IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF
WISCONSIN
The ESTATE of SYLVILLE K. SMITH,
by Personal Representative Mildred
Haynes, Patrick Smith, and Mildred
Haynes, on her own behalf.

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Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN
AND DOMINIQUE HEAGGANBROWN,
Defendants.

No.

17-cv-862

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMPLAINT
NOW COME Plaintiffs, ESTATE of SYLVILLE K. SMITH, by Personal
Representative Mildred Haynes, Patrick Smith, and Mildred Haynes, on her
own behalf, complaining of Defendants CITY OF MILWAUKEE,
WISCONSIN and DOMINIQUE HEAGGAN-BROWN, and state as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1.

Sylville Smith—a loving 23 year-old father, son, brother, and friend—

should be alive today, raising his three-year-old son. Instead, Sylville Smith’s life
was tragically and unjustifiably taken through an act of homicide by former
Milwaukee Police Department Officer Dominique L. Heaggan-Brown.
2.

Heaggan-Brown should not have been on the street the day he killed

Sylville—he should have never been hired and should have been disciplined when
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 he engaged in a pervasive pattern of excessive force and misconduct. The City of
Milwaukee, however, disregarded the obvious and, through its policies and
practices, caused this tragedy.
3.

This action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the laws of the

State of Wisconsin, seeks some measure of redress for the actions of Officer
Heaggan-Brown and the Milwaukee Police Department. Those actions have left a
family and community irreparably harmed.
4.

Though nothing can ever bring Sylville Smith back—and no form of

redress can ever compensate his family members for their loss—this action seeks to
hold accountable those responsible for the violation of constitutional and state-law
rights of not only Sylville Smith, but others harmed by the Defendants’ actions:
Smith’s family, friends, and, in the end, all residents of the City of Milwaukee.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5.

This Court has jurisdiction of the action pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1331.
6.

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). All parties reside in

Milwaukee County, and the events giving rise to the claims asserted herein all
occurred within this district.
PARTIES
7.

Plaintiff Mildred Haynes is the mother of Sylville Smith, the Personal

Representative of the Estate of Sylville Smith, and a resident of Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. Ms. Haynes is a party to this action in both her personal capacity, on her

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 own behalf, and as the personal representative of Sylville Smith’s estate.
Plaintiff Patrick Smith is the father of Sylville Smith, and a resident of

8.

Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
9.

Defendant Dominique Heaggan-Brown is a former Milwaukee police

officer who, at all times relevant to this action, was acting under color of law and
within the scope of his employment as a Milwaukee police officer.

10.

The City of Milwaukee is a Wisconsin municipal corporation, which

operates the Milwaukee Police Department (the “MPD” or “Department”), and sets
city-wide policy for the conduct of police officers employed by the Department.
FACTS
The Killing of Sylville Smith
11.

On August 13, 2016, a Saturday, Sylville Smith spent the

afternoon with an old friend.
12.

Around 3:30pm, Smith, who had been driving, parked a car on

the 3200 block of N. 44th St., on Milwaukee’s near north side.
13.

At the same time, Defendant Heaggan-Brown was patrolling

the same area in a marked MPD patrol SUV.
14.

Two other MPD officers, Officer Malafa and Officer Voden,

followed behind Defendant Heaggan-Brown.
15.

Within a minute of parking, Smith had been boxed in by

Heaggan-Brown’s marked MPD patrol SUV to the side, and the car being
driven by Malafa.
16.

Defendant Heaggan-Brown had pulled up slightly ahead of
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 Smith’s car.
17.

When Defendant Heaggan-Brown parked, he immediately

“jumped out” of his Squad car, intending to arrest Smith and the passenger
of the car, even though he lacked probable cause to perform an arrest.
18.

(Jumping out of the car in this manner was part of the City of

Milwaukee’s “jump out boys” practice and custom where MPD police officers
would go to predominately African-American neighborhoods, would pull up
next to people (whether on foot, on a bike, or in a car), detain them without
probable cause—another unconstitutional practice—and often use excessive
force along the way).
19.

