Approved for Release: 2016/08/31 C06552602

 

 

 


I 
f?
. OMee of Inspector General
Invamigm?onsSh?f
Case Closing Memorandum
I. Administrative Data
Case No: 2012-1 g; Case Title: Alleged FreedomPay Thea
Investigator: SuperVisori SAC 7 WW 
Date Received: 20 March 2012 Date Opened: 20 March 2012 

 

 

Date Assigned: 20 March 2012 Full Investigation

Summary of Investigative Actions

1. On 20 March 2013, 
Directorate of Support, noti?ed the O?ice of Inspector General (01G) of an alleged
the? from Agency vending machines involving the recdomPay payment system?. Etch! 016 that

 

 

Egg; CIAAC the persons unknown were stealing vendin oods by disconnecting the FreedomPay network cables
connected to Agency vending machines. explained that disconnecting the FreedomPay network

(7) (C) cable terminates communication between the vending machine and the FreedomPay network server,

which emits purchases to be made by non-paying individuals using unfunded FreedomPay cards.

   

2 stated he believed there thefts had been occurring since the late fall of 201 2, but the rate of
ocCurrence had recently accelerated, which prompted reporting to 016March 2013, 01G initiated an investigation into the matter. Under the
direction of OIG, technicians tirom the Of?ce of Security (OS) installedl jsurveillance
cameras at several key vending locations where a high occurrence of thefts were taking place. Video
footage recovered ?om the surveillance cameras captured numerous perpetrators engaged in the
FreedomPay theft scheme, all of whom were readily identi?able as Agency contract personnel.

Findings

3. The OIG investigation established that Agency contractors circumvented the
reedomPay payment system by disconnecting the associated network (AIN) cable, which then permitted
them to steal vending goods from Agency vending machines located throughout the Headquarters
complex using unfunded FreedomPay cards.

4. 010 determined that the FreedomPay dices originated withl?

 

 

 

 

 

lcontract employee] {was

identified as a perpetrator through other subject interviews by 016. During his 010 interview, 

admitted to originatin the idea of how to effect the thefts based on his knowledge of computer hem
According to he tested the scheme by disconnecting the FreedomPay network cable and using

 

The FreedomPay system is an electronic payment system utilized by Agency employees to purchase food,
beverage, and vending goods. The Freedoml?ay system uses the Agency interact Network (AIN) to communicate

between Freedoml?ay ?eld locations in Agency buildigs and the FreedomPay network server.


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7? 2 Case Closing Memorandum

an unfunded FreedomPay card. By doing thief hdmitted he obtained vending goods at no cost.

 

(6) subsequently shared this technique with several colleagues, which resulted in the proliferation of
the thefts by several other co?workers.
5 The following: contract employees were identi?ed as suspects in the
FreedomPay thefts through use of the security surveillance cameras, and each of whom subsequently
b)(7 C) provided admissions to 010 of their role In the thefts during their respective interviews:

(W6) .
ClAAct



 

 

 

 

 

 



6. unease) Additionally, [contract employee

was identi?ed by OIG as a subject in the FreedomPay thefts through use of the security
surveillance cameras. During his interview with to his role in the FreedomPay
thefts, having learned to commit the the?s from :3

7. Following their 010 interviews, all identi?ed subjects who made admissions to
the the?s surrendered their Agency access badges and were escorted from Agency premises by a Security
Protective Of?cer (SPO). The identi?ed subjects were also terminated from employment by their

respective contract employers.

8. The cumulative loss caused by the the?s was estimated to be $3,314.40.

9. On 22 May 2013, 010 referred this matter to the Eastern District of Virginia,
US. Attorney?s Of?ce, Department of Justice (DOJ). DOJ declined prosecution in lieu of administrative

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

action by the Agency.
IV. Re?ew and Approval 
(W6)
Case Closing Memo submitted by Investigator to 
Supervisor: '4 0' ?3
pug" Date)
ClAAct
Case Closing Memo approved by Supervisor: ?#520136




 

 


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Approved for Release: 2016/08/31 (306552602