEZ: Yes bro, that?s good I FERNANDEZ: He is ready to go to work DOMINGUEZ: That?s right FERNANDEZ: Okay buddy, here on the lookout DOMINGUEZ: Done. 41 Conclusion 43. Based upon the information contained herein, I respectfully submit that . there is probable cause to belieVe that from in or about September 2016 to in or about December 2016, at Chicago, in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Diyision, and elsewhere, IVAN REYES AZARTE did conspire with others known and unknown to corruptly obstruct, in?uence, and impede any of?cial proceeding, and attempt to do so, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371 and 1512(c)(2) and FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. JOHN GILDEIN Speial ent, DEA Squed cm to before me this _day of February, 2017. MICHAEL T, MASON Magistrate Judge United States District Court Northern District of Illinois 42