At the same time Defendant Heaggan-Brown was “jumping

out,” Smith exited the car he was driving and began to run north.
20.

Heaggan-Brown immediately drew his gun, and pointed it at

Smith, as he began to run after him.
21.

Defendant Heaggan-Brown knew that there was no lawful basis

for drawing his weapon as he got out of his squad car—he had not seen a
crime in progress and faced no threat of imminent danger at all.
22.

Smith ran into the gangway between 3216 and 3218 N. 44th St.

As he was rounding the corner, Smith fell to the ground, directly in front of a
chain link fence.
23.

Defendant Heaggan-Brown, who had partially holstered his

service weapon while running, again withdrew his gun as Smith fell.
24.

Defendant Heaggan-Brown observed Smith fall to the ground.

25.

Smith had been carrying a black pistol, which he dropped as he
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 fell.
26.

Smith was obviously attempting to disarm himself after he fell

by attempting to throw the pistol over the fence.
27.

At no time did Smith aim or fire the gun at Defendant Heaggan-

Brown, or any other person.
28.

Defendant Heaggan-Brown observed that, in attempting to

throw the gun, Smith was not in a position to fire the weapon, because he
was holding it awkwardly by the barrel, pointing at Smith himself.
29.

As Smith began to throw the gun, Officer Heaggan-Brown fired

one shot, hitting Smith in the right bicep.
30.

The harm to Smith from this gunshot was substantial, not just

because he had been shot, but also because he had been shot by a “hollow
point” bullet. Hollow-point bullets are designed to inflict damage on the
people they hit and, though outlawed by the Geneva conventions, are used by
the Milwaukee Police Department.
31.

At the time of the first shot, it was obvious that Smith was

trying to disarm himself, and that Defendant Heaggan-Brown was not in any
danger.
32.

Defendant Heaggan-Brown’s use of deadly force in shooting

Smith in the bicep was excessive and unlawful.
33.

After he was shot, Smith fell backwards onto the ground. He

was then completely unarmed.
34.

Defendant Heaggan-Brown knew that Smith was unarmed after

the first shot.
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 35.

Defendant Heaggan-Brown observed Smith respond to the

bullet wound by falling to the ground and knew that he had struck the
target.
36.

The momentum of the fall (and the gunshot) caused Smith to

end up in something like the fetal position—curled upside down on the
ground, with his knees bent up near his chest, and his hands near his head.
37.

Given the presence of the house, the chain-link fence, Defendant

Heaggan-Brown, and Officer Malafa, it was obvious that Smith was
cornered.
38.

Being unarmed and shot with a hollow-point bullet, and

writhing on the ground in pain, Smith posed absolutely no threat to
Defendant Heaggan-Brown, or anyone else, whatsoever.
39.

Defendant Heaggan-Brown knew that Smith posed absolutely

no threat.
40.

Nonetheless, as Smith lay unarmed on the ground, curled

halfway into a ball, with his hands near his head, Defendant Heaggan-Brown
fired a second shot into Smith’s chest.
41.

As he fired, Defendant Heaggan-Brown was standing directly

over Smith—an execution-style shooting of an unarmed civilian.
42.

This gunshot was completely unjustified.

43.

This gunshot, which perforated the heart and a lung, caused the

death of Sylville Smith.
44.

At no point during this incident did Smith take any action that would

justify the use of deadly force.
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 45.

At no point during this incident did Smith pose an imminent threat of

death or serious bodily harm sufficient to justify the use of deadly force by
Defendant Heaggan-Brown.
46.

Indeed, the killing of Sylville Smith via the second shot, as depicted in

images of the shooting, shocks the conscience. It was unconscionable for Defendant
Heaggan-Smith to kill Sylville Smith by shooting him at point-blank range,
standing above him, while Smith had already been shot and was completely
unarmed.
47.

Following the killing of Sylville Smith, Defendant Heaggan-Brown

was stung by a bee. In the moments that followed the shooting, Defendant Heaggan
Brown was more concerned about his single bee sting than the fact that Sylville
Smith was lying on the ground, suffering immense pain. Defendant HeagganBrown’s first call for medical help was for himself, not the person he’d just shot
twice.
48.

Indeed, more than 90 seconds had gone by before Defendant Heaggan-

Brown rendered any aid to Sylville Smith, and even then he quickly stopped
rendering aid when a small amount of blood ended up on his thumb, which he then
rubbed on Sylville Smith’s shirt.
Defendant Heaggan-Brown Should Have Never Been Hired
49.

Dominique Heaggan-Brown began his association with the MPD in

July 2010, when he was hired as a “police aide.”
50.

Police aides are uniformed civilian employees, hired at age 17-19, who
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 work for the department doing a variety of tasks and are expected to complete 24
college credits at the same time. Police aides are given preference to enter police
training programs, putting them on track for an MPD career.
51.

In December 2011, an MPD officer cited Heaggan-Brown for driving 80

miles per hour in a 50 mph zone. The officer later voided the citation to give
Heaggan-Brown a second chance, because he was a police aide. Heaggan-Brown
wrote to his MPD superiors, assuring them he would not do it again.
52.

Two days after this first incident, Heaggan-Brown was again pulled

over for speeding, this time driving 74 mph in a 55 mph zone. This time, he pleaded
guilty, and again wrote to his superiors, telling them it had been a mistake. He
suffered no professional consequences.
53.

In November 2012, while Heaggan-Brown was still a police aide, police

officers responding to a report of shots fired in his neighborhood searched his
apartment. Although Heaggan-Brown was not there, about twelve other people
were, and the apartment smelled strongly of marijuana. Police made three arrests,
and Heaggan-Brown was afterward counseled on department policies instructing
officers to avoid associations that could affect their integrity.
54.

These warning signs should have prevented Defendant Heaggan-

Brown from being made an MPD officer in the first place.
55.

Defendant Heaggan-Brown’s lack of professional judgment and

responsibility was obvious. The Department, in making Defendant Heaggan-Brown
an officer deliberately ignored the obvious red flags present at the time he was
made an officer.
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 56.

Unsurprisingly, Defendant Heaggan-Brown’s misbehavior—and the

City’s willingness to look the other way and, in effect, condone his actions—
continued.
57.

In 2013, three years to the day before he shot and killed Sylville

Smith, Heaggan-Brown became a Milwaukee Police Officer, beginning with the
department’s standard 16-month probationary period.
58.

Defendant Heaggan-Brown’s behavior during his “probationary”

period reveal that he should have never been made an MPD officer, that he lacked
professional judgment, and that he was likely to violate the constitutional rights of
citizens.
59.

For instance, in 2013, Heaggan-Brown appeared in a YouTube video,

in uniform, entering an apartment with a marijuana bong on the refrigerator.
MPD’s investigation absolved him of any wrongdoing.
60.

In March 2014, while he was still on probation, Defendant Heaggan-

Brown’s police firearm was stolen from his closet. In the course of investigating this
incident, investigators learned that he had been living with a convicted felon in
direct violation of police policy.
61.

Also in 2014, Defendant Heaggan-Brown may have been involved in

an armed robbery. Despite knowing of this allegation, the Department did not
investigate the incident whatsoever. In March 2015, despite these incidents,
Defendant Heaggan-Browns’ probationary period ended, and he became a full
sworn police officer.
62.

In September 2015, police officers found a photo of Defendant
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 Heaggan-Brown, posing with three men and apparently displaying gang signs,
posted on the website of an alleged gang member. The Department did nothing.
Defendant Heaggan-Brown Should Have Not Have Been On the Street As a
Milwaukee Police Officer On August 13, 2016
63.

As the foregoing makes clear, Defendant Heaggan-Brown should not

have been patrolling 44th Street, or any Milwaukee street, on August 13, 2016.
64.

But, in addition to the problems raised above, Defendant Heaggan-

Brown’s history of excessive force provided further reason for the City of Milwaukee
to have intervened to prevent this tragedy.
65.

During his short tenure as a Milwaukee Police Officer, Defendant

Heaggan-Brown was involved in an extraordinary number of “use of force”
incidents. There were at least 16, and eight of them took place between April and
June of 2016.
66.

Defendant Heaggan-Brown was also investigated six times for

behavior demonstrating poor judgment, and repeatedly referred to departmental
ethics rules.
67.

The Department was aware that Defendant Heaggan-Brown was

routinely using unnecessary, often excessive, force.
68.

Defendant Heaggan-Brown’s supervisors, and the supervisors above

them, knew Defendant Heaggan-Brown was routinely using unnecessary, often
excessive force.
69.

Nonetheless, Defendant Heaggan-Brown was not disciplined,

reassigned, or retrained at any point.
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 70.

Instead, the Department ratified Defendant Heaggan-Brown’s

behavior, even placing him on an overtime squad for the express purpose of
“showing force” and presence.
71.

As a result, Defendant Heaggan-Brown learned that, with the

agreement of the Department and pursuant to its practices and customs, he could
make false statements after a use of force incident to make it appear as if an
unconstitutional use of force was actually lawful.
72.

For example, in April of 2016 Defendant Heaggan-Brown and another

MPD officer used excessive force on Ronnie Martin, who was tased in violation of
his constitutional rights. As depicted in the body camera audio, on information and
belief, Defendant Heaggan-Brown can be heard concocting a false story of what he
and the other officer would say justified the use of force.
73.

Defendant Heaggan-Brown, who was not disciplined or reprimanded

in any way as a result of this use of force or in creating a false story to attempt to
justify it, was acting pursuant to the Department’s customs and practices. These
customs and practices allow officers to use force with impunity and then lie about it
later without facing any repercussions.
74.

Indeed, the same thing happened with the killing of Sylville Smith.

Defendant Heaggan-Brown believed he could use force with impunity, and then lie
about it in the aftermath. The day after killing Sylville Smith, Officer HeagganBrown met a man at a Milwaukee bar, where Heaggan-Brown bragged that he
could do whatever he wanted, without repercussions.
75.

In addition, Defendant Heaggan-Brown knew that the shooting was
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 unconstitutional, and that he was not justified in using deadly force against Sylville
Smith. As he had before, and consistent with the City of Milwaukee’s policies,
practices, and procedures, Defendant Heaggan-Brown decided to try to invent and
concoct post-hoc justifications for his actions, even though they were false. In so
doing, and in providing a statement to investigators, Defendant Heaggan-Brown
made false statements designed to minimize his misconduct (e.g., falsely claiming
that he had removed his Taser and not his handgun when he first got out of the
car); and to attempt to justify the shooting.
76.

Had the Department intervened, rather than endorsing Defendant

Heaggan-Brown by placing him on overtime, in response to the prior use of force
incidents, Sylville Smith would still be alive.
77.

And, other victims would not have been harmed either. Defendant

Heaggan-Brown’s ability to do whatever he wanted, with full endorsement of the
MPD, led him to commit numerous other crimes both before and after the shooting
of Sylville Smith.
78.

After the shooting, the Department falsely told the media—and the

residents of Milwaukee—that Heaggan-Brown had been placed in protective
custody and “fled” the City.
79.

In fact, Defendant Heaggan-Brown was out and about; he was in

Milwaukee, bragging about the shooting at a bar. He would go on to commit
additional acts of misconduct and sexual assault that evening.
80.

All the while, the Department stood behind Heaggan-Brown’s decision

to kill Sylville Smith.
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 81.

After Defendant Heaggan-Brown was charged with sexual assault and

other crimes, he was finally discharged from the Milwaukee Police Department.
82.

Owing to its polices, practices, and customs, MPD would not have fired

or disciplined Defendant Heaggan-Brown for shooting and killing Sylville Smith—
actions that they continue to stand behind even now.
Milwaukee’s Unconstitutional Practices and Policies
83.

The Milwaukee Police Department should never have made

Dominique Heaggan-Brown a sworn police officer. Once they had hired him, they
deliberately ignored numerous red flags, and encouraged his misconduct, blowing
past opportunities to supervise, retrain, reassign or discipline him in any way
84.

The City’s failures to train, discipline, and supervise Defendant

Heaggan-Brown lead directly to Sylville Smith’s death, in violation of his
constitutional rights.
85.

In the aftermath of the shooting of Sylville Smith, policymakers for the

City publically endorsed Defendant Heaggan-Brown’s actions.
86.

Milwaukee Police Chief Edward Flynn disclosed Sylville Smith’s

name, followed immediately by a reference to his arrest record, unconscionably
implying that prior arrests could somehow justify being killed unarmed at pointblank range on the street.
87.

Chief Flynn also publically declared—even though the Department’s

investigation had not even begun—that he did not believe that Heaggan-Brown
had departed from department policy or violated the law. Chief Flynn made these

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 statements because he knew that, pursuant to the City’s longstanding policies,
practices, and customs, the result of any investigation was predetermined—the
City would find the shooting justified.
88.

Chief Flynn, as the chief policymaker for the department, expressly

ratified the actions of Defendant Heaggan-Brown. His statements are indicative of
the Department’s policies and practices to defend MPD officers at all costs, thereby
creating an atmosphere and environment where officers can (and do) use excessive
force without any accountability or consequence.
89.

Chief Flynn, despite the egregious conduct described above, also

defended the hiring of Defendant Heaggan-Brown.
90.

The endorsement of the Department’s decision to hire Defendant

Heaggan-Brown, as well as an endorsement of his actions, reflects not only the
City’s practices and policies in supporting their officers who use excessive force at
any cost, but also serves as evidence of the City’s deliberate indifference to the
uses of deadly force by its officers, including Defendant Heaggan-Brown
Milwaukee’s Long-standing Pattern and Practice of Endorsing the
Unconstitutional Use of Excessive and Deadly Force
91.

The City of Milwaukee has repeatedly failed to supervise and

discipline MPD officers who have used deadly force against unarmed individuals.
In fact, the MPD has a history of accepting and encouraging such conduct. Officers
in the City of Milwaukee have killed at least three unarmed citizens since 2011,
but none of them have been disciplined or re-trained. These failures to train and
discipline—in the face of widespread de-facto policies allowing the use of excessive
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 and deadly force—cause, are deliberately indifferent to, and even encourage the
use of unconstitutional deadly force by members of the Department.
92.

The Department’s treatment of Officer Christopher Manney is just

one example of these polices, practices, procedures, and failures to train, supervise,
and discipline. On April 30, 2014, Officer Manney shot and killed Dontre
Hamilton, a mentally ill man who had been sleeping peacefully on a bench in Red
Arrow Park. Officer Manney had not received Crisis Intervention Team (CIT)
training. CIT training would have taught Manney how to engage with mentally ill
individuals, and how to interact with Mr. Hamilton in a way that did not escalate
their confrontation and result in Mr. Hamilton’s death.
93.

Christopher Manney was ultimately fired from the MPD, but not due

to his use of excessive force. The City thus remained deliberately indifferent to the
use of unjustified deadly force by MPD officers against unarmed individuals.
94.

In 2011, Derek Williams died in the back of an MPD squad car after

struggling to breathe for eight minutes, during which time three MPD officers
ignored his pleas for help. Williams was 22 years old. During the arrest, Officer
Richard Ticcioni held Williams down with a knee to the back, at which time
Williams began complaining that he could not breathe. Neither Ticcioni, nor the
other two officers involved, Jeffrey Cline and Jason Bleichwehl, were disciplined or
faced any charges for the incident.
95.

Instead, in 2016, Officer Ticcioni was promoted to the position of

Detective within the MPD, over the objections of community members. In this way,
the MPD demonstrated again its indifference to the unconstitutional use of force.
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 96.

Additionally, the MPD has a history of officers using excessive force

to non-lethal effect with impunity. Curtis Harris provides just one recent example.
97.

In 2003, Curtis Harris was arrested and taken to the police station.

There, Officer Kevin Clark slammed his head into the wall, rendering him a
quadriplegic for life. Officer Clark was never charged, fired, or disciplined for this
incident.
98.

The City’s handling of Officers Clark, Ticcioni, Manney, and

Heaggan-Brown—by failing to discipline or train them, and even promoting one of
them following the killing of an unarmed individual—demonstrates how the police
department has not only tolerated, through a lack of discipline, but has actually
encouraged, through public statements of support and internal promotions,
officers’ uses of excessive force as a matter of Department policy.
Plaintiffs’ Severe Emotional Trauma and Damages
99.

The Defendants’ actions imposed substantial harm upon Sylville

Smith during the period of time after he was shot by Defendant Heaggan-Brown
until he ultimately passed away. The excruciating pain and fear Sylville Smith felt
during those final moments is unquantifiable.
100.

Smith’s son S.R-S., who is now three years old, will grow up without

his father because of the actions of Defendant Heaggan-Brown and the Milwaukee
Police Department. At the age of two, he lost his father, who went from being a
major part of his life to simply being absent. For the rest of his life, he will have to
face the world without the love, care, and support that his father would have

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 provided for him.
101.

Plaintiffs Patrick Smith and Mildred Haynes have suffered an

unfathomable loss—the death of their oldest son. They have both also suffered
severe emotional distress—which is ongoing—as a result of the actions of
Defendant Heaggan-Brown. The aftermath of the shooting imposed, and continues
to impose, severe emotional pain; as the images of the conscience-shocking
shooting; the sight of Sylville Smith following his autopsy; and the other personal
and public pain are the direct result of Defendant Heaggan-Brown’s conduct, and
the policies of the City of Milwaukee. In addition, Plaintiffs Patrick Smith and
Mildred Haynes have been forced to bear financial loss as a result of the loss of
Sylville Smith, including but not limited the costs of an unexpected funeral, and
other expenses related to the death of Sylville Smith,
Count I – Federal Law
Excessive Force
102.

Each of the Paragraphs in this Complaint is incorporated as if

restated fully herein.
103.

As described in the preceding paragraphs, the conduct of the

Defendant Heaggan-Brown toward Sylville Smith constituted excessive force in
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
104.

The misconduct described in this Count was objectively unreasonable

and undertaken with willfulness and reckless indifference to the rights of
others.
105.

The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken pursuant to
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 the policy and practice of the City of Milwaukee, such that Defendant City of
Milwaukee is also liable, in that:
a. As a matter of both policy and practice, the City of Milwaukee
encourages, and is thereby the moving force behind, the very type of
misconduct at issue here by failing to adequately train, supervise,
control and discipline its officers such that its failure to do so manifests
deliberate indifference;
b. As a matter of both policy and practice, the City of Milwaukee facilitates
the very type of misconduct at issue here by failing to adequately
investigate, punish, and discipline prior instances of similar misconduct,
thereby leading Milwaukee police officers to believe their actions will
never be meaningfully scrutinized and, in that way, directly encouraging
future uses of excessive deadly force such as those Plaintiff complains of;
c. Generally, as a matter of widespread practice so prevalent as to comprise
municipal policy, officers of the Milwaukee Police Department abuse
citizens in a manner similar to that alleged by Sylville Smith in this
Count on a regular basis, yet the Milwaukee Police Department
investigates officer misconduct and makes findings of wrongdoing in a
disproportionately small number of cases;
d. The Milwaukee Police Department’s failure to meaningfully investigate
police misconduct and to control its officers is further illustrated by its
handling of Officer Heaggan-Brown’s many prior use-of-force incidents,

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 including his tasering of an unarmed man lying prone on the ground.
Officer Heaggan-Brown was not disciplined for any of these incidents
and remained on full active duty throughout his career until he was
discharged for unrelated reasons;
e. In fact, the Milwaukee Police Department encouraged Heaggan-Brown
to feel he could act with impunity, by repeatedly declining to discipline
him for infractions of many kinds throughout his career;
106.

As a result of the City of Milwaukee’s policy and practice and the

unjustified and unreasonable conduct of the Defendant Heaggan-Brown, Plaintiffs
have suffered injuries, including death and severe emotional distress for Sylville
Smith’s family.
107.

This Count is brought by the Estate of Sylville Smith, by personal

representative Mildred Haynes.
Count II—Federal Law
Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process)
108.

Each paragraph of this Complaint is incorporated as if restated fully

herein.
109.

In the manner described more fully above, Defendant Heaggan-

Brown, under color of law and within the scope of his employment shot and killed
Sylville Smith, depriving him of liberty, in violation of his rights secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
110.

As described more fully above, the Defendant Heaggan-Brown’s

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 second gunshot shocks the conscience and involved truly egregious and
unreasonable actions by him, which caused the death of Sylville Smith.
111.

The misconduct described in this Count was objectively unreasonable

and was undertaken intentionally, with reckless indifference to the rights of others,
and in total disregard of the life of Sylville Smith.
112.

As a result of Defendant Heaggan-Brown’s misconduct described in

this Count, Sylville suffered injuries, including but not limited to physical injury
loss of liberty, emotional distress, and ultimately death.
113.

This Count is brought by the Estate of Sylville Smith, by personal

representative Mildred Haynes.
Count III—State Law
Assault and Battery
114.

Each of the Paragraphs of this Complaint is incorporated as if fully

stated herein.
115.

In the manner described more fully above, Defendant Heaggan-

Brown intentionally and impermissibly harmed, wounded, and ultimately killed
Sylville Smith, actions which amount to assault and battery under Wisconsin law.
116.

The misconduct described in this Count was intentional and

undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of
others.
117.

As a result of these actions, Sylville Smith suffered severe injuries,

including physical pain, emotional distress, and ultimately death.
118.

This Count is brought by the Estate of Sylville Smith, by personal

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 representative Mildred Haynes.
Count IV—State Law
Survival
119.

Each of the Paragraphs of this Complaint is incorporated as if fully

stated herein.
120.

In the manner described more fully above, Defendant Heaggan-

Brown’s fatal gunshots ultimately caused the death of Sylville Smith. In the
interim, between having been shot and when he ultimately passed, Sylville Smith
suffered “other damage” to his person pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(am).
121.

The misconduct described in this Count was intentional and

undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of
others.
122.

As a result of these actions, Sylville Smith suffered severe injuries,

including physical pain, emotional distress, and ultimately death.
123.

This Count is brought by the Estate of Sylville Smith, by personal

representative Mildred Haynes.
Count V—State Law
Wrongful Death
124.

Each of the Paragraphs of this Complaint is incorporated as if fully

stated herein.
125.

In the manner more fully described above, Defendants intentionally

and unjustifiably caused the death of Sylville Smith. Sylville Smith therefore had
(as alleged in Counts I-IV above) a valid claim for damages against the defendants
at the time of his death.
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 126.

As a consequence, Sylville Smith’s son, S.R-S., has lost the financial

support he would have received from his father for the rest of his childhood. S.R-S.,
has also suffered, and will continue to suffer, significant emotional distress and
harm, including but not limited to the loss off society and companionship with
Sylville Smith.
127.

In addition, Plaintiffs Mildred Haynes and Patrick Smith suffered,

and continue to suffer, significant emotional distress and harm, including but not
limited to the loss off society and companionship with Sylville Smith
128.

The misconduct described in this Count was intentional and

undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of
others.
129.

This Count is brought by the Estate of Sylville Smith, by personal

representative Mildred Haynes, Patrick Smith, the father of Sylville Smith, and
Mildred Haynes, on her own behalf.
Count VI—State Law
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
130.

Each of the Paragraphs of this Complaint is incorporated as if fully

stated herein.
131.

In the manner described more fully above, by causing the death of

Sylville Smith, the Defendants intended to cause both physical and emotional
distress.
132.

In so doing, Defendant Heaggan-Brown’s conduct was extreme and

outrageous and caused Sylville Smith severe, disabling physical distress, emotional
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 distress, and ultimately death.
133.

Defendant Heaggan-Brown’s conduct also imposed harm on Plaintiffs

Mildred Haynes and Patrick Smith, who suffered, and continue to suffer, severe
emotional harm on account of Defendant Heaggan-Brown’s conduct, and having
witnessed the video footage of that conduct, in addition to observing the aftermath
of the shooting.
134.

The misconduct described in this Count was intentional and

undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of
others.
135.

This Count is brought by the Estate of Sylville Smith, by personal

representative Mildred Haynes, Patrick Smith, the father of Sylville Smith, and
Mildred Haynes, on her own behalf.
Count VII—State Law
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
136.

Each of the Paragraphs of this Complaint is incorporated as if fully

stated herein.
137.

In the manner described more fully above, by causing the death of

Sylville Smith, Defendant Heaggan-Brown negligently caused both physical and
emotional distress.
138.

In so doing, Defendant Heaggan-Brown’s conduct was extreme and

outrageous and caused Sylville Smith severe, disabling physical distress, emotional
distress, and ultimately death.
139.

Defendant Heaggan-Brown’s conduct also imposed harm on Plaintiffs
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 Mildred Haynes and Patrick Smith, who suffered, and continue to suffer, severe
emotional harm on account of Defendant Heaggan-Brown’s conduct, having
witnessed the video footage of that conduct, in addition to observing the aftermath
of the shooting.
140.

The misconduct described in this Count was negligent, willful, and

undertaken with reckless indifference to the rights of others.
141.

This Count is brought by the Estate of Sylville Smith, by personal

representative Mildred Haynes, Patrick Smith, the father of Sylville Smith, and
Mildred Haynes, on her own behalf.
Count VIII – State Law Indemnification
142.

Each of the Paragraphs of this Complaint is incorporated as if fully

stated herein.
143.

During all times relevant to this complaint, Defendant Officer

Heaggan-Brown was an employee of the Milwaukee Police Department, who acted
within the scope of his employment in committing the acts described herein.
144.

Wisconsin law, Wisc. Stat. §895.46, requires public entities to pay any

tort judgment for damages for which employees are liable within the scope of their
employment activities.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter
judgment in their favor and against Defendants, DOMINIQUE HEAGGANBROWN and the CITY OF MILWAUKEE, awarding compensatory damages and
attorneys’ fees, as well as punitive damages against DOMINIQUE HEAGGAN24 
 

Case 2:17-cv-00862-LA Filed 06/21/17 Page 24 of 25 Document 1

 BROWN, and, in entering liability against the CITY, Plaintiff seeks equitable,
injunctive relief, as well as any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate.

JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 38(b) on all issues so triable.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
s/ Anand Swaminathan
One of Plaintiffs’ Attorneys
Anand Swaminathan
anand@loevy.com
David B. Owens (Motion for Admission Forthcoming)
david@loevy.com

LOEVY & LOEVY
312 North May, Suite 100
Chicago, IL 60607
(312) 243-5900

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Case 2:17-cv-00862-LA Filed 06/21/17 Page 25 of 25 Document 1